Creeana P. Jefferson

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 19, 2021

88295334 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2021)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: April 19, 2021

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Creeana P. Jefferson
_____

Serial No. 88295334
_____

Charlena L. Thorpe of Incorporating Innovation LLC for Creeana P. Jefferson.

Marc J. Leipzig, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 115,
Daniel Brody, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Kuhlke, Cataldo and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Creeana P. Jefferson, seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the mark displayed below, identifying the following goods: “credit consultation in the
fields of credit repair and restoration” in International Class 36.1

1 Application Serial No. 88295334 was filed on February 9, 2019 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based upon Applicant’s claim of first use of the mark in
commerce at least as early as September 29, 2018, with the following description and color
statements: “The mark consists of a blue and white design of a three-dimensional diamond,
with the stylized wording ‘CLASSY’ appearing in blue below the diamond and the word
‘CREDIT’ appearing in blue in smaller lettering at the bottom of the mark; the black in the
drawing represents background area and is not a part of the mark.” The color(s) blue and
white is/are claimed as a feature of the mark.
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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. §1052(d), in view of the registered mark CLASSY SHOPPER, in standard
characters, identifying “financial consulting in the nature of providing advice
regarding savings and finances” in International Class 36.2
The Examining Attorney further refused registration pursuant to Section 6(a) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), based upon Applicant’s failure to comply
with the requirement to disclaim “CREDIT” apart from the mark as shown. The
Examining Attorney contends that this wording merely describes a characteristic of
the identified services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
We affirm both refusals of registration.
I. Disclaimer of “CREDIT”
A requirement under Trademark Act Section 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), for a
disclaimer of unregistrable matter in a mark is appropriate when that matter is
merely descriptive of the goods or services at issue. See In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d

2 Reg. No. 5394286 issued on February 6, 2018.
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1039, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005). A disclaimer is a statement that the
applicant does not claim the exclusive right to use a specified element or elements of
the mark in a trademark application or registration. In re White Jasmine LLC, 106
USPQ2d 1385, 1394 (TTAB 2013). “The effect of a disclaimer is to disavow any
exclusive right to the use of a specified word, phrase, or design outside of its use
within a composite mark.” Id. (quoting In re Franklin Press, Inc., 597 F.2d 270, 201
USPQ 662, 665 (CCPA 1979)). Merely descriptive or generic terms are unregistrable
under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), and therefore are subject to a disclaimer
requirement if the mark is otherwise registrable. Failure to comply with a disclaimer
requirement is a ground for refusal of registration. See In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd.,
797 F.3d 1332, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re RiseSmart Inc., 104
USPQ2d 1931, 1933 (TTAB 2012).
A term is merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it
immediately conveys knowledge of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function,
feature, purpose, or use of the goods or services with which it is used. See, e.g., In re
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir.
2012); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Whether
a particular term is merely descriptive must be determined not in the abstract, but
in relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought, the context in
which the mark is used, and the possible significance that the mark is likely to have
to the average purchaser encountering the goods or services in the marketplace. See
In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 82 USPQ2d 1818, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
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Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1473
(TTAB 2014); In re Remacle, 66 USPQ2d 1222, 1224 (TTAB 2002). In other words,
the issue is whether someone who knows what the goods or services are will
understand the mark to convey information about them. In re Fat Boys Water Sports
LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1512 (TTAB 2016).
It is the Examining Attorney’s burden to prove that a term is merely descriptive
of an applicant’s goods or services. In re Accelerate s.a.l., 101 USPQ2d 2047, 2052
(TTAB 2012). The determination that a term is merely descriptive is a finding of fact
and must be based upon substantial evidence. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 82 USPQ2d
at 1831.
A. Whether “CREDIT” Is Descriptive
The Examining Attorney argues that the “word ‘CREDIT,’ highly descriptive of
applicant’s ‘credit consultation’ services, may be separated from the rest of the mark,
such that a disclaimer of the term is proper.”3 Applicant’s arguments, discussed
below, are solely directed toward the asserted unitary nature of her mark.4

3 9 TTABVUE 12 (Examining Attorney’s brief).
Page references herein to the application record are to the downloadable .pdf version of the
USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. References to the briefs
and orders on appeal are to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. The number preceding
“TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following “TTABVUE”
refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry.
4 We note that Applicant, appearing pro se, previously disclaimed “CREDIT” in her May 17,
2019 Response to Office Action at 7. Applicant’s counsel subsequently withdrew the
disclaimer in Applicant’s January 23, 2020 Request for Reconsideration at 11-13.
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“CREDIT” is defined as “to believe; put confidence in; have faith in; trust.”5 “The
term ‘credit’ has several financial meanings, but all of them are based on the
confidence and trust that lenders or vendors have in an individual’s ability to pay in
a timely fashion.”6 Given the use of the term “CREDIT” in Applicant’s recitation of
services, we would be hard pressed not to find the term merely descriptive for services
identified as “credit consultation in the fields of credit repair and restoration.”
Descriptiveness is considered in relation to the relevant goods or services.
DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 103 USPQ2d
1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “That a term may have other meanings in different
contexts is not controlling.” Robinson v. Hot Grabba Leaf, LLC, 2019 USPQ2d
149089, at *5 (TTAB 2019) (citing In re Canine Caviar Pet Foods, Inc., 126 USPQ2d
1590, 1598 (TTAB 2018)). “It is well settled that so long as any one of the meanings
of a term is descriptive, the term may be considered to be merely descriptive.” In re
Mueller Sports Med., Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1584, 1590 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re
Chopper Indus., 222 USPQ 258, 259 (TTAB 1984)). The term “CREDIT” immediately
describes Applicant’s credit consultation, repair and restoration services.

5 Dictionary.com, based upon the Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2021). The Board
may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries which exist in
printed format. See In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014); In re
CyberFinancial.Net Inc., 65 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 n.3 (TTAB 2002). See also University of
Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982),
aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
6 Id.
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B. Whether Applicant’s Mark Is Unitary
We now consider whether Applicant’s mark creates
a unitary whole such that no disclaimer is necessary.
In her brief, Applicant analogizes her mark to LIGHT N’ LIVELY, found by the
Board in In re Kraft, 218 USPQ 571, 573 (TTAB 1983), to be unitary and not subject
to a disclaimer:
“because the mark as a whole has a suggestive significance which is
distinctly different from the merely descriptive significance of the term
‘LIGHT’ per se and that the merely descriptive significance of the term
‘LIGHT’ is lost in the mark as a whole.” [Id.] Similarly, “CLASSY
CREDIT” has a suggestive significance which is distinctly different from
any merely descriptive significance of the term “CREDIT” per se, and
any descriptive significance of the term “CLASSY CREDIT” is lost in the
mark as a whole.7

The wording in Applicant’s mark includes the terms “CLASSY CREDIT.”
“CLASSY” is defined as “of high class, rank, or grade; stylish; admirably smart;
elegant.”8 The wording in Applicant’s mark thus includes the laudatory term
“CLASSY” and the descriptive term “CREDIT” to suggest that Applicant’s credit
consultation services will repair or restore a client’s credit to a high rank or grade.

7 7 TTABVUE 10 (Applicant’s brief).
8 We hereby take judicial notice of this definition from Dictionary.com, retrieved from the
Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2021).
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Applicant argues:
The alliteration and sound of the “CL” in “CLASSY” and the “CR” in
“CREDIT” creates a distinctive impression thereby making the mark
unitary. The alliteration, equivalent number of syllables, and sound of
the “CL” and “C[R]” as the beginning of “CLASSY CREDIT” creates a
distinctive impression thereby making the mark unitary.9

However, Applicant does not explain what additional impression or meaning is
created by the wording in her mark. In order to be considered unitary, the elements
of a mark must be so integrated or merged together that they cannot be regarded as
separable. See In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 78 USPQ2d 1395, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
In re Kraft, Inc., 218 USPQ at 573; In re EBS Data Processing, 212 USPQ 964, 966
(TTAB 1981).
Although Applicant’s mark creates some alliteration due to the wording “CLASSY
CREDIT,” we find that consumers would not view the terms as inseparable from one
another or creating an additional meaning beyond that of the component terms.
Rather, each component in the mark retains its significance in relation to the
identified services, and the combination of “CLASSY CREDIT” in Applicant’s mark
results in a composite that merely suggests a quality of feature of Applicant’s credit
counselling services. See Duopross, 103 USPQ2d at 1757 (SNAP SIMPLY SAFER
merely descriptive for “medical devices, namely, cannulae; medical, hypodermic,
aspiration and injection needles; medical, hypodermic, aspiration and injection
syringes”); In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018, 5 USPQ2d 1110, 1111–1112
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (SCREENWIPE held generic as applied to pre-moistened antistatic

9 7 TTABVUE 10.
Serial No. 88295334
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cloths for cleaning computer and television screens); In re Mecca Grade Growers,
LLC, 125 USPQ2d 1950, 1955 (TTAB 2018) (MECHANICALLY FLOOR-MALTED
merely descriptive of malt for brewing and distilling and processing of agricultural
grain); Cf. In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 USPQ 382 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(SUGAR & SPICE held not merely descriptive of bakery products).
We further find no incongruity in the wording “CLASSY CREDIT.” As discussed
above, the wording “CLASSY CREDIT” in Applicant’s mark suggests that her credit
counselling services will restore a client’s credit to a high rank or grade. Such a
meaning presents no incongruity. Cf., e.g., In re Tennis in the Round Inc., 199 USPQ
496, 498 (TTAB 1978); In re Shutts, 217 USPQ 363, 364–5 (TTAB 1983); In re Vienna
Sausage Mfg. Co., 156 USPQ 155, 156 (TTAB 1967); and In re John H. Breck, Inc.,
150 USPQ 397, 398 (TTAB 1966).
We similarly are not persuaded that “CLASSY CREDIT” is a double entendre. We
find no evidence that consumers will view “CLASSY CREDIT” in Applicant’s mark as
having several connotations. Cf. In re Colonial Stores Inc., 157 USPQ at 382; In re
Tea and Sympathy, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1062 (TTAB 2008); In re Simmons Co., 189
USPQ 352 (TTAB 1976); and In re Del. Punch Co., 186 USPQ 63 (TTAB 1975).
In summary, we find that the term “CREDIT” in Applicant’s mark is merely
descriptive of Applicant’s identified services and Applicant’s
Serial No. 88295334
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mark is not unitary. Therefore, the term “CREDIT” is
appropriately subject to the disclaimer requirement.
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis
of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In
re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”), 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA
1973). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods or
services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192
USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976). See also In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405,
41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In addition, Applicant presents arguments directed
toward the strength of the terms comprising the mark in the cited registration and
the sophistication of the purchasers of the involved services.
1. Strength of the Term “CLASSY” in the Cited Registration
We consider the conceptual strength of “CLASSY” in the registered mark CLASSY
SHOPPER, identifying “financial consulting in the nature of providing advice
Serial No. 88295334
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regarding savings and finances.”10 In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1673
(TTAB 2018). As noted above, “CLASSY” is defined as “of high class, rank, or grade;
stylish; admirably smart; elegant.”11 In the context of the services identified in the
cited registration, we find this definition indicates that “CLASSY” evokes an aspect
of financial consulting regarding savings and finances, namely, that it broadly
suggests a high class, rank or grade of financial savvy and well-being. Given this
meaning, which at worst is only somewhat suggestive of a characteristic or feature of
the identified services, the term appears to be inherently distinctive. The inherent
distinctiveness of the mark in the cited registration is further evidenced by its
registration on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness
under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80
USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006). Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be
prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership
of the mark and its exclusive right to use the mark in connection with the goods or
services identified in the certificate.

10 There is little, if any, evidence of record regarding the commercial strength of the cited
mark. In an ex parte appeal, the owner of the cited registration is not a party, and the
Examining Attorney is under no obligation to demonstrate exposure to or recognition of the
cited mark in the marketplace. In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1512 (TTAB
2016). For that reason, “in an ex parte analysis of the du Pont factors for determining
likelihood of confusion …, the ‘[commercial strength] of the mark’ … is normally treated as
neutral when no evidence as to [marketplace recognition] … has been provided.” TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 1207.01(d)(ix) (Oct. 2018). Thus, because
there is no evidence of record regarding the commercial strength of the cited mark, this
consideration is neutral.
11 Dictionary.com, retrieved from the Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2021).
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Applicant argues that “‘CLASSY’ is a frequently used term as shown in the
registrations of records (internal citations omitted), thus, the public will look to other
elements to distinguish the source of the goods and services.”12 In support of this
contention, Applicant introduced into the record with her January 23, 2020 Request
for Reconsideration copies of approximately 70 third-party registrations owned by
numerous entities that include the word “CLASSY”, retrieved from a search of the
USPTO records.13
The “existence of [third party] registrations is not evidence of what happens in the
market place or that customers are familiar with them.” AMF Inc. v. American
Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973). “Applicant’s
citation of third-party registrations as evidence of market weakness is unavailing
because third-party registrations standing alone, are not evidence that the registered
marks are in use on a commercial scale, let alone that consumers have become so
accustomed to seeing them in the marketplace that they have learned to distinguish
among them by minor differences.” In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 120
USPQ2d 1738, 1745 (TTAB 2016) (citing AMF v. Am. Leisure Prods., 177 USPQ at
269).
However, third-party registrations may be probative of conceptual strength or
weakness as they “may be considered to demonstrate the meaning of a word which
comprises the mark, or a portion thereof, to show that there is a well-known and

12 7 TTABVUE 8.
13 At p. 18-68.
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commonly understood meaning of that word and that the mark has been chosen to
convey that meaning. ... The conclusion to be drawn in such a case is that there is an
inherent weakness in a mark comprised in whole or in part of the word in question
and that, therefore, the question of likelihood of confusion is colored by that weakness
to the extent that only slight differences in the marks may be sufficient to distinguish
one from the other.” Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Aiping Fan, 2020 USPQ2d 10611, at *9
(TTAB 2020) (quoting In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991)
(internal citations omitted).
In this case, all of the third-party registrations consist, inter alia, of “CLASSY”
alone or with additional terms and, in some cases, designs, that are wholly unlike the
following term in either the cited mark (“SHOPPER”) or the involved mark
(“CREDIT”). More importantly, none of the third-party registrations recites services
related to the services in the cited registration. Most of the third-party registrations
recite goods and services in the fields of clothing, cosmetics and food, but none concern
financial consulting or, more broadly, savings or finance. In re i.am.symbolic, LLC,
866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party
registrations for goods in other classes where the proffering party “has neither
introduced evidence, nor provided adequate explanation to support a determination
that the existence of I AM marks for goods in other classes, … support a finding that
registrants’ marks are weak with respect to the goods identified in their
registrations”); accord Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Gerson Stewart Corp., 367 F.2d
431, 151 USPQ 350, 353 (C.C.P.A. 1966). This evidence falls far short of supporting
Serial No. 88295334
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Applicant’s contention that the weakness of “CLASSY” will cause consumers to
distinguish between the marks based upon other component terms.
Applicant has failed to show that the shared term “CLASSY” is either conceptually
or commercially weak. We find, as a result, that the mark in the cited registration is
entitled to an ordinary scope of protection to be afforded an inherently distinctive
mark. On balance, we do not believe that, on this record, the relative strength of the
cited mark in its entirety or the shared term weighs significantly one way or the
other.
2. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We next compare the marks in their entireties and, in so doing, look to their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., 73
USPQ2d at 1692. “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but
instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components; that is, the decision must be based on the entire
marks, not just part of the marks. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ
749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d
1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be
Serial No. 88295334
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dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in
determining likelihood of confusion.”). On the other hand, there is nothing improper
in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751. Although we place the marks
alongside each other in the following paragraph for purposes of this decision,
consumers may not have the luxury of viewing the marks in such a manner.
Here, upon evaluating the applied-for mark and the
registered mark, CLASSY SHOPPER, we agree with the Examining Attorney that
the dominant feature of each mark is the term “CLASSY.” Because this term appears
first in the registered mark and in much larger font as the first word portion of
Applicant’s mark, it is most likely to be impressed in purchasers’ memories. Presto
Products, Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is
often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a
purchaser and remembered”).
Moreover, for source-identifying purposes, consumers will likely focus on the
“CLASSY” element in the marks in view of the fact that the additional literal portion,
namely “CREDIT” is merely descriptive and “SHOPPER,” at best, is somewhat
suggestive of the recited services. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943,
Serial No. 88295334
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55 USPQ2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 752
(“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the descriptive component of
a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on the likelihood of
confusion”); In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); In re Code Consultants, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1699, 1702 (TTAB 2001)
(disclaimed matter is often “less significant in creating the mark’s commercial
impression”).
The wording in the applied-for mark similarly has more source-identifying
significance than the diamond design. It is settled that where, as here, a mark
comprises both words and a design, the words are normally accorded greater weight,
in part because consumers are likely to remember and use the word(s) to request the
goods or services. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1911 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“the verbal portion of a word and design mark likely will be the dominant
portion”); In re Appetito Provisions Co. Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987)
(holding that “if one of the marks comprises both a word and a design, then the word
is normally accorded greater weight because it would be used by purchasers to
request the goods or services” and “because applicant’s mark shares with registrant’s
mark that element responsible for creating its overall commercial impression, the
marks are confusingly similar”).
As a result, while there are obvious differences between Applicant’s mark and the
registered mark, viewed as a whole, they are more similar than dissimilar in
appearance and sound. In this case, the diamond design in Applicant’s mark evokes
Serial No. 88295334
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the high grade or “classy” nature of the services and reinforces the wording “CLASSY
CREDIT.” We thus disagree with Applicant’s contention that the design in the cited
mark may be considered its dominant portion. Similarly, the relatively minor
stylization of the wording in Applicant’s mark does not create an impression that is
separate from that of its wording. Moreover, because the rights associated with a
standard character mark reside in its wording, and not in any particular display, we
must consider Registrant’s mark “regardless of font style, size, or color,” including
iterations that present Registrant’s mark in a similar stylized form. Citigroup Inc. v.
Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
In re RSI Sys., LLC, 88 USPQ2d 1445 (TTAB 2008); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp.,
8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988).
With regard to meaning, CLASSY SHOPPER evokes a shopper with high grade or
rank of acumen in savings and finance. The wording “CLASSY CREDIT” in
Applicant’s mark similarly evokes an individual with high grade or rank of credit.
Applicant argues:
Similar to the holdings in In re Sydel Lingerie Co., 197 USPQ 629, 630
(TTAB 1977) comparing BOTTOMS UP for ladies’ and children’s
underwear and BOTTOMS UP for men’s clothing, In re British Bulldog,
Ltd., 224 USPQ 854, 856 (TTAB 1984) comparing PLAYERS for men’s
underwear and PLAYERS for shoes, In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2
USPQ2d 1312, 1314 (TTAB 1987) comparing CROSS-OVER for bras and
CROSSOVER for ladies’ sportswear, and In re Farm Fresh Catfish Co.,
231 USPQ 495, 495-96 (TTAB 1986) comparing CATFISH BOBBERS
for fish and BOBBER for restaurant services, CLASSY CREDIT for
“credit consultation in the fields of credit repair and restoration” is not
likely to cause confusion, because the term “CLASSY SHOPPER” as
applied to registrant’s services (i.e., financial consulting in the
nature of providing advice regarding savings and finances) is likely to
be perceived by purchasers as being suggestive of providing advice
Serial No. 88295334
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regarding savings and finances as it relates to shopping, whereas
CLASSY CREDIT, as applied to applicant’s services (i.e., credit
consultation in the fields of credit repair and restoration) implies
something else, either an entirely arbitrary designation or a credit score
associated with a classy or rich person. Accordingly, the marks create a
different commercial connotation.14

However, it is not clear on this record to what extent, if any, consumers will perceive
the meanings Applicant assigns to the marks at issue. Further, there is no evidence
that consumers would perceive “CLASSY” as possessing a different meaning in
Applicant’s mark than in the registered mark. Based upon the dictionary definitions
and other evidence of record, it appears that Applicant’s mark conveys a meaning of
an admirable level of financial credit, and the registered mark conveys a meaning of
an admirable level of savings and financial savvy when shopping. The additional
diamond design in Applicant’s mark does not create a separate, additional meaning.
In sum, upon viewing the marks in their entireties, we find them to be more similar
than dissimilar in appearance, sound and meaning and, overall, to convey similar
commercial impressions. The fact that each mark is dominated by the same term
“CLASSY” outweighs the points of dissimilarity. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751. Thus,
this DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
3. Similarity of the Services and Trade Channels
We turn now to the DuPont factors involving the relatedness of Applicant’s
services and the services identified by the cited registration, as well as the trade
channels in which they are encountered. It is settled that in making our

14 7 TTABVUE 4. Emphasis supplied by Applicant.
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determination, we must look to the services as identified in the application vis-à-vis
those recited in the cited registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion
Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Midwest
Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1165 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re La
Peregrina Ltd., 86 USPQ2d 1645, 1647 (TTAB 2008)); In re Giovanni Food Co., 97
USPQ2d 1990, 1991 (TTAB 2011). We are mindful that the test is not whether
consumers would be likely to confuse the services, but rather whether they likely
would be confused as to their source. In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d 1912, 1919 (TTAB
2012).
It is not necessary that the respective services be competitive, or even that they
move in the same channels of trade to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. It
is sufficient that the respective services are related in some manner, or that the
conditions and activities surrounding the marketing of the services are such that they
would or could be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that could,
because of the similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they
originated from the same producer. In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d at 1388.
In this case, Applicant’s “credit consultation in the fields of credit repair and
restoration” is related to the more broadly identified “financial consulting in the
nature of providing advice regarding savings and finances” in the cited registration
inasmuch as both provide financial consultation, with Applicant more narrowly
focused on credit repair and restoration. The term “credit,” as noted above, “has
several financial meanings, but all of them are based on the confidence and trust that
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lenders or vendors have in an individual’s ability to pay in a timely fashion.” Thus,
Applicant’s credit repair and restoration counselling is encompassed within the
financial consultation provided under the registered mark. In addition, the
Examining Attorney submitted evidence with his June 11, 2019 final Office Action15
confirming the relatedness of the services. The Examining Attorney submitted pages
from five third-party websites for entities providing services under the same marks,
trade names or company names that include services of the kind provided by
Applicant and under the cited mark.16
This evidence clearly demonstrates that at least these five entities provide both
Applicant’s type of services and Registrant’s type of services as well as related
services under the same marks or names, and is probative of the relatedness of these
services for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92
USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d
1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
We recognize that consumers may be able to distinguish Applicant’s services from
the services in the cited registration; however, that is not the standard. “The
confusion found to be likely is not as to the products [or services] but as to their
source.” See, e.g., Hydra Mac, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 507 F.2d 1399, 184 USPQ 351
(CCPA 1975) (citation omitted); In re Anderson, 101 USPQ2d at 1919. Further,
Applicant does not address the key DuPont factor of the relatedness of the services in

15 At p. 6-25.
16 These include nerdwallet.com; wellsfargo.com; creditkarma.com; consumercredit.com; and
doughroller.net.
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her brief, thus “[a]pparently conceding the issue,” In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., 120
USPQ2d 1738, 1740 (TTAB 2016).
Because there are no limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers
in the recitation of services in the involved application or the cited registration, we
must presume that the identified services move in all channels of trade normal for
such services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers thereof.
See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 98 USPQ2d at 1261; In re Jump
Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640
(TTAB 1981). As noted above, the Examining Attorney has introduced evidence that
the services offered under the involved mark and cited mark are offered on the same
webpages of third parties. This evidence supports a finding that these services are
offered in at least one common channel of trade, that is, financial planning and
consultation websites and, where applicable, physical locations of these third parties,
often under the same marks, company names or trade names.
Based upon the foregoing, we find that Applicant’s services are closely related to
and may overlap with the services identified in the cited registration and that such
services may be encountered in the same channels of trade by the same classes of
consumers. The second and third DuPont factors weigh in favor of finding a likelihood
of confusion.

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4. Consumer Sophistication
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Applicant asserts that
As supported by the evidence submitted by the Examiner (see, e.g., June
11, 2019 Office Action pages 2-20 (“What To Look For In A Credit
Counseling Agency”; “Guidelines For Choosing A Financial Advisor”,
“What To Look For If You Hire A Financial Adviser”) the “buyers” of the
services of Applicant’s and U.S. Registration No. 5394286 would be
sophisticated because people seeking credit consultation and financial
consulting services tend to be more sophisticated and would exercise
great care and therefore would not be confused, particularly since the
marks are not identical.17

However, neither Applicant’s services nor the services identified in the cited
registration are restricted to any type of individual or business. Thus, we must
presume the services are available to sophisticated purchasers as well as more
modest individuals and businesses in need of financial or credit consultation who may
not exercise as great a degree of care and may be experiencing a credit-related or
broader financial emergency. In fact, the standard of care is that of the least
sophisticated potential purchaser. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 (cited in In re
FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (“Board precedent requires our
decision to be based on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.”)).
In the absence of any evidence relating to the degree of care purchasers exercise,
the similarity of the marks and relatedness of the services outweigh Applicant’s

17 7 TTABVUE 9.
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assertion that purchasers are sophisticated or careful in their purchases. See HRL
Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823 (TTAB 1989), aff’d, Weiss
Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(similarities of goods and marks outweigh sophisticated purchasers, careful
purchasing decision, and expensive goods). Moreover, were we to accord a level of
sophistication to the purchasers of the services at issue given their nature and
presumed expense (of which there is little evidence in the record), even sophisticated
purchasers are not immune from source confusion. See In re Research Trading Corp.,
793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Carlisle Chem. Works, Inc. v.
Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970) (“Human
memories even of discriminating purchasers...are not infallible.”)).
The fourth DuPont factor is either neutral or slightly favors a finding of no
likelihood of confusion.
5. Summary
The Examining Attorney has shown that Applicant’s services and Registrant’s
services are related and may emanate from a common source. The evidence of third-
party use discussed above demonstrates that the services are not only
complementary, but will be offered to the same class of consumers, and will be
encountered in at least one common trade channel, namely, the websites and
corresponding physical locations of entities providing both services. Because the
marks are similar, the services are related, and target the same consumers in at least
one common trade channel, any consumer sophistication is unlikely to prevent
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consumers from experiencing confusion. We find as a result that Applicant’s mark, if
used in association with the services identified in the application, is likely to cause
confusion with the registered mark in connection with the services recited in the
registration.
III. Decision: The refusals to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act and on the ground that Applicant failed to comply with the Examining
Attorney’s requirement to provide the disclaimer of “CREDIT” are affirmed.
However, if Applicant submits the required disclaimer of the term “CREDIT” to the
Board within 30 days from the date of this decision and prior to filing any appeal of this
decision, the requirement for the disclaimer will have been met. Trademark Rule
2.142(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g); TBMP § 1218. The disclaimer should read as follows: “No
claim is made to the exclusive right to use CREDIT apart from the mark as shown.”
TMEP § 1213.08(a)(i). The submission of the required disclaimer, however, will not
overcome the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act and does not
serve to toll the time to appeal the Board’s decision. In re Information Builders Inc.,
2020 USPQ2d 10444, at *12 (TTAB 2020).