Creamer & Dunlap

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 6, 1945

60 N.L.R.B. 437 (N.L.R.B. 1945)

In the Matter Of CREAMER & DUNLAP and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 16-R-11.25.-Decided February 6, 1945
Mr. F. B. Creamer, of Tulsa, Okla., for the Company.
Mr. Lawrence Bench, of Dallas, Tex., and Mr. J. H. Williams, of
Tulsa, Okla., for the CIO.
Mr. TV. L. Mills, and Mr. R. C. Strickland, both of Tulsa, Okla., for
the AFL.
Mr. Julius G. Serot, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a petition duly filed by United Steelworkers of America, CIO,
herein called the CIO, alleging that a question affecting commerce
had arisen concerning the representation of employees of Creamer &
Dunlap,1 herein called the Company, the National Labor Relations
Board provided for an appropriate hearing upon due notice before
Glenn L. Moller; Trial Examiner. Said hearing was held at Tulsa,
Oklahoma, on December 29, 1044. The Company, the CIO, and Shop-
men's Local #620, International Association of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Iron Workers, A. F. L., herein called the AFL, ap-
peared and participated. All parties were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing on the issues. The Trial Examiner's rulings made
at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
All parties were afforded an opportunity to file briefs with the Board.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Creamer & Dunlap is a copartnership consisting of F. B. Creamer
and Orden Brechtel, maintaining its office and plant at Tulsa, Okla-
1 Name as amended at the hearing.
60 N. L. R B., No. 83.
437
438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
homa. The Company is normally engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of steel derricks and oil field equipment. At the present
time, it manufactures ship masts and pontoons for the Maritime Com-
mission and the United States Navy. The United States Navy fur-
nishes the material used by the Company in its manufacture of
pontoons for the Navy, these materials being shipped to the Company
from points outside the State of Oklahoma. The value of these
materials is unknown, but it is substantial. In addition, raw ma-
terials used by the Company during the year 1944, in the manufacture
of articles for customers other than the United States Navy, were
valued at approximately $175,000, all of which materials were shipped.
to the Company from points outside the State of Oklahoma. During
the same year, the Company's gross income was in excess of $600,000,
and all, of its products during that period were shipped to points out-
side the State of Oklahoma.
The Company admits that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to member-
ship employees of the Company.
Shopmen's Local #620, International Association of Bridge, Struc-
tural & Ornamental Iron Workers, affiliated with the American Fed-
eration of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to membership
employees of the Company.
III. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
In November 1944, the CIO requested recognition as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the Company's employees. The Com-
pany refused to grant this request on the ground that it had a contract
with the AFL. "
On August 18, 1941, the Company and the AFL had entered into an
agreement for collective bargaining. Thereafter, on August 18, 1942,
a new, written agreement was executed, and it is this latter contract
which was made the basis of the Company's refusal' to bargain with
the CIO. That agreement provided for a 1-year term, and for auto-
matic renewal thereafter unless either party served written notice
upon the other at least 4 months prior to the expiration date of any
yearly term. The contract, as written in 1942, remains in full force
and effect today, having been automatically renewed in 1943 and again
in 1944, since neither party ever elected to terminate the agreement.
There is no statement as to the--precise contention of the CIO, but it
would appear from the record that the CIO proceeds on the theory
CREAMER & DUNLAP 439
that the AFL is no longer a functioning organization insofar as its
relations with this Company are concerned.2 However, the record
clearly indicates the contrary: Although the AFL obviously did not
enforce the union-shop clause in the contract, and although the Com-
pany discharged and laid off employees without regard to the contract,
and without consulting with the AFL, the record does show several
instances, including some within this past year, of conferences by the
Company with the grievance committee appointed by the AFL for the
purpose of improving the working conditions of the employees.
There is.no evidence indicating, and it cannot seriously be contended,
that the AFL is a defunct organization.
The record does not reveal the existence of any such unusual circum-
stance as would operate to place this case outside-the settled rule that
a valid existing contract of reasonable duration is a bar to a deter-
mination of a question concerning representation, and we therefore
find that the agreement between the Company and the AFL is a bar
to a present determination in this proceeding. We shall therefore
dismiss this petition, without prejudice to the filing of another within a
reasonable period prior to the expiration of that contract.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and the entire record
in the case, the Board hereby orders that the petition for investigation
and certification of representatives of employees of Creamer & Dun-
lap, Tulsa, Oklahoma, filed by United Steelworkers of America, affili-
ated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, be, and it hereby
is, dismissed.
2 The petitioner does not rely upon any claim that an expansion of personnel now requires
a new determination of a bargaining representative , but since the record does contain testi-
mony indicating the possibility of such a question , we point out that the Company had
reached the peak of its expansion by the time notice to alter or abrogate the contract was
required to be given , and it was not until some months after that time that the petitioner
made its request for recognition . As a matter of fact , the force decreased in size after
April 1 , 1944, the date the automatic renewal clause became operative and in November
1944,'when the petitioner made its demand , the number of men was much less than it had
been in April 1944.