Cynthia Vereen, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 5, 2000
01985918 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 5, 2000)

01985918

04-05-2000

Cynthia Vereen, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Cynthia Vereen v. United States Postal Service

01985918

April 5, 2000

Cynthia Vereen, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01985918

) Agency No. 4F-956-0151-97

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

On July 21, 1998, Cynthia Vereen (hereinafter referred to as complainant)

filed a timely appeal from the June 24, 1998, final decision of the United

States Postal Service (hereinafter referred to as the agency) concerning

her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is timely filed (see 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to

be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402(a)))<1>

and is accepted in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (to be

codified as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the reasons that follow, the

agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the complainant has proven,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency discriminated against

her on the bases of race (black), sex, and reprisal when she received

a 14-day suspension in June 1997.

Complainant filed her formal complaint on September 2, 1997. Following an

investigation, she was notified of her right to request a hearing before

an EEOC Administrative Judge or an immediate final agency decision

(FAD). She did not respond, and the agency issued a FAD, finding no

discrimination. Complainant has filed the instant appeal.<2>

Complainant worked as a full-time window clerk in the box section in

Sacramento, California. The agency issued her a notice of a 14-day

suspension for conduct unbecoming a postal employee. Specifically,

complainant was charged with physically assaulting another employee (E1)

and using unacceptable language. Complainant asserted that E1 was the

aggressor but statements from employees who witnessed the altercation

belied her contention.<3> E1 was not disciplined.

Complainant's immediate supervisor (S1) stated that he recommended the

suspension based on a thorough investigation of the incident, wherein

he found that complainant was identified as the aggressor. He asserted

that the discipline was in accord with the nature of the improper conduct.

S1 also stated that he had issued disciplinary actions to other employees,

including a charge of conduct unbecoming a postal employee to an Asian

male employee who used profanity.

In general, claims that allege disparate treatment are examined under the

tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545

F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). Initially, for complainant to prevail, s/he

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor

in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Following this

established order of analysis is not always necessary where the agency

articulates an explanation for its actions. In such cases, the factual

inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas

analysis--the ultimate question of whether complainant has shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's action was motivated

by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983). It is complainant's burden to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's action

was based on prohibited considerations of discrimination, that is, its

articulated reason for its action was not its true reason but a sham

or pretext for discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

We find that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for issuing a suspension to complainant. S1 stated that, based on an

extensive investigation, he concluded that complainant was the aggressor.

S1 explained that complainant's behavior warranted the disciplinary

action and that it was in accordance with the severity of the conduct.

Based on the record, including documents submitted by complainant,

we find that S1's action was supported by the record.

The burden now returns to complainant to demonstrate that the agency's

articulated reasons for its actions were the result of discrimination.

Complainant contends that she was not the aggressor, but her claim is

not supported by the record. She has not shown that she was treated

differently than other employees who engaged in similar behavior or

that she was singled out for disparate treatment. Further, she has not

demonstrated that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited factor,

such as race or sex. Based on our review of the record, we find that

complainant has not shown that the agency's reasons for its actions

were pretextual.

To establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, complainant

must show that (1) she engaged in prior protected activity; (2) the

acting agency official was aware of the protected activity; (3) she

was subsequently disadvantaged by an adverse action; and, (4) there

is a causal link between the protected activity and adverse action.

Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., supra;

Manoharan v. Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons,

842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988). The causal connection may be shown by

evidence that the adverse action followed the protected activity within

such a period of time and in such a manner that a reprisal motive is

inferred. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43 (2nd Cir. 1980).

Even if complainant established a prima facie case, as stated, above, the

agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions

that complainant did not demonstrate were pretextual. Therefore, we

find that the agency did not discriminate against complainant in reprisal.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 5, 2000

Date Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________ _________________________

Date

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Complainant's notice of appeal requested an extension of time, and no

further documents were submitted. The Commission finds that the record

contains sufficient information on which to decide this matter, including

an extensive statement with supporting documents from complainant.

3Apparently the altercation grew out of complainant's discontent with

the rearrangement of sorting boxes and a change in operational duties

to others.