Cromwell Printery Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 4, 1968

172 N.L.R.B. 1817 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

CROMWELL PRINTERY INC.
Cromwell Printery Incorporated and/or Cromwell
Business Forms Incorporated ; Mercury Imprints
Inc.; Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.; Typo-Lith
Corporation and Lithographers and Photoen-
gravers International Union , Local No. 259, Al-
bany-Schenectady , AFL-CIO and James Romand
and Joseph Motto and /or Cromwell Printery Em-
ployees Union, Party to the Contract
Cromwell Printery Incorporated and/or Cromwell
Business Forms Incorporated ; Mercury Imprints
Inc.; Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.; Typo-Lith
Corporation and James Bravender
Cromwell Business Forms Incorporated ; Mercury
Imprints Inc.; Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.;
Typo-Lith Corporation and Lithographers and
Photoengravers International Union , Local No.
259, Albany-Schenectady , AFL-CIO
Cromwell Printery Incorporated and/or Cromwell
Business Forms Incorporated ; Mercury Imprints
Inc.; Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.; Typo-Lith
Corporation and Lithographers and Photoen-
gravers International Union , Local No. 259, Al-
bany-Schenectady , AFL-CIO and James Romand
and Joseph Motto and/or Cromwell Printery Em-
ployees Union . Cases 3-CA-2898, 3-CA-3004,
3-CA-3208, 3-RM-349, and 3-RC-3896
September 4, 1968
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND ZAGORIA
On February 20, 1968, Trial Examiner Sidney
Sherman issued his Decision in the above-entitled
' Following the close of the hearing, the Respondent moved to strike the
General Counsel's, and the Charging Party's, exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, on the ground that they failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 102 46(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations
that such exceptions "shall designate by precise citation of page the por-
tions of the record relied on " That section further states that "Any excep-
tion which fails to comply with the foregoing requirements may be disre-
garded " Although we do not condone the failure to comply with the
Board's Rules and Regulations, we deny the Respondent's motion in the in-
stant case on the grounds that the General Counsel's, and the Charging
Party's, failure to cite in their exceptions the pages in the record relied on
was not prejudicial In their briefs, the General Counsel and the Charging
Party amply cited the page on which their arguments in support of their ex-
ceptions relied See Schneider Mills, Inc , and Jininiy and Josh, Inc , 161
NLRB 1135
172 NLRB No. 212
1817
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. He further found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices al-
leged in the complaint and recommended that such
allegations be dismissed. In the representation
proceedings, the Trial Examiner recommended that
the challenges to the ballots of James Bravender
and Jeffrey Kaplan be overruled, and that the chal-
lenges to the ballots of three other employees be
sustained, and further found merit in certain objec-
tions to the election filed by the Lithographers
Union. He therefore recommended that the ballots
of James Bravender and Jeffrey Kaplan be opened
and counted, and that, if the Lithographers Union
received a majority of the valid votes cast, it be cer-
tified as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit, but that, if it
is determined the Lithographers Union did not
receive a majority of the such votes, the election of
July 21, 1966, be set aside, and a new election be
conducted. Thereafter, the Respondent, the
General Counsel, and the Charging Party filed ex-
ceptions, and briefs in support thereof, and the
Respondent filed an answering brief. I
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's2 findings, con-
In his brief, the General Counsel stated that the charges filed by the
Lithographers Union in Case 3-CA-3208, and the affidavit of service
thereof, were inadvertently omitted from the formal papers, and moved
that they he admitted into the record as G C Exh I (fff) and I ( ggg) Since
the Respondent, in its answer, admitted the filing of said charges, and ser-
vice upon it by registered mail and in the absence of objection, we shall
grant the General Counsel's motion
We deny, as lacking in merit, the Respondent's motion to remand this
case to the Trial Examiner for additional findings and recommendations
2 We hereby correct the following inadvertence in the Trial Examiner's
Decision the first union meeting on March 13, 1966, was held at the home
of Paul DeSarbo, rather than at the home of Ashley
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt 2 - 43
1818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
clusions,3 and recommendations,' as modified
herein.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner as modified
below and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Cromwell Printery Incorporated and/or Cromwell
Business Forms Incorporated; Mercury Imprints
Inc., Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.; Typo-Lith Cor-
poration, Albany, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order,
as so modified.
Add the following as paragraph 2(c), renumber-
ing the present paragraph 2(c) and all succeeding
paragraphs:
"(c) Notify the above-named employee, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of his right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Ser-
vice Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces."
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges un-
fair labor practices not specifically found herein.
DIRECTION
It is hereby directed that the Regional Director
for Region 3 open and count the ballots of James
Bravender and Jeffrey Kaplan in the election con-
ducted herein on July 21, 1966, and thereafter
prepare and cause to be served on the parties a
revised tally of ballots, including therein the count
of said ballots. If, according to the revised tally of
ballots, the Lithographers Union has received a
majority of the valid ballots cast in the election, the
Regional Director is directed to certify that Union
as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees
in the appropriate unit. If, according to the revised
tally of ballots, the Lithographers Union has not
received a majority of the valid ballots cast in the
election, the Regional Director is instructed to set
aside the election of July 21, 1966, and conduct a
new election at such time as he may deem ap-
propriate.
tional employees , we conclude , in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that
he is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act
' While we agree with the Trial Examiner that the settlement agreement
of June 7, 1966 , should be set aside, we do so solely on the basis of the
Respondent 's postsettlement unfair labor practices Unlike the Trial Ex-
aminer, we do not believe that the Respondent 's memorandum to em-
ployees, dated June 14, 1966 , can be utilized to set aside the settlement
agreement , since the Regional Office in effect acquiesced in the Respon-
dent 's curing that breach by the additional 60 days' posting of the remedial
notice
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the merit increases given to em-
ployees Benedetto and Hollner in the latter part of June 1966 , prior to the
election herein, violated Section 8 ( a)( I ) of the Act However , we do not
believe the record supports a conclusion that a similar merit increase
granted to employee Ashley was violative of the Act , and therefore do not
adopt this finding of the Trial Examiner
' We find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Supervisor Schreiber's
solicitation of an invitation to attend the March 20, 1966, union meeting,
and his actual attendance , along with two other supervisors , constituted un-
lawful surveillance , particularly as it occurred at a time when the Respon-
dent was engaged in committing numerous other acts of interference,
restraint , and coercion The Jefferson Company, Inc , 110 NLRB 757,
771-772 We further find, contrary to the Trial Examiner , that Schreiber's
remark to employee Paul DeSarbo on March 14. 1966, that under a union
"little people could get hurt ," and implying that the Respondent would not
retain inexperienced employees when it could get "craftsmen " at the same
price , constituted a threat to discharge marginal employees Accordingly,
we find that these incidents constituted additional 8 ( a)( I) violations
The Trial Examiner found that the discriminatory layoff of employee
James Bravender on May 27, 1966, and his subsequent discharge on July 5,
1966, and the selective wage increases given by the Respondent to certain
employees in the latter part of June 1966, consitituted objectionable con-
duct, and furnished sufficient basis for setting aside the election of July 21,
1966 The Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent 's speech to
employees on July 19 , 1966, in which it explicated its reasons for believing
that it would be in the employees ' best interest to vote for the Independent,
rather than the Lithographers Union, did not constitute objectionable con-
duct , and recommended that this objection he overruled We disagree The
Respondent 's speech of July 19 must be considered in association with the
Respondent 's action of March 15, 1966, suggesting to employees that they
form their own committee to handle grievances, which , we have found, vio-
lated Section 8(a)( I) Under these circumstances , we find that the Respon-
dent's July 19 speech , which reinforced the Respondent 's earlier , unlawful
suggestion to employees concerning the Independent , also constituted
grounds for setting aside the July 21 election
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY SHERMAN, Trial Examiner: The initial
charge herein (in Case 3-CA-2898) was served on
Respondent on or about April 5,' the complaint
herein issued on December 29, and the case was
heard on April 3, 4, and 5, 1967, and on September
26 through 29, 1967. The issues litigated related to
(a) alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act; (b) alleged interference with a Board elec-
tion; and (c) challenges to ballots cast in the elec-
tion. After the hearing, briefs were filed by Respon-
dent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel,
and certain exhibits were received in evidence.'
Upon the basis of the entire record in the case,3
including my observation of the witnesses, the fol-
lowing findings and conclusions are adopted:
3 In view of the fact that Christopher Ricciardi responsibly directs the
work of seven employees at the Respondent's separate Mercury facility, ex-
ercising independent judgment in originating and revising production
schedules and releasing employees from their work duties, has exercised
the power of discharge, and has effectively recommended the hire of addi-
i All events herein occurred in 1966, unless otherwise stated
2 See the Trial Examiner 's order of February 7 and 14, 1968
3 For corrections of the transcript see the orders of December 4, 1967,
and February 7, 1968
I. THE RESPONDENT
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1819
Cromwell Printery Incorporated (hereinafter
called Cromwell Printery), its successor corpora-
tion, Cromwell Business Forms Incorporated, and
its subsidiaries, Mohawk Business Forms, Inc.
(hereinafter called Mohawk), Typo-Lith Corpora-
tion (hereinafter called Typo-Lith), and Mercury
Imprints Inc. (hereinafter called Mercury), all col-
lectively designated herein as the Respondent, are
engaged in Albany, New York, in the production
and sale of business forms. Respondent annually
receives directly from out-of-state points, and ships
directly to out-of-state points, goods valued in ex-
cess of $50,000.
The complaint alleges, and Respondent's answer
admits, that all the corporations here involved are
under common ownership and common centralized
control with respect to their labor relations policies.
It is accordingly found that all such corporations
constitute a single employer under the Act, and
that, as such employer, Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNIONS
Lithographers and Photoengravers International
Union, Local No. 259, Albany-Schenectady,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, and James
Romand and Joseph Motto and/or Cromwell Prin-
tery Employees Union, hereinafter called the Inde-
pendent, are labor organizations under the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The pleadingsin the complaint cases raise the fol-
lowing issues:'
1. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by laying off and subsequently
discharging Bravender and failing thereafter to re-
call him?
2. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by the following conduct: (a) interroga-
tion of employees concerning their union activities;
(b) engaging in, and creating the impression of, sur-
veillance of union activities; (c) threatening that
adherence to the Union would result in replace-
ment of less efficient employees; (d) soliciting from
employees an invitation to attend union meetings;
(e) threatening various reprisals for union activity;
(f) promising and granting wage increases, and
granting certain insurance benefits, to induce em-
ployees to abandon the Union; (g) suggesting that
the employees form their own union or committee
to represent them; (h) directing employees not to
sign cards for the union and retrieve those they had
already signed; (i) suggesting that employees seek
' On November 4, the name of Cromwell Printery was changed to Crom-
well Business Forms Incorporated
' There have been excluded from the ensuing enumeration all those mat-
ters covered by allegations that were struck at the hearing The request in
legal counsel and join with an alleged supervisor
(Romand) in combatting the Union's organizational
campaign; (j) branding as unlawful discussions of
the Union on company time or property; (k) telling
an employee that his work shift could not be
changed because of the union activity in the plant;
(1) permitting the circulation of petitions for an in-
dependent union on company time and premises
while forbidding like activities on behalf of the
Union; and (m) promoting such petitions for an in-
dependent union through the signing thereof by su-
pervisors, and through the solicitation of employees
by a sunervisor to sign such petitions.
In addition, the representation proceeding
presents questions as to the eligibility of certain
challenged voters and as to interference by Respon-
dent with employee freedom of choice.
A. Sequence of Events
On March 4, seven of Respondent's pressmen in-
cluding Bravender and Ashley, approached
Respondent's president, Sutin, and demanded that
he raise their rates to the union scale and adopt a
40-hour week in lieu of the existing 50-hour week.
Sutin agreed in principle to this demand, but no
conclusion was reached at that meeting as to the
exact amount of the raise to be granted the press-
men; that question was further discussed at a meet-
ing on March 11, but final decision was again
deferred to March 14. On March 13, a Sunday, a
number of Respondent's employees, including all
the foregoing pressmen, except Bravender, at-
tended the first union meeting at the home of
Ashley. At that meeting, the pressmen in at-
tendance decided to forego any further action on
their own initiative and to let the Union prosecute
their demand for higher wages. Not having at-
tended the union meeting, Bravender was not
aware of this decision, and the next day he alone of
all the pressmen adhered to his request for a raise,
and Sutin agreed to increase his hourly pay from
$2.65 to $3.40, and to put him on a "40-hour
week," without, however, guaranteeing that he
would work 40 hours every week.
Several days later employee Motto and an al-
leged supervisor, Romand, launched a campaign to
form an independent union, engaging in extensive
solicitation of employees, and during March and
April there were instances of interrogation of em-
ployees by supervisors about their union activity.
Also, in mid-March Sutin addressed the employees
on the subject of the Union, warning of the adverse
effects on the stability of their employment if
Respondent had to deal with a union. Between
April and June a number of wage increases were
granted to individual employees, allegedly on the
the Union's brief that certain of those allegations be reinstated is denied
Ruling was reserved at the hearing on motions by Respondent to strike
other allegations of the complaint These motions are hereby disposed of in
accordance with the findings below
1820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
basis of merit, and in December there was a sub-
stantial across-the-board increase granted to all the
employees.
On May 27, Bravender was laid off for an in-
definite period and on July 5, he was notified of his
discharge. He has not since been recalled.
In the meantime, on March 23, the Union filed a
petition for an election among Respondent's
production and maintenance employees, and on
April 1, Respondent filed a similar petition. On July
8, the Regional Director approved the parties'
stipulation for certification upon a consent election,
which provided for the appearance on the ballot of
both the Union and the Independent. In the elec-
tion held on July 21, 35 votes were cast for each of
the Unions, I was cast for neither, and 6 ballots
were challenged. The Union filed objections to the
election.
On May 3, 1967, the Regional Director issued a
report on challenged ballots and objections. He
recommended that the challenges to the ballots of
Amedio and Nagy be sustained, and that the chal-
lenge to the ballot of Baldwin be overruled. As to
the other three challenged voters (Bravender,
Kaplan, and C. Ricciardi), he recommended that
the issue of their eligibility be litigated in the
proceeding before me. It was also recommended
that certain of the Union's objections (2, 3, 4, and
5), which, in the main, coincided with certain al-
legations of the complaint , be litigated before me.
Exceptions to the foregoing recommendations were
filed by all parties.6
On July 18, 1967, the Board issued an order af-
firming the Regional Director 's report , except that
it found that there were substantial and material is-
sues with respect to the eligibility of Amedio and
Baldwin which might best be resolved by a hearing,
and the Board authorized the consolidation of the
representation cases with the instant complaint
cases for the purpose of hearing and ruling on the
challenges to the ballots of Amedio, Baldwin,
Kaplan, C. Ricciardi, and Bravender, and the
Union's Objections 2, 3, 4, and 5.' On August 11,
1967, the Regional Director issued an order effect-
ing such consolidation.
The Settlement Agreement
The initial charge herein was filed on April 5, in
Case 3-CA-2898, and alleged the violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)( 1) and (2) of the Act by (a) domination
of a labor organization and (b) interference with
the employees' organizational rights by "other acts
and conduct." On June 6, there was filed an
' No exception was taken to the disposition of Nagy's ballot and of the
Union's Objection I. relating to the alleged discriminatory discharge of
Nagy, which had been withdrawn by the Union
' Although the representation cases had originally been consolidated by
the Regional Director with the complaint cases for the purpose of hearing,
on April 4, 1967. during the hearing before me, I granted Respondent's
motion to sever the representation cases This motion was granted because
amended charge, which omitted any reference to
domination of a labor organization, and alleged
only in general terms interference with employee
rights, in violation of Section 8(a)( I). On June 7,
the Regional Director approved a settlement agree-
ment providing for the posting for 60 consecutive
days of the usual form of remedial notice in cases
involving violations of Section 8(a)(1) On June 14,
such notices were duly posted on various plant bul-
letin boards, but there were posted beside the
notices copies of a memorandum signed by Respon-
dent's president, Sutin, which recited, inter alia,
that the Board had found that Respondent had
committed a "technical" violation of the Act, and
that, although Respondent did not agree with this
finding, it had decided to settle the matter by post-
ing the remedial notice, and that it did so in order
to avoid the expense of protracted litigation, and to
expedite the holding of a Board election, which
could not be held until the Union's charge had been
disposed of. Also, on June 14, Respondent mailed a
copy of the foregoing memorandum to each em-
ployee. On June 30, a Board agent, Ross, notified
Respondent's attorney that the posting of the
foregoing memorandum might be deemed incon-
sistent with the posting requirement of the settle-
ment agreement, and, on July 6, Respondent's
counsel notified Ross that the memorandum had
not only been posted but also mailed to all em-
ployees." Between June 30 and July 25, Respondent
effected the removal of the various copies of the
memorandum from all its plant bulletin boards.
Thereafter, in compliance with the direction of the
Board agent, Respondent extended the period for
posting of the remedial notice by continuing such
posting for a period of 60 days plus the number of
days that the memorandum had been posted along-
side the notice, such extended period terminating
for all plants on September 23. Nevertheless, by
letter of September 28. the Acting Regional
Director noted Respondent that, by posting and
mailing the foregoing memorandum to all em-
ployees, Respondent had detracted from and
minimized the remedial notices, that it was there-
fore the opinion of the Acting Regional Director
that Respondent had not complied with the settle-
ment agreement , and that approval of such agree-
ment was accordingly withdrawn.
In the meantime on July 27, Bravender filed the
charge in Case 3-CA-3004, alleging that he had
been discriminatorily laid off on or about May 27,
and discharged on or about July 5. An allegation to
that effect was included in the instant consolidated
complaint.
of the failure of the Regional Director to issue any report on the challenges
and objections , and in order to afford him an opportunity to issue such a re-
port As already noted , such a report was subsequently issued on May 3,
1967, and the hearing reconvened on September 26, at which time the is-
sues referred to me by the Board's order of July 18. and the Regional
Director 's order of August I I , were litigated
' Counsel so testified without contradiction
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1821
B. Discussion
1. The sufficiency of the charge in Case
3-CA-2898
At the hearing, ruling was reserved on Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss the complaint in Case
3-CA-2898 because of the insufficiency of the
charge.
As already noted, that charge, as amended on
June 6, contained only a general allegation that
since on or about March 12, 1966, Respondent had
restrained, coerced, and interfered with its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. On the basis of this charge, a
complaint was eventually9 issued, which specified
more than 60 instances of alleged violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act through, inter alfa, inter-
rogation, threats, surveillance, promising and grant-
ing of wage increases, unlawful support and
assistance to a union, no-solicitation rules, and sug-
gesting to employees what statements to make to
Board agents.
Respondent cites (1) the requirement in Section
102.12(d) of the Board's rules that a charge shall
contain a "clear and concise statement of the facts
constituting the alleged unfair labor practices"; (2)
the direction in the Board's charge form that, in
stating the basis of the charge, the charging party
be "specific as to facts, names, adresses, plants in-
volved, dates, places, etc"; and (3) the Board's
decisions in Mid-States Steel and Wire Co.," and
New York Shipping Association."
In the latter case the charge alleged only a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) by improper pay-
ments to members and officers of a union. While
refusing to act on the 8(a)(2) allegation, the Re-
gional Director did issue a complaint alleging viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), in connection
with a union-security arrangement between the
Respondent and the Union. The Board there held
that the Regional Director's announced refusal to
issue a complaint alleging a violation of Section
8(a)(2) was tantamount to a dismissal of the entire
charge, since the 8(a)(1) violation alleged in the
charge was merely derivative, and could not stand
alone after the dismissal of the principal allegation.
Here, the original charge under consideration al-
leged violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act by unlawful assistance to, and domination of,
the Independent Union, and that by these and other
acts and conduct Respondent interfered with,
coerced, and restrained its employees in the exer-
cise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. The
amended charge omitted the allegations pertaining
to assistance and domination, retaining only the
substance of "the other acts and conduct" portion
of the original charge. Even if it be assumed, as
Respondent contends, that the original charge
would have been dismissed by the Regional
Director had it not been in effect withdrawn by the
amendment, the fact remains that here, unlike the
situation in New York Shipping, supra, the Union,
after such "dismissal," refiled its allegation of viola-
tions of employee rights under Section 7, thereby,
in effect, contending that these were independent
violations of such rights, separate and apart from
any derivative violations related to the 8(a)(2) por-
tion of the original charge.12 Accordingly, I do not
deem the New York Shipping case to be in point.
In Mid-States Steel, supra, the charge alleged a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by a refusal to
bargain on a date more than 6 months before the
filing of the charge, and that "by these and other
acts and conduct" the Respondent violated the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The
Board held that the portion of the charge alleging a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) was defective on its
face because of the bar of Section 10(b) and that
the remaining, general allegation was not sufficient
in itself to support a complaint alleging a violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1), within the 10(b)
period. The Board there said of this general allega-
tion:
Its vague language is nothing more than an in-
vitation to the Board to utilize its investigatory
processes to uncover for a charging party some
violation upon which to issue a complaint. As
Section 10(b) of the Act forbids the Board's
instituting a proceeding on its own motion, we
cannot perceive how the charge herein can be
held valid without doing violence to the statu-
tory intent.
In answer to the foregoing reliance on Mid-States
Steel, the General Counsel points, first, to the fact
that the relevant language of Section 10(b) does
not require any degree of specificity in a charge but
provides only that the Board shall have power to
issue a complaint whenever "it is charged that any
person has engaged in or is engaging in any ... un-
fair labor practice." In addition, the General Coun-
sel cites various Board and court decisions for the
familiar proposition that a charge is not a pleading
and that it is only the complaint, and not the
charge, which must give the Respondent notice of
the issues he has to meet.13 The General Counsel
further cites early court decisions expressly holding
that a charge in the general language of the Act is
sufficent'14 notwithstanding the requirement of
specificity in the Board's rules,15 since such require-
ment is merely "for the information of the Board,"
to aid it in conducting its investigation. Even if it be
assumed that the Board meant in Mid-States Steel
to depart from the principle established by the
e After the settlement agreement had been set aside 'a See, e g , N L R B v Fant Miffing Company, 360 U S 301. 307
10 112 NLRB 800 (1955) 14 Kansas Milling Company v N.L R B , 185 F 2d 413 (C A 10, 1950)
" 112 NLRB 1047 (1955) and Consumers Power Co v NLRB , 113 F 2d 38, 42 (C A 6, 1940 )
s As to the apparent reason for such refihng, see fn 17 below 15 Consumers Power Co v N L R B , supra
1822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
foregoing court decisions and the Board rulings af-
firmed therein, the fact remains that only 1 year
after the decision in Mid-States Steel the Board held
in Brookville Glove Company's that a charge alleg-
ing only in general terms that a respondent was en-
gaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act was sufficient to support a
complaint alleging the discharge of employees in
violation of Section 8(a)(1). Although Mid-States
Steel was not mentioned in Brookville Glove, it must
be deemed either to have been overruled sub silen-
tio or limited to its special facts."
In any event, I regard Mid-States Steel as outside
the mainstream of Board law. Apparently implicit
in that decision was the assumption that, if a charge
couched in general, statutory language were held to
be valid, the result would be to cast upon the Board
the entire burden of uncovering evidence of viola-
tions and to relieve the charging party of any
responsibility for substantiating his charge. How-
ever, Section 101.4 of the Board's Rules and Regu-
lations and Statements of Procedure18 recites that,
when a charge is filed, the Regional Director
requests the charging party "to submit promptly
evidence in its support." Thus, the burden of
furnishing the Regional Director with sufficient
details concerning the alleged violation to warrant
proceeding further would seem to remain with the
charging party regardless of how general the allega-
tions of the charge may be.
In its brief, Respondent insists , nevertheless, that
having adopted a rule requiring some degree of
specificity in a charge, even though not required to
do so by Section 10(b) of the Act, the Board may
not now waive it. Respondent cites Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), holding that,
although there was no statutory limitation on his
power to discharge an employee, the Secretary of
the Interior was bound to comply with the procedu-
ral limitations prescribed in his own regulations.
However, Respondent seems to overlook the fact
that in Vitarelli the extra-statutory limitation was
imposed by the court on the governmental agency,
which had itself promulgated that limitation in the
form of a regulation. While considerations of equity
or poetic justice19 might apply in such a case, the
matter is not so simple here; for, here, the case is
complicated by the fact that the Board rule respect-
" It 6 NLRB 1282, 1283, 1291-93
" Respondent seeks to distinguish Brookville Glove on the ground that,
there, the charge was drawn by unschooled employees, whereas here it was
prepared by the Union's counsel However, if the circumstances raider
which a charge is filed be relevant, it may be in order to point out that even
before the instant amended charge was filed the parties had already
negotiated a settlement agreement with respect to any violations of Section
8(a)(1 ), which agreement was approved by the Regional Director the day
after the filing of the amended charge Apparently, therefore, the amended
charge was filed only because it was feared that the original 8(a)(2) charge
would not support the settlement agreement , which was predicated only on
violations of Section 8(a)(I), and it was not contemplated at the time that
the amended charge would have to serve as the basis for issuing a com-
plaint (The necessity for this arose only after the settlement agreement
ing charges governs not only the actions of the
Board but also that of the charging party, and im-
poses on it a requirement of specificity not con-
tained in the statute. In other words, the issue here
is not merely whether the Board has tied its own
hands, but whether it can also tie the hands of a
charging party by imposing a restriction not spelled
out in the Act. I do not deem Vitarelli to be disposi-
tive of that issue.20
It is therefore concluded that the instant
amended charge is valid and affords a sufficient
legal basis for the issuance of the complaint in
3-CA-2898,2' and the motion to dismiss that com-
plaint is hereby denied.
2. The revocation of the settlement agreement
Under Board policy, the Board is barred by a set-
tlement agreement from finding any violations of
the Act antedating such agreement, unless it is
found (a) that the Act was violated after such
agreement or (b) that Respondent did not comply
with the terms of the agreement. Here, the General
Counsel relies on both (a) and (b), since he not
only alleges certain postsettlement violations, but
also cites the determination of the Acting Regional
Director in his letter of September 28, to the effect
that the posting and mailing of the memorandum
described above was incompatible with compliance
with the notice-posting requirement of the settle-
ment agreement. The latter contention will be first
considered. The General Counsel cites Bangor
Plastics, Inc., 156 NLRB 1165,21 where the Board
affirmed the setting aside of a settlement agreement
because of the posting alongside the remedial
notice of a statement similar to that contained in
Sutin's memorandum.
The Board there stated at 1166-67:
In passing upon the question of whether or
not the Acting Regional Director acted
properly in setting aside the settlement agree-
ment, we find it unnecessary to determine
whether, as alleged by the General Counsel,
Respondent's notice (1) altered the Board's
notice, and (2) contained an untrue statement.
It suffices to say that, in our opinion, Respon-
dent's notice posted alongside the Board's
notice was a patent attempt to minimize the ef-
was set aside ) Under these circumstances, there was no apparent , present
need for a detailed listing of alleged violations in the amended charge
" Series 8, as amended
" In concurring in Vitarelli, Justice Frankfurter remarked, " He that
takes the procedural sword shall perish by that sword
1U See Leedom v Kyrie, 358 U S 184
11 While, as I stated at the hearing, I am aware of no case where so
elaborate a superstructure was erected on a "blanket" charge as was con-
structed by the instant complaint, there seems to be no escape from the
view that the difference between this case and one like Broo/ville Glove,
where the complaint was much more limited, is quantitative rather than
qualitative
u Accord The Paymaster Corporation, 162 NLRB 123 Cf The Brearler
Company, 163 NLRB 637
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1823
fect of the Board's notice. Respondent's notice
suggests to employees that the Board's notice
is being posted as a mere formality and that
Respondent's true sentiments are to be found
in its own notice, not the Board's. Instead of
assuring employees that it will live up to the
terms of the settlement agreement as set forth
in the Board's notice, Respondent has taken
issue with the terms of that notice in such a
manner as to create in the minds of employees
the impression that it does not subscribe to any
of the statements expressed in the Board's
notice.
Unlike a settlement between private parties,
a Board settlement involves a public right
which the Board must protect. In deciding
whether or not to approve a settlement agree-
ment, the prime consideration must, of necessi-
ty, be to what extent the proposed settlement
will effectuate the policies of the Act. There-
fore, the Board requires that a settlement
agreement provide for the posting of a notice
which sets forth the statutory guarantee.
Where, as here, the posting of that notice is the
only affirmative action Respondent must take,
we cannot agree that the policy of the Act is
effectuated when the Respondent undertakes
to post with it a statement evidencing to em-
ployees its position that the posting of the
Board's notice is to be considered nothing
more than a mere formality and that the settle-
ment agreement will not effect any change in
Respondent's attitude toward the statutory
rights of its employees. In sum, we believe that
Respondent, by the posting of its own notice,
did not comply with the settlement agreement,
and, accordingly, we find that the Acting Re-
gional Director was justified in setting aside
this agreement.
Respondent seeks to distinguish Bangor Plastics,
inter alia, on the ground that, although, as related
above, Respondent made full disclosure to a
representative of the Board's Regional Office with
regard to the posting and mailing of the Sutin
memorandum, the Regional Office required only
that Respondent extend the notice-posting period
by the number of days that the Sutin memorandum
had been displayed beside the Board notice, with
which requirement Respondent complied. It is thus,
in effect, Respondent's position that there had been
an initial determination by the Regional Office
early in August23 that the denigration of the Board-
notice through the posting and mailing of the
memorandum would be adequately cured by an ap-
propriate extension of the notice-posting period,
and that the Acting Regional Director was there-
fore estopped from taking a different position on
September 28, when he found, in essence, that the
extension of the notice-posting period did not
remedy the effect of the mailing and posting of the
memorandum. However, it is well settled that there
can be no estoppel against a governmental agency.
Accordingly, even if it be assumed that the Acting
Regional Director's action in setting aside the set-
tlement agreement was inconsistent with a prior
determination by him,2" that circumstance would
not invalidate such action, provided it was not ar-
bitrary or capricious. The Board accords great
latitude to its Regional Directors in resolving
questions of compliance.25 Presumably, the ra-
tionale for the ultimate decision to set aside the set-
tlement, notwithstanding the removal of the objec-
tionable material from the plant bulletin boards and
the extension of the posting periods, was that, while
such removal insured that the employees would no
longer be exposed to the impact of the posted
material , there could be no like assurance with re-
gard to the copies thereof mailed to the individual
employees (at least absent proof that all such co-
pies had been destroyed as of a certain date). It
cannot be said that this distinction is unsound.26
Accordingly, Respondent's contention that the Act-
ing Regional Director improperly set aside the set-
tlement agreement is rejected.
In any event, the settlement agreement was sub-
ject to revocation on the ground that, as is found
below, Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices after the approval of the agreement. Ac-
cordingly, even if it be assumed that the reason for
revocation assigned in the September 28 letter was
invalid, such error was not prejudicial, as there ex-
isted at the time another, adequate reason for revo-
cation. There will next be considered the alleged
postsettlement violations.
3. Postsettlement violations
a. The merit raises
The settlement agreement was approved on June
7. The election was held on July 21. The record
shows that about the end of June, Ashley,
Benedetto, and Richard Hollner received increases
ranging from 10 to 15 cents an hour.27
" According to the stipulation of the parties, on August 2, a Board agent
orally communicated to Respondent's counsel the Regional Office's
request for an extension of the posting period and, by letter of August 4,
Board Agent Ross specified the duration of the new posting period
to In view of this assumption, there is no need to consider whether, as
Respondent contends in its brief, an adverse inference should be drawn
from the failure of the General Counsel to call Ross to testify about the
revocation of the settlement agreement, or whether Respondent was de-
nied due process by the failure of Ross of certain other Board agents to tes-
tify at the hearing in response to Respondent's subpenas
1' Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc. 116 NLRB 1260, 1262, and
cases there cited
a Moreover, it is not certain that the Board would even agree that the
posting of the memorandum had been cured by the extension of this notice-
posting period
tr See Resp Exh 5-A and G C Exh I2-C Motto testified that he, also,
received a raise in June However, Respondent 's records do not show any
such raise Accordingly, I give no weight to his testimony in that regard
1824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In explaining the foregoing raises , Sutin testified
that he would periodically draw up a list of his em-
ployees , and that , after consulting his supervisors,
he would note on such list what merit increases he
proposed to give to each employee during the ensu-
ing 6 months and the effective date of such in-
crease ; and that , in some cases , he would note
merely the date on which the employees' per-
formance would be reviewed to determine whether
he would then be entitled to a raise . There were in-
troduced into evidence certain charts ( Resp. Exhs.
4-A, 4-B, 5-A, and 5-B), which purported to
represent the schedule of projected merit increases
prepared by Sutin in the foregoing manner at the
beginning of 1966.28 For Ashley , the foregoing
charts do not project the increase received by him
at the end of June . While there is a notation op-
posite his name , indicating that his eligibility for an
increase would be reviewed on June 25 , there was
no testimony by Respondent as to the reason for
granting him such increase.
Opposite Benedetto 's name appears a note to
grant him a 15-cent raise on April 1, and to review
his case on July 1. He was in fact given a 15-cent
raise at the end of March . At the hearing, Sutin
acknowledged that Benedetto was not a good
worker , and, when asked why, in view of this,
Benedetto was given a second 15 -cent raise within
3 months after his first such raise , Sutin answered
only, "I would let the record speak for itself if I
made the promises at the beginning of the year."
However, so far as the record shows, the only
"promise" Sutin made at the beginning of 1 966, with
regard to Benedetto 's second raise , was that he
would review Benedetto 's case on July 1. If, as
Sutin admitted , Benedetto was not a satisfactory
employee , it is not clear how any review of his per-
formance on or about July I could have convinced
Sutin that Benedetto was entitled to another raise.
Benedetto , himself, testified without contradiction
that there was no appreciable change in his per-
formance during the period under consideration.29
Hollner 's foregoing June raise is not projected on
the foregoing charts , and Hollner testified without
contradiction that he was criticized for poor
production about the same time that he received
that raise.
Under all the circumstances , including the
absence of any apparent justification therefor, par-
ticularly in the cases of Hollner and Benedetto, in
terms of performance on the job, the fact that such
raises were granted during the height of the
preelection campaign , and the abundant evidence
of Respondent 's union animus ,30 it is found that
Respondent 's foregoing generosity in the matter of
raises to Ashley, Benedetto , and Hollner was in-
fluenced by the imminence of the Board election
and was designed to diminish the incentive of those
employees to vote for the Union.31
It is accordingly found that by granting such
raises Respondent violated Section 8(a)( I) of the
Act.
b. The new wage structure
About iecember 1 , the Respondent adopted a
new wage structure , which provided for substantial
increases for all classifications of employees.32 For
example , an offset pressman like Ashley , who had
theretofore received only $2. 60 an hour , was ad-
vanced to $3.75 an hour.
The General Counsel and Union contend that
this radical revision of Respondent 's wage structure
was designed to counteract the appeal of the
Union . However , there is undisputed evidence in
the record that during the first 7 months of 1966,
Respondent had lost a goodly number of employees
due to turnover;33 that strenuous efforts to recruit
replacements were unsuccessful ; that in September
it was ascertained that the principal reason for em-
ployee turnover and the unavailability of replace-
ments was the fact that Respondent 's wage rates
were not competitive with those of other industries
in the area ;34 that in September Respondent's per-
sonnel director , Taylor, recommended to its then
vice president , Geary , that wages be raised upward
to solve the manpower problem ; that Geary at that
time instructed Taylor to make a study of the
matter and submit a report ; that Taylor made a sur-
vey of area rates and of rates throughout the print-
ing industry and submitted a report to Geary late in
October ; 3S and that Geary then decided to adopt
the new wage schedule proposed in Taylor 's report,
and in December that schedule was placed in ef-
fect.
As there was no contradiction of the circumstan-
tial and extensive testimony to the foregoing effect,
I credit it and find that the adoption of the new
wage structure was prompted solely by legitimate,
°" These exhibits in fact contain notations concerning action to be taken
throughout 1966 and not just during the first 6 months thereof The reason
for this apparent conflict between the exhibits and Satin's testimony was
not explained
d9 Moreover, it is proper to consider at this point as background evidence
bearing on the motivation for Benedetto's raise the fact that in March, after
Benedetto told him he wanted the Union in order to better his wages, his
supervisor, D Ricciardi, in effect, promised to get him a raise See Joseph's
Landscaping Service, 154 NLRB 1384
1O See the discussion below of Respondent's presettlement conduct Such
conduct may be considered as background in evaluating evidence of post-
settlement violations Joseph's Landscaping Service, supra
" While these three employees represented only a small segment of
Respondent 's work force, the impact of the raises granted to these cannot
be regarded as de nununis, in view of the closeness of the election
3' See G C Exh I I
"G C Exh 12-A shows that, between January I and August I,
Respondent 's employee complement declined from 77 to 69, and that, by
November 30, there were only 65 employees
" The Albany area was at the time experiencing a great upsurge in con-
struction activity, with the result that even unskilled construction labor was
better paid than some of Respondent's skilled workers
' By that time, Geary had become president of Respondent
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC.
economic considerations , and dismissal of the in-
stant allegation will be recommended.36
c. The termination of Bravender
With some interruptions , Bravender had worked
for Respondent an aggregate of about 6 years. In
1948 or 1949 he first worked 1 year as a stripper.37
During 1954 or 1955 he worked about a year as a
stock clerk and operated the Rubber Dutro press.
During a subsequent period of employment
(1957-59), he operated the Rubber Dutro, and, in
accordance with Respondent's policy, was assigned
to other work when his press was idle. He was
rehired in June 1964, and for the first few months
operated two offset presses '311 referred to in the
record as the "O.D. 1" and "O.D. 2," until he in-
jured his thumb. Thereafter he was assigned prin-
cipally to the Rubber Dutro. Early in January 1966,
Respondent decided for economic reasons to sell
the Rubber Dutro and was seeking a buyer when, as
already related, Bravender, together with certain of
the other pressmen , proposed to Sutin that he
reduce the rather considerable gap between their
rates and the union scale. When on March 14 Sutin
granted Bravender's request for an increase from
$2.65 to $3.40 an hour, 9 he attached the following
conditions:`
1. The existing guarantee of 10 hours' overtime
work for the pressmen would not apply to
Bravender.
2. If, in any one week, there was not sufficient
work on the Rubber Dutro to keep Bravender busy
for 40 hours, he would be assigned to one of the
offset presses , provided that such assignment did
not interfere with Respondent's commitment to
provide the other pressmen with 10 hours' over-
time.
3. If, in any one week, there was not sufficient
work available on the Rubber Dutro or the offset
presses to keep Bravender busy for 40 hours, he
would be sent home, contrary to Respondent's past
practice of giving him other work during slack
periods.
" At the same time that it adopted the new wage schedule, Respondent
made a slight improvement in its group life insurance plan in that it paid for
each employee the weekly premium of $1 60 that had previously been paid
by him for the first $5,000 of coverage However, at the same time the ceil-
ing on coverage under the plan for production employees was reduced
from $10,000 to $5,000, except in those cases where an employee already
carried a $10,000 policy Geary testified that he informed the employees
that the Respondent 's foregoing assumption of premium liability was re-
lated to its new wage program , in that it was designed to compensate em-
ployees for a possible reduction in total, take-home pay that might result
from the then contemplated cutback in overtime work Under all the cir-
cumstances , I do not believe the record warrants a finding that the payment
of the insurance premiums was unlawful
" Bravender so testified While Respondent 's records did not show this
employment , they were admittedly incomplete
w The Rubber Dutro was not an offset press In addition to the Rubber
Dutro and the 0 D I and 0 D 2, Respondent 's employees operated ro-
tary presses and letter presses
'B As already noted, the other pressmen had decided at the union meet-
ing on March 13 to abandon direct negotiations and to press their wage de-
mand through the Union
1825
4. If the Rubber Dutro was sold, Bravender
would be given a job on one of Respondent's other
presses.41
As related in more detail below, the same day
that he agreed to raise Bravender's pay and for
several days thereafter, Sutin, in speeches to groups
of employees, vigorously opposed the Union,
stressing the warning that, while Respondent had
theretofore avoided layoffs, under union conditions
the employees would be subject to layoff.
After Bravender's pay was raised, work for the
Rubber Dutro tapered off, and on days when that
press was idle Bravender was usually sent home.42
However, he was eventually transferred to the night
shift and assigned to work on the offset presses.
There, he performed work that would otherwise
have been done by the regular offset pressmen.
However, on May 27, 2 days after the title to the
Rubber Dutro passed to the buyer, Bravender
ceased to work for Respondent. He was laid off on
that date, and was several days later informed by
Sutin that prospects of his recall were not good and
that he should apply for unemployment insurance.
Finally, on July 5, he was notified by letter that his
employment was terminated due to the retirement
of the Rubber Dutro and the lack of other work on
the night shift, as well as the absence of any super-
visor on that shift.
The General Counsel and Union contend, in ef-
fect, that the layoff of May 27, and the final ter-
mination on July 5, were motivated by the fact that
Bravender had pioneered a "break-through" in
Respondent's wage structure, and that those actions
were designed to deter others from following
Bravender's example, as well as to impress upon the
employees the truth of Sutin's repeated admoni-
tions to them at the inception of the Union's or-
ganizing campaign that under a union contract they
would have less assurance of continuous employ-
ment.43
Admittedly, Respondent had never before laid
any employee off for lack of work but had shifted
them to other work to avoid layoff. Respondent
contends that Bravender's case was different
'0 The ensuing findings are based on a synthesis of the testimony of Sutin,
Bravender , and Ashley
41 Both Ashley and Bravender testified without direct contradiction that
the latter was given that assurance by Sutin on March 11, and Bravender's
testimony that about the same time D Ricciardi also so stated was not
disputed
42 On one occasion , apparently in April, Sutin told him he was being as-
signed to the stockrooms for 2 or 3 days, in preference to laying him off for
that period , because of the adverse "psychological effect " a layoff might
have on the other employees , and because of the imminence of new busi-
ness
" In addition, Sutin admittedly knew at the time of his layoff of Braven-
der's adherence to the Union , and presumably regarded him as represent-
ing a vote for the Union in any election that might be held on the represen-
tation petition then pending However, in view of the findings hereinafter
made, there is no need to consider whether this was a factor in the decision
to terminate Bravender As to its bearing on the decision not to recall him,
see fn 53 below
1826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
because he had been given the option of a guaran-
teed tenure at the old rate or a higher rate without
any gurarantee of tenure and had chosen the latter.
Thus, Respondent contends, Bravender gambled
with his tenure and lost. However, nowhere in the
record does it appear that it was made clear to
Bravender before he made his election that his
tenure was at stake. The record shows only that the
discussions between Sutin and the pressmen on
March 4 and I I focused on whether, if they elected
the higher rate, they would continue to enjoy the
guarantee of 10 hours' overtime work (i.e., 50-hour
week), which had prevailed in the past, that Sutin
indicated that such guarantee would no longer
apply to those who elected the higher rate, and that
in general they could expect to work not more than
40 hours, subject to the availability of work on their
presses. Except with respect to Bravender, there is
no evidence that any reference was made to the
possibility that a situation might arise where a
pressman would have to be terminated entirely
under the new arrangement; and, in the case of
Bravender, it is undisputed, as found above, that he
was specifically assured before he made his election
(1) that during slack periods on his press he would
be assigned work on the offset presses to the extent
consistent with the overtime guarantee to the offset
pressmen, and (2) that, if the Rubber Dutro was
sold, he would be given a job on some other press.
Thus, contrary to Respondent's contention, there is
no evidence that Bravender consented to gamble
with his tenure, nor that such a gamble was con-
templated when he made his election. So far as the
record shows, the only risk Bravender knowingly
incurred was that he might work less than 40 hours
during any one week.44
Thus, it appears that, despite Respondent's
unqualified promise to Bravender that, if the
Rubber Dutro was sold, he would be given a job on
another press,45 he was released as soon as that sale
was effected. While he asserted that it was not
economical to employ Bravender at the $3.40 rate
on work such as wrapping packages and moving
stock, Sutin did not expressly deny that there was
work on other presses to which Bravender could
have been assigned.46
"Respondent in fact assigned work to Bravender which it was not
required to furnish him under its arrangement with him Thus , as noted
above ( fn 42 ), he was given work in the stockroom, but under circum-
stances indicating that such assignment was a matter of business necessity
Also, during the last weeks of May he was assigned by D Ricciardi to work
nights on the offset presses , although such assignment required that the
regular offset pressmen relinquish part of their guaranteed overtime How-
ever, although Sutin professed to have authorized this assignment , I credit
D Ricciardi 's candid avowal that such assignment was contrary to instruc-
tions given him not to use Bravender on any work other than the Rubber
Dutro, and that , when he learned of the matter, Sutin rebuked D Ricciardi
for violating that instruction
° There is no evidence or contention that such promise was contingent
on the availability of work on the offset presses over and above Respon-
dent 's overtime commitment to the offset pressmen or that it was, in fact,
limited to employment on those presses and did not contemplate work on
one of Respondent 's other presses See fn 38, above
'" Moreover , as indicated above (fn 44 ), while it appears that the offset
work performed by Bravender at the end of his tenure was in derogation of
Moreover, even if no presswork was available,
there was nothing to preclude Respondent from of-
fering Bravender a less skilled job at his former, or
some other, lower rate. Respondent did not do so,
despite its admitted manpower shortage '41 prefer-
ring to depart from its traditional, no-layoff policy,
as well as its foregoing assurance to Bravender, and
aggravate that shortage, rather than explore means
of keeping him at work.48
In sum, it is admitted that Bravender was sub-
jected to disparate treatment with regard to the ap-
plication of Respondent's no-layoff policy, and the
only justification offered is that such disparate
treatment was the logical and necessary result of
the election made by Bravender on March 14. For
reasons already stated, I find no merit in that con-
tention. In the absence of any persuasive explana-
tion by Respondent for such disparate treatment,
and, in view of (a) the abundant evidence of
Respondent's union animus, (b) the timing of
Bravender's layoff and discharge in relation to the
impending election, and (c) Sutin's admonitions to
the employees, linking the higher wages and other
benefits of a union contract with layoffs, I find that
Bravender's layoff and subsequent discharge were
motivated by a desire to impress upon the em-
ployees the truth of the foregoing admonitions and
to discourage them from supporting the Union in
the election, and that the sale of the Rubber Dutro
was utilized by Respondent as an opportune and
colorable pretext for such layoff and discharge.
I find, moreover, that the foregoing analysis of
Respondent's motivation is confirmed by certain
events occurring after Bravender's discharge.
Despite the critical manpower shortage ex-
perienced by Respondent in the latter half of 1966,
no effort was made to recall Bravender. As noted
above, I have credited the testimony of Respon-
dent's witnesses that the radical upward revision of
its wage structure in December was due to the dif-
ficulty encountered by Respondent in retaining and
recruiting employees at the old wage levels.
Respondent's personnel director, Taylor, described
his efforts at recruitment between July and
December as follows:
the overtime guarantee to the regular offset pressmen , there is no evidence
or contention that on May 27, when Bravender was laid off, or on July 5,
when he was discharged , Respondent believed, or had reason to believe,
that it would not in the foreseeable future have any "excess " overtime
work for the offset presses that could be assigned to Bravender While
there was considerable testimony by Respondent 's witnesses as to Braven-
der's limitations as an offset pressman , there was no evidence that that was
a factor in his termination As to the validity of such contention as a reason
for not recalling him, see the discussion in the text, below
" See discussion of this in the text, above
When asked why, instead of laying Bravender off, he did not offer to
retain him in some capacity at his former rate, Sutin answered , triter alia,
that he believed that Bravender preferred to be laid off, and that it was not
incumbent on Respondent to take the initiative but it was for Bravender to
make such a proposal There is no need to comment on the first explana-
tion, and the second rings hollow in view of the evidence discussed below
as to the strenuous measures being taken by Respondent to solve its man-
power problems
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1827
Q. And you were interviewing people or ad-
vertising for people all that time?
A. Yes, in fact, I even had an assistant help-
ing me whose primary function was specifically
employment.
Q. Did anyone respond to the ads?
A. We had response to the ads, quite a few.
We tried blind ads with our name not listed in
the newspapers, received telephone calls. They
asked us what the rate was and we never heard
from them again . . . we called the New York
State unemployment [sic] and, in fact, we even
went to the Parole Board and tried to get peo-
ple there.
When asked whether he had attempted to rehire
any former employees of Respondent, Taylor an-
swered, " It's against my policy to rehire, but under
the circumstances we were forced into doing such a
thing."
As to Bravender , Taylor explained that he had
not been offered reemployment because Taylor had
been advised by Bravender's supervisor (D. Ric-
ciardi ) that he was not qualified to operate any
machine other than the Rubber Dutro, which had
already been sold.
While admitting that Respondent lost some of its
pressmen during the latter part of 1966,49 Geary
echoed the reason given by Taylor for not recalling
Bravender . At the same time , Geary acknowledged
that the Rubber Dutro was more difficult to operate
than the offset presses, and the record shows that
the operation of the Rubber Dutro commands a
substantially higher rate under union contracts than
do Respondent's offset presses.50
Moreover, Bravender testified, without con-
tradiction, and I find, that he had worked for about
a year on offset presses for other firms, before
returning to Respondent in June 1964, and it is not
disputed that at that time he was assigned to
Respondent's offset presses for I or 2 months and
was taken off them only after he suffered an injury;
nor is it disputed that he thereafter throughout his
tenure did fill-in work on those presses.
It is clear from the foregoing that when, in
March, Bravender was, as is found above, promised
any available work on the offset presses whenever
the Rubber Dutro was idle, Respondent had already
had ample opportunity to ascertain his capabilities
on those presses. The fact that he was given such
promise, that he was actually assigned to those
presses toward the end of his term, and that, as
noted above, there is no evidence that his termina-
tion was due to his alleged deficiencies on offset'
work, all these circumstances are persuasive that
Bravender was not so incompetent in that work as
to cause Respondent to prefer to recruit totally in-
experienced men, or go short handed, rather than
recall Bravender.st Yet, although Respondent ad-
mittedly had need for offset pressmen after Braven-
der's discharge, as well as for other categories of
employees, and, although it was having great dif-
ficulty in recruiting even inexperienced help, and
was seeking out other, former employees, no at-
tempt was made at any time after his layoff to ex-
plore Bravender's willingness to return as an offset
pressman or in some less skilled capacity.- 51
It is therefore concluded that, by laying
Bravender off on May 27, by discharging him on
July 5, and by failing thereafter to recall him,53
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.54
4. Conclusion as to the settlement agreement
In view of the postsettlement violations found
above, including the discharge of Bravender on July
5, it is concluded that the settlement was subject to
rescission on account of such violations, as well as
for the reason cited by the Acting Regional
Director, and that, even if the cited reason were in-
valid, it would be proper for me to affirm his ac-
tions on the basis of such violations.
49 Ashley's uncontradicted testimony shows, and I find , that, after
Bravender 's discharge , Respondent had to hire four offset pressmen, all of
whom were presumably inexperienced, it being Respondent's admitted pol-
icy to hire inexperienced personnel and train them on the job
50 According to the uncontradicted testimony of Ashley and Bravender,
in March 1966 , the hourly union rate for the Rubber Dutro was $ 3 75, as
against $3 45 for the offset presses Ashley described the Rubber Dutro as
more complicated than the other presses
" Needless to say, in the light of the circumstances set forth above, I
deem incredible D Ricciardi 's testimony that even inexperienced men
were able to operate the offset presses more efficiently than Bravender
Sz In its brief, Respondent cites the fact that it had not, after Bravender's
previous departures from its employ ( in 1955 and 1959), attempted to re-
call him However , those departures were not caused by any alleged lack of
work but on the one occasion by Bravender 's resignation because of a
desire for a change in climate, and on the other occasion by his discharge
for giving way to a fit of temper Moreover , there is no evidence that
Respondent on those occasions experienced a manpower shortage com-
parable to that which prevailed in 1966, nor that Respondent was then, as
in 1966, actively seeking out other former employees
" Even if Bravender 's termination were deemed nondiscriminatory, I
would still find the failure to recall him unlawful, not only because of his
disparate treatment in the matter of recall, but also because Respondent
was undoubtedly aware that, in iew of the closeness of the election of July
21, the outcome of any future election that might he directed might well
turn on Bravendcr 's (prounion) vote
"The record contains testimony by one Tefft that, in the summer of
1966, Hill, who was then a vice president of Respondent and Tefft's next
door neighbor, expressed to Tefft the view that Bravender's termination
might "teach (the employees] a lesson what it would be like if the
Union comes in " Although Hill controverted this testimony, I was more
favorably impressed by Tefft's demeanor , and but for the circumstances
next discussed would give weight to such testimony In its brief Respon-
dent moves to strike Tefft's entire testimony on the ground that the
General Counsel failed at the hearing to comply with Respondent's request
for production of certain notes of a pretrial interview with Tefft The
General Counsel represented to me that such notes had not been prepared
until a few days after the interview and were based on his recollection
thereof As I was satisfied from this representation, as well as from Tefft's
testimony about the matter, that he had not signed, approved , or otherwise
adopted the notes, I did not order the General Counsel to show them to
Respondent 's counsel See Sec 102 118 of the Board's Rules However, it
now appears to me that under Campbell v U S , 365 U S 85, the proper
procedure would have been for the Trial Examiner on his own motion to
call the General Counsel as a witness and examine him under oath about
the matter , with opportunity for cross-examination by Respondent To
avoid the necessity for reopening the hearing for this purpose, I have de-
cided to attach no weight to Tefft 's testimony
1828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. The presettlement violations
There was extensive testimony with regard to al-
legations of presettlement interrogation, threats of
reprisal, and other coercive conduct. Except insofar
as such testimony related to the supervisory status
of Romand, Respondent offered no defense to such
allegations, choosing to rely entirely on its conten-
tion that any violation findings were barred by the
settlement agreement. As this contention has been
rejected, it becomes necessary to consider the
foregoing testimony, which, except where otherwise
specifically noted, is uncontradicted.
Bohen-Briggs
On March 12, Briggs was asked by Plant
Manager Bohen if he was going to attend the union
meeting the next day. On the 14th Bohen asked
Briggs if he had signed anything, and, when Briggs
answered that he had, Bohen expressed the hope
that Briggs would not "get hurt by this." Later that
day, Bohen asked Briggs what he wanted, and,
upon learning that Briggs wanted the same rate of
pay as that of another employee, Bohen promised
that Sutin would agree to this.
that his notification to the DeSarbos on March 12
that he knew of the impending employee meeting,
unlawfully created the impression of surveillance, I
base no violation finding on the discussion of the
March 20 meeting, as Paul voluntarily broached
that subject, nor do I find any merit in General
Counsel's contention that Schreiber's solicitation of
an invitation to attend that meeting5S and his actual
attendance, together with two other supervisors,
were unlawful.56
In the foregoing conversation on the 14th,
Schreiber remarked to Paul that under a union "lit-
tle people could get hurt," inquiring in this connec-
tion whether he thought that Sutin would retain
slow and inexperienced employees when he could
hire "craftsmen" at the same rate of pay. The
General Counsel contends that this was a threat to
discharge marginal employees if the plant was or-
ganized. However, I am inclined to view this rather
as a speculation by Schreiber that Sutin would find
it uneconomical to pay the union scale to some of
his existing employees, since he could attract more
competent employees at the higher pay rates. Ac-
cordingly, I find no violation here.
Ricciardi
Schreiber-DeSarbo
On March 1 l , a group of employees decided to
hold a meeting at Paul DeSarbo's house on March
13, to consider engaging in concerted activity. The
next day Paul's supervisor, Schreiber, called his
house and in his absence spoke to Mrs. DeSarbo,
stating that he had heard there would be a meeting
at her home that evening and that he wanted to talk
to Paul about it. When her husband came home
later that day, Mrs. DeSarbo told him about this
call. The meeting held the next day was addressed
by a union representative, and most of the em-
ployees in attendance signed union cards. When
Paul reported to work on the 14th, Schreiber inter-
rogated him in some detail about the union meet-
ing. Thereafter, Paul volunteered that there would
be another larger meeting, to which "everybody"
would be invited, which prompted Schreiber to ask
if he would receive an invitation. When Paul
thereupon extended one to him, Schreiber obtained
from Paul the date of the meeting, and attended the
meeting , on the 20th, together with two other su-
pervisors, Bohen and D. Ricciardi.
While there is no difficulty in finding that all the
foregoing instances of interrogation by Schreiber
about the March 13 meeting were unlawful, and
's See J W Mais, Inc, 147 NLRB 942,947-948
See J W Mays, Inc. supra, and Presser Scientific, Inc. 158 NLRB
1375, 1383, holding that attendance at a union meeting by supervisors with
the knowledge and consent of the employees does not constitute surveil-
lance Here there was clearly consent as to Schreiber , and as to the other
two supervisors there is no evidence that anyone objected to their presence
at the meeting
A day or two after the union meeting of March
13, R. DeSarbo was told by a supervisor, D. Ric-
ciardi, that he had heard that the "whole mess"
started because of him, and asked if it was too late
to talk about it. Later that day D. Ricciardi asked
R. DeSarbo what the men wanted, and, when
DeSarbo expressed a desire for better conditions,
Ricciardi asked him to put it in writing and he
would see what he could do about it. Similarly, on
March 14, after eliciting from Benedetto an ex-
planation that he wanted the Union in order to im-
prove his wages , D. Ricciardi said, "I'll get that for
you." Benedetto did in fact receive two raises
within the next few months.
On March 14 or 15, D. Ricciardi solicited infor-
mation from Bravender about the union activity in
the plant, and asked Bravender how he felt about it.
Bravender answered that he favored the Union."'
On March 15, D. Ricciardi told a group of em-
ployees that they did not need an "outside" union
and suggested they form their own grievance com-
mittee. When an employee suggested that the su-
pervisor take the lead in organizing such a com-
mitte , he demurred, explaining that such action
would have to be taken by a nonsupervisory em-
ployee, and he proposed that one of their number,
Motto, undertake the task.
" About a week later, D Ricciardi told Bravender that his projected
transfer to the night shift was being held in abeyance because of the "union
business " While Bravender testified that he preferred the night shift for
personal reasons , he admitted that he did not request the transfer but that
Sutin was the one who had broached it Bravender was in fact assigned
some night work shortly thereafter Under these circumstances , I base no
violation finding on this incident
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC.
On the same occasion D. Ricciardi stressed the
same theme that Sutin was then elaborating in his
speeches to the employees (see the text, below)-
namely that, under a union, Respondent would not
shift employees from job to job to avoid layoffs.
Sutin
On March 14, the day after the first union meet-
ing, Sutin went through the plant, addressing
groups of employees in their work areas. Thus, he
told the Typo-Lith employees on that day that he
had heard rumors of the advent of the Union, and
that there had been an employee meeting; that he
did not want outsiders telling him how to run his
business; that some employees had proposed to him
the formation of a grievance committee to submit
complaints to Sutin; that, if the Union prevailed,
flexibility would be hurt, he could not move people
around from job to job, and he could not guarantee
a 48-hour week; and that some employees might
lose their jobs, and those who had attended the
union meeting on March 13 were "rejects" who
could not find jobs anywhere else.SB After apprising
the Typo-Lith employees that he knew that some
had signed cards, he adjured them not to sign any
more cards. In response to an inquiry by a super-
visor as to whether those who had signed could get
them back, Sutin stated that he "assumed" that
they could.
The same day, Sutin adressed the Mohawk em-
ployees in two separate groups. One group, consist-
ing of the pressmen and strip-up employees, was
told that Sutin had heard there had been a union
meeting the day before, and that some union cards
had been signed; that under a union he could not
guarantee overtime work nor move people about
freely from job to job; that a grievance committee
might be a good idea; and that, since it would have
to pay higher wages under a union contract,
Respondent would not be able to afford overtime
pay, and so would not be able to accept as much
work as it had in the past.59
In his speech to the rest of the Mohawk em-
ployees, Sutin repeated his opposition to an outside
union, suggested the formation of an employee
grievance committee, and warned that "we
probably wouldn't be able to work more than 40
hours a week if the union did come in" (in contrast
" The foregoing is based on a synthesis of the testimony of R Desarbo
and Briggs, both of whom were Typo-Lith employees (As to Briggs, see
Resp Exh 5-B )
The findings in this paragraph are based on Ashley's testimony
The foregoing findings are based on the testimony of Motto
Paul DeSarbo so testified While Ashley at first ascribed to Sutin on
this occasion an interdiction of union solicitation on company time or pro-
perty, Ashley retracted this when confronted with a statement in his pretri-
al affidavit that he did not recall any such remark by Sutin
The findings in the above paragraph are based on Ashley's testimony
This finding as to Sutin is based on his warnings of layoffs, and proba-
ble reduction in overtime, under a union While it is inferrable from
Ashley's testimony that, in one or both of the two speeches about which he
testified, Sutin ascribed the danger of layoffs and loss of overtime to the an-
1829
to the prevailing practice of working as much as 55
hours a week)."
Sutin also addressed the employees at plantwide
meetings called by him. On March 15 or 16, he
stated at such a meeting that under a union he
could no longer guarantee a 48-hour week, and
flexibility of work assignments would be reduced;
that some employees had proposed a grievance
committee to him, and he thought this was a good
idea; and that, while theretofore Respondent had
avoided layoffs, the employees would be subject to
layoffs under a union . In another speech to the em-
ployees on March 17, Sutin warned that it was il-
legal to discuss the Union on company time and
property'61 and on April 1, Respondent for the first
time posted a rule forbidding (a) solicitation for a
union during worktime and (b) distribution of
union literature at any time in work areas and dur-
ing worktime in nonwork areas.
At another plantwide meeting, held the next day,
Sutin again indicated that unionization would im-
pair flexibility, and that under a union the em-
ployees would no longer be assigned to other tasks
when there was no work for them in their primary
jobs, but would have to go home, and that the em-
ployees should establish their own method of han-
dling their problem instead of calling in outsiders.62
On March 14 or 15, Sutin told R. DeSarbo that
Sutin could not do anything about the existing
union activity, but that, if DeSarbo wanted to do
something about it, he should see a lawyer or Ro-
mand and Motto. As related below, only a few days
later Romand and Motto began to circulate a peti-
tion designating them as the representatives of the
employees in dealing with management.
On the basis of the foregoing incidents I find the
following violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Coercive interrogation by Bohen, Schreiber,
and D. Ricciardi, concerning employee union senti-
ments and activities.
(b) Schreiber's telephone call of March 12, to
Paul DeSarbo's home, creating the impression of
surveillance of union activity.
(c) Warnings of reprisal for union activity by
Bohen (to Briggs ), Sutin, and D. Ricciardi.63
(d) Sutin's injunction to the employees not to
sign any more union cards and his intimation, in
response to an inquiry by a supervisor, that those
who had already signed might retrieve their cards.
ticipated requirements of a union contract, particularly the higher rates of
pay under such a contract, which would make it uneconomical to continue
Respondent's practice of guaranteeing extensive overtime, it does not ap-
pear that this economic rationalization was spelled out in any of the other
speeches outlined above In any event , it is well settled that warnings of
probable loss of overtime or layoffs under a union contract are not pro-
tected free speech, particularly where, as is the case here , such warnings
are delivered in the context of other unfair labor practices Crustal Tire Co ,
165 NLRB 563, Wausau Steel Corporation, 160 NLRB 635, enfd 377 F 2d
369 (C A 7), General Automation Manufacturing, Inc, 167 NLRB 502,
Welding & Industrial Products, Ltd, 167 NLRB 881, 882-883
The finding in the test as to D Ricciardi is based on his reiteration on
March 15 of Sutin's foregoing warning regarding layoffs under a union
1830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) The suggestions by Sutin and D. Ricciardi to
the employees that they form their own grievance
committee rather than seek representation by the
Union, and Sutin's suggestion to R. DeSarbo that
he engage in activity in opposition to the Union.
(f) The promise of a wage increase by Bohen
and D. Ricciardi to Briggs and Benedetto, respec-
tively, in order to diminish their incentive to join
the Unions'
The Romand-Motto Petition
In the latter part of March there was circulated
among the employees a petition designating Ro-
mand , an alleged supervisor , and Motto as the
representatives of the employees for the purpose of
dealing with management . This activity began, so
far as the record shows , on March 18, only a few
days after Sutin repeatedly urged the employees to
form their own committee to deal with manage-
ment , and suggested to R. DeSarbo that he ally
himself with Romand and Motto , if he wished to
combat the Union , and only 3 days after D. Ricciar-
di suggested to a group of employees that Motto
take the lead in organizing an employee grievance
committee . During the next week , Romand and
Motto, assisted by others , engaged in extensive cir-
culation throughout the plant during worktime of
the foregoing petition , and on at least one occasion
an admitted supervisor , Schreiber , was present. On
another occasion, C. Ricciardi , an alleged super-
visor , permitted Motto to address a group of em-
ployees on worktime concerning the petition.
The General Counsel contends that , with respect
to this petition , Respondent violated the Act in the
following ways: ( a) by permitting the circulation of
such petition , while prohibiting solicitation on be-
half of the Union ; ( b) by the fact that such petition
was signed by an admitted supervisor, Schreiber,
and by two alleged superviosrs , Romand and C.
Ricciardi ; and (c ) by the conduct of Romand in sol-
iciting employees to sign the petition.
As to ( a), above, the only prohibition upon union
solicitation during the period of circulation of the
foregoing petition was that announced by Sutin on
March 17, as related above . 65 However , there was
ample evidence of flagrant breaches of this rule, by
Romand and Motto , and, while , as to only one ad-
mitted supervisor , Schreiber, was there direct
testimony that he witnessed and condoned such a
breach ,66it is inferrable from the openness and ex-
tent of such activity that other supervisors were
" However , I make no finding as to whether , as alleged, certain increases
granted to the employees prior to approval of the settlement agreement
were unlawfully motivated In view of the findings above as to the postset-
tlement raises , no useful purpose would be served by passing on the same
issue here
w There was no evidence of any circulation of the petition during work-
time after the posting of the April I no-solicitation rule
w He in fact , also, signed the petition
°' Bravender also testified that, after Motto began to circulate the peti-
tion, the two debated the merits of the Independent Union in the presence
of D Ricciardi
aware thereof, and there is no evidence that any
employee was disciplined therefor, At the same
time, Ashley admitted that supervisors condoned
discussions by him with other employees during
worktime of the relative merits of the Union and
the Romand-Motto organization, and, since Ashley
was an adherent of the Union from the inception of
its campaign, it may be presumed that in these
discussions he espoused the cause of the Union.67
While such activity by Ashley may not have ap-
proached in magnitude that of the Romand-Motto
group, it is inferrable from the foregoing that dur-
ing the period in question there was no effort, or
disposition, by management to enforce a no-sol-
icitation rule against either union group.68 Ac-
cordingly, I do not believe that it has been
established by the preponderance of the evidence
that there was disparate enforcement of such a rule.
As to (b), above, while admitting that Schreiber,
Romand, and C. Ricciardi signed the petition,
Respondent denied that the latter two were super-
visors. In view of the admission as to Schreiber and,
as it is found below that C. Ricciardi was a super-
visor, there is no need to consider, for the purpose
of this allegation, the extensive, conflicting
evidence in the record as to Romand's supervisory
status.
As to (c), above, I do not deem it necessary to
pass on this allegation , which again raises the issue
of Romand's status, since it is abundantly clear, and
it has been found, that it was Sutin and D. Ricciardi
who implanted in the minds of the employees the
idea of countering the organizational efforts of the
Union by forming their own union organization to
deal with management, that D. Ricciardi even sug-
gested the name of Motto as the leader of such a
movement, and that Sutin suggested to R. DeSarbo
that he might help to defeat the Union by allying
himself with Romand and Motto. The foregoing cir-
cumstances, coupled with the fact that Schreiber
and C. Ricciardi signed the petition, suffice to
establish that, by the totality of its conduct,
Respondent unduly interfered with employees
freedom of choice, thereby violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.69
IV. THE POSTELECTION ISSUES
A. The Challenges
1. Bravender. Bravender's vote was challenged
by the Board agent because his name did not ap-
w It may well be doubted, moreover, that Sutin's oral announcement of
March 17 was intended as anything more than a statement of the law per-
taining to union solicitation on worktime, or that he had before April I
reached any decision to promulgate, let alone enforce, a no-solicitation
rule
" The General Counsel does not allege that such interference violated
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, and, contrary to the Union's position in its
brief, expressly disclaimed any request for the sort of remedy normally as-
sociated with 8(a)(2) violations As such matters are within the exclusive
control of the General Counsel, such a finding and remedy will be omitted
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1831
pear on the eligibility list. The eligibility date was
the pay period ending June 22, 1966. It is ap-
parently Respondent's position that Bravender was
not eligible because he was at that time in layoff
status with no reasonable prospect of recall. How-
ever, as it has been found that Bravender's layoff
and subsequent discharge were discriminatory, it
will be recommended that the challenge to his bal-
lot be overruled.
2. Amedio. His ballot was challenged by the
Union on the ground that he was an irregular, part-
time employee. When hired on November 30,
1965, he was operating, together with a partner, a
floor-sanding business, and he explained to Sutin
that he desired a job with Respondent as a means of
tiding him over the lulls in his sanding business,
which occurred principally in the winter. It was
agreed that Amedio would work for Respondent on
that basis, and would take leave whenever necessa-
ry to attend to his sanding work, returning to
Respondent when that work fell off. He worked for
Respondent from November 30, 1965, to April 20,
1966, and during that period averaged somewhat
more than 20 hours a week. However, he did no
work for Respondent during the rest of 1966, ex-
cept for the week ending July 20, when he worked
12-1/2 hours, and the week ending July 27, when
he worked 2-1/2 hours. It is undisputed that he did
no work on July 21, the date of the election.
Amedio resumed work for Respondent late in
January 1967, working every week thereafter to
May 31, and during this period his time ranged
from 3-1/2 to 32 hours a week, the average being
about 15 hours.
Ashley testified, without contradiction, and I find
that on the day of the election he encountered
Amedio in the plant, and, in response to Ashley's
inquiry as to the reason for his presence, Amedio
stated, "I came in to quit and vote," explaining that
he had too much floor-sanding business, and could
not keep up both jobs. However, there is no
evidence that prior to the election Amedio commu-
nicated to Respondent his intention to quit , 70 and it
is clear, in any event, that in January 1967 he
returned to work for Respondent on a part-time ba-
sis. The Regional Director concluded that Amedio
was either an intermittent , part -time employee or a
temporary employee, and as such was not eligible
to vote. In finding Amedio to be an intermittent,
part-time employee, the Regional Director cited the
fact that he did not work at all for Respondent dur-
ing the 12 weeks immediately preceding the elec-
tion; and the Regional Director relied on Hagg
Drug Co., Incorporated.71 where the Board held
that one who had been a regular, part-time em-
ployee until April 1963, but thereafter, because of
full-time employment elsewhere, worked only 22-
1/2 hours during the 20 weeks preceding the elec-
tion , had become an irregular, or intermittent, part-
time employee, and was not eligible to vote. I deem
the foregoing considerations persuasive here, and
will recommend that the challenge to Amedio's bal-
lot be sustained.72
3. Kaplan. He was challenged by the Union as a
"seasonal " employee. He was a high school stu-
dent, and began to work early in June 1966, during
his school vacation period. He worked about 40
hours a week throughout July and the first half of
August, returning early in September, and he
thereafter worked 4 or 5 hours a week during 10 of
the next 14 weeks, his last day being December 14.
It is well settled that the Board will not deem
eligible to vote students who are hired only for
summer work.73 However, if they are hired with the
understanding that they will continue to work after
the summer on a regular, part-time basis-e.g., on
weekends, or after school hours-there is authority
for holding them eligible to vote.74 The principal
issue as to Kaplan was whether he was hired with
such an understanding or only for summer work.
According to Sutin, it was agreed, when Kaplan
was hired, that he would work during the summer
and at least on Saturdays after school opened, and
Kaplan testified that, when he was hired, he in-
tended to continue to work weekends after the start
of the school year, if he was able to maintain his
school grades, and that he so informed Sutin.75
The fact that Kaplan did in fact work on a part-
time basis for Respondent during the school term
until mid-December (when his family moved from
the area) tends to confirm his testimony that, when
hired, it was understood that he would do so, pro-
vided that his school work would not be adversely
affected thereby. Accordingly, I credit such
testimony, and find that this was in fact the un-
derstanding when Kaplan was hired, and that,
under the authorities cited above, he was eligible to
vote. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the
challenge to his ballot be overruled.
4. Baldwin. His vote was challenged by the
70 The record shows, as noted above, that he in fact worked 2-1/2 hours
during the week immediately following the election Moreover, Sutin
testified, without contradiction , that Amedio did not at any time resign
from Respondent's employ
71 146 NLRB 798, 800
rt Even if it be assumed that, as Sutin testified, there was in effect on the
eligibility date an understanding that Amedio was free to return to Respon-
dent's employ whenever his other work permitted, there could be no as-
surance at that time that the pattern of such future employment , if any,
would be more regular than in the past ( Nor was his subsequent employ-
ment in 1967 in fact more regular than in the 1965-66 period ) The fact
that the parties contemplate a continuing employment relationship does
not preclude a finding that the employment is intermittent , where, as here,
it is sporadic and contingent upon the availability of other employment
° Bross n-Forman Distillers Corp , 118 NLRB 454, George Groh and Sons,
141 NLRB 931, 937-939
N Sandy's Stores, Inc , 163 NLRB 728, Giordano Lumber Co , Inc , 133
NLRB 205, 207, Big Ben Department Stores, Inc, 160 NLRB 1925, 1935,
Horn and Hardart Co, 147 NLRB 654, 658, Taunton Supply Corp, 137
NLRB 221, 222
75 Kaplan's mother testified that in June 1966 he told her that he would
like to continue to work after school started, if it did not interfere with his
school program
1832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board agent because his name did not appear on
the eligibility list. He was a truckdriver on the
payroll of Cromwell Printery, which company con-
sisted mainly of administrative and sales em-
ployees.76 The eligibility list contained only names
of those on the payroll of Typo-Lith, Mohawk, and
Mercury, which comprised Respondent's produc-
tion operations. There was no other truckdriver in
the employ of any of the four foregoing77 compa-
nies . Baldwin's duties consisted of making delive-
ries from Respondent's shipping department to
customers. Emergency deliveries are made by a sta-
tion wagon operated by employees who are admit-
tedly in the unit. Baldwin's immediate supervisor
was Gizzi, who was in the employ of Cromwell
Printery. However, instructions from Gizzi and
others in the office of Cromwell Printery concern-
ing deliveries are sometimes relayed to Baldwin by
Barba, a unit employee in the Typo-Lith shipping
department. Baldwin receives the same fringe
benefits as unit employees, spends about one-half
hour each day at the shipping department to load
his truck, and eats his lunch there. He has been
replaced during his vacation periods by unit em-
ployees, as well as by nonunit employees.
The Regional Director found Baldwin to be eligi-
ble on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the stipulated
unit purported to include "production and main-
tenance employees" of Cromwell Printery, (2) that,
in any event, Baldwin made deliveries for the entire
plant from the Typo-Lith shipping department, and
(3) that he had a close community of interest with
the unit employees. While this result would seem to
be sound, if we were dealing here with a contested
unit, the fact remains that the unit here was stipu-
lated, and in such a case , absent any statutory de-
fect in the agreed unit, the controlling considera-
tion is the intent of the parties in entering into the
sitpulation.78 The stipulation for certification
defines the Employer as including Cromwell Prin-
tery, 79 as well as Mohawk, Typo-Lith, and Mercu-
ry, and describes the unit as including all produc-
tion and maintenance employees of such employer,
excluding office clerical employees, administrative
employees, sales employees, confidential em-
ployees, managerial employees, guards, profes-
sional employees and supervisors. Thus,
truckdrivers are neither expressly included nor ex-
pressly excluded. It may be urged on the one hand
that, since the Board traditionally treats
truckdrivers as a separate category from production
and maintenance employees, the failure to provide
expressly for their inclusion denotes an intent to ex-
clude them. On the other hand, it may be con-
tended that the failure to list truckdrivers among
the excluded categories reflects an intention to
treat them as part of the included group. In view of
the apparent ambiguity in the unit stipulation on
this point, it seems appropriate to consider the
evidence as to the actual intent of the parties as
reflected in the discussions which culminated in the
execution of the stipulation on June 24, 1966.
Jones, Respondent's trial counsel, testified that at
the final, preelection conference on June 24, 1966,
when he explained to the union representatives,
Paul DeSarbo and Zeiger, that Baldwin's name had
been omitted from the eligibility list submitted by
Respondent because he was an employee of Crom-
well Printery, the union representatives expressly
disclaimed any contention that any Cromwell Prin-
tery employee was eligible to vote. According to
Jones, he then had the eligibility list retyped, Bald-
win's name still being omitted, all parties agreed
that such retyped list was correct and complete, it
was initialed by Zeiger, and the stipulation for cer-
tification was then signed. Paul DeSarbo80 insisted,
however, that at the June 24 conference he
questioned the omission of Baldwin's name from
the eligibility list submitted by Jones, and that,
when Jones explained that Baldwin was an em-
ployee of Cromwell Printery and not a production
or maintenance employee, the witness and Zeiger
stated that they did not believe that to be the case.
However, the witness did not specifically dispute
Jones' testimony that, when a retyped list was sub-
sequently submitted by Jones, which still did not
contain Baldwin's name , the union representatives
agreed that it was correct and complete, and that it
was initialed by Zeiger.81
In view of this, and on the basis of demeanor, I
credit Jones and find that at the June 24 con-
ference the Union, in effect, acquiesced in Respon-
dent's interpretation of the stipulated unit as not in-
cluding Baldwin, and agreed that he was not eligi-
ble for that reason. Under the circumstances Bald-
win is found not to be eligible and it will be recom-
mended that the challenge to his ballot be
sustained.
5. C. Ricciardi. His vote was challenged by the
Board agent because his name did not appear on
the eligibility list.82 The Union contends that he was
a supervisor, whereas Respondent contends that he
76 While Baldwin is shown on Respondent's table of organization (G C
Exh 8) as an employee of Typo-Lith, there was no dispute at the hearing
that he was in fact on the payroll of Cromwell Printery
" Another of Respondent's companies-Cromwell Business Machines-
has a delivery employee
78 Oliver Machinery Co, 93 NLRB 731, 732, Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co,
117 NLRB 744, Koester Bakery Co , Inc , 136 NLRB 1006, 1010
19 Respondent's trial counsel, Jones,testified that the name of Cromwell
Printery was included in the designation of the Employer only for technical
reasons It had previously been included in the RM petition but not in the
RC petition
80 Zeiger did not testify The Union's counsel explained that he was out
of the country
8' The list, bearing Zeiger's initials, was introduced in evidence as G C
Exh 7
82 Respondent's position is apparently that his name was omitted from
that list through a misunderstanding by its counsel as to his supervisory
status, and that this misunderstanding was reflected in the erroneous
designation of C Ricciardi as Mercury 's "plant manager " in a table of or-
ganization prepared by counsel in connection with the representation
proceeding In any event, at the hearing the General Counsel and the
Union disclaimed any contention that , by omitting C Ricciardi's name
from the eligibility list, Respondent in effect conceded that he was a super-
visor
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC.
did not become a supervisor until December 1,
1966.
During the preelection period Ricciardi airected
the work of the seven production employees of
Mercury. 83 His hourly rate at that time was $3,
which was $1 higher than that of any other Mercu-
ry employee.84 The Mercury operation was carried
on in a building located several miles from Respon-
dent's other operations, and visits to that building
by admitted supervisors were relatively infrequent.
Hunter testified that about January 1, 1966, while
working at Mercury, he asked Ricciardi for a raise,
that he promised to talk to Sutin, and the raise was
subsequently granted. Biance testified that in April
1966, while working at Mercury, he saw Ricciardi
summon to his office a Mercury employee, Walker,
who had come to work in an intoxicated condition,
and who, after emerging from the interview with
Ricciardi, promptly left the plant. Biance added
that Ricciardi confided to him after that incident
that Walker was the first man he had ever
discharged, that it was a "tough thing to do," and
that he thought he had better "go through Mr.
Sutin now." Biance insisted, moreover, that at the
time of the election Ricciardi spent only about 50
percent of his time in production work; and that he
implied in certain remarks he made to Biance that
Ricciardi originated and revised the production
schedules for the presses under his direction.85 Bi-
ance added that Ricciardi would grant requests for
time off without consulting anyone else.
C. Ricciardi testified that during the preelection
period his duties consisted of operating a press at
Mercury about 90 to 95 percent of his time and as-
signing to the other two pressmen job tickets
received from the main plant; and that he had no
discretion in the matter of those assignments, since
the press on which a job was to be run was already
designated on the ticket. His version of the Walker
incident was that he merely reported to Sutin that
Walker appeared to have been drinking and had
damaged a press, and that he did not think that
Walker could continue to run the press that day,
whereupon Sutin directed that Walker be
discharged. As for his subsequent discussion of the
incident with Biance, the witness' version was that
he told Biance only that Sutin had ordered the
discharge of Walker, and that the witness might
have remarked to Biance that it had been difficult
for him to carry out this order. However, I credit
Biance as to the postdischarge conversation '86 and
find that he was told by Ricciardi that he had
discharged Walker but did not relish doing so, and
"See GC Exh 7
'See G C Exh 12-C
" In its brief , Respondent contends that this and other testimony by Bi-
ance about Ricciardi 's "admissions " of supervisory authority should be
disregarded as hearsay However, as no such objection was made at the
hearing , this contention is rejected
" I was favorably impressed by Biance's demeanor and by the
forthrightness of his testimony
1833
would in the future take up such matters with Sutin.
The clear implication of this was that Ricciardi had
made the decision in that case, himself, without
consulting Sutin. In view of this admission, I do not
credit the testimony of Ricciardi and Sutin that Ric-
ciardi had merely passed along to Sutin information
about Walker's condition.
Also, Ricciardi admitted that, after he indicated
to management the need for more personnel at
Mercury, Bohanick was hired and assigned to Mer-
cury, and Geary acknowledged that this action was
taken pursuant to Ricciardi's suggestion.87
As to the proportion of time spent by Ricciardi in
production work, I credit Biance for reasons cited
above, and find that at the time of the election such
work occupied only about half of Ricciardi's time. I
also credit Biance's testimony as to the preparation
and revision of work schedules by Ricciardi.
With regard to Hunter's raise , Ricciardi testified
that he apprised Sutin of Hunter's request, and that
Sutin promised that, if he determined from his
records that Hunter merited a raise , he would have
one, and Ricciardi denied that he made any report
on Hunter's performance or made any recommen-
dation to Sutin. As there was no effective con-
tradiction of the foregoing testimony,88 I credit it,
and find insufficient evidence that Ricciardi was
authorized to, or did, recommend raises.
With regard to the matter of employees leaving
work early, Ricciardi denied that he had any discre-
tion on that score, insisting that, in accordance with
company policy, employees would merely report to
him that they were leaving for the day. Sutin con-
firmed that this was in keeping with company pol-
icy. However, Ricciardi admitted that he might
have granted requests by Biance and Hunter for
permission to return late from lunch, and there is
no evidence that he was required by company pol-
icy to grant such permission."'
There remains to be considered in this regard the
"Motto incident." As related above, in the latter
part of March, Romand and Motto circulated a
petition designating them as the collective-bargain-
ing agent of the employees. It is undisputed that
during that period Motto telephoned Ricciardi from
the main plant and requested permission to speak
to the Mercury employees, which was granted, and
Ricciardi testified that, when Motto arrived at Mer-
cury, the witness excused the employees from work
to listen to Motto, who addressed them for a sub-
stantial period of time.90 The subject was the Inde-
pendent Union. Since Ricciardi admitted that he
was not aware of any company policy covering such
"v Bohanick , or Bohenek , as he is listed in G C Exh 12-C, was hired in
August 1965 , according to that exhibit
Sutm professed to have no recollection of this matter
5" Sutin 's testimony suggests that Respondent, in fact, frowned on late
return from work breaks
" According to the witness , Motto spoke for about 30 minutes Hunter,
on the other hand, estimated that the speech lasted an hour and a half
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 2 - 44
1834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a situation,9' it is clear that in this instance he exer-
cised his own discretion in releasing the employees
from their duties.
Finally, it is clear from the testimony of Respon-
dent's own witnesses that, while on some matters
his management contact was Gizzi,92 in other areas,
including personnel actions and prodution
problems, Ricciardi dealt directly with top manage-
ment-namely, Sutin and Geary; and, the limited,
minimal authority ascribed by Respondent to Ric-
ciardi hardly accounts for the vast disproportion
between his wage rate and that of his subordinates.
In view of all the foregoing circumstances, it is
found that C. Ricciardi was a supervisor at the time
of the election, and it will be recommended that the
challenge to his ballot be sustained.
B. Interference with the Election
The objections to the election referred to me re-
late to (I) the layoff and discharge of Bravender,
(2) the granting of preelection wage increases, (3)
a speech delivered by Sutin to the employees on
July 19, and (4) Respondent's vitiation of the
Board notice posted under the settlement agree-
ment.
The critical period here runs from March 23,
1966, when the Union's petition was filed, to July
21, 1966, when the election was held. As to (1) and
(2), above, it has already been found that Braven-
der's layoff on May 27, and his discharge on July 5,
were for the purpose of discouraging adherence to
the Union, and that certain wage increases were
granted at the end of June 1966 to predispose the
recipients thereof against the Union. It is ac-
cordingly found that by such conduct Respondent
interfered with freedom of choice in the election.
As to (3), above, it appears that in a speech
delivered on July 19 Sutin explicated at some
length his reasons for believing that it would be to
the employees' interest to vote for the Independent
rather than for the Union. The Regional Director
was of the opinion that such remarks should be
evaluated in the light of the evidence in the instant
complaint proceeding concerning Respondent's
"unlawful assistance and support" to the Indepen-
dent. Presumably, this has reference to the
evidence recited above, on the basis of which it
has been found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by encouraging the formation of
the Independent. However, there was no cogent
evidence that Respondent actively supported the
Independent on or after the date of the filing of the
Union's election petition-March 23. Absent any
such evidence, such support may not serve as a
basis for setting aside the election. As for the
speech itself, while it contained a strong expression
of Respondent's preference for one of the two com-
peting unions, such an expression is not per se a
proper ground for setting aside an election.93 Ac-
cordingly, it is recommended that this objection be
overruled.
The final objection is based on Respondent's acts
in derogation of the Board notice posted under the
settlement agreement. The Regional Director was
apparently of the opinion that since, by reason of
such acts, the settlement agreement failed to ac-
complish its purpose of neutralizing the prior viola-
tions of the Act alleged in the instant complaint, all
such violations must be deemed to have continued
to affect the employees up to the date of the elec-
tion. However, as no such violations have been
found to have occurred during the critical period
other than those pertaining to Bravender and the
June wage increases, it does not appear that
anything would be gained by passing on this matter.
See Garner Aviation Service Corp., 114 NLRB 293.
Accordingly, I do not rely thereon.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, it will be
recommended that the Respondent cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Bravender was discriminatori-
ly laid off on May 27 and discharged on July 5, 1
shall recommend that Respondent be required to
offer him reinstatement to his former or substan-
tially equivalent position without impairment of
seniority or other rights and privileges. I shall also
recommend that Respondent be required to make
him whole for any loss of earnings suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him, by pay-
ment to him of a sum of money equal to that which,
but for such discrimination, he would have earned
as wages from May 27, to the date of a valid offer
of reinstatement, less his net earnings during such
period. Backpay shall be computed in accordance
with the formula stated in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289; interest shall be added to
backpay at the rate of 6 percent per annum. Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
In view of the Respondent's unfair- labor prac-
tices, particularly the discriminatory conduct found
above, there exists a threat of future violations,
which warrants a broad cease-and-desist order.
" While insisting that it was Respondent's policy to allow employees
considerable latitude in the matter of straying from their work station to
talk to other employees, Sutin conceded that this policy did not go so far as
to permit speeches during worktime by employees to other employees
Nevertheless , Ricciardi admittedly was not disciplined for his part in the
Motto incident
^t He was in charge of production control
91 The Union's brief cites the statement in Sutin 's speech that the Union
was trying to "buy" the employees' support by offering to waive initiation
fees for those who signed union cards forthwith The Union attempts to
equate this statement with a charge of bribery by the Union However, that
is a strained construction of what was plainly merely a characterization by
Sutin of the Union's offer, and the employees were clearly in a position to
evaluate the accuracy of such characterization Accordingly, I find no
merit in this contention
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CROMWELL PRINTERY INC. 1835
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce.
2. By laying Bravender off, discharging him, and
failing to recall him, all for discriminatory reasons,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees about
their union activities, by promising and granting
benefits to induce defections from the Union, by
creating an impression of surveillance of employee
union activity, by warning employees of layoffs, loss
of overtime, and other reprisals for engaging in
union activity, by exhorting employees not to sign
any more union cards and implying that they might
retreive those already signed, by suggesting to em-
ployees that they form their own grievance commit-
tee rather than join the Union, and by otherwise en-
couraging the employees to adhere to the Indepen-
dent, Respondent has interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Respondent has interfered with freedom of
choice in the election held on July 21.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case , and the
foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it
is recommended that Respondent , Cromwell Prin-
tery Incorporated and /or Cromwell Business Forms
Incorporated ; Mercury Imprints Inc.; Mohawk
Business Forms , Inc.; Typo-Lith Corporation, Al-
bany , New York, its officers , agents, successors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Lithographers
and Photoengravers International Union , Local No.
259, Albany-Schenectady , AFL-CIO, or in any
other labor organization , by discriminating against
employees in regard to their hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any other term or condition of employ-
ment.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees about
their union activities , promising or granting benefits
in order to discourage union activity, creating an
impression of surveillance of union activity, warn-
ing employees of layoffs, loss of overtime, and
other reprisals for engaging in union activity, ex-
horting employees not to sign union cards and ad-
vising them that they might retrieve those already
y' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order"
signed, suggesting that employees form their own
grievance committee rather than adhere to the
above-named Union, or otherwise encouraging the
formation of an employee organization in opposi-
tion to said Union.
(c) In any other manner, interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of their right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist the above-named Union, or any other
labor organization, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by the
provisos to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer James Bravender immediate reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges.
(b) Make whole the said employee in the
manner set forth in the section of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision entitled "The Remedy," for any
loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
Respondent's discrimination against him.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its plants in Albany, New York, co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."94
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 3, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.95
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, of the chal-
lenged ballots cast in the election of July 21, 1966,
only those of James Bravender and Jeffrey Kaplan
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
1836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be opened and counted, and that , if it is deter-
mined , after counting such ballots , that the Union
received a majority of the valid votes cast in the
election , it be certified by the Board as the
representative of the employees in the appropriate
unit . If, however , it is determined that the Union
did not receive a majority of such votes , it is recom-
mended that the election be set aside and that the
representation cases be remanded to the Regional
Director for Region 3 to conduct a new election at
such time as he may deem appropriate.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board
and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended , we hereby
notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Lithographers and Photoengravers Interna-
tional Union, Local No. 259, Albany- Schenec-
tady, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organiza-
tion, by discriminating against employees in re-
gard to their hire or tenure of employment or
any other term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT try to keep our employees
from joining that Union or any other union by
asking them about their interest in any union,
by promising or giving them raises , by giving
the impression that we are spying on union
meetings , by warning that under a union there
will be layoffs and loss of overtime work or
that some other harm will come to employees
who support a union , by telling employees not
to sign union cards and that they can get back
cards they already signed , by giving employees
the idea of forming their own committee to
deal with us rather than go to an outside union,
or by encouraging employees in any other way
to form a union of their own instead of joining
an outside union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to
form , join, or assist Lithographers and
Photoengravers International Union , Local No.
259, Albany -Schenectady , AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization , to bargain collective-
ly through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain
from any or all such activities , except to the
extent that such right may be affected by the
provisos to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to James Bravender reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent
position , and WE WILL make him whole for any
loss of pay suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination against him.
All of our employees are free to become or
remain , or refrain from becoming or remaining,
members of Lithographers and Photoengravers
International Union, Local No. 259, Albany-
Schenectady, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
CROMWELL PRINTERY
INCORPORATED AND/OR
CROMWELL BUSINESS
FORMS INC.
(Employers)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
MERCURY IMPRINTS INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
MOHAWK BUSINESS
FORMS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
TYPO- LITH CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) ( Title)
Note : We will notify the above -named employee
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of his right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Ser-
vice Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions , they may
communicate directly with the Board 's Office, 7th
Floor , Drislane Building , 60 Chapel Street, Albany,
New York 12207, Telephone 842-3112.