Dalton Telephone Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 12, 1949

82 N.L.R.B. 1001 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

In the Matter of DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY and SOUTHERN
FEDERATION OF TELEPHONE WORKERS
Case No. 10-C-,0179.-Decided April 12,1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On September 23, 1948, Trial Examiner Henry J. Kent issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that
the Respondent had not violated Section 8 (1), 8 (3), and 8 (5) of
the Act as alleged in the complaint and recommending that the com-
plaint against the Respondent be dismissed, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto.' Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel and Southern Federation of Telephone Workers, here-
inafter referred to as the Union, each filed exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report and supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed a
brief in relpy to the briefs of the General Counsel and the Union 2
The Board 3 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and
finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
affirmed.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner
to the extent that they are consistent with the additions and modi-
fications hereinafter set forth.
' The provisions of Sections 8 (1), 8 (3 ), and 8 ( 5) of the National Labor Relations
Act are continued , without any change material to this proceeding , in Sections 8 (a) (1),
8 (a) (3), and 8 ( a) (5) of the Act , as amended by the Labor Management Act, 1947 The
complaint against the Respondent also alleged that the Respondent had violated Sections
8 (a) (1), 8 ( a) (3), and 8 ( a) (5) of the amended Act. We construe the Intermediate
Report as also finding that the Respondent had not violated the amended Act.
2 The Union ' s request for oral argument is denied , as the record , the Intermediate Report,
and the briefs adequately present, in our opinion , the issues and the positions of the parties.
8 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended , the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-man
panel consisting of the undersigned Board Members [ Chairman Ilerzog and Members
Houston and Gray]
82 N. L. R. B., No. 131.
1001
1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. The Respondent and the Union 4 reached an impasse in bargain-
ing negotiations when, after agreeing on all other substantive issues,-"-
the Respondent insisted, as a condition precedent to the execution of a
contract, that the Union register with a Georgia Court in the manner
provided by the Georgia Code. The Respondent thereby intended to
make the Union subject to suit on its contract. The statutory provi-
sions in question are not mandatory; rather, they make the registration
of unincorporated associations a voluntary matter.' The Trial Exam-
iner found that the mechanics of registration were not "unduly bur-
densome," and concluded that, by imposing the condition of registra-
tion upon the Union, the Respondent did not fail to bargain within
the meaning of the Act.
The Board has heretofore considered problems of a like nature and
has reached conclusions which are controlling here. In the Eppinger
case,' the Board held that the duty of an employer to bargain within
the meaning of the Act was not subject to the mandatory provisions of
a Florida law requiring the licensing of union agents. The Board has
also held that the incorporation of a union or the posting by it of a
performance-bond may not be made conditions precedent to initiation
of the bargaining process.' Thus, the principle is clearly established
4 We find that , at all times material herein , all employees at the Respondent' s Dalton,
Georgia, telepho ne exchange and plant , excluding guards, professional employees, and
supervisors as dr- ned in the Act, constituted, and now constitute, an appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act; we
further find that since on or about November 13, 1946 , and at all times thereafter , the Union
has been the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in that unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
We adopt the Trial's Examiner 's finding that on March 11, 1947, the no-strike clause
demanded by the Respondent was not in issue between the parties The Respondent's
contrary contention , made in its brief, is not supported by the evidence. In any event, in
the view we take, the Respondent ' s insistence on registration is violative of the Act,
even though some substantive issues remained unresolved.
4 The Respondent contends , and it is not disputed , that under Section 22-409 to Section
22-414, inclusive , of the Georgia Code of 1933 , an unincorporated labor union is not subject
to suit in the courts of the State of Georgia unless its name , style, objects, and the names of
its trustees or officers are recorded in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court. Matter
of Smith v . National Ladies Garment Workers Union, et at , 58 Ga App. 26; O'Jay Spread
Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507.
T Matter of Eppinger if Russell Company , 56 N. L. R. B 1259 The Florida statute in
question , among other provisions regulating the affairs of labor organizations , made it
unlawful for any person to act as the business agent of a labor organization without first
procuring a license or permit. The Board rejected the Employer 's contention that it was
relieved of its obligation to bargain with the union representing its employees because the
union's business agent had not complied with the provisions of the statute The Board's
decision in the Eppinger case was later cited with approval by the Supreme Court, when it
held invalid an application of the same Florida statute on the ground that it conflicted
with the National Labor Relations Act by circumscribing full freedom of choice of repre-
sentatives . Hill, Leo H. v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 . Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co., et at. v. N. Y.
State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767.
s Matter of Jasper Blackburn Products Corporation , 21 N L. R. B. 1240; Matter of
Scripto Manufacturing Company, 36 N. L. R. B. 411 ; Matter of Interstate Steamship Co.,
36 N. L. R B. 1307 ; Matter of Benson Produce Co ., 71 N. L. R B 888, 889 ; Matter of
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1003
that employers are not relieved of their statutory obligation to bar-
gain because bargaining representatives may have failed to satisfy
conditions which delay or impede or otherwise circumscribe the bar-
gaining process and which are not required by the Act. We conclude,
therefore, that the limitation which the Respondent sought to impose
in this case as a condition for executing an agreement is an unlawful
impediment to collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act;
and that by seeking to impose , and, indeed, by imposing such restric-
t ion on the Union on and after March 11, 1947, the Respondent violated
Section 8 (5) of the Act?
2. Although the Trial Examiner discussed generally the contentions
of the General Counsel and the Union with respect to the strike which
commenced on April 26, 1947, he made no specific finding as to the
cause of the strike. While there is some evidence in support of the
Respondent's contention that the employees were striking for wage
increases, the preponderance of the evidence shows, and we find, that
the underlying cause precipitating and prolonging the strike was the
Respondent's refusal to execute a bargaining agreement unless the
Union made itself subject to process in the courts of Georgia.10 As
we have found that this conduct by the Respondent which caused
the strike constituted a violation of the Act, we also conclude that the
striking employees were entitled, upon request, to immediate rein-
statement to their former positions, even though the Respondent had
hired new employees during the strike.-
Accordingly, we find that the Respondent, by refusing to reinstate
the striking employees who unconditionally applied for reinstate-
Amory Garment Co , 80 N. L R B. 1S2, Matter of Cookeville Shirt Co, 79 N. L. R. B. 667.
See also Matter of Union Manufacturing Company, 76 N. L. R. B. 322.
In the Scripto case, which, like the instant case, wks concerned with an employer located
in Georgia , the immunity from suit of the union involved was specifically brought to the
attention of the Board The Board , however , rejected the contention of the employer that
the union 's immunity provided justification for the conditions which the employer sought
to impose upon bargaining.
Y Our conclusion that the Respondent refused to bargain collectively is made without
reference to the additional arguments of the General Counsel based upon the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, by the terms of which a labor organization is made suable
in the district courts of the United States for the breach of a contract with an employer.
10 In any event, an unfair labor practice strike does not lose its character as such merely
because economic reasons may also have contributed to the work stoppage . N. L. R. B. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 871-872 (C. A. 2), cert. denied 304 U. S 576;
N. L. R. B. v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F. (2d) 167 , 175-176 (C A 3), cert. denied 308 U. S.
605; Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472, 478 (C. A. 3) modified as to
other provisions 311 U S. 7; Matter of Brown Radio Service and Laboratory , 70 N. L. R. B.
476
"Matter of Remington Rand, supra; Matter of Polish National Alliance of the United
States, 42 N. L. R. B. 1375, 1397 , enforced except as to other provisions, sub nom, Polish
National Alliance v. N. L R B., 136 F. ( 2d) 175 ( C. A. 7), affirmed 322 U S. 643
The Respondent is not relieved of the duty to reinstate its employees by the fact that it
may have in good faith believed that it was not committing an unfair labor practice See
Rapid Roller Co. v. N. L R B, 126 F. ( 2d) 452 , 460 (C. A 7).
1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment,12 discriminated against them with respect to the hire and tenure
of their employment, thereby discouraging membership in the Union,
and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
3. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent did not violate the
Act either by interrogating George Washington Bell with respect
to his union affiliation or by granting Bell a wage increase. As Bell
occupied the dual status of both an employee of the Respondent and a
part-time personal servant of Kirk, the Respondent's vice president,
the Trial Examiner, finding that Kirk was motivated in questioning
Bell by his desire to protect confidential records belonging to his em-
ployers and kept at Kirk's home, concluded that the interrogation of
Bell was privileged under the circumstances. The Trial Examiner
also concluded that the wage increase was not granted to induce Bell
to withdraw from the Union, as alleged in the complaint, but was for
the purpose of putting him on a wage parity with other employees of
the Respondent. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's con-
clusions on either of these issues.
We think it significant, as reflecting on Kirk's actual reason for
interrogating Bell, that Kirk responded to the knowledge that Bell
was a union member by granting him an immediate wage increase;
and not until a considerably later date, after the Union and the Re-
spondent had reached an impasse in their bargaining and the Union
had served a strike notice, did Kirk take the obvious measure to pro-
tect the records left in his safekeeping, which was to remove his
house key from Bell's custody. The record, moreover, shows that
before the advent of union activities in the plant, Bell had complained
to Kirk concerning his rate of pay as a plant employee, and Kirk had
promised to look into the matter. However, it was not until union
activities had begun, and after he had found out by interrogating
Bell that Bell was a member of the Union, that Kirk granted the wage
increase to Bell. Under these circumstances, we do not agree with
Kirk's explanation that the granting of the wage increase was not
related to the current union activities, and we find, accordingly, that
the effect of the interrogation together with the granting of such eco-
17 Louise Pointer , Doris Teasley , Doris Rogers , Hula Cashon , Jane Youngblood, Sarah
Dennington , Ralph Orr , and Newt M . Holloway.
Although the Respondent contends that Rogers and Dennington were placed "beyond the
protection of the Act" by their participation during the course of the strike In an assault and
battery upon an employee who commenced to work for the Respondent after the inception
of the strike , no evidence was adduced to show that the incident was the cause of their
rejection , or even that the Respondent was aware of it when the Respondent refused to
reinstate these employees . We find, therefore , that this incident was not the cause of such
refusal As to whether such conduct bars reinstatement , see section entitled "Remedy,"
infra.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1005
nomic benefit was coercive, and that together these acts constituted
conduct violative of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
The effect of the unfair labor practices upon commerce
The activities of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section
I of the Intermediate Report, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
The Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in the unfair labor
practices set forth above, we shall order that it cease and desist there-
from and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent refused to bargain collec-
tively with the Union as the representative of its employees in an
appropriate unit. Accordingly, we shall order the Respondent to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment, and if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
written agreement.
We have found that the Respondent's refusal to bargain with the
Union was the underlying cause precipitating and prolonging a strike
at the Respondent's plant, and that the Respondent discriminated in
regard to the hire and tenure of employment of eight striking em-
ployees who unconditionally applied for, and were denied, reinstate-
ment. We shall therefore order that the Respondent offer to the six 1S
employees who have not yet been offered reinstatement, immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions,14 without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and priv-
ileges, and that the Respondent make them whole for loss of pay they
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, by
payment to each of them a sum of money equal to that which he or
she normally would have earned as wages during the periods : (1)
"Louise Painter, Hula Casbon , Doris Rogers , Jane Youngblood , Ralph Orr, and
Newt M. Holloway.
14 In accordance with the Board's consistent interpretation of the term , the expression
"former or substantially equivalent position" is intended to mean "former position wherever
possible and if such position is no longer in existence then to a substantially equivalent
position " See Matter of The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 N L. R. B. 827.
1006 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from the date of the Respondent's refusal to reinstate him or her
until September 23, 1948, the date of the Intermediate Report,15 and
(2) from the date of our Decision and Order herein to the date of
the Respondent's offer of reinstatement; less his or her net earnings 16
during such periods. As the Respondent offered to reinstate Sarah
Dennington'17 and Doris Teasley prior to the hearing in this case,
Dennington declining employment and Teasley accepting it, we shall
not order that the Respondent offer them reinstatement, but shall
order that each of them be made whole for loss of pay she may have
suffered from the date of the Respondent's discrimination against her
to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement.
The Respondent asserts that Doris Rogers, one of the striking em-
ployees, should be denied reinstatement because she pleaded guilty in
a Georgia court to a charge of assault and battery upon a girl who
had begun to work for the Respondent during the strike. The inci-
dent, which occurred away from the Respondent's premises, involved
a verbal interchange, hair pulling, and fisticuffs; no weapon was
used. While we do not condone violence in any form, we do not con-
sider the minor offense committed to be of such serious nature as to
render Rogers unfit for employment and to warrant withholding the
normal remedies of reinstatement and the award of back pay 18
The violations of the Act which the Respondent committed are
persuasively related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the
Act, and the danger of their commission in the future is to be antici-
pated from the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive pur-
poses of the Act will be thwarted unless our order is coextensive with
the threat. In order, therefore, to make more effective the interde-
pendent guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair
labor practices, and thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens
11 As the Trial Examiner did not recommend their reinstatement, in accordance with
the Board's general practice in such cases, we exclude from the back-pay award to these
employees the period from the date of the Intermediate Report to the date of our Decision
and Order.
16 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the Respondent, which would not have been incurred but for the unlawful
discrimination and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See
Matter of Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L R. B 440. Monies received for work per-
formed upon Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects shall be
considered as earnings See Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7.
li Dennington was present at the time Rogers committed the assault discussed herein,
but was not a participant. We perceive no reason why she was thereby placed beyond
the "protection of the Act," as contended by the Respondent ; it is to be noted, moreover,
that the Respondent itself did not consider Denningon unfit for employment, as indicated
by its offer of reinstatement to her
Is See N. L. R B. v. Stackpole Carbon Cc, 105 F (2d) 167, 176 (C. A 3), cert. denied
308 U. S. 605; Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472, 479-480 (C. A. 3),
modified as to other provisions 311 U. S 7; Matter of Berkshire Knitting Mills, 46
N L It. B. 955, 1002-1004, enforced as modified 139 F. (2d) 134 (C A. 3), cert. denied
322 U. S 747.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1007
and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act,
we shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from infringing in
any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Southern Federation of Telephone Workers is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act and the amended
Act.
2. At all times material herein, all employees of the Respondent at
its Dalton, Georgia, telephone exchange and plant, excluding guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, consti-
tuted, and now constitute, an appropriate unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act and
the amended Act.
3. Southern Federation of Telephone Workers, on March 11, 1947,
was, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representative
of all employees in the above unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act and the amended
Act.
4. By refusing to bargain collectively with Southern Federation of
Telephone Workers, as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the
Act and Section 8 (a) (5) of the amended Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of the employees named in the Order below, thereby discouraging
membership in Southern Federation of Telephone Workers, the Re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act and Section 8 (a) (3)
of the amended Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and the
amended Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act and
Section 8 (a) (1) of the amended Act.
7. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act and the amended Act.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent , Dalton Telephone
Company, and its officers , agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Southern Federation of
Telephone Workers as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees of the Respondent at its Dalton, Georgia, telephone ex-
change and plant, excluding guards , professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act ;
(b) Discouraging membership in Southern Federation of Tele-
phone Workers, or in any other labor organization of its employees,
by refusing to reinstate any of its employees, or in any other manner
discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of their employment;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations , to join or assist Southern Federation of Tele-
phone Workers, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act,
as guaranteed in Section 7 thereof.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Southern Federation
of Telephone Workers as the exclusive representative of all employees
of the Respondent at its Dalton, Georgia, telephone exchange and
plant, excluding guards, professional employees, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed written agreement;
(b) Offer to Louise Painter, Hula Cashon, Doris Rogers, Jane
Youngblood, Ralph Orr, and Newt M. Holloway immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges;
(c) Make whole the persons named in the preceding paragraph for
any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's
discrimination against them, by payment to each of them a sum of
money equal to the amount which he or she normally would have
earned as wages during the periods : (1) from the date of the Respond-
ent's refusal to reinstate him or her to September 23, 1948, the date of
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1009
the Intermediate Report herein, and (2) from the date of our Decision
and Order herein to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment; less his net earnings during such periods;
(d) Make whole Doris Teasley and Sarah Dennington for any loss
of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's dis-
crimination against them by payment to each of them a sum of money
equal to the amount which she normally would have earned as wages
during the period from the date of the Respondent's refusal to rein-
state her to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less
her net earnings during said period ;
(e) Post at its telephone exchange and plant in Dalton, Georgia,
copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A." 19 Copies
of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth
Region, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's representative,
be posted immediately by the Respondent upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material ; and
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the Respondent violated Section 8 (3) of the Act by discriminatorily
discharging Thelma Cantrell, and insofar as it further alleges that
the Respondent violated Section 8 (1) of the Act by conduct other
than that found to be violative in this Decision and Order, be, and it
hereby is, dismissed.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist SOUTHERN FEDERA-
TION OF TELEPHONE WORKERS, or any other labor organization, to
"In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a Court of Appeals, there shall
be inserted in the notice, before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER," the words :
"A DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING "
1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to re-
frain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above-
named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment,
and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is :
ALL our employees at the Dalton, Georgia, telephone ex-
change and plant, excluding guards, professional employees,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL OFFER the employees named below immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and priv-
ileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole, in the manner
provided in the Decision and Order, for any loss of pay suffered
as a result of the discrimination.
Louise Painter
Hula Cashon
Doris Rogers
Jane Youngblood
Ralph Orr
Newt M. Holloway
WE WILL MAKE WHOLE the employees named below for any loss
of pay suffered as a result of the discriminatory delay in offering
to reinstate them.
Doris Teasley
Sarah Dennington
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-named union or any other labor organization. We will not dis-
criminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment against any employee because of membership
in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Employer.
By ----------------------------------
Dated-------------------- ( Representative ) (Title)
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1011
NoTE.-Any of the above named employees presently serving in the
armed forces of the United States will be offered full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act after
discharge from the armed forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date thereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
ERRATA
The undersigned issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled case on
September 23, 1948.
It appears that inadvertently the date of service of the so-called second amended
charge erroneously appears in footnote 2, page 1Q11, as August 15, 1948, rather
than August 15, 1947, the correct date of said service ; that the prefix "non" was
omitted before the word "supervisory" on line 40, page 1015 of this report ; and
that the word "not" was omitted between the words "could" and "be" on line
7, page 1016 of the report.
It is hereby ordered that the date of service of the second amended charge be
corrected in footnote 2 to read August 15, 1947; that the prefix "non" be inserted
before the word "supervisory" one line 40, page 1015; and that the word "not" be
inserted between the words "could" and "be" on line 7, page 1016 of the said Inter-
mediate Report.
HENRY J. KENT,
Trial Examiner.
Dated October 12, 1948.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
William M. Pate, Esq., for the General Counsel.
R. Carter Pittman, Esq., of Dalton, Ga., and Legare Davis, Esq., of Atlanta,
Ga., for the Respondent.
Irwin Panken, Esq. (for Henry Mayer, General Counsel for the Union), for
the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a third amendd charge field on March 25, 1948, by Southern Federation of
Telephone Workers, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board; by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta,
Georgia), issued a complaint dated March 26, 1948, against Dalton Telephone
Company, herein called the Respondent, alleging that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat.
449, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136,
herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, all charges filed by the Union
and served upon the Respondent,' with notice of hearing thereon were duly served
upon the parties.
2 The General Counsel and his representative in this case are referred to herein as the
General Counsel. The National Labor Relations Board is referred to as the Board.
2 It is noted that the so-called original charge filed on December 20, 1946, was served
upon the Respondent on June 27, 1947 ; that a first amended charge was filed on March 13,
1947, and served upon the Respondent on June 27, 1947; that a second amended charge
filed August 14, 1947, was served upon the Respondent on August 15, 1948, and that the
third amended charge filed on March 25, 1948, was served simultaneously with a copy of the
complaint
1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended, alleged
in substance that the Respondent (1) on or about November 15, 1946, and there-
after refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of the Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit; (2) that on or about
April 2, 1947, Respondent discharged Thelma Cantrell because of her membership
and activity on behalf of the Union; (3) that on various dates in July 1947,
Respondent refused to employ and to restore to their former positions eight other
employees who went on strike on April 16, 1947, allegedly because of Respondent's
refusal to bargain and the discharge of Cantrell ; and (4) from on or about October
1, 1946, and thereafter the Respondent interrogated its employees concerning
their union affiliation and activities, threatened and warned employees to refrain
from assisting, becoming members, or remaining members of the Union, and
promised them wage increases and better working conditions if they refrained
from assisting or affiliating with the Union.
In its answer duly filed the Respondent generally admitted the factual allega-
tions concerning the nature of its business operations, but denied engaging in
any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. It further affirma-
tively averred that it negotiated and tentatively agreed with the Union upon
substantially all terms and provisions of a contract covering working conditions
and wages of its employees with the Union and that it only refused to sign this
agreement after the Union (an unincorporated association) refused to file a cer-
tificate (pursuant to certain provisions in the code of Georgia) stating the names
of its officers and furnishing other data regarding its status, because such asso-
ciations were not legally responsible for breaches of contract absent the filing
of such certificates. The answer further averred that Cantrell had been law-
fully discharged and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because
the charge on which the complaint was based was filed more than 6 months after
the alleged unfair labor practices occurred and also 6 months after August 22,
1947, the effective date of the amended Act.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from May 17 to May 20, 1948, at Dalton,
Georgia, before the undersigned Trial Examiner duly designated to conduct the
hearing by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Respondent,
and the Union were all represented by counsel and participated in the hearing.
Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and in-
troduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded the parties.
At the opening of the hearing the undersigned denied without prejudice and
reserved for further consideration Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that the charge upon which the complaint was based was not
timely filed This motion was grounded upon the proviso within Section 10 (b)
of the amended Act which became effective on August 22, 1947, that states :
No complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring
more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the
service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is
made . . .
The record discloses that the last amended charge was filed on March 25, 1948,
that it was attached to and served with the complaint issued on March 26, 1948.
If this charge had been the only charge filed and served upon the Respondent,
the motion to dismiss would have been well taken, because the record shows
not only that all unfair labor practices stated in the charge occurred more than
6 months prior to the filing of the charge, but also that this charge was not
filed within 6 months after the effective (late of the amended Act. However,
the record further shows that an underlying charge (the so-called second
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1013
amended charge) had been filed by the Union on August 14, 1947, and that it was
thereafter duly served upon the Respondent on August 15, 1947. Consequently,
under the provisions of the original Act, the Respondent received timely notice
that the Union was seeking to initiate a cause of action. All averments in the
last charge attached and served with the complaint were substantially identical
with those in the second amended charge except that in the earlier charge three
additional employees were named as discriminatory dischargees whose names
were deleted in the last charge filed and who also were not named in the com-
plaint as discriminatory dischargees. Consequently, the last charge did not
result in any broadening or enlargement of the cause of action brought, but
rather narrowed it. While the undersigned believes that the acceptance and
adoption of the third amended charge as the apparent basis for the issuance of
a complaint may have been improvident and ill-advised, the Respondent was not
prejudiced by the procedure followed. At most, the purpose of a charge is to give
notice to prospective respondents that the person filing it is seeking the aid of the
Board to remedy alleged unfair labor practices and the alleged reasons for
doing so. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Indiana cE
Michigan Electric Company case,' "The charge is not proof It merely sets in
motion the machinery of an inquiry When a Board complaint issues the ques-
tion is only the truth of its accusations. The charge does not even serve the pur-
pose of a pleading." [Emphasis supplied.] Accordingly, the undersigned con-
cludes that the underlying second amended charge which was filed by the Union
on August 14, 1947, and thereafter served upon the Respondent on August 15,
1947, affords it sufficient basis for the issuance of the complaint herein. The
Respondent's contention would only have merit if Section 10 (b) of the amended
Act were gig en retroactive effect. Since this said Section merely effects a pro-
cedural c ange in the oiiginal Act it may only be regarded as having prospective
application.' The above motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
At the opening of the hearing, over objection from counsel for the Union, the
undersigned granted a motion by the Respondent to exclude all witnesses from
the bearing room, except two for each of the respective parties.
The General Counsel upon resting his case-in-chief moved to amend paragraph
9 in his complaint to show that the date of the alleged refusal to bargain was
"November 15, 1946, and at all times thereafter." The motion was granted
without objection. At this time Respondent's counsel also moved to dismiss the
complaint for the reason that the proof failed to support any of the allegations,
which motion was denied without prejudice to later renewal
At the close of the case, counsel for Respondent renewed his earlier motions
and in addition moved to dismiss the specific allegations relating to the dis-
criminatory discharge of Thelma Cantrell on the ground that his proof offered
shows Cantrell was discharged for lawful cause. The undersigned reserved rul-
ing and the motions are disposed of below in the findings and conclusions in this
report. At this time, the undersigned also granted a motion by the General
Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof in respect to formal matters. The
parties were afforded an opportunity to present oral argument, but waived it.
All parties were granted 15 days to file briefs with the undersigned. Thereafter
time to file briefs was extended to July 15, 1948, by the Chief Trial Examiner.
Briefs were duly filed by counsel for the Respondent and the Union.
See N L. R. B . v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, et at, 318 U. S 9, 18.
' See N. L. R B v Caroline Mills, Inc, 167 F. (2d) 212 (C C A. 5) ; N L. R B v
Gate City Cotton Mills , 167 F (2d) 647 (C C. A. 5) ; George H. Clark, d/b/a Clark Phono-
graph Record Co , 78 N I, R B. 34 ; Matter of Briggs Manufacturing Co , 75 N L R. B. 569
838914-50-vol 82-65
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Dalton Telephone Company is a Georgia corporation, having its principal office
at Dalton, Georgia. It operates a telephone exchange at Dalton, Georgia, having
approximately 2,000 subscribers In the course of its operations it handles
long distance telephone calls transmitted over the lines of the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company and affiliated companies to and from other States
of the United States and the State of Georgia. During the calendar year 1947,
which is representative of the Respondent's operations at all times herein mate-
rial, the Respondent's revenue from its business operations was approximately
$80,000, approximately 20 percent of which represents long distance calls to and
from points outside the State of Georgia. It is found that Respondent is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
H. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Southern Federation of Telephone Workers, affiliated with Communication
Workers of America, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees
of the Respondent.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of material events
1. The bargaining negotiations
Insofar as the record shows, the first effort made to organize the Respondent's
employees commenced about the middle of October 1946, when the Union initiated
an organizing campaign among them. In the next few weeks many of the em-
ployees signed membership cards for the Union.
On November 15, 1946, Harvey Tweedy, a vice president of the Union, S. E.
Sims, director for the Union in charge of organization in the State of Georgia,
Respondent's vice president, J. E. Kirk, and Respondent's legal advisor, R. Carter
Pittman, Esq, met at Dalton, Georgia, pursuant to a request from the Union that
a conference be held to discuss bargaining negotiations. At this meeting the
Union offered its signed membership cards for inspection by the Respondent as
proof of its claim that it was majority representative of Respondent's non-super-
visory employees. The cards were turned over to Kirk's secretary, Miss Ruth
Mauldin, who proceeded to privately check the validity of the signatures thereon.
Shortly thereafter Miss Mauldin reported back that her check disclosed a majority
of the non-supervisory employees had signed the cards, whereupon the Respond-
ent signed a written statement agreeing to recognize the Union as exclusive bar-
gaining representative for the non-supervisory employees.
At this same meeting, after a general discussion regarding working condi-
tions and the negotiation of a prospective contract, the Respondent asserted it
would not sign a written contract with the Union unless and until the latter filed
a certificate with the clerk of the Superior Court in the local county of Respond-
5 The findings under this subheading are based upon the testimony of the Union's repre-
sentatives , Tweedy and Sims, and Vice-President Kirk for the Respondent which is in
substantial accord
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1015
ent's domicile in the State of Georgia pursuant to the provisions of the Georgia
code, pertaining to unincorporated associations.'
The second bargaining conference between the Union's and Respondent's rep-
resentatives was held at the Union's office at Atlanta, Georgia, early in December
1946. At this meeting the Union submitted a proposed agreement covering all
terms and conditions for a final agreement. The Respondent requested that a
provision regl:iring the Union to file a registration certifi $te in Georgia and a
no-strike clause, not contained in the Union's proposed agreement, also be in-
cluded in the contract. As a result of negotiations the Respondent agreed sub-
stantially to nearly all of the Union's proposals, but the Union refused to agree to
include either the no-strike, or a provision for filing a registration certificate,
clauses demanded by Respondent
Thereafter, several more negotiation meetings were held, some of them in At-
lanta and others in Dalton At these meetings the principal bone of contention
arose out of the Respondent's insistence that the Union file a registration certifi-
cate in Georgia and the inclusion of a no-strike clause in the contract.
The last formal bargaining conference was held at the Union's office in Atlanta
on March 11, 1947. At or prior to this meeting, the Respondent had waived its
demand for a no-strike clause and evidenced its willingness to exclude an express
provision in the contract that the Union should file a registration certificate in
Georgia providing it, in fact, would file such a certificate. By this time an, agree_
meut had been rer shed and reduced to writing concerning wages and all other
provisions of the contract insisted upon by the Union, but the Union persisted in
its refusal to file a registration certificate.
On this same day, after the failure of the parties to consummate the agreement,
Vice-President Kirk sent the following letter to the Union :
The Dalton Telephone Company has asked the Southern Federation of
Telephone Workers, in its negotiations, to register which you are familiar
with, so that the Union will be made responsible the same as the Company,
and the Union up until this time has refused to do so. The Company does
hereby withdraw all offers made to your Union.
On the following day, March 12, 1947, the Union's vice president, Tweedy, sent
the following strike notice to the Respondent :
This is to advise you pursuant to Georgia Act #293-1941, Section 3, that
the Southern Federation of Telephone Workers has this day filed a strike
notice with Honorable Paul Herzog, Chairman National Labor Relations
Board and with Honorable Lewis Schwellenbach, Secretary of Labor, pur-
suant to War Labor Disputes Act, of intention to strike on behalf of non-
supeivisory employees employed by your Company.
Thereatter, on April 16, 1947, all but 4 or 5 of about 30 supervisory employees of
Respondent went out on strike The strike continued until July 1947, when 8 of
the employees who had engaged in the strike applied for reinstatement. The
Respondent refused to reinstate any of them for the asserted reason that it had a
full complement of employees, as further discussed below.
During the first few weeks of the strike, union representatives and the Re-
spondent's vice president, Kirk, re-negotiated and signed a collective bargaining
agreement covering non-supervisory employees of the United Telephone and
U It was the Respondent's position, and the contention was not challenged by the Union,.
that voluntary associations may not sue or be sued for breaches of contract under the law
of Georgia.
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Telegraph Company at Dothan, Alabama.' During these negotiations in con-
nection with the "United" contract there was some incidental discussion con-
cerning a settlement of the strike at Dalton and execution of the contract.
The record shows that at some of these meetings Kirk informed the union
representatives the Respondent had not insisted upon the inclusion of a union
responsibility clause in the "United" contract because under the Alabama laws
an unincorporated labor organization could be sued in the courts of Alabama
for breaches of contract, that Kirk renewed his offer to sign the proposed agree-
ment previously and tentatively agreed upon by the Union and the Respondent
for Dalton if the Union would file a registration certificate in Georgia, but
that the Union refused to do so.
Thereafter, on June 24, 1947, the Union sent a telegram to Kirk stating, "Desire
conference Friday June 27, to execute contract. Request meeting be held at
11: 00 A. M." . . . [at Atlanta.] The following day Kirk replied by telegram
saying, "Please refer my letter to you of March Eleventh,' I will be out of
the State until Monday June Thirtieth."
Tweedy admitted that the request to bargain, made on June 24, was the last
formal request to bargain made by the Union. He further testified on re-direct
without denial that in a telephone conversation with Kirk sometime in July
1947, concerning the Alabama contract with "United," Tweedy told Kirk that
he thought the recent amendments to the former National Labor Relations Act
should satisfy the Respondent's former requirement concerning union responsi-
bility, but said Kirk denied it.
2. The discharge of Thelma Cantrell
Thelma Cantrell was first employed by the Respondent as telephone operator,
in August 1940. She continued to work regularly on this job until she was
discharged on April 2, 1947, for the asserted reason that she violated company
rules by talking while on duty at the switchboard and also after being specifically
reprimanded for it by Vice-President Kirk. The Respondent admits that she
was a competent telephone operator. On or about January 3, 1948, she was
offered reemployment by Respondent , but did not accept.
As found above, the Union commenced its organizational campaign about the
middle of October 1946; on November 15, 1946, following a check of cards, the
Respondent in writing accorded recognition to the Union as exclusive repre-
sentative for its non-supervisory employees. According to Cantrell she did
not join the Union until March 17, 1947. After joining it, two meetings of the
organization were held at Cantrell's house, the first on some undisclosed date in
March and the second on April 15, 1947, or about 2 weeks after her discharge.'
According to Vice-President Kirk's credible and undenied testimony, the
telephone in his office rang a few minutes after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of
April 1, 1947. There was no one on the line when he answered the call and
4 Kirk was an officer of the "United " in charge of labor relations policy for that Com-
pany. The "United" was a larger concern employing about 240 employees whereas
Respondent had a total pay roll of about 40.
"It will be noted that the March 11 letter set forth above calls attention to the refusal
.of the Union to file a registration certificate in Georgia and withdraws Respondent's
tentative agreement to the Union 's proposed contract.
L The record is somewhat confused concerning the dates of these meetings . Cantrell
testified that the first one was held before her discharge and later asserted that it was
held on or about March 20, 1947 , and that the second was held about 1 week later.
The record clearly shows that the second one at her home was not held until April 15,
1947 , nearly 2 weeks after her discharge.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1017
after hanging up the telephone he called the switchboard and Cantrell answered
his call; he then said to her, "this telephone rang and I am getting darn tired of
this telephone ringing when no one is on the line. This is the first time it
has happened and something is going to be done about it." Cantrell replied,
"I did not ring this number," whereupon Kirk said, "I am not accusing you of
ringing it . . . but somebody is going to be fired for it, if I find out who did it." 10
Kirk said: a few minutes later, he went to the office of the cashier (a new
employee) to learn if she had properly listed the receipts for that day; that
when he was in the cashier's office, which adjoined the switchboard room, he
beard Cantrell relating to some of the other operators what had transpired
during his conversation with her pertaining to the blind call incident; that he
then stepped to the door leading into the operator's room and said "'Cant' that
is not to be discussed any more at the board, and I don't want to hear any more
of it." He further testified that he then returned to his own office and plugged
in the monitor to Cantrell's headset; that when listening over the monitor
device he overheard Cantrell resume the discussion concerning the blind can
incident and continue to talk about it with other operators working next to her
until 6 o'clock ; that (luring this period he overheard Lulu McLure, the assistant
chief operator, reprimand Cantrell and other operators for talking at the board
on two occasions, but that Cantell disregarded McLure's orders and still con-
tinued to talk; and he said that during the period Cantrell only handled 15 or
20 telephone calls when she should have taken approximately 100.11
Assistant Chief Operator McLure, called as witness for the Respondent, gen-
erally corroborated Kirk's version in respect to talking at the Board on the
afternoon of April 1. She said after Kirk had reprimanded Cantell, that on tw"
occasions after he had left the room she ordered the girls to stop talking, and
that an each of these two occasions Cantrell was participating in the discussions.
Cantrell asserted during her cross-examination that she did not hear the
reprimand Kirk directed to her and said that after she made an inquiry of
some of the other girls regarding what Kirk had said, she stopped talking to
other operators until she left the switchboard at 6 o'clock 12 She later admitted
that, at least, she heard Kirk order that talking at the board cease.
Basing his conclusions on all of the evidence and his observation of the wit-
nesses, the undersigned finds the versions of Kirk and McLure to be the more
credible and he accepts their versions in respect to Cantrell's conduct at the
Board on that afternoon as the more credible.
Kirk met Cantrell in the hall at 6 o'clock when she was leaving the building to
go for dinner. He told her, not to return for work that night, but to report at
his office at 10 o'clock on the next morning. When Cantrell reported there on
the following morning, Kirk accused her of failing to obey his order to stop
10 Kirk also testified that customarily he and Ruth Mauldin , his secretary, left the office
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that he had learned the telephone frequently rang after
they had left and suspected that some operator was ringing it to ascertain if any one was
in the office checking on the operators over the monitor device installed there many years
ago to check on the work of the operators.
11 The record shows that on March 1, 1947, Kirk had spoken to all of the operators
regarding seriice to subscribers and especially called attention to a rule prohibiting con-
versations at the "board," and that on the same day a notice was posted in the operators'
room concerning this and other rules. Kirk credibly asserts that this meeting was called
shortly after he had learned that employees of the utilities commission for the State of
Georgia were coming to Dalton to check on telephone service.
12 Hula Hinton , another operator called to testify by the General Counsel, testified that
she heard Kirk reprimand Cantrell for talking and further asserted Cantrell said nothing
further after the reprimand.
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
talking at the switchboard. Cantrell denied she had done so . According to
Kirk he then related to her some of the remarks she made while he was listen-
ing in on her head-set. Cantrell again denied having done so Kirk then said
she was lying to him and discharged her.'3 He further testified that if she had
not adopted to a belligerent attitude during this occasion and offered some excuse
for her conduct he might not have summarily discharged her. On January 3,
1948, Respondent offered her reinstatement, but she did not accept the job.
Kirk also asserts that he had no knowledge concerning Cantrell's union activi-
ties at the time he discharged her. There is no direct evidence in the record
showing that he had such knowledge. His testimony in this respect was not
convincingly discredited or impeached and the undersigned from his observation
concluded that he was a reliable and trustworthy witness. Accordingly he ac-
cepts Kirk's testimony regarding the matter as credible and finds it to be true.
3. The refusal to reinstate eight strikers in July 1947
As found above, the Respondent signed a written agreement to recognize the
Union as exclusive representative of the non-supervisory employees on November
15, 1946; that thereafter on March 11, 1947, after numerous bargaining con-
ferences held either at Dalton or Atlanta, Georgia, the parties were in sub-
stantial agreement on all provisions of a contract concerning wages and
working conditions but before signing the agreement Respondent was insistent,
as it had been from the beginning of the negotiations, that the union file a
registration certificate in the State of Georgia, as an unincorporated association.
Following the refusal of the Union to file such a certificate, the Respondent in
effect notified the Union in writing on March 11 that an impasse had been reached
and further negotiations would be futile. On the following day, March 12, 1947,
the Union duly filed a notice of intention to strike.
On April 16, 1947, substantially all non-supervisory employees, except 4 or 5
of approximately 30 persons in this category, went out on srtike. A picket line
was maintained in front of the exchange building for several weeks. Except
for one incident during the strike, in which it appears that Doris Rogers, a strik-
ing operator, admittedly pleaded guilty to an assault upon a new employee who
accepted work as an operator during the strike, there was no violence during
the strike.
During two or three conferences held in April or May the Union offered to
,call off the strike if the Respondent would agree to reinstate all of the strikers
and in addition reinstate Cantrell and two or three other employees who had been
discharged during some few months previous to the strike. The Respondent re-
fused to entertain the offer unless the Union agreed to file a registration cer-
tificate in Georgia, which the Union refused to do.
New employees had been hired to replace striking employees and by the early
part of June, the Respondent had a full complement of employees on its pay roll.
As previously found above, the Union by telegram dated June 24, 1947, re-
quested another bargaining conference to be held at Atlanta, Georgia, on June
27. Kirk, the Respondent's bargaining representative, by a reply telegram dated
June 25, stated that he would be out of the State until June 30. Thereafter
no further request to bargain was made by the Union.
13 It is noted that the rule prohibiting talking at the switchboard had been enforced
before any union activities had commenced Louise Trentham, another Operator, had been
discharged for violating the rule on September 8, 1946
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1019
On or about July 3, 1947, six of the striking operators" filed written applica-
tions for reinstatement in the following form :
I hereby unconditionally apply for reinstatement to my job. I did so
personally on and was refused work. This letter is written to
afford you another opportunity to permit me to work.
Previous thereto, on the same day or a day or two earlier, all of the above-
named six employees, except possibly Youngblood,' had verbally requested Kirk
to reinstate them. At the time, Kirk requested them to sign new applications
for employment, but they all refused stating, in substance, that they presently
considered themselves to be employees entitled to reinstatement. None of them
have since been employed, except Doris Teasley, who was offered and acceVted
an operator's job a few weeks before the hearing.16
Thereafter, Ralph Orr and "Newt." Holloway, two employees in the plant
department who had gone out on strike, went to the Respondent's office, Orr on
July 8 and Holloway on July 25, 1947, to seek reinstatement. According to Orr,
Superintendent Lamb told Orr that Respondent had a full crew then and
would notify Orr later if a job became available. Orr was never called to
report for work. The Respondent credibly asserts without contradiction that no
additional plant employees were thereafter hired, but that since that time two
of such employees then working have been laid off because of lack of work."
4. Other alleged interference, restraint, and coercion
a. The interrogation of George Washington Bell concerning his union affiliation
The record shows that in addition to being a plant department employee of
the Respondent for many years, Bell was also a part-time personal servant at
Kirk's hone. He took care of the furnace and did other odd jobs when called
upon.19 Bell for several years carried a key to the basement door and entry
to the basement gave Bell access to all parts of the house.
In addition to Kirk's duties as managerial officer of the Respondent, he was
also managerial officer of a much larger telephone company at Dothan, Alabama,
with which latter concern an agreement with the Union had been signed during
the strike at Respondent's plant. He was also managerial officer of several
smaller telephone companies operated in various cities located in Georgia or
Alabama. His duties often required him to be absent for several days from his
home at Dalton and frequently his family went with him on business trips. Kirk
kept confidential records of the Respondent and other companies, in a room at
his home which he used as an office.
Bell testified that one morning in the fall of 1946, after the Union had com-
menced to organize the Respondent's employees, he was at Kirk's home and the
latter asked him if he had joined the Union. Bell further testified that when he
replied "yes," Kirk in substance remarked that he thought Bell would have been
14 Louise Painter, Doris Rogers, Jane Youngblood , Doris Teasley , Hula Cashon, Sara
Dennington.
15 Youngblood gave no testimony at the hearing.
16 Sarah Dennington also testified that she had been offered a job in February 1948, but
refused to accept it.
17 Holloway gave no testimony at the hearing.
is The Respondent paid Bell by check for services rendered to it. Either Kirk or his
wife paid Bell in cash for personal services rendered . Kirk paid the charges on a telephone
installed in Bell's home several years earlier to enable Kirk to call Bell when Kirk wanted
Bell to perform some special service.
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the last one to join it in view of their long association ; that Bell replied he had
done so to secure a wage increase and better working conditions , because he
believed some of the white employees were paid higher wages than Bell for doing
the same work Bell was doing ; that Kirk then asked him what his current wages
were ; and that when Bell told Kirk he was earning 70 cents an hour, Kirk
said he would raise his wages to 85 cents and told Bell not to mention their
conversation . Thereafter Bell was paid 85 cents an hour by the Respondent.
Bell admitted that the conversation had at all times been carried on in a
friendly vein , that Kirk told him he had a right to join the Union and did not
threaten him with any reprisals if he continued to remain a member of the
Union, and he said that each of them freely expressed their personal viewpoints
regarding unions.
Kirk admitted that he had asked Bell if the latter had joined the Union and
asserted at the hearing that his sole purpose for doing so was because he was
concerned about the possibility of a union adherent having ready access to the
confidential records of the various companies he was associated with. He said
he made it plaint td Bell that the latter had a right to join the Union . He also
credibly asserted without denial that a short time previous to the conversation
testified to above by Bell, and before any union activities had commenced, Bell
had called upon him at his office and complained to Kirk that the Respondent
was paying Bell lower wages than other employees were receiving for similar
work; that , on that occasion , Kirk promised Bell to investigate the matter and
remedy the situation if Bell's complaint had merit; and that the increase given
Bell merely brought Bell 's wages in line with the rates paid to other employees
doing similar work.
Following the above-related conversation between Kirk and Bell, Bell continued
to hold both jobs until a few days after the Union served the strike notice on
March 12. Kirk said he then decided to take his house key from Bell and to
hire another person not employed by the Respondent to do the work about his
home that Bell had been doing . He told Bell that he was turning the house
job over to someone else and asked for the key to the house Bell was carrying.
Kirk further credibly testified that because the telephone service he was pay-
ing for at Bell's home was no longer any benefit to Kirk he told General Super-
intendent Lamb to tell Bell that Bell would have to pay for service in the future
if the telephone remained there. Bell asserts that when Lamb notified Bell
regarding the order to charge Bell for service, Bell asked "why " and said Lamb
replied, "Because , you are in the Union , I reckon."
Lamb categorically denied having mentioned the Union at the time. Since
there was no reason why Kirk or the Respondent should continue to furnish
Bell with free telephone service, there was no occasion for Lamb to make such
a remark, and the undersigned credits Lamb's denial that he made it.
Bell went out on the strike with the other union adherents on April 16, 1947.
After the strike was over, he made no application for reemployment and is no
longer an employee of the Respondent.
The General Counsel and the Union contend in effect that by interrogating
Bell concerning his union membership and by granting him a wage increase for
the apparent purpose of inducing him to withdraw from the union as alleged in
the complaint, the Respondent has violated Sections 7 and S ( 1) of the Act The
undersigned does not agree.
Kirk 's purpose in interrogating Bell regarding his Union affiliation, under
the circumstances existing in this case , was not to pry into matters of sole
concern to an employee, but rather as Kirk credibly explained to determine
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1021
whether Kirk should take steps to protect confidential records belonging to
Kirk's employers.19 In view of the novel relationship existing between the Re-
spondent, Kirk, and Bell, the undersigned is of the opinion that the general
principle evolved by the Board, namely, that interrogation regarding union
affiliation of an employee by his employer is per se a violation of the Act should
not be controlling in reaching a decision herein.
The evidence has also failed to convince the undersigned that the Respondent
raised Bell's wages to induce him to withdraw from the Union as alleged in the
complaint. Bell admits that Kirk plainly stated at the time Kirk agreed to raise
his wages that Bell was privileged to engage in Union activities. In addition,
the record shows that shortly previous to this time, and before the Union
activities commenced, Kirk had promised to investigate Bell's status to deter-
mine whether he had been unfairly discriminated against and it is a fair in-
ference that Kirk was merely endeavoring to remedy an injustice as Kirk
claims was done.
Accordingly the undersigned finds that these allegations have not been
sustained by the proof.
b. Alleged coercive conduct of Foreman William Leonard Parker
Ralph Orr, a member of a plant department construction crew, called as a
witness by the General Counsel, testified that one day before the strike when
he was digging a hole for a telephone pole, Foreman Parker, who was in charge
of the crew, called him aside and said:
Orr, I want to talk to you and we went on off out there and he said the
best thing for me to do was write a letter, a little note to the head of the
[Union] John Borders [a fellow employee] . . . and tell him I was pulling
out of the Union and I asked him about my job and he said he would guaran-
tee I kept my job, and he said Mr. Kirk could not give me a raise right
now on account of the Union.
During cross-examination, Orr further testified that he could not remember
whether he was working in town or out in the country, on this occasion, that he
did not remember who the other members of the construction crew were, who
were also working on the job on that day, or what they were doing at the time
and also admitted that he did not believe any of the other rank-and-file employees
were close enough to overhear Parker's conversation with Orr.
George Bell, another employee in the construction crew, testified that the crew
was running a telephone line into a farmhouse located on "Dug Gap Road"
about 2 or 3 weeks before the strike; that he [Bell] was up on a telephone
pole working and Orr was digging a hole across the road for another telephone
pole, and that Bell overheard Parker say to Orr :
I am going to leave you and Jack [Parker's brother, another member of
the construction crew] at the barn this afternoon, and you all can decide
whether you want to stay in the Union or get out, but if you don't get out
all of you are going to lose your jobs.
Parker, a witness called by the Respondent, asserts that he only held one conver-
sation with Orr during which the Union was mentioned. He said that Orr
brought the subject up one day when Orr was digging a hole for a telephone pole,
that on this occasion the other men in the crew were setting or working on
v It is noted Kirk did not effect any change in Bell's status until the strike notice was
served, and that this change did not concern Bell's job with Respondent.
1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
telephone poles and credibly asserted without contradiction that he and Orr
were at least 160 feet distant from the next nearest employee, and the conver-
sation was carried on In a normal tone of voice.
Parker gave the following version regarding the conversation:
He [Orr] said: Mr. Parker, I would like to ask you a question, and I said:
Okeh, Ralph if I know the answer I will give it to you, and he said, I am
getting tired of this Union, and said I wonder if I can hold my job if I get
out of it, and I said, Ralph, as far as I know I guess you could ; you held it
before you got into it and as far as I know that is all I know about it; you can
stay in or get out.
Parker categorically denied that he ever stated to any employee that he would
lose his job if he did not withdraw from the Union, or that he requested any
employee to resign from the Union.
It is noted that in Orr's version he did not relate that Parker threatened em-
ployees with loss of their jobs if they remained in the Union, as Bell asserted
was done. Moreover, to some extent Orr's version tends to corroborate Parker's,
except that Orr asserts that Parker initiated the conversation and requested
Orr to resign from the Union.
In view of the fact that Bell admittedly was working a considerable distance
away from the spot where the conversation occurred, the undeisigned doubts
that Bell actually overheard any of it. The record shows that reliance may
not be accorded to much of Bell's testimony because he is inclined to exaggerate
and overstate matters of fact and that frequently his testimony is based upon
erroneous conclusions rather than statements of fact.
Certainly, because Orr's recollection was so faulty regarding the place where
the conversation occurred and substantially all of the other surrounding circum-
stances at the time, his version is not entitled to substantial credit. On the other
hand, Parker impressed the undersigned as a reliable and trustworthy witness
who was able to give a clear picture of the material circumstances in connection
with the incident.
He, therefore, concludes and finds that Parker's version of the incident is the
more reliable and he accepts it as true. Accordingly, he finds that the allegations
of the complaint respecting Parker's asserted interference with the rights of em-
ployees to self-organization have not been sustained by the proof.
c. Alleged unlawful interrogation regarding union activities by Chief Operator
Dillingham
Ruth Dillingham had been employed by the Respondent as a telephone oper-
ator for about 10 years before March 18, 1947. On this date she was promoted to
the job of Chief Operator. She never joined the Union and credibly asserted
that Vice-President Kirk instructed her not to discuss matters of union concern
with employees at the time he promoted her .21
20 It is also noted that a notice had been posted in the operator's room on Nlarch 1, 1947,
stating briefly certain rules regarding service by operators and which also contained
the following :
Regarding Union :
I wish to make the facts clear regarding the Union Some of the employees have
been led to believe that they have to join the union so they can continue their job
with this Company. I wish to state the facts in this matter. You do not have to
belong to the Union to be employed here. You may belong or you may not. Every
employee will have the same treatment . [ Emphasis supplied.]
T. ^. KIRK,
Manager.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1023
Operator Mary Louise Painter (Painter recently married, hence her name at
times appears in the record as Mary Louise Rogers), one of the operators who
went out on strike on April 16, 1947, and not thereafter reemployed, testified
regarding certain alleged anti-union interrogations by Dillingham. Painter
asserts that a few days before the first union meeting was held at Cantrell's
house, Dillingham asked Painter to attend the meeting and report back to
Dillingham the names of those present at it, and what was said regarding the
prospective strike ; that after the meeting, Dillingham again approached her and
asked who attended it, whereupon Painter said that she told Dillingham she had
not remained at the meeting long enough to find out anything. According to
Painter , both she and Dillingham were alone in the "girls ' room" when both of
the above two conversations were held. Painter further testified that on
the day after the second meeting was held at Cantrell 's house, Dillingham and
Painter were working at the switchboard when Dillingham handed Painter a
note asking for information concerning the names of those present at the meeting
held at Cantrell's house, whereupon Painter wrote "everyone" on the piece of
paper and handed it back to Dillingham; and that Dillingham then handed
Painter another note, asking if a date had been set for the strike whereupon
Painter appended the word "no" and handed the paper back to Dillingham."
Thelma Cantrell, a witness called by the General Counsel, testified: the next
day after a union meeting had been held at her home, she was working at the
switchboard beside Painter, and that Dillingham, who was sitting behind them
at the recording desk in the same room, arose and left her chair to hand Painter a
note. Cantrell asserts that she read the note over Painter's shoulder ; she said
it contained an inquiry seeking information concerning those present at the meet-
ing in Cantrell's house and also what had transpired there, and that after reading
it Painter appended an answer stating, in substance, that most of the operators
were there, but that nothing of consequence was told to Painter.
Dillingham was called to testify by the Respondent. She categorically denied
ever requesting Painter or any other employee to give her any information
concerning union matters either verbally or in writing after she became the
Chief Operator, and also said that when she was appointed Chief Operator on
March 18, 1947, Kirk expressly instructed her not to discuss matters of union
concern with the employees.
On the basis of the foregoing and all of the evidence , the undersigned credits
Dillingham 's denial. Dillingham was an intelligent witness ; she knew at the time
that a strike was imminent , and it seems unlikely that, under the circumstances,
she would have disregarded Kirk 's instructions so soon after her promotion.
It is highly improbable that Dillingham would openly pass such a noteto Painter
when Cantrell was seated next to Painter , as Cantrell testified . Furthermore,
if the note incident happened after the second meeting at Cantrell 's (according
to Painter's version) Cantrell could not have been working at the time for she had
been discharged nearly 2 weeks earlier . On this state of the record , Dillingham's
denial that the incident ever occurred seems to be the more credible and I
accept her denial as true. Consequently , I find that the evidence fails to support
the allegation that Dillingham unlawfully interrogated employees concerning
their union affiliations as alleged in the complaint.
21 Insofar as the record shows , only , two meetings were held at Cantrell 's house, the first
one on some unidentified date in March 1947 , and the second on the night of April 15,
1947 . The strike started at 7 o'clock on the morning of April 16.
1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. General conclusions
The principal issues remaining to be decided are (1) whether the Respondent
refused to bargain with the Union, (2) whether Thelma Cantrell was discrimina-
torily discharged, and (3) whether the refusal to reinstate eight strikers in
July 1947 was a violation of the Act.
1. Conclusions regarding the alleged refusal to bargain
It appears from the foregoing facts that the Respondent signed an agreement
in writing to recognize the Union as exclusive collective bargaining representative
for all non-supervisory employees on November 15, 1946, at the first meeting held
between accredited representatives of the Respondent and the Union. There-
after, following subsequent meetings duly held by the said bargaining repre-
sentatives either at Dalton, Georgia, the situs of the plant, or at the Un_on's
office at Atlanta, Georgia, the parties by March 11, 1947, had reached an agree-
ment concerning all substantive provisions of a proposed contract concerning
wages and working conditions.
At the meeting on March 11, the negotiations broke down when the Union
refused to file a registration certificate as an unincorporated association, with
the Superior Court of the State of Georgia in accordance with certain pro-
visions of the code of Georgia. The Respondent's reason for insisting that this
certificate be filed was that it enabled it to bring suit in the event of a breach of
contract by the Union, as further discussed below. • Following the break-down
of negotiations, the Respondent notified the Union on the same day that it was
withdrawing its former approval regarding the contract provisions, because of
the Union's refusal to file a certificate. On the following day the Union duly
served a notice of intention to strike. On April 16, 1947, substantially all of
the non-supervisory employees except four or five went out on strike. By the
early part of June 1947, Respondent had hired a full complement of employees
to replace the strikers.
Respondent, in its brief, logically contends that it should have the right
to submit a dispute concerning an interpretation or an alleged breach of the
contract to the courts. It further asserts that unless an unincorporated associa-
tion operating in the State of Georgia files a registration certificate, a suit may
,not be maintained by or against such an entity. As authority for this conten-
tion it cites in its brief the case of Smith v. International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, et al., 58 Ga. App. 26, which holds as follows :
Felton, J. It was the intention of the legislature by acts codified (Code,
Sectiois 22-409, 22-410, 22-411, 22-412, and 22-414) to provide under what
circumstances any association of individuals could sue or be sued as an
association ; namely, that it must be incorporated or shall have entered the
names of its trustees or officers, together with the name, style, and object
of the association or society, on the records of the clerk of the Superior
Court. The object of the record of the officers was to provide for the designa-
tion of representatives upon whom authorized service might be had, or
who could institute legal proceedings in behalf of the society. The Code
of 1933, Sec. 22-414 (19 ;0 Sec. 2830), refers to Sec. 22-412 (Sec. 2829). The
Code, Sec. 22-412, Spread Co. v. Hicks, 185 Ga. 507 (195 S. E. 564) ; Wilkins
v. Wardens & c. of St. Marks Church, 52 Ga. 351; Jones v. Watson, 63 Ga.
n Although the Respondent continued to bargain with the Union until the parties
agreed on the terms of a contract It had at all times taken the position that it would
not sign a contract unless the Union filed a certificate.
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1025
679; Thurmond v. Cedar Spring Baptist Church, 110 Ga. 816 (36 S. E. 221) ;
Barbour v. Albany Lodge, 73 Ga. 474; Josey v. Union Loan & Trust Co.,
106 Ga. 608 (32 S. E. 628) ; Kelsey v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 113 (50 S. E. 951) ;
Green v. Young Zion Baptist Church, 27 Ga. App. 572 (109 S. E. 517). An
unincorporated labor union is such a society as is contemplated by the above-
quoted sections of the Code, and is not subject to suit as an association of
individuals, the suit not purporting to proceed against the members in-
dividually or as partners, and it not having been incorporated and not having
had its name, style, objects, and the names of its trustees or officers recorded
by law. It was not error for the court, on motion, to dismiss the instant suit
as to the three defendant unions.
Neither the General Counsel nor the Union disputes the construction given
to the law of the State of Georgia presented by the Respondent.
The filing of such a registration certificate imposes no obligation upon the
Union to change its organizational structure. It only requires the payment of
a nominal filing fee. Therefore, it appears that compliance with Respondent's
proposal would neither be unreasonable nor unduly burdensome to the Union.
The Union in its brief contends that the principles laid down by the Board in
,Scripto Manufacturing Co.," wherein the employer insisted that the Union execute
a $100,000 performance bond, or in lieu thereof incorporate, and in the Jasper
Blackburn Products Corporation case,24 in which a performance bond was also
insisted upon by the employer, as conditions precedent to signing a collective
agreement by employers are controlling in this case. The undersigned does
not agree. As the Board points out in its decisions in the "Scripto" and "Black-
burn" cases, the conditions sought to be imposed upon the unions concerned
were unduly burdensome on the organizations involved and illegal within the
meaning of the Act. Similar objections do not appear under the facts herein.
Accordingly, the undersigned is of the opinion that the decisions in the "Scripto"
and "Blackburn" cases are not controlling in arriving at a decision in the instant
case. He is of the further opinion that the Respondent's insistence that the
Union file a registration certificate was not unreasonable under the facts herein
and, therefore, that it does not constitute a refusal to bargain within the meaning
of the Act.
Following the abortive strike called on April 16, 1947, the Union made its last
request to bargain on June 24, 1947, in which it asked for a meeting to be held
at Atlanta, Georgia, on June 27. On replying to this request on June 25, the
Respondent stated that its accredited bargaining representative would be out of
the State until June 30, 1947. No subsequent request to bargain was thereafter
made by the Union.
On the basis of the foregoing facts and all of the evidence, the undersigned
concludes and finds that the evidence offered fails to sustain the allegations in
the complaint pertaining to the refusal to bargain.
2. Conclusions regarding the discharge of Thelma Cantrell
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact in respect to Cantrell the under-
signed finds that the evidence fails to support the contentions of the General
Counsel and the Union that Cantrell was discharged because of her membership
in and activities on behalf of the Union.
22 36 N L. R. B. 411
24 21 N. L. R. B. 2140.
1026 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As found above , Cantrell did not join 'the Union until March 17, 1947 , or about
5 months after the peak of the Union 's organizational activities . It is true that
two union meetings were held at her home after she joined the Union , the first
on some undisclosed date in March 1947 , before her discharge on April 2, 1947,
and the second on April 15, 1947 , about 2 weeks after her discharge. Similar
meetings had been held at the home of other union members , but insofar as the
record shows, those employees were not discriminated against. Furthermore,
there is no credible direct evidence in the record to show that the Respondent
was aware of Cantrell 's union activities.
Although Ruth Mauldin , secretary to Vice-President Kirk, admitted during her
cross-examination that a Mr. Houston , employed at an automobile salesroom at
Dalton, told Mauldin that a union meeting had been held at Cantrell 's home,
Mauldin asserted that she did not remember whether this information had been
given her before or after Cantrell 's discharge. Houston was not called as a
witness to fix the date when he gave Mauldin this information . Therefore, on
this state of the record it cannot be found that Mauldin obtained the informa-
tion before Cantrell was discharged , assuming that Mauldin may have related
the conversation to Vice-President Kirk, who discharged Cantrell on April 2,
1947.
Kirk denied having any knowledge regarding the union affiliation or activities
of Cantrell before he discharged her. Because the undersigned from his obser-
vation concluded that Kirk was a reliable and trustworthy witness and in view
of the lack of any direct or convincing circumstantial evidence to impeach or
discredit this testimony , the undersigned accepts Kirk ' s denial that he had
knowledge regarding Cantrell's union activities before he discharged her
Kirk asserted that the sole reason for her discharge on April 2, was due to
the fact that she disregarded his order to stop talking while working on the
switchboard on the late afternoon of April 1 , 1947. The record shows that the
Respondent had promulgated and enforced such a rule before the appearajice
of the Union at the plant . Although Cantrell denied having continued to talk
after Kirk had reprimanded her on the afternoon of April 1, the record shows other-
wise. The undersigned , as found above, discredited her testimony in this respect
and accepted Kirk 's version as corroborated by that of the assistant chief
operator as the more credible.
On the basis of the foregoing and all of the evidence the undersigned concludes
and finds that the discharge of Cantrell on April 2 , 1947 , was not discriminatory
within the meaning of the Act.
3. Conclusions regarding the refusal to reinstate eight strikers in July 1947
The General Counsel and the Union contend in effect that the April 16, 1947,
strike was an unfair labor practice strike which was caused by the refusal of
the Respondent to bargain with the Union , and also because Respondent dis-
criminatorily discharged Cantrell on April 2 , 1947 , and that therefore the failure
to reinstate eight of the strikers when they made unconditional applications
for reinstatement in July 1947 , was violative of the Act.
The undersigned does not agree . Having found above that Respondent has
-not unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union , and that the discharge of
Cantrell was not discriminatory within the meaning of the Act, it follows that
the April 16 strike was not an unfair labor practice strike.
The record shows that by the early part of June 1947 , the Respondent had
hired a full complement of employees to operate its business , and it fails to show
'that there were any vacancies during July when the eight strikers made un-
DALTON TELEPHONE COMPANY 1027
conditional applications for reinstatement. Consequently, no duty was imposed
upon the Respondent to offer employment to the said eight employees in July
when they offered to return to work.
On the basis of the foregoing and all the evidence the undersigned finds that
the refusal to reinstate the said eight strikers in July 1947 was not a violation
of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Southern Federation of Telephone Workers is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and
upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned recommends that the com-
plaint against the Respondent, Dalton Telephone Company, Dalton, Georgia, be
dismissed
As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board-Series 5, as amended August 18, 1948, any party may,
within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring
the case to the Board, pursuant to S ction 2)3.45 of said Rules and Regulations,
.file with the board, liochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original
and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order or to any other part of the record
or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies
upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ;
and any party may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a
brief in support of the Intermediate Report and Recommended Order. Im-
mediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties.
Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the por-
tions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed,
and if mimeographed shall be double spaced. Proof of service on the other
parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required
by Section 203.85 As further provided in said Section 203.46 should any party
desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be
made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service of
the order transferring the case to the Board.
In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom-
mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules
and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclu-
sions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
Dated at Washington, D. C., this 23rd day of September 1948.
HENRY J. KENT,
Trial Examiner-