Crown Coach Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 8, 1965

155 N.L.R.B. 625 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

CROWN COACH CORPORATION 625
2. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices as alleged in the
complaint.
I recommend that:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
1. The complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety.
2. In Case No. 9-RC-6022, the challenges to ballots of employees listed in the
attached Schedule A be sustained or overruled, in accordance with the findings above
and as set forth in the two lists in said schedule.
SCHEDULE A
Challenges overruled. Count ballets
Margaret Ingram Robert Baldwin John Justice
William K. Henry Jackie Belcher Kenneth McDonald
Howard Adams, Jr. Bobby Bahus Jerry Lawson
Alfred Dingess Carosel Ball Douglas Mullins
Albert Donahue Teddy Bias Tommy Owens
Herbert Neal Drake Ronald Blankenship Jim Morris
Roy Lee Evans Earl Boggs Este] Murray
Harold Fisher William Bowling Henry Parsley
Denny Hall Clifford Browning Dennis Porter
Dallas Hensley Jimmy Browning Larry Rhodes
Larry Rondan Alex Butcher Clarence Sanson
Benjamin Forbes Bobby Joe Cline Ruth Saultz
John Hill Jimmy Chapman Ernest Smith
Fred Elkins Diamond Collins John Whitlock
James Lowe McArthur Conley James Williamson
William Ramey Wilkie Conley Dennis,Runyon
Sherill Hanshaw Conrad Cummings Irene Jeffrey
Michael E. McDonald Everett Curnrutter Lawrence Amburgey
Jim Comes Bruce Drautz Raymond Elliott
Bill Miller Carl Epling Hayden Gibson
Scott Craddock Billy Fry Orsell May
Paul Fortune Herbert Grimette Leslie Maynard
James Quillin Joe Hampton Wade Perrine
John P. Avis Robert Hargis Johnnie Reggio
Donald Burress Avon Harles$ Howard Rosky
George Graham, Jr. Fred Hutchinson Don Watterson
Lonnie Kirk, Jr. Harold Hurst,
Challenges sustained. Do not count ballots
Ellen Ann Tabor Elizabeth T. Johnson James Farley
Elmer R. Callaway Ray Lambert Raymond Roberts
Dewey Crum Carl D. Murphy Kenneth Eversole
Dana Gillman Joseph Rice W. C. Wilson
Arleda Gore Eva Thompson Glenn Grose
Mary Jane Henry Freddie E. Maynard
Crown Coach Corporation and International Union, United Auto
mobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America , UAW-AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 21-CA-5939 and 2-1-CA-
61.78. November 8, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 27, 1965, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Decision
in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had_
.155 NLRB No. 67.
626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and rec-
ommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The
Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in cer-
tain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recom-
mended that these allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs; the Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and a brief in support thereof and in answer to the
General Counsel and the Charging Party.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Decision,
the exceptions, cross-exceptions, briefs, and the entire record in this
case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.]
DECISION OF THE TRIAL EXAMINER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint in this proceeding alleges , in material substance , that Crown Coach
Corporation (herein called Crown , the Respondent , or the Company ), has failed
and refused to bargain in good faith with International Union , United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO
(herein called the Union ), in violation of Section 8(a)(S) and ( 1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C., Sec. 151 , et seq.; also referred to
herein as the Act); that such conduct caused a strike among employees of the Com-
pany; and that the said Respondent has unlawfully refused to reinstate 14 such
employees because they engaged in the "concerted work stoppage and strike," and
has thereby violated Sections 8(a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act.'
The Respondent has filed an answer denying, in material substance , that it com-
mitted the unfair labor practices imputed to it, and that its employees engaged in a
strike caused by any such unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice duly served upon the Respondent and the Union by the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, a hearing upon the issues in this
proceeding has been held before Trial Examiner Herman Marx at Los Angeles,
California . Each of the parties appeared through , and was represented by, counsel
and was afforded a full opportunity to be heard, examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, adduce evidence , file briefs , and submit oral argument . I have read and
considered a brief filed with me by each of the parties since the close of the hearing.
i The complaint in this proceeding is dated October 16, 1964, and is based upon a charge
filed by the Union on May 11, 1964, in Case No . 21-CA-5939 ; an amendment of that
charge filed on May 18, 1964 ; and a charge filed by the labor organization on August 27,
1964 , in Case No . 21-CA-6138. The cases have been duly consolidated for bearing.
Copies of the charges, the said amendment , the complaint, and an order consolidating the
cases have been duly served upon the Respondent.
CROWN COACH CORPORATION 627
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. NATURE OF THE RESPONDENT 'S BUSINESS ; JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD
The Company is a corporation; maintains a manufacturing plant in Los Angeles,
California; is there engaged in the business of manufacturing buses and firetrucks;
employs approximately 260 production and maintenance employees in its enterprise;
and is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act.
In the course and conduct of its business, the Company annually purchases and
receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from enterprises located outside
California, and each year sells and ships merchandise valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the said State. By reason of such interstate
transactions, the Company is, and has been at all times material to the issues, engaged
in commerce within the purview of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Accordingly,
the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
proceeding.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union admits individuals employed by the Company to membership; exists for
the purpose of bargaining and otherwise dealing with employers concerning wages
and other terms and conditions of employment of employees; and is, and has been
at all material times, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory statement
As the record establishes, without dispute, all production and maintenance employ-
ees at the Company's plant in Los Angeles, California, including shipping and
receiving employees, material handlers and control employees, countermen, time-
keepers, servicemen, repairmen, and leadmen, but excluding all office clerical
employees, engineering employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act, constitute, and have at all material times constituted, a unit appropriate
for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
On December 11, 1963, the National Labor Relations Board duly certified the
Union as the bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit, and the
Union was on that date, has been at all material times since, and is now, the
exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
Early in February 1964,2 tollowing its certification, the Union sought bargaining
negotiations of the Company, and, in response, the latter's president, Robert Brock-
way, informed the Union that a Mrs Edwin Selvin, who is engaged in business as a
"labor relations consultant," would act for the Company in "further business dealings
(and) negotiations" with the Union The labor organization, through one
Clarence Wright, an officer of one of its local affiliates, Local 509, communicated
with Selvin, and the upshot of the matter was that the Union and the Company held
12 meetings, the first on February 11, and the last on September 21. On each occa-
sion, the Company was represented by Selvin, and the Union by Wright and several
others, including a "negotiating" or "shop" committee of employees The Company
had the proceedings at every meeting taken down and transcribed by a reporting
service, and the complete bargaining transcript (identified herein as BT), covering
approximately 1,300 pages, is in evidence.
The General Counsel contends, in essence, that the Company violated its statutory
bargaining obligation in the course of the meetings by refusing to bargain with the
Union with respect to (1) a proposal by the labor organization to prohibit the per-
formance of nonsupervisory production and maintenance work by supervisors; and
(2) grievances of employees. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that
it met its bargaining obligation in both areas .3
2 Unless otherwise specified, all dates mentioned occurred in 1964.
s Paragraph No. 8 of the complaint broadly alleges a refusal "to bargain in good faith,"
but is followed by specific allegations in paragraphs Nos. 9 and 10 that the Respondent
refused to bargain regarding grievances and "unit work " by supervisors. The specifi-
212 -8 09 -6 6-v o l . 15 5-41
628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of the limited nature of the General Counsel's bargaining claims, it would
serve no useful end to canvass the many areas of negotiation at the meetings, whether
reflecting accord as to some subjects or disagreement as to others, and thus the dis-
cussion of the sessions that follows below will be scaled to what appears to me to be
appropriate to a consideration and resolution of the bargaining issues raised by the
General Counsel's contentions.
B. The alleged refusals ' to bargain
The first of the bargaining issues mentioned above centers on certain provisions
of a proposed contract submitted by the Union to the Company at the first meeting.
The terms in question, contained in article XXV (general provisions) of the proposal,
provide: "Foremen and supervisors or any other employees not in the Bargaining
Unit shall act in a supervisory capacity only and shall not perform any work in the
Bargaining Unit."
These provisions (which will be termed here, for convenience of reference, the
"supervisors' work clause") were taken up by Selvin for discussion at the second
meeting (March 5). She rejected the proposal, stating:
Now, the next one is, your nine foremen and supervisors shall not perform
any work in the bargaining unit. We are going to reject any comment whatso-
ever on the duties of the foremen and supervisors. This is not within the limits
of what the company bargains. We don't bargain on either the duties or
responsibilities of the supervisors or foremen, and we do have working foremen,
as everybody knows.
... They don't work all the time, but they do work some of the time. But
they are not covered by the union contract. Therefore, it isn't within your
province to tell us what to do with it (BT 189).
The obvious purpose of the clause in question is to preserve nonsupervisory produc-
tion and maintenance work for employees in the unit, and, plainly, contrary to
Selvin's position, the mere fact that the proposed terms would affect supervisors
does not relieve the Company of an obligation to bargain with respect thereto. On
the contrary, the clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining, as its provisions, deal-
ing as they do with employment opportunities for employees in the unit, pertain to
their "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," within the
meaning of Section 8(d) of the Act, which defines the bargaining obligations of
employers and labor organizations.
The Respondent, however, in its brief, characterizes Selvin's refusal to bargain
regarding the clause as "de minimis," and argues that notwithstanding the position
she expressed, there was, in fact, no refusal because the parties bargained over a
"management prerogatives" clause, in substance reserving to the Company all man-
agement functions not otherwise covered by contract between the parties.
cations suggest an intention to narrow paragraph No. 8 to the particular bargaining
refusals alleged in paragraphs Nos. 9 and 10, but, in addition, apart from the subject of
"unit work" by supervisors, the General Counsel points to no specific contract proposal
as to which he claims the Company refused to bargain, and, what Is more, his intention
to limit the bargaining allegations clearly appears in the following colloquy shortly after
the start of the hearing:
Mr. EVANS (for the General Counsel) : . . . Those are the particular sections (of
the bargaining transcript) that we are relying on with respect to refusal to bargain
concerning grievances and the refusal to bargain concerning whether a supervisor
should perform unit work.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Now, those are the two items to narrow the issues as to which
you are alleging there was a refusal to bargain in good faith or failure to bargain in
good faith
Mr. EVANS: Yes. We contend that by those two refusals, that the whole question
of good faith is decided in favor of the union.
In view of the General Counsel's limitation of his bargaining claims, and of his "final
authority," under Section 3(d) of the Act, with respect to the "issuance of complaints . . .
and . . . prosecution of such complaints before the Board," I do not pass upon a claim
by the Union, in its brief, that the Company unlawfully refused to bargain as a result .
of denial by Selvin, during the course of the meetings, of requests by the Union that the
Company authorize the reporter to sell -a copy of the bargaining transcript to the Union.
CROWN COACH CORPORATION 629
I do not agree that Selvin 's bargaining failure was of a de minimis nature, for
although the clause in question was not a major feature of the negotiations , it would
seem obvious that the performance of nonsupervisory work by supervisors may have
a substantial impact upon employees' earnings by denying them work opportunities.
Indeed, Selvin's allusion to "working foremen" suggests the likelihood that the per-
formance of nonsupervisory functions by foremen in the plant is substantial. Nor
do I find merit in the claim that the relevant refusal was cured by discussions at the
meetings regarding a management prerogative clause. Such a clause was included
in the Union's contract proposal (article XIX) submitted at the first meeting, and
received little more than passing reference, Selvin taking the position at that session
that it was insufficient, and that she would make a counterproposal at a later date
(BT 22-23, 26-28). She did so, and subsequent discussions of the subject centered
about the Company's proposal, concerning which no agreement was ever reached .4
These discussions, it is evident, were not, in terms at least, addressed to the super-
visors' work clause, even if it be assumed that the Company's managerial prerogatives
proposal would have had the effect of an express reservation to the Company of
the right to assign nonsupervisory work to supervisors. Actually, the only two
meetings , the second and the fourth , at which both a managerial prerogatives clause
and the Union's supervisors' work proposal were mentioned, the discussion of each
appears in a different context from the other. At the second meeting, Selvin alluding
to the management prerogatives clause in the Union's contract proposal reiterated
her position of the first session to the effect that she would make a counterproposal
on the subject stating, also , that "(w)e are not too far apart" on the matter; and it
was at a substantially later point in the meeting, in the context of a discussion of
the general provisions article of the Union's contract proposal that she expressed her
refusal to bargain regarding the supervisors' work clause, as previously described.
At the fourth meeting, the Company's managerial prerogatives counterproposal was
discussed almost at the start of the session (BT 353-356), whereas at a much later
point in the meeting, during a discussion of the general provisions article in the
Union's contract proposal, Selvin discussed the supervisors' work clause and flatly
rejected it (BT 452).5
It appears to me that the present claim that the discussions regarding a managerial
prerogatives clause constituted bargaining with respect to the Union's supervisors'
work proposal is nothing but an afterthought put forward to escape the consequence
of Selvin's express refusal to bargain about the proposal. But quite apart from that
view of the matter, the hermetically sealed attitude reflected in Selvin's refusal to
negotiate regarding the supervisors' work clause was obviously not converted into
an open one on the subject simply by force of her insistence upon a contractual
statement of prerogatives the Company possesses in any case to the extent that it
does not surrender them. The sum of the matter is that Selvin's refusal to bargain
concerning employees' work opportunities, a subject reflected in the supervisors'
* The clause proposed by the Union reserved to the management the right to prescribe
employees' duties, discharge and discipline employees, direct the working force, and deter-
mine the means, methods, and schedule of production and maintenance The Company's
proposal was apparently submitted at the third meeting (BT 245), and it was discussed
at that and subsequent sessions, but the full and precise language proposed by the Com-
pany does not appear until the eighth meeting, held on May 22, when the Company sub-
mitted a proposed form of contract (Respondent's Exhibit No. 10) containing,a managerial
prerogatives clause labelled "Article IV-Management's Retained Rights." That clause,
in substance, reserves for the Company exclusively "all matters not covered" in the con-
tract, and also particularizes various matters so reserved, including hiring, promotion,
discipline, the type and amount of work to be performed, and "the processes, methods and
means of manufacture and distribution ," to the extent not modified or limited by the
contract.
5 In the course of her rejection , Selvin refers to the clause as "section 4 . . ., on
page 15," although the supervisors' work clause is article XXV of the Union's contract
proposal submitted at the first meeting. Perhaps Selvin's section and page reference was
erroneous, or it may be that at some point after the first meeting, the Union submitted
another form of contract with a different sectional or page arrangement, but whether
either accounts for Selvin's reference to the clause as "section 4 . . ., on page 15," it is
clear from the context (BT 451-453) that the parties were engaged in a discussion of
the clause. Any doubt about the matter is dispelled by the fact that both the clause
and a provision prohibiting unit work by employees "covered" by another labor orga-
nization follow in sequence in the same paragraph in general provisions ( article XXV)
of the Union 's contract proposal submitted at the first session ; and that both clauses
were discussed in the same sequence at the fourth meeting ( BT 452-453).
630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work clause, was a rejection of a bargaining obligation imposed upon the Company
by Section 8(d) of the Act; and that by such conduct the Company violated Section
8(a) (5) of the Act, and abridged rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the
Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Statute.
With respect to grievances, the General Counsel' s position hinges on statements
made by Selvin during the course of the meetings. She initiated a discussion of the
subject at the first session, stating: "The Company has had a request from one of
the committee (a member of the employees' negotiating committee) to negotiate a
grievance through the committeemen . . . we do not recognize the committee until
we have a contract setting forth the . grievance machinery. So we will not
recognize anybody for the purpose of settling grievances until and if we get a con-
tract. That often happens, because people don't understand that we do have the
machinery to work through." Wright thereupon suggested, in substance, that the
management "show an effort of trying to get together" regarding grievances with
"the chosen people" (employees' committee, apparently), but Selvin declined, taking
the position, in the discussion that followed, that the Company preferred "to have
theii grievances handled directly between the supervisor and the employee, as they
have in the past ... until we get a contract ... setting forth the machinery", and
that the Union and the committee represented the employees for the purpose of
contract negotiations , and not grievances until an agreement was concluded. Wright
expressed the view that the committee "would have a right though to meet with
management in behalf of an employee," and Selvin replied that the Company would
not "adjust grievances through the committee until we have a contract setting forth
the committee's part and role" (BT 9-11).
The Company took much the same position at the fourth meeting (April 8).
Wright had previously asked Selvin to ascertain from the management the reason
for the termination of an employee named Lopez, and Selvin reported at the fourth
meeting that Lopez had had an excessive number of unexcused absences, and detailed
them (BT 346-347). Later in the meeting, in the context of a discussion of shop
rules, including one related to absenteeism, Selvin alluded to Lopez' case; and Wright
observed, in effect, that, with Selvin's information, he had both "side(s) of the
story," and that Selvin had explained the Company's position "very nicely." Then
Selvin expressed the view that "we're not bound to review all the terminations with
the Union because we [sic] do not get recognized on anything on grievances until we
have a contract"; and, in response, Wright, stating that "so far, we have had no
trouble and I hope we haven't been a nuisance," said that he "would want you
(Selvin) to consider something" (grievance matters, from the context), and "if you
don't think you ought to consider it, you can take whatever position you think is
right ." To that, Selvin replied, in substance, that she had advised the management
that "we don't recognize any union grievance until we get a contract"; that the Com-
pany had "objected to my asking at this time" (for information regarding Lopez'
termination ); and that she had told the management that she would submit the
Union's "request (pertaining to Lopez) this time and ... would not bring another
request again" (BT 356-358).
At the sixth meeting (May 6), the Union renewed a previous request for a list
of employees and their "seniority dates." Selvin replied that she thought she had
furnished the information, and, after some discussion, indicated that she would
supply the data (BT 755), but proceeded to reassert her position on grievance nego-
tiations at some length, as appears in the following excerpts from the bargaining
transcript (BT 755-757):
Mrs. SELVIN: Of course, as of now, you understand this Mr. Wright, and I
want you to thoroughly understand this; apparently you don't, because we have
been coming, and the Company complains to me because I am permitting it.
Mr. WRIGHT: What was that?
Mrs. SELVIN: That is that you are actually undertaking to negotiate griev-
ances when we have stated that we recognize you for the negotiation of a con-
tract but not for the settlement of grievances until we get machinery to go by
and, of course, I have been getting you information which could be called
grievance objections, and everytime I do it the Company objects to giving it
to me because they claim that I have told them we don't have to settle grievances
until we have a contract, which I have, and then they say "Why do you keep
asking us this? Because this is a grievance...."
Mr. WRIGHT: ... When you tell me that the Company doesn't understand
that this labor organization represents those people as far as hours of work,
CROWN COACH CORPORATION 631
working conditions , and other conditions of employment , this being one of
them, they may not be forced to follow a procedure of being fair or just, and
by my merely asking the question of why, if they won't feel that they want to
give this information , all they have to do is to tell me that they refuse to discuss
these matters with me, and then we will take it from there.
Mrs. SELVIN ' That is a matter-grievances are a matter which require
machinery . We have a grievance procedure proposed , and when we have a
contract signed, which we are willing-we have shown you a contract we are
willing to sign , and we have made some changes and additions.
Mr. WRIGHT : Aside from that, I reserve the right to question anybody's
termination , do I not?
Mrs. SELVIN : I don't think so.
Mr. WRIGHT : All right.
Mr. FORMICA ( A member of the Union 's negotiating committee ): I was told
by Mr. Brockway , when I went to see him, that anything that came up from
now on would have to go through channels.
Mrs. SELVIN : What he told me, he said to you that he was not going to
recognize your coming in to settle grievances . You are a Committee . We will
recognize this Committee when we get a contract . That is part of signing a
contract.
Mr. FORMICA : He said "go through channels."
Mrs. SELVIN : That is what I told him."
Similarly, at the eighth ( May 22 ), ninth (July 31 ), and last ( September 21) meet-
ings, Selvin reiterated the position , in substance , that the Company would not recog-
nize or deal with the Union for the settlement of grievances until the execution of a
contract establishing grievance machinery (BT 961 , 1117-1118 , 1166-1168, 1345).7
The position , as it related to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment," is plainly an erroneous limitation of the bargaining obligation imposed
upon the Company by Section 8(d),8 but that does not mean that any of the repeated
expressions of the attitude by Selvin constituted a violation of the Act. The nub of
the matter is that there is no substantial evidence that the position was actually
applied to the considerable number of requests for information or complaints regard-
ing personnel matters submitted by the Union to Selvin. Actually , notwithstanding
her repeated assertions of the position , she did, in fact, explore such complaints with
the Union , sought and secured from the management explanations of personnel
actions that were the subject of grievances , or other pertinent information requested
9 The incident mentioned by Formica was apparently the request of the management by
"one of the committee" for negotiation of a "grievance ," to which Selvin alluded at the
first meeting when she took the position that the Company would "not adjust grievances
through the committee until we have a contract setting forth the committee 's part and
role" ( BT 11 ). The record is far from clear as to the nature of the "grievance " In his
testimony , Formica attributes to himself an effort to secure the recall , on a preferential
seniority basis, of a former employee named Holstock who had been laid off , but in the
state of the record , it would be no more than a guess that that was the matter Formica
sought to take up with Brockway , and was told to submit " through channels" or, in
other words , to Selvin. Incidentally , notwithstanding Selvin ' s position that grievances
were not negotiable prior to the execution of a contract , according to Formica , the Hot-
stock matter was discussed at one of the bargaining meetings , and "was straightened out,
I guess, in one way or another."
7 The position was stated somewhat at random at the eighth and last meetings , appear-
ing in the former as a volunteered addendum to a reference to proposed contract terms
governing seniority ; and in the final session as a remark summarizing the Company's
view for it Federal mediator who attended the meeting in that capacity I dispense with
details of the context in which the position was expressed at the ninth meeting because
their inclusion would add nothing of substance to a resolution of the material issue.
6 A proviso to Section 9(a) of the Act preserves the right of an individual employee,
under prescribed conditions , to present a grievance directly to his employer and to secure
its adjustment without the intervention of his bargaining representative , but although
the issues here require no construction of the interplay of Section 8(d) with Section 9(a),
it may be pointed out that the proviso obviously confers no license upon the employer, to
refuse to negotiate with his employees ' bargaining representative regarding grievances in
situations beyond the scope of the proviso.
632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the Union ; and transmitted such managerial information and positions to the
Union , discussing them with the labor organization 's representatives in the course
of the bargaining negotiations .9
It may be that there would have been greater bargaining efficiency had the man-
agement dealt directly with the Union in the areas in question rather than to commit
its responsibility in the premises to a "labor relations consultant" who lacked first-
hand knowledge of personnel actions in the plant, but there is nothing in the Act
to preclude the Company from designating Selvin as its bargaining representative,10
and the record will not support a finding that the information and explanations of
personnel actions furnished by Selvm, in response to specific requests or complaints
by the Union, were so deficient as to constitute a refusal to bargain, or were thus
treated by the Union during the course of the negotiations, or that the Union was
discouraged from submitting, or continuing to press for, satisfaction of any grievance
by any action of Selvin, whether in her handling of information requests and com-
plaints or her generalizations on the subject of grievance negotiations prior to the
existence of contract machinery to deal with them. Indeed, notwithstanding her
pronunciamentos on the subject, on at least two occasions during the negotiations,
Wright either intimated or expressed satisfaction with the course Selvin had followed
in processing information requests and complaints by the Union (BT 357-358,
297-298); and he conceded in his testimony that during the negotiations he "could
discuss" grievances or any other subject with her.
Summarizing the matter, upon examination of the total bargaining record, what
the General Counsel summons from the meetings for support of his position regarding
grievances turns out to be nothing more, substantially, than rhetorical stances by
Selvin on the subject of bargaining on grievances prior to the establishment of con-
tractual grievance machinery. Such rhetoric is not of itself a violation of the Act,
and that is obviously true of Selvin's postures examined in the light of the actions
actually taken by her on concrete inquiries and complaints by the Union. Nor is
the General Counsel's position made by testimony of Vice President McClave, that
a "formalized procedure," established prior to the Union's certification, for process-
ing grievances directly with the employees concerned is still in effect. The record
does not establish the number of grievances-whether one or more-handled since
the certification directly with any employee through the procedure; nor any details,
or even the nature, of any such grievance; nor that the Union was actually prevented
or discouraged by the existence of the procedure from processing any grievance.
With such a paucity of evidence, a finding that the Respondent violated the Act as a
result of McClave's generalizations about the procedure would be a venture in
speculation.
6 See, for example, BT 67-69, 1027-1035 ( wage increases ) ; 346-347 , 357-359, 744-754,
1191-1194 ( terminations ) ; 762-767, 1046-1039 ( complaints of antiunion actions by man-
agement personnel ) ; 136-137 , 224-225, 239-240 (callin pay) ; and 490-500, 549-553
(claims of excessive employment agency fees for jobs ). The bargaining record reflects
much additional discussion and consideration at the bargaining sessions of subjects of
inquiry or complaint by the Union , but the matters cited sufficiently exemplify the point
under consideration , and I deem it unnecessary to draw upon the record for other illus-
trations. I note, also , that the General Counsel's claim that the Company unlawfully
refused to negotiate regarding grievances is not materially aided by the fact that Selvin
first took the position in question here in connection with a matter "one of the committee"
(apparently Formica ) sought to discuss with the management and was told to submit to
Selvin . The record , as indicated earlier, leaves one to guess as to the nature of the alleged
grievance, and thus it would be speculative to say that the matter was one upon which
the Company was obligated to bargain . Moreover, if the subject was Holstock 's recall,
Formica's testimony suggests the possibility that the matter was "straightened out"
during the negotiations.
iU I intend no implication that the representative status of Selvin, who is not a lawyer,
carried with it the right to give the Company legal advice, as she did in effect when she
told the Company that "we don 't have to settle grievances until we have a contract"
(BT 756 ) ; and when, as the Company Vice President Edison J. McClave testified, she
gave the Company " legal clearance or advice " that it was proper to replace employees
who absented themselves from work on August 25 to attend a union meeting . California
forbids the practice of law in the State to all but members of the State bar (Bus. and
Prof. Code Sees . 6125-6126), and the giving of legal advice constitutes practicing law.
State Bar v. Superior Court, 207 C. 323; People v. Ring, 26 C.A. 2d Supp. 768 ; People v.
Sipper, 61 C.A. 2d Supp.'844.
CROWN COACH CORPORATION 633
I hold, in short, that the General Counsel has not carried the burden of proving
his claim that the Respondent has refused, in violation of the Act, to bargain with
the Union concerning grievances.
C. The strike; its cause; and the allegations of job discrimination
As matters stood as of the close of the 10th bargaining meeting (August 7), the
Company and the Union were in disagreement, or had not reached an accord, on
most, if not all, major subjects of negotiation, including rates of pay, union security,
seniority, and grievance and arbitration provisions. Almost all of the meeting of
August 7 was devoted to a discussion of proposed contract terms governing seniority,
a subject that had been discussed at length at prior meetings, each side having made
proposals affecting it. There can be no doubt that an impasse had been reached
over the differing proposals (which need not be spelled out here). At the August 7
meeting, the Union submitted some modifications in its seniority proposal, and
Selvin took them under advisement. In submitting them, the Union's spokesman at
the meeting, characterizing the issue as "one of the important ones," expressed the
view that the parties would be "much closer to agreement if we could in some way
get over this seniority question" (BT 1210). From this, and the extent of discus-
sion of the subject at the August 7 meeting, it is fair to conclude that from the
Union's standpoint, at least, the disagreement over the "seniority question" was
the principal barrier to the conclusion of a contract.
On August 21, before another bargaining session was held, a number of employees
in the bargaining unit, variously estimated at some 30 to 70, attended a meeting
held under the auspices of the Union for the purpose of giving the employees a
report of the progress of negotiations. As a member of the negotiating committee,
Joseph Formica, testified, the "big item" of discussion at the meeting was the
dispute over seniority terms. There were some expressions of dissatisfaction at the
meeting with the Company's performance rating methods and its alleged disregard of
seniority in various personnel actions such as the assignment of overtime and the recall
of employees following a layoff. Wright, who attended, "went through certain (con
tract) proposals" made by the Company; reported that he had not been permitted
to enter the plant to "investigate complaints" from the employees regarding merit
increases; expressed the view that the Company was not bargaining in good faith;
and stated that it was possible that the Union would take "economic action" in the
form of a meeting of employees during working hours in order to put "pressure"
upon the Company to agree to terms more favorable to the Union.
There was a similar meeting on August 24, attended by 45 employees, according
to a count taken there (although the record includes estimates varying from 19 to 75),
and again the "big item" of discussion was the dispute over seniority provisions,
although there was also some discussion of the disagreement over terms governing
grievance and arbitration procedures. The upshot of the meeting was that the
employees present, with substantial unanimity, voted to hold a "demonstration meet-
ing" (as Wright terms it) during working hours on the following day beginning at
8 a.m., and to publicize the meeting by means of leaflets distributed to employees at
plant entrances early the following morning.
Leaflets containing an announcement of the planned meeting were distributed to
production employees in the plant vicinity on the morning of August 25, about
7 o'clock, the employees' customary starting time.
McClave, who is in charge of production, learned of the projected meeting from a
leaflet upon his arrival at the plant shortly after 7 that morning; and held a meeting
of supervisory personnel at about 7:30 a.m. He was informed at the meeting that
one of the streets leading to the plant had been blocked early that morning by some
automobiles; that approximately 50 individuals were "involved in the blockage,"
about 40 of them employees; that police authorities had been summoned and had
effected removal of the cars; and that a number of employees had not reported for
work. He issued instructions that absences be verified and directed two division
superintendents and the plant "production controller" in attendance at the meeting
to hire permanent replacements for absent employees, but that those who returned
before replacements "clocked in" were to be put to work.
The "demonstration meeting" took place at a union hall, starting about 8 a.m. as
planned . In all, 35 employees attended, none of them having "clocked in" at the
plant that morning. Again, the "big item" discussed at the meeting was the dispute
with the Company over terms governing seniority. There was also some discussion
634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of a claim that the management did not fairly distribute overtime. The upshot of
the meeting was a resolution, adopted by vote of the employees present, not to work
that day or, in other words, to engage in a strike for the balance of the day.1'
Notwithstanding the strike resolution, six of the employees at the meeting returned
to the plant the same day and were put to work. Of these 29, who absented them-
selves for the balance of the day, 14 were permanently replaced during the course
of the day (most of them before noon), and the remainder were put to work when
they reported to the plant the following morning.12
Of the 14 who were replaced, 11 reported for work on the morning of August 26,
saw that their timecards were missing from the card rack, and learned of their
termination, some being told by supervisory petsonnel that they had been "terminated"
and others, in substance, that they had been replaced. By reporting for work, each
of the 11 in effect sought unconditional reinstatement, and whether or not he was
told that he had been terminated or replaced, it is evident that each was denied
reinstatement by the very fact that his timecard was removed, and that he was paid
his terminal wages. There is no evidence that the other three replaced employees
either attempted to report for work or otherwise sought reinstatement, but if they
did it is clear that they did not do so prior to their replacement.
The General Counsel contends that all 14 replaced employees were unlawfully
denied reinstatement, asserting in his brief, in substance, that the 1-day work stop-
page was an unfair labor practice strike caused by refusals by the Company to bar-
gain, and that thus the 14 were entitled to reinstatement upon their unconditional
application.
There is, as stated earlier, no evidence that three of the replaced employees
(Vasquez, Sanchez, and Medina) have ever applied for reinstatement, but passing
that, a basic prop of the General Counsel's claim, his thesis that the strike was
caused by unlawful refusals by the Company to bargain, is not established.
The nature of the strike must be determined, obviously, not on the basis of the
allegation of bad-faith bargaining leveled against the Company at any union meet-
ing, but of the bargaining record within the framework of the issues raised by the
General Counsel's bargaining claims Basically, as described earlier, these are that
the Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain with respect to (1) the supervisors'
work clause and (2) grievances. The evidence establishes the first of these claims,
but the relevant refusal occurred early in the negotiations; was not a major area
of conflict between the negotiating parties; so far as appears, was not even mentioned
at any of the union meetings at which the work stoppage was discussed; and, plainly,
was not a factor in the decision to take "economic action." The other bargaining
claim, as previously stated, is simply not made out by the evidence, and thus, on that
ground apart from any other, the record does not support a finding that the strike
was a product of an unlawful failure or refusal to bargain regarding grievances.13
11 Actually, for all practical purposes, the absences from work to attend the meeting
amounted to a strike Wright, incidentally, variously alluded to a meeting of_ that type
in his testimony as a "pressure move" and a "demonstration strike," as well as' a "demon-
stration meeting "
"The 14 who were replaced, all named in the complaint as alleged discriminatees, are'
Ken Aland W. H. Smith Jesse H Medina
Felix Vasquez Abraham M Sanchez John Horn
Kenneth Welch Phillip Kreutzer Joseph Formica
Earl H Wolf Gerald G. Craig Bob Brown
Nobuichi Matsukawa James Painter
Five of the replacements were actually employees who were upgraded to fill the jobs they
were given, and replacements were hired for those upgraded.
131 find no significance in testimony of one of the replaced employees, Nobuichi Matsu-
kawa, that at the union meeting of August 25, "something (was said) about grievance "
He could not recall what was said, and, conceivably, he used the tend "grievance" in a
broad sense to describe dissatisfaction with working conditions, or perhaps the word
"grievance" is all he recalls of what was said at the meeting about contract terms dealing
with grievance and. arbitration procedures. Nor do I find substantial support for the
General Counsel's claim as to the nature of the strike in Wright's testimony that Selvin
had forbidden him to enter the plant "to investigate" whether employees had been unfairly
treated in the granting of merit increases ; and that he reported the prohibition at the
union meeting 'of August 21, or that of August 24. The record does not demonstrate why
the "investigation" Wright sought could not have been made by the members of the
Union's shop committee all of whom were employed in the plant throughout the period of
the negotiations prior to the strike, and participated in them. In any case, the mere fact
that Wright alluded to Selvin's prohibition at a union meeting does not mean that that
action was a causative factor in the strike.
CROWN COACH CORPORATION 635
Moreover , it is fairly inferable from the last bargaining session preceding the 1-day
strike, and from the "big item" discussed at the three union meetings , that at least
one primary aim of the work stoppage was to bring pressure to bear upon the
Company to agree to seniority terms sought by the Union. Indeed, although Wright
generalized in his testimony that the strike action was taken because the Company
"had not shown interest in bargaining, in what we felt was good faith," and that
the object of the "demonstration meeting" was to secure a contract, he as much as
conceded, under cross-examination, that the reason for the "economic action" was
the disagreement with the Company over seniority terms and a demand by the
Union for the inclusion in contractual grievance machinery of a provision for
arbitration.14 These, as well as a considerable number of other matters, had been
the subject of much negotiation. The General Counsel points to no failure by the
Company to bargain in good faith concerning any contract terms except the super-
visors' work clause; and, except for that proposal, the record does not warrant a
finding that there had been such a failure.
The sum of the matter is that the strike was not caused by any unfair labor
practices, but was undertaken for the economic end of securing agreement by the
Company to contract provisions, notably terms dealing with seniority sought by the
Union, which had been the subject of substantial bargaining between the parties;
and that, in view of the nature of the strike, the Company, under long-established
doctrine, had a right to continue its business and, to that end, to hire a perma-
nent replacement for any striker prior to an unconditional request by him for-
reinstatement.15
The Union, however, in its brief, proceeding beyond the position taken by the
General Counsel in his, argues that the 14 employees in question were in fact dis-
charged because of their attendance at the union meeting on the morning of
August 25.16 In support of that contention, the Union stresses testimony by McClave
to the effect that the 14 employees were replaced and terminated because they attended
the union meeting of August 25; the fact that when W. H. Smith, one of the replaced
employees, went to the office on the morning of August 26, he was told by the
production controller, Joe Graffio, that he did not "appreciate (his) job," and that
if he did, he "would not have gone to the meeting", and the Company's routine prac-
tice of putting "back on the job without question" employees who absent themselves
for as much as 3 days without notifying the Company.
Passing the question (unnecessary to decide here) whether the "demonstration
meeting" during working hours and the work stoppage for the balance of the day
amounted to a "partial strike" unprotected by the Act,17 it appears to me that the
Union reads too much into this evidence, emphasizing the semantic reach of language
used by McClave and Grafflo at the expense of a reasonable interpretation of the full
context of events. There is no reason to believe that McClave's instructions to rein-
state any absentee who reported for work prior to the time a replacement for him
"clocked in" were not carried out, and the very fact that a substantial majority of
those at the meeting were put back to work supports an inference, and I am per-
suaded, that only those for whom replacements were, in fact, available and ready
for work were replaced and thereupon terminated.
The course followed, harnessed to undisputed evidence that the Company was in
the midst of its peak production season (roughly, the summer months in the produc-
tion of school buses for delivery in time for the school season), points to a purpose,
in effecting the replacements, to maintain continuity of production rather than to
"The differences over seniority and arbitration terms are the only concrete disputes
spelled out by Wright as reasons for the strike
15 N.L.R B. v. Mackay Radio t Telegraph Co., 304 U S. 333. The Company' s right to
hire permanent replacements was unaffected by the fact that the strikers intended the
work stoppage to be of short duration , although I note, in passing, that there Is no
Indication that the Company was informed of that intent.
18 Although the complaint contains an allegation that the 14 employees were unlawfully
denied reinstatement because "they had engaged in the concerted work stoppage and
strike," the General Counsel makes no argument In his brief regarding that allegation,
resting his claim of discrimination there on his position that the 14 were entitled to
reinstatement as unfair labor practice strikers.
17 See Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 NLRB 1806, and cases cited at pp . 1810, 1811.
Similarly , in view of the results reached below , it Is unnecessary to pass on a contention
by the Respondent that the work stoppage was a "wildcat" strike and unprotected as
such, although I note that cases such as N.L R.B. v Draper Corporation, 145 F. 2d 199
(C.A. 4), and Harnischfeger Corporation v. N.L R.B., 207 F. 2d 575 (C.A. 7), upon which
the Respondent relies, are distinguishable for reasons set forth In N.L.R.B. v. R. C. Can
Company, 328 F. 2d 974 (C A. 5), which runs counter to the Respondent 's position.
636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
punish any absentee for attendance at the meeting or any other union activity such
as membership on the shop committee. Against that background, it seems to me,
one may fairly read McClave's reference to attendance at the union meeting in his
description of the basis for the replacements as an identification of the nature of the
absences that led to the replacements rather than as a statement, as the Union in
effect interprets it, that it was attendance at the union meeting, without regard to
absenteeism and the Company's production necessities, that led to the replacements.
Similarly, putting aside the fact that it was McClave , and not Grafflo, who formulated
and issued the replacement instructions, I think it reasonable,'in the context of circum-
stances, to interpret Graffio's remark to Smith as a criticism of the latter for absenting
himself from his job to go to the meeting rather than as a statement, as the Union
appears to read it, that Smith had been discharged because of the union activity
involved in attending the meeting.rs
These views are not negated by the evidence that the Company has followed a
practice of tolerating unexcused absences of as, much as 3 days. For one thing,
there is a manifest difference between the absence of an individual employee and
that of 35 at one time. There is no evidence that any significant number had ever
previously been absent at the same time during a peak production season, and thus
one cannot say with any reasonable certainty that the Company, in such circum-
stances, would not have hired some replacements to meet its production requirements.
For another matter, the Company had no notice of the meeting prior to the morning
-of August 25, was not informed of the length of time the employees would be away,
and received no demands from any of the strikers, nor any statement from them or
the Union as to the purpose of the strike. Moreover, the absences and the report
of interference with access to the plant (whether or not accurate) McClave received
on the morning of August 25 would reasonably lead one to believe that a work
stoppage or strike of unpredictable duration was developing. In that setting, par-
ticularly taking into account the large number of absentees and the peak production
season, it was not unreasonable for the Company to take the steps it did, and I can-
not say that the omission to follow the policy routinely applied to individual cases
of absenteeism in other situations points to an unlawful discriminatory motive rather
than an aim to serve the Company's production necessities. This is also true of
evidence that 5 employees who were absent on August 25 and telephoned to say that
they were ill were not replaced, for the Company had a chance, at least, to determine
how long the 5 would be absent, and to form a judgment as to the impact of these
absences upon production-an opportunity not afforded the Company on August 25
by the Union or any of the 29 who absented themselves all of that day.
The record, in short, contrary to the General Counsel and the Union, does not
establish that the replacement and termination of the 14 employees constituted, in
the language of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act "discrimination ... to . . . discourage
membership in any labor organization." Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal
of the allegations of discrimination in the complaint.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection
with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
18 Unlike the Union, I see no significant support for its position In the evidence that on
the morning of August 26, Foreman Hough told Welch that he had been terminated
"because of what happened yesterday," and that Foreman Klipple expressed the view to
Wolfe that "that was a stupid thing to do." Here, too, one may note thta the replace-
ment policy was formulated by McClave, but apart from that, it is at least as reasonable
to read the allusion to "what happened yesterday" and the "stupid thing to do" as refer-
ences to the absence from work to attend the meeting, rather than as an Intimation that
employees were discharged because of the union activity involved. Nor am I able to
accord any weight to testimony by Aland that when he reported for work on the morning
of August 26, his foreman asked him whether he had been at the meeting, and receiving
an affirmative reply said, "Well, that Is It. Go up to the office." Under cross-examination,
Aland quoted the inquiry by his foreman, and his affirmative reply, and then agreed that
that was "all, that was said by either," thus departing materially from his previous version
of the foreman's remarks. In any case, contrary to the implication of, that version, It Is
clear that Aland was not discharged by his foreman, and that he was replaced on the day
before the alleged conversation in common with the other 13.
r
CROWN COACH CORPORATION
V. THE REMEDY
637
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act, I shall recommend below that it cease and
desist therefrom , and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Crown Coach Corporation is, and has been at all material times, an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
. 2. International Union, United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America , UAW-AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all material times,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 ( 5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees at the Company 's plant in Los
Angeles, California , including shipping and receiving employees , material handlers
and control employees , countermen , timekeepers , servicemen , repairmen , and lead-
men, but excluding all office clerical employees , engineering employees , watchmen,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act , constitute and have constituted at all
times material to the issues , a unit appropriate ,for collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
4. The said Union was , on December 11, 1963, has been at all times since, and is
now, the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to bargain collectively with the Union , as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit, as found above, the Company
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, as found above, the Company has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and 2 (7) of the Act.
8. The work stoppage and strike in which employees of the Company engaged, as
found above , was not caused by any unfair labor practices.
9. The record does not establish the allegations of discrimination against 14
employees set forth in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the
entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent, Crown Coach Cor-
poration, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the bargaining unit
described in section III, above, with respect to the performance of any nonsupervisory
production or maintenance functions or work by any individuals, including super-
visors, in the Company's Los Angeles plant.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees 'in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. _
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representatives of the employees in the said bargaining unit,
described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
terms and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a
signed contract.
630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at its plant and place of business in Los Angeles, California, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized
representative of the Company, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are 'customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the said Company to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.19
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt
of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.20
It is further recommended that so much of the complaint be dismissed as alleges
that the Company violated the Act by refusing, and continuing to refuse, to reinstate
the 14 individuals named in the said complaint as alleged discriminatees.
10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the additional event that the Board's order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
20In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, paragraph 2(c)
thereof shall be modified to read "Notify the said Region Director, in writing, within 10
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
therewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that-
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW-AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
bargaining unit described below, with respect to the performance of any non-
supervisory production or maintenance functions or work by any individuals,
including supervisors, in our plant. The bargaining unit consists of all produc-
tion and maintenance employees at our plant in Los Angeles, California, includ-
ing shipping and receiving employees, material handlers and control employees,
countermen, timekeepers, servicemen, repairmen, and leadmen, but excluding
all office clerical employees, engineering employees, watchmen, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the said Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activ-
ities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the said Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit described above
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or any other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a
signed contract.
CROWN COACH CORPORATION,
.Employer,
Dated------------------- By--------------------------------------___-_
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849
South Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. 688-5204.