Dandridge Textile, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1986

279 N.L.R.B. 89 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

DANDRIDGE TEXTILE
Dandridge Textile, Inc., Ronald W. Woods , Individ-
ually and as Officer and Managing Agent and
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-20936
31 March 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
13Y MEMBERS DENNIS, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 3 September 1985 Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge 's rulings , findings, I and
conclusions. 2
' The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board 's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
We shall issue an Order and corresponding notice in lieu of the
judge's recommended Order and notice to correct certain inadvertent
errors, and to include a provision stating that the Respondent shall not be
required to rescind , abandon , or vary any economic benefits granted the
employees
In sec 11,A, par I of his decision, the judge found that Judy Baker, at
the 12 February 1985 employee meeting, commented that employees
were having a difficult time paying bills with the wages they were re-
ceiving The record shows Lorene Woods made the statement to which
the judge referred and that Baker commented that she could not see how
heads of households were "making it" on $3 35 an hour
Contrary to the judge's implication in sec II,B, par 2 of his decision,
there is no record evidence that Mary Strange distributed authorization
cards
In sec II,D, par I of his decision, the judge found that the Respond-
ent employed Mary Strange in January 1984 The record shows the Re-
spondent first employed Strange in 1978, she left in 1982, and returned in
1983 She began working as Lorene Woods' partner in October 1984
In sec 11,G, par 16, the judge found that Respondent Woods did not
discuss his planned wage increase with Linda Manis, his office manager,
before he announced it on 22 March 1985 The record shows that Manis
discussed the wage increase with Woods before the 22 March 1985 an-
nouncement during a "general discussion in the office "
2 We note that no exceptions have been filed to the judge's finding, at
sec II ,G, par 11, that Supervisor Ralph Morse's questioning of Mary
Strange on 25 March 1985 did not violate Sec 8 (a)(I) Member Babson
additionally notes that no exceptions have been filed to the judge's dis-
missal , at sec II,G, par 9, of the 8(a)(1) allegation involving Respondent
Woods' alleged threat of discharge to Strange in the 19 February 1985
meeting
In agreeing with the judge 's conclusion , at sec II,G, par 22 , that the
Respondent discharged Lorene Woods and Mary Strange in response to
their union activities , we do not rely on his finding that Respondent's
owner Woods told Supervisor Glenda Cates on 22 March that he was
thinking of firing the two employees . The record establishes that Re-
spondent Woods made these comments to Cates in February, after the
second or third employee meeting Linda Manis credibly testified, how-
ever, that Respondent Woods told her 23 March 1985 that it was time to
take final action against Woods and Strange Because of this and other
89
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that
the Respondent, Dandridge Textile, Inc., Ronald
W. Woods, individually and as officer and manag-
ing agent , its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating any employee about
union support or union activities.
(b) Engaging in surveillance of employees' union
meetings.
(c) Soliciting employee grievances by announc-
ing individual employee interviews and by holding
such interviews during a union organizational cam-
paign.
(d) Announcing and granting an unscheduled
wage increase to employees during a union organi-
zational campaign ; provided, however, that nothing
herein shall be construed as requiring it to rescind,
abandon, or vary any economic benefits granted
the employees.
(e) Discharging or otherwise discriminating
against any employees for supporting International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL--CIO, or
any other union.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Lorene C. Woods and Mary A. Strange
immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantial-
ly equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previous-
ly enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of
the discrimination against them, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the
unlawful discharges of Lorene C. Woods and Mary
A. Strange and notify the employees in writing
that this has been done and that the discharges will
not be used against them in any way.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to
the Board or its agents for examination and copy-
ing, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
evidence the judge cited, we find that the discharges violated Sec 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act
We correct two case citations in the judge's decision High view, 235
NLRB 672, 676 (1978), in sec II,G, par 8, and NLRB Y Exchange Parts
Co, 375 U S. 405, 409-410 (1964), in sec 11,G, par 12
279 NLRB No. 15
90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
amount of backpay due Lorene C. Woods and
Mary A. Strange under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its facility at Dandridge, Tennessee,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 10, after being signed
by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
® If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
Union or any other union, but we are not required
to change existing wage levels.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any of you for supporting International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL offer Lorene C. Woods and Mary A.
Strange immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to
their seniority or any other rights or privileges pre-
viously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from their discharge, less any net interim earnings,
plus interest.
WE WILL notify Lorene C. Woods and Mary A.
Strange that we have removed from our files any
reference to their discharges and that the dis-
charges will not be used against them in any way.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or pro-
tection
To choose not to engage in any of these
protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively question you about
your union support or activities.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of your
union meetings.
WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances by an-
nouncing individual employee interviews or by
holding such interviews during an organizational
campaign by the International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union or any other union.
WE WILL NOT announce or grant an unscheduled
wage increase during an organizational campaign
by the International Ladies' Garment Workers
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE, INC.
Ann Leslie Unger, Esq., for the General Counsel.
William H. Goddard, Esq. (Strand & Goddard), of Dan-
dridge, Tennessee, for the Respondent.
James R. Goldberg, Esq., of Atlanta, Georgia, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S . BRANDON , Administrative Law Judge.
This case was tried at Dandridge, Tennessee , on 23-24
July 1985 . 1 The charge was filed by International
Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO (Union), on
7 May. The complaint issued on 20 June alleging that
Dandridge Textile, Inc. (Respondent Dandridge or the
Company), Ronald W . Woods, individually and as offi-
cer and managing agent (Woods or Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act in discharging employees Lorene C . Woods (em-
ployee Woods) and Mary A. Strange on 26 March. The
complaint , as amended at the hearing , further alleges that
Respondent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act not only in the discharges of employees Woods and
Strange but also in acts of unlawful interrogation of em-
ployees concerning union activities, solicitation of griev-
ances to interfere with union activities, promising and
granting wage increases for the same purpose , engaging
in unlawful surveillance of union activities , threatening
employees with discharge for engaging in concerted ac-
tivities , and threatening to withhold an announced wage
increase as a result of employees ' union activities. Re-
i All dates are in 1985 unless otherwise stated
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE 91
spondent filed an answer denying the unfair labor prac-
tices alleged.
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Charging
Party, and Respondent, I conclude that the General
Counsel, with certain exceptions involving the independ-
ent 8(a)(1) allegations noted hereafter, has established the
allegations of the complaint, and I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Company is a Tennessee corporation with an
office and place of business located at Dandridge, Ten-
nessee , where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale
of hosiery. During the calendar year preceding issuance
of the complaint, the Company sold and shipped from its
Dandridge, Tennessee facility finished products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside
the State of Tennessee. It was stipulated at the hearing
that Ronald W. Woods is the sole stockholder of the
Company. The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer
admits, and I find that the Company is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act. The complaint further alleges, Re-
spondent stipulated at the hearing, and I further find that
the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Alleged Protected Concerted Activities of
Employees in Meetings with Woods in February
As of February, Respondent's employees had not re-
ceived a wage increase since January 1982. As a result,
and because the employees perceived their wage rates to
be excessively low, there was considerable discontent
among Respondent's 30 to 35 employees and particularly
those in the boarding and pairing department. It is undis-
puted that after discussions with other employees con-
cerning low wages, employee Woods,2 a 12-year em-
ployee of Respondent working in the boarding and pair-
ing department, asked Supervisor Glenda Cates, about 11
or 12 February to arrange a meeting between Woods and
employees to discuss wages. Cates did so, and Woods
met with the seven or eight boarding and pairing depart-
ment employees, as requested in the department during
the lunch period about 12 February. Employee Woods
testified that she told Woods at this meeting that they
wanted to discuss more money. Woods replied, in es-
sence , that because of various specified problems includ-
ing the fact the Company was losing money, the Compa-
ny could not give employees a raise at that time. Judy
Baker , employee Woods' sister and also an employee in
the department, commented that employees were having
a difficult time paying bills on the wages they were re-
ceiving Employee Woods further testified that Woods
announced that he was contemplating purchasing Toner
Hosiery, a Boston, Massachusetts concern, and that
would result in more production work for the Compa-
ny's employees which would in turn enable employees to
make more money on piece work.3 Woods added that
when that happened he did not want to hear any more
"bitching."
The testimony of employee Woods regarding the fore-
going, the first of three employee meetings with Re-
spondent Woods in February, was generally corroborat-
ed by Strange and Baker. Strange added in her testimo-
ny, however, that Woods had stated at the conclusion of
the meeting that he would keep the employees posted
about the Toner situation and would get back with them
in about 3 weeks.
The testimony of Woods differs from that of employee
Woods, Strange, and Baker in one respect claimed to be
significant by Respondent. Woods testified that, after ex-
plaining he was losing money, he indicated that the em-
ployees would be making more money by virtue of
having "more dozens" (of socks) to run on production
rates. Employee Woods had responded, "Bull, you must
be crazy if you think we believe that." Employees
Woods, Strange, and Baker denied that such a remark
was made. On the other hand, employee Woods attrib-
uted such a remark to Woods himself testifying that after
referring to the Company's hardships, he had added, "I
know y'all think this is a bunch of bull and won't believe
it, but it is the truth."
As a witness, I found Woods unpersuasive. He was de-
fensive, indirect, and occasionally argumentative. He
found it necessary in his testimony to refer to notes he
claimed he made immediately after not only the meeting
of 12 February but subsequent meetings with employees.
These notes were received in evidence and their self-
serving nature is reflected in their content of Woods'
subjective reactions to occurrences at the meetings.
Moreover, the notes are suspect as reconstructions rather
than contemporaneous recordings. They contain a
number of strike-throughs revealing changes in phraseol-
ogy which suggest the notes were more a contrivance
than a factual report. Further, the notes regarding the 12
February meeting are marked as "first meeting" indicat-
ing that either that marking was added later or the
whole note was a later reconstruction for it could not
have been known at the time of writing that the meeting
would be the first one. Further, the notes on the subse-
quent meeting of 21 February, discussed below, are
marked as "February 21st," and "22nd." If the note of
that meeting was made immediately after the meeting as
Woods claimed, there would have been no confusion
about the date of the meeting. In the notes of the 19 Feb-
ruary meeting, also discussed below, Woods noted uncer-
tainty about whether it was employee Delores Mason
who had asked a question about unemployment compen-
sation at the meeting. It appears reasonable to conclude
that if the notes had been made immediately after the
meeting, he would have had no uncertainty. Strangely,
3 Normally employees in the boarding and pairing department worked
on piece work or production rates However, during periods of slack
2 The record reflects no familial relationship between employee Woods production, they were assigned to "pre-boarding" jobs at a flat hourly
and Company Owner Woods rate resulting in significantly lower earnings
92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
aside from the question attributed to Mason, none of the
notes about any of the meetings attributed particular re-
marks or questions to any employees other than Woods
and Strange. Lastly, one of Woods' notes which is undat-
ed but which has the number 19 at the top of the page
has the entirely self-serving observation that Woods had
remarked to two office workers that he could not believe
he had "let those ladies talk to me the way they do," and
that he "should have fired them." Under these circum-
stances, and in the absence of any explanation by Woods
why he found it necessary to make these notes, particu-
larly the one containing his remarks to the office em-
ployees, it is reasonable to infer that they were recon-
structions designed to justify subsequent actions. I am
unable to place any credence in them. Further, because I
found Respondent Woods unconvincing in testimonial
demeanor and behavior, I would not credit him when
contradicted and unsubstantiated by other credible testi-
mony or evidence.
The testimony of Woods concerning the remark he at-
tributed to employee Woods appears to be corroborated
by the testimony of Supervisor Cates and employee Jane
Tittle, both of whom were at the 12 February meeting.
Tittle impressed me as candid and sincere. Of all the wit-
nesses to the 12 February meeting who testified, she was
the most likely to be objective and disinterested. Accord-
ingly, considering the tone of the meeting with rather
frank exchanges between the participants which would
foster the type of response attributed to employee
Woods, a person who did not impress me as reticent or
timid, I credit Tittle and conclude that employee Woods
made the remark attributed to her by Woods.4
Another meeting between Woods and employees of
both the finishing department and the boarding and pair-
ing department took place about 19 February. This meet-
ing was held in the finishing department at the end of the
work day and was arranged at the request of employee
Delores Mason following Mason's discussion with other
employees including Woods and Strange, concerning Re-
spondent's grant of a raise to Pam Chesteen, a finishing
department employee with relatively low seniority. Em-
ployee Woods testified that at the meeting Woods admit-
ted the raise to Chesteen but claimed that it was based
on a promotion into management and that she would
soon be working at another of Respondent's locations.
Employee Woods asked why he had not posted the
opening so that older employees would have a chance
"to move up." Woods replied that he did not run his
business like that.
It is undisputed that during the 19 February meeting,
which was attended by about 20 employees, Strange told
Woods that it made employees feel bad to meet friends
of Woods who told them that employees were working
to make him a millionaire. Woods replied that if he felt
toward her like she felt toward him, he would fire her
"damn ass," and that if he "was her," and felt as she did,
he would find another job. Strange responded she might
just do that. According to Strange, Woods then replied
4 In making this credibility resolution, I also note that no witness sup-
ported employee Woods' contention that it was Woods himself who ob-
served that the employees might believe what he was saying was "bull "
that he did not want to fire her, and did not want her to
quit, and added he did not want to lose any of his em-
ployees. The testimony of Mason, employee Woods,
Strange, Baker, and another General Counsel witness
and employee of Respondent, Carol Johnson, is mutually
corroborative regarding remarks made at the 19 Febru-
ary meeting.
Woods' testimony and notes regarding the same meet-
ing are substantially to accord with the General Coun-
sel's witnesses . However, his notes omitted any reference
to his use of the vulgar terms attributed to him by the
employees. Further, his notes omitted any reference to,
and he failed to testify about, any matter brought up at
the meeting regarding Chesteen' s raise , although he con-
ceded at the hearing that he was aware that his grant of
a raise to Chesteen had caused "a problem" among em-
ployees. On the other hand, Woods' notes indicate a gen-
eral wage increase was a concern of the employees at the
meeting and further reflects that he told employees that
the Company was losing money, that it had gone
through a "hanging on period," that things looked better,
and he would give a raise as soon as he could.
The witnesses agree that there was another meeting
between Woods and employees about 21 February. Ap-
parently this meeting was called by Woods because he
felt he had been unable to "convince the people of the
actual situation" at the Company. Admittedly, at this
meeting attended by all the employees, he held up a
number of his personal paychecks which he claimed he
had not cashed, explained "why things weren't so good,"
but related that there was "plenty of business." He added
that employees should be concerned about doing a better
job and stated that he would do "something for them" as
soon as he could. Woods' notes related, and he testified,
that during his remarks he observed Woods and Strange
look at each other, smile , and sigh out loud. Such action
prompted him to say that things were too difficult to tol-
erate statements like "Bull, I must be crazy," and "Em-
ployees were working themselves to death to make him
a millionaire."
B. Beginning of Union Activity
Uncontradicted record evidence reveals that Baker
contacted the Union in early March concerning organiz-
ing Respondent's employees. It is further undisputed that
Burl Robinson, a representative of the Union , was as-
signed by the Union to contact Baker and did so by tele-
phone about 13 March. Baker and Robinson arranged a
meeting of a few employees to be held at Baker's home
on 14 March. Employees attending besides Baker were
employees Woods, Strange, and Grace Walker. Robinson
explained organizational procedures and suggested em-
ployees talk to other employees and ascertain the extent
of the employees' desire for organization.
Robinson testified that he met again with Baker and
employee Woods at Baker's home on 19 March. Appar-
ently, a conclusion was reached to proceed with organi-
zational efforts and at that point Robinson gave union
authorization cards to the two to be distributed to em-
ployees. Thereafter, both Baker and employee Woods
distributed the cards to employees at Respondent's plant,
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE 93
and there discussed union organization with their fellow
employees. So did Strange.
It was Robinson's further testimony that, although un-
certain of the supervisory status of Ralph Morie, who
was over Respondent 's finishing department , some em-
ployees had suggested to Robinson that Morie, might be
helpful in their organizational efforts and that he would
at least keep things confidential. Accordingly, on 20
March, Robinson visited , Morie at his home, told him of
the organizational efforts, solicited information from him
about his supervisory status, and left union authorization
cards with him to distribute to Mone's mother, Helen
Rice , an employee in the boarding and pairing depart-
ment , and Morie 's uncle, John Morie , a maintenance man
for Respondent. Robinson explained that the cards were
left with Morie for his mother and uncle rather than
Robinson visiting them himself because Morie had said
he could do "more with them" than Robinson. Although
Morie had told Robinson that Morie had authority to ef-
fectively recommend firing of employees, Robinson re-
mained uncertain of Morie's supervisory status. Never-
theless, he invited Morie to a union meeting with em-
ployees scheduled for the evening of 26 March at the
Holiday Inn in Morristown, Tennessee.5 The meeting
with Morie concluded, according to Robinson's testimo-
ny, with an agreement between the two that if either
subsequently ascertained Morie's supervisory status, they
would be in touch with each other.
Morie testified for Respondent and, in effect, denied
that there was any uncertainty expressed about his super-
visory status in the conversation with Robinson.6 Ac-
cording to Morie, he expressly told Robinson that he
could not help him, but he admitted that Robinson had
left him union cards to be signed by himself, his mother,
and his uncle. I credit Robinson where he contradicts
Morie. Robinson's testimony reflected good recall, and
he projected sincerity in testifying.
On the evening of 25 March, Robinson again met with
Morie in the vicinity of Morie's home. At this time
Morie advised Robinson that his mother and uncle had
decided not to sign cards.
C. Announcement of a Wage Increase and Program to
Solicit Employee Grievances
On 22 March Woods called a meeting of employees
and announced that, effective 1 April, he would be
giving employees a 3-percent wage increase and that
there would also be a 2-percent increase effective 1 July
"unless something drastic happens before then." Further,
according to his note of the meeting, Woods told em-
ployees that "we are going to be sitting down and talk-
ing" to each other telling each other our situation, com-
pliment or complaint.
Employee Woods testified without contradiction that
after announcing the wage increase Woods asserted that
he was proud of all his employees and did not want to
lose any of them. That testimony was corroborated by
The record does not show when the meeting was initially arranged.
Respondent stipulated at the hearing that Morie was a supervisor
within the meaning of Sec 2(l 1) of the Act
Strange and Johnson and was not contradicted by
Woods.
Notwithstanding the announcement of the wage in-
crease, in a subsequent conversation with employee
Woods and Strange in the boarding and pairing depart-
ment on the same day, Woods explained that the increase
would be applicable only to production (piece rate) work
and would not be applicable to straight hourly rates.
Based on the testimony of Linda Manis , office manager
and production coordinator, only about one-third of Re-
spondent's employees were on production work.
Respondent Woods could not specify the exact time he
decided to grant the increases announced 22 March. He
could not even approximate the date of his decision.
Moreover, although he testified that Respondent's finan-
cial situation had not "turned around," he said there was
"plenty of business" and it was obvious that the business
year would be better than the previous one. Further, he
testified without any substantiation that he had just
gotten a big influx of orders "that month." Nevertheless,
he conceded that the raise was "premature," and strictly
for morale purposes. He asserted, however, that the first
notice of union activity came to him in the evening of 26
March, subsequent to the announcement of the wage in-
creases.
The April wage increase was effectuated as was the
one set for July. However, three of the General Counsel
witnesses, Walker, Baker, and Johnson (with lesser cer-
tainty), testified that on 28 March Woods told employees
in a meeting called by him that he had tabled his expan-
sion plans (the purchase of Toner Hosiery) and that the
July raise would not be given. Another of the General
Counsel's witnesses, Mason, related that he only said the
July raise might not be given. The complaint alleged that
this threatened revocation of the July increase was un-
lawful.
Woods failed to testify on this point, but Manis in her
testimony for Respondent denied that Woods said that
the July increase would not be given. That denial was
supported by Tittle's testimony. Further, Manis identified
a tape recording of the 28 March meeting as accurately
reflecting Woods' comments at that meeting. The tape
recording was received in evidence, but its audio quality
at certain points was poor and portions are indecipher-
able. It is clear, however, that Woods announced his de-
cision reached the day before to abandon his expansion
plans . Respondent Woods did refer to a 5-percent in-
crease suggesting that he had wanted to give a 5-percent
increase earlier but found that it was not possible and
went with 3 percent. However, because of the rambling
way in which he made his remarks and because of the
poor quality of the tape, the full context of the wage ref-
erence is not entirely clear. On 12 April Woods had an-
other meeting with employees in which he referred to a
rumor he had heard that the July raise would not be
given, and told employees in effect that the rumor was
untrue.
It is conceivable that employees listening to his re-
marks would interpret the announcement of cancellation
of the "expansion" coupled with the difficulty Woods
had in deciding to give a 5-percent total increase as
94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
amounting to an announcement that the additional 2-per-
cent wage increase in July would not be given. Howev-
er, considering the record as a whole on this issue, the
credible testimony of Tittle, the conflict between the
General Counsel's witnesses Walker, Baker, and Johnson
on the one hand and Mason on the other, and because it
is improbable that Woods would have acted on 12 April
to "squelch" the "rumor" that the July increase was can-
celed if he had in fact earlier canceled it, I find the
record does not establish that Respondent Woods an-
nounced on 28 March that the July increase would not
be given.
D. Discharges of Employees Woods and Strange
Strange, who had been employed by Respondent in
January 1984, worked as a partner with employee
Woods on a production operation. The two were consist-
ently the highest producers among Respondent's employ-
ees. Neither had been previously warned or reprimanded
in any respect about their work prior to the time of their
discharges on 26 March.
The involvement of employees Woods and Strange in
the employee meetings with Woods in February has al-
ready been related above. Their involvement in the ini-
tial union meeting with Robinson has also been related,
as well as their involvement in talking to other employ-
ees about union activity and signing union authorization
cards.
Strange also testified about a conversation she had
with Ralph Morie, which is the predicate for a complaint
allegation of unlawful interrogation by Morie. Thus,
Strange testified that when she came to work on 25
March, she talked to Morie and he asked her if the union
man had come to see her. Strange replied only with a
smile. Then Morie smiled and said the union man came
to see him too. Morie asked Strange what she thought
about it, and Strange replied that they needed something
done "down there " Strange then asked Morie what he
thought about it, and he answered that the "man" was
checking to see if he could sign a card, but with his posi-
tion he did not think he could. Morie asked Strange if
she was going to sign a card. Strange's response was
again a smile followed by a question about whether
Morie's mother, Rice, would sign a card. He replied that
his mother had a mind of her own but conceded that the
union man had asked him to speak with his mother and
uncle.
Morie's version was that, when Strange came to work
that morning, she was whistling, and he commented that
she must have had a good weekend. She agreed and an-
nounced that the union man had come to visit her. She
went on to ask Morie what his mother thought about the
Union, and he observed that his mother had a mind of
her own, and that Strange would just have to talk to her.
According to Mone, that was the extent of the com-
ments. On cross-examination, Morie conceded that he
had asked employees Mason and Grace Walker if they
had had a visitor. He made no contention that they had
initially raised the union activity subject. In view of
Morie's admission, I find it reasonable to believe
Strange's testimony that it was Morie who initially raised
the subject of the union man's visit with her. According-
ly, and because Morie appeared as a hesitant, defensive,
and sometimes angry witness, as contrasted with
Strange's rather straightforward manner, I credit Strange
where her testimony contradicts Morie.
At the end of the work day, on 26 March, employee
Woods and Strange were told by Supervisor Cates to go
to Woods' office. There Woods told them they were dis-
charged explaining that it was because of their attitude
toward him and the Company. He added that he had lis-
tened to them complain about him and the Company
long enough. According to Strange's testimony, Woods
alluded to Strange's having missed 3 days of work in the
preceding 4 weeks, but stated that that was not the real
reason for the discharge. He also alluded to employee
Woods' failure to perform some overtime work. Both
employees Woods and Strange were given separation no-
tices dated 25 March but neither contained the reason for
the discharges.
Respondent Woods submitted papers to the Tennessee
Department of Employment Security explaining "two"
of several reasons for Strange's discharge, thusly:
No. 1 During a meeting with all employees
present, she stated she was tired of working herself
to death to make me a millionaire and that she had
met someone "a friend" and they told her she was
working for nothing just to make me a millionaire,
and she was tired of it.
No. 2 She told me that I didn't even pay her
decent wages, and that she thought it was wrong,
she needed every penny she could get.
No. 3 Since then she has missed 3 days of work
in the past 4 weeks.
Similarly, with respect to employee Woods, Woods re-
lated to the employment security office that he had told
her as a reason for her discharge:
No. 1 Over the past several months you have
become more unreasonable and refuse to accept
anything except your own thinking.
No. 2 During a meeting in the boarding and pair-
ing department when discussing a raise , I told you
that this company was having a hard time and gave
you some examples. I also told you that the compa-
ny was losing money, you immediately replied,
"Bull, you must be crazy, if you think we believe
that."
Strange testified that she had missed 3 days of work as
Respondent claimed, 1 because she was sick, another be-
cause she was off with permission from Cates to hospital-
ize her grandmother, and the last was a Saturday which
was an overtime day Employee Woods explained in her
testimony that she had refused 8 hours of overtime on
one Saturday and 15 minutes one afternoon, but that she
had been excused from such work.
Respondent's evidence on the circumstances of the dis-
charges differs little from the General Counsel's. Woods
related that he initially decided to discharge the two at
the conclusion of the 21 February meetings . However,
he took no overt steps in that direction until 23 March
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE 95
when he told Manis that he was reviewing employees
Woods' and Strange's personnel files and considering dis-
charging them . He did not finally communicate the deci-
sion to Manis until 25 March when she prepared the sep-
aration slips.
E. Alleged Surveillance
The complaint alleges that Respondent Woods en-
gaged in surveillance of the union meeting on 26 March.
Respondent Woods conceded that on the afternoon of 26
March, around 5 p.m. and after the discharge of Woods
and Strange , while still at the plant, he received two
anonymous strange telephone calls from individuals
asking if he was going to the union meeting . He dis-
missed these calls as pranks , but he received one about
an hour later at his home from John Morie, his mainte-
nance man , advising him of a union meeting at a Holiday
Inn. Woods decided to confirm that such meeting was
taking place but did not know in which of the two Holi-
day Inns in nearby towns the meeting would be held. He
therefore proceeded to the one in Newport, Tennessee,
while he sent his wife to the one in Morristown. The
meeting , in fact, was held in Morristown , and Woods ad-
mitted that his wife reported to him those cars she rec-
ognized in the parking lot. There was no evidence sub-
mitted to show that Woods' wife actually saw any em-
ployees or that any employees saw her.
F. Alleged Interrogation and Solicitation of Grievances
on 18 April
The complaint, as amended , also alleged that Respond-
ent Woods interrogated employees concerning their
union membership , activities , and desires on 18 April,
and that, consistent with the announcement of 22 March,
he solicited grievances from employees on 18 April.
Woods admittedly began to conduct individual meet-
ings with employees on 18 April. The meetings took
place in an office in the dye room of the plant. Each em-
ployee was called in individually where Woods spoke to
them alone and asked each the same series of prepared
questions . He wrote down some of the answers that were
given by the employees on the question sheets . The fol-
lowing questions were among those asked:
When was the last time anyone complained to
you about you or your work?
What do you think the problems at DT [Dan-
dridge Textile] are?
Why do you think the people at DT would want
to, or need to, organize?
How do you think the pay here compares to
other places you have worked or probably could
have worked?
G. Arguments and Conclusions
It is the General Counsel 's position that employee in-
volvement in the February meetings with Woods, and
particularly the involvement of Strange and employee
Woods in arranging and/or supporting the meetings in
an effort to improve their wages, constituted protected
concerted activity under the Act. Proceeding from this
premise, the General Counsel contends that during the
meetings employee Woods and Strange engaged in no
misconduct which would remove them from the protec-
tion of the Act. Accordingly, it is urged that to the
extent Respondent relied on the conduct of the employ-
ees at these meetings to discharge them such discharges
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel additionally argues that the dis-
charges of employee Woods and Strange violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) because it was also responsive to their union
activities . In making this argument , the General Counsel
asserts that Respondent 's knowledge of their union ac-
tivities may be inferred from the small size of the plant.
Moreover, it is argued that the timing of the discharges,
in relation to the start of the union activity , and all the
other circumstances surrounding the discharges reveal
Respondent 's discriminatory motivation.
With respect to the independent 8(a)(1) allegations, the
General Counsel argues that Respondent Woods unlaw-
fully threatened Strange with discharge because of her
concerted protected complaints in his comments to her
during the 19 February speech , that Respondent on 22
March was unlawfully responding to the Union's cam-
paign in announcing the wage increase to its employees
together with the announcement of Respondent's intent
to solicit the employees' views and grievances , that Re-
spondent , in keeping with the announcement of 22
March , unlawfully granted the wage increases on 1 April
and 1 July , that Ralph Morie coercively interrogated
Strange about her union activity or inclinations on 25
March, that Respondent Woods systematically interro-
gated employees regarding their reasons for union sup-
port in meetings with individual employees on 18 April,
and that Respondent engaged in surveillance ofemployee
union activities on 26 March in observing employee cars
at the union meeting place on that date.
The arguments in the Charging Party's brief essentially
parallel that of the General Counsel.
Respondent's position is that the two employees were
discharged for insubordinate remarks to Woods in the
February meetings. Respondent 's brief does not address
the General Counsel 's contention that the two employees
were engaged in protected concerted activity in making
the remarks . Respondent 's primary defense to the 8(a)(3)
allegation is based on Woods ' contention he had no
knowledge of any union activity prior to the discharges.
Respondent also contends that in the absence of knowl-
edge of union activity the 22 March announcements
could not have been responsive to the union activity and
therefore could not be unlawful. The actual grant of the
wage increases, it is urged , could not be unlawful be-
cause they were consistent with the earlier lawful an-
nouncements and, on the contrary, it would have been
unlawful to withhold the increases.
Based on the testimony of its witnesses, Respondent
contends that there was no interrogation of Strange by
Ralph Morie. Respondent also contends that Woods
questions of employees on 18 April regarding the basis of
employees ' desires for organization were not unlawful
because Woods had a right to keep informed about what
was going on in the Company . Respondent concedes the
96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
facts of the alleged surveillance on 26 March and raises
no specific defense to this allegation.
Considering first the issue of the protected concerted
activity basis for the discharge of employee Woods and
Strange, the record is clear that both were instrumental
in arranging and supporting the meetings with Woods on
12 and 19 February. The record fully establishes that the
employee concern that prompted the first meeting was
the failure of Respondent since January 1982 to grant
employees a wage increase. That concern was shared by
other employees in the boarding and pairing department
if not in the remainder of the plant. Employee concern
which prompted the second meeting was the employees'
perception of the unfairness of Respondent's grant of the
wage increase to Chesteen in light of their own failure to
receive a wage increase. The voicing of these concerns
to management by a mutually supportive nondisruptive
group of employees constitutes the exercise of a funda-
mental right under Section 7 of the Act of employees to
engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. . .
See, e .g., Steak & Ale Restaurant, 263 NLRB 107 (1982).
It was evident that the remarks made by both employee
Woods and Strange to Woods in the meetings were sup-
portive of their wage concerns. Whether the concerns of
the employees were justified is not relevant to whether
the activity in voicing their concern was protected. Spi-
noza, 199 NLRB 525 (1972). Protection is lost to an em-
ployee engaged in concerted activity under the Act if
the employee "conducts himself in such an offensive and
egregious manner as to depart from the res gestae of the
concerted activity and expose himself in an area beyond
protection of Section 7 of the Act." Will & Baumer
Candle Co., 206 NLRB 772, 774 (1973). Put another
way, if the statements of employee Woods and Strange
in the February meetings were so offensive, vulgar, de-
famatory, or opprobrious or their conduct so flagrant,
violent, extreme or otherwise "indefensible," to render
them unfit for further service, then they have no protec-
tion under the Act and their discharges, to the extent
based on their actions at the meetings, cannot be found
to be unlawful. See NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local
1229 IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 477 (1953); Dreis & Krump
Mfg., 221 NLRB 309 (1975); American Telephone Co., 211
NLRB 782 (1974).
I conclude that neither employee Woods nor Strange
lost the Act's protection in their conduct in the February
meetings . There is no evidence they engaged in flagrant,
violent, or extreme conduct. And even if their remarks
to Woods may be classified as disrespectful, they hardly
fit into the category of being excessively offensive,
vulgar, or defamatory. Nor can they be classed as inde-
fensible. Although Woods may have found their remarks
and complaints unpleasant and perhaps distressing, the
outer limits of the protection of Section 7 of the Act
may not be measured alone by the yardstick of his per-
sonal , subjective reaction to the remarks. See High view,
235 NLRB 672, 675 (1978). In any event, that Woods
subjectively did not find these remarks so opprobrious to
render the two employees unfit for further employment
was demonstrated by his failure to fire either of them im-
mediately after their alleged "misconduct." Instead, he
waited for over a month to conclude that their state-
ments warranted discharge. Under these circumstances, I
must conclude that to the extent Respondent admitted
that employee Woods and Strange were discharged for
their remarks made in the context of their concerted and
protected activity, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act as alleged.
Notwithstanding the above finding that the discharges
violated Section 8(a)(1), I do not find a threat of dis-
charge in Respondent Woods' comments to Strange in
the 19 February meeting. Strange admitted that follow-
ing his remark to her to the effect if he felt toward her
like she felt toward him he would fire her, Woods told
Strange he did not want to fire her, did not want her to
quit, and did not want to lose her. I find this to be an
immediate retraction of what otherwise would have been
an unlawfully coercive comment. See Gray Drugs, 272
NLRB 1389 (1984). Even Strange admitted on cross-ex-
amination that she did not view Woods' remarks as a
threat after he added that he did not want to lose her.
Accordingly, and also because Woods' remarks were
also conditioned on his feeling toward Strange as she felt
toward him, a condition not shown to have been met at
that time, I find the remark did not violate Section
8(a)(1).
Other alleged independent violations of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act are, however, clearly established. Thus, Re-
spondent admittedly engaged in an unlawful surveillance
of a union meeting on 26 March. The fact that the em-
ployees attending such meetings were not immediately
aware of the surveillance does not preclude it from con-
stituting interference in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. Southwire Co, 429 F.2d 1050, 1054 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 939 (1971). Woods' systemat-
ic interrogation of employees on 18 April regarding any
basis for employees' desires to organize I find was also
violative of Section 8(a)(1). The questioning took place
in the context of what must be inferred was an ongoing
union campaign. It occurred in individual interviews in
an office, a locus of managerial authority. Employees re-
sponding to the question, to the extent they indicated the
existence of a basis for organization, ran the risk of im-
plying the likelihood of their support of organization.
Moreover, a response to the question might lead to the
revelation of other employee motivations and possibly
the identity of union supporters. Indeed, some employees
failed or refused to respond to the question regarding the
basis for organizational desires thereby evidencing the
coercive impact of the question.
I reach a different conclusion with respect to the inter-
rogation attributed to Ralph Morie. Based on Strange's
credited testimony, Morie did inquire about her having a
visitor, a clear reference to union visitation, and he fur-
ther asked her what she thought about the Union. How-
ever, it appears from Robinson's testimony that employ-
ees viewed Morie as being possibly supportive of the
Union. In Morie's further comments to Strange, he sug-
gested he might be supportive of the Union if it was de-
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE
termined that he was eligible.7 Morie's questions were
not accompanied by any threats, reprisals, or promises of
benefits. And Strange admitted that Morie had once told
her that if he had union cards he would distribute them,
a remark clearly showing he was likely to be sympathet-
ic to the Union. Under these circumstances, Morie's
questions must be considered as innocuous and devoid of
any coercive intent . See Herb Kohn Electric Co., 272
NLRB 815 (1984). Accordingly, I find no violation of
Section 8(a)(1) based on Morie's questions of Strange.
With regard to the announcements by Woods made on
22 March, the Board has held that the essence of a viola-
tion of the Act based on solicitation of grievances in the
course of a union campaign is not the solicitation itself
but the inference that the employer will redress the
grievances responsive to the solicitation. University of
Richmond, 274 NLRB 1180 (1985). Woods admittedly
announced the institution of a program of soliciting em-
ployee views and concerns and he indicated he would be
more receptive to complaints. Employee Woods credibly
testified with corroboration from Strange, and without
any record contradiction, that Woods even said his per-
sonality had changed and he was going to start "working
with" the employees. It is undisputed that this announce-
ment constituted a clear departure from prior practice.
The only real issue in determining the violative nature of
the announcement of what amounted to a grievance so-
licitation program is whether Respondent knew of the
union campaign at the time the program was announced.
The same issue is determinative of the violation with re-
spect to the announcement at the same time of the wage
increase for it is established Board and court law that the
announcement of a previously unplanned benefit such as
a wage increase in the face of an active employee organi-
zational effort interferes with Section 7 rights of employ-
ees. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 374 U.S. 405, 409-410
(1964); Village Thrift Store, 272 NLRB 572 (1984).
Knowledge of union activity, even the union activity
of a particular employee, may ordinarily be imputed to
an employer by virtue of the knowledge of such activity
by the employer's supervisors. Jenkins Index Co., 273
NLRB 736 (1984). Such knowledge will not be imputed,
however, when it is affirmatively established that the su-
pervisor or agent did not pass it on to others in manage-
ment . Dr. Phillip Megdal, D.D.S., 267 NLRB 82 (1983).
Woods, who decided on the actions announced on 22
March, claimed he became aware of union activity only
after the announcements . One supervisor, however,
Ralph Morie, was aware of the union activity prior to 22
March but maintained he had not passed this information
on to Respondent Woods. In this instance, I credit
Morie. Morie's remarks to Strange suggested that he
would consider union support if it was determined that
he was not a supervisor. Based on Robinson's testimony,
which I credit, Mone also indicated some union sympa-
thy by telling Robinson he would speak to Helen Rice
and John Morie about signing a card because he "could
get more out of them" than Robinson. In view of this
and because of the issue as to his supervisory status, it is
' Morte testified that he had previously been a union member while
working for a different employer
97
unlikely that Morie would have informed Woods of the
union activity. Moreover, Robinson on 20 March told
Morie of the union meeting to be held on 26 March. If
Morie had in fact told Woods about the union activity, it
is probable he would have included the information
about the meeting Yet John Morie credibly testified that
he found it necessary to tell Woods on 26 March about
the meeting, because Ralph Mone had not done so.
Record evidence nevertheless remains showing that
Woods knew of the union activity prior to 22 March.
Thus, Respondent's own witness, Tittle, testified in re-
sponse to a question of Respondent's counsel that she
had told Supervisor Cates prior to 22 March about the
union "man" being in town. Cates did not specifically
rebut Tittle's testimony and only generally denied
knowledge of union activity until 27 March. Cates con-
ceded she would have told Respondent Woods had she
known of the union activity. I previously found Tittle
credible and credit her in this instance over Cates." With
the knowledge I find Cates had, and given her admitted
inclination to advise Woods of such knowledge, it is rea-
sonable to conclude, and I so conclude, that Woods had
knowledge from Cates of the union activity before 22
March. In so concluding, I also find incredible Woods'
claim that he first learned of union activity late on 26
March.
Other circumstantial evidence fully supports the infer-
ence that Woods was aware of the union activity prior
to 22 March. First in this regard is the timing of the 22
March announcements within only a few days after the
beginning of union activity. Respondent offered no legiti-
mate explanation for his timing of the announcements.
Secondly, Respondent employed only about 30 to 35 em-
ployees in a relatively small plant facility in which the
union activity and discussions took place. Even Woods
testified he considered the employees as a "small family."
It is undisputed that Woods himself was frequently in the
plant during the day. Even Supervisor Cates admitted
that things did not stay secret in the plant for long.
Under these circumstances , it is probable that the union
activity would have quickly come to Woods' attention.
See Jenkins Index Co., supra.
Timing and small plant size are not the only factors
which support the conclusion that Woods' 22 March
statements and announcements were directly responsive
to the union activity in violation of employee Section 7
rights. The wage increase announcement was unprece-
dented. No prior increases had been given in Respond-
ent's plant in the preceding 10 years at that time of year.
All prior increases were granted in January. Further, al-
though Manis testified that Woods had always in the past
8 Mams admitted in her testimony for Respondent that Tittle also told
her that someone was "talking union" at the plant, but did not do so until
24 March Manis testified she did not tell Woods, even though she knew
he was considering firing employee Woods and Strange Given the
recent employee wage complaints and the employees' likely dissatisfac-
tion with a small increase applicable to only about a third of the work
force, and considering the impact of union organization on a business
claimed to be struggling, I find it incredible Manis would not have told
Woods of the information given her by Tittle. Her testimony that she re-
garded the information as nothing "out of the ordinary" was unconvinc-
ing in the absence of any other "union talk" during Respondent's history
98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discussed wage increases with her prior to such increases
being announced , he had not discussed with her those
announced on 22 March . Additionally , the announce-
ment of an increase constituted a complete reversal of
positions Woods had taken in the February meetings.
Only I month earlier Woods had clearly explained that
because of the Company's financial condition there
would be no wage increase . There was no substantiation
for the bare claim made by Woods that things had im-
proved at the time of the wage increase announcement.
No details were offered by Respondent to show how or
exactly when they had improved . Woods could not even
state when he reached the decision to grant the increase
or to otherwise explain the timing of the announcement.
On the contrary , Woods even admitted that the raise was
"premature."
The announcement about individual meetings with em-
ployees to listen to their complaints and to exchange
views was also unprecedented . Respondent's concerns
over the views of the employees is strangely inconsistent
with the umbrage taken at the candid February remarks
of employee Woods and Strange regarding employee
wage complaints.
Cnsidering the foregoing and because Respondent
Woods admittedly was opposed to his employees ' organi-
zation , I conclude that the announcement of 22 March
was designed to interfere with employee Section 7 rights
and tended to have that effect . If follows, and I further
conclude , that the grant of the benefit announced, the
wage increases as well as the individual interview pro-
gram to solicit employee complaints with the implicit
promise to remedy them also interfered with Section 7
rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as al-
leged. As set forth above, however, I have found there
was no threatened cancellation of the July increase. Con-
sequently , I find this allegation of the complaint has not
been established.
In view of the finding that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) in the discharges of employee Woods and
Strange , a finding regarding the 8 (a)(3) allegation would
appear superfluous . However , because the Board may
disagree with the conclusion regarding the 8(a)(1) dis-
charge findings , and because an 8(a)(3) remedy under-
scores employee rights to engage in union organizational
efforts , a finding on the 8(a)(3) allegation is warranted.
The involvement of employee Woods and Strange in
union activity, the knowledge of that activity which I
have found above that Respondent possessed ,9 Respond-
ent's union animus, as reflected in its willingness to
engage in unlawful questioning of employees and surveil-
lance of a union meeting, the admittedly good work
records of employee Woods and Strange with no prior
reprimands and warnings, the staleness of the claimed
basis for their discharges , and the timing of the dis-
charges shortly after beginning the union activity clearly
establish the General Counsel's prima facie case that the
discharge of the two employees was responsive to their
9 In light of their announced displeasure over the absence of a wage
increase , Respondent would quite reasonably infer that employee Woods
and Strange were likely union supporters even in the absence of direct
knowledge of their union support
union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Other factors support this prima facie case. Thus , neither
employee Woods nor Strange were warned about their
"bad attitudes" prior to their discharges . Further, the dis-
charge of Strange was inconsistent with statements credi-
bly attributed to Woods by Strange on 19 February to
the effect he did not want to lose her . It was further in-
consistent with other statements attributed to Woods by
Strange at the 22 March meeting , and not denied by him,
to the effect he was proud of all his employees . Finally,
that Respondent was groping for a basis for the dis-
charges was revealed by Woods' allusion at the time of
the discharges to prior absences of both of the dis-
charged employees . However , Strange's testimony that
Woods said that the absences were not in fact the basis
for the discharge was not contradicted.
In view of the General Counsel 's prima facie case, the
burden shifts to Respondent to demonstrate that the two
employees would have been discharged without regard
to their union activity. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied
455 U.S. 989 ( 1982). Respondent , I conclude , has not met
its burden in this regard . It is true that Respondent did
establish there was precedent for discharging employees
for "bad attitudes ." Out of 12 discharges in the 9 years
preceding the discharges involved herein , 2 employees
were discharged for "bad attitude." Each of those dis-
charges , however, involved the refusal of the employees
to follow directions of supervision according to the testi-
mony of Manis . There was no such failure to follow in-
structions on the part of employee Woods and Strange
prior to their discharges.
Woods' testimony suggests that the attitudes of em-
ployee Woods and Strange "built up" until 25 March
when he found it necessary to discharge them . Thus, he
appears to rely on their cumulative conduct evidencing
the development of a deteriorating "attitude ." Incredibly,
however, Woods cited no specific examples of the dete-
riorating attitudes of the two other than their remarks at
the meetings in February.
There was also testimony by Respondent Woods that
he decided to discharge Woods and Strange on 21 Feb-
ruary long before the union activity started . He was con-
tradicted in this regard by Cates who testified that on 22
March , Woods told her only that he was thinking about
firing them. She further testified that she did not know
of the actual decision to discharge either of the two until
26 March. Similarly , Manis testified Woods only told her
on 23 March after the beginning of the union activity
that he was considering discharging them . Finally, there
was no explanation by Woods why he happened to
choose that particular time for the discharges for alleged
offenses which occurred more than a month before. In
light of the factors noted above in the General Counsel's
prima facie case, and based on the record considered as a
whole, I reject as incredible Woods' testimony and de-
fense and find that the discharges were a direct response
to the union activities of employee Woods and Strange.
Accordingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act as alleged.
DANDRIDGE TEXTILE 99
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By announcing on 22 March 1985 a wage increase
and the establishment of a system of individual employee
interviews for soliciting grievances ; by engaging in sur-
veillance of a union meeting on 26 March 1985; by
granting wage increases ; by interrogating employees on
18 April 1985 concerning the basis for union organiza-
tional desires ; and by conducting individual employee
interviews wherein grievances were solicited on 18 April
1985, Respondent engaged in , and is engaging in, unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By discharging employees Lorene C. Woods and
Mary A . Strange on 26 March 1985 because of their in-
volvement in protected concerted activity under the Act
including union activity , Respondent engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not violate the Act in any other
manner alleged in the complaint.
6. The unfair labor practices in paragraphs 3 and 4
above affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
actions designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
Lorene C . Woods and Mary A. Strange , I recommend
that Respondent be ordered to reinstate them and make
them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits,
computed on a quarterly basis from the date of their dis-
charge to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement, less
any net interim earnings , as prescribed in F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as comput-
ed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).10 Con-
sistent with the Board 's decision in Sterling Sugars, 261
NLRB 472 (1982), it will also be recommended that Re-
spondent be required to remove from its records and
files any reference to the discharges of Woods and
Strange and notify them in writing that this has been
done and that evidence of the unlawful discharges will
not be used for future personnel actions against them.
The Charging Party, citing Marlene Industries Corp.,
255 NLRB 1446 at 1449 (1981), argues that Woods
should be required to read the notice herein to employ-
ees because the violations were "egregious" and were
largely committed by Woods in the presence of employ-
ees at group meetings . Although serious, Respondent's
unfair labor practices found herein were not so extensive
or widespread as those in Marlene Industries. Moreover,
unlike in Marlene Industries, there was no unfair labor
practice history involving Respondent. Under these cir-
cumstances , I reject the Charging Party 's argument and
find the usual posting will adequately remedy the viola-
tions found.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices , I find it necessary to order it to 10 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716, 716-721 (1962)