Curtis Ling et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 18, 2020

13723897 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/723,897 12/21/2012 Curtis Ling M3921.10004US02 8104
164869 7590 02/18/2020
MB - MAXLINEAR, INC.
1389 Center Drive, Suite 300
Park City, UT 84098
EXAMINER
TRINH, SONNY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
d@mabr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CURTIS LING and TIMOTHY GALLAGHER
Appeal 2018-005782
Application 13/723,897
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, all of the pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MaxLinear, Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to “broadband near-field
communication utilizing full spectrum capture.” Spec. ¶ 5.2
Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below and is
exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for communication, the method
comprising:
in a communication device comprising an integrated
broadband transceiver:
detecting one or more usable channels within a frequency
spectrum band designated, by a regulatory body, for
communication of signals corresponding to a first type of
communications, wherein said detecting is performed based on
full spectrum capture, with an entirety of said frequency
spectrum band being digitized for instant access to all channels
in said frequency spectrum band; and
wirelessly transmitting one or more content-carrying
signals corresponding to a second type of communications, on
said one or more channels, wherein:
said first type of communications and said second
type of communications correspond to different
communication protocols or standards; and
each of said one or more content-carrying signals
corresponding to said second type of communications is
transmitted at a power level that is below a spurious
emissions mask set for said first type of communications

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed
December 21, 2012 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed July 10,
2017 (“Final Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed January 10, 2018 (“Appeal
Br.”); (4) the Examiner’s Answer mailed March 14, 2018(“Ans.”); and (5)
the Reply Brief filed May 14, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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by said regulatory body for a respective one of said one or
more channels on which it is transmitted; and
configuring transmission of said content-carrying signals
to spread transmit power over a bandwidth larger than a
bandwidth used by said regulatory body to set said spurious
emissions mask.
Appeal Br. 40 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The references3 relied upon by the Examiner are:
Name Reference Date
Andrea US 5,506,545 Apr. 9, 1996
Mattisson US 2002/0012381 A1 Jan. 31, 2002
Dent US 2004/0110506 A1 June 10, 2004
Dekel US 2006/0083187 A1 Apr. 20, 2006
Waltho US 2007/0202867 A1 Aug. 30, 2007
Liu US 7,558,348 B1 July 7, 2009
Bahl US 2009/0196180 A1 Aug. 6, 2009
Ben Ayed US 2011/0313922 A1 Dec. 22, 2011
Gargi US 8,725,113 B2 May 13, 2014

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Bahl, Dent, and Mattisson.
Final Act. 3–5.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent,
Liu, and Waltho. Id. at 5–8.

3 All citations to the references use the first-named inventor only.
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The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 9, 10, 13–15, 19, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed,
Dent, Liu, Waltho, and Gargi. Id. at 8–10.
The Examiner rejects claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu,
Waltho, and Dekel. Id. at 10–11.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent,
Andrea, and Bahl. Id. at 11–14.
The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 9, 10, 13–15, 19, and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed,
Dent, Andrea, Bahl, and Gargi. Id. at 15–16.
The Examiner rejects claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea,
Bahl, and Dekel. Id. at 17.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects independent claims 1 and 11 as obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over three different combinations of references. Each of
these combinations is discussed separately below using claim 1 as the
exemplary claim.

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First Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1 and 11
The Examiner rejects claims 1 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Bahl, Dent, and Mattisson.
Final Act. 3–5. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Bahl to teach or suggest
each of said one or more content-carrying signals corresponding
to said second type of communications is transmitted at a power
level that is below a spurious emissions mask set for said first
type of communications by said regulatory body for a respective
one of said one or more channels on which it is transmitted,
as recited in claim 1. Id. at 3–4 (citing Bahl ¶¶ 2, 46, 70–72).
Appellant argues “neither Bahl nor Mattisson disclose, at the above
paragraphs or anywhere else, any ‘spurious emissions mask’, particularly
ones set by a regulatory body for transmission using a first type of
communication, with transmission of a second (different) type of
communication being performed based on such mask.” Appeal Br. 16.
“There is simply nothing in these references about transmitting signals for
one type of communication using masks for another type of
communication.” Id. at 17.
The Examiner responds to Appellant’s arguments by discussing Liu,
which is used neither in the current rejection nor specifically argued here by
Appellant:
Since Liu does teach spreading the clock so that the power of
spurs will be distributed over a wider bandwidth, thereby
reducing the interference noise floor, . . . it is clear that Liu does
teach the limitation “transmitted at a power level that is below a
spurious emissions mask set . . . by [the] regulatory body,” and
where the transmission is configured to “spread transmit power
over a bandwidth larger than a bandwidth used by said regulatory
body to set said spurious emissions mask,” as claimed.
Ans. 28.
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We find Appellant’s argument persuasive. The Examiner, by
discussing Liu, fails to address specifically Appellant’s arguments based on
Bahl. Furthermore, although Bahl discusses “mitigating interferences
among secondary users” of a spectrum band (Bahl ¶ 72), our review does not
reveal where Bahl teaches or suggests signals “transmitted at a power level
that is below a spurious emissions mask,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal
Br. 40.
Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments
advanced by Appellant for the Examiner’s first rejection of claim 1, we need
not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments. Accordingly, based on
the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of independent claim 1 over the combined teachings of Bahl, Dent, and
Mattisson, and, for the same reasons, of independent claim 11.
Second Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1 and 11
The Examiner finds the combination of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, and
Waltho teaches or suggests all of the limitations of claims 1 and 11. Final
Act. 5–8. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion. For this second
rejection of claim 1, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the
Final Office Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional
findings of fact appearing below for emphasis.
The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Ben Ayed and
Waltho to teach or suggest detecting one or more usable channels within a
frequency spectrum band, as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 5 (citing Ben
Ayed ¶ 135, Waltho Fig. 3 and related disclosure). Appellant argues “Ben
Ayed fails to disclose any ‘one or more usable channels within a frequency
spectrum band,’ or any detection thereof. The Examiner does not provide
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any support for the assertion that Ben Ayed’s ‘established channels’ can be
construed as ‘one or more usable channels.’” Appeal Br. 19.
We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. First, Appellant’s
argument does not address the Examiner’s findings based on Waltho.
Appellant’s arguments, therefore, are not responsive to the rejection because
Appellant argues Ben Ayed alone when the Examiner relies on the combined
teachings of Ben Ayed and Waltho. We also find Appellant’s arguments
regarding Ben Ayed alone unpersuasive because we agree with the
Examiner that, by establishing a channel for short range communication,
Ben Ayed teaches or at least suggests that the channel is usable, as recited in
claim 1. See Ans. 22–23 (“[T]he low power Bluetooth device in Ben Ayed
is an unlicensed user and the device must scan for unused channels in the
area in order to establish a communication channel for short range
communication. Therefore, these ‘established channels’ would be ‘one or
more usable channels.’”) (Emphases omitted). Appellant fails to respond to
these additional findings (id.) provided by the Examiner in the Answer. See
Reply Br. 10–12.
Next, Appellant argues “even assuming for the sake of argument that
Ben Ayed’s ‘established channels’ can be construed as ‘one or more usable
channels,’ which the Appellant does not concede, the Appellant submits that
Waltho does not disclose . . . anything that may be construed as ‘full
spectrum capture.’” Appeal Br. 19.
In response, the Examiner, in interpreting “full spectrum capture,”
determines that “for any communication device, ‘a full frequency spectrum
band’ is just a ‘total bandwidth’ desired for such communication device
according to its specification.” Ans. 23. (emphasis omitted).
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We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because Appellant fails to
establish the Examiner’s interpretation of “full spectrum capture,” as recited
in claim 1, is not the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
Appellant’s Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Specification does not define expressly “full
spectrum capture.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 23. Appellant, moreover, fails to set
forth a description of the term in the Specification that is inconsistent with
the Examiner’s interpretation. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Appellant, therefore, fails to persuasively demonstrate that the
Examiner’s broad interpretation of full spectrum capture as encompassing
Waltho’s detecting of reusable channels across a spectrum is inconsistent
with Appellant’s Specification or is otherwise unreasonable. In re Smith
Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Examiner relies on Dent’s “wideband digitizing circuit” to teach
or suggest “an entirety of said frequency spectrum band being digitized for
instant access to all channels in said frequency spectrum band” (Appeal
Br. 40), as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6 (citing Dent ¶¶ 8, 27, Figs. 2, 4).
Appellant argues “Dent does not teach digitizing a frequency
spectrum band in its entirety, and particularly doing so for instant access to
all channels in said frequency spectrum band.” Appeal Br. 20.
We are unpersuaded because Appellant fails to show the Examiner’s
interpretation of digitizing an “entirety of said frequency spectrum band” to
include Dent’s wideband digitizing circuit’s digitizing of a frequency
spectrum band in its entirety, is unreasonably broad. With respect to
Appellant’s providing instant access to all channels argument, the Examiner
concludes “it would have been obvious . . . at the time the invention was
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made for utilizing a wideband digitizing circuit as taught by Dent for
frequency scanning, as an alternative of obvious design choice for utilizing
advantages of wideband digitizing scanning circuit such as quick scanning
and power saving.” Ans. 24 (citing Dent ¶¶ 8, 27). Appellant, in turn, fails
to respond to the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to
use Dent’s wideband digitizing circuit for quick scanning of channels, i.e.,
for instant access to all channels. Reply Br. 13–14; Appeal Br. 20–21.
The Examiner relies on Liu’s discussion of emission masks to teach or
suggest “each of said one or more content-carrying signals corresponding to
said second type of communications is transmitted at a power level that is
below a spurious emissions mask set . . . by said regulatory body” (Appeal
Br. 40), as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 7 (citing Liu 7:12–34, 10:10–26,
Figs. 4, 7, 8). In response, Appellant argues
while Liu may disclose masks and use of a mask in conjunction
with the alleged invention(s) described thereby, Liu fails to teach
using such masks in the particular manner in the claim limitations
at issue––that is, where signals corresponding to a second type
of communication, that is different from a first type of
communication for which the masks are set, are transmitted at a
power level that is below such masks, and with the transmission
of signals (for both types of communication).
Appeal Br. 22.
This argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Claim 1 does not require transmitting signals corresponding to a second type
of communication with signals corresponding to a first type of
communication signals. Claim 1 does not require transmitting a first type of
communication signals at all. Rather, claim 1 recites detecting channels for
a first type of communications wherein a second type of communications is
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transmitted. See id. at 40 (“detecting one or more usable channels within a
frequency spectrum band designated, by a regulatory body, for
communication of signals corresponding to a first type of communications”
and “each of said one or more content-carrying signals corresponding to said
second type of communications is transmitted”).
Appellant further argues “[t]here is simply nothing in Liu about
transmitting signals for one type of communication using masks for another
type of communication.” Id. at 22. The Examiner responds that “Liu’s
teaching is used solely for its teaching of spreading the transmission power
over a wide bandwidth in order to reduce its transmission power below the
emission mask set by FCC for interference avoidance purpose.” Ans. 27
(emphases omitted).
Appellant’s argument fails to identify dispositive error in the
Examiner’s rejection. Arguments must address the Examiner’s action. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The arguments shall explain why the examiner
erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.”). Here,
Appellant argues Liu alone when the Examiner relies on the combination of
references to teach the disputed limitation. The Examiner relies on Liu to
teach transmitting a second type of communications signals at a power level
that is below a spurious emissions mask set by a regulatory body. Final Act.
7. But, Appellant’s argument does not address the Examiner’s reliance on
Ben Ayed to teach “a spurious emissions mask set by said regulatory body”
for a first type of communications signals. Final Act. 6 (citing Ben Ayed ¶¶
69, 113–114).
Appellant argues Liu fails to teach or suggest “configuring
transmission of said content-carrying signals to spread transmit power over a
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bandwidth larger than a bandwidth used by said regulatory body to set said
spurious emissions mask,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 21.
The Examiner responds
Since Liu does teach spreading the clock so that the power of
spurs will be distributed over a wider bandwidth, thereby
reducing the interference noise floor, and “. . . to spread power,
therefore decreasing the power density at those bands of
frequencies . . . ”, and “embodiments of the present invention
has emissions 804 that comply with emissions mask 802 over
frequency” (see Liu, col. 7, lines 12–34, col. 10, lines 10–26), it
is clear that Liu does teach the limitation “‘transmitted at a power
level that is below a spurious emissions mask set... by [the]
regulatory body,” and where the transmission is configured to
“spread transmit power over a bandwidth larger than a bandwidth
used by said regulatory body to set said spurious emissions
mask.” as claimed.
Ans. 28. The Examiner further finds “that ‘spread transmit power over a
bandwidth larger than a bandwidth used by said regulatory body’ is just an
inherent limitation, particularly to a Bluetooth system employing frequency
hopping.” Id.
Appellant, in turn, fails to respond specifically to the Examiner’s
additional findings provided in the Answer, and so this argument is
unpersuasive. Reply Br. 15–16.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s second 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of independent claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s second
obviousness rejection of independent claim 11, which is not argued
separately. Appeal Br. 17–23. The rejections of claims 2, 6, 10, 12, and 16,
which depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or 11, and were either not
separately argued, or nominally separately argued, are sustained for similar
reasons.
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Third Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1 and 11
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent,
Andrea, and Bahl. Final Act. 11–14. The Examiner finds that Ben Ayed
teaches most of the limitations of claim 1. Id. For example, the Examiner
finds, “although Ben Ayed discloses a low power mode, Ben Ayed is silent
with transmitting at a power level that is below a spurious emissions mask
by spreading transmit power over a bandwidth larger than a bandwidth used
by said regulatory body to set said spurious emissions mask.” Id. at 13.
“However, Andrea teaches a transmission method for transmitting at a
power level that is below a spurious emissions mask . . . in order to conform
to FCC regulation regarding maximum allowable transmission power.” Id.
(citing Andrea 2:12–44). Thus, the Examiner relies on Andrea to teach or
suggest
each of said one or more content-carrying signals corresponding
to said second type of communications is transmitted at a power
level that is below a spurious emissions mask set for said first
type of communications by said regulatory body for a respective
one of said one or more channels on which it is transmitted,
as recited in claim 1.
Appellant argues “Andrea does not disclose . . . masks, let alone
specifically a ‘spurious emissions mask’ that is set by a regulatory body.”
Appeal Br. 26. Appellant further “disagrees with the Examiner’s assertion
that Andrea teaches use of masks and/or signal spreading ‘in order to
conform to FCC regulation regarding maximum allowable transmission
power’ as Andrea never mentions the FCC or any other regulatory body.”
Id.
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We find Appellant’s argument persuasive. The portion of Andrea
cited by the Examiner describes maintaining power of a clock signal at a low
level by spreading in frequency the spectral components of the clock signal,
not by masking or filtering the clock signal. Final Act. 13; Ans. 31 (citing
Andrea 2:25–45). Accordingly, the Examiner does not demonstrate
sufficiently that Andrea teaches or suggests signals “transmitted at a power
level that is below a spurious emissions mask,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal
Br. 40.
Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments
advanced by Appellant for the Examiner’s third obviousness rejection of
claim 1, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments.
Accordingly, based on the record before us, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1 over the combined
teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea, and Bahl, and, for the same reasons,
of independent claim 11. We do not sustain for similar reasons the rejection
of dependent claims 3–5, 9, 10, 13–15, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea,
Bahl, and Gargi and the rejection of dependent claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben
Ayed, Dent, Andrea, and Bahl. Id. at 15–17.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 3 and 13
The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho,
and Gargi. Final Act. 9. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Gargi to teach
or suggest “configuring said integrated broadband transceiver with security
levels during said pairing, wherein said security levels are determined based
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on corresponding distances between said integrated broadband transceiver
and said one or more other integrated broadband transceiver enabled
devices,” as recited in claim 3. Id. at 9 (citing Gargi, Figs. 1–3).
Appellant argues “[w]hile Gargi arguably discloses providing
different services at different distance thresholds, it never discloses different
security levels, let along teaching or suggesting applying such different
security levels to different distances or distance thresholds.” Appeal Br. 29–
30. The Examiner responds
Gargi does teach provide different security levels to different
distances or distance thresholds as claimed (see Figs. 1–3 and
related disclosures noting for “In various embodiments, an
electronic device such as the mobile device 110 may disable
functions and/or capabilities, for example, that allow access to
personal information that the primary user 140 may wish to keep
private and confidential when the device is beyond a specified
threshold distance from the primary user 140, and being used by
others ...”), where it is clear that the first access state and the
second access state would have different security levels. In
addition, the disable/enable of functions in Fig. 3 would clearly
indicate a security level associated with a distance.
Ans. 33 (emphases omitted) (citing Gargi 3:1–10, Figs. 1–3).
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
appearing below for emphasis. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive
because Appellant fails to respond specifically to the Examiner’s additional
findings provided in the Answer. Reply Br. 22–23. Appellant’s response,
amounting to little more than a paraphrasing of the claim language and a
general denial, is not a substantive argument that persuasively and
specifically addresses why the Examiner erred. Reply Br. 23 (“The
Appellant disagrees and (re-)submits that Gargi fails to teach or suggest the
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limitations of claims 3 and 13––that is “configuring [the] integrated
broadband transceiver with security levels”); see In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art”).
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims
3 and 13.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 4, 5, 14, and 15
The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu,
Waltho, and Gargi. Final Act. 9. Specifically, the Examiner relies on
combined teachings from Ben Ayed and Gargi to teach or suggest
“communicating said content with said one or more other integrated
broadband transceiver enabled devices based on said selected security levels
utilizing said one or more BNC protocols,” as recited in claim 4. Id. at 9
(citing Ben Ayed ¶¶ 101, 128; Gargi, Figs. 1–3).
Appellant argues
Gargi fails to teach use of different security levels, particularly
where such levels are applied to different distances or distance
thresholds. Further, Ben Ayed does not teach or suggest, at the
cited paragraphs, any communication of content using BNC
protocols or supported non-BNC protocols, particularly where
such communication is specifically done based on different
security levels that correspond to different distances or distance
thresholds.
Appeal Br. 32.
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We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own. Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive
because they amount to little more than a paraphrasing of the claim language
and a general denial, and, thus, are unpersuasive to rebut the prima facie
case produced by the Examiner. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement
which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an
argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); In re Baxter Travenol
Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this
court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant,
looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 4 and 14 and of claims 5 and 15 not argued separately.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 7 and 17
The Examiner rejects claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho,
and Dekel. Final Act. 10–11. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Dekel to
teach or suggest “wherein said detected one or more usable channels
comprise a plurality of channels that are discontiguous in frequency,” as
recited in claim 7. Id. at 11 (citing Dekel ¶¶ 64, 66).
Appellant argues Dekel does not teach or suggest “channels that are
discontiguous in frequency,” as recited in claim 7, because Dekel’s
frequency hopping “does not necessary [sic] entail use of discontiguous in
frequency.” Appeal Br. 34. In response, the Examiner finds that “for a
frequency hopping method, the pseudorandom sequence of frequencies in
FHSS would ensure no adjacent frequency when hopping from one
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frequency to another for minimizing interferences caused by adjacent
frequencies.” Ans. 36.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
appearing below for emphasis. We agree that one skilled in the art would
have understood that to optimize channel security, frequency hopping’s
pseudorandom sequence would necessarily include transmission on non-
contiguous channels. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because
Appellant fails to specifically respond to the Examiner’s additional findings
provided in the Answer. Reply Br. 25–27. Instead, Appellant repeats the
arguments regarding frequency hopping from the Appeal Brief. Reply
Br. 27 (“As noted before, as the plain meaning of the term ‘discontiguous’
indicates, the claim limitation involves use of frequencies that are not
adjacent. Frequency hopping does not require or necessarily entail this
limitation.”).
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims
7 and 17.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 8 and 18
The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho,
and Dekel. Final Act. 10–11. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Ben
Ayed’s discussion of synchronization in a sniff mode and hold mode to
teach or suggest “synchronizing signals received from said one or more
other integrated broadband transceiver enabled devices during said
communicating,” as recited in claim 8. Id. at 11 (citing Ben Ayed ¶ 114).
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Appellant argues “Ben Ayed does not teach or suggest any
synchronizing of signals received during communication between devices.”
Appeal Br. 35–36.
Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner erred. We adopt the
Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own
and add any additional findings of fact appearing below for emphasis.
Appellant’s argument, amounting to little more than a summary of Ben
Ayed, a paraphrasing of the claim language, and a general denial, is not a
substantive argument that persuasively and specifically addresses why the
Examiner erred. Appeal Br. 35–36. (“Appellant submits that Ben Ayed does
not teach or suggest any synchronizing of signals received during
communication between devices. Rather, Ben Ayed only discloses
maintaining synchronization between master and slave Bluetooth devices.”).
Furthermore, Appellant fails to respond specifically to the Examiner’s
additional findings provided in the Answer. Reply Br. 27–29. Instead,
Appellant repeats the arguments from the Appeal Brief. Reply Br. 28 (“The
Appellant disagrees and re-asserted, as the Appellant explained in the
Appeal Brief, that Ben Ayed does not teach or suggest at ¶ 0114 any
synchronizing of signals received during communication between devices.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 8 and 18.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 9 and 19
The Examiner rejects claims 9 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho,
and Gargi. Final Act. 9–10. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Ben Ayed
and Gargi to teach or suggest “determining a range of said one or more other
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integrated broadband transceiver enabled devices utilizing said BNC
protocols,” as recited in claim 9. Id. at 10 (citing Ben Ayed ¶ 114; Gargi,
9:1–17, Figs. 1–3).
Appellant argues “Gargi does not teach or suggest, at the cited
sections, any determining of range of other integrated broadband transceiver
enabled devices (or devices in general), particularly where such
determination is made based on BNC protocols.” Appeal Br. 37.
The Examiner responds
Gargi does teach determining a range of said one or more other
integrated broadband transceiver enabled devices as claimed (see
Gargi, Fig. 3 and col. 3, lines 1–15, col. 9, lines 1-35), and may
teach said BNC protocols as well (see col. 10, lines 55–65
regarding Bluetooth protocol). However, the BNC protocols
have been taught by Ben-Ayed (see [0101, 128] regarding NFC
protocol).
Ans. 38. We are persuaded by the Examiner’s response. We adopt the
Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own
and add any additional findings of fact appearing below for emphasis. We
are persuaded that one skilled in the art would have understood that the
portions of Gargi cited by the Examiner, including Gargi’s determination of
a distance of a broadband transceiver from a primary user, teaches or at least
suggests determining a range of integrated broadband transceiver enabled
devices, as claimed. Moreover, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive
because Appellant fails to respond specifically to the Examiner’s additional
findings that “the BNC protocols have been taught by Ben-Ayed.” Id.
Instead, Appellant merely repeats the arguments regarding Gargi from the
Appeal Brief without discussing the Examiner’s findings from Ben Ayed.
Reply Br. 29–31.
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We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
dependent claims 9 and 19.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 10 and 20
The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho,
and Gargi. Final Act. 9–10. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Ben Ayed
and Gargi to teach or suggest “identifying a corresponding position of said
one or more other integrated broadband transceiver enabled devices based
on said ranging,” as recited in claim 10. Id. at 9–10, 16 (citing Ben Ayed
¶¶ 101, 128; Gargi, 9:1–17, Fig. 3).
Appellant argues “Gargi does not teach or suggest, at the cited
sections, any identifying of position(s) of such other devices based on such
ranging.” Appeal Br. 38.
Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner erred. We adopt the
Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as our own
and add any additional findings of fact appearing below for emphasis.
Appellant’s conclusory argument, amounting to little more than a
paraphrasing of the claim language and a general denial, is unpersuasive to
rebut the prima facie case produced by the Examiner.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 10 and 20.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 11 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Bahl, Dent,
and Mattisson.
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We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of
Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, and Waltho.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3–5, 9, 10, 13–15, 19,
and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho, and Gargi.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben
Ayed, Dent, Liu, Waltho, and Dekel.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 16
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of
Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea, and Bahl.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3–5, 9, 10, 13–15, 19,
and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea, Bahl, and Gargi.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of 7, 8, 17, and 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Ben Ayed,
Dent, Andrea, Bahl and Dekel.
Because we affirm at least one rejection of each pending claim, we
affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 11 103(a) Bahl, Dent, Mattisson 1, 11
1, 2, 6,
11, 12,
16
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu,
Waltho
1, 2, 6,
11, 12,
16

3–5, 9,
10, 13–
15, 19,
20
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu,
Waltho, Gargi
3–5, 9,
10, 13–
15, 19,
20

7, 8, 17,
18
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Liu,
Waltho, Dekel
7, 8, 17,
18

1, 2, 6,
11, 12,
16
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea,
Bahl
1, 2, 6,
11, 12,
16
3–5, 9,
10, 13–
15, 19,
20
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea,
Bahl, Gargi
3–5, 9,
10, 13–
15, 19,
20
7, 8, 17,
18
103(a) Ben Ayed, Dent, Andrea,
Bahl, Dekel
7, 8, 17,
18
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED