Daly, Christopher N.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 27, 20202019001953 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/293,758 11/10/2011 Christopher N. Daly 5441-350B 9709 111614 7590 05/27/2020 Pilloff Passino & Cosenza LLP 2000 Duke Street Suite 300 Alexandria, VA 22314 EXAMINER D ABREU, MICHAEL JOSEPH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3792 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/27/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mail@pilloffpassino.com mcosenza@pilloffpassino.com rpilloff@pilloffpassino.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHRISTOPHER N. DALY Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 Technology Center 3700 Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, JOHN C. KERINS, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–16, and 18–30. An oral hearing was held on May 6, 2020 and a transcript of the hearing has been entered into the record (“Tr.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Cochlear Limited. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s invention is directed to “the configuration of implantable medical devices.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1, 8, 15, and 25 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An implantable medical device comprising: an implantable component comprising an implantable memory module, said implantable component configured to receive and store data in said implantable memory module; and an external component comprising an external memory module, said external component configured to communicate with said implantable component to receive said data, wherein said external component further comprises an identification circuit and is further configured to transmit an identification code stored on said identification circuit, and wherein said implantable component further comprises a sensor configured to receive said identification code and is further configured to transmit said data from said implantable memory module to said external memory module upon receiving said identification code and verifying the compatibility of said external component. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Faltys US 6,219,580 B1 Apr. 17, 2001 Haubrich US 6,482,154 B1 Nov. 19. 2002 REJECTIONS 1) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Haubrich. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 3 2) The Examiner rejected claim 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 27–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Haurbrich and Faltys. OPINION Rejection 1 The Examiner provides the same findings and reasoning for independent claims 1 and 25. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses most of the limitations of claims 1 and 25 but “it is unclear as to what [Haubrich’s] EMD discovery signal contains; however, it is noted that Haubrich states that the identifying information can be used by the EMD in subsequent telemetry transmissions.” Id. at 7 (citing Haubrich, 13:15–21). The Examiner concludes that “it would have been an obvious design choice to have some sort of identifying information in the discovery signal in order to ensure that the device is paired appropriately” and “the device necessarily includes some sort of verification and identification circuit in order to have ‘identifying information’ and to establish secure and uninterrupted connections . . . as is well known in the art.” Id. Claim 25 Claim 25 recites, inter alia, “An implantable medical device system comprising: an implantable component . . . configured to provide stimulation to the recipient” and “that the implantable component can configure a plurality of different external components.” Appeal Br. 159 (Claims App.). The Examiner does not direct us to any disclosure in Haubrich to support a finding that Haubrich discloses either of these claim limitations. See Final Act. 5–7; Ans. 3–5. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 25. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 4 Claims 1, 3, 5, 7 Appellant contends that Haubrich fails to disclose an external component that comprises “an identification circuit” and argues that the identification circuit is a separate component from the recited “external memory module.” Appeal Br. 45–47. The Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses “a memory cell in either the hard disk drive or floppy disc drive . . . where [the identification code] is stored prior to transmission” which, according to the Examiner, corresponds to the recited identification circuit. Final Act. 2 (citing Haubrich, Fig. 2). The Examiner also finds that hard disk drive 52 shown in Figure 2 of Haubrich corresponds to the recited external memory module. Id. at 6. The Examiner further finds that identifying information sent by the internal component to the external component is “used by the EMD in subsequent telemetry transmissions to the IMD to assure that only the desired IMD receives and responds to transmissions.” Id. at 3–4 (quoting Haubrich, 13:15–21). Resolution of this rejection requires construction of the claim term “identification circuit.” We give claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations from the Specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification . . . is an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the Specification, i.e., an interpretation Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 5 that is ‘consistent with the specification.”’ In re Smith International, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We begin our analysis with the claim language. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 884 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[C]laim construction must begin with the words of the claims themselves.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Claim 1 recites that the external component comprises both “an external memory module” and “an identification circuit” and that the identification code is stored on the identification circuit, not on the external memory module. The language of claim 1, thus, suggests that the external memory module and the identification circuit are distinct components as Appellant argues. Paragraph 50 of Appellant’s Specification provides: FIG. 2D illustrates a different technique for triggering the data transfer in another embodiment of the invention in which an ID circuit 270, for example an RFID chip, is incorporated into external component 222. Implanted component 224 comprises a circuit configured to detect and receive data from an ID circuit 270 such as an RFID chip. Upon detecting the ID circuit and upon passing a preprogrammed test, recipient-specific data stored in memory 238 of implanted component 224 is transmitted to external component 222 automatically. The pre-programmed test may be the matching of data representing a serial number or a model number. In one embodiment of the present invention, receiving a model number from ID 270 of external component 222 which is an exact match or within a range of acceptable model numbers stored in implanted component 222 will allow cochlear implant 220 to enter an operational state. Where the model number is not an exact match or within an expected range programmed into implanted component 224, hearing prosthesis will be prevented from entering an operational state, or if already in operational state, will cause hearing prosthesis to enter a fault or error mode. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 6 Spec. ¶ 50 (emphases added). From this disclosure and the claim language, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand that the identification circuit in the external component is separate from the external memory module and contains data that can be used to identify the external component. Haubrich is directed to a telemetry system “between an implanatable medical device (IMD) and an external medical device (EMD) such as a programmer or a monitor.” Haubrich 1:7–10, Fig. 1. Specifically, Haubrich is directed to “a method of ensuring that the telemetry link is between an intended, rather than an unintended, implantable medical device and the external medical device.” Id. 1:11–14. In use, Haubrich’s “EMD (programmer 20) transmits a beacon or EMD discovery signal . . . and waits for a predetermined time for receipt of an uplinked IMD discovery or ID signal.” Id. 11:67–12:3. The IMD(s) then “transmit their ID codes or other IMD discovery signals” to the EMD. Id. 12:10–11. The EMD may use the IMD identification information “in subsequent telemetry transmissions to the IMD to assure that only the desired IMD receives and responds to transmissions from the EMD.” Id. 13:18–21 Although we agree with the Examiner that Haubrich discloses that its IMD transmits an identification code to the EMD and that code may subsequently be transmitted back to the IMD by the EMD, that code identifies the IMD, not the EMD, so that whatever programming is transmitted by the EMD reaches the intended IMD. The Examiner has not shown that Haubrich discloses an identification circuit on the EMD that stores an identification code that identifies the EMD in order to “verify[] the compatability of the said external component” with the implantable Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 7 component as required by claim 1. Further, the Examiner’s reasoning that design choice supports modifying Haubrich’s discovery signal to include identification information of the EMD to “ensure that the device is paired appropriately” is not properly supported. See e.g. Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 636 Fed. Appx. 575, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (stating that a particular placement of an element is a design choice does not make it obvious; a reason must be offered as to why a skilled artisan would have made the specific design choice). In this case, as noted above, Haubrich is directed to “ensuring that the telemetry link is between an intended, rather than an unintended, implantable medical device and the external medical device.” Haubrich, 1:11–14. The Examiner has not adequately explained why one of ordinary skill in the art would include information identifying Haubrich’s EMD in the discovery signal to ensure that the EMD is “paired appropriately” with the intended IMD because, as discussed above, the EMD uses the identification code for the IMD in subsequent transmissions to assure appropriate pairing. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1 because the Examiner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Haubrich discloses an “identification circuit” as required by claim 1. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 3, 5, and 7, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 1 for the same reasons. Claim 15 Claim 15 is an apparatus claim requiring “an internal component” as recited (the “first limitation”) and “an external component” as recited (the “second limitation”). Appeal Br. 157–58 (Claims App.). We address each of these limitations separately focusing on Appellant’s contentions for each. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 8 The Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses the subject matter of claim 15. Final Act. 8. With respect to the first limitation, the Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses, inter alia, “the implantable component configured to receive and store operating parameters . . . wherein said operating parameters are specific to a recipient of the implantable component.” Final Act. 8 (citing Haubrich 3:41–4:25, 4:52–5:2); see also Ans. 4 (“Haubrich is clearly a pacemaker with a memory which necessarily stores operating parameters specific to the recipient of the implantable component.”). In connection with the first limitation, Appellant provides several contentions based on an argument that Haubrich fails to disclose operating parameters that are specific to a recipient of the implantable component. See Appeal Br. 66, 68, 76, and 78. In support of these contentions, Appellant focuses primarily on the disclosure at column 4, line 52 to column 5, line 2 of Haubrich. See Appeal Br. 66–67, 68–69, and 73–74. Appellant’s only mention of Haubrich’s disclosure at column 3 line 41 to column 4 line 25 in connection with the first limitation is the following: “Assuming arguendo that columns 3–4, lines 41–25 so disclose operating parameters specific to a recipient (it does not, demonstrated above), those alleged operating parameters are not the parameters that are transferred to the external component.” Id. at 79. We make several observations with respect to this argument. First, this argument is not commensurate in scope with the first limitation of claim 15, which does not require transferring operating parameters to the external component.2 We note that claim 16 recites that 2 Because it is not necessary to our decision here, we do not reach the argument raised by Appellant in the oral hearing that the language in the Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 9 the internal component is configured to transfer the operating parameters. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Consequently, we do not construe claim 15 as requiring transfer of operating parameters by the internal component. Second, claim 15 does not affirmatively require that the operating parameters be stored in the memory module of the internal component. Claim 15 only requires that the implantable component be configured to receive and store the operating parameters. Third, in order to evaluate the possible relevance of this argument to the first limitation of claim 15, we reviewed the portions of the Appeal Brief dealing with claim 15 from page 66 to page 79, and do not discern any argument by Appellant even addressing, let alone demonstrating, that the disclosure of Haubrich column 3, line 41 to column 4, line 25 does not correspond to “operating parameters . . . specific to a recipient of the implantable component.” See id. at 66–79. Further, based on that review, we do not discern any argument by Appellant that Haubrich fails to disclose an implantable component comprising an implantable memory module also required by the first limitation of claim 15. See id. For the following reasons, we determine that Appellant’s contentions regarding the first limitation of claim 15 do not apprise us of Examiner error. second limitation of claim 15, “receive said operating parameters,” should be construed as requiring the external component to receive the operating parameters from the internal component. Tr. 18:19–20:13. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 10 Appellant’s Specification provides that “recipient-specific operating parameters” include “a set of instructions or settings values for that recipient.” Spec. ¶ 8. The Specification describes various types of data that may be used in connection with a cochlear implant such as speech processing schemes. Id. ¶¶ 8, 45. Claim 15, however, is not limited to a cochlear implant but is directed to a generic “implantable medical device.” We note that the Specification contemplates that recipient specific data encompasses a broad category of data for such a generic “implantable medical device” as recited in claim 15 where it provides that “recipient- specific operating parameters” include generic “data of other types” that “are well understood by those skilled in the art.” Id. ¶ 45. Haubrich discloses: The memory registers or RAM may also be used for storing data compiled from sensed cardiac activity and/or relating to device operating history or sensed physiologic parameters for telemetry out on receipt of a retrieval or interrogation instruction. All of these functions and operations are well known in the art and many are employed in other programmable IMD’s to store operating commands and data for controlling device operation and for later retrieval to diagnose device function or patient operation. Programming commands or data are transmitted between an IPG RF telemetry antenna 28 and an external RF telemetry antenna 24 associated with the external programmer 20. Haubrich, 3:62–4:8. Haubrich, thus, discloses an internal component with a memory that stores data relating both to the patient (the “recipient”) and to operating commands for controlling the functions and operation of the IMD Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 11 implanted in the patient and that such data is well known in the art.3 Therefore, Appellant’s contentions concerning the first limitation of claim 15 do not apprise us of Examiner error because Haubrich discloses an internal component with a memory that stores operating parameters specific to a recipient. The second limitation of claim 15 requires “an external component comprising an external memory module, the external component configured to communicate with said implantable component and, upon the implantable component verifying the compatibility of the external component with the implantable component, to receive said operating parameters and configure the external component using said operating parameters.” Appeal Br. 157– 58. Appellant’s first contention with respect to the second limitation of claim 15 is that Haubrich fails to disclose that the operating parameters specific to a recipient are transferred to the external component. Appeal Br. 86. As discussed above, leaving aside the fact that claim 15 does not require the implantable component to receive and store the operating parameters and that there is no requirement of a transfer from the internal component to the external component, Haubrich discloses that recipient specific operating parameters are, in fact, transferred from Haubrich’s IMD to EMD. 3As we noted above, Appellant’s argument at page 79 of the Appeal Brief that Haubrich does not disclose transferring this data to the external component is not commensurate in scope with the first limitation of claim 15. However, to the extent the argument has any relevance at all to claim 15, it is belied by the above quoted disclosure as well as other disclosure in Haubrich describing “bi-directional communications between the IMD and EMD” including “preliminary information regarding device status from the IMD to the EMD.” Haubrich, 12:64–67; see also id. 12:54–63. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 12 Haubrich, 3:62–4:7; 12:54–63. Consequently, this contention is not persuasive. Appellant’s second contention with respect to the second limitation of claim 15 is that there is no disclosure in Haubrich that “the EMD (external medical device) is configured by anything it receives from the IMD. Appeal Br. 93. Appellant further argues that “nowhere does Haubrich disclose structure where the programming or anything else that configures the external device comes from the implant. This is a structural requirement of claim 15.” Id. at 94. We note that Appellant does not dispute that Haubrich’s external component includes a memory module and is configured to communicate with the implantable component. Tr. 12:12–18. Appellant’s contentions focus primarily on how the claimed device operates using broadly defined functional language. Appellant’s Specification is instructive here because it provides that “the external components are generic in that they are provided to the recipient without first setting any operational parameters that are tailored for use by the particular recipient” and that the external components are configured by “storing operational parameters that are specific to a particular recipient in the memory module of an implantable component, transmitting at least one configuration between the implantable and external components.” Spec. ¶ 37. From this we discern that the basic structural components of the claimed apparatus are produced as generic devices not including operating parameters specific to a recipient. We note that in certain circumstances functional language, such as recited in claim 15, may be used to add limitations to an apparatus claim. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 13 Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 1443–44 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The problem with Appellant’s contentions, however, is that claim 15 does not require the implantable component to verify the compatibility of the external component with the implantable component. Rather, claim 15 recites an external component “configured to . . . receive operating parameters and configure the external component using said operating parameters” only “upon the implantable component verifying the compatibility.” Due to the conditional nature of this limitation, claim 15 does not require that the external component be configured using the operating parameters. Additionally, as discussed above, claim 15 does not require that the operating parameters be received and stored in the internal component, only that it is “configured to receive and store” the operating parameters. This language adds an additional condition to the configured language in the second limitation of claim 15. Therefore, Appellant’s contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error in connection with the second limitation of claim 15. We have considered all of Appellant’s contentions in connection with claim 15 and determine that Appellant does not apprise us of error. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 15. Claims 16, 18, 19, 22, 26 Claims 16, 18, 19, 22, and 26 all depend directly from claim 15. Appeal Br. 158–59 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses the subject matter of these dependent claims. Final Act. 9. Appellant argues separately for the patentability of each of these claims. See Appeal Br. 97–103. Claim 16 recites that the implantable medical device of claim 15 “is configured to transfer said operating parameters upon operationally coupling Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 14 said implantable component with said external component.” Appeal Br. 158 (Claims App.). Appellant contends that the Examiner implicitly rewrote claim 16 as “wherein said implantable medical device is configured to transfer said operating parameters upon after operationally coupling” because in Haubrich “[e]verything associated with activating or otherwise starting transfer of data is directed towards using utilizing something explicit other than the external device.” Id. at 97–99. Appellant further argues that in Haubrich “there is already operational coupling between the two devices prior to any transfer of data.” Id. at 99. We interpret Appellant’s argument to be that the claim term “upon” should be construed as requiring transmission of the operating parameters simultaneously or concurrently with the operational coupling. Although the term “operationally coupled” does not appear to be used in the Specification, the Specification provides that “[u]pon detecting the ID circuit and upon passing a pre-programmed test, recipient-specific data stored in memory 238 of implanted component 224 is transmitted to external component 222 automatically.” Spec. ¶ 50. From the description, it appears that operational coupling, in the context of claim 15, would include passing “a pre-programmed test” as no ID circuit is recited in claim 15. However, there is clearly a sequence of events described. First, a pre-programmed test is “passed,” then, only if there is a match of model numbers, will the operating parameters be transmitted to the external component. See id. Although the transfer is described as occurring “automatically,” that does not mean that the transfer occurs simultaneously or concurrently. Rather, the transfer is described as occurring after the test is passed. Therefore, we are not apprised of Examiner error because Appellant’s argument that it was improper for the Examiner to construe Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 15 “upon” to mean “after” is contrary to the intrinsic evidence. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 16. Claim 18 recites that the “internal component has stored therein a unique identifier representing said operating parameters stored in said implantable memory module.” Appeal Br. 158 (Claims App.). Appellant repeats its contention that claim 15 “requires that the device be configured to transfer those operating parameters to the external component.” Appeal Br. 100. This contention is not persuasive for the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 15. Appellant also contends that in Haubrich, “there is nothing about any unique identifier, and certainly nothing about that ‘unique identifier representing said operating parameters.’” Appeal Br. 100. This contention cannot be reconciled with Appellant’s contention in connection with claim 1 that Haubrich’s EMD Discovery signal is not an identification code because, inter alia, Haubrich uses the term identification code “with respect to the identification signal that is transmitted from the implant to the external component.” Id. at 48, 50. We agree with Appellant that Haubrich does in fact disclose an identification code for the IMD. See Haubrich, 12:8–13. We are not persuaded by this contention because Appellant does not explain adequately why the IMD identification codes of Haubrich do not correspond to the unique identification codes recited in claim 18 or why those codes do not represent the operating parameters stored in memory. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 18. Claim 19, which depends from claim 18, recites that the external component “is configured to download said unique identifier concurrently with said operating parameters.” Appeal Br. 158 (Claims App.). Appellant contends that the Examiner has ignored the recitations of claim 19. Appeal Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 16 Br. 102. Haubrich discloses that its EMD first selects the intended IMD by receiving the ID code from the IMD. See Haubrich, 12:8–53. The EMD then initiates telemetry with the selected IMD. Id. 12:54–57. The Examiner has not directed us to any disclosure in Haubrich to support a finding that Haubrich’s EMD is configured to download the unique identifier concurrently with the operating parameters as required by claim 19. See Final Act. 9. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 19. Claim 22 depends from claim 15 and recites, “wherein the implantable component is implanted in the recipient, and wherein at least a portion of the external component is located opposite the implantable component with a layer of skin located between the external component and the implantable component.” Appeal Br. 158 (Claims App.). The entirety of the rejection of claim 22 states that “any external component would necessarily be opposite the implantable component with a layer of skin separating the two components.” Final Act. 9. Appellant argues that “Haubrich is a device designed to communicate with the implantable component at relatively large distances” and “does not necessarily have to be opposite the implantable component.” Appeal Br. 104 (citing Haubrich Fig. 1). In the Answer, the Examiner responds that “any external element would be ‘opposite’ the implanted device when using the skin as the layer between.” Ans. 5. For the following reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 22. Haubrich discloses that “the present invention relates to a long-range telemetry system.” Haubrich, 3:11–12. Figure 5 of Haubrich discloses use of the “long range telemetry system for monitoring the operation of an IMD with a home based monitor.” Id. 2:63–65, Fig. 5; see also Fig. 1. The Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 17 Examiner has not adequately explained how the external component in the long range telemetry systems illustrated in Figures 1 and 5 of Haubrich are located opposite the implantable component as required by claim 22. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 22. Claim 26 recites that “the operating parameters are stored in the implantable memory.” Appeal Br. 159 (Claims App.). Appellant contends that the “recitations of claim 26 have been ignored in the Office Action. Appeal Br. 103. As discussed above in connection with the rejection of claim 15, Appellant has not squarely addressed the disclosure of Haubrich at column 3 line 41 to column 4 line 25, which as discussed above supports a finding that Haubrich stores operating parameters in the implantable memory. For the same reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 26. Rejection 2 The Examiner finds that Haubrich discloses all the limitations of claim 8 except for “a speech processor or prosthetic hearing device.” Final Act. 9. The Examiner finds that Faltys “discloses a comparable implantable telemetry device as a speech processor.” Id. Appellant contends that “claim 8 specifies two separate unique identifiers that exist at the same time” which, according to Appellant, the Examiner fails to address in the rejection of claim 8. Appeal Br. 119–20. For the following reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 8. Claim 8 requires an implantable component “configured to receive and store a first unique identifier for said implantable component” and an external component “configured to store a second unique identifier for said external component.” Appeal Br. 156–57 (Claims App.). The Examiner Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 18 does not direct us to any portion of Haubrich disclosing “a second unique identifier” for the external component. See Final Act. 9. In fact, the only specific identification code disclosed in Haubrich is for Haubrich’s IMD. See Haubrich, 12:8–12. The Examiner has, thus, not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Haubrich discloses “an external component . . . configured to store a second unique identifier for said external component in the external memory module.” Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 8. Claims 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, and 27 depend directly or indirectly from claim 8. Appeal Br. 157–59 (Claims App.). We do not sustain the rejection of these dependent claims for the same reason. Claims 28, 29, and 30 depend from claim 1. Appeal Br. 160 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s reliance on Faltys in the rejection of claims 28, 29, and 30 fails to cure the deficiency in the rejection of claim 1 discussed above in connection with Rejection 1. See Final Act. 9. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 28, 29, and 30 for the same reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1. Claim 20 depends indirectly from claim 15. Appeal Br. 158 (Claims App.). Appellant has apparently not made any separate arguments for the patentability of claim 20. See Appeal Br. 8–15. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 20. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed in part. More specifically, Appeal 2019-001953 Application 13/293,758 19 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 5, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26 103(a) Haubrich 15, 16, 18, 26 1, 3, 5, 7, 19, 22, 25 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 27–30 103(a) Haubrich, Faltys 20 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 27– 30 Overall Outcome 15, 16, 18, 20, 26 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 21– 25, 27–30 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation