D. J. Eshom Meat Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 28, 1973

208 N.L.R.B. 41 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

D. J. ESHOM MEAT CO., INC.
D. J. Eshom Meat Co., Inc. and Manuel Galvez.
Cases 21-CA-11594 and 21-CA-11714
December 28, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On September 12, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
James S. Jenson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and Respondent filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative
Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, D. J. Eshom Meat
Co., Inc., Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it
relates to Case 21-CA-11594.
1 We find no merit in the General Counsel's contention that the 10(b)
period is to be determined by the filing date of the charge in Case
2I-CA-11594 The unfair labor practices found herein are based on the
allegations of the charge in Case 21-CA-11714, filed April 13, 1973. Those
unfair labor practices bear insufficient relationship to the charge filed on
March 1, 1973, and, consequently, a computation of the 10(b) period for
remedial purposes from the March 1 date would be'inappropnate See
Hunter Saw Division of Asko, Inc,, 202 NLRB 330; Prince Pontiac, Inc, 174
NLRB 919, 921-922
2 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently misstates the 10(b) period
in the Remedy section of his Decision as running from February 23, 1973,
the date of the unlawful layoff, to April 13, 1973, the date of the filing of the
charge. Since we agree that reimbursement for lost pay and benefits is
proper for the 6-month period prior to the date of the filing and service of
the charge in Case 21-CA-11714, it is clear that such reimbursement shall
be made for such losses suffered between October 13, 1972, and February
23, 1973, the date of Galvez' layoff
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
41
JAMES S. JENSON, Administrative Law Judge : Pursuant to
unfair labor practice charges filed on March 1, 1973, in
Case 21-CA-11594 and on April 13, 1973, in Case
21-CA-11714, a consolidated complaint issued on May 7,
1973, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by (1) paying Manuel Galvez a wage rate
below that provided for in a collective -bargaining agree-
ment because he was not a member of the Union; (2)
denying Galvez fringe benefits provided for in said
collective-bargaining agreement because he was not a
member of the Union; and (3) discharging Galvez because
he joined the Union . Respondent denies the commission of
any unfair labor practices and contends Galvez was laid
off for economic reasons and is subject to recall. The case
was tried before me in Los Angeles, California , on July 24,
1973. Briefs were thereafter filed by both Respondent and
the General Counsel.
Upon the entire record of the case, upon my observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, and upon considera-
tion of the briefs , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the processing
and wholesale distribution of meat in Los Angeles,
California. During the calendar year 1972, its interstate
purchases from suppliers located within California, who
purchased and received said goods directly from suppliers
located outside California, exceeded $50,000. Respondent
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Provision House Workers Union Local No. 274,
AFL-CIO (herein called Local 274), is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Chronology of Events
At all times material herein, Respondent and Local 274
have been parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
covering, inter alia, apprentice meatcutters.i
Galvez was employed by Respondent in September 1971
1 The current agreement runs from October 1, 1973, to October 1, 1973,
and contains a union-security clause, wage schedules, and various fringe
benefit provisions
208 NLRB No. 29
42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as a "helper." Although the collective-bargaining agree-
ment does not contain a "helper" classification, it is clear
from a description of his duties and the testimony of Don
Holeman, the business representative for Local 274, that
Galvez' classification under the contract was that of
apprentice meatcutter. The evidence established that
Galvez was paid less than the appropriate contract wage
scale and was denied the fringe benefits provided for in the
contract during his entire period of employment by
Respondent.
On February 19, 1973,2 Galvez received an injury
requiring emergency hospital treatment. He learned
through hospital personnel that the cost of his medical care
might be covered by an insurance plan through a union
and his employer. On the morning of February 20, Galvez
went to the Respondent's plant for the express purpose of
finding out whether there was an insurance plan covering
his medical expenses. He learned through another employ-
ee that Local 274 represented Respondent's employees. He
then went to the Union's office and completed union
membership application and insurance forms.3
Early in the afternoon he talked to Business Representa-
tive Holeman, and informed him that he wanted to join
Local 274. Holeman questioned Galvez regarding his
length of employment, work record, and work performed
and informed him there would be no problem with regard
to joining. Holeman then called David Eshom, Respon-
dent's president, and informed him that Galvez was in the
Union's office and that he was "taking him into the
Union." Eshom responded that that was all right, but that
business had been bad and Respondent might have to lay
off some employees, that Galvez might be one of them and
that it might look as though ". . . I am laying him off
because of his being in the Union." Holeman replied ".. .
if you have to lay off some people . . . do it according to
classification seniority."4
Holeman then questioned Galvez regarding previous
jobs with Respondent, and upon learning that this was his
initial job, informed him that Respondent might have to
lay off some people and that he might be one of those laid
off. After learning that Galvez was not receiving the proper
wage, Holeman told him that he would go to Respondent's
plant and watch Galvez work in order to determine what
his classification and wage rate should be, but that it would
be between $5.56 and $4.85 per hour.
On February 22, Eshom called Holeman and informed
him that, as they had discussed earlier in the week.
Respondent was going to have to lay off three employees,
and as Galvez would be one of them he was ". . . worried
about how it would look so soon after the man had joined
2 All dates are in 1973 unless otherwise stated
3 Galvez, who does not speak English, was accompanied by his wife who
interpreted
4 Art. XII, seniority, sec. A, provides in pertinent part
The employee shall accumulate seniority standing as follows.
The plant seniority shall equal the employee's total length of service
with the Employer dating from the first day of his employment.
Classificational seniority shall equal the employee's total length of
service in the classification in which he is working
All promotions or reductions in the working force within classifica-
lions shall be made on the basis of classificational seniority when
ability is relatively equal In other words, employees holding classifica-
tional seniority within a particular job classification in the affected
the Union." Holeman said that he should make certain
that all employees were laid off ". . . according to
classificational seniority as we have outlined in the
contract ." Holeman then questioned Eshom to see whether
Galvez might be entitled to "bump" down in accordance
with the contract , and learned that Galvez was the least
senior employee cutting meat and was doing the same
work he had done from the commencement of his
employment, and therefore had no bumping rights.
Galvez worked February 21, 22, and 23, and at the end
of the day on February 23 was advised , according to
Galvez' testimony that , ". . . there was no longer to be any
work for me . . . it was going to get slow and that he was
not going to need me any more , that he no longer wanted
me at work , that he was going to lose some clients." Eshom
testified that he told Galvez that , ". . . due to the work
load has slackened off . . . we were going to cut back and
that he is the less senior man and I would have to lay him
off plus two people in the clean-up crew." Eshom testified
that he told the same thing to the two cleanup men he laid
off at the same time .5 Galvez' wage rate was increased the
last 3 days of employment from $3 .85 to $4.475 per hour.6
Approximately a week later, Galvez and his wife went to
the union office and inquired , "why he was fired."
Holeman indicated he was under the impression that
Galvez had been laid off. He called Eshom on the phone
and was assured that Galvez was laid off and was subject
to being recalled.
Within a few days , Holeman found a grievance on his
desk from Galvez dated March 1, stating, "Why was I fired
from work without no reason at all." He therefore called
Eshom , advised him of the grievance , and that he "wanted
in writing that he is not fired, is only laid off ." After
receiving a letter from Eshom , Holeman wrote Galvez on
March 6 as follows:
Dear Mr. Galvez:
In answer to your questior of March 1, you are not
fired. You were laid off according to your classifica-
tional seniority and you are subject to recall.
Approximately 2 or 3 weeks later Galvez and Polanco, a
friend who speaks both Spanish and English, went to the
union offices. Polanco "wanted to know why Mr. Galvez
was fired." Holeman informed Polanco that "Mr. Galvez is
not fired, he is only laid off." Polanco then threatened to
file charges against Holeman if he didn't get Galvez a job.7
Holeman's response was to "Go ahead and file charges
against me. We have 600 unemployed members in this
classification shall be laid off in inverse order,
The agreement also provides for displacement of less senior employees
within the same classification and in lower classifications in which
previously employed
5 Several of Respondent 's employees , including the two cleanup men,
were not members of Local 274 One of the cleanup men was recalled prior
to the trial and became a union member as had all of Respondent's
employees at trial time
6 The hourly contract rate for an apprentice meatcutter in his third 6
months of employment was $5 24
7 Polanco , although present during the trial, was not called as a witness
to refute Holeman's testimony which is credited
D. J. ESHOM MEAT CO., INC.
Union and when we get them a job, Mr. Galvez will be
next on the list."
B. Respondent's Defense
Witnesses for Respondent testified that a meeting of the
officers of the corporation was held in early February at
which time the financial statement was reviewed since the
profit margin was at a dangerous low; that meat prices had
continued to rise resulting in a loss of some accounts; that
the meat boycott was "coming on"; and that it was decided
it would be necessary to do the following: (1) Reduce labor
costs by laying off at least three employees; and (2)
eliminate the smaller marginal profit accounts. A review of
the accounts was thereafter made by one of the officers
and the marginal accounts eliminated; and on February
23, three employees, including Galvez, were laid off as
planned.
Analysis and Conclusions
Respondent's Failure to Pay Galvez the Wage Rates
and Deny Him Fringe Benefits Provided for in the
Collective-Bargaining Agreement
It is clear from the evidence that Galvez was employed
as an apprentice meatcutter throughout his entire period of
employment with Respondent, and that the apprentice
meatcutter's classification has been included in the wage
schedule contained in the collective-bargaining agreement
which the parties agreed has been in effect at all times
material herein. It is further clear that Galvez has never
been paid in accordance with the contract wage schedule,
nor has he been covered by any of the fringe benefit
provisions in the contract. It is likewise clear the reason he
has not enjoyed contract coverage is because he was not a
union member.8
Respondent contends "... to find that the employer
violated the law when it was merely following the
interpretation of the contract placed on it by itself and the
Union is unwarranted and unfair."
In Rockway News Supply Company, Inc., 94 NLRB 1056,
1059, the Board stated:
... aside from the legality or illegality of their
agreements, the Respondents, by granting more advan-
tageous working conditions to the union-member
employees, unlawfully discriminated against nonunion
employees. Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it illegal
for an employer to discriminate, on the basis of union
membership, in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any other term or condition of employment of his
employees. To hold that because a collective bargain-
ing agreement purports to establish terms and condi-
tions of employment for union members only, an
employer may refuse to give his nonunion employees
equal terms and conditions, would not only be contrary
to the plain meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, but
8 After Holeman informed Eshom on February 20 that Galvez had
applied for union membership and he " . -. was taking him into the Union,"
Galvez received an increase in pay from $3 85 to $4 475 per hour. The latter
figure was the contract rate effective October 1, 1970, to October 4, 1971,
43
would also violate the spirit and intent of the entire
Act.
In The Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, the
United States Supreme -Court considered three cases
because they all involved encouragement of union mem-
bership by employers. In the Gaynor News case, the
employer granted retroactive wage increases to union
members but not to nonunion employees in ' the same
bargaining unit . The Supreme Court stated at page 46:
In Gaynor, the second circuit also properly applied
this principle. The court there held that disparate wage
treatment of employees based solely on union member-
ship status is "inherently conducive to increased union
membership." In holding that a natural consequence of
discrimination, based solely on union membership or
lack thereof, is discouragement or encouragement of
membership in such union, the court merely recognized
a fact of common experience-that the desire of
employees to unionize is directly proportional to the
advantages thought to be obtained from such action.
No more striking examples of discrimination so
foreseeably causing employee response as to obviate
the need for any other proof of intent is apparent than
the payment of different wages to union employees
doing a job than to nonunion employees doing the
same job. As noted above, the House Report on
Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act emphasized that such
disparate treatment was impossible under the Act.
7,
We express no opinion as to the legality of disparate
payments where the Union is not exclusive bargaining
agent since that case is not before us. We do not hold
that in the circumstances of this case, the Union being
exclusive bargaining agent for both its members and
nonmember employees, the employer could not, with-
out violating Section 8(aX3), discriminate in wages
solely on the basis of such membership even though it
had executed a contract with the Union prescribing
such action. Statements throughout the legislative
history of the National Labor Relations Act emphasize
that exclusive bargaining agents are powerless "to
make agreements more favorable to the majority than
to the minority." Such discriminatory contracts are
illegal and provide no defense to an action under
Section 8(a)(3). [Citations omitted.]
Accordingly , I conclude and find that Respondent's
refusal to pay Galvez the same benefits and compensation
which it gave its union employees , because of his lack of
union membership , was discrimination in regard to terms
and conditions of employment which reasonably tended to
for an apprentice meatcutter with less than 6 months ' experience According
to the wage schedule effective after October 2, 1972 (G.C. Exh. 4,
addendum 1(b) an apprentice meatcutter with 12 months ' experience was
entitled to $5 24 per hour.
44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
encourage membership in Local 274, and that Respondent
thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.9
The Alleged Unlawful Discharge
The General Counsel contends Galvez was discharged
because he joined Local 274, and as a consequence
Respondent was going to have to pay him union scale.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends Galvez was laid
off along with two other employees for economic reasons
and is si.^blect to recall.
The General Counsel argues that Respondent was quite
willing to employ Galvez for 17 months at wages below
union scale, but when it learned he had joined the Union
and would be faced with paying him union wages, it
terminated him. The General Counsel then argues that
Respondent's failure to produce a financial statement
reflecting a poor profit margin warrants the adverse
inference that if the document were produced, it would be
contrary to Respondent's position.
The burden of proof rests, of course, upon the General
Counsel. The issue is not whether the business considera-
tions which Respondent advances to support its defense
were or were not adequate to justify Galvez' layoff. The
Act imposes no requirement that an employer exercise
good business judgment and exacts no penalty because he
exercises bad judgment. What the General Counsel must
establish is that Respondent's decision was not motivated
by business considerations, but rather to discriminate
against its employee because he joined Local 274.
Speculation and surmise are not sufficient. The General
Counsel must establish by affirmative evidence that a
motivating reason for the termination was proscribed by
the Act-here, retaliation against Galvez for joining Local
274 or engaging in other protected, concerted activity. In
the absence of such evidence, lack of economic or business
justification would not in and of itself justify a finding of
motivation proscribed by the Act.
In the present case, we have an employer and a union in
contract relations. While the collective-bargaining agree-
ment contained a union-security clause, neither the
agreement nor the Act places a burden upon the employer
to notify the employee of his union obligations under the
contract. That obligation rests upon the union involved.
The employer's obligation, as found above, is to apply the
same terms and conditions of employment to all employees
within the collective-bargaining unit regardless of union
membership.
It is clear from the testimony of both Eshom and
Holeman, that it is not unusual for employers within the
jurisdiction of Local 274 to have employees working at
jobs covered by the contract for substantial periods of
time-in excess of 2 years-before they become union
members. Thus, it was established that cutting department
employees Villalobos and Garcia had worked for Respon-
dent approximately 3 years before they became union
members, and Legg, who had worked for approximately 2-
1/2 years, did not become a union member until after
Holeman contacted the employees at Respondent's plant
after Galvez alerted him to the fact that not all of
Respondent's employees were union members. Whether,
during the interim, they were paid in accordance with the
collective-bargaining agreement was not established.
After careful review of the evidence, I conclude and find
that the General Counsel has failed to establish the
absence of economic motivation for Galvez' layoff.
Respondent's economic defense finds support in Holeman,
a witness for the General Counsel, who testified that he
didn't think it unusual for Respondent to be laying off
employees in February "Because of the situation of the
meat business this year. Everybody practically is laying off
and were laying off at that time. We had approximately
600 union members unemployed at that time due to layoff.
The largest unemployed membership that we ever have
had." Further, his concern upon being informed that
Respondent might have to lay off employees was that
"classificational seniority," as provided for in the contract,
be applied in the case of all employees. The evidence
established that Galvez was the least senior employee in
the meatcutter classification. Of further significance is the
fact that no replacement has been hired for Galvez, and the
employer has notified Local 274 and stated at the trial of
this matter that he is subject to recall. I have also noted
that two other employees, both nonunion, were laid off at
the same time Galvez was laid off, one having been
recalled and having become a union member at the time of
the trial. And Legg, a nonunion meatcutter with more
classificational seniority than Galvez, was not laid off or
terminated although he has since become a union member.
In sum, and on all the evidence of record, I conclude and
find that the General Counsel has not established that the
layoff of February 23 was discriminatorily motivated and
designed as a retaliation against Galvez because he joined
Local 274 or engaged in other protected concerted activity.
A violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act in this
regard has not been proved. Accordingly, I recommend
that this allegation of the consolidated complaint be
dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several states and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by failing to pay Galvez they wage rate
provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement and by
9 The fact Local 274 has been lax in policing the collective-bargaining
agreement is no defense
D. J. ESHOM MEAT CO., INC.
denying him the fringe benefits provided for in said
contract , because he was not a member of Local 274, I
shall recommend that Respondent make Manuel Galvez
whole for any loss of pay and benefits he may have
suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against
him as aforesaid . Said loss of pay and benefits shall be
calculated back from April 13, 1973, the date of the filing
and service of the charge in Case 21-CA-11714, the charge
upon which the unfair labor practices are founded, to
February 23, 1973, the date of Galvez' layoff.10 Said
backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the
manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289. The interest on backpay shall be
computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716.
It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to
make available to the Board, upon request, all payroll and
other records to facilitate checking the amounts due.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. D. J. Eshom Meat Co., Inc., is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Provision House Workers Union Local No. 274,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the terms and
conditions of employment of Manuel Galvez, thereby
encouraging membership in the above Union, Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By such discrimination, 'Respondent has also inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and is
thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER i i
D. J. Eshom Meat Co., Inc., its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from encouraging membership in
Provision House Workers Union Local No. 274, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees, by
discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment, of
any of its employees because of their nonmembership in
such organization , or by any like or related conduct
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Make whole Manuel Galvez for any loss of pay and
benefits he may have suffered by reason of Respondent's
45
discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the
section herein titled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payments records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze and determine the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this recommended Order.
(c) Post at its office in Los Angeles, California, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."12 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 21, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent, shall be posted immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated complaint
be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges that
Respondent discriminatorily terminated the employment
of Manuel Galvez on February 23, 1973.
10 The General Counsel contends backpay should be computed back
from the date of filing and service of the charge in 21-CA-11594, while the
Respondent contends it should be predicated on the date of filing of the
charge in 21-CA-11714 I have found the unfair labor practice allegation in
21-CA-11594 to be without merit The unfair labor practice findings herein
are based solely upon allegations contained in the charge in 21-CA-11714
Accordingly, the 10(b) period shall be computed from the date of the filing
and service of the charge in 21-CA-11714.
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
12 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse or fall to pay any employee in
the bargaining unit covered by our collective-bargain-
ing agreement with Provision House Workers Union
Local No. 274, AFL-CIO, the proper wage rate
provided for in said agreement, because he is not a
member of Local 274.
WE WILL NOT,refuse or fail to grant to any employee
in the bargaining unit the fringe benefits provided for
in any collective -bargaining agreement with said union.
WE WILL make Manuel Galvez whole for the loss of
pay and other benefits which he suffered as a result of
our discrimination against him.
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. J. ESHOM MEAT Co., This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
INC. from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
(Employer) or covered by any other material . Any questiojis concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
Dated By directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building,
(Representative) (Title) 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California 90014,
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
Telephone 213-688-5229.
anyone.