Crystal Springs Shirt Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 18, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 4 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case
15-CA-5961
April 18, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On September 28, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, to
which the Respondent filed a brief in reply. The
General Counsel filed a brief in support of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.1
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Crystal Springs
Shirt Corporation, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
i Member Murphy would find merit in the Charging Party's exceptions
to the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to order that it be reimbursed
for expenses incurred as a result of the Respondent's unfair labor practices
and would grant that remedy.
Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, while adhering to the principle
expressed in Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 NLRB 1234, 1236 (1972), that in the
appropriate circumstances the Board is capable of providing other than the
usual remedial relief in order to fully rectify particular unfair labor
practices, do not view the circumstances of this case as warranting any of
the extraordinary remedies requested by the Charging Party and therefore
adopt the remedy recommended by the Administrative Law Judge.
Respondent's conduct, while ultimately determined herein to have been in
bad faith, nevertheless cannot be fairly characterized as so egregious, nor its
defenses before us as so frivolous, that the usual remedies provided by the
Administrative Law Judge should be deemed inadequate, and we see no
reason to believe that the relief thus given will not entirely remedy the unfair
labor practices found.
DECISION
STATEMENT' OF THE CASE
HENRY L. JALETrE, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding involves allegations that the above-named
Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by engaging in surface
bargaining and by unilaterally instituting a wage increase.
The proceeding was initiated by a charge filed by the
above-named Union on January 2, 1976. Pursuant thereto,
a complaint issued on February 27, 1976. Hearing was held
on May 13, 1976, in Jackson, Mississippi.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs of the
parties, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE FACTS
Respondent is a Mississippi corporation with its princi-
pal office and place of business in Crystal Springs,
Mississippi, where it is engaged in the manufacture of
garments.1 On June 24, 1974, the Union was certified as the
bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in a
production and maintenance unit and, on September 6, the
parties held their first negotiation session. They were to
meet thereafter on 19 other occasions, the last meeting
occurring on December 18, 1975. Throughout the negotia-
tions, the Respondent's only negotiator was Attorney
James Moore. The union negotiating committee consisted
of five employees and a varying number of union officials,
principal of which were Assistant Southern Director Carl
Fisher and James Jackson, manager of the Union's
Mississippi joint board.
The Union submitted written contract proposals on
September 6, 1974, and Respondent submitted written
contract proposals on September 18, 1974. By the time of
the 20th negotiating session, the parties had agreed on
many contract provisions. (In September 1975, the Union
advised the employees that agreement had been reached on
80 percent of the total contract.) However, a number of
items, economic and noneconomic, were still unresolved.
Economic issues included the Union's proposal for its
insurance and pension plan, holidays, vacations, and
wages. On noneconomic items, the parties were in
disagreement over Respondent's proposals for a manage-
ment rights clause and a zipper clause, and the Union's
proposals for dues checkoff and binding arbitration.
Although the Union had offered to pay the cost of
Jurisdiction is not in issue. Respondent admits that it meets the Board's
direct outflow standard for the assertion ofjurisdiction.
229 NLRB No. 10
4
CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP.
deducting union dues, Respondent had refused to agree,
offering only to permit union representatives access to the
plant during break periods to collect dues. Respondent had
a practice, however, of checking off Christmas club
payments and insurance payments.
At the sixth meeting, January 8, 1975, the Union raised
the question of Respondent's failure to give the employees
a turkey at Christmas. According to Attorney Moore,
whose testimony is corroborated by Union Negotiator
Fisher, he told the Union that the Company considered a
turkey bonus a discretionary matter not subject to
bargaining. He explained, according to Jackson, that the
turkeys had not been given because of the poor quality of
the production at the plant.
In the spring of 1975, the Union learned of rate changes
on three jobs (collar run, collar gauge, and tack shoulders).
At the April 10 meeting, the Union raised the issue with
Moore who said, according to Jackson, that his client did
not understand the niceties of the law and he had advised
them not to do this any more.
At the April 10 meeting, the Union also raised a question
respecting a rule that employees arriving I minute late for
work were not permitted to start work for 15 minutes and
were docked that period. Moore promised to check about
any work rules and, if any existed, to provide the Union
with a copy. Apparently there were no written rules as
none was submitted to the Union.
In late 1974 or early 1975, the Union learned that the
plant manager had passed out a paper among the
employees asking them to agree to change their working
hours. According to Jackson's uncontradicted testimony,
he advised Moore this was a subject of bargaining and the
plant manager's conduct was direct dealing to which they
objected. Moore, after checking, assured the Union it
would not happen again.
At one bargaining session, the Union raised the issue of
testing employees returning from layoff. Moore checked
with the Company and, according to Jackson, reported
that tests had been given in the past, then discontinued,
then reinstated in December 1974.
Respondent operates another garment plant in Utica,
Mississippi, about 15 miles from Crystal Springs. It had
applied to the wage and hour division of the Department of
Labor for a special permit to hire learners at less than the
minimum wage, on the ground that experienced employees
were unavailable. The Union had opposed the application
and submitted information to the Labor Department
respecting the number of unemployed individuals with
experience in the Utica and Crystal Springs area. At a
meeting in late summer or early fall, Moore told the Union
that if the learner's permit was not granted "he thought we
had problems."
At the October I negotiating session, the Union request-
ed wage information. By letter dated October 17, Respon-
dent furnished wage information which is in the record as
General Counsel's Exhibit 2. On November 5, Union
Negotiator Jackson advised Moore that the Respondent
had furnished the wage information in different form from
prior information which had been supplied and that it was
hardly useable because the information did not describe
the job that people were performing on which they were
being paid piecework. Jackson also complained that the
information only listed the employee's name and rate per
hour earned with no indication of how many hours had
been worked or if overtime was involved.
At this November 5 session, Moore asked the Union for
a wage proposal and the Union proposed a 50-cent-per-
hour across-the-board increase. Moore described the
proposal as ridiculous and rejected it and counteroffered
10 cents per hour above the existing minimum wage. The
Union rejected this, and counterproposed a 30-cent across-
the-board wage package. Moore said he would take it
under advisement, that he did not know if it was possible,
but at least they would look at it.
The next meeting was on December 18. After some
preliminary discussions about holiday pay for three
individuals, the parties turned to a discussion of wages,
with Moore insisting that the Union make another
counteroffer. Jackson explained that the Union felt 30
cents an hour was a realistic wage offer based on the fact
that the minimum wage was going to increase by 20 cents
an hour on January 1, only 2 or 3 weeks from that time.
Jackson also explained that he believed it was a realistic
proposal in light of the information contained in what
Respondent had submitted to it on October 17. Several
times Moore asked the Union if they did not have a wage
offer and they said they did not. Moore then produced a
five-page document listing the names of nearly all the unit
employees setting forth each employee's present rate of pay
and the new base rate of pay. After the Union had looked
at this document, Moore asked if the Union would accept
it and Jackson replied that they needed further time to
analyze it. Jackson remarked that it looked as though
Respondent was offering several different base rates. (As it
turned out, there were nine different base rates in the
proposal.) Moore asked if the Union could give him a yes
or no answer that day and Jackson replied that the Union
needed more time. In the process of the discussion, the
Union discovered that the shipping department had not
been listed on the wage offer and called this to Moore's
attention. The union negotiators left the room with the
understanding that Moore would call the plant. They
returned some 20 or 30 minutes later at which time Moore
gave them the rates of pay for each of the shipping
department employees by name. According to this offer,
some of the shipping department employees who were
hourly rated would not get any increase at all. The Union
asked Moore if the Respondent's proposal included bid
rights permitting employees to bid from one job level to
another paying a higher base rate. Moore said no.
In the discussion of variable base rates, Jackson told
Moore that the Union did not reject the concept of variable
base rates. To the contrary, he testified that Moore asked
the union negotiators if, after they had time to go over and
analyze Respondent's proposal, they would come back
with a counterproposal that included variable base rates,
and that he replied that until he could analyze what Moore
had given them a little further he could not respond
sensibly, but that the Union certainly was not rejecting the
concept.
During the discussion, Moore accused the union negotia-
tors of stalling, stating that they had had enough time to
5
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
analyze the proposal. Moore also had told the Union when
he made the offer that it was tied to everything else that
was open in the contract; namely, that in order to get this
wage increase and conclude a contract the Union would
have to accept Respondent's management rights clause as
written, its zipper clause, and abandon its position on
checkoff and binding arbitration. Jackson asked Moore if
he was saying take it or leave it and Moore's reply was that
this was his final offer. After further discussion, Moore told
the Union that the Company was going to put the wage
increase into effect and that it was going to announce it the
following day whether the Union agreed or not.
During the meeting, the Union asked Moore whether he
was willing to set future meetings and he had replied that
there was no point in calling him about a meeting unless
the Union was willing to accept what he had offered. The
meeting ended at 3:30 p.m.2 At 3:55 p.m. that day, the
Company made an announcement to the employees of the
wage increase which they had proposed to the Union.
According to Jackson, several times during the negotia-
tions the Union raised the question of Moore's being the
only negotiator and asked for someone from the plant to
participate in the negotiations who would better under-
stand some of the problems that arose. Moreover, Moore
had advised the Union that once the contract was
concluded he did not anticipate participating in the matter
any further and the Union pointed out to him that this
would make it difficult in the day-to-day implementation
of the contract. On one occasion, the Union requested the
presence of a company engineer for a better explanation of
rates. In nearly all instances Mr. Moore's reply to the
Union's request was that he had full authority to negotiate
and that the plant personnel were too busy.
The Union requested mediation and Respondent re-
fused.
II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing presents two issues for consideration: (1)
did Respondent bargain in bad faith with no intention of
entering into a collective-bargaining agreement; and (2)
did Respondent fail in its obligation to bargain in good
faith by putting into effect the wage proposal of December
18, 1975. 1 find that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5)
and (1) of the Act in both respects.
The second issue is less difficult to analyze than the first,
and, for that reason, is treated first. It is well settled that an
employer who takes unilateral action regarding terms and
conditions of employment then in the process of being
negotiated with the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of his employees violates his collective-bargaining
obligation under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act unless
the parties have reached an impasse in the negotiations.
N.LR.B. v. Benne Katz etc., d/b/a Williamsburg Steel
Products Company, 369 U.S. 736, 741-742 (1962). Respon-
dent does not dispute this legal proposition, but contends
that the record in this case justifies the conclusion that an
impasse had been reached at the time it announced and put
into effect the wage proposal of December 18.
2 I base this finding on Attorney Moore's notes which I believe have
more probative value than Jackson's recollection that the meeting ended at
4:10 p.m.
An employer who has not bargained in good faith may
not rely on an asserted impasse in defense of unilateral
conduct and Respondent is here charged with, and found
guilty of, failure to bargain in good faith. However, without
relying on that finding, I conclude that all the surrounding
circumstances support a finding that there was no impasse
on December 18. I base this finding on the undisputed
facts that, except for discussions of interim wage increases
in late 1974 and mid- 1975, the issue of wage increases, their
amount and nature, was not discussed until November 5,
and at that meeting the discussion was in terms of an
across-the-board increase by both parties. Then, on
December 18, without any advance notice of its intention,
Respondent submitted a five-page wage proposal listing
nearly all unit employees by name, specifying the operation
on which they were employed, their present base rate, and
the new base rate. This proposal used nine different base
rates as against an existing system of a single base rate.
Respondent had the right to propose variable base rates,
but, aware as it was of the Union's opposition to variable
bases rates, it could not in good faith expect the Union to
accept the proposal without some study. With the differ-
ences in base rates, based on degree of difficulty of the
operation, it is evident that the rate for each operation can
require some lengthy discussions. Respondent offered no
rationale for the different base rates it proposed except
difficulty of the work. Obviously, the degree of difficulty
for certain types of work is a matter about which opinions
will differ and the Union could not reasonably be expected
to assimilate the data on Respondent's proposal on
presentation and then engage in meaningful discussions.
As it was, the Union detected an omission relative to
hourly rated employees and was offered wage increases on
an individual basis, again without explanation. In my
judgment, the contention that an impasse existed in light of
the foregoing facts cannot be taken seriously.
Respondent defends its action on the ground that it was
necessary to raise rates to comply with new minimum wage
rates going into effect at the beginning of the year. There is
no merit to such a defense. It is essentially a claim of good
faith but, as N.LRB. v. Katz, supra, teaches, good faith is
no defense for unilateral conduct. I am not holding that
Respondent could not raise rates to meet the new
minimum rates; obviously, it was required to do that. But
Respondent went beyond that and established rates in
excess of the minimum required by law. I find that it
thereby violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.
The remaining issue in this case, Respondent's good faith
in bargaining, is, as stated earlier, a difficult issue. As the
court stated in N.LRB. v. Herman Sausage Company, Inc.,
275 F.2d 229, 231 (C.A. 5, 1960), "Probably in few other
instances is the task of judging so difficult." One reason for
the difficulty as the court further pointed out is that
objective standards are generally either unavailable or
unavailing, and the trier of the facts must weigh the entire
set of circumstances surrounding the bargaining. In this
case, evaluation of all the circumstances compels a finding
that Respondent did not enter into discussions with a
sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement.
6
CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP.
One circumstance indicative of bad faith is conduct
wherein the employer undertakes to make changes in
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment without
consulting with the Union. As the court stated in N.L.RB.
v. Katz, supra at 747, "unilateral conduct often discloses an
unwillingness to agree with the union." I have already
described and found that Respondent engaged in unlawful
unilateral conduct by putting into effect the wage proposal
of December 18. Prior thereto, Respondent had engaged in
other unilateral acts. Thus, it had instituted a new tardiness
rule and made piece rate adjustments on three operations.3
As to the changes in piece rates, the principal defense is
not that they did not constitute unilateral changes, but
rather that the changes occurred outside the 10(b) period.
That, of course, is not the point. The evidence of such
changes was not offered to support a finding that
Respondent violated the Act by making the changes, but as
background evidence of Respondent's attitude towards its
bargaining obligation and its good faith at the bargaining
table.
As to the Union's complaint concerning a tardiness rule,
Respondent asserts that there is no evidence that the rule
complained of represented a change in past practice. I
agree there is no direct evidence to such effect. It is
noteworthy, however, that when the Union complained of
the rule Respondent did not defend its action on the
ground of past practice. The inference is warranted that the
rule was new and it is clear it was unilaterally adopted.
In late 1974, Respondent's plant manager circulated a
paper -among the employees asking them if they would
agree to a change in starting times. In late February 1975,
employees in quality control were called into the company
office and offered a new quality pay program. Such direct
dealing is clearly unlawful (N.LR.B. v. Medo Photo Supply
Corporation, 321 U.S. 678 (1944)), and could have been the
basis of an 8(a)(5) finding had a timely charge been filed.
Respondent's only defense to its conduct is the absence of
a timely charge but, again, the conduct is adverted to as
background evidence for consideration of Respondent's
state of mind relative to negotiating a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union.
Returning to the December 18 wage proposal of
Respondent, I find several aspects of the proposal
supportive of a finding of bad faith apart from its unilateral
aspect. First, there is the timing of the proposal. In 1974, in
anticipation of an increase in the minimum wage in
January 1975, Respondent proposed a wage increase in
September, discussed it in October, and agreed to an
interim wage increase in November. Although Respondent
was well aware of the increase in minimum wage scheduled
for January 1976, it did not make a wage proposal until
December 18. True, there had been discussions of a wage
increase on November 5, but those discussions were in the
context of an across-the-board increase. In presenting its
proposal on December 18, Respondent timed the proposal
to preclude meaningful discussion. Simultaneously, Re-
spondent's negotiator accused the union negotiators of
3 General Counsel and the Union contend that the discontinuance of the
turkey bonus in Christmas 1974 and the institution of dexterity tests in 1975
were unlawful unilateral acts. The record does not indicate how long it had
been a practice to give turkeys at Christmas so that it cannot be determined
whether it was a condition of employment and a mandatory subject of
"stalling" and exhibited clearly a desire to contrive a
deadlock to relieve Respondent of any further obligation to
meet.
Second, there is the circumstance that the proposal
represented a change from a single base rate system to nine
base rates. While Respondent had the right to propose such
a change in measuring the value of various operations, it
could not reasonably expect the Union to agree to the
change without being afforded an opportunity to analyze
the proposal and discuss with Respondent the base rates
proposed for the various operations.
Third, there is the circumstance of Respondent's rejec-
tion out of hand of the possibility of including bidding
rights in the contract. Thus, under Respondent's proposal,
an employee engaged in the operation of hemming fronts
at a base rate of $2.45 would be precluded from transfer-
ring to the operation of hemming bands at a base rate of
$2.55, except at the unfettered discretion of Respondent
under its retained rights proposals. Respondent offered no
explanation for rejecting the concept of bidding rights.
Fourth, there is the circumstance that the proposal was
in reality a proposal of individual wage increases with some
individuals getting no increases and with no proffered
explanation for the increases proposed. Moreover, the
wage rates proposed were personal to each employee with
the result that the issue of wage rates was always open
when new employees were hired. In that connection,
according to Attorney Moore's notes, Respondent reserved
the right to set the rate of new employees at between $2.30
per hour and the rate of the employee on the job with the
only qualification that Respondent would discuss and
negotiate the rate it set for the employee with the Union
before putting it into effect.
Fifth, there is the circumstance that Respondent's
proposal was linked to the Union's acceptance of Respon-
dent's proposals on all open items. Included among those
items was an extremely detailed management rights clause
which required the Union, in effect, to waive practically all
of its rights and which exempted from the grievance and
arbitration provisions any disputes arising thereunder.
Such a proposal in the context of all the circumstances of
the case supports a finding of bad faith.4
As noted earlier, among the open items on noneconomic
issues was the Union's proposal for a checkoff. Although
Respondent made deductions from employees' wages on
other matters, and although the Union offered to reim-
burse Respondent for any cost of administering a checkoff,
Respondent rejected the proposal. In the circumstances,
including the other indicia of bad faith, I am persuaded
that Respondent's position was intended to frustrate
agreement with the Union. H. K Porter Company, Inc.,
Disston Division-Danville Works, 153 NLRB 1370 (1965),
enfd. sub nom. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO
[H.K Porter Company] v. N.LR.B., 363 F.2d 272
(C.A.D.C., 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 851.
Upon consideration of all the foregoing, the conclusion is
inescapable that Respondent had no intention of reaching
bargaining. As to dexterity tests, the record is insufficient to support a
finding that in administering the tests Respondent was instituting a new
policy.
4 East Texas Steel Castings Company, Inc., 154 NLRB 1080(1965).
7
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
an agreement with the Union. Respondent argues that it
negotiated in good faith as manifested by its willingness to
meet at agreed-upon regular intervals, 5 by presenting
counterproposals, by offering reasonable compromise
language, and by making numerous concessions. Upon an
examination of the contract provisions agreed upon prior
to December 18, I am unable to find any concessions by
Respondent of any significance and Respondent adverts to
none in its brief. In any event, "to sit at a bargaining table,
or to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and
there, could be the very means by which to conceal a
purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail."
N.LR.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., supra at 232. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that Respondent, which
purported not to understand the "niceties" of the law, had
shown a disregard of the law in other proceedings.
I have taken official notice of the Board's decisions in
Shaw Industries, Division of Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 218
NLRB 1196 (1975), enfd. 529 F.2d 1350 (C.A. 5, 1976), and
Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 175 NLRB 284 (1969), enfd.
419 F.2d 1275 (C.A. 8, 1969). As the title of the first case
indicates, the case involved a division of Respondent. As to
Hamburg Shirt Corporation, at one point in this proceeding
Attorney Moore admitted it was a division of Respondent,
but later stated that he did not know "that they are
related." Nevertheless, Moore admitted that one Paul
Bernstein is president of Respondent and owns stock in
Respondent and in Hamburg Shirt Corporation. The
decision in Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 156 NLRB 511,
513, fn. 2 (1965), indicates the relationship between
Hamburg Shirt and Respondent. I am persuaded that the
principal is the same in both cases and the conduct
described in those cases lends further support to the finding
herein made that Respondent did not engage in good-faith
bargaining.
III111. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section 1,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed therein, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically,
it having been found that Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri-
ate unit described herein, it will be recommended that
5 The Union contends that the facts that Attorney Moore was
Respondent's sole negotiator and that he was unwilling to meet more often
than he did obstructed bargaining. I am not persuaded that the evidence
supports a finding that the fact Moore was the sole negotiator interfered
significantly with the negotiations, nor am I persuaded that the Union really
pressed for more frequent meetings. To the contrary, it appears that the
union negotiators' own commitments contributed to some delay.
Respondent bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Union as the exclusive representatives of the employees in
the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees, exclud-
ing office clerical employees, watchmen/guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, is, and at all times material herein has been, the
exclusive representative of the employees in the unit
described above, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act.
5. By unilaterally putting into effect new rates of pay
for unit employees, and by engaging in bargaining with the
Union in bad faith with no intention of entering into any
final binding collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent
has engaged, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Sections 8(aX5) and (1) and 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER6
The Respondent, Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation,
Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in the unit described
above, by unilaterally changing the rates of pay of said
employees.
(b) Refusing to bargain with Amalgamated Clothing
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the unit described above,
by negotiating in bad faith with no intention of entering
into a collective-bargaining agreement.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
8
CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP.
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive representative of all employees in the unit
described above, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in Crystal Springs, Mississippi, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
? In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ-
ees in the appropriate unit described below, by
unilaterally changing rates of pay.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ-
ees in the appropriate unit described below, by
negotiating in bad faith with no intention to enter into
a final agreement with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL upon request, bargain collectively with the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ-
ees in the appropriate unit described below, with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if
an agreement is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed contract. The appropriate bargaining unit
is:
All production and maintenance employees,
excluding office clerical employees, watch-
men/guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT
CORPORATION
9