D2L CORPORATIONDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 30, 20202019006824 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 30, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/025,147 09/12/2013 Stefan REGEHR K8001241US 5983 34236 7590 12/30/2020 GOWLING WLG (CANADA) LLP 50 QUEEN STREET NORTH, STE. 1020 P.O. BOX 2248 KITCHENER, ONTARIO N2H6M2 CANADA EXAMINER HATCHER, DEIRDRE D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/30/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): JEFF.WONG@GOWLINGWLG.COM VAL.COTTRILL@GOWLINGWLG.COM Waterloo.IP@gowlingwlg.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte STEFAN REGEHR, SCOTT WILLIAMS, BRIAN PEARSON, and STEVEN LOW ____________ Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3–12, 14–19, 21–23, 25, and 27. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Feb. 4, 2019), Claims Appendix (“Claims App.,” filed Mar. 5, 2019), Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 27, 2019), Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Jan. 4, 2018), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Sept. 12, 2013). Appellant identifies D2L Corporation as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 2 CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant’s invention “relates to methods and systems for entity based position assignment.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 12, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for assigning positions, the method comprising: [(a)] obtaining position data related to each position of a plurality of positions in a classroom, wherein the position data related to each position includes one or more characteristics of the corresponding position; [(b)] obtaining data related to each entity of a plurality of entities, wherein the plurality of entities comprises a plurality of students, associated with an event to be held in the classroom, wherein each entity is to be assigned to one of the plurality of positions; [(c)] obtaining a position weighting for one or more positions based at least in part on the position data; [(d)] determining a desirable arrangement based at least in part on the position data, the position weighting, one or more instructor preferences, and the entity data; [(e)] arranging each entity in a corresponding desired position within the desirable arrangement; [(f)] storing an arrangement of each entity in the corresponding desired position on a storage medium; [(g)] obtaining additional data related to one or more of the plurality of entities from a learning management system; [(h)] determining an occurrence of one or more academic events associated with the one or more of the plurality of entities based at least in part on the additional data; [(i)] determining that a re-arrangement triggering event occurred based at least in part on the determination that one or more academic events associated with the one or more of the plurality of entities occurred; and [(j)] in response to determining that the re-arrangement triggering event occurred, arranging one or more entities to one Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 3 or more corresponding positions based at least in part on the re- arrangement triggering event. Claims App. 22. REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3–12, 14–19, 21–23, 25, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1, 3–12, 14–19, 21–23, 25, and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Morris (US 2014/0229390 A1, pub. Aug. 14, 2014), Stirlen (US 2009/0063208 A1, pub. Mar. 5, 2009), Wilson,2 and MAT Blog.3 ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group. Appeal Br. 7–13. We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 2 Duncan Wilson, Class Seating Charts & Behavior Management, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pD8OkYRf_S4, posted Dec. 2, 2012. The Examiner provides a three page print out from YouTube for this YouTube video. We refer to the print out as “Wilson” and treat the print out as if sequentially numbered with the page having the phrase “class charts” in a YouTube search bar designated as page 1. The Examiner provides a partial transcript of this video presentation (Ans. 17), as well as two screenshots from the presentation (Ans. 15, 17), in the Answer. 3 Marygrove College, 5 Classroom Management Apps Every Teaches Needs to Know About (posted Jan. 15, 2013). A copy of the posting is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20130129081612/http://info.marygrove.edu/ MATblog/bid/90368/5-Classroom-Management-Apps-Every-Teacher- Needs-to-Know-About (last accessed June 15, 2020). Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 4 Principles of Law 35 U.S.C. § 101 An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) and Alice, “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” such as an abstract idea. Id. According to Supreme Court precedent, concepts determined to be abstract ideas include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (id. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 5 and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). USPTO Guidance We are also guided by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) guidance, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), incorporated into the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2104–06, Rev. 10.2019 (“MPEP”) in June 2020. “The guidance sets out agency policy with respect to the USPTO’s interpretation of the subject matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of decisions by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. Although “[a]ll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance,” the guidance “does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the USPTO.” Id. The Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id. at 50. Under USPTO guidance, the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework is a two-prong inquiry. MPEP §2106.04(II)(A); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (“Step 2A of the 2019 Revised Patent Matter Eligibility Guidance is a two-prong inquiry.”). “Prong One asks does the claim recite an abstract Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 6 idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?” MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(1); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. For determining whether a claim recites an abstract idea, the guidance defines enumerated groupings of abstract ideas, distilled from precedent. MPEP § 2106.04(a); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. If the claim recites a judicial exception, then the claim requires further analysis at Prong Two. MPEP § 2106(II)(A)(1); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “Prong Two asks does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?” MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(2); see also id. § 2106.04(d), Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the additional elements, individually or in combination, provide an inventive concept. See MPEP §§ 2106(III), 2106.05. “An inventive concept ‘cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.’” Id. at § 2106.05(I) (quoting Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Among the considerations in determining whether the additional elements, individually or in combination, amount to significantly more than the exception itself, we look to whether they add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(II); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 7 Rejection The Examiner determined here that independent claim 1 is directed to “analyzing data to determine a desirable seating arrangement,” which is an abstract idea in the form of both a certain method of organizing human activity and a mental process. Ans. 4 (identifying the abstract idea recited in claim 1), 7–9 (determining that the additional elements recited in claim 1 do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application); see also Final Act. 3–4 (determining that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of “assigning seating positions”). Under the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner determined that claim 1 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Ans. 8–9; see also Final Act. 4–5. Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One) We are not persuaded, as an initial matter, that the Examiner characterized the claim language too broadly, failed to articulate how the claim is similar to any concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea, or otherwise erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 7–12. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 8 Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR ENTITY BASED POSITION ASSIGNMENT,” and states that the “present disclosure relates generally to position assignment.” Spec. ¶ 1. In the Background section, the Specification describes that many situations require “placing various entities in specific positions.” Id. ¶ 2, “[I]n a classroom setting, an instructor typically arranges students in particular seating arrangements in order to obtain a distribution that pleases the instructor.” Id. For example, an instructor arranges students to ensure students have appropriate access to classroom amenities. Id. Periodically, the teacher needs to manually rearrange the class seating arrangement for optimization. Id. This trial-and-error approach (i.e., position arrangement and reorganization) is typically necessary with conventional approaches for entity based position assignment. Id. ¶ 3. “It is, therefore, desirable to provide an improved method and system for entity based position assignment.” Id. ¶ 4. The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to address this problem by providing a method and system for entity based position assignment that retrieves position data, entity data, and rules for assigning entities to positions, and then determines a desirable arrangement based on the position data, entity data, and rules. Id. ¶ 36. Consistent with this overview, claim 1 recites a method for assigning positions comprising the following steps: [(a)] obtaining position data related to each position of a plurality of positions in a classroom, wherein the position data related to each position includes one or more characteristics of the corresponding position; Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 9 [(b)] obtaining data related to each entity of a plurality of entities, wherein the plurality of entities comprises a plurality of students, associated with an event to be held in the classroom, wherein each entity is to be assigned to one of the plurality of positions; [(c)] obtaining a position weighting for one or more positions based at least in part on the position data; [(d)] determining a desirable arrangement based at least in part on the position data, the position weighting, one or more instructor preferences, and the entity data; [(e)] arranging each entity in a corresponding desired position within the desirable arrangement; [(f)] storing an arrangement of each entity in the corresponding desired position . . . ; [(g)] obtaining additional data related to one or more of the plurality of entities . . . ; [(h)] determining an occurrence of one or more academic events associated with the one or more of the plurality of entities based at least in part on the additional data; [(i)] determining that a re-arrangement triggering event occurred based at least in part on the determination that one or more academic events associated with the one or more of the plurality of entities occurred; and [(j)] in response to determining that the re-arrangement triggering event occurred, arranging one or more entities to one or more corresponding positions based at least in part on the re- arrangement triggering event. Therefore, claim 1 recites collecting data (position data, student data, position weighting) (steps (a)–(c)); analyzing the data to determine a desirable arrangement (step (d)); arranging students based on the results of the data collection and analysis (the desirable seating arrangement) (step (e)); storing the arrangement (step (f)); collecting additional data (related to one or more students) (step (g)); analyzing the additional data for the occurrence of an academic event and a re-arrangement triggering event (steps (h) and (i)); and rearranging the students in response to a re- Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 10 arrangement triggering event (step (j)). Claim 1, considered as a whole and given its broadest reasonable interpretation, recites steps for determining and managing a seating arrangement in a classroom.4 Each of these steps include observations, evaluations, and judgments recited at such a high level of generality that they could be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and paper, i.e., the mental processes abstract idea grouping. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining that “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” where the steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be performed in the human mind is an abstract idea); University of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics, 774 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed Cir. 2014) (determining that “comparing BRCA sequencing and determining the existence of alterations” where the claims cover any way of comparing BRCA sequences such that the comparison steps can practically be performed in the human mind is an abstract idea). For example, here, any manner of “determining a desirable arrangement” and “arranging each entity . . . within the desirable arrangement” may be performed at steps (d) and (e) of claim 1. After observing various data (steps (a)–(c)), a teacher could evaluate the data mentally to determine an arrangement for students in a classroom based on 4 Although our articulation of the concept to which the claims are directed may differ from that articulated by the Examiner, any such difference only relates to the level of abstraction. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”). Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 11 the observed data (step (d)), and arrange the students accordingly (step (e)), such as by using pen and paper to create a seating chart that identifies a seat position for each student in the classroom. See Spec. ¶ 62 (describing that “the output from system 100 may be a seating chart 330 where the students are arranged according to the rules and the data received by the system 100”); see also id. ¶ 54 (describing that the system “is configured to allow instructors to assign seats to students within a classroom layout”). For example, a teacher could evaluate student data and position data to arrange younger students closer to the front of the classroom. Id. ¶ 65. In another example, the teacher could evaluate the data to diversify the arrangement of students, such as distributing students having the same gender throughout the classroom. Id. ¶ 66. The teacher could memorize the seating chart to store the chart in the human mind (step (f)). To aid the mental process of storing, the teacher could physically store the seating chart created with pen and paper, such as by placing the chart on a desk or in a file cabinet. Turning to the remaining limitations of claim 1, steps (h) and (i) cover any manner for “determining,” and step (j) covers any manner for “arranging” based on a re-arrangement triggering event. Thus, after arranging the students, the teacher could observe additional data related to the students (step (g)) and judge whether an academic event occurred (step (h)). Based at least in part on one or more academic events that occurred, the teacher could evaluate whether a re-arrangement triggering event occurred (step (i)), and arrange one or more students accordingly (step (j)). For example, the teacher could determine that a student failing a test or an assignment constitutes a re-arrangement triggering event. See id. ¶ 69. In response to this determination, the teacher could use a pen to modify this Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 12 student’s position on the seating chart. See id. An underperforming student could be re-arranged to interact with different students. Id. ¶ 68. The concept of determining and managing a seating arrangement in a classroom, as recited by claim 1, also pertains to “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions),” which is a subgrouping of the “certain methods of organizing human activity” abstract idea grouping. MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II); see also id. at § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For example, “determining a desirable arrangement based at least in part on the position weighting, one or more instructor preferences, and the entity data” (step (d)) and “arranging each entity” (step (e)), as recited in claim 1, relates to applying rules to the data gathered at steps (a)–(c). The Specification describes, for example, that “system 100 is configured to arrange the entities into positions to create a desirable arrangement” by “the application of the rules to the position data and entity data.” Spec. ¶ 51, Fig. 2; see also id. ¶ 67. The rules include “rules related to the instructor preferences” and “special criteria based on entity data or position data,” such as whether a student must sit in a particular location for access to certain equipment required by the student. Id. ¶ 59. “The desirable arrangement is intended to improve (e.g., optimize) the placement of the entities in that the greatest number of rules and requests with respect to aligning the entity preferences and position attributes are met.” Id. ¶ 51. “[E]ach entity is assigned a position according to the desirable arrangement.” Id. ¶ 52. Likewise, “determining an occurrence” (step (h)), “determining that a re-arrangement triggering event occurred” (step (i)), and, in response, Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 13 “arranging one or more entities” (step (j)) involves applying rules to additional data to determine whether to re-arrange the position of one or more students. For example, the Specification describes applying a rule to rearrange students who are underperforming in a current arrangement to ensure they interact with different individuals than in previous arrangements. Spec. ¶ 68. An exemplary rule includes evaluating whether a student’s grade on a test or assignment is below a predetermined threshold and, if so, placing the underperforming student in a higher weighted position. Id. ¶ 69. Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two) Having concluded that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under the Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One, we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that, when considered individually or in combination, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application under Step 2A, Prong Two. MPEP § 2106.04(d); 2106.04(d)(II), Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Exemplary considerations for the Prong Two analysis, culled from precedent, are set forth at MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I), and described in more detail at MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1), 2106.04(d)(2), and 2106.05(a) through (c), and 2106.05(e) through (h). Here, claim 1 additionally recites a “storage medium” (step (f)) and “learning management system” (step (g)) — elements that are recited at a high level of generality as generic computer components. For example, claim 1 recites that the “storage medium” performs the generic function of “storing.” See also Spec. ¶¶ 41, 80, Fig. 1 (describing the storage medium required by the claimed invention generically). Claim 1 further recites that the “learning management system” functions as a source for “additional data related to one or more of the plurality of a entities.” But see SAP Am. Inc. v. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 14 InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”). The Specification does not indicate that any specialized learning management system is required by the claimed invention. Instead, the Specification describes generally, and at a high level, that entity data can be retrieved from “external network devices (not shown)” (id. ¶ 43), or “third party network devices (not shown)” (id. ¶ 46). These additional elements, at most, require generic computer components to implement the abstract idea, and generally link the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (a learning management system). Therefore, considered individually and as an ordered combination, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”); Affinity Labs of Texas v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that limiting the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (cellular telephones) is insufficient for patent eligibility); see also MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(I), 2106.05(f), 2106.05(h). We are not persuaded by any of Appellant’s arguments that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a practical application. See Appeal Br. 7–13. For example, Appellant argues that claim 1 “inherently requires more than . . . ‘gathering and analyzing information’ information [sic], such as an input interface to receive data, or an output interface to output the assigned seating positions, etc.” Id. at 9. Appellant’s Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 15 argument is not persuasive at least because it is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. Claim 1 does not recite an input interface for receiving data or an output interface to output the assigned positions. See, e.g., Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Contrary to Digitech’s argument, nothing in the claim language expressly ties the method to an image processor. The claim generically recites a process of combining two data sets into a device profile.”). Nor does claim 1 indicate that any particular technology or technique is required for this functionality. Here, claim 1 covers any manner of solution that achieves the result- focused, functional limitations of “obtaining,” “storing,” “determining,” and “arranging.” This is insufficient to show that the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (cautioning against claims “so result-focused, so functional, as to effectively cover any solution to an identified problem”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he claim language here provides only a result-oriented solution with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law demands more.”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(1) (explaining that “claim limitations that attempt to cover any solution to an identified problem with no restriction on how the result is accomplished and no description of the mechanism for accomplishing the result, do[] not integrate a judicial exception, because they recite no more than an idea of a solution or outcome”). Attempting to analogize claim 1 to the claims at issue in Enfish, Appellant contends that the claim 1 “addresses an improvement in computer related technology.” Appeal Br. 9. Specifically, Appellant asserts that Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 16 claim 1 “addresses . . . an improvement on how information pertaining to backup data can be more effectively and timely provided, for which the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer software applications and the Internet.” Id. Appellant does not point to anything in the claim language or the Specification to support these assertions. Here, we find no improvement in computer capabilities related to the provision of backup data analogous to the improvement to computer functionality achieved by Enfish’s self-referential table for a computer database. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, the Specification frames the claimed invention as improving how teachers arrange students in a classroom to obtain an optimal arrangement and manage that arrangement. See Spec. ¶¶ 1–6; see also Appeal Br. 10 (acknowledging that claim 1 is directed to “an improvement on how positions in a classroom can be assigned and re-arranged based on various input data pertaining to the students and/or the properties of the positions”). We are not persuaded that an improvement to assigning and managing a seating arrangement is an improvement to computer functionality, as opposed to an improvement in a process that is itself the abstract idea. See Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“To be a patent-eligible improvement to computer functionality, we have required the claims to be directed to an improvement in the functionality of the computer or network platform itself.”). For similar reasons we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is analogous to the patent-eligible claim analyzed in Example 2 Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 17 of the USPTO’s “Examples: Abstract Ideas,”5 which analyzes claim 19 of DDR Holdings under prior Office guidance. Appellant asserts that claim 1 aims to “overcome a problem associated with efficiently and effectively allocating positions in a classroom to students based on data pertaining to the students and data pertaining to the students.” Appeal Br. 11. Yet, in DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit distinguished the claimed solution, which was “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” from patent-ineligible claims that broadly and generically require the use of a computer and the Internet to perform an abstract business practice. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–58. Namely, the court held that the claims at issue “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. Here, we are not persuaded that a problem associated with efficiently and effectively allocating students’ positions in a classroom is a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer technology, as opposed to a problem that has existed for instructors in the classroom long before the advent of computer networks. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 2–3 (describing the arrangement of students in a classroom as a longstanding problem for instructors). Likewise, we are not persuaded that the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology analogous to the patent-eligible claims in DDR Holdings. Instead, at best, claim 1 requires the use of a 5 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 101_examples_1to36.pdf. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 18 storage and data from a learning management system to implement the abstract idea. We also are not persuaded, for much the same reasons outlined above, that claim 1 is analogous to hypothetical claim 2 in Example 21 of the USPTO’s “July 2015 Update Appendix 1: Examples”6 Appeal Br. 12. Exemplary claim 2 of Example 21, like the claims at issue in DDR Holdings, solved an Internet-centric challenge (alerting a subscriber with time sensitive information when the subscriber's computer is offline) with a claimed solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology. Appellant argues that claim 1, like hypothetical claim 2, “recites additional limitations that when considered as an ordered combination demonstrates a technology rooted solution to an Internet-centric problem.” Appeal Br. 12. However, for the reasons described above, we are not persuaded that claim 1 addresses a challenge particular to the Internet or recites a solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology. Instead, claim 1 uses computers as tools to implement the abstract idea in a particular technological environment involving a learning management system. We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument regarding preemption. See Appeal Br. 11. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. Nevertheless, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle 6 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july- 2015-app1.pdf. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 19 of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability,” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. Appellant does not persuade us that any additional element or combination of additional elements recited in claim 1 improves computer functionality, technology and/or a technical field to the claimed invention, or that otherwise integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the Guidance. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites either a mental process or a certain method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim do no more than generally link the abstract idea to a particular technological environment and use computers as tools to implement the abstract idea. Therefore, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1, as a whole, is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we consider whether the claim includes any additional elements, alone or in combination, that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. This step of the analysis considers additional elements, as limitations reciting a judicial exception cannot supply an inventive concept. See Mayo, Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 20 566 U.S. at 72–73 (requiring “a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself” (emphasis added)); BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.”). Thus, to the extent Appellant argues that the combination of steps (d), (e), (i), and (j) of claim 1 are not well-understood, routine, conventional in the field (see Appeal Br. 12–13), that argument is not persuasive at least because those steps comprise the abstract idea itself. In addition, Appellant asserts that the claim feature for “determining that a change in one or more values associated with at least one of the plurality of students exceeds a predefined threshold” in combination with other claim features are not well understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Id. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive, at least because none of the claims recite this language. As set forth above, the only additional elements recited by the claims are generic computing elements such as the “storage medium” recited in step (f) and the learning management system in step (g). Such generic computing elements are well-known, routine, and conventional. See Alice, Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 21 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) Here, Appellant has not identified any additional elements recited in claim 1 that, individually or in combination, provide significantly more than the abstract idea. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We also sustain the rejection of the remaining claims, which fall with claim 1. Obviousness We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is in error because the Examiner does not provide sufficient explanation or reasoning how or why the prior art renders obvious determining that a re-arrangement triggering event occurred based at least in part on the determination that one or more academic events associated with the one or more of the plurality of entities occurred; and in response to determining that the re-arrangement triggering event occurred, arranging one or more entities to one or more corresponding positions based at least in part on the re- arrangement triggering event, as recited in steps (i) and (j) of independent claim 1, and similarly recited in independent claims 12 and 19. See Appeal Br. 17–18. The Examiner acknowledges that Morris does not teach steps (i) and (j), as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 12 and 19, and relies upon Wilson for these aspects of the claim language. Id. at 9, 12, 14. In the Answer, the Examiner provides a transcript of a portion of Wilson relevant to the Examiner’s rejection and a screenshot from Wilson of a user interface Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 22 for tracking student behavior. Ans. 17. The transcript of Wilson suggests, at a high level, a toolkit for teachers having both a class seating chart and behavior management software. See id. (“Seating charts are an essential part of any teacher’s toolkit[,] and managing behavior is necessary for effective learning to take place. So what if you combine the two?”). The screenshot provided by the Examiner shows buttons for positive student behavior, such as being kind, on task, and sharing. Id. Wilson ostensibly teaches that teachers can track behavior over time. Wilson 3 (describing that the application “provides charts for student behavior over time”). The Examiner finds that Wilson teaches grouping students based on a behavior score and reasons that “a new seating chart may be warranted” when a behavior score changes, constituting a re-arrangement triggering event. Final Act. 9. The Examiner concludes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Morris to include the rearrangement triggering event corresponding to academic events “to more effectively manage the classroom and student changing needs.” Id. at 9–10. One problem with the Examiner’s analysis, however, is that the Examiner has not established that Wilson teaches or suggests rearranging seating based on a changed behavior score or other re-arrangement triggering event. Indeed, the Examiner has not shown that any of the prior art teaches these aspects of the claim language. Because the Examiner’s finding that Wilson teaches or suggests steps (i) and (j), as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 12 and 19, lacks adequate support, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 12, and 19, and dependent claims 3–11, 14–18, 21–23, 25, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2019-006824 Application 14/025,147 23 CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–12, 14–19, 21–23, 25, 27 101 Eligibility 1, 3–12, 14– 19, 21–23, 25, 27 1, 3–12, 14–19, 21–23, 25, 27 103 Morris, Stirlen, Wilson, MAT Blog 1, 3–12, 14– 19, 21–23, 25, 27 Overall Outcome 1, 3–12, 14– 19, 21–23, 25, 27 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation