CRST, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 27, 1984

269 N.L.R.B. 400 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cedar Rapids Steel Transport, Inc. a/k/a CRST,
Inc. and International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local Union No. 238. Case 18-
CA-7653
27 March 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND DENNIS
On 23 March 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Elbert D. Gadsden issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel and the Union filed
responses.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,I and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order. 2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Cedar
Rapids Steel Transport, Inc., a/k/a CRST, Inc.,
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order.
I The judge found that Robert Konchar was director of labor relations
for the Respondent when in fact Konchar is one of the attorneys who
represented the Respondent in the course of its negotiations with the
Union. Also, at one point in his decision, the judge suggests that the
Union made its information request on 17 March 1982, the same date that
it presented its initial contract proposal to the Respondent. However, it is
clear from the record, and as reflected elsewhere in the judge's decision,
that the Union's request for information and the Respondent's initial re-
sponse thereto were made on 27 March 1982.
s In affirming the judge's decision, Member Dennis finds that the
Union demonstrated the reasonable or probable relevance of the informna-
tion requested to the Union's role as bargaining representative of the city
drivers.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ELBERT D. GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge.
Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed on April 5,
1982, by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
No. 238, herein called the Union or the Charging Party,
against Cedar Rapids Steel Transport, Inc., a/k/a CRST,
Inc., herein called the Respondent or CRST, a complaint
was issued by the Regional Director for Region 18 on
behalf of the General Counsel on May 28, 1982.
269 NLRB No. 78
The complaint alleges in substance that the Union is
and has been at all times material herein the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent's
employees, and that the Union requested the Respondent
to furnish it certain information to enable it to perform
its representative function, which the Respondent has
failed and refused to furnish, in violation of Section
8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act.
The Respondent filed an answer on June 11, 1982, de-
nying that it has engaged in any unfair labor practices as
alleged in the complaint.
The hearing in the above matter was held before me in
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, on January 12, 1983. Briefs have
been received from counsel for the General Counsel,
counsel for the Charging Party, and counsel for the Re-
spondent, respectively, which have been carefully con-
sidered.
On the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is now, and has been at all times ma-
terial herein, an Iowa corporation with headquarters and
a place of business in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where it is
and has been engaged as a common carrier in the inter-
state transportation of freight.
During the 12-month period ending December 1, 1981,
the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business
operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $50,000
for the transportation of freight and commodities from
the State of Iowa, directly to points outside the State of
Iowa. During the same period, the Respondent per-
formed services valued in excess of $50,000 in States
other than the State of Iowa.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that the Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I
find that International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
Union No. 238, herein called the Union or the Charging
Party, is and has been at all times material herein a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
The Respondent is an Iowa corporation with head-
quarters and a place of business in Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
where it is a common carrier engaged in the interstate
transportation of freight.
The parties stipulated that the following employees of
the Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
400
CRST, INC.
All full-time and regular part-time city employees
engaged in local pick-up and delivery and assembly
of freight in an area not to exceed a radius of 25
miles of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, or in the case of
peddle drivers, not to exceed a radius of 100 miles
of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, employed by Cedar Rapids
Steel Transport, Inc., at its Cedar Rapids, Iowa fa-
cility; excluding office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
The parties also stipulated that the Union has been the
designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the Respondent's employees in the above-described
unit, and that such recognition has been embodied in suc-
cessive collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent
of which is effective by its terms for the period April 1,
1979, and including March 31, 1982. (G.C. Exh. 2.)
The parties further stipulated that the Union herein is
the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit
above described for the purpose of collective bargaining
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The parties stipulated that since on or about March 27,
1982, the Union, by letter hand delivered to the Re-
spondent during a negotiating session, requested the Re-
spondent to furnish the Union with the following infor-
mation:
Re: Information needed to negotiate succeeding
CRST, Inc.-Local 238 Agreement covering the
Cedar Rapids city unit and garage unit.
In compliance with the NLRB policy of good
faith bargaining and in order to make it possible for
Local 238 to properly bargain with the Company;
and further in light of the NLRB decision in case of
Lincoln Sales & Service, Inc., d/b/a Midlands Ex-
press, Employer, and General Drivers Helpers
Union 554 Case No. 17-RC-8363 (236 NLRB 619),
the following information is requested:
1. During the calendar year 1981 state the
number of drivers employed by Lincoln Sales &
Service, Inc., d/b/a Midlands Express or by Mid-
lands Express who either picked up or delivered
dispatches of freight in Cedar Rapids, Iowa or the
area coming under the jurisdiction of the collective
bargaining agreements between CRST, Inc. and
Local Union No. 238.
2. Where the said dispatched freight deliveries or
pickups were pertinent, were they handled under
the CRST, Inc. city contract?
3. What pickups or deliveries, if any, were made
out of Manchester, Iowa, or other points which
would fall within the jurisdiction of Local Union
No. 238 and its contract with CRST, Inc.?
4. How many dispatches were handled by Lin-
coln Sales & Service, Inc. d/b/a Midlands Express
or Midlands Express or Lincoln Sales & Service,
Inc. through leasing arrangements with owner oper-
ators or fleet contractors to handle the same from
the area covered by Teamsters Local Union No.
238? Name the owner operators, fleet contractors,
including Midlands Express, Lincoln Sales & Serv-
ice, Inc. and others which have handled freight of
any nature during the calendar year 1981, under the
certificate issued by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (Department of Transportation) to C.R.S.T,
Inc.
5. Name any other companies engaged in han-
dling of freight under permits issued by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (Department of Trans-
portation) during the year 1981 and which are
either wholly owned or majority interest of the
same owned by Herald Smith, Miriam Smith, Paul
Shawver and Rebecca Shawver, John Michael
Smith, and/or a combination of any of the said per-
sons.
6. Set out which of said companies identified
from the previous paragraphs have operated in or
out of the territory covered by the contracts with
CRST, Inc. and Teamsters Local 238 during calen-
dar year 1981.
7. Set out more fully what persons, if any, have
handled and made delivery of freight under the pro-
visions of the city cartage Agreement between
CRST, Inc. and Local 238, if the same had been de-
livered by employees of CRST, Inc. instead of by
employees, owner-operators or fleet contractors as
set out above.
I take administrative notice of the Board's decision in
Midlands Express, 236 NLRB 619 (1978), that CRST,
Inc. and Lincoln Sales & Service, Inc., d/b/a Midlands
Express are joint employers of employees in the follow-
ing unit:
All full-time and regular part-time drivers employed
by Lincoln Sales & Service, Inc. d/b/a/ Midlands
Express, at its Omaha, Nebraska facility, EXCLUD-
ING office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, guards and supervisory employees as defined in
the Act and all other employees.
The parties commenced negotiations for a new con-
tract in January 1982 in an effort to obtain an agreement
to succeed its agreement which was to expire March 31,
1982. The parties met in negotiation sessions on approxi-
mately 15 to 20 occasions. Early in its negotiation ses-
sions, the Union requested the Respondent to furnish the
specific information enumerated in its letter dated and
delivered March 27, 1982 (G.C. Exh. 7), regarding the
scope and volume of the Respondent's city and over-the-
road truckdrivers' work, in an effort to determine wheth-
er there was enough work for the city drivers, whom the
Union also represented. The Respondent furnished only
some of the information requested to the National Labor
Relations Board in November 1982, at which time a
copy of said information was furnished the Union. The
Respondent has not as of this date furnished the informa-
tion requested directly to the Union. The Union there-
fore contends that the Respondent has failed and refused
to furnish the information requested in violation of Sec-
tion 8(aX)(1) and (5) of the Act.
401
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Consequently, the issues presented for determination in
this proceeding are:
1. Is the information requested by the Union nec-
essary and relevant to its representative function of
Respondent's unit employees?
2. Did Respondent fail and refuse to honor the
Union's several requests for the specified informa-
tion?
B. Bargaining Sessions of the Parties and the Union's
Request for Information
According to the undisputed and credited testimony of
Harry J. Wilford, secretary/treasurer and business repre-
sentative for Local 238, the Union and the Respondent
met in the first bargaining session on January 13, 1982,
for the purpose of negotiating a new contract to succeed
their current agreement which would expire on March
31, 1982. Persons present during the session were John
Grigsby, Esq., of Richmond, Virginia, and Larry Pol-
lard, for the Respondent. The parties engaged in some 15
to 20 bargaining sessions between January 13, 1982, and
November 1982. Other persons attending sessions for the
Union were Herman Casten, business agent for the
Local, and at a later time Stewart Christensen. Repre-
senting the Respondent initially were attorney Grigsby,
who was succeeded by attorney Melvin R. Manning, and
Robert Konchar, industrial relations director. Wilford
took notes during all of the bargaining sessions including
the session on March 19, at which time attorney Grigsby
presented a proposal to the Union (G.C. Exh. 3). On
page 2 of that proposal at the top of the page, Wilford
testified that Grigsby said he would completely eliminate
the bargaining unit covered in the prior agreement. He
explained his understanding of the Respondent's proposal
as follows:
A. The way this would do that is that the previ-
ous contract provided for the company to maintain
a minimum of four city jobs, under this city-pick-
up drivers, dock and wide peddle area driver con-
tract and the Company's proposal there is to name
individuals in there with the net result that when
those people either retired, left the company for any
reason, there would be no more city bargaining
unit.
Q. Did the company propose anything else with
regard to the members of the bargaining unit, cov-
ered by the soon to expire collective bargaining
agreement?
A. No, their proposal has not changed, in that re-
spect.
Wilford further testified that the Company's proposed
language modification in the second paragraph of article
1, that eliminating the prior language was basically elimi-
nating the work that was provided for the city employ-
ees. The only reason offered for the change by the Com-
pany was Pollard's statement to the effect that the Com-
pany did not need any city drivers. The position of the
Union was that sufficient work was being performed by
the over-the-road drivers that belonged to the city driv-
ers, and that if that work were performed by the city
drivers there could be possibly at least four or more city
employees working under the contract. The Union's con-
clusion on this matter is supported by the fact that the
over-the-road drivers from time to time had informed the
Union about how much work was being performed in
the Cedar Rapids area by road drivers, and that the Re-
spondent and the other companies that were in the
Omaha Local 554 case versus CRST and Lincoln Sales
& Service and Midland Express were all one and the
same thing; and that the old drivers supplied by all of
those companies performing this work would eliminate
the city drivers.
The Union based its request on the information on
pages 1 and 2 of the General Counsel's Exhibit 4, the
Respondent's notices to drivers other than Local 238, ad-
vising of new cargo claim classifications dealing with
preventable and nonpreventable claims, as well as the
letter, the General Counsel's Exhibit 5, a letter from
Local 592 to the Eastern Conference of Teamsters, ad-
vising about its observation of CRST representing itself
as CRST and Lincoln Sales & Service, involving consid-
erable other nonunion truckdrivers.
The General Counsel's Exhibits 6(a), (b), and (c), a
brochure put out by CRST, suggest the Respondent's re-
lationship with the other companies named therein,
which the Union believes are operating trucking oper-
ations within its jurisdictional territory. It was also this
information on which the Union concluded the need to
request the information from the Respondent on March
27, 1982. The information indicated the companies
(CRST, Lincoln Sales & Service, with its subdivision)
were all one and the same, that they were operating all
over the territory of CRST, and that they came in and
out of the CRST territory on a daily, weekly, or month-
ly basis.
Wilford testified that when the Union presented its
written request for the information to Konchar on
March 27, 1982, he told Konchar that the Union felt it
needed the information to do a better job representing its
members in negotiations for a new city contract. Kon-
char said he would have to talk to the Company about
it. Later, Konchar advised him that he did not think the
information was pertinent, and that the Company
thought the Union wanted the information to organize
employees in some of the other companies. He said he
told Konchar that that was not true. Subsequently, the
Union made an informal and oral request for the infor-
mation outlined in its letter of March 27 at nearly every
negotiating session, by advising the Respondent that the
Union was still awaiting the information. On April 16,
1982, Wilford said he gave the Respondent another letter
(G.C. Exh. 8), the substance of which was the same as
the March 27 letter, requesting the same information. By
this time, the charge in the instant proceeding had been
filed and Konchar told him that since this was a matter
before the Board there would be no response to the
Union's request from the Company.
The Union presented its first proposal to the Company
on March 17 when Konchar informed Casten and Wil-
ford that the Company rejected the Union's request be-
402
CRST, INC.
cause it was irrelevant to matters in negotiations. The
Union thereafter mentioned its requests for the informa-
tion during the bargaining session held on May 20, when
Manning became counsel and negotiator for the Re-
spondent. During the May 20 bargaining session, Wilford
testified that he recalled Manning asking him just what
specific information the Union was requesting, and he re-
plied that the information the Union requested was that
in its letters of March 27 and April 16. He denied he told
the Company the Union was not going to answer any
more questions about the requested information and that
the Company would have to rely solely on the contents
of the letters. Instead, he recalled being asked a number
of legal questions to which he replied that if they were
asking legal questions they would have to contact Robert
E. Conley, attorney for the Local. Herman Casten, busi-
ness representative of Local 238, corroborated essentially
all of Wilford's testimony about the Union's requests and
the Company's nonresponse.
Wilford denied the Company asked him more ques-
tions about the request and he told the Company to take
it up with the Board. Instead, he said he told the Compa-
ny that, if it had any more legal questions, to get in
touch with the Local's attorney, Robert E. Conley.'
Wilford acknowledged receipt of a letter dated No-
vember 5, 1982 (R. Exh. 1), addressed to Curtis Welles
of the National Labor Relations Board, advising as fol-
lows:
CRST, Inc. had hoped to be able to resolve the
matter raised by the complaint during the negotia-
tion process with Local 238. We have been advised
by Mr. Wilford, chief negotiator for Local 238, that
any information we had concerning this matter
should be directed to the Board. Therefore, CRST
is writing you this letter concerning the information
it will provide at this time.
On pages two and three of the complaint certain
information is requested which is identical to the in-
formation requested in Local 238's letters to CRST
dated March 27, 1982 and April 16, 1982. These an-
swers are submitted for the purposes of settlement
discussions only, and not by way of any admission
that CRST has violated the NLRA. CRST, in re-
sponse thereto respectfully states that:
6(a)(1). A maximum of 50.
6(a)(2). No, the loads were not transported by
any employee of CRST.
6(a)(3). None.
I credit Wilford's testimony that he told company representatives if
they were asking him legal questions they would have to contact legal
counsel for Local 238. I also credit Wilford's denial that he refused to
answer any more questions about the Union's request, and told the Com-
pany to take it up with the Board. However, I was persuaded that Wil-
ford, out of frustration from being asked repeated questions about the
specificity of the request, in effect, told the Company the contents of the
Union's letter is clear, and he would stand on its language. The letter is
in fact clear, and the Respondent did not direct any written inquiry to
the Union about its lack of clarity. Hence, I was further persuaded by the
oral as well as the circumstantial evidence of the Respondent's failure
and refusal to provide any of the requested information, as well as by the
demeanor of Wilford, that he was testifying truthfully in this regard, and
the Respondent's witnesses were not.
6(a)(4). None.
6(a)(5). None.
6(a)(6). None.
6(a)(7). None.
Wilford said the Union was concerned about the city
drivers' jobs throughout the last contract negotiating ses-
sion because the Respondent had hired only two drivers,
and there were four city jobs, the minimum specified by
the contract. As a result of the vacancies, the Union filed
a grievance. The Respondent introduced the Respond-
ent's Exhibit 3, the Union's proposal, to show that it
does not deal with city drivers and therefore the Union's
requests for information are irrelevant. Wilford stated
that the Company's November 5 letter did not respond
to the Union's request. He said the requests would have
become relevant to the over-the-road contracts.
In response to the Union's March 27 request, Larry
Pollard, director of industrial relations for the Respond-
ent, testified as follows:
A. I don't recall the specific words that we used
at that time. I know that we did not say at any time
that we refused to give them that information.
Q. On the 16th of April, do you recall any dis-
cussion, in depth, with regard to the relevancy of
the information or what it was needed for or how it
involved itself in the negotiation?
A. I don't believe there was any on that particu-
lar day.
Q. Well now, after the 16th of April, did there
come a time, later, when there was further negotia-
tion or further conversation with respect to the
union's request as set forth in both those letters of
April 16 and March 27th?
A. No Mam, I think you misunderstood. I said
that there were two responses and the first one was
that we would take it back to the company. The
second response was that we rejected the request as
to their relevance, at this time and that we would
take it back to the company.
Pollard denied the Company ever refused to furnish
the information requested by the Union. He acknowl-
edged, however, that the Union asked about its requests
on several occasions after April 16, more specifically on
May 11 or 20, at which time he said Manning asked the
Union did it need the information and how it affected ne-
gotiations. In response thereto, he said the Union said,
"You have our request letters which covers it." The
Union has never acknowledged its receipt of the infor-
mation in the Respondent's November 5 letter which
was directed to the National Labor Relations Board with
a copy to the Union. The Union filed charges with the
Board on April 5, 1982, for the Company's refusal to
provide information. Pollard contends the Company sup-
plied that information to the Board on November 5, with
a copy to the Union. The Board issued a complaint on
May 28, 1982. The next meeting, June 11, the Company
did not provide the information. The parties met in bar-
gaining sessions in July, August, and September, at
403
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which times the Union referred to its requests, but the
Respondent did not submit the requested information to
the Union. The parties also met in October and Novem-
ber and the Company did not submit the information to
the Union.
Analysis and Conclusions
In determining whether the Respondent herein failed
and refused to provide information repeatedly requested
by the Union herein, it must first be determined whether
the information requested by the Union met the legal re-
quirements of relevance. In this regard, it is well-estab-
lished law that the legal obligation of an employer to
bargain collectively in good faith carries with it a duty
to provide information requested by the duly designated
bargaining representative of its employees, when that in-
formation is relevant, probably relevant, necessary, or
useful to such representative in performing its representa-
tive functions (negotiating a collective-bargaining con-
tract or enforcing the contract in arbitration proceed-
ings) on behalf of the unit employees it represents.
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v.
Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 432-436 (1967); Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).
Information requested by the bargaining representative
on behalf of bargaining unit employees is presumptively
relevant, and a specific showing of relevance is not re-
quired. However, when the request is for information
outside the bargaining unit the bargaining representative
is required to establish relevance, necessity, or usefulness
of the information requested. In National Cleaning Co.,
265 NLRB 1352, 1353 (1982), appropriately cited by
counsel for the General Counsel, the Board stated:
An employer cannot refuse to furnish requested in-
formation on the basis that the bargaining represent-
ative seeks information regarding matters outside
the scope of the bargaining unit represented by the
union. Rather, an employer is obligated to supply
such information when the information sought
meets the requisite standard of relevance set forth in
Ohio Power Co., and reaffirmed in Doubarn Sheet
Metal, Inc. The following language from Ohio Power
Company, sets forth the standard of relevance to be
applied:
Where the information sought covers the terms
and conditions of employment within the bar-
gaining unit, thus involving the core of the em-
ployer-employee relationship, the standard of rel-
evance is very broad, and no specific showing is
normally required; but where the request is for
information with respect to matters occurring
outside the unit, the standard is somewhat nar-
rower (as where the precipitating issue or con-
duct is the subcontracting of work performable
by employees within the appropriate unit) and
relevance is required to be somewhat more pre-
cise.... The obligation is not unlimited. Thus
where the information is plainly irrelevant to any
dispute there is no duty to provide it.
The uncontroverted evidence in the instant proceeding
established that during early negotiation sessions for a
new contract on March 19, 1982, the Respondent submit-
ted a contract proposal which the Union understood
would, in the long run, eliminate the need for the four
city drivers' jobs provided for under the current con-
tract. The Company's explanation for the change was
simply that it did not need city drivers. However, the
Union had received apparently reasonable and reliable
information that the Company was using over-the-road
drivers within and without the unit's jurisdictional terri-
tory to perform work which should and could have been
performed by city drivers. In order to further verify the
information it had received about the over-the-road driv-
ers, and to enforce the contract with respect to the city
drivers' positions provided for under the contract, the
Union requested the specific information outlined in its
March 27 and April 16 letters.
A mere reading of the specific information requested
by the Union readily reveals that the Union specifically
stated:
1. That the information was needed to assist it in
negotiating a succeeding contract with Respondent,
with respect to the four city drivers' jobs provided
for under the contract.
2. To enable the Union to properly bargain with
Respondent about the number of over-the-road
drivers, the scope, location, and amount of work
being performed in the jurisdictional territory of
Local 238, by members and members of Local 554
over-the-road drivers of the Respondent, operating
as a complicated joint employer, as found by the
Board in Lincoln Sales & Service, Inc., d/b/a Mid-
lands Express.
3. The location of any freight pickup or deliv-
eries by over-the-road drivers and where was such
freight handled under the contract between Re-
spondent and the Union.
4. How many dispatches were handled by leasing
arrangements with other operators or fleet contrac-
tors, or others during calendar year 1981, and the
names of such operators.
It is therefore clear that the Union not only stated the
purpose (negotiations for a succeeding contract including
the city drivers) for which the information was request-
ed, but also it was reasonably specific and precise in enu-
merating what information it desired, by referring to a
particular provision of the current contract relating to
city (drivers') jobs which was a subject of negotiations
brought on by the Respondent's contract proposal.
Under these circumstances, I find that the information
requested by the Union was not only probably relevant,
but also in fact relevant, necessary, and indeed useful to
the Union in carrying out its negotiation functions as bar-
gaining representative of the over-the-road as well as
city unit drivers, within the territorial jurisdiction of
Local 238. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., supra; NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., supra.
The Respondent's initial arbitrary announcement that
the information requested by the Union was not perti-
404
CRST, INC.
nent, relevant, or clear is not supported by the evidence
of record. In fact, the Union has more than satisfied the
requirements of relevance. Any inquiries by the Re-
spondent for additional specificity or clarity, if indeed
there were any such inquiries, would have been appar-
ently unnecessary and unduly burdensome for the Union
to obtain more specificity, since the Union could hardly
have had easy assess to more information without divul-
gence by the Respondent. As in San Diego Newspaper
Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 868-869 (9th Cir.
1977), also cited by counsel for the General Counsel, the
court stated:
When [a] union asks for information which is not
presumptively relevant, the showing by the union
must be more than a mere concoction of some gen-
eral theory which explains how the information
would be useful to the union in determining if the
employer has committed some unknown contract
violation.... Conversely, however, to require an
initial, burdensome showing by the union before it
can gain access to information which is necessary
for it to determine if a violation has occurred de-
feats the very purpose of the "liberal discovery
standard" of relevance which is to be used. Balanc-
ing these two conflicting propositions, the solution
is to require some initial, but not overwhelming,
demonstration by the union that some violation is or
has been taking place.
Additionally, the Union (Local 238) manifested early
concern about the probable erosion or diversion of bar-
gaining unit work (work for four city drivers) by the Re-
spondent when it filed a grievance about the Respond-
ent's use of two instead of four city drivers, as provided
by the contract in effect at the time. Moreover, when the
Union received evidence that the Respondent was appar-
ently operating a number of other trucking entities under
various names set forth in a letter (G.C. Exh. 5), the
Union's reason for requesting the specified information,
as well as the relevance of such information to terms and
conditions of employment within the bargaining unit, is
well substantiated by the record evidence. As the Board
stated in Associated General Contractors of California, 242
NLRB 891, 892 (1979), enfd. 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir.
1980):
[T]hey [unions] are entitled to the requested infor-
mation under the "discovery-type" standard enu-
merated in N.LR.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385
U.S. at 437, to judge for themselves whether to
press their claims in the contractual grievance pro-
cedure, or before the Board or courts, or through
remedial provisions in the contracts under negotia-
tion. The Torrington Company v. N.LR.B., 545 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1976). It is certainly well within the
statutory responsibilities of the Unions to scrutinize
closely all facets relating to the diversion or preser-
vation of bargaining unit work and, therefore, they
are fully warranted in any reasonable probing of
data concerning the exclusion of the employees of
certain AGCC members from the bargaining units.
[242 NLRB at 894, citing NLRB v. Rockwell-Stand-
ard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1969); Curtiss-
Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).]
See also National Cleaning Co., supra.
The Respondent's contentions that the information re-
quested by the Union is not relevant because it is not
sought by the Union for bargaining purposes, but instead
for purposes of organizing nonunion employees of the
Respondent and other employers in its territorial juris-
diction and that the Union has failed to explain why it
needs the information, or that it is relevant and necessary
to negotiations, are unsupported by the essentially uncon-
troverted evidence of record.
Did the Respondent Fail and Refuse to Provide
Relevant Information Requested by the Union?
The record evidence fails to demonstrate that the Re-
spondent made any attempt to provide the Union with
the requested information prior to November 5, 1982. In
fact it is well established by the record that the Respond-
ent informed the Union in late March or early April that
it did not deem the requested information pertinent or
relevant to negotiations, and that it believed the Union
wanted the information to organize nonunion employees
in the Respondent and other companies. The Union filed
a charge in the instant proceeding on April 5, 1982, and
renewed its request for the information by letter on April
16, 1982. As the Respondent's director of industrial rela-
tions, Larry Pollard, testified, the Respondent's second
response to the Union's request was that "we rejected
the requests as to their relevance, at the time, and would
take it back to the Company." The record does not show
that the Respondent ever changed its position prior to
November 5, 1982, about providing the requested infor-
mation.
Although testimony by the Respondent's witnesses
seemingly imply that the Respondent had some questions
about the relevance or clarity of the information request-
ed by the Union, it is particularly observed that at no
time did the Respondent ever direct any specific inquir-
ies, or even a response in writing to the Union's written
requests. Thus, it is unequivocally clear from the Re-
spondent's oral responses of rejection, as well as its con-
tinued overt omission to provide any information to the
Union from March 27, 1982, to November 5, 1982, that
the Respondent's failure to provide the information was
in keeping with its initial erroneous oral response, that
the information was not relevant or pertinent to the
Union's representative bargaining function. Hence, the
Respondent has failed to provide the requested informa-
tion during the entire period, March 27, 1982, through
November 5, 1982, while negotiation sessions between
the Union and the Respondent were in progress.
Finally, on November 5, 1982, the Respondent submit-
ted a letter (R. Exh. 1) to the National Labor Relations
Board as an offer for settlement. The letter contained
some information about the Respondent's freight road
driver operations. However, a cursory reading of the
letter reveals that it does not provide much information
in response to the specific requests outlined in the
Union's letters of March 27 and April 16, 1982. The Re-
405
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent sent a copy of its letter (R. Exh. 1) to the
Union, which it contends constituted a response to, and
discharge of, any duty it had to provide the information
requested by the Union. However, as counsel for the
General Counsel argues, the Respondent's original letter
(R. Exh. 1) was a response (letter directed) to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board in an effort to achieve a
settlement with the Board with respect to the charge
filed herein. The Respondent merely sent the Union a
courtesy copy of that letter. Since the letter was ad-
dressed to the National Labor Relations Board, which is
neither an agent of the Union nor the bargaining repre-
sentative of the unit employees, such letter can hardly be
construed as a response to the Union's request and the
statutory duty of the Respondent to provide information
to the duly designated bargaining representative of its
unit employees.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the Respond-
ent's November 5 letter (R. Exh. 1) was an attempt to
provide some of the requested information, the excessive
lapse of time under the circumstances, in the absence of
any excuse offered by the Respondent for the untimely
delay, can neither justify the Respondent's conduct nor
obviate the need for a remedy herein. Universal Building
Services, 234 NLRB 362 (1978); Taft Broadcasting Co.,
264 NLRB 185 (1982); Lumber & Mill Employers Assn.,
265 NLRB 199 (1982).
Although the Respondent argues that the Union made
a request for information pertaining to both the shop and
city contracts, and refused to establish any rationale in
support of the request, I find that the information re-
quested about the shop contract was sufficiently relevant
to the city contract, on the ground that it is potentially
and probably relevant, if not in fact relevant, as I have
found. Associated General Contractors of California, supra.
Additionally, I find that the Union's explanation for the
requested information of employees under the shop con-
tract had a direct bearing on, and was relevant to, the
bargainable issues raised in regard to the city contract
employees. Under these circumstances, I find that the
Union's request satisfied the requirements of Soule Glass
& Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1093 (Ist Cir.
1981), cited by counsel for the Respondent.
Although the Respondent argues that since the Union
requested the information on March 27, 1982, and filed
its unfair labor practice charge on April 5, 1982, such
filing by the Union constituted bad faith on its part, and
its resort to the Board was premature. Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, supra. However, it is observed
that the Union in the instant case did not file its unfair
labor practice charge against the Respondent until after
the Respondent informed the Union that the information
it requested was not pertinent or relevant to the negotia-
tions. Counsel for the Respondent further argues pursu-
ant to the Soule case that where an employer offers to
assist the union the union must try to accommodate the
employer in reference to providing information request-
ed. It is noted, however, that the Respondent did not es-
tablish any evidence of its efforts to assist the Union in
any way in the instant proceeding. Consequently, the
principle of the Soule case is not applicable in that regard
to the facts as found herein.
Consequently, I conclude and find on the foregoing
findings and authority that, by failing to provide the
Union with the information requested, the Respondent
has failed and refused to bargain in good faith in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in close connection with its oper-
ations as described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and a substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, we shall order that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights, by refusing to furnish the
Union relevant information requested by the Union for
the purpose of negotiating a succeeding collective-bar-
gaining agreement on behalf of unit city truckdrivers,
and by so failing and refusing, the Respondent has failed
and refused to bargain with the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act, the recommended
Order will provide that the Respondent cease and desist
from engaging in such unlawful conduct, and that it take
certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses and policies of the Act.
Because of the character of the unfair labor practices
herein found, the recommended Order will provide that
the Respondent cease and desist from or in any like or
related manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120
F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1941).
On the basis of the above findings of fact and on the
entire record in this case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Cedar Rapids Steel Transport, Inc., a/k/a CRST,
Inc., the Respondent herein, is, and has been at all times
material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union
No. 238, herein called the Union, is, and has been at all
times material herein, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing to provide the above-named Union with
information necessary and relevant to its administration
and negotiation of collective-bargaining agreements with
the Respondent, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
406
CRST, INC.
Section 7 protected rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing to provide the above-named
Union with necessary and relevant information requested
by the Union, the Respondent has failed and refused to
bargain in good faith, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
the entire record, I issue the following recommended 2
ORDER
The Respondent, Cedar Rapids Steel Transport, Inc.,
a/k/a CRST, Inc., Cedar Rapids, Iowa, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of their guaranteed Section 7 rights, by
failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with the des-
ignated representative of unit employees.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of unit
employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer to and, on request, provide to International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 238, the infor-
mation which it requested in its letters of March 27 and
April 16, 1982.
(b) Offer and, on request, bargain collectively in good
faith with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
Local Union No. 238, the Union herein, on behalf of our
employees in the appropriate unit.
(c) Post at the Respondent's Cedar Rapids, Iowa facili-
ty copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3
Copies of said notices on forms provided by the Region-
al Director for Region 18, after being signed by Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted im-
mediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
3 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nationa
Labor Relations Board."
tive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the united States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the informa-
tion requested by the Union for its evaluation in effec-
tively performing its representative function in negotiat-
ing and administering collective-bargaining agreements
with us.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer to and, on request, provide the Union
with the information it requested on March 27 and April
16, 1982, and thereafter to enable it to effectively per-
form its representative function of negotiating and ad-
ministering collective-bargaining agreements with us.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the appropriate unit described as
follows:
All full-time and regular part-time city employees
engaged in local pickup and delivery and assembly
of freight in any area not to exceed a radius of 25
miles of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, or in the case of
peddle drivers, not to exceed a radius of 100 miles
of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, employed by Cedar Rapids
Steel Transport, Inc., at its Cedar Rapids, Iowa fa-
cility; excluding office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
CEDAR RAPIDS STEEL TRANSPORT, A/K/A
CRST, INC.
407