Curlee Clothing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 29, 1979

240 N.L.R.B. 355 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

CuLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 355
Curlee Clothing Company and Southwest Regional
Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union, AF-CIO-CC. Cases 9-CA-
10735 and 9RC- 1560
January 29, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 5, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Robert E. Mullin issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings findings
2 and
Respondent has excepted generall) to tlhe Admim tradlie .aw Judlg's
failure to grant its motion for the sequestrtiI of witnesses during a portion
of the hearing on this matter Assuming. airluendi. that the failure to seqaces
ter was inconsistent with our present poc' v ith regard to sequestratlin ee
U'ngl Painting (Crporaitn, 237 N RB 3Lh (1978), we find that the effect
of nonsequestraiton here is not sufficient to ua:rrant a reersal.
Respondent contends hat the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to
sequester witnesses called to testif} concerning the slcitatlion of certa.in
authorization cards prejudiced its challenges to the cards I he prejuidce las
compounded. Respondent urges. b the fac thlt while questioning vtilne-
es ahoul the slicitatiin of cards. the (ieneral (ounsel also introdluced tesii-
mion) concerntig arrilous 8a)( It allegations. I he prejudice here. ccording
toi Respondenl stems from the fIti that w itnesses In the hearing room lierd
the testimony of those preceding them anid llegedls the, simpl, repeaied
the tesimony that seeniled t ecoke the ins.t favorable response frol Ihe
(ienerl Counsel
Initiall . we note hat the General ( insel's questions relaltlng io lieh
solicitation of uthortatiot cards were of a chiaracter designed t chil
generalls simlar responses. Bend thls, howeer, is the fact that the crds
were sohllcited h seeral different people in debls ariant circuistances. so
thalt the witnesses were not lestifsing to ans single event but lo man differ-
ent evenls
At the time of the deial of the motin foi sequestration b? the Adnilnlis
tralve Iaw Judge, which he based solel, on the large number of witncsese
necessar; for the presentation f (eneril ('ounsel's case and seere spatial
limilatlons. he informed all prties that, in light of the mpossibilit of e-
quesitratin. he would examine the record clisel to detet rin palerned
answers or tailoring of testimony. Our ow n realng of the record comnsince
us that the dministratlve Law Judge, consistentl ith his udicious exercise
of discretion, did undertake the sealuation lie piromlsed ;t the hearing. and
there does not appear to he ir! cionforlming f testimion), As stated hb' the
Fourth ('ircuit in -lirshein .'h .Srore' (i, , \V L R B., 96 LRRM 32t
11977),. i. t s not possible to assurne that he [the Administratie I aw
Judge] failed to ealuate the estitlons n light of the witnesses' ppirtuni-
ties to profit hb haing heard their fellow emplo'ees testif ',.
We are at a loss to comprehend our concurring colleague's curious inter-
pretation that the result herein ndicates both a retroactie applicaton of
U/nga Painting and that a "blaitant failure" Io follow the Board's rules ith
respect to sequestration will not be trea ted as preudicial error Neither of
these statements is remotels related to the JIelling herein.
First, we are not mandating a retroactive application of nga Painting
his case. of course was herd prior to the adoptiin of ur presenl seques-
tration rules. We cite 'na Paintin slls to acknowledge ;in u;Aareness
that our rules hae changed since this case was decided When this case ,as
heard. our plicy was one f allowing Administraie l.aw Judges consider-
able discretlin with regard to the sequestratiin of witnesses. Arguahl., we
need not hise pssed on this Iportion f the dminlstrtlie I av Judges
I)ecision at a1l loweecr. we leuv this lBoiard' responsibilltles 1 eimt-
paissing a careful review of the priceedtnins beh lo to leteinine n ich i.ae
whether the dmunimtrutile I aw Judge's "rl ings. findings. ; d concLu-
sions" are correctl anld ioinpreluidcla .dl 1 sa that under our old riules ad
minlstrlilve l,, Judges pssssed lle dls retlioll wilh respect to the seqlles-
240 NLRB No. 41
conclusions o3 f the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National abor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge. as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Cur-
lee Clothing Co., Winchester, Kentucky. its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in said recommended Order, as so modified:
I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(f):
"(f) In any like or related manner interfering with.
restraining. or coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization, to form. join, or as-
sist labor organization s, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to
refrain from any or all such activities."
2. Substitute the attached Appendix B for that of
the Administrative law Judge.
I ISi I tRTH R OR)l RI-.D that the election in Case 9-
RC 10735 be, and the same hereby is. set aside. and
that Case 9--RC 10735 be dismissed.
MEFM1BR M RPHY. concurring:
Since the hearing herein was conducted prior to
the issuance of the Board's recent decision in Una
Painlting Corporation, 237 NLRB 1306 (19781. and
thus at a time when the Board still permitted an ad-
ministrative law judge wide discretion in the matter
of sequestration of witnesses, I find that the Admin-
ration ofi uinesses is not to, a that such discretion was unlimiited lius. If
the circumstances of this case were different. we could. een under our ld
rules. determine that the Administrative Law Judge had either abused his
dscretilir or that such prejudice resulted that a reversal of the decision .,as
warranted We hold the Administrative Law Judge here neither abused his
discretion. nor. contrary to our colleague. was there prejludice to his Respon-
dent
he Respoindent has excepted to certain credibilit? findings made h the
Adminlsrale Law- Judge. t the Board's established polic' not to oier-
rule an Administratlve l.awu udge's resolutions with respect t., credibilit
unless the clear preponderance of all of the releslant evidence consice us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr Wall Pr,,luict.L In . 91
NLRB 544 19501, enfd 188 2d 362 (3d ('i. 1951). vWe hae carefull,
examined the record and find no hasis for reversing his findings
3 In the absence of exceptins. we adopt pro firnl the dlrminilir.iise
law. Judge's dating of the hbrgauilnng order as of Septcemlhc I. 197ti Fur-
thermore. irl adopting the I)ecisin of the Administrative au Judge, we doi
no, rels n his discussion of .Stcl-auh. Irnc. 212 NLRB 363 11974). hlch
has been superseded by 7lraidng Porr, Inc. 219 NLRB 29 (119751, as auuthor-
its for the ssuance of a hargaining order
l In par llf) f the recoimnreded Order, the Admninlstralise Law Judge
inadlertentls uses the broad injunctive language. " a.n other manner."
rather han the narrov, cease-and desist language. "in an) like r related
manner '" We shall mild if the recoimm ended Order anid notice a.cordingl
CIJRLEE^ CL TH N CO P N 54w -- -
356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
istrative Law Judge did not err in failing to sequester
the witnesses. Accordingly, I affirm the Administra-
tive Law Judge's ruling.
However. I cannot agree with the rationale used by
my colleagues herein, because it suggests they are
about to embark on a wholly unacceptable procedur-
al sea in applying the rule set forth in Unga.
The facts of this case are worth restating. Respon-
dent moved for sequestration of all witnesses, none
of whom were alleged discriminatees. The Adminis-
trative Law Judge denied the motion, relying on his
broad discretion under the Board's sequestration
rules. Subsequent to the hearing herein, the Board
issued its decision in Unga Painting, supra, setting
forth new revolving-door rules with respect to the
sequestration of witnesses. While, as fully discussed
in Unga, my colleagues and I are not in agreement as
to the rules which should be in effect for alleged dis-
criminatees, we were unanimous in stating that the
mandatory sequestration provisions of Rule 615 are
to be applied to nondiscriminatees. Thus, if the find-
ings in Unga were applied here, the sequestration of
the witnesses would be mandatory. However, since
the hearing was conducted prior to issuance of Unga
and since the rule set forth in Unga is procedural, I
find it would be patently unfair to apply the changed
rules for hearings to this situation, for, as discussed
below, changes in procedural rules must be made
prospectively.
My colleagues, however, state that the sequestra-
tion rule set forth in Unga is arguably applicable to
the hearing conducted herein, for they accept as the
issue to be discussed whether the Administrative L.aw
Judge committed prejudicial error. In doing so they
err again, in that (I) they thereby give the revolving
turnstile rule set forth in Unga retroactive application
and (2) they hold that even a blatant failure to follow
the Board's mandatory rules with respect to seques-
tration will not be treated as prejudicial error per se.
Both positions are totally unacceptable.
As to the matter of prospective versus retroactive
application, it is ridiculous to suggest that a new rule
of this type should be applied retroactively. The rule
as to sequestration of witnesses is a rule of procedure,
and hearings are conducted in terms of the procedur-
al rules in effect at the time of the hearing. As any
practicing lawyer or sitting judge will readily under-
stand, it creates an unmanageable hearing. The par-
ties to a hearing simply are not in a position to antici-
Nor will I find that the Administrative I.wu Judge abused his discretion
in refusing to do so. My colleagues erroneousls state that I ai finding thai
Respondent here was prejudiced by the Administralive .alw Judgcs lctlirl
That, of course. is clearly not the case Ihe Adninistrati e I alw Judge acted
within the limits of his discretion under the rules in effect at the iie ti f the
hearing In these crcustlances there ias no prejudice to Respondenit
pate if- and when -rules of this nature will be
changed. Rules of procedure are designed to insure
an orderly presentation of all evidence. If the parties
must anticipate changes in these rules, chaos will be
the only result. I urge my colleagues to state clearly
that the changes in Unga are to be applicable only to
hearings conducted after the date of the decision
therein.
Perhaps even more disturbing is the approach tak-
en herein that the majority is willing simply to ignore
blatant failures to follow sequestration rules with re-
spect to nondiscriminatee witnesses as constituting
nonprejudicial error. In order to understand the pre-
judicial nature of such failures we need only examine
the purposes of the sequestration rule. These pur-
poses were clearly set forth by the majority in LUnga.
There they stated: 6
Speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, Judge Friendly aptly describes "the
rule" as not an exclusionary principle but, rath-
er, "a simple and time-tested method for helping
to discover the truth ... " Stark, 525 F.2d at
427. The process of exclusion consists of pre-
venting a prospective witness from being taught
by hearing another's testimony.' The less a wit-
ness hears of another's testimony, the more like-
ly he is to declare his own unbiased knowledge,
even though the witnesses have talked among
themselves before the hearing and have dis-
cussed their testimony with counsel. Thus, the
purpose of exclusion is preventative; it is de-
signed to minimize fabrication and combina-
tions to perjure as well as mere inaccuracy. Wig-
more describes its efficiency as one of the
"greatest engines" invented by man to detect
false testimony.' At the hearing it deprives the
witness from hearing suggestions, be they con-
scious or unconscious, from which testimony
may be shaped falsely. It also aids in detecting
inconsistent testimony among different witness-
es and increases the efficiency of cross-examina-
tion by preventing subsequent witnesses from
learning from earlier cross-examination covering
the same subject. Whether we concede, as Wig-
more does, "that successful perjury is always a
possible feature of human justice," I' or reluc-
tantly admit that inexactness is human charac-
teristic, we cannot deny the exclusion process its
deserved prominence as a vehicle for ascertain-
ing truth. Hence, upon request of a party we
.Szqira, at 130 07
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 357
shall continue to exclude from the hearing room
all witnesses who are not alleged discriminatees.
See 6 Wigmore. Eidence §1837 1842 ((hadhourn re.. 19
7
6i.
d at § 1838.
'"ld at § 1839.
Ignoring completely their own statement, my col-
leagues find: "Assuming, arguendo, that the failure to
sequester was inconsistent with our present policy
with regard to sequestration, see lUnga Painting Cor-
poration, 237 NLRB 1306 (1978) . . . the effect of
nonsequestration here is not sufficient to warrant a
reversal."
In reaching this conclusion, the majority asserts
that "there does not appear to be any conforming of
testimony." I must point out that statement is de-
monstrably inaccurate. For example, witness Eulah
Trusty was asked to corroborate the testimony of
witness Jane Patrick as to an alleged threat made by
supervisor Henry:
Q. What did she say to Mrs. Patrick?
A. Well, just what she told you up here
awhile ago....
More importantly, here-and in the typical case of
this type-it is extremely difficult to determine
whether the witness is conforming his or her testi-
mony or simply stating the facts in essentially the
same way because that is the way they occurred. Fur-
ther, as the majority correctly notes, many of the
questions, particularly those related to the signing of
authorization cards, are of such a nature as to evoke
similar responses. Because of this there is a substan-
tial risk that some witnesses will alter their testimony
without being detected.
Thus, without sequestration there is no easy way of
ascertaining with certainty that a response was inde-
pendently arrived at or was the result of seeing how
cross-examination progressed and ascertaining which
response is consistent with that of earlier witnesses or
likely to be the safest. Since deception is so difficult
to detect, the failure to follow the Board's sequestra-
tion rules must be treated as prejudicial error per se.7
Thus, my colleagues give lip service to establishing
7 Indeed. if the fabrication or shifts in testimony were easily detectable.
there would be little need for the sequestration rule, since the questionable
testimony could simply be discredited.
8I have made several references to the fact that the witnesses are nondis-
criminatee witnesses. This is not to suggest that the mandator) aspects of
the rule do not apply to discriminatee witnesses as well. The d The differ-
ence is that with respect to discriminatees there is at least some balance to
be drawn some reason why as aggrieved parties it could arguably be said
that discriminatees should be permitted to he present dunng the hearing (as
indeed the Board in the ordinary case permitted prior to Lt'nga). Perhaps in
determining whether there is prejudicial error it arguabl, might be legiti-
mate to weigh this factor in the balance although I would not do so. Hisa-
ever, herein the witnesses are all nondiscriminatees Thus. they have noi
standing in the proceedings as aggrieved parties. They, therefore. hase no
interest which might arguably he weighed n the balance n reaching a deter-
mination that the failure to exclude them was not prejudicial error.
9 See m; dissent in : 'nga Panlinng, mliril
a mandatory rule providing for sequestration of non-
discriminatee witnesses, but they are willing to write
off wholesale deviations as not being prejudicial er-
ror.
In practical effect the majority is removing the
mandatory aspect from the sequestration of witness-
es rule announced in Unga, making it simply a mat-
ter of discretion with the Administrative Law Judge
or, should I say, the Board. As I indicated in Unga, I
will strictly adhere to the provision of Rule 615 9 and
shall find that ignoring the provisions of Rule 615 in
hearings conducted subsequent to the issuance of
that decision constitutes prejudicial error per se.
APPENDIX B
NO'l ICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL. LABOR RFLArIONs BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WF Wl.l NOT question employees about their
union activities or their knowledge of the union
activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of union
meetings or give the impression we are engaging
in surveillance.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that they
might lose their jobs, that we might close our
plant, that we will transfer our operations in
Winchester to any other location, or that we will
impose any other reprisals should a union win a
Board-conducted election or otherwise be desig-
nated as our employees' representative.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with Southwest Regional Joint Board, Amalga-
mated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC, as the collective-bargaining
representatives of our employees in the unit de-
scribed below.
WE WILL. NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, or to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the terms
and conditions of employment of our repre-
sented employees without bargaining with their
representative.
WE Wll.. upon request, bargain collectively
with Southwest Regional Joint Board, Amalga-
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO CLC, as the exclusive representative
of all our employees in the unit described below,
and if an agreement is reached v. will.l. embody
it in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed at the Winchester, Kentucky, plant.
excluding office clericals, professional em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
CURLEE CI.OIHIN(; COMPANY
DECISION
SIATIMENT OF HE CASE
ROBERT E. MULLLIN, Administrative Law Judge: This is a
consolidated proceeding involving allegations that the
above-named Employer engaged in unfair labor practices
in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (5) and also involving
objections to an election held pursuant to a petition filed
by the above-named Union in case 9-RC-11560.
The unfair labor practice allegations are set forth in a
complaint issued in Case 9-CA 10735 on December 28,
1976.' By order dated December 29, 1976, the Regional
Director for Region 9 consolidated the complaint case with
the above-numbered representation matter and directed a
hearing. In its answer, duly filed, the Respondent conceded
certain facts with respect to its business operations, but it
denied all allegations that it had committed any unfair la-
bor practices.
The hearing of these consolidated matters was held on
April 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13, 1977, in Winchester, Kentucky.
At the hearing all parties were represented by counsel. All
were given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine
witnesses and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived. On
July 20, 1977, briefs were submitted by the General Coun-
sel, the Charging Party Union, and the Respondent Em-
ployer.
Upon the entire record herein, and from my observation
of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACr
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENI
The Respondent, a Missouri corporation, is engaged in
the manufacture of clothing at plants in Mayfield and
Winchester, Kentucky, but only the latter facility is in-
volved in this proceeding. During the 12 months prior to
the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, the
Respondent had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. Dur-
ing the same period of time, the Respondent purchased
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from
points outside the State of Kentucky and caused said
iThe charge was filed on October 21. 1976.
goods to be shipped from said points directly in interstate
commerce to its Winchester plant. Upon the foregoing
facts, the Respondent concedes, and I find, that Curlee
Clothing Company is an employer as defined in Section
2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce and in opera-
tions affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZAIION INVO() VED
The Respondent concedes, and I find, that the Union
(also known herein as Clothing Workers) is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of the Act.
III THE ALLEGEI) UNFAIR LABOR PRA(TRI(ES
A. Background and Sequence of Events
Early in June 1976.2 the Union initiated an organiza-
tional campaign among the employees at the Respondent's
Winchester plant. On June 17, the Union filed a represen-
tation petition in Case 9 RC--11560 which ultimately re-
sulted in the holding of a secret ballot election on Septem-
ber 3. On June 18, and on various dates thereafter, the
Union requested recognition and bargaining for a unit of
the production and maintenance employees at that plant.
No written or oral response to this demand was ever made
by the Respondent.
The General Counsel alleges that by refusing to bargain
with the Union on June 18 and thereafter the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and that by
various other acts and conduct during the summer and fall
of 1976 the Respondent engaged in interference, restraint,
and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act. All
of these allegations are denied by the Respondent in their
entirety.
B. Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion; Findings
and Conclusions Wit/i Respect Thereto
1. The Union's campaign and the Employer's response
The first organizational meeting for the employees was
held June 10. This was followed by many other meetings
during the course of the summer. On June 18, the Union
made the first of several demands for recognition as the
bargaining agent of a production and maintenance unit at
the plant. The original and all subsequent demands were
met with silence by the Respondent.
The General Counsel alleged that throughout the period
from June through September the Respondent engaged in
numerous acts of interference, restraint, and coercion. To
the issues and the evidence in connection with these allega-
tions we will now turn.
The Respondent had approximately 375 employees in
the Winchester plant at the outset of the organizational
campaign. It had about 450 employees in its factory at
Mayfield, Kentucky. John C. Stanley III, president and
chief executive officer of the Respondent, testified that
nless otherwise indicated, all dates are In 1976.
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 359
both plants are capable of making the same garments. The
plant at Mayfield did not have a union representing its
employees.
Employee Norma Hunt was the first to seek assistance
from the Union in organizing the Respondent's employees
at Winchester. Hunt testified that early in June she tele-
phoned the St. Louis headquarters of the Clothing Workers
to ask the Union's help. In response to her request, shortly
thereafter Union Representative Lauren Sielbeck arrived
in Winchester. The first organizational meeting was held
on the grounds of a Holiday Inn, on the outskirts of Win-
chester. This was late on the afternoon of June 10. About
50 employees attended the meeting, during the course of
which Sielbeck discussed with them the objectives of the
Union and distributed authorization cards to those present.
While the meeting was in progress, Supervisor Julia Cooper
came through the area in an automobile and circled the site
twice. She was immediately recognized by many of the em-
ployees, some of whom waved to her. According to em-
ployee Virginia Witt, Cooper's husband was driving the
automobile. The route followed by Cooper and her hus-
band was along a private access road on the grounds and
not one generally used by any other than those with busi-
ness at the motel.3 Cooper was called to the stand by the
Respondent but was asked no questions about this matter.
I find, as alleged by the General Counsel, that Cooper's
actions and conduct on this occasion constituted unlawful
surveillance of the employee's organizational meeting and
gave the employees the impression that she was engaged in
surveillance. In so doing, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
The General Counsel contends that subsequent to the
initial organizational effort at the Holiday Inn and before
the election on September 3 many of the Respondent's su-
pervisors engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1). The evi-
dence and findings in connection with this issue are set
forth below.
Arthur Lee Shelton was in charge of maintenance at the
plant and an admitted supervisor. Employee Edgar King,
a mechanic, testified that shortly before the election Shel-
ton told him that "if the Union got in they would move
the factory to Mayfield. He'd put a padlock on the door."
King testified that Shelton repeated this assertion many
Limes. According to King, Shelton told him that "if the
union comes in, we're going to close the factory. Put a
padlock on the door, but I'll be working because I'll be
here when they move the stuff out and you all will be gone.
You won't be here." King testified that on another occa-
sion Shelton told him "the Company would move to May-
field because they said they' would work down there with-
out a union ... if the union got in, they would just move."
Employee Luis Garcia, another mechanic in the mainte-
nance section, corroborated much of King's testimony. In
Many of the employees testified as to his ncident. See. for example. the
testimony of Debra Powell. Ida Wiseman, Juanita Patrick. Gwendella
Slusher. Louise Hawkins. Annette Burton. Bonnie Baile?, Louise Lt.or,.
and Norma Hunt.
4 here was no issue as to the status of Shelton or an, iof the numerous
individuals who are described ais supervisors nfra The5 are all among the
number whom the Respondent acknowledged to he supervisors personnel
within the meaning of Sec. 2( 1 I) of the Act
addition, Garcia testified o an instance immediately be-
fore the election when Shelton told him that if the Union
won "they are going to close the factory and put a lock on
the front door and we would all be out of a job." Employee
Printha Sue Burgess testified that on the day before the
election Shelton told her and several other employees "the
factory was going to be clsoed if the Union got in." Em-
ployee Randall Brandenburg, another mechanic working
under Shelton, testified that for several weeks before the
election Shelton frequently advised him and other employ-
ees in the section "to quit and find another job because of
the union, if they come in, most likely the Company would
go to Mayfield." The Union lost the election and promptly
thereafter filed objections. According to Brandenburg, in
this post-election period, Shelton told him that "if the
Union come in" he might "have to lay me and my brother
[Greg Brandenburg, another employee] off. and [then]
bring the night watchman down in our place." Shelton was
never called to the stand. and no explanation was made for
his nonappearance as a witness. The testimony of the em-
ployees named above was credible, and I find that Shelton
made substantially the remarks which they attributed to
him. By Shelton's threats of plant closure and of moving
the Winchester work to Mayfield if the Union won the
election, as well as by threatening Randall and Greg Bran-
denburg that "if the Union come in" the night watchman
might be utilized in their places, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)( ) of the Act.
Employee Nettie Frye testified that one morning in the
week before the election Robert Baber, her supervisor,
came over to her machine and questioned her about the
union activities of her coworkers. According to Frye, Ba-
ber said, "Nettie, I can talk to you when I can't talk to any
of the other girls. Are most of the girls for the union?" Frye
dismissed the question by disclaiming knowledge as to
what her colleagues thought about the Union. Baber was
never called by the Respondent to rebut the testimony
which Frye gave. The latter was credible. I find that her
uncontradicted and undenied account of the exchange
with Baber occurred as she described it. By such interroga-
tion on Baber's part, the Respondent violated Section
8(aX ).
Employee Ida Wiseman credibly testified that after al-
most every union meeting, Supervisor Julia Cooper ques-
tioned her as to who attended, what went on, and what was
said by the participants. Employee Emma Wright corrobo-
rated this testimony about Cooper's questions on the sub-
ject of union meetings. When on the stand, Cooper never
specifically denied this interrogation. I find that it occurred
substantially as Wiseman testified. By such conduct on
Cooper's part, the Respondent violated Section 8(aX) ).
Employee Cathy Griffey testified that on about June 19,
when she was in a group of eight to nine coworkers who
were engaged in a discussion of the campaign, Supervisor
Phyllis Lindsey approached and told her that the "Union
could cause you to lose your job." Lindsey denied that she
had mentioned the Union to Griffey and testified that on
the occasion in question she had reprimanded Griffey for
staying in the restroom too long. Griffey's testimony as to
this incident was the more persuasive, and I find that Lind-
sey made the comment attributed to her. By such conduct
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
.. _ _ _ . ....
360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
Several witnesses testified as to the alleged antiunion
conduct of Supervisor Julia Cooper in the period immedi-
ately prior to the election. According to Lattie Wood,
about 2 weeks before the election Cooper, who was her
supervisor, came to her and several of the other employees
to tell them " [W]e better work while we could because if
the Union got in we wouldn't have any work." Wood's
testimony was corroborated by that of Mary Welsh, a co-
worker who was present at the time. Later, Cooper general-
ly denied having uttered such a comment. The testimony of
Wood and Welsh, however, was credible, and I find that
Cooper made the remark about which they testified. With
Cooper's comment the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(l).
On or about September 1, Stanley, the Respondent's
president, and Wilson Conner, the plant manager, held a
meeting with all the supervisors at the Winchester facility.
Employee Brenda Gross testified that immediately after
this meeting Acting Supervisor Mary Jo Kenney, came
back to their work area and told her and her coworkers
that she [Kenney] had just been to a meeting with Stanley
and Conner. According to Gross, Kenney then said that
Respondent's officials "had told them like it was, that they
[the supervisors] were supposed to come . . . and talk
against the Union, that their jobs depended upon it....
Gross testified that when she protested that Kenney could
not be serious about this report, Kenney reiterated her ac-
count and thereupon said, "They really will shut down this
plant, they just as much [as] said so." When Kenney was
called as a witness for the Respondent and was questioned
about this incident, she acknowledged, "I might have said
that, but I can't remember." Gross was a credible witness,
and I find that Acting Supervisor Kenney spoke to Gross
and Slusher in substantially the manner that Gross testi-
fied. The threat of plant closure contained in Kenney's
message to the employees was an obvious violation by the
Respondent of Section 8(a)(l). I so find.
Employee Emma Wright testified that after Supervisor
Julia Cooper returned to her group from this same supervi-
sorial meeting with Stanley and Connor, Cooper told them,
". . girls, you had better think twice before you vote for
the Union because, if the Union gets in, the factory will
close . .. we won't have any work because all the sponging
is done in Mayfield." Others who were present testified
that Cooper repeated this threat several times. Employee
Ruth Turley testified that Cooper told her and other em-
ployees who were gathered around her, ". . . girls if you all
vote for the Union . . . the work is going to Mayfield and
you won't have a job and I said, Julia, you don't believe
that do you? and she said, I know so because they just told
us so." Wright's testimony was corroborated by employees
Virginia Witt, Eulah Trusty, and Junie Patrick. Turley's
account was corroborated by employees Opsie Stewart and
Ida Wiseman. When called as a witness for the Respon-
dent, Cooper generally denied telling any one that work
would be transferred to Mayfield or that there would be no
work for anyone if the Union won at the Winchester plant.
As to most of the conversations about which the employees
testified, she acknowledged that she may have talked with
the employees on the occasions in question, but she could
not remember any of the details. The employees named
above were frank and straightforward in their versions of
what occurred during the preelection period and about the
comments which they attributed to Supervisor Cooper. I
find that, notwithstanding Cooper's general denials, the ac-
counts of the employees, related above, were the more
credible. Consequently, I find that, as they testified, Coop-
er voiced to them within the 2 days preceding the election
the Respondent's threat that if the Union won the plant
might be closed and the Respondent's operations in Win-
chester transferred to Mayfield. By these threats which
Cooper made to the employees, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1).
Other employees testified to allegedly unlawful conduct
on the part of Supervisor Phyllis Lindsey. According to
employee Ruth Turley, on about September 2, while she
and several other employees were in the women's restroom
at the plant, Lindsey told them, ". . . girls you don't know
what you are getting into. You better think twice before
you vote for this Union because . . . you are going to be
paying union dues and what are you going to do when you
don't have any job." Turley's account of what occurred on
this occasion was corroborated by employee Opsie Stewart,
one of those who was present. Employee Cathy Griffey
testified that on the night of September 2, while she was
home on sick leave, Supervisor Lindsey telephoned her at
her home to tell her that, at the behest of Plant Manager
Conner, she was calling to ask if Griffey planned to vote
the next day. When Griffey answered in the affirmative,
Lindsey told her that "if the Union come in, they [the Re-
spondent] would close the doors." At the hearing, Lindsey
acknowledged telephoning Griffey on the night in question
but testified that she could not remember anything about
the conversation she had with the employee. Neither could
Lindsey recall any details as to the conversation with Tur-
ley and Stewart. Griffey, Turley, and Stewart were credible
witnesses whose testimony was frank and convincing. Con-
sequently, in view of this conclusion and the lack of any
persuasive denials by Lindsey, I find that the conversations
in question occurred substantially as the employees de-
scribed them. I therefore find that here again the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(l) when, through Lindsey, it
voiced a threat that if the Union won the election it would
"close the doors" and that employees such as Turley, Stew-
art, and the others would discover that they had no jobs.
Employee Junie Patrick testified that on the day before
the election Supervisor Gladys Henry spoke to her and a
coworker, Eulah Trusty, as to the aftermath of a union
victory at the polls. According to Patrick, Supervisor Hen-
ry predicted that in the event of such a development "[t]he
factory will close," and then asked the employees, "Aren't
you afraid for your job?" Henry testified that she could not
recall her conversation with Patrick. The latter was a credi-
ble witness, and her testimony was corroborated, in part,
by that of employee Norma Hunt. I find that the conversa-
tion with Supervisor Henry transpired in the manner re-
lated by Patrick and that, by Henry's forecast that the ar-
rival of a union would cause the plant to close, the
Respondent further violated Section 8(a)( ).
Employee Virgie Tyree testified that on about Septem-
ber I her supervisor, Monica Francis, returned to her work
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 361
area after having attended the supervisors' meeting de-
scribed earlier. According to Tyree, Francis told her and
the rest of the employees then on duty, "you better all vote
no, because they were moving the plant to Mayfield and
you will be without work." Tyree further testified that at
the same time Francis cautioned the employees under her
that, in addition to the move, the Respondent could take
away from them various fringe benefits, such as insurance.
At the trial, Francis denied having made these statements
to Tyree. On the other hand, in a pretrial affidavit that was
used on her cross-examination, she acknowledged that, af-
ter the election notices were first posted on the plant bulle-
tin boards, she had commented to several employees on the
likelihood that the Respondent's moving work from Win-
chester to the Mayfield plant "would go quicker now...."
(Emphasis supplied.) Tyree was a credible witness. In view
of this conclusion and the contradictions that were appar-
ent in Francis' testimony, it is now found that the supervi-
sor made the comments which Tyree attributed to her at
the time and place in question. Accordingly. the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)( 1) by the threat of a plant move
as retaliation in the event the employees gave the Union an
election majority.
Employee Nettie Frye testified that during the week of
the election Supervisor Francis questioned her about the
names of the employees who attended the most recent
union meeting which had been held only the night before.
Francis conceded that she had engaged in some question-
ing of Frye as to the identity of at least one of the employ-
ees who was at the meeting. According to Francis. she did
this only to quiet a rumor going about the plant as to an-
other employee's union interests. In view of the widespread
dissemination of threats by the supervisory staff during this
same week, however, all of which have been found viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(l), the type of interrogation by Francis
of employee Frye cannot lightly be dismissed. It is now
found that Francis' questioning of Frye about the identity
of those in attendance at a union meeting created an im-
pression of surveillance of employee activities and consti-
tuted a further violation of Section 8(a)( ) by the Respon-
dent.
On the morning of September 3, employee Janie Keith
was in front of the plant passing out union leaflets when
the morning shift was reporting for duty. It was undisputed
that Don Berges,5 head mechanic and supervisor, inquired
of Keith as to whether Monica Francis, her supervisor,
knew what she was doing outside the plant. When Keith
answered in the negative, Berges told her that he would
report the matter to Francis. According to Keith, Berges
thereafter told her that the plant did not need a union, that
she should vote against it in the election that afternoon,
and that if the Union won the Company "would close the
factory." As soon as Keith reached her work station, Su-
pervisor Francis came to announce that Berges had report-
ed that Keith was handbilling outside the plant and that he
had asked that she discuss the matter with Keith. Accord-
In the transcript this name is mlstakenl? pelled "Burgess " The G(eneral
Counsel has moved that this spelling be changed so that the transcript 9il1
reflect the correct spelling. he motion is granted. and the transcript
hereby corrected in accordance with this ruling
ing to the latter, Francis then told her that if she (Keith)
"wanted to be working at Christmas I had better vote no."
It was undenied that later that morning Berges came to
Keith's work station to inquire as to whether Francis had
succeeded in persuading her to vote against the Union. At
the hearing, Francis conceded that she had had a conversa-
tion with Keith on the day in question and that it had been
precipitated by a call from Berges. She denied only that her
comments had included any threat to Keith's job. Berges
likewise acknowledged having had a conversation with
Keith while she was outside the plant. According to the
supervisor, however, the exchange was initiated by Keith.
who had inquired of him as to what she should do about
the Union and had solicited his advice. Berges' version of
his conversation with the employee was completely uncon-
vincing. Keith was an independent and aggressive stalwart
of the prounion group who had been active in the organiza-
tional campaign most of the summer. It would appear most
unlikely that when she was distributing handbills outside
the plant on the very morning of the election she would
engage Berges in a conversation as to what position she
should take on the union issue. After a consideration of the
testimony outlined above and the respective demeanor of
these witnesses as they appeared and testified, I find that
Keith was a credible witness and that, insofar as her testi-
mony was contradicted by the testimony of Berges and
Francis, Keith was the more credible. I find that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(l) by Berges' forecast that if
the Union won "they would close the factorv" and by
Francis' comment to Keith that if she "wanted to be work-
ing at Christmas she] had better vote no."
On the morning of the election. and shortly before the
voting, Supervisor Jacqueline Woods called employee Ella
B. Adams away from her machine and asked that she come
to another section of the plant, where Woods proceeded to
question Adams about her support of the Union. Woods
herself testified that she told Adams "Bea, no one could
have ever told me that you would be for the Union . . .
because Mr. Conner has been so good to you .... " When
Adams protested that each employee was entitled to her
own opinion. Woods countered with the statement that
Curlee was entitled to more consideration from her in view
of the way in which the Company had always put her back
to work after each of what apparently had been several
absences. The conversation lasted almost 15 minutes be-
fore Woods released the employee to go back to work. At
the hearing, the Respondent sought to justify Woods' ex-
change with Adams on the grounds that the two were
friends. Assuming that to have been the case, however, that
in itself is not a shield for coercive interrogation of an em-
ployee. In Florida Steel Corporation. 224 NLRB 45 (1976),
the Board held "it has long been recognized that the test of
interference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act does not turn on a respondent's motive, cour-
tesy, or gentleness, or on whether it succeeded or failed. It
also does not turn on whether the supervisor and employee
are on friendly or unfriendly terms. Rather, the test is
whether the supervisor's conduct reasonably tended to in-
terfere with the free exercise of the employee's rights under
the Act." In the instant situation, Supervisor Woods called
Adams away from her workplace and then interrogated
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
..
362 [)DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and criticized her for supporting the Union. This was not
an innocent exchange of views between friends. Woods
was manifesting the management's displeasure on discov-
ery that Adams planned to support the Union. The
supervisor's comments to the employee under these cir-
cumstances interfered with Adams' exercise of her Section
7 rights and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Florida
Steel Corporation, supra.
Employee Brenda Gross testified that on election day
Supervisor Gladys Henry and Acting Supervisor Mary Jo
Kenney came to her and employee Gwendella Slusher to
tell them that no talking would be permitted among the
girls that day. According to Gross. this was the first time
that she had ever heard of such a rule at the plant. Later.
the General Counsel secured testimony from several other
witnesses to the effect that they had never been warned or
cautioned about talking while on duty and that prior to the
election campaign they had been free to move about the
plant during working hours, and away from their ma-
chines, apparently without fear of reprimand. This testi-
mony was incredible and so out of keeping with the regi-
men that the Respondent must have followed to insure the
orderly operation of the plant that no weight is given to
such testimony as the General Counsel introduced along
this line of inquiry. Consequently. I find that the General
Counsel has not proved by preponderance of the evi-
dence that prior to the election the Respondent introduced
a discriminatory work rule against talking among the em-
ployees.
2. The wage raise
President Stanley testified that on April 20, and as the
result of a corporate policy decison made in the early
spring, he spoke to the employees in the Winchester plant
and told them that the Company was instituting an annual
wage review. According to Stanley, at a management meet-
ing on May 27, the decision was made to give the employ-
ees a wage increase, effective October 1. Stanley further
testified that in September the Board of Directors agreed
on an average increase of 30 cents an hour in the employ-
ees' pay and that on September 30 he came to Winchester
and made the announcement at a meeting with all the
plant personnel present.
The management memorandum to which Stanley allud-
ed in his testimony was received in evidence. This states
that the announcement of the pending increase would be
made to the employees on July 19. Whether the announce-
ment was made at that time or earlier is not clear from the
record. Plant Manager Conner testified that on May 27 he
held a supervisors' meeting at which he told them about the
decision to give the employees a wage raise in October and
he further testified that he advised them to tell their em-
ployees about it at once. Ora Clay Palmer, the only super-
visor other than the plant officials who testified about this
issue, stated that she told the employees in her section
about the forthcoming wage increase immediately after the
meeting with Conner. Many of the Respondent's witnesses
testified to having heard about the prospective raise in
May6 or June, but whether they heard the news from
Palmer or some other supervisor is not clear. Similarly,
there was much confusion in the testimony of the General
Counsel's witnesses as to when they heard the announce-
ment. Some testified that Palmer told them about a pay
raise late in July,7 others that it was immediately after their
vacation (all employees at the plant went on vacation the
first 2 weeks in July), and some that Palmer told them
about a raise before their vacation. 9
The complaint alleged that on or about August I Super-
visor Palmer violated Section 8(a)( 1) of the Aci by promis-
ing a wage increase to dissuade them from supporting a
union. On the basis of the numerous conflicts in the testi-
mony of the employees offered to support this allegation,
however, I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to
prove this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.
On the other hand, the Respondent did not deny that the
announcement to all the employees as to the amount of the
wage increase, made on September 30, was effectuated uni-
laterally and without any consultation with the Union.
Whether this action violated Section 8(a)(5) and (I of the
Act involves issues which are discussed later in this Deci-
sion.
3. The management speeches to the employees on
September 2
The corporate offices of the Respondent are in St. Louis,
Missouri. President Stanley testified, however, that in June,
when he learned of the union activity at the Winchester
plant, he immediately came to the scene to take charge.
According to Stanley, he was informed of the Union's ar-
rival on about June 17 but was told that Plant Manager
Conner heard of the organizational plans as early as June
4. Stanley testified that from the day that he learned of the
employee's interest in the Union until the election on Sep-
tember 3 he spent about 20 percent of his time at the Win-
chester plant. In contrast, he testified that subsequent to
the election he returned to Winchester only once, and that
was when he announced the terms of the pay raise to the
plant personnel on September 30.
President Stanley made several speeches about the
Union to the employees, but we are concerned here only
with the one which he gave on September 2. This speech,
deliverd to all the employees at about I p.m. that af-
ternoon, was a very antiunion declaration in which he
characterized the union representatives as "outsiders" and
told the employees that the future of the Winchester plant
depended upon their ability to operate without a bargain-
ing agent. Stanley stated, in relevant part:
I have also heard several comments made here that
union representatives have said if this plant goes
un.on the Company cannot close it. If this statement
has been made, the only way that the union can fulfill
it is if they arrange to buy this facility and operate it
'See e he tc'ilnnn ' of [)lyH HBrinllngl. Su.Slc tall, Sue McRannolds . ili-
ail Meatis. 1 ic\ lorgulson. Belie St1anlh pe Ethel Mc( all. Nancy I rue,
and elIsa Perry
See the lestimonv of .Isle Jc;an Merrill.
es illn . of l.oda ( lark.
' See tes'imllons f lasier (enlrs and Rose ee tBrlun
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 363
themselves. Do you suppose the Amalgamated Union
wants to buy Curlee Winchester'? Let there be no mis-
take about our present business aims . . . we expect
today to produce clothing here. No one can guarantee
you that this plant will forever continue in operation.
We have an absolute right to close this plant if busi-
ness requires. The future of this plant, as I have indi-
cated before, rests entirely with our ability-yours,
mine and others involved here to operate it as a team
without any outsiders. [Emphasis supplied.]
As an example, our friendly competitor in Mayfield,
Kentucky, the Merit Company, which is organized by
the same union that is trying to organize you, closed a
plant in Martin, Tennessee about a year ago. Certain-
ly, the dues paying union members who worked in
that plant learned what a union guarantee is worth.
Nothing!
Stanley finished his speech with the declaration, "There
will be no union here," whereupon he struck the lectern
with his fist in an emphatic gesture of finality.
Plant Manager Conner followed the Respondent's presi-
dent to the stand with brief speech in which he reiterated
Stanley's theme against the Union. lie said:
I have great confidence in John Stanley. I see him as
a friend and good businessman. There have been some
suggestions that John Stanley's tenure as president will
be short-lived.' I know, in fact, that it will only be
short-lived if it is short-lived for all of us. The turna-
round of this business under John's leadership pro-
vides him and the rest of us with security, and only if
we mess it up will we be in trouble.
What do you think the Mayfield plant employees
hope you do tomorrow? I would expect that the em-
ployees in Mayfield hope you vote the union in, so
that they can vote against it in the hope of getting
more work. Our two plants have argued hard with
management over the years about the distribution of
work between the plants. This plant has been success-
ful and it has been kept busy over the years often
when things were slow and people were laid off at
Mayfield. For the sake of my family and yours, I don't
want to see this changed.
I frankly cannot see how a union has a place here,
and ask you, for the sake of all concerned, to vote
against it.
The two speeches by the Respondent's president and its
Winchester manager clearly emphasized the possibility of
the plant's closing and the likelihood that work would be
transferred to the Mayfield plant." The thrust of these
This was an allusion to the fact that Stanlcs had become president of
Ihe Respondent onl a es months earlier is elevation to the post of chief
executive officer came after a disie prox hbattle among the stockholders
which lasted for an extended period he internal dispute was settled nls
when agreement was reached on Stanle as he compromise leader best
suited to effectuate a realignment of the (ompa.n!'s goals and management
Stanle) and Conner testilled th tht he reid their speeches and thal.
apart from brief introductory remarks for nstance. In Stanle;'s case. telhing
a joke at the outset of his talk. thes did not deslate fromn the printed texts
which were received In evidence Seseral witnesses for the (ieneral Counsel
testified as to their recollektiins as to vhat the plant fficials said on this
speeches must be viewed in the light of the fact that they
came at the end of an organizational campaign during
which the Respondent's supervisors, as found above. had
stated on numerous occasions that a union victors at the
polls would cause the Respondent to close the doors of the
Winchester plant and/or move the work to its plant in
Mayfield. As found earlier, these forecasts took on an un-
usually grim note and greatly increased in frequency after
Stanley met with the supervisors on September 1 and told
them that their jobs depended on the outcome of the vote.
Whereas Stanley was free to state in one line that the Re-
spondent had "an absolute right to close this plant if busi-
ness requires .... " he followed this statement with the
declaration that the future of the Winchester plant "rests
entirely with our ability yours, mine and others involved
here- to operate it as a team without any outsiders." (Em-
phasis supplied.) With these words the Respondent's presi-
dent made manifest that to insure that the Winchester
plant remained in production it was imperative that the
employees reject the Union when they voted. Thus,
Stanley's remarks in this connection were "no longer a rea-
sonable prediction based on available facts, but a threat of
retaliation .... " N.I.R.B. v. Gissel Packing (., 395 U.S.
575. 618 (1969).
In the second speech to the employees gathered at this
meeting. Conner bluntly told them that the turnaround of
the business under Stanley's presidency provided them all
with a security that would continue unless they proceeded
"to mess it up." His subsequent statement that the employ-
ees in the Mayfield plant hoped to get more work if their
counterparts in Winchester voted for the Union clearly
added substance to the rumors of such a development
which many of the supervisors had predicted, as found ear-
lier, during the preceding week. From the whole tenor of
this speech the listener could conclude that only by voting
against the Union would closure of the Winchester plant
and the transfer of work to Mayfield be prevented.
Finally, in assessing the overall impact of these speeches,
it is significant that at no time did either StanleN or Conner
assure the employees that they were free to select the
Clothing Workers or that the Respondent would ever deal
with that union if they chose it to be their collective-bar-
gaining representative. By their silence in this rerpect, these
spokesmen for the Respondent impliedly supported threats
to which their supervisors had been giving currency. Con-
sequently. I find that by these speeches on September 2 the
Respondent interfered with the employees' Section 7 rights
and violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., suora,. Ludwig Motor Corp., 222 NLRB 635.
636 (1976); Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc., 220 NLRB 982, 983
(1975): Jimmyl-Richard Co., Inc., 210 NI.RB 802, 805
(1974). enfd. sub nonm. Amalgamated Clothing 'orkers of
America v. V.L.R.B., 527 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
occa.sion I heir testimomn did nt differ in any material a, friom Ithe texts
of the speeches Ihe Resptimdent called seseral witnesses ho tetified h.at
thes did not hear either S;anles or Conner make anll threats, and counsel
for the Respondent thereafter made a proffer f the estimion, of apprtxl-
matel 7 other witnesses h,. it was asserted, would testifs it the ame
effect For the purposes iof the discussion that appears hereinafter, it is
assumed and found as tI both Stanles and C('nner that the; adhered to the
texts of hier prepared specches
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 6
364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. The Evidence as to the A lleged Violations of Section
8(a)(5); Findings and Conclusions With Respect Thereto
1. The appropriate unit
The General Counsel alleged in the complaint, and the
Respondent conceded in its answer, that all production
and maintenance employees at the Respondent's plant in
Winchester, Kentucky, excluding office clericals, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the
Act, constitute an appropriate unit. Accordingly, I con-
clude and find that the unit described above was at all
times material herein appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
2. The demand for recognition and whether the Union
had a majority
By letter dated June 18, 1976, the Union wrote to Walter
King, then president of the Respondent, that the Union
had been designated as the bargaining agent by a majority
of the employees in a unit made up of the production and
maintenance employees at the Winchester plant, excluding
office clericals. professionals, guards, and supervisors. The
letter contained a demand that the Union be recognized as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the afore-
said unit and asked that the Company meet promptly to
negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement. It further cau-
tioned the Employer against any unilateral changes in the
terms and conditions of employment of unit members and
suggested that, if the Company desired, the Union stood
ready to prove its majority by a card check conducted by
an impartial third party.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend
that this initial request for recognition was a continuing
demand and that it was subsequently restated on several
occasions. The record supports this contention.
On June 17, 1976, the Union filed a representation peti-
tion with Region 9 (Curlee Clothing Co., Case 9-RC- 11560)
and asserted, as Petitioner, that its petition was supported
by 30 percent or more of the employees. Authorization
cards presented to substantiate this claim were marked
with a receipt stamp by the Regional Office at that time.
Most of the cards that were to become an issue in this case
were received by the Region 9 office on that day. On Jul)'
6, 1976, the Union filed an amended representation peti-
tion in the same matter. The latter differed from the origi-
nal only in that in the amended petition the name of the
Southwest Regional Joint Board was added to that of the
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL
CIO-CLC. The filing of the amendment of a representa-
tion petition under these circumstances had been held to
constitute a renewal of the Union's demand that the Re-
spondent recognize and bargain with it. American Com-
pressed Steel Corporation, 146 NLRB 1463, 1470 71
(1964).12 It is so found here.
12 The fact that the petition was amended to add the Southwest Regional
Joint Board as the Petitioner had no effect on the cards solicited in the
name of the International Union. It is well established that cards solicited
by, and designating, an International are valid designations for representa
tion by local affiliates of that International. Breaker (onfec(ton, Ins i 163
In a letter dated January 4, 1977, William C. Hall, vice
president of the International Union, wrote the Respon-
dent to renew the request for bargaining as to the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit at the Winchester plant. In an-
other letter to the Respondent, dated February 14, 1977,
Joseph S. Cannavo, regional counsel for the Union, noted
that since the Respondent had made no response to the
letter of January 4 the Union, at that point, was then re-
questing that it be furnished with a substantial amount of
data as to the names of all employees, their classifications,
rates of pay, all fringe benefits, all terminations, discipli-
nary actions, and all changes and/or increases in pay effec-
tuated since the Union made its first demand for bargain-
ing in June 1976. There is no evidence in the record that
the Company ever made any response to any of the fore-
going letters from the Union.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, I conclude and find
that the Union's demand for recognition and bargaining,
first made in its letter of June 18, 1976, was a continuing
demand and that it was renewed thereafter, as described
above, on July 6, 1976, January 4, 1977, and February 14,
1977. Further, by its silence, the Respondent rejected
the initial demand of June 18 and all subsequent requests
for negotiation.
Early in the hearing, the parties stipulated that a list of
employees at the Winchester plant, with one addition,3
constituted a complete enumeration, by name, of all per-
sonnel in the appropriate unit on June 18, 1976. On the
basis of this list and the stipulation of the parties, it is now
found that on that date the Respondent had 373 employees
in the appropriate unit. To the question of whether the
Union did, in fact, have a majority in that unit, then or
later, we will now turn.
a. The drive to secure authorization cards
The card which the Union distributed during the course
of its campaign at the Winchester plant read as follows:
Type A
APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
in the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO
1627 Locust St. Phone 241-0018 St. Louis, Mo. 63103
I, the undersigned, hereby apply for membership in the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and do
hereby appoint and authorize the officers thereof, to
represent and negotiate for me in all matters pertaining
to wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
Name (Please sign):--------
NLRB 882, 887 (1967): Knickerboker Plastics (Co., 104 NLRB 514. fn. 3
(1953). Dolores. Inc., 98 NLRB 550, 554 (1951) A Sartorius & Co., 40
NI.RB 107, 120 (1942).
This was the name of Anna Conner. Studs of the stipulated list, how-
ever, discloses that Conner's name also appears there. N explanation for
this duplication was ever offered, and the parties did not refer to it in their
briefs.
CURLEE CLOTHING C(OMPANY 365
Address:
'ielephone Number: - [)ate:
(Company: - --
Department: - ()peration:
Type B was identical with foregoing except that it had an
additional line on which the applicant could write his/her
signature on the card for a second time:
Type B
APPLICATION FO()R MEMBERSHIP
in the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. AFL ('1()
1627 Locust St. Phone: 241-0018 St. Louis, Mo. 63103
I, the undersigned. hereby apply for membership in
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and
do hereby appoint and authorize the officers thereof,
to represent and negotiate for me in all matters per-
taining to wages. hours and conditions of emplo:-
ment.
Name (Please sign): 14
Address:--
Telephone Number: - [)ate:
Company: - - -
I)epartment: - Operation: -
Signed :- -
The foregoing are worded unambiguously and on their
face clearly set forth a purpose to designate the Union as
the signatory's collective-bargaining agent. The type of au-
thorization here involved is the kind to which the Board
referred in Levi Straus & Co., 172 NLRB 732. 733 ( 1968).
where the Board stated:
An employee who signs such a card may perhaps not
understand all the legal ramifications that may follow
his signing, but if he can read he is at least aware that
by his act of signing he is effectuating the authoriza-
tion the card declares.
The foregoing principle was subsequently' endorsed by the
Supreme Court in N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co.. 395 U.S.
575. 584 (1969).
At the first organizational meeting held on June 10, at
the Holiday Inn. Lauren Sielback. a representative of the
Clothing Workers, told the assembled employ ees about the
objectives of the Union and solicited their support in orga-
nizing the plant. Authorization cards (facsimiles of which
appear above) were distributed to those present. and about
15 of the employees volunteered to assist in the solicitation
of their coworkers at the plant. C'ora Hall. one of the latter
group, credibly testified that Sielback told them that in
talking with their fellow employees they were to "make it
plain ... that it [the authorization card] was . .an appli-
cation for membership in the Union." Hall further testified
that Sielback emphasized that it would cost the employees
nothing to sign the card and that they, should sign the au-
thorization only if they were doing it of their own free will.
14 O(n i f (of these irds l he dire nll l 'T.JeC ign"'' i.1i replI.i ed hs the
u. rds "Pleae P'rint "
After the first meeting, subsequent organizational meet-
ings were held at intervals of approximately 2 weeks during
the course of the summer. Norma Hunt. another employee
who volunteered to serve on the organizing committee, tes-
tified that at a meeting early in June one of those present
asked whether there would be an' initiation fee to join the
Union. According to Hunt's credible testimony. Sielback
assured them that there was no initiation fee required of
any employee who wanted to join the Union, and he asked
that those present reassure their coworkers to that effect.
Ruth Turlel, another employee on the organizing commit-
tee who attended all the organizational meetings, testified
that there was no discussion at any of the meetings as to
whether there would be an election. According to Turley.
Sielback told them that there could be no discussion of an
election until the employees had secured enough signed
authorization cards from their coworkers to get the Union
in. urle, testified that Sielhack explained, "We weren't
discussing an election. We were working for a union." '
F'inall,, there was no credible testimony from any witness
that any employee was told that the authorization cards
would be used onli to secure an election. '
b. Cards signed on or before Junle 18
(I Cards as to which there was no dispute
The cards of the following employees were signed on or
before June 18.'' Each of the signatories testified to having
read the card, having understood the language imprinted
thereon, and thereafter having signed the authorization.
There was no testimony, nor evidence. that any of these
employees was told that the card would be used solely for
the purpose of getting an election:
John Tilford Abner, Jr.
BettN, Jean Adams
Ela B. Adams
Odetta Adams
I.ois Alexander t8
Alma J. Allen
Billie J. Arnold
Susan Babb
Bonnie Bailey 9
Rhoda Bailey
Viola Bailey
Bobbie Baker 2
Sarah Ann Baker
Grace Ballard
Laura C('ole
Cornetta Conner
Emma Sue Conner
't he quotatin I, fronin urles', credible estimonN
-( ertin tiesitnon, on this issue i u ll he discussed nram
Ipa.rt frolm the card f ( arlene Branton. which was signed on June 18.
ill of the other daulhrizati,.n In this I ting were sigled bet' een June 8 and
June 1 7
i Sleander Ias hired on about June 3. 19
7
6 She was told at the time
that the oh to hich she ,would he islgned nitllil might he temporar, hut
nol that her eilplment would be tempor.ar. She worked until the latter
pirl of Nugust. hen she ilinlaril q Since she as on the payroll
rosicr for June 18 Alexander's card is a ,alid authorizllation.
l Although Bllle', card is dated Mas 10. 1976. she testified hat he
signed it ar the first union nicc llee uhll v. as held at the HolidaN Inn. O(ther
e dence eat.blished that this meetlnt uas held in June 10 176 It here-
lure ppears that BHale', crd wa1, aclual[ signed oln the latter date ans
cent. t its signed before June 17. 197f. because it bears an hI RB time
receipt stamp ndicating that the non delisered it t,, the Regional Office
on h,11 da . ( onequentiN. Blc's card Is .a .iid iauthortal:tIi aIld muS
be u ltcd
:i Subsequent to the time he i gned the card. Baker as diorced and
esunimed the use of her ;inaien naie I hil she testified as Bobbie Martin.
uhcca,l ii Juie 1976 she Icte,.l the ard is "Bobbieh K Baker" I is a salid
deslglluot in
CIJRLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARI)
Carolyn A. Barker
Mary Lou Barker
Betty Jean Barnett
Patty Barrett
Alta Benningfield
Linda Berryman
Margie Birchum
Wilma Bishop
Elsie Botts
Mabel Bradley
Randall Brandenburg
Carlene Branton
Dolly Brinegar
Rose Lee Brown
William Edward
Burgess
Annette Burton
Nancy Caudill
Freda Charles
Mary ('henault
Lola Clark
Sandra ('lark
Vicki Dunaway
Haddix 23
Mary K. laggard
Cora Hall
Imogene Hlollon 24
Annetta Hampton
Avonell Hatton
Gertrude Hlatton
Kathy Hatton
Georgia Hawkins
Louise Hawkins
Brunie ledger
Emma Hull
Norma lunt 25
Laura Jackson
Eugene Combs
Margaret Combs
Mazie ('ombs
Ella Louise Cosby
Sandra Dailey 21
Kathy Dearing
Mary Edith Dunn
Sarah S. Embrv
Carolyn Epperson 22
Grace Fallen
Carolyn Frazier
Nettie Frye
Felicita Garcia
L.uis Garcia
Ardella Gay
Easter Gentry
Gladys Grace
Lucille Greene
Cathy Griffey
Margaret Griffith
Brenda G(ross
Mona Kennedy
Sarah L. Kennedy
Alsie Jean Merritt
Bernice B. Lewis
I)ebra Litteral
Louise l.owry
Anna Lyle
Jean McCall
Wanda Martin
Debra Mason
Margaret Mason
Aneta Means
Jonita Means
Edgar King 26
Alice Jefferson
Arthonia Johnson
Mary Johnson
Dorrita Jones
Patricia Jones
Janie Keith
Juanita Patrick
Junie Patrick
Mary Patrick
Hlazel Patton
William R. Pelfrey
Debra Powell
Josephine Proffitt 28
Elizabeth Puckett
Mary Pury 29
Edith Rainev 31o
Sam Richardson
Sue Roberts
Eunice Roberts
Evalene Rose
Vivian Rose
C(heryl Rye
Linda Saylor
Esther Schooler
Barbara Tharp
Anna T'homas
Beulah Townsend
Rosie Lee Trent
Lillie Mullins
Mary Jane Neal
Jenn Nichols 27
Dorothy Osborne
Barbara Owings
I.ionille Sue Paslex
Minnie Shoemaker
Wanda Shumate
Fave Slusher
Gwendella Slusher
Brenda Smith
Bonnie Snowden
('orenia Sparks
Mavis Spencer
Phyllis Spivey
Sandra Stanfield
Marilyn Steele
Opsie Stewart
.inda Stidham
Mona Stone
(iail Swafford
D)oris 'Taylor
Kathy Terry
Vickie Thacker
Frances Whisman
Ava M. White
Evelyn Williams
Alice Willoughby
21 I);ailc testified that she eceived the card at the first unilnr Ineetilin
held at the Iliday Inn and that she signed It. after reading it. tI secure
better benefits and pay. She laiter testified that during the meeting one If the
organiters stated that the cards nlight also be used ito get all electionll, but at
no hine did she testify that anltine told hel that this was the only purpose
for which the cards were being secured ( nsequettl. in view of he express
languaige in the card, i nist be couuted I d& It Ptlacrii ,triuftictring ( ,
158 NIRB 139s. 1197 ( 1966). cnlf. 389 1.2d 678. 682 6th ( ir. 1968)
l2 ipperson's namie appears on the list which is in the record as (i C( Ixh
2. I his wis introduced b) agreement of all coiunsel its the cnomplete enuler
atin if all etploly ces at the plant on June 18 lowe er, her nanre does ntil
appear on (.(. I h II. which purports to he a photiocop iof the Respn-
dent's payroll list. On the other hand. l:pperon. whro appeared ais a itness.
credibly testified that she had been an empliycee of the Respondent fr 7
years and that at the time in question she was working n the coat shop
under the supervlsion If Phyllis l.indsey (onsequentl,, it misl tbe and s.
found that she was n the unit at all times material.
}21 laddirx signed her card on Jne I11. aIj ickl )u nai la,. her maiden
nanme. She married on June 26 and testifierdal the hearing as Vicki [)uina-
way I;addix, her married name.
Ihis nalme is al s spelled "llalllln in the ecord.
2s Although FHunt's card bears a signature date if August 7. 176, lIiunt
credibly testified that she signed the card at the first union meeting held t
the ltliday Inn. Ihis was established, hb the testimnony of nunmerolus .it-
nesses. as having been held on June 10. 1976 Finalls, on the reverse sidr of
the card. there appears the Reglonal ()ffice dalte stanllp indicaltig its receipt
on June 17, 1976. It is, therefore. obviaus that the card was signed by tlunt
and delivered t the tlnioln well before the demand date iof June 18 1976
('Consequently. the card nmust he counted as a valid designaltion.
6v King credibly testified thalt his wife Iead the card to htit. il.it he LInider-
stlood t, purpose. and hat, at his equest. she signed tie card n his behalf.
('ronsequenli. his card is a s did dcsignation. 4I-t/eai ticaii. Inr . 159 Nl.RB
585 (1966).
2 Nichols testified that she found her aulhoriiallon card ion her machine
one daI when she "was giod and niad at herl superisor'' iand that, after
reading it. she immediatel filled it out and placed it hback where she had
found thli card. She hersell nlcsr illrned i in to any of the rganizers
Accoldiig t Nichols. later that da. aftlc behing aa frIron her station fr
the lunch hour. she fund that he card was gnc i1 its brief, the Respion
dent contends that Nichols' crd should nt be counted because the author-
iatioli was never voluntarils turned ocer t the nitln. Nichols. howeser.
did not testify that the card wia taken fronl her w, rk statilrn surreptitiousl
or witlhiout her nsenlt Arid .hll Ini til slaid. she did not disatuw her
card or tesntf that she hitl ,ese sought toi cet it back fromn the Ilniion
('Consequentlls. it is nov. found that 1onI Junll 18 it wals a valid. unrevoked
authrization ca;rd and that it should be counted See Jii tl autilhew.I &
( I v N 1. R.B . 354 2d 432. 437 (8th ('it 1916) ( "'here is n showing that
('llult. assuning he hild rseralttil ahboul his dicsinaitn of the nion.
ever colnmunlctitated those resersvatillos t anyilen a nieri her f ianagte
mnent. r otherwise." )
21 Prillfit credibls testified that she was hspitalhied n the date her card
was co mpleted According to Proffilt. sh read the card, ndersttitid it and;d
was lever told that it wouild he used fur ai: purpose oilher thran that de-
scribed n the card. She testified that, al her request, her slel filled oiur the
aulhoiration and signed it o her behalf. lHer card constiatutes a id desig-
nation. Vrthiict Ingineertni ( o, 158 NiLRb 624. 0i3. fIn 4 ( 1966. enfd
376 F.2d 770 1).(' ('ir. 1967).
' lihe name ''Mary P'ur" appears the transcript, but the signature on
her card could he read its either "Piurs" or "Perry." ()nl, a "Mary Perrs"
appears oin the eligibility list. In any; et ,ni. ury (r Perrx ) appeared as a
witness and testified, credibly and ithut cntradictiun, that she ha;s been
an employee in the pocket sectritn for It0 1 cirs and that for secral c;ars she
had been working there under the superiiso of Phillis Mitchell it is clear
that Pury was in the unit it the time in quesltin and that her card shoiuld bhe
counted.
i0 In the tra;iscript the witness' inane Is spelled ''Ralec '' lo:sever, in
the authorization card which she identified hen n the stand. the signature
is plal spelled "Ra;ine "'' She credbl~t testified thIt she has bheen an em-
phloyee for 15 Nears and tha;t during the tle it1 questihon she vas wiorking in
the coat shop
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 367
Eulah Trust) Debra Willoughby
Ruth Turley Jean \Wise
Carole Turner Ida Wiseman
Virgie Tyree Hildegard Witt
Lizzie Watson Virginia Witt
Adeline Watts Lattie Wood
Shirley Watts Mildred Woosley
Mary Welch Emma Wright
Carolyn Whisman
Total 160
(2) Cards in dispute
(a) (Circumstances surrounding the solicitation of certain
cards
All of the cards discussed below were signed by employ-
ees who acknowledged having read the card, in most in-
stances having filled it out in her own hand, and thereafter
having signed it. At the trial, however, many of these same
employees testified as to comments about an election
which, allegedly. were made by the solicitor at the time the
cards were signed. From this testimony the Respondent
urges that the authorizations now in question were ren-
dered invalid. In resolving the questions presented here,
the opinion of the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing o.. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). is controlling. On this
issue, with respect to authorization cards, the Court stated
in that case (at 606 608):
[E]mployees should be bound by the clear language of
what they signed unless that language is deliberately
and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words
calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget
the language above his signature. There is nothing in-
consistent in handing an employee a card that the
signer says authorizes the union to represent him and
then telling him that the card will probably be used
first to get an election. . . . We agree, however, with
the Board's own warnings in Lei Strauss & Co., 172
NILRB 732 . .. n. 7 (1968). that in hearing testimony
concerning a card challenge, trial examiners should
not neglect their obligation to ensure employee free
choice by a too easy application of the (umberland
rule."
The soundness of the Supreme Court's holding that
employees should be hound by the pla:. language on the
cards which they signed, absent deception or manifestly
misleading characterizations from the solicitor. was no-
where more evident than in this case. The witnesses here
were almost all women from the town of Winchester and
the surrounding neighborhood. They were, in large measure,
an intelligent and literate group. Insofar as could be detect-
ed, when on the stand, not a single one displayed any read-
Sc Ih Board hs declred Ih.rl it i lot the priesnc e or hb,cric If ml.g-
Ic" wtIrds W hich is conirlihng hut rather he congeries ,f facils SUlrounding
the soiciton 4 he ll n f r /I. 1. lrtlus ( I 172 NLRB '32. 733. fn 7
( 196>8)
ing disabilities when asked to examine the card which she
had signed. Almost everyone acknowledged having read
her authorization prior to signing it and having understood
the printed language which appeared thereon. Thus, in this
connection, the answers of two witnesses on cross-exami-
nation are relevant background to any consideration of the
problems which are discussed hereinafter. One was em-
ployee Lizzie Watson, who, when asked, "How did you
know what it [the authorization card] was?" answered.
"Well, I just knew. I can read. [Emphasis supplied.]" The
other was employee Laura Jackson, who was asked the
following questions and gave the answers which appear be-
low:
Q. Did she [the coworker who gave her the authori-
zation] tell you what the card would be used for when
she gave it to you?
A. No, sir, she didn't. I knew what it was for.
Q. How did you know?
A. I read it. [Emphasis supplied.]
In the light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Gissel and
the evidence as to the circumstances in which the cards
were signed, it is now found that the cards of the following
employees, 28 in number, should be counted.
Dorothy Ball testified that she signed her card at a union
meeting. Ball acknowledged having read and understood
the card and that no one told her that it would be used for
an) purpose other than that stated on the card. She testi-
fied that during the meeting the organizer (whom she did
not identify) explained the benefits which a union would
bring to the employees and answered questions about ne-
gotiations. She also testified that during this meeting the
organizer stated that the card would give the Union a
chance to have negotiations and a vote. This was the equiv-
alent of saying that one purpose of the card, inter alia, was
to secure an election. Since the organizer made it clear that
the card had other purposes, viz, negotiations with the Re-
spondent on behalf of the employees. Ball's card should be
coun ted.
Ophie Lee Bond testified that she read her card. filled it
out in her own handwriting, and signed it. On cross-exami-
nation she testified that when Emma Hull. a coworker,
gave her the card, Hull told her that it was an "application
for an election." On redirect examination, however, she
acknowledged that Hull told her that the card was "an
application for a membership," and on re-cross-examina-
tion she reiterated that Hull had represented that the card
was an "application for membership for a union." Bond's
card is a valid authorization for the Union.
Diana Bradleiy testified that she received her card from
her sister and that she signed it without reading it. Accord-
ing to Bradley. her sister told her that it was a union card
and would be used for an election. Apart from the fact that
her sister did not tell her that the only purpose of the card
was to secure an election, Bradley's testimony that she did
not read the card was incredible. She acknowledged that at
one point in her career she had worked for a unionized
employer. so that she obviously was no stranger to unions.
More significantly, however, she conceded that she had
filled out the entire authorization in her own handwriting.
a feat that could hardly have been accomplished without
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
... _ _ .. . ..
368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reading most, if not all, of the card. Consequently, in view
of the foregoing considerations, it is now found that, at the
time she signed the card, Bradley understood that it was an
application for membership in the Union. Her card should
be counted.
Bonnie Brandenburg testified that she received her card
from a coworker named Brenda Back. According to Bran-
denburg, she read the card, filled out the spaces on the
card, and understood its purpose before signing it. She also
testified that Back told her that they wanted to get all the
cards signed so that there would be an election and that if
Brandenburg did not sign a card then she would have to
pay an initiation fee. However, there is no evidence of any
kind that Back was an agent of the Union. It is well settled
that the Union is not responsible for misstatements and
rumors concerning initiation fees made or started by rank-
and-file employees. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L..R.B.,
354 F.2d 432, 437-443 (8th Cir. 1965). cert. denied 384 U.S.
1002 (1966). In any event, from Brandenburg's own testi-
mony it is apparent that Back did not tell her that the onhv
reason for signing the card was to secure an election. Since
Brandenburg acknowledged that no one told her that the
card itself would be used for any purpose other than that
which was stated on its face, her authorization must he
treated as a valid designation of the Union.
Printha Sue Burgess testified that she received her card at
a union meeting. According to Burgess, she did not read
the card before signing it because it was explained to her at
the meeting. She also testified that she was told that a cer-
tain percentage of cards had to be signed before the Union
could secure an election. However, it is clear from her testi-
mony that nothing was said to her that would cancel the
absolute language of the card. N.L.R.B. v. Stow Manufac-
luring Co., 217 F.2d 900, 902 (2d ('ir. 1954), cert. denied
348 U.S. 964 (1955).
Bobbie Chenault testified that she received her card
from organizer Sielbeck, who told her that the card would
be used "for an election and for better benefits for the
factory." Later, Chenault acknowledged that before sign-
ing it she read and understood the language on the card.
When on the stand, Chenault manifested an extreme reluc-
tance to testify about her participation in the Union's orga-
nizational effort. At one point in her testimony, she mani-
fested her resentment at being summoned to testify hb
declaring, "I didn't think it [the cardl would be used
against us like this." In view of the fact that she conceded
that she had had an opportunity to read the card and that
she understood it, the card should be counted.
Mary Crouch acknowledged having filled out and signed
her card, after having received it from employee Brenda
Gross. She testified that she had the card for a day or more
but never read it. She further testified that Gross told her
that the purpose of the card was merely to get an election
and that those who signed a card before the Union got in
would not have to pay an initiation fee. Crouch's statement
that she never read the card was totally incredible. She
admittedly had the card in her possession for over a day,
and, according to her own account, she filled in the entire
card before signing it. In view of the fact that at the top of
the card there appears in large, boldface type the words
"APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP" and thereafter
there appear only four short lines authorizing the Union
to represent and negotiate for the signatory, it strains cre-
dulity to accept Crouch's statement that although she kept
the card for over a day before filling it out in her own hand
and signing it she never read the caption or the short para-
graph that appears on the card. Gross, on the other hand.
appeared as a witness and crcdibl, testified that she never
told Crouch that the card would he used merely to get an
election and never informed her that those who signed a
card early would not have to pay an initiation fee. Gross
further testified that at several meetings organizer Sielbeck
was asked whether the employees would have to pay an
initiation fee. According to Gross, in each instance he an-
swered in the negative and asked those present to reassure
all their fellow employees that the Uinion had no require-
ment of an initiation fee. (iross was a credible witness, and
her testimony in this connection was corroborated by em-
ployees Norma Hunt. Rosa Lee Brown, Ruth urley. and
Janie Keith. There was no credible evidence in the record
that any union official, either at meetings or on individual
visits, ever told an employee that the Union required an
initiation fee or that any such charges would be imposed
on the nonsigners. In view of the foregoing considerations.
it is my conclusion that Crouch did, indeed, read her card
before filling it out and signing it and that her authoriza-
tion constituted a valid designation of the Union.
Emerine Drake testified that she signed her card and
thereafter attended one union meeting. According to
Drake, she received the card from ay Slusher, a coworker.
and Slusher told her that when the Union got in she would
have to pay $50 to join or lose her job. Drake testified that
she did not read the card but inerel glanced at it before
she signed it. Drake's attempt to disavow ever having read
the card which she admittedly signed was unconvincing.
and her testimony as to what Slusher allegedly told her
was not credible. There is no evidence that Slusher was any'
more than a coworker, and certainl) none that she was a
union agent who was authorized to make statements bind-
ing on the Union. J. C. Penney (Company, 215 NLRB 24, 25
(1974). In any event, on the facts present here, there is no
evidence that Drake was told by anyone that she should
ignore the language above her signature. As the Supreme
C('ourt stated in Gissel Pacing, she "should he bound b)
the clear language of what [she] sign[ed]." (Gis.sel, suprra at
606). Her card should be counted.
(Iara Gross testified that her daughter gave her the card
and that she read the card, filled it out, and signed it. Ac-
cording to Gross, her daughter told her, "If we got a major-
ity of the cards signed, we will haxe a union election."
However, Gross testified earlier that when she read and
signed the card no one ever told her that the authorization
would not be used for the purpose stated thereon. The
words of her daughter as to the various ways in which the
card might be used are insufficient to void the authoriza-
tion, and it should be counted. Ja.v. H. Matthews & ('o. v.
N.L.R.B., 354 F.2d 432, 437 438 (8th C('ir. 1965), cert. de-
nied 384 U.S. 1002 (1966); J. ('. Pennev, supra.
Susi Hall acknowledged having filled in her card and
having signed it. She testified that she read the line at the
top of the card. viz, "application for membership." 32 but
i Ihisc ;1l- her words- - - - -
CIRLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 369
that she did not read the rest of the printing. According to
flail, she received the card from Carol Barker. a fellow
employee, who told her that "it was a majority card" and
that "they was going to see if they could get enough cards
like that to have an election." Hall's testimony to the effect
that she never read the entire card was incredible. I find
that she must have read it at the time she filled out the
authorization. Apart from the fact that Barker was only a
fellow employee and not an agent for the Union, there was
nothing even from Hall's version of her conversation with
Barker that would establish that Barker told her anything
which was inconsistent with the express language on the
card. I find that Hall's card was a valid designation of the
Union. Cumhberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 69
(1963), enfd. 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
I)oroth Ilatton testified that she received her card from
employee Opsie Stewart and that she had the card in her
possession for 4 or 5 days, at which point she filled in the
information required on the face of the card, signed it, and
dated it. She also testified that she heard some discussion
about an initiation fee but that she was told that the Union
had no such fee. Opsie Stewart credibly testified that she
gave the card to Hatton, that Hatton did not ask anything
about costs or initiation fees, and that she did not tell Hat-
ton anything to that effect. In view of the fact that Hatton
admittedly had the card in her possession for several days
and then filled it out before signing it, her testimony at the
hearing that she had never read the balance of the card was
most unpersuasive. I conclude that Hatton understood
what she was signing and that her card should be counted.
Elizabeth Ltunt testified that she received her card from
Mary Dunn, another employee. There was no evidence
that Dunn was on any organizing committee or in any way
an agent of the Union. According to Hunt, she heard other
employees talking about an election and she believed, al-
though she was not certain, that Dunn told her that if
enough people signed cards there would be an election.
Hunt acknowledged having read and sgned the card. She
also testified that no one ever specifically told her that the
card would be used for some purpose other than that which
is described on the card itself. No statement by Dunn or
anyone else cancelled the language of the authorization
which Hunt signed. It should be counted.
Lois Jones testified that she received her card from em-
ployee Cora Hall. According to Jones, she had the card
about a week before signing it, and during that period she
read the card, understood it. and knew what it was for. She
further testified that tlall told her that the card would be
used for an election, that a majority of the employees had
already signed the cards, and that she would have to pay a
$100 fee if the Union got in. Jones said she attended two
union meetings and at neither of them was there any men-
tion of cards or initiation fees. Hall credibly testified that
at the time she gave Jones a card she told her that it was an
application for membership in the Union. She specifically
denied ever telling Jones that it would cost her a $100 fee if
she did not sign the card. Jones' testimony as to her con-
versation with Hall was the result of either a faulty recol-
lection or a deliberate distortion. In an) case, since Jones
acknowledged having read her card and having understood
its language, her authorization is valid.
Rose Manr Jones testified that she could not recall who
gave her the card which she signed. According to Jones.
this individual, who was never identified,. told her that
when enough cards were secured they could have an elec-
tion. However, she also testified that after getting the card
she read it and understood it before signing it. Her card
must be counted. Cunherland Shoe Corporation, supral.
Mary Jo Kenner testified that the coworker who gave her
a card told her it was "to see if they could have an election
vote." Later, however, she was not so certain that this was
what the solicitor told her and acknowledged that the mat-
ter of a vote was a deduction made on her own. As Kenney
testified. "That's the way I guess I figured it out. They had
to have so many members before the Union could ask the
Company to be recognized-have a vote." Kenney also
testified that she read the card when it was given to her,
that she knew it to be an application for membership. that
she filled it out, and that she signed it. Uinder these circum-
stances, her card must be considered a valid designation of
the Union. Cato Show Printing Co., Inc., 219 NLRB 739,
757 (1975). In the latter part of July. Kenney was promoted
to the position of acting supervisor in her department, and
the Respondent conceded that she was a supervisor from
then until some time in October. However, at the time now
in question, she was not a supervisor and was clearly a
rank-and-file employee within the unit. Consequently. her
card must be counted.
Lillian Means testified she obtained her card from em-
ployee Cora Hall and that Hall told her that " i]f they
could get enough people to sign, they would have a union
come in. We would have an election." Means conceded
that she did not recall having heard Hall use the word
"only" in reference to getting an election. Hall herself sub-
sequently took the stand and credibly testified that all she
told Means was that the card was an application for mem-
bership in the Union. At another point in her testimony.
Means acknowledged that she read the card, that she un-
derstood the language on the card, and that she filled out
the entire card and then signed it on the date it bears. In
view of the foregoing, her authorization must be, and is,
found a valid designation of the Union.
Donetta McCall testified that Ida Wiseman, a coworker,
gave her the card and told her it would be used for an
election. Wiseman, however, credibly denied ever telling
McCall or any other employee that the purpose of the card
was only to get an election. More significantly, McCall ac-
knowledged that she read the card, that she understood it,
that she filled out most of the card in her own handwriting,
and that she signed it. Under these circumstances. Mc-
Call's card constitutes a valid designation of the Union.
Ethel F McCall testified that there was some mention of
an election at the union meeting the night she signed her
card. 3 On the other hand, she acknowledged that she read
the card, that she understood what it said, that she filled
out the card, that she signed it, and that no one ever told
Mi (all at first lesified thail hs stsrat enl sas made h oinc she de-
scrihed as "the man fronm the union" Later. howeer. she conceded that she
,cold not retail hi made he renimark
CR LEE CLOTHING COMPANY
370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
her that it would be used for an)' purpose other than that
stated on its face. Her card should be counted. N.L.R.B. v.
Stow Manufacturing Co.. 217 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
Mina Muncie testified that her daughter gave her a card
and that she signed it without ever having read it. Although
Muncie also testified that she was never told the purpose of
the card, while on the stand Muncie acknowledged that she
"figured it was for the union." There is no evidence that
any union representative ever told Muncie that she should
ignore the printed language that appears immediately
above her signature and which specifically designates the
Union as her bargaining agent. Muncie's card is a valid
designation and should be counted. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 606 (1969).
Ora Parido testified that she read and signed her card.
She also testified "a union man" 34 at the organizational
meeting where she secured her card stated that if enough
people signed cards there would be a vote. On the other
hand, she conceded that this same "union man" did not
say that the card would be used only to get an election.'5
Parido's card was a valid designation and should be count-
ed.
Gloria Palmer testified that she received her card at the
union meeting held at the Holiday Inn, an event which was
established by other testimony as having been held on June
10. She acknowledged that before signing the card she read
and understood it. She further testified that no one ever
told her that the card would be used for any purpose other
than that set forth in the printed language which appears
thereon. Later she testified that the union organizer stated
that the card could be used to get an election. [However,
she does not remember the word "only" being used. Ac-
cording to Palmer, she was "just under the impression"
that the card would be so used. Her card is a valid designa-
tion and should be counted.
Alice Powell testified that she read and understood her
card before signing it. She further testified that she under-
stood that the more cards the employees signed, "the more
chance they had of getting an election." As with the case of
employee Palmer, supra, however, she did not testify that
she was ever told by a union agent that getting an election
was the only purpose of the card. Her card should be
counted.
Jacqueline Solfi " testified that she read her card before
signing it. Although Solfi also testified that she was "under
the impression that it [the card] was to be used for an elec-
tion," she conceded that this "impression" was based on
what she characterized as "shop hearsay." She further con-
ceded that at the time she signed her card she knew it was
"for the Union." Consequently, her card is now found to
be a valid designation which should be counted.
Bessie Stanhope testified that she received her card from
Maxine Clark, a coworker, but that she was not told the
14 The phrase is fromn Palrido's tectilnon. llHer solicitor wals never denti-
fied any further or in an) other manner.
s Thus, Parido testified, "he didn't say that [an election s w(uld he lthe
onIv use."
In the record this name is also spelled "S-a-l-f-i All quotations In this
paragraph are from Solfit's estimony.
purpose for which it was to be used. However, she acknow-
ledged that she read the card at the time she signed it.
Stanhope testified that she heard about the possibility of an
election through rumors among the employees at the plant,
and that as a result she assumed that the card would be
used to gain an election. This type of thinking on
Stanhope's part cannot invalidate her signed authorization
card, which she admittedly read. N.I..R.B. v. Stow Manu-
facturing Co.. 217 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied
348 U.S. 964 (1955). Stanhope also testified that Virgie
Tyree, another coworker, told her that if Stanhope did not
sign a card she would have to pay $50. Tyree, however.
credibly testified that she did not tell Stanhope or any
other employee that it would ever be necessary to pay $50
for not signing a union card. Stanhope's card should be
counted.
Brenda Watts testified that she received her card from
employee Alta Benningfield. According to Watts, at the
time she signed her card she read and understood it. She
further testified that no one ever told her that the card
would be used for any purpose other than that described
on the face of the authorization. Watts also testified that
her husband is a union member, so that she obviously was
by no means unacquainted with the subject. Nevertheless,
she later testified that Benningfield told her that if a major-
ity of the employees signed cards an election could be held.
On the other hand, she acknowledged that Benningfield
never used the word "only" with reference to an election.
Watt's card should be counted. (Cumherland Shoe Corp.,
144 NLRB 1268, 1269 (1963). enfd. 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1965). H & H Plastics Manufacturing Co.. 158 NLRB 1395,
1397 (1966), enfd. 389 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1968).
Bertie Wells testified that she received her card from em-
ployee Ida Wiseman and that the latter told her that the
card "was to get enough signatures to have a vote." Never-
theless, Wells stated that after receiving the authorization
she read, understood, and signed the card. Later she testi-
fied that she could not recall Wiseman having used the
word "only" in connection with the alleged statement that
the card would be utilized to secure an election. Wiseman,
on the other hand. specifically denied ever telling any em-
ployee that the sole purpose of the cards was to secure an
election. In view of the foregoing. and particularly Wells'
testimony to the effect that she read and understood the
card before signing it. her authorization should be counted.
Linda Wells testified that employee Easter Gentry gave
her a card and told her that it "was to get an election."
Wells conceded, however, that she could not recall having
heard Gentry say that that was the only purpose of the
card. She also acknowledged not only that she read the
card after Gentry gave it to her and before she signed it but
that she understood the purpose of the card. Her card
should be counted. Cato Show Prnting (Co., Inc., 219
NLRB 739, 757 (1975).
Edna Wilcox testified that she read, understood, and
signed her card. Nevertheless, according to Wilcox, she
was under the impression that if enough employees signed
cards there would be an election. On the other hand, she
also testified that employee Bonnie Bailey, who gave her
the card, did not tell her anything as to the purpose of the
authorization and that she herself never attended any
T - --
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 371
union meetings where she might have been enlightened on
this subject. Moreover, Wilcox conceded that no one ever
told her that she should ignore the language printed on the
card. T'his, again, is obviously the type of situation to
which the Supreme Court was referring when it wrote that
"employees should be bound by the clear language of what
they sign...." N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., supra at
606. Wilcox's card should be counted.
(b) Cards bearing the printed nnamles of the emplo'ees
Four cards were received in evidence on which the em-
ployee in each instance had printed his or her name. These
were the authorizations of Maxine (Ulark, Ruth Dunn. Jan-
ice Pelfrey. and Billi Pelfrev. Each of these employees ap-
peared and testified to having read his or her respective
card, having understood it, and thereafter having filled it
out. Billy Pelfrev testified that he printed his name on the
card because he normally prints his name on applications
and related questionnaires. He specifically testified that he
considered his printed name to be his signature. Janice Pel-
frey, Ruth Dunn, and Maxine Clark gave similar testimony
as to their own practices. There was no evidence of forgery
as to any of these cards, and the Respondent does not so
contend. In view of the credible testimony of these four
employees, wherein they acknowledged having read and
understood their cards before filling them out. I find that
their cards constituted valid designations of the Union as
their bargaining agent. Jas. I. Matthews & Co. v. N. L. R. B..
354 F.2d 432, 437 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S.
1002 (1966): Tri-Countl Tube, Inc., 194 NLRB 103, 105, fn.
6 (1971); Hercules Packing Corp.. 164 NL.RB 264, 268
(1967). Janice Pelfrey's card was dated June 13, Maxine
Clark's and Billy Pelfrey's were dated June 14. and Ruth
Dunn's was dated June 15. All should be counted.
(c) Cards that were signed in pencil
The cards of Nancy Brookshire, Ada Francis, Margaret
Moore, and Lula Sewell were all signed in pencil. Each of
these employees identified the signature on the card that
she had signed as her own and further testified that at the
time of execution she read and understood the card. The
Respondent objected that only a card which had been
signed in ink should be counted as a valid designation.
There is no merit to this objection where, as here, there is
no issue as to authenticity and the individual card signer
credibly testifies as to the time and place that she executed
her name on the authorization.
Francis' card was signed and dated June 14,
Brookshire's and Sewell's on June 16, and Moore's on June
18. All should be counted.
The card of Patricia Pond. dated June 15, was also
signed in pencil. Pond acknowledged having read the au-
thorization and having signed it. She also testified that af-
ter having received the card from Emma Hall, a fellow
employee, she was told that it would be used to get an
election. However, she acknowledged that she was not told
that this would be the only purpose of the card. Later in
the hearing, when Hall was on the stand she credibly testi-
fied that she never told Pond an thing as to the purpose of
the card. According to Hall, she gave Pond a card after
Pond asked for one, and a short time later Pond returned
to her with the card completely filled out and signed. It is
now found that Pond's card is a valid designation of the
Union and that it should be counted.
(d) Cards that were incompletelv dated or undated
Bett Willoughbvr's card is undated. At the hearing she
testified that she read the card, that she understood it, and
that she signed it. Willoughby could not recall the date she
executed the authorization. However, the card bears a
backstamp receipt which indicates that it came into the
possession of the Regional Office of the Board on June 17.
1976. It is obvious, therefore, that Willoughhb's card was
turned over the the Union at some time pnrior to the date
that the Union made its demand for recognition on June
18. 1976. Consequently, her card is valid and should be
counted. Aero Corp., 149 NLRB 1283. 1291 (1964). enfd.
363 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1966). cert. denied 385 U.S. 973
(1966): Rea Construction Co.. 137 NLRB 1769. 1772 (1962).
Edna Loraine White testified that she read and under-
stood her card before signing it. Her card is dated "June
II" with no indication of the year. However, she testified
at the hearing that she signed the card on June I 11., 1976. It
also bears a receipt on the back indicating that it was re-
ceived in the Board's Regional Office on June 17, 1976.
White's card should be counted.
Bertt Patrick testified that she read and understood her
card and that she signed it before she attended two sepa-
rate meetings at the union hall in Winchester. From other
evidence in the record, it appears that these meetings were
held before the Union made its initial demand for recogni-
tion on the Respondent. Her card is undated, hut it bears a
receipt on the back indicating that it was received at the
Board's Regional Office on June 17. 1976. Consequently. I
find, in light of the foregoing evidence, that Patrick's card
was received by the Union prior to the time it requested
recognition and that the card should be counted. Murcel
Manufacturing Corp.. 231 NLRB 623, fn. 4 (1977).
Carlos McCormick testified that he signed his card in the
spring of 1976 while attending one of the organizational
meetings held at the union hall in Winchester. He further
testified that before signing the authorization he read and
understood it. McCormick did not date his card. However.
the reverse side of the card bears an NL.RB date stamp
indicating that it was received in the Board's Regional Of-
fice on June 17, 1976. Accordingly, it is now found that
McCormick's card is a valid designation of the Union and
should be counted.
Eunice Lowe testified that she read and understood her
card before signing it. Her card bears only the date "June
16" and no specific year. However, Lowe credibly testified
that she signed the card on that date in the year 1976. The
card also bears a Regional Office backstamp for June 17,
1976. Her card is valid and should be counted.
Juanita S. Jones testified that she read and understood
her card before she filled it out. Although the card bears
only the date "June 14," Jones testified that she signed it
on that day in the year 1976. In addition, on the reverse
side, a backstamp indicates that it was received at the
CUR LEE CLOTHING COMPANY ... _ _ . ..... ...... .
372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD[
Board's Regional Office on June 17, 1976. The card is a
Type B authorization, which, as noted earlier, requires the
employee's name in two places. Jones duly inscribed her
full name in both places, and in ink. The Respondent ob-
jects that her card is invalid on the ground that these in-
scriptions of her name are printed, rather than written. As
found earlier, this objection is without merit where, as here,
the employee appeared as a witness and credibly testified
as to all the circumstances surrounding her completion of
the authorization as well as averring that the card was her
own. Jones' card should be counted.
Ethel Jones credibly testified that she filled out and
signed her card after receiving it from Janie Keith, a fellow
employee. Her card was undated, and while on the stand
Jones could not recall the precise time when she signed the
card. However, the reverse side of her authorization bears
a receipt stamp indicating that it was received at the
Board's Regional Office on June 17. 1976. Accordingly, I
find her card to have been a valid designation of the Union
prior to the demand of the latter for recognition.
Wanda Hisle testified that, after having read and under-
stood her card, she filled out the information requested on
the face of the card and signed the authorization during
June 1976. The card bears only the date "June 1976."
However, the reverse side has a backstamp indicating that
it was received at the Board's Regional Office on June 17,
1976. Consequently, I find that Hisle's card should be
counted.
Anna Conner identified her card and credibly testified
that she signed it on June 14, 1976, after having read and
understood the language imprinted thereon. The card
bears only "June 14" as the date, with no designation as to
the year. However, in addition to her own testimony as to
the year in which she signed the authorization, the card
also bears the Board's Regional Office backstamp receipt
indicating that it was received there on June 17, 1976. Con-
sequently, I find that Connor's card is a valid designation
and should be counted.
3. The Union's majority status on June 18, 1976
A tabulation of the authorization cards discussed above
discloses that as of June 18, 206 employees had signed val-
id designations of the Union as their collective-bargaining
agent.3 At that time there were 373 employees in the ap-
propriate unit. The requisite majority therefore would have
been 187. Since the Union had secured valid authorization
cards in excess of the latter number prior to the date when
it made the demand for recognition on the Respondent, it
must be, and is now, found that the Union had a majority
within the appropriate unit on the critical date.
As found earlier, the Union's demand was continuing
and was renewed at various times during the succeeding
months. Since the Board may not agree with all of the
foregoing conclusions with respect to authorizations con-
sidered earlier herein, the validity of various additional au-
thorization cards which employees signed subsequent to
June 18 will now be considered.
7 For a recapitulation of the names of the employees whose cards nmake
up this total, see Appendix A, if;lru.
4. Cards signed after June 18 and on or before June 28
a. Cards as to which there was no dispute
The cards of the following employees were signed after
June 18 and on or before June 28. The signatories credibly
testified to having read, understood, and signed the cards,
and there was no testimony or evidence that any employee
was told that the card would be used solely for the purpose
of getting an election:
Arvilla Elam
Geraldine Fox
Ruth Mullins 38
Ella Muncie
Elizabeth Welsh
Connie Young
The cards of the six above-named employees should be
counted in any tabulation of the Union's strength as of
June 28, 1976.
b. Other cards signed between June 18 and June 28
Delilah Abner testified that she received her card from
Ida Wiseman, a coworker, and that she read and under-
stood the card before she signed it.39 On the other hand,
she also testified that at some point in their association
Wiseman told her that a certain number of signatures for
an election were needed. Abner further testified that there
were rumors in the plant that there would be a fee for those
who did not sign a card. Wiseman, however, credibly testi-
fied that when she gave the card to Abner and before the
latter signed it the employee never asked her about any
costs connected with getting into the Union or any initia-
tion fee. The rumors which Abner testified that she had
heard do not bind the Union or invalidate the employee's
authorization. Jas. H. Matthews & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 354
F.2d 432, 433-434 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S.
1002 (1966); J. C Penney (onpant. Inc. 215 NLRB 24, 25
(1974). Since Abner testified to having read and under-
stood the card before having signed it. and since she was
never told that the only purpose of the card was to obtain
an election, her card should be counted.
Estell Johnsons card was dated "17 6 76" which she tes-
tified was meant to be "17 June 1976." as the date on
which she signed the card. According to Johnson, she re-
ceived the card from Alice Powell. a coworker. She testi-
fied that she read and understood the card before signing
it, and that no one ever told her that the card was to be
used for any purpose other than that indicated by the lan-
guage which appeared on the card. Her card should be
counted.
Myrtle Moore testified that she received her card from
fellow employee Ruth Turley and that she read and under-
stood it before signing it on June 28. She also testified that
at some point a friend of hers, one Gertrude Hatton, told
her that if she did not sign a card and the Union was
successful, she would have to pay $50 to work for the Re-
Is Mlullins card w3as dated Junec 22* ithlut designat;ion as to the ear
isowceser. the reverse side of the card has a lime stalmp of Region 9 indicat-
in4 that it was received there at 2 p m. on Julk 14. 1976.
1 lie date on Abner's card did not include the ear, simpl, setting out
"June 17T as the time on hich it usas signed. tiowever. Ahner credibl
estflied Ihthat she signed the card on June 17, 197h ( f UItelc,l Ruhinslin,
In .42 NRB 898, 913 (1942)
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 373
spondent. Apart from the fact that there was no evidence
that Hatton was ever an agent for the Union, and the fur-
ther fact that there was no credible evidence in the record
that any union representative ever told any of the employ-
ees that there would be a penalty attached to not signing
an authorization card, such comments as Moore attribued
to Hatton cannot invalidate her card. This is particularly
true here, when, in view of Moore's testimony and subse-
quent to the time that she allegedly heard Hatton make the
statement in question, she received a card from Wiseman
which she thereafter read and understood before signing.
Moore's card should be counted.
Dorothy Hopper testified that she received her card from
Emma Hull, a coworker, and that she read the card and
understood its purpose before signing it on June 23. Al-
though she subsequently testified that Hull told her that
the card could be used for an election, she acknowledged
that Hull never informed her that the card would not be
used for the purpose stated on its face. Since even from
Hopper's own testimony it is evident that this employee
was never told that the only purpose of the card was to
secure an election, Hopper's card should be and is, found a
valid designation of the Union.
On the basis of the foregoing findings as to the validity
of cards signed subsequent to June 18, it is now found that
with the addition of the 10 additional cards discussed
above, on June 28, 1976, the Union had valid authoriza-
tions from 216 employees in the appropriate unit.
c. Cards offered without testimony of signatory or witnesses
to the execution thereof
The General Counsel offered 16 cards which bore signa-
tures that purportedly were those of Brenda Bach. Kathy
Bowling, Greg Brandenburg., Virginia Carpenter, Kathy Cur-
tis, Mary Curtis, Debra Kay Harris. Phyllis Holder, Linda
Huff, Kathleen C. Love, Debra Litteral, Ruby McAnnallv.
Bertha Parido, Debra Ann Rice, Alta Spicer, and Sylvia Wil-
liams. All of the foregoing names are those of employees in
the unit on June 18. None of these individuals appeared at
the hearing to testify. The General Counsel asserted that
they had been subpenaed but had failed to respond. and
did not produce any witnesses who testified to having seen
these authorizations executed.
The General Counsel thereupon offered in evidence.
along with the authorization cards bearing the names of
the above-described employees, a photocopy of the with-
holding exemption certificate for each of these individuals,
with the exception of Brandenburg. The latter documents
had been secured from the Respondent's personnel files,
and each exemption certificate bore the signature of the
employee. The authorization cards and the exemption cer-
tificates were received in evidence.
There is authority for the proposition that the Adminis-
trative Law Judge is vested with discretion to make signa-
ture comparisons in a case such as the present one and
where documents of unquestioned authenticity from an
employer's personnel records are available for such com-
parisons. Combined Metal Mfg. Corp., 123 NLRB 895, 896-
897 (1959); Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 131 NLRB 80, 87
(1961), enfd. 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 370
U.S. 919. An examination of these exhibits and a compari-
son in each instance of the signature on the authorization
card with the signature which appears on the exemption
certificate of the employee by that name establishes, in my
judgment, that in the absence of any countervailing evi-
dence the cards of Bach, Bowling, Carpenter. Kathy Cur-
tis, Mary Curtis, Harris, Holder, Huff. Love, Litteral, Mc-
Annally, Parido, Rice, Spicer, and Williams were signed by
the employees whose names appear thereon.
At this point, however, it should be noted that at the
hearing some consideration was given to calling a hand-
writing expert and that the parties stipulated that, even if
called, a qualified graphoanalyst would have difficulty es-
tablishing the authenticity of the signatures on these cards
if his examination was confined to the signature on the
card and the single signature on the withholding certificate.
The Administrative Law Judge thereupon stated hat the
foregoing cards would not be considered unless, upon his
subsequent examination of the record, they became cntical
to a resolution of the majority issue, in which event he
would reopen the record for the taking of further testi-
mony. Consequently, none of the parties offered any fur-
ther testimony or evidence as to these cards. Since the au-
thorization cards considered earlier herein establish that as
of June 18 the Union had secured signed cards from 206
employees in the appropriate unit, a figure that by itself
constituted a substantial majority, and futher that as of
June 28 the Union had secured an additional 10 cards, so
that by this latter date it had 216 valid authorizations in
support of its representation claim, no further consider-
ation will be given here to the issues of those 15 cards
whose authentication rests solely on a comparison of the
signatures which appear on the cards and on the withhold-
ing exemption certificates of those particular employees.
5. Findings and conclusions as to the alleged unlawful
refusal to bargain
As found above, the Union represented a majority of the
employees in the appropriate unit at all times material
from the date of the Union's demand for recognition until
the date of the election. On June 18, the date of the
Union's initial request for bargaining, and at a time when
there were 373 employees in the unit, at least 206 employ-
ees in the appropriate unit had signed valid authorization
cards. Ten days later an additional 10 employees had
signed authorizations. As the election approached, the
number of employees declined somewhat, there being only
338 in the unit on the eligibility date. Consequently, on the
basis of authorization cards signed, the Union's majority
was greater on the date of the election than when the
Union first requested recognition. Nevertheless, the Union
lost the election by a vote of 150 for and 167 against, out of
324 ballots cast. As noted earlier, the Union filed timely
objections to conduct affecting the results of the election.
I find that the Respondent engaged in conduct violating
Section 8(a)( 1) during the period between the date on
which the petition for certification of representatives was
41) [here were seven challenged ballots
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY
374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
filed and the election, and that the objections have merit
and should be sustained. It is further found that the Re-
spondent's unlawful conduct was so extensive and perva-
sive as to prevent the holding of a fair election. In the
circumstances, I find that the Company violated Section
8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the majority representative of its employees and
at by the same time engaging in unlawful conduct by in-
fringing upon its employees' organizational rights (rading
Fort, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975)). and that by such refusal
it has coerced, restrained, and interfered with the employ-
ees' exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 and
thereby has further violated Section 8(a)(1). Furthermore.
at the time the Respondent announced the pay raise of
September 30. 1976, it was under a continuing obligation to
bargain with the Union as the majority representative of its
employees. Since this move by the Respondent was taken
unilaterally, and without according the bargaining agent
an opportunity to be heard, this action by the Company
further violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Lastly, and on
the basis of the above findings as to the Company's policy
and actions subsequent to the Union's initial request for
recognition I find that the Respondent's entire course of
conduct after June 18, 1975. demonstrated a complete re-
jection of the principles of collective bargaining and there-
by violated Section 8(a)(5).
In their briefs, the General Counsel and the Charging
Party Union contend that here the conventional remedial
order and direction of a new election are inadequate and
request a bargaining order against the Respondent. This
request is vigorously opposed by the Respondent.
The lead case on this issue is, of course, N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing (o., supra, where the Supreme Court held
that the Board. in drafting a remedy in cases of this type.
could consider the extent of an employer's unfair labor
practices in terms of their past effect in destroying the at-
mosphere for a fair and free election and the likelihood of
their reoccurrence in the future. In Seel-Fah, Inc., 212
NLRB 363 (1974), the Board explained:
Under Gissel, to determine whether or not a bargain-
ing order should issue as part of the remedy, we evalu-
ate the seriousness of the employer's misconduct and
its impact on the holding of a fair election (or re-run
election). In effect, by issuing a bargaining order, we
are remedying an employer's . . . violations that have
dissipated a union majority and prevented the holding
of a fair election.
It is my conclusion that in view of the circumstances
present here, considered in the light of Gissel and the Steel-
Fah line of cases, a bargaining order is required to protect
the free expression of employee desires that was reflected
in the large majority who initially signed authorization
cards before the Union requested recognition.
As found earlier, the Respondent's unfair labor practices
began with the Union's first organizational meeting on
June 10, when Supervisor Cooper engaged in surveillance
of that gathering. Throughout the months of July and Au-
gust, both Supervisors Cooper and Lindsey engaged in acts
of interrogation and voiced threats of plant closure. In ad-
dition, during the month of August, Supervisor Francis en-
gaged in unlawful interrogation. Supervisor Kenney threat-
ened employees with plant closure in the event the Union
won the election, and Supervisor Shelton repeatedly voiced
the same threat to employees in the maintenance section.
as well as the added threat that the Respondent would
move its operations to the Mayfield plant if the Union
won.
On September 1. President Stanley met with the plant
supervisors and informed them that their jobs depended on
a defeat of the Union in the forthcoming election. Thereaf-
ter. and as the inevitable consequence of the president's
ultimatum. the supervisors returned to the employees in
their sections and broadcast the threat of plant closure
and/or a transfer of their work to the Mayfield factory if
the Union won. Thus, Kenney told the employees in her
section that at the meeting with Stanley and Conner the
latter informed the supervisors "that they were supposed to
come up and talk against the Union. that their jobs depend-
ed on it" and that "t]hev reallv will shut down this plant,
ther, [Stanlev and Conner] just as much as said so." (En-
phasis supplied.) Cooper told her employees. . girls you
had better think twice before you vote for the Union. be-
cause if the Union gets in the factory will close . . . we
won't have any work because all the sponging is done in
Mayfield." Shelton told the maintenance crew that "if the
Union got in they would move the factory to Mayfield.
He'd put a padlock on the door." Lindsey told those work-
ing under her, "You better think twice before you vote for
this Union . . . what are you going to do when you don't
have a job. .... And the night before the election, Lind-
seN telephoned employee Griffev, who was then on sick
leave to ask that Griffey come to the plant to vote because
if the Union came in the Company "would close the
doors." Henry told the employees under her supervision.
"The factory will close. Aren't you afraid for your job."
Francis told those working under her that "you better all
vote no, because they were moving the plant to Mayfield
and you will be without work." Berges told employee
Keith, whom he observed distributing union circulars on
the morning of the election, that if the Union won the
Company would "close the factory" and then ordered that
Keith discuss her union sympathiea with her supervisor.
Monica Francis. When the employee did as directed, Fran-
cis told her that if she "wanted to be working at Christmas
[she] had better vote no." During the same critical period
immediately before the election, Supervisors Baber and
Woods unlawfully interrogated employees concerning their
union activities and sympathies. Finally, as found earlier,
shortly after noon on September 2. President Stanley and
Plant Manager Conner assembled the entire work force
and subtly reinforced the supervisors' threats that a union
victory in the election Mayfield. These threats, directed at
the employees' jobs, were the most forceful weapons that
the Respondent could use in combating the Union's orga-
nizational campaign. The courts and the Board are in
agreement that the likelihood of plant closure and loss of
jobs, so freely predicted by the supervisors on the eve of
the election, are among the most serious unfair labor prac-
tices that an employer can commit. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel
Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 618-620 (1969).
Moreover, the effect of the Respondent's unlawful con-
CURLEE CLOTHING COMPANY 375
duct in opposition to the Union's organizational campaign
extended far beyond the votes of the specific individuals to
whom the threats were communicated, since, as the courts
have recognized, "any expressions of company attitudes.
even to small groups of individuals. [are] likely to be rapid-
ly disseminated around a plant during the struggle of orga-
nization." Irving Air Chute Companv, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 350
F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1965). Since it is my conclusion that
the likelihood of eliminating the effects of the Respon-
dent's unfair labor practices and insuring a fair election by
the use of the conventional remedy of a cease-and-desist
order is minimal and that in this case the employee senti-
ment expressed through the authorization cards obtained
by the Union would be better protected by a bargaining
order, it will be recommended that such an order issue. The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Compant, Inc., 230 NLRB 766
(1977); Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
527 F.2d 803, 807 808 (D.C. Cir. 1975): Ann Lee Sports-
wear, Inc., 220 NLRB 982, 983 (1975); Automated Business
Systems, a Division of Litton Business Systems, Inc., a Sub-
sidiary of Litton Industries, Inc., 205 NLRB 532, 536 (1973);
Milgo Industrial, Inc., 203 NLRB 1196. 1200 01 (1973).
IV 1 ie REPRISENI AT IO PR(KFI:t)IN(i
For the reasons stated above, it is now recommended
that the objections to the conduct of the election filed by
the Union in Case 9 RC 11560 be sustained and the re-
sults of the election be set aside. As it will be recommended
that in Case 9 CA 10735 an order issue requiring the Re-
spondent to bargain collectively with the Union. upon re-
quest, it will be recommended further that the petition in
9 RC 11560 be dismissed and all proceedings held there-
under be vacated.
CONC(I.SIONS OF L w
i. All production and maintenance employees employed
by the Respondent at its Winchester. Kentucky, plant, but
excluding all office clericals, professional employees.
guards, and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of the
Act, constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
2. At all times material herein, the Union has been the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Re-
spondent's employees in the aforesaid unit within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
3. By refusing, on and after September 1, 1976, to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive represen-
tative of its employees in the appropriate unit described
above, and by granting a pay increase to the employees in
the unit without reference to the Union, the Respondent
has engaged, and is engaging. in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining. and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The Respondent has not engaged in violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)( I) of the Act. or in any violations of the Act. other
than those herein specifically found.
THti REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that the Re-
spondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully has re-
fused to bargain collectively, with the Union and that the
Respondent has engaged in egregious violations of the Act
which make it unlikely that a fair election can. be conduct-
ed even following compliance with a conventional cease-
and-desist order, I will recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to bargain collectively with the Union. upon re-
quest, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment. and other terms and conditions of employment for
the employees in the appropriate unit described below. It
will also be recommended that such order include a re-
quirement that any understanding reached between the
parties be embodied n a signed agreement.
It has been found that the Union had a majorit, on June
18, 1976, when it first requested that the Respondent recog-
nize and bargain with it as the majority representative for
the appropriate unit. Thereafter the Respondent engaged
in some unfair labor practices during the course of the
summer, but it was not until about September 1, on the eve
of the representation election, that the Respondent
launched an all-out campaign of threats and coercion to
defeat the Union at the polls. Consequently, I find that the
bargaining order should be dated as of September 1. 1976,
the date on which the Respondent "embarked on a clear
course of unlawful conduct . . . to undermine the union's
majority status." Trading Port. Inc., 219 NL.RB 298. 301
(1975): The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Comrpanv, Inc., 230
NLRB 766 (1977); Kroger Co., 228 NLRB 1213 (1977).
Finally. since the Respondent is being directed to bargain
collectively with the Union, although no designation of
representative has been made in accordance with the pro-
cedures of Section 9 of the Act, it will be recommended
further that the notice herein contain language advising the
employees of their right to a decertification election. See
N.L.R.B. v. Triangle Plastics. Inc., 406 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.
1969); A'.L.R.B. v. Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., d b'a
Par'less. 405 F.2d 67 (6th C'ir. 1968), 407 F.2d 1325 (6th Cir.
1969); N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996,
1003 (10th Cir. 1977); N. L.R.B. v. Drives, Incorporated, 440
F.2d 354, 367 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 912
(1971); A'.L.R.B. v. Patent Trader, Inc., 426 F.2d 791, 793
(2d Cir. 1970): Morse's FItodmart of New Bedford, Inc., 230
NLRB 1092 (1977): Perfornance, Inc., 208 NLRB 618, 627
(1974).
The Respondent's unlawful activities were pervasive and
egregious. They are potentially related to other unfair labor
practices proscribed by the Act, and the danger of their
commission in the future is to be anticipated from the Re-
spondent's conduct in the past. Accordingly, in order to
CUR LEE CLOTHING COMPANY 75
. . .
376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7
and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, an order requir-
ing the Respondent to cease and desist from in any other
manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed
in the Act is deemed necessary.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, there is issued the following recommended:
ORDER 4'
The Respondent, Curlee Clothing Company, Winches-
ter, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their
union activities.
(b) Engaging in surveillance of employees' activity with
respect to union organization or giving the impression
thereof.
(c) Threatening employees that they might lose their
jobs, that the Company might close the plant, or that all
their work might be transferred to another factory, or
threatening them with any other reprisals, should the
Union win a Board election or otherwise be designated as
the employee representative.
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively with Southwest Re-
gional Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union, AFL CIO-CLC. as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of all employees in the unit
found appropriate herein.
(e) Unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of
employment of its represented employees without bargain-
ing with their representative.
(f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Upon request, bargain with the aforesaid Union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the appro-
priate unit and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The appropriate
unit is:
All production and maintenance employees employed
at the Winchester, Kentucky, plant, excluding office
clericals, professional employees, guards and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
(b) Make no changes in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment for the employees in the aforesaid unit without
consulting their bargaining agent.
(c) Post at its place of business in Winchester, Ken-
tuckZ, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix
B." Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by the
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges any unfair labor practices, other than
as herein specifically found.
41 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted b) the Board and become
its findings. conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
' In the event that this Order is enforced b) a judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted bh Order
of the National L.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States (Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National l.abor Relations Board''
APPENDIX A
Employees from whom the Union had received valid
authorization cards prior to June 18, 1977
John Tilford Abner, Jr.
Betty Jean Adams
Ella B. Adams
Odetta Adams
Lois Alexander
Alma J. Allen
Billie J. Arnold
Susan Babb
Bonnie Bailey
Rhoda Bailey
Viola Bailey
Bobbie Baker
Sarah Ann Baker
Dorothy Ball
Grace Ballard
Carolyn A. Barker
Mary Lou Barker
Betty Jean Barnett
Patty Barrett
Alta Benningfield
Linda Berryman
Margie Birchum
Wilma Bishop
Ophie Bond
Elsie Botts
Diana Bradley
Mabel Bradley
Bonnie Brandenburg
Randall Brandenburg
Carlene Branton
Dolly Brinegar
Lola Clark
Maxine Clark
Sandra Clark
Laura Cole
Anna Conner
Cornetta Conner
Emma Sue Conner
Eugene Combs
Margaret Combs
Mazie Combs
Ella Louise Cosby
Mary Crouch
Sandra Dailey
Kathy Dearing
Emerine Drake
Mary Edith Dunn
Ruth Dunn
Sarah S. Embry
Carolyn Epperson
Grace Fallen
Ada Francis
Carolyn Frazier
Nettie Frye
Felicita Garcia
Luis Garcia
Ardella Gay
Easter Gentry
Gladys Grace
Lucille Greene
Cathy Griffey
Margaret Griffith
CURLEE COTH1ING COMPANY 377
Nancy Brookshire
Rosa Lee Brown
Printha Sue Burgess
William Edward Burgess
Annette Burton
Nancy Caudill
Freda Charles
Bobbie Chenault
Mary Chenault
(;ertrude Hlatton
Kathy Hatton
(ieorgia Hawkins
Louise Hawkins
Brunie Hedger
Wanda Hisle
Imogene Hollon
Emma Hull
Elizabeth Hunt
Norma Hunt
Laura Jackson
Alice Jefferson
Arthonia Johnson
Mary Johnson
Dorrita Jones
Ethel Jones
Juanita S. Jones
Lois Jones
Patricia Jones
Rose Mary Jones
Janie Keith
Mary Joe Kenney
Mona Kennedy
Sara .. Kennedy
Edgar King
Bernice B. Lewis
Debra l.itteral
Brenda Gross
Clara Gross
Vicki Dunaway Haddix
Mary K. laggard
Cora Hall
Susie Hall
Annetta ampton
Avonell Hatton
Dorothy Hatton
Junie Patrick
Mary Patrick
Hazel Patton
Billy Pelfre)
Janice Pelfrev
William R. Pelfrev
Patricia Pond
Alice Powell
Debra Powell
Josephine Proffitt
Elizabeth Pickett
Mary Pury
Edith Rainey
Sam Richardson
Sue Roberts
Eunice Roberts
Evalene Rose
Vivian Rose
Cheryl Rye
Linda Savior
Esther Schooler
Lula Sewell
Minnie Shoemaker
Wanda Shumate
Fave Slusher
(iwendella Slusher
Brenda Smith
Eunice Lowe
l.ouise Lowry
Anna Lyle
D)onetta McCall
Ethel McCall
Jean McCall
('arlos McCormick
Wanda Martin
I)ebra Mason
Margaret Mason
Aneta Means
Jonita Means
Lillian Means
Alsie Jean Merntt
Margaret Moore
l.illie Mullins
Mina Muncie
Mary Jane Neal
Jenny Nichols
Dorothy Osborne
Barbara Owings
Ora Parido
Gloria Palmer
Lionille Sue Pasle?
Betty Patrick
Juanita Patrick
Shirle 3 Watts
Mar) Welch
Bertie Wells
l.inda Wells
('arolyn Whisman
l:rancis Whisman
Edna Wilcox
Ava M. White
Edna Loraine White
Evelyn Williams
Bonnie Snowden
Jacqueline Solfi
('orenia Sparks
Mavis Spencer
Phyllis Spive3
Sandra Stafield
Bessie Stanhope
Maril n Steele
Opsie Stevwart
Linda Stidham
Mona Stone
Gail Safford
Doris I avlor
Kathy I errv
Vickie Ihacker
Barbara I'harp
Anna IThomas
Beulah Townsend
Rosie l.ee Irent
Eulah T'rusty
Ruth Turley
C'arole urner
Virgie Tyree
Lizzie Watson
Adeline Watts
Brenda Watts
Alice Willoughby
Betty Willoughby
Debra Willoughby
Jean Wise
Ida Wiseman
H}ildegard Witt
Virginia Witt
Lattie Wood
Mildred VWoosley
Emma Wright
Iotal 206
CURLEE CLOT[G COMPANY
.. .