Daly, Curtis N.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 8, 2020

12491876 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/491,876 06/25/2009 Curtis N. Daly P2009-03-17 (290110.432) 6199
70336 7590 04/08/2020
Seed IP Law Group/DISH Technologies (290110)
701 FIFTH AVENUE
SUITE 5400
SEATTLE, WA 98104
EXAMINER
CORBO, NICHOLAS T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2424
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/08/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTOeAction@SeedIP.com
pairlinkdktg@seedip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte CURTIS N. DALY
________________

Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, DENISE M. POTHIER, and
JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

2
STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
This application returns to us after another panel of this Board
affirmed the Examiner’s decision to reject then-pending claims 1–5, 7, 8,
and 10–22. See Ex parte Daly, Appeal 2016-003473 (PTAB Apr. 17,
2017).1 Prosecution reopened after that decision, and Appellant2 now
appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) the Examiner’s subsequent decision to
reject claims 1–5, 7, 8, 11–16, and 18–22. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Invention
The invention relates to a voice-enabled system and method for
controlling a receiving device. Spec. ¶ 2, Fig. 2. In particular, the invention
related to a voice enabled media presentation system (“VEMPS”) including
a remote-control device having an audio input device that receives a spoken
command from a user. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 30. The VEMPS is configured to perform
speech recognition to determine the spoken command, and upon the
determination of the spoken command, control a set-top box of the VEMPS.
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 31–32. The control of the set-top box may include muting or

1 We hereinafter refer to the prior appeal as “Daly I,” and our decision in
that prior appeal as “Daly I Decision.” Similarly, we refer to the Final
Action mailed January 1, 2015 as “Final Act. I”; the Examiner’s Answer
mailed December 15, 2015 as “Ans. I”; and the Appeal Brief and Reply
Brief filed July 15, 2015 and February 16, 2016, respectively, as “Appeal Br.
I” and “Reply Br. I,” respectively.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, DISH Technologies LLC is the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

3
reducing audio output being currently provided by the set-top box. Id. at
¶ 50.
Exemplary, now-pending claim 1 under appeal3 reads as follows:
1. A media presentation system, comprising:

a remote-control device including multiple keys and an audio
input device; and
a set-top box wirelessly communicatively coupled to the
remote-control device,
wherein the media presentation system is configured to:

obtain audio data via the audio input device, the audio
data received from a user and representing a spoken command to
control the set-top box, wherein the spoken command includes a
program title to identify programming;
determine the spoken command by performing speech
recognition upon the obtained audio data;
control the set-top box in response to the determination
of the spoken command;
control the set-top box in response to a user selection of
one of the multiple keys of the remote-control device;
receive an indication that the user is speaking the spoken
command, wherein the received indication is an initial portion of the
audio data;
reduce audio output volume provided by the set-top box
in response to the received indication;
receive a signal transmitted by the remote-control device,
the signal generated in response to a voice enable key of the remote-
control device being pressed by the user;
in response to the receiving the signal transmitted by the
remote-control device generated in response to the voice enable key of

3 We hereinafter refer to the evidence before us in this instant appeal, namely
the Final Action mailed April 17, 2018, as “Final Act. II;” the Examiner’s
Answer mailed January 9, 2019, as “Ans. II”; the Appeal Brief filed
September 17, 2018, as “Appeal Br. II;” and the Reply Brief filed March 11,
2019, as “Reply Br. II.”
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

4
the remote-control device being pressed by the user, reduce audio
output volume provided by the set-top box; and
after the audio is reduced in response to the voice enable
key of the remote-control device being pressed by the user, receive
additional audio data including audio data representing speech of the
user including a set-top box command from the user, the additional
audio data including audio data representing speech of the user
including a set-top box command from the user having had signal
processing operations performed on the additional audio data by the
remote-control device in order to subtract from the additional audio
data presence of other television program audio components output by
the set-top box.

Appeal Br. II 16–17 (emphases added to indicate limitations in dispute).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 11, and 15, 16, 18–214 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Handelman (US 2002/0052746
A1; published May 2, 2002), Houser et al. (US 5,774,859; issued June 30,
1998) (“Houser”), and Broadus et al. (US 2003/0005462 A1; published
January 2, 2003) (“Broadus). Final Act. II 3–9.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and Bhogal et al. (US
2002/0094512 A1; published July 18, 2002) (“Bhogal”). Final Act. II 9.
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, Bhogal, and Relyea et al.

4 Final Act. II and Appeal Br. II both refer to claim 17 as being rejected. See
Final Act. II 3, 8; Appeal Br. II 8. However, claim 17 was canceled prior to
Final Act. II, and its inclusion in Final Act. II appears to have been a
typographical error by the Examiner. The rejection of claim 17 is therefore
not before us on appeal.
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

5
(US 2008/0120665 A1; published May 22, 2008) (“Relyea”). Final Act. II
10.
Claims 14 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and Bloebaum et al. (US
2007/0230678 A1; published October 4, 2007) (“Bloebaum”). Final Act. II
10–11.
ANALYSIS
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. 5 Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not
to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

A. Procedural History
In Daly I, the Board affirmed the Examiner’s rejections of then-
pending claims 1–5, 7, 8, and 10–22. Daly I Decision 17. In particular, we
affirmed the Examiner’s rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
then-pending (i) claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 15–21 over Handelman,
Houser, and Broadus; (ii) claim 12 over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and
Bhogal; (iii) claim 13 over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, Bhogal, and
Relyea; and (iv) claims 14 and 22 over Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and
Bloebaum. See Daly I Decision.
In the prior appeal (Daly I), Appellant provided arguments with
respect to claim 1, challenging the Examiner’s findings with respect to

5 In the instant appeal, claims 2–5, 7, 8, 11–16, and 18–22 are not argued
separately from claim 1 in either of Appellant’s briefs (Appeal Br. II 9–15;
Reply Br. II 2–6), and will not be separately addressed.
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

6
Handelman, Houser, and Broadus. See Daly I Decision 5–10 (citing Final
Act. I, Appeal Br. I, and Reply Br. I). Appellant also presented separate
arguments (1) for claim 12, regarding the Examiner’s findings with respect
to Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and Bhogal (see Daly I Decision 11–12),
(2) for claim 13, regarding the Examiner’s findings with respect to
Handelman, Houser, Broadus, Bhogal, and Relyea (id. at 13–15), and (3) for
claims 14 and 22, regarding the Examiner’s findings with respect to
Handelman, Houser, Broadus, and Bloebaum (id. at 15–17).
Reproduced is then-pending claim 1 from Daly I:
1. A media presentation system, comprising:

a remote-control device including multiple keys and an audio
input device; and
a set-top box wirelessly communicatively coupled to the
remote-control device,
wherein the media presentation system is configured to:

obtain audio data via the audio input device, the audio
data received from a user and representing a spoken command to
control the set-top box, wherein the spoken command includes a
program title to identify programming;
determine the spoken command by performing speech
recognition upon the obtained audio data;
control the set-top box in response to the determination
of the spoken command;
control the set-top box in response to a user selection of
one of the multiple keys of the remote-control device;
receive an indication that the user is speaking the spoken
command, wherein the received indication is an initial portion of the
audio data; and
reduce audio output volume provided by the set-top box
in response to the received indication.

Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

7
Appellant subsequently filed a Request for Continued Examination,
and amended claim 1 to include new limitations including, inter alia, the
emphasized portions of now-pending claim 1 which are in dispute before us.
Compare then-pending claim 1, with now-pending claim 1.
The law of the case doctrine “generally bars retrial of issues that were
previously resolved.” Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 253 F.3d 695, 697
(Fed. Cir. 2001). More particularly, the doctrine applies to both explicit
determinations as well as all “necessary inferences from the disposition.”
Kori. Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 657
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
“[A] Board decision in an application is the ‘law of the case,’ and is
thus controlling in that application and any subsequent, related application.”
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 706.07(h)(XI)(A)
(9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018). Accordingly, the Board has routinely
applied the “law of the case” and found that all conclusions and decisions in
a first decision by the Board, whether express or implicit, are accorded
issue-preclusive effect and are not revisited during subsequent prosecution
of the same application. See Ex parte Fisher, Appeal No. 2013-000665,
2015 WL 5782991, at *4 (PTAB Sept. 16, 2015), (non-precedential); Ex
parte Keggenhoff, Appeal No. 2012-001720, 2014 WL 3950403, at *4–5
(PTAB Aug. 11, 2014) (non-precedential); Ex parte Wood, Appeal No.
2010-006834, 2012 WL 2929626, at *3 (BPAI July 12, 2012) (non-
precedential); PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2, Rev. 10, § III6 (“A

6 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20
FINAL.pdf (last accessed Feb. 27, 2020).
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

8
routine decision is binding in the case in which it is made, even if it is not
designated as precedential or informative, . . . .”).
Under the doctrine of law of the case, the Board will generally adhere
to a decision in a prior appeal in the same case unless one of three
exceptions exist: (i) the evidence in a subsequent appeal contains new and
different material evidence; (ii) there has been an intervening change of
controlling legal authority; or (iii) the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice. See Intergraph, 253 F.3d at 698;
Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
To the extent we apply the law of the case doctrine, we determine that
none of these exceptions exist. In other words, rather than relying on
different prior art (or even different sections from the prior art), with respect
to now-pending claim 1, the Examiner makes the same findings with respect
to Handelman, Houser, and Broadus as were made with respect to then-
pending claim 1. Compare Final Act. II 3–6, with Final Act. I. 3–6. Further,
there has not been an intervening change of controlling legal authority, nor
do we determine the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous. See Northern
Helex Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 557, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1980) (explaining
that “[a] mere suspicion of error, no matter how well supported, does not
warrant reopening an already decided point”). Accordingly, under the law
of the case doctrine, the Examiner’s findings of Handelman, Houser, and
Broadus related to then-pending claim 1—as well as the proffered
combination of the references—are binding in the instant appeal as it relates
to now-pending claim 1.
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

9
However, none of the disputed limitations of claim 1, now before us,
were present in the claims of Daly I. Therefore, the law of the case doctrine
does not preclude Appellant’s arguments in this instant appeal.
B. Whether Handelman in view of Houser and Broadus teaches “in
response to the voice enable key of the remote-control device being
pressed by the user, reduce audio output volume provided by the set-
top box”
For claim 1, the Examiner finds that Handelman in view of Houser
teaches, inter alia, “in response to receiving the signal transmitted by the
remote-control device generated in response to the key of the remote-control
device being pressed by the user[ ](key press of Voice/Recognize button 772
in Houser’s Fig. 9), and receive additional audio data including audio data
representing speech of the user including a set-top box command from the
user. Final Act. II 5 (citing Houser at 17:17–21, 18:27–60) (original
emphases omitted; emphasis added). The Examiner, however, finds that
Handelman in view of Houser “is unclear as to . . . in response to the
receiving signal transmitted by the remote-control device generated in
response to the voice enable key of the remote-control being pressed by the
user, reduce audio output volume provided by the set-top box, [sic].” Final
Act. II 6. Instead, the Examiner finds that Broadus teaches:
receiving an indication and a signal that the user is speaking the
spoken command, wherein the received indication in [sic] an
initial portion of the audio data and the signal is the pressing of
a voice-enabling key, and reducing audio output volume
provided by the set-top box in response to the received
indication and signal.

Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

10
Id. (emphases added). Namely, the Examiner finds that Broadus teaches “in
response to detecting the indication (voice input) and the signal (key press) [
] wherein the user after the, [sic] the television/STB is effectively muted (or
attenuated/blocked/suppressed).” Id., citing to Broadus ¶¶ 37, 146–148, 152
(emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues that:
Houser does not disclose reducing audio output volume
provided by the set-top box device in response to the key being
pushed on the remote. Instead, Houser discloses the button may
be used to “exclude spurious noise”, and is completely silent as
to reducing audio output volume provided by the set-top box
device in response to the key being pushed on the remote.

Appeal Br. II 10–11 (citing Houser at 17:18–20) (emphasis added).
Appellant’s contention that Houser does not teach reducing the audio
output volume in response to a user pressing a key on the remote is not
persuasive to show Examiner error. Notably, the Examiner cites Broadus in
combination with Handelman and Houser, not Houser alone, for teaching
this particular feature. See Final Act. 6. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments
attacking Houser singly for an individual shortcoming, without considering
the combination of the references, is not an effective argument against
obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck &
Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The Appellant additionally argues that:
On page 3 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner states
“Houser is relied upon by the Examiner to specifically disclose
reducing audio output volume of the television/STB as an
extraneous/spurious sound reduction mechanism in Col. 17,
Lines 28–37”. Contrary to this allegation of the Examiner, the
“extraneous/spurious sound reduction mechanism in Col. 17,
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

11
Lines 28–37” of Houser is not reducing the audio output
volume provided by the set-top box.
Reply Br. II 3 (original emphasis omitted; emphases added); see also Ans. II
3.
However, in view of the Examiner’s findings regarding the teachings
of Houser and Broadus as a whole, and particularly upon consideration of
the Examiner’s express findings that: 1) “Handelman in view of Houser is
unclear” as to the above limitations in dispute (see Final Act. II 6); and 2)
Broadus teaches “reducing audio output volume provided by the set-top box
in response to the received indication and [pressing of a voice-enable key]”
(id.), we deem the Examiner’s statement to be harmless error. The
Examiner’s findings were clearly stated in the Final Action. Id.
The Appellant further contends that Broadus teaches the audio output
is suppressed in response to a user speaking, rather than to a key being
pressed by the user. Reply Br. II 3. Specifically, Appellant argues:
[I]n Broadus, the STB audio output is suppressed in response to
the user speaking, not, as the Examiner alleges, “in response to
detection the indication/voice input and the signal (key press).”
Rather, the key press in Broadus is merely for training and
calibration of the system. This is shown in paragraph 152 of
Broadus, which states, “The user 906 may push the calibration
button (not shown) to indicate when he or she is speaking into
the microphone 244, 710. Of course, it will be appreciated by
those skilled in the art that the voice detection unit 1402 may
also be operated without any training or calibration period.
Reply Br. II 4 (original emphasis omitted; emphases added).
Figure 15 of Broadus, which is discussed in paragraph 152 of that
reference, is reproduced below:
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

12

Figure 15 shows the flowchart for using a set-top box having an audio
output suppression module.
Broadus teaches at step 1502, that
[i]nitially, the voice detection unit 1402 may be trained 1502 or
calibrated to detect when a user is speaking. The hybrid
communicator/remote control 106 may include a button for
calibration (not shown). The user 906 may push the calibration
button (not shown) to indicate when he or she is speaking into
the microphone 244, 710.

Broadus ¶ 152. (emphases added). Broadus further teaches, with regard to
Figure 15:
[a]udio input 904 is picked up 1506 or captured by the
microphone 244, 710. The audio input 904 is then provided
1508 as input to the voice detection unit 1402. The voice
detection unit 1402 processes 1510 the input(s) to determine
whether a voice 909 is present. If 1512 voice 909 is present, the
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

13
audio output 1004 to the television may be suppressed 514, or
the television may be muted.
Id. at ¶ 153 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Broadus explicitly teaches the calibration button is pressed
at step 1502 and the audio output volume of the STB is suppressed at step
1514. Figure 15 of Broadus further indicates that, but for the calibration
being pressed at step 1502, the audio output volume of the STB would not
be suppressed at step 1514. See Broadus at fig. 15.
We do not find Appellant’s argument commensurate with the scope of
claim 1. The language of claim 1 does not preclude intermediate steps—in
the case of Broadus, a user speaking—between the calibration button being
pressed and the audio output volume being suppressed. Accordingly, we
agree with the Examiner that Broadus teaches the limitation in dispute.
With respect to Appellant’s argument that the calibration button of
Broadus is not a “voice enable key,” per the language of claim 1, the
Appellant contends that “the key press in Broadus is merely for training and
calibration of the system,” and that “pressing the calibration key does not
trigger the suppression of audio.” Reply Br. II 4.
Our reviewing court has held that “[t]here is a ‘heavy presumption’
that the terms used in claims ‘mean what they say and have the ordinary
meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the
relevant art.’” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870,
874–75 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Although claim terms are interpreted
in light of the specification, we do not read limitations from the specification
into the claims. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d
1560, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988) (various
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

14
limitations on which appellant relied were not stated in the claims; the
specification did not provide evidence indicating these limitations must be
read into the claims to give meaning to the disputed terms); see also In re
Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In
addition, proper claim construction requires the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
833 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
Applying the guidance above, we turn to Appellant’s Specification
which discloses:
The remote-control device 100 includes a keypad 202 having
multiple buttons (keys), a voice enable key 204, and a
microphone 206. The keypad 202 includes multiple keys that
are each associated with a particular command that can be
generated by the remote-control device 100 and transmitted to
the receiving device 118. The voice enable key provides push-
to-talk capability for the remote-control device 100. When the
user 220 pushes or otherwise activates the voice enable key
204, the remote-control device 100 begins to receive or capture
audio signals received by the microphone 206, and to initiate
the voice recognition process, here performed by the voice
interface manager 101, as described below.
Spec. ¶ 39 (emphases added).
We find nothing in Appellant’s Specification that precludes the
Examiner’s mapping of the calibration button of Broadus, which “the user
906 may push . . . to indicate when he or she is speaking into the microphone
244, 710,” (see Broadus at ¶ 152), to “the voice enable key” of claim 1.
Based on the evidence before us, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in finding that Handelman in view of Houser and Broadus
teaches “in response to the voice enable key of the remote-control device
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

15
being pressed by the user, reduce audio output volume provided by the set-
top box,” as required by claim 1.
C. Whether Handelman in view of Houser and Broadus teaches “signal
processing operations performed on the additional audio data by the
remote-control device”
The Examiner finds that Handelman in view of Houser and Broadus
teaches the above limitation in dispute, because Houser teaches, inter alia,
“disclosing in response to receiving user speech, signal processing is
performed on the audio data to subtract television audio output by the
television.” Final Act. II 5 (citing Houser at 17:28–38; emphasis omitted).
The Examiner maps the “speech input device” having “a second
microphone” of Houser (see Houser 17:28–38) to the claimed signal
processing operations to subtract television program sound from the
additional audio data. Final Act. II 5; Ans. II 4.
Appellant contends that the portion of Houser on which the Examiner
relies,
disclose[s] the functionality of the system in the second case
regarding functionality of the subscriber terminal unit 160, not
the remote control device. In particular, the section of Houser
that precedes cited col. 17, lines 28–38, states "Second, in those
arrangements where the speech-related functions are provided
in subscriber terminal unit 160 . . ." (col. 17, lines 22–24,
emphasis added).
Appeal Br. II 11; see also Reply Br. II 4–5.
The Examiner finds that “Appellant focuses on a single statement in a
passage not relied upon by the Examiner.” Ans. II 4. The Examiner further
finds in Houser:
[w]hile this particular passage of Houser [directed to the
subscriber terminal unit 160] regards the functionality of the
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

16
subscriber terminal unit, this is not considered a teaching
against what is disclosed in Col. 17, lines 28-38. Appellant's
passage does not limit the microphone on the speech input
device from being location [sic] on the remote control unit. It is
merely an alternative teaching as to some speech relation
function being provided in the subscriber terminal unit relating
to a wake-up speech command. The function of subtracting
sound from the television output is assigned to the “speech
input device” which could be either the remote control or the
subscriber terminal unit.
Id. (emphases added). In other words, the Examiner finds that Houser
teaches multiple embodiments—the remote control or the subscriber
terminal unit—each having a speech input device.
Appellant additionally argues that, “[the Examiner’s interpretation] is
incorrect. The ‘speech input device’ is only mentioned once in Houser, and
that is after switching from discussing remote controls which perform
speech related functions to discussing ‘those arrangements where the
speech-related functions are provided in subscriber terminal unit 160’
(emphasis added).” Reply Br. II 5.
We disagree with Appellant’s contention that Houser teaches the
speech input device only for the subscriber terminal unit. Appellant’s
argument ignores the linking words and phrases apparent in Houser. The
disclosure of Houser is reproduced below, with underlining to indicate
pertinent language:
Several optional features may be applied to each of the above-
identified arrangements. First, on those remote controls which
perform speech-related functions, a press to speak (or
) button may be used to exclude spurious noise
and/or to extend battery life. Thus, the speech-related circuitry
may be powered only when the press to speak button is pressed.
Second, in those arrangements where the speech-related
functions are provided in subscriber terminal unit 160, a “wake-
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

17
up” speech command may be used and other command
recognition inhibited until the wake-up is recognized. For
example, the system might wait for the word “ATTENTION”,
and then recognize additional utterances for 30 seconds. In
addition, various mechanisms may be employed to reduce
extraneous sounds. For example, a second microphone may be
included on the speech input device which samples the ambient
noise and subtracts it from the spoken signal. Alternatively, any
television audio which is received at the microphone may be
removed by subtracting from the microphone input data the
known television audio signal which is being generated by the
subscriber terminal unit. This would assist in preventing
recognition of “commands” or “utterances” spoken by
television voices.
Houser at 17:16–38.
Houser, column 17, lines 16–38, above, describes “[s]everal optional
features” for speech recognition hardware. Houser at 17:16. Read as a
whole, Houser teaches a “[f]irst” embodiment (id. at 17:17) whereby
“remote controls . . . perform speech-related functions” (id. at 17:17–18),
and a “second” embodiment (id. at 17:22) whereby “speech-related
functions are provided in subscriber terminal unit 160.” Id. at 17:23–24. “In
addition” to these first and second embodiments (id. at 17:28), “various
mechanisms may be employed to reduce extraneous sounds” (id. at 17:28–
29), including, “[f]or example, a second microphone.” Id. at 17:30.
In Houser, (see id. at 17:28–32), the words and phrases “[f]irst,”
“[s]econd,” “[i]n addition,” and “[f]or example” (id. at 17:17–32) at least
suggest that the second microphone may also be provided in the first
embodiment of a remote control being a speech input device.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Handelman in view of
Houser and Broadus teaches “signal processing operations performed on the
additional audio data by the remote-control device in order to subtract from
Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

18
the additional audio data presence of other television program audio
components output by the set-top box,” as required by claim 1.
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 1, as well as those rejections of independent claims 5, 8,
and 15, which contain similar limitations. Arguments related to the other
rejections of claims 12–14 and 22 refer to the arguments presented for claim
1. See Appeal Br. II 13–14. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1–5, 7, 8, 11–16, and 18–22.

Appeal 2019-003114
Application 12/491,876

19
CONCLUSION
In summary:
AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7, 8,
11, 15, 16,
18–21
103(a) Handelman,
Houser, Broadus
1–5, 7, 8,
11, 15, 16,
18–21

12 103(a) Handelman,
Houser, Broadus,
Bhogal
12
13 103(a) Handelman,
Houser, Broadus,
Bhogal, Relyea
13
14, 22 103(a) Handelman,
Houser, Broadus,
Bloebaum
14, 22
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7, 8,
11–16, 18–
22