Crown Equipment Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 22, 2012

No. 77248621re (T.T.A.B. Oct. 22, 2012)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF
THE T.T.A.B.

Mailed: October 22, 2012

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Crown Equipment Corp.
________

Serial No. 77248621
_______

On Request for Reconsideration
_______

B. Joseph Schaeff of Dinsmore & Stohl LLP for Crown
Equipment Corp.

Julie A. Watson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
109 (Dan Vavonese, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Bucher, Cataldo and Wolfson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:

On September 24, 2012, applicant, Crown Equipment
Corp., filed a request for reconsideration of the Board’s
August 23, 2012 decision affirming in part the examining
attorney’s refusal of registration of its applied-for mark,
Ser. No. 77248621
2
CROWN INSITE, for its goods recited in International Class
9 on the ground of likelihood of confusion.1
As a preliminary matter, we note that applicant’s
request for reconsideration is timely inasmuch as it was
filed within 30 days of the date of the Board’s decision.
See Trademark Rules 2.144 and 2.196. See also Avedis
Zildjian Co. v. D. H. Baldwin Co., 181 USPQ 736 (Comm’r
1974).
Generally, the premise underlying a motion for
reconsideration, modification or clarification under
Trademark Rule 2.127(b) is that, based on the facts before
it and the prevailing authorities, the Board erred in
reaching the order or decision it issued. Such a motion
may not properly be used to introduce additional evidence,
nor should it be devoted simply to a reargument of the
points presented in a brief on the original motion.
Rather, the motion normally should be limited to a
demonstration that, based on the facts before it and the
applicable law, the Board’s ruling is in error and requires
appropriate change. See TBMP § 543 (3d ed., rev. 2012) and
authorities cited therein.

1 Our August 23, 2012 decision reversed the examining attorney’s
refusal to register as to applicant’s goods recited in
International Class 12.

Ser. No. 77248621
3
Applicant asserts in its request for reconsideration
that “In support of its decision, the Board made a number
of determinations with which Crown disagrees.”2
Specifically, applicant disagrees with the following
findings:
- Applicant provided insufficient evidentiary support
for its contention that CROWN is its house mark;
- Applicant’s goods, being unrestricted, may be used
in the same underground environments as those of
registrant; and
- The marks engender similar connotations and
commercial impressions.
Turning to applicant’s first basis for its request for
reconsideration, we observe that applicant submitted as
evidence examples of use of its mark on various lift-truck
products, articles discussing applicant and its position in
the lift-truck industry, and third-party registrations for
CROWN formative marks for various goods and services
primarily related to its lift-truck products. This
evidence, while demonstrating applicant’s notoriety in its
field, fails to support its contention that it uses CROWN
as a house mark. Furthermore, as we observed in our
September 23, 2012 decision, the question of whether a mark

2 Request for reconsideration, p. 2.
Ser. No. 77248621
4
is or is not a house mark is not conclusive in determining
whether a likelihood of confusion exists with another mark.
As we noted in addition, the nature of the other elements
in the marks at issue play a role in our likelihood of
confusion determination as well. See, e.g., In re Fiesta
Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360 (TTAB 2007); and Knight Textile
Corp. v. Jones Investment Co., 75 USPQ2d 1313 (TTAB 2005).
Turning to applicant’s second basis for its request
for reconsideration, as we noted in our September 23, 2012
decision, our likelihood of confusion determination must be
based upon the goods as identified in the involved
application and cited registration. As identified, only
some of registrant’s goods are limited to use in
underground environments, and there is nothing in
applicant’s identification of goods that precludes their
use in underground environments. Thus, we are bound by the
language of the respective identifications of goods,
notwithstanding applicant’s evidence pointing to narrower
fields of application for its goods. See Octocom Systems,
Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16
USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and Paula Payne
Products v. Johnson Publishing Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ
76, 77 (CCPA 1973).
Ser. No. 77248621
5
Finally, turning to applicant’s third basis for its
request for reconsideration, we observe that in our
September 23, 2012 decision, we found that, based upon the
record of the case, the term INSITE or “insight” is not
weak as applied to the involved goods and that the
similarities between the marks at issue outweigh the
differences. Applicant’s arguments and evidence to the
contrary, as discussed therein, did not convince us
otherwise.
In summary, we find that applicant points to no error
in our September 23, 2012 determination, but rather
disagrees with the result reached therein and otherwise
presents reargument of points previously raised in support
of the positions articulated in its brief on appeal. As a
result, we remain of the opinion that our determination
affirming in part the examining attorney’s refusal to
register is correct.
The request for reconsideration is denied.