Danny R. Jones, Complainant,v.Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, (Natural Resources Conservation Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 9, 2010
0120080673 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 9, 2010)

0120080673

06-09-2010

Danny R. Jones, Complainant, v. Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, (Natural Resources Conservation Service), Agency.


Danny R. Jones,

Complainant,

v.

Tom J. Vilsack,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

(Natural Resources Conservation Service),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080673

Hearing No. 490200600163X

Agency No. NRCS200600103

DECISION

On November 20, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

October 15, 2007 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Administrative Judge erred in finding that complainant

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on reprisal; and

whether the Administrative Judge should have ensured that complainant

was provided copies of the agency's internal investigations conducted

in September 2005 and April 2006.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant

worked as a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) specialist at the

agency's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) facility in

Murfreesboro, Tennessee. His first level supervisor was A-1, Supervisory

GIS Specialist. A-2 was his second level supervisor, the State Resource

Conservationist. The record indicates that, on September 12, 2005,

complainant's co-worker (C-1) entered his office during work hours to

discuss work matters. C-1 alleged that she found complainant sitting

at his desk with his pants unzipped and his left hand covering his

penis. C-1 immediately left complainant's office and reported what she

had observed to the first co-worker she could find. Subsequently, she

spoke to A-1 who informed A-2 and C-2, who supervised C-1. A-1, A-2,

and C2 contacted the agency's Administrative Officer (AO) for Tennessee

to determine how to proceed.

That same day, September 12, 2005, A-2 obtained statements from

complainant, C-1, A-1 and C-2. Complainant was placed on administrative

leave for the remainder of the day. He remained on administrative

leave the next two days. During this period, management had his hard

drive removed from his computer in order to determine if he had stored

or accessed inappropriate material. Complainant was issued a different

computer prior to his return on Thursday, September 15, 2005. Files from

his old computer, that he requested, were forwarded to complainant on

September 23, 2005. Complainant had been scheduled to attend Spatial

Analyst training offered by the agency's National Employee Development

Center from September 19 through September 22, 2005. Given the situation,

however, complainant chose not to attend the training and his supervisor

agreed..

The agency's initial investigation could not determine whether complainant

had in fact engaged in the alleged conduct and he was notified of this

fact.1 Consequently, both the complainant and C-1 remained employed

with the agency and continued working in the same office.

On October 27, 2005, complainant contacted an EEO counselor,2 and,

on February 2, 2006, he filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was

discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American) and reprisal

for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when:

1. On or about September 2005, the agency disclosed negative information

and false documents regarding him;

2. On or about December 2005, the agency denied his request to work from

home as a reasonable accommodation;

3. On or about September 2005 and continuing, his work production and

performance have been impeded due to a fragmented workstation;3

4. On or about September 2005 and continuing, the agency damaged his

reputation by accusing him of sexual misconduct, investigating him and

denying him access to the investigative report; and

5. From September 19-22, 2005, he missed training due to the work

environment.

On or about March 16, 2006, C-1 filed an EEO complaint alleging sexual

harassment and a hostile work environment based on complainant's actions.

Management ordered an independent, third-party misconduct investigation.

After C-1 filed her complaint, complainant, based on the direction of

the agency's Civil Rights Division that complainant and C-1 should not

work in the same office, was involuntarily reassigned to the agency's

Nashville office.

Afterward, the following claim was added to complainant's complaint.

6. On or about March 16, 2006, the agency retaliated against him by

encouraging C-1 to accuse him of sexual harassment a second time, which

resulted in a second investigation and his involuntary reassignment to

the agency's Nashville office.

With respect to claim (1), the agency maintained that management

acted in compliance with the agency's NRCS Sexual Harassment Policy in

investigating the alleged misconduct. Therefore the investigation was

justified as required under agency guidelines. Moreover, to the extent

that complainant contends that information was disclosed, management

testified that "one of the first things [they] discussed was the need

to keep it [complainant's alleged misconduct] confidential." Management

testified that "they kept the events of September 12, 2005, and the

investigation that followed and the results thereof in strictest

confidence."

With respect to claim (2), management testified that complainant did not

make a "reasonable accommodation" request on the basis of any mental

or physical disability. Instead, complainant informed management that

he wanted to work from home because he "sought to safeguard [himself]

from further harm."4

With respect to claim (3), management maintained that, pursuant to its

investigation into complainant's alleged misconduct, agency officials

were obligated to inspect his work station and equipment. Moreover, to the

extent that his work station was "fragmented," management maintained that

agency officials acted expeditiously to restore his computer, including

its original settings and files, to his work station. Further, management

testified that complainant was informed that the removal of his computer

would not adversely affect his performance evaluation rating. According

to management, complainant's post September 12, 2005 performance rating

was consistent with the ratings he had received in previous years.

With respect to claim (4), management testified, as was discussed

with respect to claim (1), that it was obligated by policy to conduct

an investigation into C-1's allegations and that it only disclosed

information to those who needed to know about the matter. To the

extent that complainant also alleges that he was denied a copy of the

September 2005 misconduct investigative report, management testified that

its actions were consistent with the recommendations of the agency's

national Employee Relations (ER) Branch. Management testified that

per the advice of the ER Branch, complainant was not entitled to a

copy of the investigative report because "it contained sensitive sworn

statements by other individuals and complainant was not entitled to

see these because no disciplinary action had been taken against him."

Accordingly, the agency maintained that management's actions were fully

consistent with agency policy which was applicable to all employees.

With respect to claim (5), management testified that it was complainant's

decision to not attend the September 19-22, 2005 training session. The

record indicates that complainant requested not to attend the training

because of "[his] stress level, humiliation, and [his] emotional

state." Moreover, management testified that the training at issue did

not directly relate to or impact complainant's work duties. Finally,

the record indicates that management provided complainant with the

opportunity to register for the training at a later date.

With respect to claim (6), management again cited its responsibility

to investigate sexual harassment allegations immediately. The AO

indicated that, once C-1 filed a formal complainant, the agency's Civil

Rights Division directed the completion of the second investigation and

complainant's reassignment to the agency's Nashville office. According to

the agency, the reassignment was initially temporary and was intended to

separate the accuser and the accused pending the outcome of its sexual

harassment investigation; however, the investigation recommended that

complainant and C-1 not work together.

At the conclusion of the EEO investigation of complainant's complaint,

complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and

notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing, and, on May 11, 2007,

the AJ, in granting partial summary judgment, dismissed the basis of race

on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that

complainant could not make a prima facie showing of race discrimination

under either a disparate treatment or hostile work environment analysis.5

On May 18, 2007, the AJ held a full evidentiary hearing with respect

to complainant's retaliation claim and issued a decision on September

6, 2007. The agency subsequently issued a final order on October 15,

2007 adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that he

was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

AJ's DECISION

In her decision, the AJ found that complainant had established a

prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. The AJ further found

that the agency had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions. Specifically, the AJ found that given the nature of the

allegations, management had an obligation to investigate complainant's

alleged misconduct. Finally, the AJ found that complainant failed to show

that the agency's reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the AJ found that

complainant had been discriminated against in reprisal for prior protected

EEO activity. The agency adopted the AJ's findings and determinations.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant maintained, in pertinent part, that the AJ withheld

copies of the September 2005 and April 2006 internal investigative

reports from him; and he was adversely affected when, at various times,

three different AJs were assigned to preside over his case.

The agency argues on appeal that complainant's objections to the AJ's

decision are without merit. Specifically, the agency avers that the

agency did not use the "results from the misconduct investigations to

support any adverse action against complainant whatsoever." Accordingly,

the agency contends that the report had no bearing and the AJ's ultimate

decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, we note that complainant does not, on appeal, specifically

challenge the AJ's decision regarding claim (2). Equal Employment

Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (MD-110), Ch. 9,

Sec. IV(A) at p. 9-10 (November 9, 1999) provides that the Commission

has the discretion to only review those issues specifically raised

on appeal. Accordingly, we will not address claim (2) in the decision

herein.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's

credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the

tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other

objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to

an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal

claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case

of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus

exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25,

2000).

Claims (1), (3), (4) and (5)

We find that the AJ erred as a matter of law, when she found that

complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based

on reprisal. The matters at issue in claims (1), (3), (4) and (5)

occurred in September 2005. Complainant, however, did not contact an

EEO counselor until October 27, 2005.6 Therefore, as a matter of law,

we can not find that there was a nexus between his EEO activity and the

agency's actions being challenged in these four claims because the EEO

activity occurred after the agency's actions, not before. Accordingly,

we affirm the finding of no discrimination regarding these claims.7

Claim (6)

On appeal, complainant maintains that the AJ erred by withholding the

September 2005 and April 2006 internal investigation reports from him

while the agency had access to them before the hearing in his case.

We agree. At the beginning of the hearing, complainant's attorney was

told by the AJ that she would give him the opportunity to look at the

September 2005 and April 2006 investigation reports. Hearing Transcripts

(HT) at 11. The AJ indicated that she did not believe letting complainant

and his attorney review "it" would "destroy any confidentiality or

Privacy Act issues." Id. at 11 and 12.8 At the conclusion of the

hearing, complainant's attorney again requested "the opportunity to look

at the investigative file that deals with the March 2006 allegations."

HT at 192. At which time, the AJ stated that "I will produce it for you

within the next five days as soon as I get back to the office." Id.

According to complainant, who is no longer represented on appeal, he

did not receive copies of the reports. A review of claim (6) indicates

that complainant alleged that management, on or about March 16, 2006,

retaliated against him by encouraging C-1 to accuse him of sexual

harassment, a second time, which resulted in a second investigation and

his involuntary reassignment to the agency's Nashville office. Thus,

we find it reasonable that complainant would want to review these reports

to search for any inconsistencies between the earlier statements of C-1

and management and the testimony at the hearing.

In its appeal brief, the agency maintains that complainant offered no

evidence that: (1) he was harmed by not having the reports, because

the agency did not use the results from the misconduct investigation to

support any adverse action against him whatsoever; (2) he contacted his

attorney to see if the AJ provided him with a copy of the report; and

(3) he had tried to obtain a copy from the AJ. With respect to the

agency's first contention, we note the testimony of the AO that one of

the recommendations of the April 2006 internal investigation was that

complainant and C-1 not work in the same office because there was some

sexual misconduct. HT at 181. Although complainant's reassignment was

initially deemed temporary, the AO outlined several reasons for not

bringing him back to the Murfreesboro office, among them, the findings

of the investigation. Id at 183. Therefore, we find that the agency's

contention that complainant did not suffer an adverse action as a result

of the April misconduct investigation is without support in the record.

Regarding the agency's (2) and (3) contentions, we would agree that

complainant did not indicate whether he contacted his former attorney

or the AJ to obtain copies of the investigations. However, the agency

could have also contacted these individuals in order to determine whether

the attorney was provided copies or that the AJ, as she promised, mailed

copies of the report to the attorney. In the absence of evidence that the

AJ provided complainant with copies of the two misconduct investigation

reports, we will vacate the finding of no discrimination pertaining

to claim (6) and we will remand this matter back to the agency for a

supplemental investigation as set forth below.

With respect to complainant's second contention on appeal, we find no

persuasive evidence that his ability to proceed with his EEO complaint was

prejudiced by the fact that, at various stages in the process, three (3)

different AJs presided over his case. Complainant notes his disagreement

with the procedural rulings of the AJs, but there is no indication that

the AJs' abused their discretion with respect to these rulings nor is

there any evidence that the ruling would have been different had there

only been one AJ.9

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the finding of no

discrimination with respect to claims (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).

Regarding claim (6), we VACATE the finding of no discrimination. Claim

(6) is REMANDED to the agency to conduct a supplemental investigation

pursuant to the ORDER below.

ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD (B1208)

The agency is ordered to conduct a supplemental investigation, which

shall include the following actions:

The agency, within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, shall ensure that copies of its

September 2005 and April 2006 internal investigative reports

concerning C-1's allegations of misconduct by complainant are

added to the record. Upon completion, the agency, within thirty

(30) calendar days, must provide the complainant with a copy of

its the supplemental record and issue a new final decision in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it

also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar

days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after

one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____06/09/10_____________

Date

1 According to the EEO counselor's report, complainant placed this date

as being on October 13, 2005.

2 Prior to this, the record indicates that complainant had engaged in

EEO activity in May 2002 and March 2003.

3 Complainant alleged that when he returned to work, on September 15,

he found that papers on his desk and office furniture had been moved,

and that computer files, bookmarks and printer cables were missing.

Complainant felt that he lost important information because his computer

files had not been backed-up.

4Complainant's testimony indicates that his only medically documented

request for an accommodation was made in March 2003.

5 Complainant did not appeal this decision by the AJ.

6 The AJ mistakenly stated, on page 4 of her decision, that complainant

sought counseling on or about September 12, 2005.

7 We also find that complainant failed to show that a nexus exists between

his 2002 and 2003 EEO activity and the matters at issue. This is too

remote in time to establish a nexus between his prior EEO activity

and claims (1), (3), (4) and (5). See Clark County School District

v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in

order to establish causality in reprisal cases, the time period between

the employer's initial knowledge of the prior protected activity and the

adverse employment action must be "very close;" a three month time period

not proximate enough to establish a causal nexus); see also Battaglia

v. FDIC, EEOC Appeal No. 01985358 (July 30, 2001)(holding that a two

year period between the EEO activity and adverse action was sufficient

to establish a causal connection).

8 Although the AJ used the term "it," we assume that she was referring

to both reports because she had earlier indicated that she had read both

of them and found that they "pretty much state the same thing." Id.

9 We note that EEOC Administrative Judges have broad discretion in

the conduct of hearings. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e); Equal Employment

Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110)

at 7-8 to 7-14 (revised November 9, 1999); Bennett v. Department of the

Navy, EEOC Request No. 05980746 (September 19, 2000).

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0120080673

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120080673