Creative Healthcare Solutions, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 15, 1998

No. 74619299 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 15, 1998)

Paper No. 18
PTH
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB SEPT 15, 98
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Creative Healthcare Solutions, Inc.
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Serial No. 74/619,299
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Nicholas E. Westman of Westman, Champlin & Kelly for
Creative Healthcare Solutions, Inc.
Wanda Kay Price, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
103 (Michael Szoke, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Simms, Hairston and Walters, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Hairston, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Creative Healthcare Solutions, Inc. has filed an
application to register the mark SHORTSTAY SUITES for
“providing medical clinical and personal healthcare
services within an assisted living or other residential
setting.”1

1 Application Serial No. 74/619,299 filed January 9, 1995, and
based on an allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark
in commerce.
Ser No. 74/619,299
2
Registration was refused pursuant to both Sections
2(d) and 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d)
and 1052(e)(1), on the grounds that applicant’s mark for
the identified services so resembles the mark SHORT STAY
METHADONE RESIDENCE for “health services, namely,
residential substance abuse treatment services”2 as to be
likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive;, and
that SHORTSTAY SUITES is merely descriptive of applicant’s
identified services. When the refusal was made final,
applicant appealed. No oral hearing was requested.
Section 2(e)(1) refusal
We turn first to the refusal to register based on the
ground that SHORTSTAY SUITES is merely descriptive of the
identified services. It is the Examining Attorney’s
position that SHORTSTAY SUITES describes a feature of
applicant’s services. In support of this refusal, the
Examining Attorney relies on dictionary definitions of
“short”--“lasting only a short period of time,” “stay”--“to
remain in a given place or condition,” and “suites”--“a
series of connected rooms functioning as a living unit,” as
well as excerpts taken from the NEXIS data base which show

2 Registration No. 1,853,386 issued September 6, 1994 on the
Supplemental Register.
Ser No. 74/619,299
3
that the term “short-stay” is used to refer to hospitals
and medical procedures, e.g.:
Medicare pays short-stay, acute-care
hospitals a pre-determined rate for care
provided to Medicare beneficiaries using
a prospective . . .
(“Medicare: HHS Proposes FY ’97 Hospital
Rate Increases;” Health Line; May 31,
1996).
The facility is designed to be a short-stay
regional hospital that can keep patients
closer to their families and homes while
easing the burden on the state’s two
existing . . .
(“Regional News;” Modern Healthcare;
January 27, 1997);
. . . episodes of persons injured,
restricted activity due to illness,
health status, and the use of medical
services—-including physician contacts
and short-stay hospitalizations.
(Current estimates; Public Health
Reports; May 1996); and
Patients were excluded if they were
admitted for short-stay (24-48) hour
elective procedures, or if they were
too ill to be interviewed.
(“Prevalence and detection of illicit
drug disorders;” American Journal of
Drug and Alcohol Abuse; August 1996);
Applicant, in urging reversal of the refusal to
register, argues that SHORTSTAY SUITES is not merely
descriptive of the identified services because the mark
does not identify the particular services which applicant
intends to offer, and that “suite” is not a word which is
usually associated with healthcare services.
Ser No. 74/619,299
4
The NEXIS excerpts show that the term “short-stay” is
used to describe both hospitals and medical procedures.
Thus, when the term short-stay is used in connection with
healthcare services, the relevant purchasers of such
services would readily understand its meaning. The fact
that applicant has deleted the hyphen to make it SHORTSTAY
is of no consequence. Moreover, the dictionary definition
submitted by the Examining Attorney shows that “suite”
describes a particular arrangement of rooms, and while
“suite” may most often be associated with hotels or motels,
it is not limited to these settings. We note in this
regard that applicant has not argued that the assisted
living or residential setting where the medical clinical
and personal healthcare services are to be provided will
not contain suites. Thus, when the terms SHORTSTAY and
SUITES are combined in the mark SHORTSTAY SUITES, we agree
with the Examining Attorney that the mark, as used for the
identified services, would immediately convey to purchasers
that such services feature suites for persons needing
short-stay healthcare. And because a mark, which
immediately conveys information about a characteristic,
quality or feature of a product or service is considered
merely descriptive, applicant’s mark is not entitled to
Ser No. 74/619,299
5
registration. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d
1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Section 2(d) refusal
This brings us to the refusal to register based on
Section 2(d) of the Act (likelihood of confusion). The
Examining Attorney contends that the dominant features of
the respective marks are essentially identical, namely,
SHORT STAY and SHORTSTAY; and that the parties’ services
are related or identical inasmuch as both are healthcare
services and applicant’s services are broad enough to
encompass registrant’s substance abuse services.
Applicant, on the other hand, maintains that
purchasers are not likely to assume that applicant’s and
registrant’s services emanate form the same source simply
because both use the term SHORT STAY. Rather, according to
applicant, purchasers will distinguish the marks and
services of registrant, in particular, by the wording
METHADONE RESIDENCE. Further, applicant argues that the
purchasers of registrant’s services are discriminating.
Notwithstanding the relatedness or identity of the
services herein, we believe that purchasers are not likely
to rely upon the highly descriptive words SHORT STAY and
SHORTSTAY in order to distinguish source. Rather, we agree
with applicant that purchasers will distinguish these marks
Ser No. 74/619,299
6
and the sources of these services by the remaining
features, namely METHADONE RESIDENCE and SUITES. When the
marks are considered in their entireties, the commercial
impressions of the marks as a whole are different and these
differences in the marks are sufficient to avoid a
likelihood of confusion.
An additional factor which is significant to our
determination that confusion is not likely, is the nature
of the services involved. It is unlikely that purchasers
of healthcare services would select a provider without
careful consideration. In sum, we think that careful
purchasers will readily perceive the different commercials
impressions conveyed by applicant and registrant’s marks,
and because of these differences will regard the marks as
indicating separate sources of the services.
Ser No. 74/619,299
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Decision: The refusal to register under Section
2(e)(1) is affirmed; the refusal to register under Section
2(d) is reversed.
R. L. Simms
P. T. Hairston
C. E. Walters
Administrative Trademark
Judges, Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board