Crown Drug Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 6, 1962

136 N.L.R.B. 865 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

CROWN DRUG COMPANY 865
the Board speaks again , I am bound , as I see it, to find a violation of the Act in
the instant case.
By reason of the facts set forth above, it is found that the picketing of Vestaglas,
Inc., by Respondent is intended to force or require it to recognize or bargain with
Respondent as the representative of its employees at a time when Respondent is
not currently certified as the collective -bargaining representative of the employees
of Vestaglas , Inc., in an appropriate bargaining unit , and that such picketing consti-
tutes a violation of Section 8(b) (7) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with the operations of Vestaglas , Inc., as set forth in section 1 , above, have
a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action found to be necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Vestaglas, Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Carpenters District Council of St. Louis, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By picketing Vestaglas, Inc., from July 27, 1961, with an object of forcing and
requiring Vestaglas , Inc., to recognize and bargain collectively with Respondent
notwithstanding that Respondent does not represent a majority of the Vestaglas em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes , Respondent has restrained and
coerced, and is restraining and coercing , Vestaglas' employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and by such picketing , with an object
of forcing and requiring Vestaglas , Inc., to recognize and bargain with Respondent
as the collective -bargaining representative of its employees and forcing and requir-
ing employees to accept and select Respondent as their bargaining representative,
although more than a reasonable period has elapsed after July 27, 1961, without a
petition under Section 9(c) of the Act being filed, Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and 7 ) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Paul Robey, an individual d/b/a Crown Drug Company and
Retail Clerks Union Local 775, Retail Clerks International
Association , AFL-CIO. Case No. 9O-CA-fl046. April 6, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 5, 1961, Trial Examiner Eugene K. Kennedy issued
his Intermediate Report herein, finding that Respondent had not en-
gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set
forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the
136 NLRB No. 86.
866 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report together with supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings and finds that
no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are affirmed. The
Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and adopts the findings, con-
clusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed by Local 775 of the Retail Clerks Union, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, a complaint was issued against Paul Robey, an Individual d/b/a
Crown Drug Company, herein called Respondent , alleging that Respondent had on
April 11, 1961, and at all times since that date, refused and continued to refuse to
sign a written agreement regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment agreed upon by the Respondent and the Union,
thereby violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
herein called the Act.
The complaint also alleged that on March 25, 1959, the majority of the employees
of Respondent selected the Union as their representative . The Respondent denies
this allegation although admitting that it recognized the Union as the representative
of its employees and that it has continued to recognize the Union as such. The
question of majority representation as well as the issue as to whether a contract was
agreed upon but not signed are the two issues presented by the pleadings in this
matter which was tried in San Francisco , on August 1, 1961.
Upon the entire record in the case and upon my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE EVENTS
The Respondent is engaged in the retail drug business .' The location of its store
involved in the dispute with the Union 2 is located in Daly City , California.
Sometime prior to March 25, 1959, the Union picketed the Respondent's Daly
City store located in San Mateo County. The pickets were removed and the dispute
was adjusted between Respondent and the Union by the execution of a document,
entitled "Stipulation ," on March 25, 1959. Certain portions of this document will
be adverted to herein , and the entire document is attached hereto as Appendix A.
It is in effect a collective -bargaining agreement of indefinite duration , by its terms
contemplating a further written agreement.
In summary , it provides that (1) the Union will remove its pickets; (2) Respondent
will recognize the Union as having a right to negotiate "on the behalf of the regular
parties concerned"; ( 3) that there shall be a Union shop; (4) that the parties will
agree to negotiate a contract for Respondent 's Daly City store based upon the San
Mateo area contract ; ( 5) seven employees will be offered reinstatement ; ( 6) Re-
spondent agrees to pay scales currently in effect for other drugstores in San Mateo
County within the jurisdiction of the Union ; ( 7) Respondent agrees to certain
seniority principles in hiring or laying off employees ; ( 8) the area contract provisions
1 Respondent has retail drugstores at various locations in California Its annual gross
volume exceeds $ 500,000, and it annually receives goods valued in excess of $5,000 de-
livered directly to it from points outside the State of California Respondent at all times
material herein has been engaged in commerce and operations affecting commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
2 Retail Clerks Union Local 775, Retail Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO, is
a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
CROWN DRUG COMPANY 867"
relating to adjustments and arbitration are incorporated by reference in the-
"Stipulation."
Following the execution of this "Stipulation," there were three formal negotiating
meetings, the first taking place on October 12, 1959. At this meeting, representing the
Respondent was a Mr. Robert Norton and Mr. Raymond Amrhein, Respondent's
attorney. Representing the Union was Robert Cowell, an attorney for the Union,
and the Union's secretary-treasurer, Carl E. Cohenour. At the first meeting it was
made clear that Respondent did not want to execute another agreement with the pro-
vision relating to arbitrating concerning discharge of employees. In this connection
it is noted that the "Stipulation" incorporates by reference provisions for arbitration
contained in the Union's area contract. The record indicates that the Union had
brought to arbitration two or three complaints on behalf of discharged employees.
The other two formal negotiating meetings were held in November 1959 and
January 1960. Unresolved issues at these meetings included the provision for
arbitration of discharges and the health and welfare plan provision.
Before the negotiations commenced, Cowell in a letter to Norton inquired whether
or not he was authorized to negotiate and conclude an agreement. Norton responded'
saying that Cowell's letter had been reviewed and that he would be hearing soon.
Cowell received a letter of similar import from Respondent's attorney, Amrhein,
and a Mr. Nixon, one of Respondent's officials. Cowell continued to discuss the
execution of a new contract with Norton although he never did receive any written
advice as to who was authorized to conclude a settlement for Respondent. In this
connection it is noted Amrhein agreed to the "Stipulation" of March 25, 1959, on.
behalf of Respondent although the document was signed by Norton. In January 1961,
Norton informed Cowell that no agreement could be signed without the approval
of Paul Robey, Respondent owner.
A letter to the union representative from Norton in May 1960, reflects that Norton
required Robey's approval in dealing with the Union and he (Norton) did not have
independent authority, and so informed the Union:
CARL E. COHENOUR,
MAY 24, 1960.
Secretary-Treasurer,
Retail Clerks #775,
San Mateo, Calif.
DEAR MR. COHENOUR: In reply to your letter of May 17: Mr. Robey has
taken the matter of your stipulation under advisement, and will inform this
office at his earliest convenience.
Very truly yours,
(S) R. W. Norton,
R. W. NORTON.
In September 1960, Cowell advised Norton that the Union would not insist on,
having the arbitration of discharges included in the proposed collective-bargaining
contract. Norton then informed Cowell that he would discuss the matter with
Amrhein, Respondent's attorney, and then would contact Robey and recommend a,
settlement of the matter. Norton for some reason did not get Robey's approval.
Whether it was because of Robey's illness, his absence from the country, or some
other reason cannot be ascertained from the record.
On January 16, 1961, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Re-
spondent alleging that on or about September 6, 1960, it reached an agreement with
Respondent and that Respondent was refusing to bargain in good faith by failing to
execute this agreement in writing. This charge was withdrawn and subsequently the
Union submitted its proposed contract along with the following letter on March 16,
1961:
Re: Crown Drug , Daly City.
Mr. ROBERT W. NORTON,
California Association of Employers,
260 Stockton Street,
San Francisco 8, California.
MARCH 16, 1961.
DEAR MR. NORTON: Enclosed please find my compilation of the Union's
position on the contract, which has been gathered from my notes on the ne-
gotiating meetings, previous correspondence between your office and mine, and
from Carl Cohenour to you. I believe that this sets forth the true and correct
picture of our discussions.
641795-63-vol. 136-56
,868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Will you kindly review same and indicate the employer 's position as promptly
as possible.
I regret the delay in sending this to you. However, my recent illness has
caused a backlog to develop here.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT P. COWELL.
This letter of March 16, 1961, together with the Union's proposed contract was in
answer to the letter of January 25, 1961, addressed to Cowell from Norton as follows:
JANUARY 25, 1961.
Re: Crown Drug, Daly City, Case No. 20-CA-1979.
ROBERT COWELL, Esq.
Attorney and Counselor at Law
900 Balfour Building
351 California St.
San Francisco 4, California
DEAR MR. COWELL: Confirming a telephone conversation with you as of
Tuesday, January 24, 1961, at about four o'clock of the afternoon; please be
advised it is thought to be expedient and proper for the union to draw up what
it considers to be the understanding entered into and to do so in the general
form of a tentative contract.
It would not appear necessary to do any more than list by paragraph and sub-
paragraph those sections believed to be accepted in toto.
Very truly yours,
(S) Robert W. Norton.
Norton's attempt to have the proposed contract approved by Robey is indicated
by a letter of April 21, 1961, which he sent to Robey with a copy to Cowell:
APRIL 21, 1961.
Re: Crown Drug Co., Daly City, Calif.
Mr. PAUL RoBEY,
Mayway Pharmacy, 139 E. Lake Ave.,
Watsonville, California
DEAR MR. ROBEY: It has been impossible to get you on the telephone these
past several days or to find you in the office.
Mr. Cowell, counsel for the Retail Clerks has probably been quite bothered
likewise since my continued absence from the office has caused his telephone
calls to go unanswered.
However, sometime ago Mr. Cowell presented a copy of a contract draft,
which draft is pretty much in line with past understandings. Consequently the
time has come to close the matter at Crown Drug by means of an agreement
in writing.
This office is advised by counsel that the Union may (and probably will)
formulate refusal to bargain charges against Crown Drug.
May we have your OK to go ahead and execute a proper written agreement.
Very truly yours,
(S) Robert W. Norton.
cc: Robert Cowell, Esq.
Raymond Amrhein, Esq.
The next event reflected by the record was the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge by the Union on April 25, 1961. This time the charge alleged that Respond-
ent committed an unfair labor practice by reason of the fact that Norton informed
Cowell, the Union's attorney, that the contract was satisfactory but that although he
(Norton) was authorized to execute the same he would not until checking with his
employer The charge goes on to recite that Respondent refused to bargain in good
faith by failing to execute a negotiated agreement.
A prerequisite to a finding that Respondent failed to bargain in violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act requires establishment of the appropriate bargaining unit of
employees and the majority representation of them by the Union.
IT. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
The parties agree and it is found that:
All employees of Respondent employed in its Daly City, California, store,
exclusive of guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
CROWN DRUG COMPANY
III. MAJORITY STATUS OF THE UNION
869
In his complaint the General Counsel alleges as follows:
On or about March 25, 1959, a majority of the employees of Respondent, in
the unit described in paragraph V above, designated or selected the Union as
their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with Respondent,
and at all times material herein, subsequent to that date, the Union has con-
tinued to represent a majority of Respondent's employees.
Presumably, the General Counsel is relying on the execution of the "Stipulation"
,of March 25, 1959, between the Union and Respondent as establishing majority rep-
resentation as of that date and subsequent thereto. Assuming this is the basis of the
claim that the majority of the employees selected the Union as their representative
,on March 25, 1959, this claim finds support in Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 NLRB 998;
124 NLRB 494, 280 F. 2d 665 (C.A.D.C.); certification denied 364 U S. 892.
In the case at hand, Respondent, in its answer, denied the designation of the ma-
jority on March 25, 1959, thereby requiring the General Counsel to prove this
designation of majority. According to the Shamrock case, this proof is supplied
by establishing the execution of the agreement extending recognition by Respondent
Jo the Union. As the Board said in its Shamrock Decision, 124 NLRB 494-495:
A majority of the Board, consisting of the Chairman and Members Jenkins
and Fanning, find that the Union had majority status and was at all times ma-
terial the exclusive representative of the employees involved here. The Re-
spondent granted exclusive recognition to the Union as the representative of
the Respondent's employees in the 2-year contract, executed on October 1, 1953.
Such recognition raises a presumption of regularity, namely, that the Union was
the majority representative of the employees at the time of the execution of
the contract; for, otherwise, it would have been unlawful for the Respondent to
have extended such recognition. There is no evidence to rebut this presumption.
Nor is there any evidence that the Union lost such majority status at any time
after execution of the contract. By virtue of the existence of the contract, the
Union was entitled to exclusive recognition for at least the term of the contract.3
IV. ALLEGED REFUSAL TO SIGN A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT
It is uncontroverted that Norton, Respondent's negotiator, on April 11, 1961,
indicated to the Union's attorney, Cowell, that the agreement forwarded to Norton
on March 16, 1961, was satisfactory. The only area of conflict in testimony arises
from Cowell's testimony that Norton on this occasion told Cowell that he had the
authority to sign the contract but that it was against his policy and he wanted Robey
to see it. Norton admitted that he had the authority to negotiate, as he had been
doing, but insisted that at all times, particularly after January of 1961, the Union
was on notice that Robey, owner Respondent, had to approve any collective-
3 Assuming that the Shamrock Decision is controlling with respect to this method of
establishing majority, several reasons suggest themselves for reexamination of this
precedent It appears to be based on the proposition that an employer will be presumed
to have executed a collective-bargaining contract only when the union represents a
majority of the employees involved. The Shamrock Decision is silent as to whether the
same presumption applies to a union The Board has been exposed to a not uncommon
practice of a union and an employer executing agreements when the union represents none
or a minority of the employees involved. The interest of a union in having an employer
execute an agreement with a union-shop provision is obvious. In the case at hand the
interest of Respondent in executing the "Stipulation" was obviously to obtain the removal
of the pickets The indifference of Respondent to the Union's majority status on March
25, 1959, is reflected in its answer wherein it admits recognizing the Union but disclaim-
ing any knowledge of majority status. Proof of majority status is peculiarly available
to a union and substituting for this proof a presumption that the employer would sign an
agreement only under lawful conditions is a unique and, to the Trial Examiner, an un-
persuasive method of establishing majority status
In a case such as this, Respondent, after recognizing the Union for 2 years can deny
majority status with ill grace. However, holding the Respondent bound by its recogni-
tion of the Union ignores the question as to whether the employees involved have had
their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act adequately protected To say they
may have a legal remedy does not take into account that many employees v onld as a
practical matter be unaware of, or be reluctant to assert them In short, why should
not the Board in this most important area of Its responsibility require a union to supply
proof of majority that it would be in a position to readily supply?
870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bargaining agreement . In this case the Union chose to negotiate with Norton on
terms that where known to it and since the record lacks any evidence of Robey's
agreement to the Union's proposed contract, it follows that it has not been estab-
lished that there was a negotiated and agreed-upon contract.
Norton's version is consistent with the correspondence commencing with his letter
of May 24, 1960, to Cohenour, in which it was indicated that his action was subject
to Robey's approval. Further, it is consistent with Cowell's letter of March 16,
1961, in which he recognized Norton could not execute an agreement without
ascertaining the "employer's position." Moreover, it is uncontroverted that in
January 1961, Norton informed Cowell that he had an agreement with Amrhein and
Robey that they must approve any negotiated agreement. There is nothing in the
record to indicate any reason why Robey's approval would not be necessary in
April 1961. It is accordingly found that Norton's recollection of his conversation
with Cowell on April 11, 1961, is correct and Cowell's, incorrect. The record is
abundantly clear that Norton did have authority to negotiate but not to conclude an
agreement , and that the Union chose to deal with Respondent on these terms. Since
the Respondent did not agree, it may not be held to have failed to sign a negotiated
agreement.
Another basis for finding that the General Counsel's proof falls short of estab-
lishing that Respondent failed to sign a negotiated agreement is that the proposal
forwarded to Norton on March 16, 1961, contained wage scales and provisions re-
garding health and welfare payments that had not been a subject of discussion. It
seems obvious that the Respondent cannot be regarded as having agreed to some-
thing that had not been discussed. Although the record reflects that the proposed
agreement was agreeable to Norton and Amrhein , the same assumption can not be-
made in the case of Robey.
In view of the foregoing it is found that Respondent did not agree to a contract
that it refused to sign.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and'
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the-
Act.
3. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the com-
plaint , within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATION
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions , and upon the entire-
record , it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
APPENDIX A
STIPULATION
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the Crown Drug Company at
Daly City, California, called the "Company," and the Retail Clerks Union, Local
No. 775, called the "Union ," that:
1.
They have the right to negotiate for and on the behalf of the regular parties con-
cerned with the labor dispute at the Company's store at Daly City, California.
if.
Lorraine Jennings, one of the persons who left their jobs in the original dispute,
shall be entitled to exercise an option of either being rehired for a period of two (2)
weeks and after said two weeks' period to resign without penalty or prejudice to the
Company, or to accept a terminal leave from the Company. In any event, the
Company agrees to furnish a letter of recommendation to Lorraine Jennings which'
shall, among other items, state that her employment was under such conditions as to
warrant her recommendations elsewhere. Further, the Company stipulates and
agrees that any inquiries relative to her shall be referred to Mr. Murray Nixon.
III.
Any person employed by the Company who is a member of the Union shall"
remain a member of the Union in good standing during the employment term. Any
CROWN DRUG COMPANY 871
other person who is or may become an employee shall after 30 days become and
remain a member of the Union in good standing during the employment term.
IV.
Subsequent to the current negotiations for the San Mateo area contracts the parties
hereto agree to negotiate a contract for the Company's Daly City store based upon
the aforementioned contract.
V.
The employment of bona fide managers and pharmacy students who are sub-
sidized by the Company shall not be subject to Union membership.
VI.
It is understood that the word "Sunday," as the word may appear in any contract
negotiated by and between the Company and the Union , shall be construed to mean
the particular day of the week on which any employee observes his religious rites in
accordance with the practices of his religion.
VII.
Reinstatement to employment of the following named persons who left their
jobs in the original dispute shall occur as follows:
,(a) Lorraine Jennings shall be extended the option as aforesaid.
,(b) Ellen Stockolager, Frieda Huess, and Ila Meyers shall be reinstated to their
positions on the day next following the execution of this stipulation.
(c) Ruth Alpers and Joan Storni shall be reinstated to their original positions no
later than twenty calendar days next following the execution of this stipulation.
(d) Don Parrish and Don Rose shall be reinstated to their original positions as
stock boy and under the same conditions as existing at the time of the dispute, twenty
calendar days next following the execution of this stipulation.
It is understood and agreed that all of the above-named persons shall have twenty
days to signify to the Company that they accept and are available for reinstatement.
However, it is understood that the Company is not obligated to pay such persons
until the date they are reinstated.
VIII.
The Company agrees that upon the signing of this stipulation or upon the first
day of the pay period first commencing after the signing of this agreement, the scale
of pay currently in effect in San Mateo County for drugstores within the jurisdiction
of the Union shall be put into effect by the Company. Specifically, the scale of pay
shall be in accordance with Sections 3(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the current
area contract.
Further, the Company agrees that the principle of seniority shall apply in the
laying off or rehiring of employees. For the purpose of this section, seniority shall
mean the date the employee was originally hired, notwithstanding any subsequent
absence from the employment.
The Adjustment and Arbitration provisions, specifically Sections 29 and 30, con-
tained in, the current area contract are hereby incorporated by reference and made
a part of this stipulation as though fully set forth herein.
IX.
It is stipulated that any and all court actions, any complaint before the National
Labor Relations Board, or any complaint before the State Labor Enforcement Divi-
sion. arising by reason of the labor dispute at the Company's Daly City store, shall
be withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice upon the execution of this stipulation.
X.
Further, upon the execution of this stipulation the picket lines at the Company's
Daly City store shall be immediately removed. and the Company will join the San
Mateo Drug trade in contract negotiations. Dated March 25, 1959.
-------- ---------------------------------------
(C9RL CorrecouR, for Local 775)
-------------------------------------------
(ROBERT W. Noarox, for the Calif Association of Employers
and for the Company)
It is understood by and between the parties hereto that the stipulation set forth
above constitutes a full and complete settlement of all disputes and claims arising
872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from and by reason of the labor dispute at the Company's Daly City store , and the
parties represented by the persons signatory hereto are hereby released , one from
the other , from all sums of money, actions , accounts , claims and demands up to the
date and execution of the above stipulation.
------------------------------------------------
(CARL COHENOUR)
------------------------------------------------
(ROBERT W. NORTON)
Parkhurst Manufacturing Company, Inc. and General Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union 534, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers of America. Cases Nos. 17-CA-1781 and
17-RC-3469. April 6, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 15, 1961, Trial Examiner John C, Fischer issued his
Intermediate Report, finding that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. He also found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommended dismissal as to them. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions with a
supporting brief.'
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and briefs, and the entire record. The Board affirms the Trial Ex-
aminer's rulings and adopts his findings and conclusions.
ORDER
The Board adopts, with the addition set forth below, the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner as its Order.2
1 Respondent's request for oral argument is denied because in our opinion the record,
exceptions, and briefs adequately set forth the position of the parties.
2 Paragraph 2 of the Recommendations is supplemented by adding the following para.
graph between paragraphs (a) and (b):
(aa) Upon request, bargain collectively with General Drivers, Warehousemen & Help-
ers Local Union 534, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America as the exclusive bargaining representative of
employees it is certified to represent.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed by General Drivers , Warehousemen & Helpers Local
Union 534 , affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America , herein called the Union , the General Counsel
1.36 NLRB No. 81.