Daniel G. Lopez, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 21, 2011
0120100085 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 21, 2011)

0120100085

06-21-2011

Daniel G. Lopez, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.




Daniel G. Lopez,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southwest Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120100085

Hearing No. 451-2009-00120X

Agency No. 4G-780-0323-08

DECISION

On September 30, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s

August 26, 2009, final decision concerning his equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission deems the appeal

timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as

a Letter Carrier at the Agency’s Post Office facility in Brownsville,

Texas. Complainant also served as Branch President and Steward of the

local employees’ union.

On November 14, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of national origin

(Hispanic) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:

1. on August 15, 2008, his driving privileges were suspended for 45 days;

2. on or about July 5, 2008, his request for leave under the Family

Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was denied;

3. on unspecified dates, the Postmaster has failed to schedule formal

Step meetings in the grievance process with Complainant;

4. in Complainant’s prior EEO complaint, Complainant twice requested

a hold-down assignment; however he was bumped off by a junior white

employee.

The Agency dismissed claims (3) and (4), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §

1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim and stating the same claim

raised in a prior complaint, respectively. Subsequently, Complainant

amended his complaint to include the following claims:

5. on December 4, 2008, Complainant received a 14-day suspension;

6. on December 2, 2008, approval for his FMLA-covered condition was

deactivated;

7. on December 26, 2008, Complainant was issued a Notice of Proposed

Removal;

8. on unspecified date, the Postmaster made a derogatory remark to

another employee;

9. on unspecified date(s), Complainant's hold-down assignment was denied;

10. on unspecified date, Complainant's claim with the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs (OWCP) was denied.

The Agency accepted claims (5) and (6) for investigation. The Agency

dismissed claims (7), (8), and (10) for failure to state a claim pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1). The Agency also dismissed claim (9)

pursuant to C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) for raising a claim which was

resolved by settlement agreement dated June 4, 2008.

The Agency investigated claims (1), (2), (5) and (6). At the conclusion

of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of

the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested

a hearing but subsequently withdrew his request. Consequently, the

Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).

The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency

subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

Complainant appealed. On appeal, Complainant alleged that the Agency’s

investigation was not adequate. Further, Complainant, through counsel,

asserted that the Agency fragmented his complaint by dismissing claims

(3) and (4). In addition, Complainant’s counsel indicated that in

dismissing these claims, the Agency fragmented Complainant’s claim of

harassment. Finally, Complainant’s attorney argued that the Agency

has a history of abuse of the EEO process and discrimination against

Hispanics. Therefore, Complainant requested that the Commission find

in his favor. The Agency asked that the Commission affirm its final

decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de

novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal

Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614,

at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo

standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record

without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous

decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Dismissal of Claims (3) and (4)

The Agency procedurally dismissed claims (3), (4), (7) – (10). However,

on appeal, Complainant only challenged the Agency’s dismissal of claims

(3) and (4). Therefore, we will not address the dismissal of claims

(7) – (10) in this decision.

As to claim (3), Complainant alleged the Agency discriminated against

him during the grievance process. The Commission has held that an

employee cannot use the EEO complaint process to lodge a collateral

attack on another proceeding. See Wills v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Request

No. 05970596 (July 30, 1998); Kleinman v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05940585 (Sept. 22, 1994); Lingad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05930106 (June 25, 1993). The proper forum for Complainant to have

raised his challenges to actions which occurred during the grievance

proceeding was at that proceeding itself. It is inappropriate to now

attempt to use the EEO process to collaterally attack actions which

occurred during the arbitration process. Therefore, we find that the

Agency properly dismissed claim (3).

As to claim (4), Complainant specifically stated in his formal complaint

that in his last EEO complaint, he alleged discrimination when he was

bumped from his assignment. The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. §

1614.107(a)(1) provides that the agency shall dismiss a complaint that

states the same claim that is pending before or has been decided by the

agency or Commission. Here, Complainant, in his formal complaint,

admitted that the matter was raised in his prior EEO complaint.

Therefore, we find that the dismissal of claim (4) was appropriate.

Complainant also asserted on appeal that the Agency fragmented

the complaint by failing to include claims (3) and (4) as part of

Complainant’s claim of harassment. As noted above, we find that the

Agency dismissal of these claims was appropriate.

Claims (1), (2), (5) and (6)

A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined

under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the

adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts

to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie

case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at

issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions

were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep’t. of Transp.,

EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep’t. of Health

and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington

v. Dep’t. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review of the record, we find that the Agency has provided

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. We note that the

Postmaster averred that Complainant’s driving privileges were suspended

(claim 1) based on the Agency’s policy following Complainant’s

at-fault accident. Complainant concedes that he hit a mailbox while

delivering mail, but characterizes the accident as “minor.” Further,

the Letter Carrier Supervisor averred that Complainant was issued the

December 2008 14-day suspension (claim 5) for unacceptable performance

and failure to follow instructions and being Absent Without Official Leave

(AWOL).

With regard to his FMLA-related claim (claim 6), in December 2008,

Complainant was notified by management that his FMLA certification

was “deactivated” because of the need to submit further medical

documentation in support of his claim due to a potential change in the

duration of his condition. Once Complainant submitted an application

for re-certification, his coverage was re-certified on January 2, 2009.

Complainant’s original application for FMLA coverage was submitted in

January 2008, and indicated that his condition would last for one year.

Therefore, Agency management stated that he was asked to submit a new

application for re-certification because the year had expired.

Finally, with regard to the denial of FMLA leave on July 5, 2008 (claim

2), Complainant’s supervisor averred that when Complainant was absent

on July 5, 2008, the day after a holiday, and requested FMLA-related

annual leave, the supervisor requested medical documentation establishing

that his absence was related to his FMLA-approved medical condition.

The supervisor stated that Complainant did not supply the requested

documentation. Therefore, the supervisor disapproved the annual leave

request and changed the time to Leave Without Pay (LWOP).

Upon review of the record, we find that Complainant has not shown that

the Agency’s reasons were pretext for discrimination.1 We note that on

appeal, Complainant asserted without evidence of the Agency’s history

of discrimination against Hispanic employees. The Commission notes that

even if Complainant had testimony supporting his version of the facts,

he still failed to provide any evidence to show that the Agency’s

reasons for its actions were pretext for prohibited discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 21, 2011

__________________

Date

1 As to Complainant's argument of an inadequate investigation, we

find that Complainant merely identified a list of individuals who he

claimed were not properly questioned by the investigator, with no more

than a bare assertion to support this contention. As such, we cannot

conclude that the investigator's failure to undertake evidentiary

development to ascertain if there is any substance to Complainant's

bare assertion renders the investigation inadequate. In this regard,

we advise Complainant that it is he who bears the burden of proof in

this matter. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

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0120100085

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120100085