Crowley's Milk Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 4, 1953

102 N.L.R.B. 996 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CROWI.EY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. (PATERSON DIVISION) and MILK
DRIVERS AND DAIRY EMPLOYEES LOCAL UNION No. 680, INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS, A. F. OF L. and UNITED DAIRY WORKERS ASSOCIATION,
PARTY TO THE CONTRACT. Cabe No. 2-CA-327 . February 4, 1953
Supplemental Decision and Order
On March 13,1950, the Board issued its original Decision and Order
in the above-entitled proceeding,' finding in part that the Respondent
had violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act, and that the strike
at the Respondent's plant became an unfair labor practice strike on
May 11, 1948. Accordingly, the Board ordered that the Respondent
cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found, and reinstate
the strikers upon application, if necessary dismissing all replacements
hired since May 11, 1948. After the Board's Decision issued, the
Union made application for reinstatement of 14 of the strikers. The
Respondent has complied with certain provisions of the Board's origi-
nal Order, but has refused to reinstate any of the strikers.
Upon a review of the record the Board concluded that certain facts
concerning the reinstatement rights of the strikers had not been fully
developed at the original hearing, because no application for reinstate-
ment had been made up to the time of that hearing and the Trial
Examiner believed that reinstatement was not in issue. Accordingly,
on August 8, 1951, the Board remanded the proceeding to the Division
of Trial Examiners and directed that the record be reopened to permit
the Respondent and the other parties an opportunity to adduce rele-
vant testimony concerning the strikers' rights to reinstatement.'
On June 12, 1952, a supplemental hearing was held before Trial
Examiner David London. On August 20, 1952, the Trial Examiner
issued his Supplemental Intermediate Report, a copy of which is
attached hereto, finding that one of the strikers, Gerald Smith, was
entitled to immediate reinstatement and back pay from the time of his
request for reinstatement on June 6, 1950.3 Thereafter, the Respond-
ent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Supplemental
Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the supplemental hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con-
sidered the Supplemental Intermediate Report, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,
188 NLRB 1049.
2 95 NLRB 1023.
At the remanded hearing it was demonstrated that, of the 14 strikers for whom rein-
statement had been demanded , only Smith evinced any further interest in the proceeding.
102 NLRB No. 102.
CROWLEY ' S MILK COMPANY , INC. 997
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the
following additions and modifications :
1. The Trial Examiner has found that none of Smith's activity dur-
ing the strike justified the Respondent's failure to reinstate him. We
agree with this finding.
The Respondent contends that on the first or second day of the strike
Smith forfeited his right to reinstatement by engaging in unlawful
mass picketing at the Respondent's Paterson plant; and that there-
after he participated in an unlawful secondary boycott by picketing
the premises of the Respondent's customers. As we are convinced on
the record before us that none of the Union's picketing was unlawful,
it follows that Smith's participation in that picketing could not affect
his right to reinstatement.
The record reveals, as the Trial Examiner found, that the only
evidence of alleged mass picketing was testimony that on the first or
second day of the strike Smith was one of a group of 12 men who
conducted a picket line in front of the garage door of the Crowley
plant in Paterson. Francis Crowley, the Respondent's vice president
and general manager, testified that the pickets were orderly, but "it
was necessary for me to call the Paterson Police Department to have
this circle of strikers broken up enough so that we could pass in and
out of the property." The police, according to Crowley, dispersed the
picket line within 30 minutes of the time it formed. No evidence was
adduced in support of Crowley's statement that it was necessary to
break up the picket line to allow ingress to or egress from the plant,
nor was it shown that any person or vehicle was impeded in any way
from entering or leaving the property. In the circumstances we are
compelled to conclude, like the Trial Examiner, that the picketing of
the Respondent's plant was lawful primary activity and that there was
nothing in Smith's participation therein which would justify the
Respondent 's failure to reinstate him.
With respect to the alleged secondary boycott, Smith admitted at the
second hearing that he had picketed two of the Respondent 's customers.
The only establishment identified was the Guernsey Crest Ice Cream
Company of Paterson, where it appears that a picket sign was carried
in front of the customers' entrance. The sign read in effect "This
establishment sells products of Crowley's Milk Company, which Com-
pany is on strike. Please do not buy Crowley's products. Teamsters
Local 680, A. F. L." When asked by Respondent's counsel at the sec-
ond hearing if he did not picket Crowley's customers to influence the
customers' employees to cease handling Crowley's products, Smith
answered "we picketed the stores so that the customers would not buy
Crowley's products." The foregoing is the only persuasive evidence
adduced at either hearing concerning the alleged secondary boycott.
250983-vol . 102-53-64
998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
... to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans-
port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . where an
object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other-
wise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person. .. .
It is clear from the record that in picketing the premises of the
Respondent's customers the Union intended to institute a consumer
boycott only. There is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that the Union made any appeal to employees of the Respondent's
customers, or ever picketed the employee or delivery entrances of any
of the customers. In the circumstances the Union's secondary picket-
ing, whether it be viewed as a direct appeal to the Respondent's
customers or as an appeal to those doing business with the Respond-
ent's customers, was not violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.4
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in remanding
a proceeding to the Board with instructions to test certain picketing
against the standards which the Board established in the Moore D'ry
Dock case,5 said :
If this picketing met the criteria announced in the [Moore
Dry Dock case], then it was not unlawful because employees of
the secondary employers or employees of other employers, due
to their habitual unwillingness to cross picket lines, refuse to do
so, for such effects are within the realm of the "incidental." Nor,
if otherwise lawful, was the picketing unlawful because it induced
or encouraged concerted conduct, not of the neutral employers'
employees, but of their customers, since the prohibition of Section
8 (b) (4) does not extend to such solicitation of customers. [Em-
phasis supplied.]6
In view of the foregoing we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
none of Smith's conduct during the strike justified the Respondent's
failure to reinstate him.
2. The Respondent further contends that its refusal to reemploy
Smith was warranted by the fact that his former job was abolished
See The Hoover Company, 90 NLRB 1614 , enfd . as modified in other respects, 191 F.
2d 380.
92 NLRB 547.
e N. L. R. B. v. Service Trades Chauffeurs ( Teamsters ) (Howland Dry Goods Company),
191 F. 2d 65.
CROWLEY' S MILK COMPANY, INC. 999
before his application for reinstatement on June 6, 1950, and that on
and after that date there was no position in the Respondent's plant
which Smith was qualified to fill. Like the Trial Examiner, we reject
this contention. At the second hearing it was proved that Smith
had not been replaced before the strike at the Respondent's plant
became an unfair labor practice strike on May 11, 1948. Further, it
was established that, although the Respondent abolished one of its
3 cooler positions on January 13, 1950, it thereafter continued to
employ 2 cooler men, only 1 of whom McManus, was employed before
the strike became an unfair labor practice strike. It follows, there-
fore, that Smith is entitled to reinstatement in the other cooler posi-
tion, unless he was not qualified to perform the duties of that job.
We do not find this to be the case.
The job of a cooler man entails unloading incoming raw products,
adding them to an inventory sheet, and placing them in the cooler.
When the manufacturing operations are completed the cooler men
put the finished products in the cooler and record them on the inven-
tory sheet. They also fill customer orders and make appropriate
changes on the inventory records as orders are removed from the
cooler. The Respondent maintains that Smith was only a cooler
helper, and was not capable of performing the inventory work re-
quired of a regular cooler man. However, Smith testified without
contradiction that from the time of his original employment in 1945
up to the time of the strike in 1948, he did the same sort of physical
work as the other cooler men and, like them, kept the running inven-
tory. Further, the record establishes that during this period he
received regular periodic pay increases and that his hourly pay at the
time of the strike was the same as that of the other 2 cooler men. In
the absence of any persuasive evidence that Smith's former job was
substantially dissimilar from that of the other 2 cooler men, we
are compelled to conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that at all
relevant times Smith was qualified to carry out the duties of a cooler
man.
The Remedy
Having found that Gerald Smith was qualified as a cooler man and
that none of his conduct during the strike justifies the Respondent's
failure to reinstate him, we shall order that the Respondent offer him
immediate employment in his former or a substantially equivalent
position, dismissing if necessary any replacements hired after May 11,
1948. We shall further order that the Respondent make Smith whole
in the manner prescribed in the Intermediate Report for any loss of
pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Crowley's Milk
Company, Inc. (Paterson Division), Paterson, New Jersey, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
(a) Offer to Gerald Smith immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for
any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him in
the manner provided in the Supplemental Intermediate Report.
(b) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, time cards, personnel records, and
reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back
pay due.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Supplemental Decision and Order.
Supplementary Intermediate Report
PREFATORY STATEMENT
In its decision in the above proceeding (88 NLRB 1049), dated March 13,
1950, the National Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as the Board, found,
in part, that Respondent had restrained, interfered with, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act (61 Stat. 136) herein called the Act. In that decision, the Board
also found that a strike at Respondent's plant, commenced on April 28, 1948,
became an unfair labor practice strike on May 11, 1948. Accordingly, the Board
ordered, in part, that Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices
found and that it reinstate the strikers upon application, if necessary, dismissing
all replacements hired on or after May 11, 1948, and not employees of Respondent
on that date. The Board also reserved the right to modify the reinstatement
provisions, if necessary.
Thereafter, the Board was advised that Respondent had refused to reinstate
the strikers upon application on the grounds that they forfeited any right to
reinstatement by their actions during the strike, and that in any event, all the
strikers were permanently replaced before May 11, 1948. After further reviewing
the entire record, and being of the opinion that the question of the reinstatement
rights of the strikers may not have been developed fully at the hearing which
preceded the Board's order aforementioned, the Board, on August 8, 1951,
remanded this proceeding to the Division of Trial Examiners "to afford the
parties an opportunity to adduce further relevant testimony concerning the
CROWLEY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. 1001
strikers' rights to reinstatement" and the issuance of an appropriate Supple-
mentary Intermediate Report 1
Pursuant to said order of remand, and after due notice to all parties, a hearing
(referred to herein as the second hearing) was held on June 12, 1952, at New
York, New York, before the undersigned duly designated Trial Examiner. The
General Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel who participated
therein, and all parties were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and adduce evidence bearing on the issues. After the close
of said second hearing, a brief and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law were received from Respondent which have been duly considered.
At the second hearing, Respondent entered objections to proceeding therewith
and moved that the present proceeding be dismissed. Most of said objections and
grounds urged for dismissal concerned themselves with issues outside the scope
of the remand and were considered and disposed of by the Board in its original
decision of March 13, 1950. My role herein being limited to the remand ordered
by the Board on August 8, 1951, the only new procedural objections raised by
Respondent at the second hearing, which may appropriately be the subject of
my ruling, are the following: (1) That the undersigned Trial Examiner is not
the same Trial Examiner who conducted the original hearing and (2) "that
there is nothing in the record which establishes that the complaining union or
its International was in compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the
Act."' The first of these objections was overruled on the authority of N. L. R. B.
v. Stocker Manufacturing Company, 185 F. 2d 451 (C. A. 3) and Editorial El
Impartial Inc., 99 NLRB 8, and the second on the authority of the Law and
Son v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. 2d 236 (C. A. 10) and N. L. R. B. v. Greensboro Coca-
Cola Bottling Company, 180 F. 2d 840,844 (C. A. 4).
By reason of the foregoing analysis of the present status of this proceeding,
the contentions advanced by Respondent both at the hearings and in its brief,
the record herein now calls for consideration by me of only the following
substantive issues:
1. Did any of the strikers make application to Respondent for reinstatement
pursuant to the Board's Order of March 13, 1950, and was such application
denied or refused?
2. Had any of the strikers who made application for reinstatement been per-
manently replaced prior to May 11, 1948, the date on which the strike was
converted into an unfair labor practice strike, by employees newly engaged on
or after that date?
3. Assuming that the first of the foregoing questions is answered affirmatively
and the second in the negative, did the strikers who might otherwise be entitled
to reinstatement forfeit that right by reason of their misconduct during the
strike?
Upon the entire record of this proceeding, and from my observation of the
witnesses at the second hearing, I make the following :
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT
On March 31, 1950, approximately 2% weeks after the Board's original decision
herein, 13 employees of Respondent who had been engaged in the aforementioned
strike made application through Thomas L. Parsonnet, their attorney , for rein-
statement to their former or substantially equivalent position. Respondent
95 NLRB 1023
s These sections of the Act deal with filing by union officials of so-called non-Communist
affidavits and specified union records.
1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
made no response to that demand. It not only denied that it received such a
demand, but, according to the testimony of Francis E. Crowley, its vice president
and general manager , Respondent, on or about April 28, 1948, "fired the men that
went on strike and wanted no more part of them." At the second hearing,
however, the General Counsel announced that the only striker whose right to
reinstatement was being litigated was one Gerald Smith who was not included
among those for whom Parsonnet made the demand for reinstatement on March
31, 1950.
Smith was employed by Respondent on November 3, 1945, and worked steadily
until April 28, 1948, when he, and a substantial majority of the other production
and maintenance employees, engaged in the strike that commenced on that day.
On April 30, 1948, Smith and all other strikers were allegedly " discharged"
because of their participation and activities in that strike. Smith, however,
continued the strike activities hereafter described for about 2 months.
1. Smith's demand for reinstatement
I find that on or about June 5, 1950, Parsonnet, as attorney for Smith, by letter
addressed to Respondent, made a demand for Smith's reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position, and that Respondent has ignored
and refused to comply with that request. While Respondent denied that it
ever received Parsonnet's letter, I credit the latter's testimony that he mailed
that letter on June 5, properly addressed with postage prepaid, and that it was
never returned to him. I further find that it was received by Respondent on
June 6, 1950. It is significant that a copy of that letter, sent by Parsonnet to
the Board's Regional Office at New York, was received by that office on June 6
and acknowledged on June 7, 1950. And, though Respondent denied it had
received a demand from any of the strikers for reinstatement, there was received
in evidence, produced from Respondent's own files pursuant to the General Coun-
sel's subpoena , the original of Parsonnet's letter of March 31, 1950, demanding
reinstatement of the 13 strikers aforementioned. On the entire record I find that
on June 5, 1950, Parsonnet, in Smith's behalf, unconditionally demanded rein-
statement for him to his former or substantially equivalent position and that
Respondent has failed to so reinstate him.
Nor is there any merit to Respondent's contention that Smith's right to rein-
statement is "barred by laches." By ordering Respondent, on March 13, 1950, "to
reinstate the strikers, upon application," the Board must be presumed to have
held that by that time Smith was not estopped from acquiring reinstatement.
It certainly cannot be contended that a further lapse of less than 3 months, until
June 5, 1950, should effect such an estoppel 8
2. Was Smith permanently replaced prior to May 11, 1948?
Smith was employed by Respondent on November 3, 1945, as "a cooler man"
and continued at that work until he went on strike and picket duty April 28,
1948, an activity which he continued for about 2 months. As a cooler man it was
his duty to stack cans containing Respondent's milk and cream products in the
cooler and to bring them in and out of the cooler to the platform for loading
on trucks.
According to its payroll records for the week ending April 27, 1948, Respondent
then had 21 employees engaged in production and maintenance work. During
8 The evidence clearly establishes that an earlier, or indeed, any demand by the strikers
would have been futile for, as Crowley testified, Respondent, on or about April 28, 1948,
"fired the men that went on strike and wanted no more part of them."
CROWLEY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. 1003
the week ending May 4, ]948, and the week ending May 11, 1948, no new employees
for work in the cooler department were engaged. According to Respondent's own
testimony, it employed 3 cooler men from June 9, 1948, to January 13, 1950, and
2 such cooler men thereafter. On June 9, 1948, these positions were filled by
McManus, Wales, and Dipolo. Of these 3, only McManus had been employed
prior to May 11, 1948, and he continued in that work to the date of the second
hearing. Wales was replaced by Holste on September 8, 1948, and the latter was
replaced by Collesano on November 6, 1948. The latter continued in that position
until January 13, 1950, when 1 of the 3 cooler jobs was eliminated. Dipolo was
replaced by Hennessey on August 2, 1948, who continued as such replacement to
March 16, 1949. Chester Walker then took over until March 23, 1949, when he in
turn was replaced by Cocker. On March 19, 1950, Cocker started training for an
engineer's job and Ralph Holste took his place and continued as a cooler to the
date of the second hearing. None of the replacements aforementioned were hired
before May 11, 1948. On Respondent's own testimony and records, therefore, I
find that in addition to the job filled by McManus, cooler jobs for 2 men until
January 13, 1950, and for 1 man thereafter, were filled by employees who were
not in Respondent's employ on May 11, 1948.° Accordingly, I find that Respond-
ent had not on or before May 11, 1948, permanently replaced Smith, and that
since June 9, 1948, at least 1 job as cooler man was filled by an employee hired
after May 11, 1948.6
3. Did Smith's strike activities bar his reinstatement?
Smith testified that he participated in the picketing at Respondent's plant and
at two retail stores selling Respondent's products "so that the customers would
not buy Crowley's products." With respect to the picketing at Respondent's
plant, the evidence does not establish that Smith indulged in any objectionable
conduct other than that he was one of a group of 12 individuals "walking around
in a circle in front of the garage door." Two members of this group carried
picket signs reading "This plant is on strike, A. F. L., 680." Such primary picket-
ing was clearly lawful and I find nothing in Smith's participation in this activity
which would justify Respondent's failure to reinstate him.
With respect to Smith's picketing elsewhere, Crowley testified that he observed
Smith carrying a sign in front of the premises of the Guernsey Crest Ice Cream
Company containing the inscription : "Do not buy Crowley's products." By
this conduct, Respondent argues that Smith "engaged in a vicious secondary boy-
cott in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act and in so doing, ... forfeited
all rights under the law. [His] illegal conduct deprived [him] of any right to
reinstatement or back pay."
Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act declares it to be an "unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents . .. to engage in, or to induce or encourage
the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any . . . commodities or to perform any services, where an
object thereof is" any one of numerous objectives proscribed by the remainder
of that section. (Emphasis supplied.) But the prohibition is against induce-
• General Counsel's Exhibit 16, Respondent's payroll record for May 27, 1952, shows two
men employed in the "cooler department"-McManus and Holste , the latter having been
hired on March 199, 1950.
6 By reason of this finding, I find it unnecessary to give consideration to evidence of-
fered by the General Counsel that other allegedly substantial equivalent positions, which
the General Counsel claimed Smith was qualified to fill , were given to employees hired after
May 11, 1948.
1004 THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY
ment and encouragement of "employees" of secondary employer to engage in a
strike or concerted refusal to handle the goods of the primary employer enmeshed
in a labor dispute with the latter's employees. As the Board has repeatedly held,
"Section 8 (b) (4) (a) does not prohibit [the inducement of] employers to cease
doing business with another employer." (Emphasis in original text.) Con-
solidated Frame Company, 91 NLRB 1295, 1299; International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 294, A. F. L.
(Conway's Express), 87 NLRB 972; Sealright Pacific Ltd., 82 NLRB 271. Here,
according to Crowley's own testimony, all that Smith did by picketing at places
other than Respondent's own plant was to induce other employers "not [to] buy
Crowley's products." Such inducement directed to customers of Respondent is
not proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act.
Nor is there any merit to the contention urged in Respondent's brief that
"employees who go out on strike not caused by unfair labor practices may be
discharged" or denied reinstatement. Presumably, what Respondent has in
mind in this respect is that because the strike which began on April 28 as an
economic strike and was followed by the alleged discharge of the strikers on
April 30, while the strike was still of an economic nature, that the discharges of
April 30 effectively terminated the employment relationship.
Though the Board by its Decision and Order of March 13, 1950, in ordering
the reinstatement of the strikers impliedly rejected this contention, a word of
explanation in support of such rejection may not be inappropriate. Employees
who engage in a strike do not lose their status as employees. The right to strike
without loss of employment status is guaranteed by Section 13 of the Act' and
is recognized by Section 2 (3) thereof.? N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio and Tele-
graph Company, 304 U. S. 333, 347; N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Cor-
poratzlon, 306 U. S. 240, 255. While it is true that if the strike is of an economic
nature, an employer may replace such strikers, that prerogative is not predi-
cated on a right to discharge such strikers because they engaged in the strike.
Rather, it is based on the relinquishment by the strikers of their right to con-
tinue work in exchange for the right to engage in a strike to compel their
employer to grant their economic demands. In such a situation an employer
is not required to sit idly by, stop or curtail his operations, and weaken his own
economic position. If, however, the strike is caused by or converted into an
unfair labor practice strike, work has not been voluntarily relinquished by the
employees, but rather to protect a right guaranteed by the Act. To permit an
employer to discharge or even replace unfair labor practice strikers merely
because they engaged in such a strike would be to encourage violations of
the Act.
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent's proposed findings of fact number 8, reading as follows, is
adopted :
8. Said Gerald Smith picketed places of business of Respondent's cus-
tomers ; and exposed to the public a placard, requesting the public, and such
customers, not to buy Respondent's products, in front of places of business
e "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect
the limitation or qualifications on that right."
7 "The term 'employee' . . . shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment. . . .
THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY 1005
of various customers of Respondent within a 12 mile radius of Respondent's
plant.
All other proposed findings are rejected . Proposed finding number 1 has been
covered by other findings made herein . All other proposed findings are rejected
either because they are not material to the issues presently under consideration,
or are not supported by the evidence , or are mere conclusions of law and not the
subject of findings of fact. All proposed conclusions of law are rejected because
they are not the legal conclusions that can properly be drawn from the facts
found herein.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY and WATE, RBURY PRINTING PRESSMEN
AND ASSISTANTS' UNION, LOCAL 150, AFL, PETITIONER. Case No.
1-RC-3035. February 4,1953
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Sidney A. Coven,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing
are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Houston, Styles, and Peterson].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer 1 is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent employees
of the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following
reasons:
The Petitioner seeks a unit described as printing pressmen, com-
positors, stonemen, machine setup men, slittermen , and platemaker
at the Employer's Waterbury, Connecticut, operations. The Em-
ployer contends the proposed unit is inappropriate on the grounds
that the employees involved are not craftsmen and that its operations
are so integrated as to preclude other than a plantwide unit. There
has been no history of collective bargaining with respect to the
Employer's employees.
The Employer manufacturers paper tags, some printed and some
not, at the plant here involved. All operations are performed on
1 The name of the Employer appears in the caption as amended at the hearing.
102 NLRB No. 97.