Daniel T. Lynch, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 21, 2000
01a00155 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 21, 2000)

01a00155

03-21-2000

Daniel T. Lynch, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.


Daniel T. Lynch, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01A00155

) Agency No. 4G-720-0110-99

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W. Region), )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

On October 2, 1999, complainant filed a timely appeal with this

Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the agency dated September

3, 1999, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of three

January 28, 1993 settlement agreements into which complainant contends

the parties entered.<1> See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659, 37,660 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �

1614.402); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

The copies of the three settlement agreements at issue, as submitted by

both complainant and the agency on appeal, are signed by management but

not by complainant. The agreements provided, in pertinent part, that:

(1) complainant will be afforded the right to representation when EEO

matters are discussed with him by management;

(2) management will treat complainant with the same dignity and respect

afforded other employees, and complainant will be advised and encouraged

to seek career growth through the Postal Employee Development Center;

and

(3) management states that complainant did not receive an official

discussion on November 6, 1992, there will be no record of the alleged

official discussion, and it will not be used against complainant in any

manner.

Complainant contends that although it was not memorialized in these

written settlement agreements, the former Acting Station Manager (M1),

now deceased, verbally agreed that complainant would never have to

work under the supervision of a particular manager (M2). The alleged

breach at issue arose on April 30, 1999, when M2 was assigned as the

Acting Station Manager at the agency's Sherwood, Arizona facility,

where complainant is stationed.

By letter to the agency dated May 17, 1999, complainant alleged that

the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that

the agency specifically implement its terms. Specifically, complainant

contended that the agency failed to honor his alleged verbal agreement

with M1 that complainant would never be assigned to work under the

supervision of M2.

In its September 3, 1999 FAD, the agency concluded: (1) management

had not breached the terms of the 1993 written settlement agreements,

(2) M2 denied that he had agreed he would not accept an assignment at

a location where complainant worked, and there was no evidence that a

verbal agreement to this effect had been made between M1 and complainant;

and (3) even assuming a verbal agreement had been made between M1 and

complainant, it could not be expected to extend beyond M1's tenure.

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999)(to be codified and

hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a)), any

settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties,

reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both

parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes

a contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, we concur with the agency's finding that complainant

has failed to establish a breach of an enforceable settlement agreement.

The written agreements at issue contain no provision prohibiting

assignment of complainant and M2 to the same location, and any purported

verbal agreement to this effect between complainant and M1 is not

enforceable under the foregoing standard. With respect to the alleged

verbal agreement between complainant and M1, we find that even if made,

it is unenforceable. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides

in relevant part that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily

agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process,

shall be binding on both parties. However, an offer and acceptance

do not constitute an enforceable settlement agreement unless the

agreement reached is in writing and signed by both parties. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.603. Accordingly, the agency properly concluded that no

settlement breach occurred, and the FAD is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

3/21/00

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

___________________________

Equal Employment Assistant Date1On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.