Dalton Brick & Tile Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 5, 1960

126 N.L.R.B. 473 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

DALTON BRICK & TILE, CORPORATION r 473
excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act
[Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication ]
MEMRERS RoDGERS and JENKINS took no part in the consideration of
the above Decision and Direction of Elections
I
Dalton Brick & Tile Corporation and United Stone & Allied
Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113. Gases
Nos 10--CA-3979 and 10-CA-3980 February 5, 1960
DECISION AND, ORDER
On July 31, 1959, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
Respondent Dalton Brick-& tTile Corporation had engaged in and
was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report -attached hereto
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and a brief in support thereof
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed The
rulings are hereby affirmed The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,
and recommendations i
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that Respondent Dalton Brick &' Tile Corpora -1
tion, Dalton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
i Respondent , on December 7, 1959, filed with the Board a motion to reopen the record
to receive additional evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing The
General Counsel and Local 113 submitted briefs in response thereto The additional evi
deuce in question relates to further findings and a decision upon appeal of the Georgia
Employment Security Agency with respect to applications for unemployment compensa-
tion made by certain of Respondent's employees subsequent to Respondent 's suspension of
operations In affirming the Trial Examiner's conclusions that the Respondent, by its
actions, violated Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and ( 5) of the Act we note that the Trial Examiner
did not, in any manner, give weight to the findings or decision of the State ' agency, but
rather, utilized the relevant circumstances to illustrate the inconsistent reasons for the
suspension of operations given by the Respondent during the course of the proceedings
before such State agency and before this Board The Intermediate Report correctly finds
that the reason given to the Georgia Employment Security Agency for such suspension
constitutes a definite admission against interest, so far as the instant proceeding is con-
cerned Inasmuch as the additional evidence which the Respondent seeks to introduce
in no way refutes this patent inconsistency, Respondent's motion is hereby denied
126 NLRB No X61
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in United Stone & Allied Product
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113, or any other labor organi-
zation of its employees, by discriminatorily locking out or laying off
any of its employees, or discriminating in any other manner in regard
to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the afore-
said labor organization, as the exclusive representative of all produc-
tion and maintenance employees employed by Dalton Brick & Tile
Corporation at its Dalton, Georgia, plant, with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment, by engaging in or threatening to engage in lockouts, lay-
offs, or other measures adversely affecting the earnings of its employ-
ees, for the purpose of forcing the aforesaid labor organization or the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit represented by it to
abandon bargaining demands made by the Union and to accept instead
bargaining demands made by the Respondent, or by engaging in any
like or related conduct in derogation of its statutory duty to bargain.
(c) Threatening its employees with plant shutdown or layoff, or
a continuation thereof, in order to force them to give up their bar-
gaining demands and accept the Respondent's contract proposals
instead without further bargaining.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole all employees listed in Appendix A attached hereto
for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimi-
nation against them, in the manner set forth in the section of the Inter-
mediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant at Dalton, Georgia, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix B." 2 Copies of such notice, to
21n the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 475
be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBERS RODGERS and JENKINS took no part in the consideration of
the above Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
W. J. Bailey Hoyt Whaley, Jr. George Prince, Jr.
Will Saylors Earl Rogers John Brackett
James Cleary George Bell Forest Callahan
Roscoe Edwards Clinton L. Brock Charles E. Prince
Eugene Martin Claude Jackson, Jr. George J. Lowery
John W. Wyatt J. William Cleary Fred E. Harris
Raymond Mullins Sam McCaJley J. Tom Busby
Robert Martin John Laster J. L. Ashe
Wallace Bell Charles Mullins Bill Camp
Donald Cleary Roscoe Brock Willard Busby
C. Cleo Bailey Woodrow Jackson Dillon Ponders
Lester Rogers Buford Wheat Claudie Jones
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Stone & Allied
Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113, or any
other labor organization of our employees, by discriminatorily
locking out or laying off our employees, or by discriminating in
any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with
United Stone & Allied Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
Local 113, as the exclusive representative of all production and
maintenance employees at our Dalton, Georgia, plant, with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
terms and conditions of employment, by engaging in or threaten-
ing to engage in lockouts, layoffs, or other measures adversely
affecting the earnings of our employees, for the purpose of forc-
ing the aforesaid labor organization and/or the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit represented by it to abandon bar-
gaining demands made by the Union and to accept instead our
bargaining demands; nor will we engage in any like or related
conduct in derogation of our statutory duty to bargain.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with plant shutdown or
layoff, or continuation thereof, in order to force them to give up
their bargaining demands and accept our contract proposals
instead without further bargaining.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist
the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to
engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all of such activities.
WE WILL make whole the following named employees for any
loss of pay suffered by them as a result of our discrimination
against them :
W. J. Bailey Hoyt Whaley, Jr. George Prince, Jr.
Will Saylors Earl Rogers John Brackett
James Cleary George Bell Forest Callahan
Roscoe Edwards Clinton L. Brock Charles E. Prince
Eugene Martin Claude Jackson, Jr. George J. Lowery
John W. Wyatt J. William Cleary Fred E. Harris
Raymond Mullins Sam McCalley J. Tom Busby
Robert Martin John Laster J. L. Ashe
Wallace Bell Charles Mullins Bill Camp
Donald Cleary Roscoe Brock Willard Busby
C. Cleo Bailey Woodrow Jackson Dillon Ponders
Lester Rogers Buford Wheat Claudie Jones
All our employees are free to become, remain or to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of the above-named labor organiza-
tion, or any other labor organization.
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
DALTON BRICK & TILE, CORPORATION 477
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by United Stone & Allied Product Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, Local 113, herein called the Union, against Dalton Brick & Tile Corpora-
tion, herein called the Respondent, the General Counsel issued a complaint in the
above-entitled duly consolidated proceeding alleging that the Respondent had en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136,
herein called the Act. The Respondent filed an answer in which it denied the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. On May 26 and 27, 1959, a hearing was
held at Dalton, Georgia, before Arthur Leff, the duly designated Trial Examiner. At
the opening of the hearing and again at the close of the General Counsel's case, the
Respondent moved to dismiss the 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint upon the
asserted ground that such allegations were rendered moot by virtue of a collective-
bargaining agreement entered into after the alleged violation. The Respondent's
motions were denied. During the hearing, the General Counsel amended the com-
plaint by deleting the names of two employees-J. B. Callahan and Claude Jackson,
Sr.-from the list of employees alleged to have been unlawfully discriminated
against. All parties waived oral argument. Briefs were submitted by the parties
on July 7, 1959.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Dalton Brick & Tile Corporation, a Georgia corporation with its principal office
and place of business at Dalton, Georgia, is engaged in the manufacture of shale
brick. During the 12-month period preceding the issuance of the complaint, a
representative period, the Respondent sold and shipped brick valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Georgia. The Respondent
does not dispute that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Stone & Allied Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113 is a
labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
Ori December 22, 1958, while negotiations were pending between the Respondent
and Union for a new collective-bargaining contract to supersede a recently expired
one, the Respondent shut down its production operations and laid off its employees
in the union-represented production and maintenance unit. Except for occasional
miscellaneous work assigned in the interim to some employees, in some instances at
rates below their regular rates of pay, the Respondent maintained the shutdown in
effect until on or about February 24, 1959, when it finally reached full accord with
the Union on the terms and conditions of a new contract. Characterizing the shut-
down and accompanying layoff as a "lockout," the complaint alleges that the purpose
of the lockout was to force the employees and the Union to abandon their bargaining
demands to the extent opposed by the Respondent and to accept instead the Respond-
ent's contract proposals precisely as submitted. The lockout, along with certain
alleged statements of management officials to employees that continued operations
and consequent employment were to be conditioned upon acceptance of the Re-
spondent's proposed contract terms,,are alleged to have constituted conduct that was
at once coercive of the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights, discriminatory in
the statutory sense, and in derogation of the Respondent's good-faith bargaining
obligations, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act.
The Respondent does not dispute that the shutdown and layoff-which it concedes
may in a loose sense be characterized as a "lockout"-was related to some extent
to the pending contract negotiations. But it contends the lockout was reas-
onably justified by virtue of economic and operative considerations in order to
protect its legitimate employer interests, and, in the absence of specific antiunion
motivation, must therefore be viewed as lawful and privileged. More specifically,
the Respondent claims that it was led to shut down its operations by the combina-
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion of the following interrelated considerations: (1) The fact that it was then
operating with a shortage of working capital, and was, moreover, in its off-season
with a high inventory and few orders; (2) its reluctance to continue production
without a contract fixing future labor costs and thereby eliminating uncertainties as
to price quotations on new business; (3) its desire to avert a possible strike and
picketing by the Union that might have a harmful impact on its customer relations;
and (4) the economic advantage to it of forcing a resolution of the contract dispute
at a time when it could afford a shutdown, and thus countering a union objective of
delaying negotiations until the busy season and then, by strike or threat of strike,
imposing pressure on the Respondent for acceptance of the Union's demands. The
Respondent contends additionally that a good-faith bargaining impasse had been
reached prior to the lockout, and that even in the absence of other special circum-
stances it was therefore then free to lock out its employees in support of its bargaining
position.
B. The history of the controversy
1. Background
At the times material herein, the Respondent employed some 36 production and
maintenance employees who were grouped in an appropriate collective-bargaining
unit represented by the Union.' The Respondent and the Union have enjoyed con-
tractual bargaining relations since 1946. Their relationship prior to the events
here involved has been singularly free from industrial strife. In all that time there
has never been a union-authorized strike against the Respondent.
Contracts have normally covered annual periods running from December 1 to
November 30. It has been more usual than not for the parties to delay their final
negotiations for a new contract until after the termination date of the old one.
The time lag in some years has been substantial. Thus, for example, no new
contract was executed in 1955 until August of that year. During the hiatus periods,
the employees have always continued working without a contract, but with the
tacit understanding that their terms and conditions of employment would remain
governed by the expired contract until a superseding one was executed.
The November 30 contract expiration date falls within the Respondent's slack
season , there being little demand for bricks during the period of winter weather
running from late November until late February or early March. It is customary,
however, for the Respondent to maintain its production operation during the winter
season, although perhaps on a somewhat curtailed basis, utilizing that period to build
up an inventory of staple bricks for the busy season lying ahead. There have been
instances in past years when the Respondent has closed down its operations around
Christmas time, but only for periods of about a week or two, and then only after
about 5 days' posted notice to the employees.
2. The events leading to the shutdown of plant operations and layoff of
December 22, 1958
The contract for the year 1958 expired on November 30, 1958. On October 15,
1958, the Union served on the Respondent a 60-day notice of its intention and
desire to negotiate a new contract, and 3 days later the Respondent served a cross
notice on the Union. On November 18, 1958, the Union gave the 30-day notice
required by Section 8 (d) (3) of the Act.
The first negotiating meeting was held on December 5, 1958. The Union was
represented by International Representative Marvin Blaylock, who normally acted
for the Union in contract negotiations, and by the local shop committee; the Re-
spondent, by its president and general manager, William I. Haymaker, and its vice
president and plant manager, William E. Hankins. At this meeting, the Union
presented for the first time its written proposals for contract changes. Included
were demands for (1) a general 12-cent an hour wage increase which would have
raised the hourly rates from a range of $1-$1.19 per hour to a range of $1.12-$1.31
per hour; (2) premium pay for work in excess of 8 hours in any day and for all
work on Saturday and Sunday; (3) added group life and health insurance benefits,
and (4) various changes in the contract's work task provisions. Taking the position
'It was stipulated, and it is found, that all production and maintenance employees at
the Respondent's plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act, and that the Union
at all times material herein was, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit.
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 479
that it could not because of its financial condition do anything that would cost it
money, the Respondent requested the Union to renew its previous contract without
change 2 Haymaker stated that if the Union agreed to do so he would either con-
tinue, or attempt to continue , the plant in full operation , closing it down only for
Christmas Day .3 The clear implication was that rejection of the Respondent's pro-
posal would be met by a suspension of operations and a consequent loss of earnings
by employees. Nothing was settled at the December 5 meeting. The meeting ended
with a statement by Blaylock that he would have to discuss the situation with the
men.
The Union expressed no strike threat at the December 5 meeting, or, for that
matter, at any other time during the entire period of negotiations. Nor did the
Respondent voice a fear of strike. The Respondent did not ask for any no-strike
assurance, and the Union did not suggest it-the word "strike," or its possibility,
never having been mentioned. Haymaker testified that he saw no advantage to a
no-strike assurance that might postpone possible strike action to a time within or
close to the Respondent 's busy season.
After the bargaining meeting of December 5, a further meeting was arranged for
December 22, 1958. In the meantime, the Respondent continued to maintain its
production operations at a virtually full or at least at a substantial level-and this,
although according to its witnesses, it was then suffering from a shortage of working
capital and had a large inventory on hand. Under the provisions of the 1958 con-
tract, the Respondent was required to give its employees a paid vacation of from 1
to 2 weeks, depending upon length of service, the vacation period to start sometime
between December 15 and 22; but the right was reserved to the Respondent to keep
the employees at work during the vacation period by paying them a bonus equal to
their vacation pay in lieu of the vacation. Notwithstanding the Respondent's as-
serted financial straits and large inventory, the Respondent in 1958 gave no notice
of a vacation shutdown, but elected instead to continue production and to pay the
employees a vacation bonus on top of their regular pay. Except as related to the
contract negotiations, the Respondent gave no indication that it planned a substantial
shutdown of its operations during its off-season. Joe Cleary, Sr., a department
supervisor, testified without contradiction that on December 15, 1958, he asked
Plant Manager Hankins how long the men would be off for Christmas, drawing
from Hankins the reply, "If they went along with the contract, only Christmas Day."
Shortly before the meeting on December 22, 1958, at about noon, Hankins laid
off employee Hoyt Whaley, Jr., president of the local, as well as the other members
of Whaley's working crew, some of whom were also members of the shop commit-
tee. When Whaley inquired whether the men were to return to work after the
meeting, Hankins said he did not know. Later, however, while on their way to the
meeting, Hankins told Whaley, in the presence of other employees, that an agree-
ment between the Union and Company to renew the old contract would mean work
for the employees every day except Christmas Day.
At the bargaining meeting of December 22, Hankins alone appeared for the Re-
spondent, President Haymaker being out of town at the time. Hankins submitted
the Respondent's counterproposal to the Union's bargaining demands. It provided
for a renewal of the earlier contract with the following additions: (1) Certain im-
provements in insurance benefits that would give the employees somewhat increased
hospitalization benefits and provide them with a $5,000 polio policy; and (2) a re-
duction in the work task requirements as to 2 of the approximately 25 types of bricks
manufactured by the Company. The Union thereupon announced that it was pre-
pared to settle for a 5-cent hourly increase instead of the 12 cents originally de-
manded, but Hankins rejected the Union's offer, reiterating that the Company was
financially unable to pay out more money. Later, after a recess and caucus by
Blaylock and the shop committee, the union representatives returned to the meeting
room and indicated that they would be willing to recommend to the employees a
settlement on the basis of the Company's proposal plus the Union's overtime de-
mands, dropping everything else including the request for a wage increase. The
i When the past two contracts had come up for negotiation the Respondent had also
pleaded financial inability to make economic concessions, and the Union had then acceded
to the Respondent's request that it go along on new annual contracts without any wage
increase.
Three witnesses for the General Counsel testified that Haymaker flatly promised to
continue the plant in full operation if the old contract was renewed Haymaker's version
was that he said he would "attempt" to maintain full employment during the slow period
under those circumstances.
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent, however, declined to go beyond its own counterproposal. At the urg-
ing of Hankins, the union representatives agreed to submit the Respondent's offer
to a vote by the employees.
The meeting was thereupon adjourned and plant operations suspended so that the
employees might consider and vote on the Respondent's contract offer. All em-
ployees in the unit were allowed to vote, whether members of the Union or not.
The overwhelming majority chose to reject the Respondent's contract proposal. The
question of whether strike action was favored was not submitted and was not
involved.
When the bargaining meeting reconvened immediately after the voting, Hankins
asked, "Well, where do we go from here?" Blaylock replied, "Well, if you cannot
make any other concessions, why, it appears to me that we are deadlocked, and we
should call in the Federal Mediation and Conciliation and see if they can start
negotiations to moving." Hankins expressed the hope that the Union would recon-
sider its rejection of the Company's contract proposal so that the plant might con-
tinue to operate. The meeting was then adjourned with the understanding that
Blaylock would communicate with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and that a further meeting between the Union and Company would later be
arranged.
Several days before the December 22 meeting, Haymaker and Hankins, according
to their testimony, had discussed whether the Respondent's operations ought to be
shut down. The question of closing was concededly considered by them in rela-
tionship to the Union's contract demands. Haymaker testified that he then told
Hankins that if "the [Union's] demands were going to be heavy and we had no
assurance of a contract, with all the uncertainties, that we would have to cease opera-
tions after we found out what [the Union's] attitude was going to be." However,
final decision was deferred. It was left "more or less dependent," according to
Hankins, on what the "general atmosphere of the negotiations" on December 22
would be.
Immediately following the meeting on the 22d, Hankins called Haymaker and
posted him on what had occurred. Haymaker thereupon instructed Hankins to dis-
continue regular plant operations until-in the words of Hankins-"we could work
out something." That same day the Respondent laid off all of its hourly paid
production and maintenance employees except one, Charles Mullins, its fireman
oldest in seniority. Apart from Mullins, the Respondent retained only its salaried,
nonunit employees, who were assigned to fire the kilns, replacing hourly paid fire-
men who normally performed such work. Mullins was continued at his regular
rate of pay ($1.31 an hour) until the fire in the kiln went out, and then was as-
signed to do watchman's work for the remainder of the shutdown period at the $1
common laborer's rate applicable to the watchman's job. The salaried employees
continued to perform work at their regular pay for the duration of the shutdown.
The Respondent did not resume general operations until about February 24, 1959,
when a new contract was finally negotiated, under circumstances to be related
below, and all laid-off employees were recalled to work. In the interim, however.
the Respondent continued to accept at least some orders and to make deliveries of
its product out of accumulated inventory. During the shutdown some of the laid-
off employees, among them shop committeemen, were called in on occasions as
needed by the Company to perform services in connection with the shipment of
small orders, guard work, and custodial work. The employees given such occasional
temporary work were paid the regular rate applicable to the work assigned , usually
the common laborers rate, which in many instances was lower than the rates at
which they normally would have worked but for the shutdown. The names of the
employees whose earnings were adversely affected by the layoff, and who are alleged
in the complaint to have been discriminated against by reason thereof, are set out
in Appendix A.
When Supervisor Joe Cleary, Sr., asked Hankins on December 23 why the plant
had been shut down, Hankins explained that the Company and the Union could not
get together on a new contract, and added that operations would not be resumed
until a new contract was signed. Similar explanations were given to rank-and-file
employees. Thus, on one occasion during the shutdown Haymaker told employee
James Cleary that if the boys had agreed to the old contract they would not have
been off but Christmas Day. On January 9, 1959, Hankins told employee Robert
Martin that the employees would not go back to work until a new contract was
signed.
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 481
3. Subsequent events; the denial to employees of unemployment compensation;
negotiations leading to the final resolution of the dispute and resumption of work
On January 5, 1959-2 weeks after the shutdown-a further negotiating meeting
was held. There was no change in the respective positions of the parties with regard
to contract terms. Whaley for the Union asked Hankins when the men would be
recalled. Replying that he did not know, Hankins went on to add that if the
Union signed a contract in accordance with the proposals the Company made at the
previous bargaining meeting, the men could return to work the following day. The
Union, however, again rejected the Company's proposal, explaining that it saw no
point in resubmitting to the employees a proposal they had already voted down,
and were therefore unlikely to accept. Nothing was accomplished at this meeting.
Thereafter, no further negotiating meetin* was held until the meeting about a month
later at the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to be reported in due course.
In the meantime, certain other events of interest occurred.
Several days after the January 5 meeting, Hankins, according to his testimony,
became convinced on the basis of hearsay reports he had received that many of the
employees, perhaps a majority, would be content to accept the Respondent's contract
proposal in order that they might be able to return to work. Hankins conceived the
idea of calling a meeting of all the employees so that they might vote by secret ballot
on whether they favored acceptance of the Respondent's contract proposals. (The
voting on December 22 had been by a show of hands.) Accompanied by Foreman
Cleary, Hankins called upon several of the shop committeemen to broach that idea
and endeavor to obtain union consent. Although Blaylock could not be reached,
and at least one of the committeemen, Sam McCalley, the local's secretary-treasurer,
expressed strong opposition to that procedure, Hankins nevertheless went ahead
without official union consent and called the employees in for a "meeting" on Jan-
uary 12. Any impropriety in the Respondent's procedure was, however, cured on
January 12, prior to the balloting, when Blaylock, who was present at the plant that
day, expressly consented to the vote being taken; the General Counsel so concedes.
At the meeting that day, the assembled employees were given ballots prepared by
the Respondent calling for a vote on the question of whether they desired to accept
or reject the Respondent's contract proposal as presented on December 22. Again
a large majority of the employees voted for rejection.
When the result of the secret balloting was announced, Hankins expressed his
annoyance in the presence of employees. "It doesn't look like the men want to go
back to work as they said they did," he declared-and this, though the question of
a return to work had not been presented in the balloting. Indeed, as the record
shows, President Whaley of the local, prior to the balloting, had assured Hankins
that the employees were willing to resume work at any time.
Of more than passing interest is the position taken by the Respondent at this
time with regard to employees' claims for unemployment compensation. Shortly
after the shutdown of December 22, the employees had filed claims for unemploy-
ment compensation with the Georgia Employment Security Agency, stating as the
reason for their separation , "Lack of work." Under the applicable State laws,
employees are entitled to compensation if their loss of employment is for that reason,
but apparently not if they have been separated because of a labor dispute. When
the Respondent received notice from the State agency of the filing of the claims, it
advised that agency on a form provided for that purpose, as follows:
We feel that a clarification should be made as to the present status of the un-
employment at the plant. We have been recently negotiating toward a new
contract with representatives of Local 113, of the U.S. & A.P.W.A. Our pro-
posal to extend our 1958 contract for another year was voted by the men and
rejected by them. For this reason, we felt it necessary to cease operation.
[Emphasis supplied.]
As a result of the Respondent's advice, the regional division of the State agency
disallowed the employees' compensation claims. Thereafter an appeal was taken
and a hearing held. At that hearing, Hankins, inconsistently with the Respondent's
position in the instant proceeding, made no reference in his testimony to lack of
work as a contributing consideration for the shutdown.4
4 Following the hearing, the appeals referee of the State agency sustained the decision
from which the appeal was taken A further appeal filed on behalf of the employees was
pending undetermined before the board of review of the State agency when the hearing in
this case was held
554461-60-vol. 126-32
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On February 6, 1959, a negotiating meeting was held in Atlanta at the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, with a conciliator present, and a followup
meeting, not attended by the conciliator, was held at the same place 2 days later.
At the second meeting the negotiating parties reached agreement on all provisions
of the new contract, except the expiration date. In sum, the parties agreed upon a
3-year contract, containing a 10-cent hourly across-the-board wage increase (pay-
able 3 cents during the first year, with 3i cents to be added in each of the succeed-
ing years), and a provision for Sunday premium pay, along with the improvements
offered by the Respondent on December 22. The only issue left unsettled was
whether the 3-year contract term should run from the date when agreement was
actually reached, as the Union demanded, or should carry a December 1 execution
date and a November 30 expiration date in line with past contracts, as the Respondent
insisted upon.
Although the understanding reached on February 8 was such as to resolve the
Respondent's uncertainties as to its future labor costs and the Respondent was
nearing its busy season with its inventory gradually being diminished by the deliver-
ies made during the shutdown, the Respondent nevertheless continued to maintain
the layoff in effect. On February 12, 1959, Morgan C. Stanford, the Union's
attorney, called Haymaker to request him to return the employees to work while
negotiations continued on the only open issue. Haymaker refused to do so, referring
Stanford to the Respondent's counsel, Erle Phillips. Stanford and Phillips were
unable to get together until February 23, 1959. At their meeting that day, they
reached a compromise as to the contract's expiration date, fixing it at January 1,
1962. The very next day-February 24, 1959-the Respondent resumed operations,
recalling all its laid-off employees to work, although the contract was not actually
ratified by the employees and signed until some days later.
C. Analysis of the applicable law; consideration of the Respondent's defenses;
concluding findings
The applicable principles of law guiding decision in this case are these: An
employer is always free-whether or not bargaining is in progress at the time-
to suspend operations for business or other reasons that are wholly unrelated to the
exercise by his employees. of their statutory rights.5 But the situation is different
where a lockout or layoff is prompted by a purpose to defeat or impair the free
exercise of such employee rights. This, of course, is clearly true, where the action
is prompted by a specific motive to defeat union organizations But the presence
of union bias or hostility-an element concededly absent in the instant case-is not
essential to a showing of a violation where there has been an actual infringement
of Section 7 rights.7 Section 7 safeguards employees not only in their right to self-
organization, but also in their right to bargain collectively and to engage in concerted
action for that purpose or other mutual aid and protection. Embraced therein is
the right to demand through their union representative in collective-bargaining nego-
tiations, and to press for better contract terms than those offered by their employers.
To lay off (lock out) employees, or otherwise to reduce their earnings because
they have done so, operates as a restraint upon the free exercise of that right, and
hence constitutes, at the very least, a prima facie violation of Section 8(a)(1);
that violation is an unquestionable one where no basis appears for the lockout
other than a coercive purpose to force, while negotiations are still in progress,
abandonment of the Union's demands and acceptance instead of the contract terms
proposed by the employer. And, as discouragement of union membership is a
"natural consequence of discrimination" based on "protected concerted activity," 8
such employer conduct also falls within the proscription of Section 8(a)(3). More-
over, since the free functioning of the collective-bargaining process contemplated by
the statute is impeded when in the course thereof the employer subjects the union
and the employees it represents to "unwarranted and illegal pressure, [creating]
an atmosphere in which the free opportunity for negotiations does not exist," such
6 See N.L.R.B. v. The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, 211 F. 2d 848 (CA. 5) ;
N.L R.B v Goodyear Footwear Corporation , 186 F. 2d 913, 918 (C A. 7).
e See. e g., N.L.R.B. v Wallick & Schwalm Company, et at., 198 F . 2d 477 (C.A. 3) ;
N.L R R v. Somerset Classics, Inc., et at ., 193 F. 2d 613 (C A. 2), cert. denied 344
U.S 816.
7 Republic Aviation Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 924 U.S. 793 , 797; N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool
Workq. 153 F 2d 811 (CA 7).
8 The Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL (A. H. Bull
Steamship Company ) v N.L R B., 347 U S. 17, 45-46
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 483
conduct also runs afoul of Section 8(a) (5). See, Quaker State Oil Refining Corpora
tion, 121 NLRB 334, enfd. 270 F. 2d 40 (C.A. 3); Great Falls Employers' Council,
Inc., et al., 123 NLRB 974. See, also, American Brake Shoe Company, et al., 116
NLRB 820, set aside 244 F. 2d 489 (C.A. 7) ), the court finding special extenuating
circumstances, contrary to the Board's determination.
But, though the Board views lockouts in the context of contract negotiations as
presumptively violative of the Act, it also recognizes that the employees' statutory
right to bargain collectively and to strike in support of their demands is not absolute;
that at times situations may arise where such rights collide with legitimate employer
interests; and that the special circumstances of a given case may be such as to compel
the employee rights to give way to what in the circumstances are found to be para-
mount rights of the employer. Thus, the Board has held that an employer is privi-
leged to counter by lockout threatened or imminent strikes or interferences with
plant production, where the lockout is used as a defensive measure, reasonably
necessary in the circumstances, to ward off operational problems, plant hazards, or
economic loss of an unusual character that would flow from the threatened union
action.9 Thus, too, the Board has held a lockout privileged where it was designed
to counter a union's strike tactic aimed at atomization of a multiemployer system of
bargaining.10 To justify infringement of employee statutory rights, however, the
burden is on the employer to come forward with evidence that the legitimate inter-
ests he seeks to protect are of such a compelling nature as to outweigh in the cir-
cumstances of the particular case the employee rights that are being trenched upon.
The Board has made it plain that an employer may not lock out or threaten to lock
out his employees in aid of his bargaining position, absent special circumstances,
clearly justifying the need for and use of the lockout as a defensive measure to
protect his business, property, or other proper interests from loss or damage which
is threatened by an imminent strike, reasonably apprehended."
In this case there is an abundance of evidence pointing to the conclusion that the
Respondent's lockout action was conceived and carried out in aid of the Respondent's
bargaining position as a coercive device to force the Union and the employees to
their knees. This is apparent alone from the sequence and timing of events as set
out above. Thus, the Respondent at the very first negotiating meeting impliedly
threatened to suspend operations unless the old contract was renewed; it in effect
repeated that implied threat immediately before the second meeting at which it
formally proposed continuance of the old contract with relatively minor revisions;
it suspended regular operations and laid off those in the bargaining unit , but not
others, directly after the employees had voted rejection of its contract offer, and
at a time, moreover, when it was not faced with any imminent danger of strike; it
made clear in oral statements to employees and at a negotiating meeting thereafter
that acceptance of its contract proposals was the only obstacle to resumed operations;
and it ended the layoff simultaneously with the end of the contract controversy. But
that is not all. The position taken by the Respondent as to payment of unemploy-
ment compensation benefits to its employees provides potent evidence confirming
the coercive and retaliatory motivation for the lockout action.12 No clearer admis-
sion of motive can be expected than is to be found in the Respondent's advice to
the Georgia Employment Security Agency that "we felt it necessary to cease opera-
tion" because "our proposal to extend our 1958 contract for another year was voted
by the men and rejected by them." All of this adds up to a powerful prima facie
case, to say the least.
The Respondent seeks, nevertheless, to justify its conduct as lawfully privileged on
other grounds. The Respondent's contentions in this regard have been outlined in
9 See, e.g, Duluth Bottling Association, 48 NLRB 1335, 1359-1360 (where necessary to
avoid spoilage of materials) ; International Shoe Company. 93 NLRB 907 (where eco-
nomical operations were being impeded by recurrent employee work stoppage) ; Betts
Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 NLRB 268 (where, because of union's refusal to give reasonably
required advance notice of a threatened strike, employers had no assurance and were left
uncertain that new repair work could be finished and automobiles returned to customers).
io Buffalo Linen Supply Company, et at., 109 NLRB 447, affd 335 U S. 87.
n See, Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation, supra, where, though a sudden strike
without notice would have resulted in damages to plant property, the Board found that
the employer had no reasonable basis to fear such a strike at the time of the lockout,
and the Board was satisfied that the real purpose of the lockout was to force acceptance
of the employer's contract terms See, also, Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., et al,
supra; American Brake Shoe Company, at at., supra.
12 Cf. Great Falls Employers ' Council, Inc., et al., supra.
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the statement of the issues appearing earlier in this report. They will be considered
below in the order there set forth.
1. I consider first the Respondent's contention that its shutdown decision was
influenced by financial and business considerations unrelated to the pending contract
negotiations. In support of that contention, the Respondent adduced testimony
to show that at the time of the shutdown it was operating with a serious shortage of
working capital; that its inventory was high and orders few; that it could expect little
new business during the normally slow winter months; and that it was uncertain as
to its business prospects for the busy season lying ahead. At the hearing, the-
Respondent did not contend that its business and financial condition was the primary
consideration in its decision to suspend operations, only that it was a contributing
factor. In response to a direct question on that point, Haymaker testified that he
did not know whether the Respondent would have shut down the plant for that
reason were it not for the concurrent labor dispute. In its brief, however, the
Respondent goes further. It argues that it is a "fair inference" that the Respondent
"would have been compelled, in any event, to shut down production," and therefore
requests dismissal of the complaint "for the reason that the lockout resulted from
economic necessity." With that, I am unable to go along.
The issue here is not whether the Respondent might have in the exercise of sound
business judgment suspended operations for the reason stated, but whether it did.
I have no reason to doubt that the Respondent in assessing the costs against advan-
tages to it of a shutdown at that particular time, did take into account at least some
of the business considerations to which it alludes. But, on all the record, I am
convinced that the Respondent was not prompted initially by such considerations to,
shut down the plant, and that but for the contract dispute it would not have done so.
Thus, as has been shown, when the question of a possible shutdown was first con-
sidered by Haymaker and Hankins several days prior to December 22, it was dis-
cussed in the context of the pending contract negotiations, and final decision was
made dependent on the Union's "attitude" in such negotiations. The shutdown was_
put into effect on a Monday afternoon-timing that has significance only in relation
to the employees' rejection that day of the Respondent's contract terms The claim
that a shortage of working capital, a high inventory, and an absence of orders made
closing necessary is scarcely consistent with the Respondent's election to forgo a_
vacation shutdown and keep the men at work at bonus rates during the normal
vacation period immediately preceding the shutdown. Nor does it square with the
reiterated statements to employees that the shutdown would be terminated at once
upon acceptance of the company proposals, or with the Respondent's indication on
the unemployment compensation forms that "lack of work" was not the reason for
the layoff.
2. The Respondent asserts, by way of further attempted justification, that its
shutdown decision was motivated in part by its reluctance to continue production in
the face of uncertainty as to its future labor costs and consequent pricing policies on
new business. I do not believe, however, that such uncertainty was a significant
factor impelling the shutdown. In past years the Respondent had not considered
the absence of a contract settling future labor costs an impediment to continued
operations. Moreover, the bulk of the Respondent's production during the off-
season was normally directed to the building up of an inventory of staple products
against anticipated future orders; and, as to such work, the Respondent could not
have been confronted with pricing problems related to labor costs; for, as the record
shows, the applicable wage rates pending the execution of a new contract continued
to be those provided for in the old contract. It is significant also, that even after
labor costs were settled at the February 8 meeting, the Respondent continued to
maintain the lockout in force for an additional 2 weeks, for no other reason than
to force acceptance of its contract proposal exactly as submitted. In any event,
even assuming the Respondent's lockout decision was motivated in part by the
element of uncertainty as to future wages and prices, that alone would not qualify
as a "special circumstance" within the economic hardship rule. That is an element
almost always present in any business enterprise whenever a new collective-bargaining
contract comes up for negotiation. And the Respondent has not shown that it had
any extraordinary problems in that respect. To hold that uncertainty of the kind
here involved is enough to satisfy the "special circumstances" exception, would have
the practical effect of broadening the exception into a rule allowing the use of the
lockout as an economic weapon in virtually every case.
3. Another consideration motivating the lockout decision, according to the
Respondent, was a desire to protect its customer relations. Haymaker testified that
he was anxious to avert a strike and picketing which would prevent the Respondent
from fulfilling its contractual commitments, with resultant inconvenience to cus--
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 485
Comers and risk that some of them might thereafter be reluctant to buy from a
company known to have "union troubles." I am unimpressed by that assertion, and
consider it one contrived as an afterthought . To begin with , the record does not
show that the Respondent had any reasonable basis to fear an imminent strike at
the time the lockout was imposed . Moreover , the action the Respondent claims it
took as a preventive measure was of a kind likely to produce the very condition the
Respondent says it wanted to avoid. As it happened , the Union in this case re-
frained from picketing the Respondent 's plant to advertise the lockout as a labor
dispute, but the Respondent could not have known this when the lockout was
imposed . Besides, even if the Respondent 's assertions were accepted as true, it
would not justify a "special circumstance " finding. The possibility of a strike with
accompanying customer inconvenience prevails whenever parties are engaged in
collective bargaining . It may scarcely be viewed as an unusual circumstance of
such overriding character as to warrant an inroad on protected employee activity.
4 The Respondent would further justify its lockout action as a proper defensive
countermeasure to what it asserts to have been a union objective of delaying nego-
tiations until the Respondent 's busy season and then coercing the Respondent into
acceptance of the Union 's demands by strike or threat of strike . The Respondent
argues that under the circumstances its action in shutting down production at a
time when it could afford a shutdown in order to forestall union pressure at a
time when a shutdown would have been "economic suicide" must be viewed as a
reasonable and lawful measure demanded by good business judgment in ,the protec-
tion of its legitimate employer interests . Significantly , Haymaker, in testifying as
to the considerations which he says motivated his lockout decision , made no refer-
ence to any purpose of warding off any union objective such as stated above. That
reason was , however, mentioned in the opening statement of the Respondent's
counsel. And it now appears to be the principal "justification" urged by the Re-
spondent in its brief.
The initial difficulty with this contention is that it rests on an unsupported factual
premise. The record contains not one word of evidence , and no basis for fair
inference , that the Union was acting with the objective the Respondent ascribes to
it, or that the Respondent had any reason to believe so at the time of the lockout.
On the contrary, the evidence is such as to leave no doubt that the Union was
bargaining in entire good faith and with a sincere desire to reach agreement expe-
ditiously and without resort to strike sanctions . This is clear alone from the
Union 's conduct at the December 22 meeting , at which it sharply reduced its
demands, agreed to the Respondent 's request that the Respondent 's counterproposal
be submitted to a vote by the employees , and, when agreement failed, urged con-
ciliation as an avenue through which differences might be resolved.
It is, of course , unnecessary to consider whether the lockout action would have
been privileged as a proper defensive measure if the Respondent 's factual premise
were correct . On the facts found here , I am satisfied clearly it was not. I do not
doubt, of course , that the Respondent considered it to be to its best business in-
terests-from the standpoint of obtaining a more favorable labor contract-to
accelerate what in practical effect was a strike situation to a time when it was strong
and the Union weak, rather than chance even the possibility that such a situation
might develop at a time when the contrary became true . But from this it does
not follow that its lockout action was privileged . Implied in the right to strike is
the right to refrain from striking , and to determine when, if at all, 'a strike should
be timed . A lockout which , as in this case, has both the aim and effect of lessening,
if not destroying entirely, future strike impact , blunts the strike weapon , deprives the
Union of the element of control, and thus interferes with, impedes , and diminishes
the right to strike . Where as here , an employer takes the offensive to gain through
lockout an economic advantage that is brought about only by infringement of em-
ployee rights, he is scarcely in a position to point to the economic advantage so
gained to justify the lockout as one undertaken in the promotion of his "legitimate"
employer interests To interpret the Act as allowing an employer to "beat a union
to the punch" with lockout action where his only interest is to avoid a contingent
possibility of greater impact on his operation if bargaining should fail and if the
Union should elect to strike, is not only to ignore the statutory admonition of Section
13, but also to pay scant heed to the Act's policy to encourage the peaceful settlement
of disputes . Moreover , in balancing out the respective interests of an employer
and a union in a situation such as the one here, it must not be overlooked that
impairment of employee rights by lockout is not essential to an employer to counter-
balance a union 's power to strike. For, unlike a union , which has only the strike
weapon at its disposal if bargaining fails, an employer has it within his right and
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
power unilaterally to establish the employment terms and conditions he desires and
to meet a strike by replacing strikers.
5. Finally, the Respondent, asserting that a bargaining impasse had been reached
prior to the lockout, and relying upon language to be found in Morand Brothers
Beverage Co. V. N.L.R.B., 190 F. 2d 576, 582 (C.A. 7); and Albert Leonard, et al.
d/b/a Davis Furniture Co., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 197 F. 2d 435, 441 (C.A. 9), appears
to argue that, because of that asserted impasse, its lockout was justified in law
regardless of the presence or absence of other special circumstances. Even if the
Respondent's factual premise could be accepted as correct, I would doubt the validity
of the conclusion the Respondent would draw therefrom. Neither of the cited cases
may be viewed as square authority covering the situation here presented-where a
single employer uses the lockout not as a defensive weapon but solely as an offensive
measure, resorting to it before threat of imminent strike and purely to advance his
bargaining position.13 The Board, to date, has never acquiesced in the view that
the mere existence of a bargaining impasse, without more, warrants the use by an
employer of lockout action in aid of his bargaining position.14 I have great difficulty
in seeing why infringement of employee statutory rights by lockout, under circum-
stances otherwise violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), should achieve immunity
under the law simply on the basis of an impasse and nothing else.15 For purposes
of decision in this case, however, that is a question that need not be faced, for I am
satisfied that the record in this case fails to substantiate the Respondent's factual
claim that there was a genuine bargaining impasse at the time it shut down opera-
tions on December 22.
The Respondent would predicate an impasse finding largely upon Blaylock's dec-
laration to Hankins near the end of the December 22 meeting that the parties were
seemingly "deadlocked." Up to that point the parties had met only twice. Little
had occurred at the first meeting besides the presentation of the Union's demands.
At the second meeting, at which the Respondent first submitted its counterproposal,
the Union, far from displaying a frozen attitude, had made substantial concessions
and had otherwise indicated that its bargaining position was still in a fluid state. In
context, Blaylock's declaration to Hankins cannot be read as an admission that
negotiations had come to a hopeless stalemate. It will be recalled that Blaylock's
full statement was, "Well, if you cannot make any other concessions, why, it appears
to me that we are deadlocked, and we should call in the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service and see if we can start negotiations to moving." This is not
the expression of one who feels that the negotiating parties have exhausted the
1H Both of the cited 'cases involved situations where the employers were not merely
advancing their bargaining positions but were protecting their multiemployer bargaining
unit against destruction-and interest which the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B v. Truck
Drivers Local Union No 449, et al (Buffalo Linen Supply Co ), 363 U S 87 in line with
the Board's holding in that case, recognized was entitled to special consideration. The
courts in both Morand and Davis emphasized the defensive nature of the lockout action
there taken. See, particularly, the second opinion in Morand, 204 F. 2d 529, at 533,
and the second opinion in Davis, 205 F 2d 355, at 356
11 In both Morand and Davis, the Board, subsequent to the initial court decisions, re-
jected the view that a lockout occurring after a bargaining impasse is privileged as a
corollary of the emplovees' statutory right to strike a anection that was thereafter ex-
pressly left open by the Supreme Court in the Bufal'o Linen Supply Co. (Truck Drivers
Local Union No. 449, et al) case, supra See, Morand Brothers Beverage Co., et at., 99
NLRB 1448, 1460; Albert Ldonard, et al, d/b/a Davis Furniture Co , et al, 100 NLRB
1016, 1018 In the more recent American Brake Shoe and Quaker State Refining Corpora-
tion cases , supra, the Board had no occasion to consider that question since it found as a
fact in both cases that the 1^ckurt was not unreceded by a bargaining impasse. However, it
is to be noted that in the Board's most recent lockout case, Great Falls Employers' Council,
Inc, et at.. supra, the Board, without expressly discussing the effect of a bargaiining
impasse on the principles it normally applies, found a partial lockout to be unlawful under
Section S(a) (1) and (3), although, as 'appears from the Board 's decision in that case,
there was a bargaining 'impasse at the time of the conduct there found unlawful
is On that specific point, it seems to me that the reasoning of the Board in Morand
Brothers Beverage Co , et al., '99 NLRB 11448, 1462, and in Albert Leonard, et at d/b/a
Davis Furniture, at at., 100 NLRB 1016, 1018, is sound. I confess, however, to difficulty
in finding an 8(a) (5) violation where it appears that prior to a lockout the parties have
already exhausted the possibilities of good-faith collective bargaining. (Cf. N.L.R B. v.
Crompton Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U S 217.) But, see, Prudential Insurance Company
of America, 119 NLRB 7618, set aside 260 F. 2d 736 (CA, D C ), cert granted 35'8
U.S 944.
DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 487
possibilities of collective bargaining, leaving no recourse open for resolution of their
differences but a trial by battle. In suggesting conciliation, the Union was only
carrying out a duty the law imposes on labor unions and employers alike to use, when
necessary, the avenue of conciliator-aided negotiations in an effort to work out
peaceful settlement of contract disputes at the bargaining table.ls The Union,
thus, was not breaking off bargaining, but rather expressing a positive desire for
the continuation of negotiations. Moreover, as has been found, the December 22
meeting was adjourned on the express understanding that a further meeting would
be arranged. This alone is clear evidence that both parties understood that bargain-
ing, although having perhaps temporarily stalled on December 22, had not yet
reached the point of actual impasse where continued negotiations would be futile.
In point of fact, the parties did continue to bargain while the lockout was in prog-
ress-one of the meetings, on January 5, being held before the conciliator was
actually called in. The "give and take" character of the meetings that eventually
led to agreement tends to confirm that the parties had not yet actually reached the
end of their bargaining rope on December 22. Under all the circumstances, I am
persuaded and find that no genuine impasse had in fact been reached when the
Respondent shut down its operation and laid off its employees on December 22,
and that the Respondent had no justifiable basis for believing otherwise.
Upon all the record, I conclude and find that during the period from December 22,
1958, to February 24, 1959, the Respondent, without justifiable basis therefor, locked
out and laid off and/or assigned to lower-paying jobs, the employees in its produc-
tion and maintenance unit whose names are listed in Appendix A, for the purpose
of forcing such employees and the Union to abandon the Union's contract demands
and to accept instead contract terms proposed by the Respondent. I find that by
such conduct, as well as by statements to various employees, prior to the lockout,
threatening to close plant operations if the Union and the employees did not agree
to the Respondent's proposed contract terms, and by statements to employees, during
the lockout, conditioning the resumption of plant operations upon the acceptance by
the Union and the employees of the Respondent's proposed contract terms, the
Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1), unlawfully discriminated
against the employees listed in Appendix A within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3),
and engaged in activity impeding and impairing the bargaining process in violation
of Section 8(a)(5).
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent has unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployees listed in Appendix A during the period from December 22, 1958, to February
24, 1959, I shall recommend that the Respondent make whole each employee listed
in said Appendix A for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of such un-
lawful discrimination during the aforestated period by payment to him of a sum of
money equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages during that
period , less his net earnings during that period, such sums to be computed in accord-
ance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
291-294. I shall further recommend that the Respondent, upon request, make
available to the Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all payroll and
other records necessary to enable the Board to analyze and compute the amounts
of backpay due.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. United Stone & Allied Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
ie See Section 204, LMRA, 1947.
488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent's Dalton,
Georgia, plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees,
and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid labor organization is and has been at all material times the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its em-
ployees, and thereby discouraging membership in the aforesaid labor organization,
the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
5. By locking out and laying off its employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit
during the course of collective bargaining for the purpose of forcing the aforesaid
labor organization and the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit to abandon
bargaining demands made by them and to accept instead contract terms proposed
by the Respondent, the Respondent has impeded and impaired collective bargaining
with the Union and has acted in a manner inconsistent with good-faith bargaining,
and by reason thereof has failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers'
Union of America , Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO and Economy
Forms Corporation
International Hod Carriers , Building and Common Laborers'
Union of America , Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO and Peter Kiewit
Sons' Company
International Hod Carriers , Building and Common Laborers'
Union of America, Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO and Miller Exca-
vating Company
International Hod Carriers , Building and Common Laborers'
Union of America , Local No . 1140, AFL-CIO and Natkin & Co.
Cases Nos. 17-CC-91,17-CC-92,17-CC-93, and 17-CC-94. Feb-
ruary 5, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 2, 1959, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs.
,126 NLRB No. 66.