Craftool Mfg. Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 12, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 634 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Craftool Manufacturing Company and Craftool Com-
pany, Subsidiaries of Tandy Corporation and
Tandy Craftool Mfg. Co. and United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.
Cases 16-CA-6416 and 16-CA-6502
May 12, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On October 18, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Craftool Manu-
facturing Company and Craftool Company, Subsidi-
aries of Tandy Corporation and Tandy Craftool Mfg.
Co., Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard on June 8 and 9 and July 9, 1976, in Fort
Worth, Texas, on a consolidated complaint issued on April
30, 1976, as amended thereafter.' The original consolidated
complaint alleges that Respondent - the two named
I Charges and amended charges in Case 16-CA6416 were resolved by
an informal settlement agreement approved by the Regional Director on
February 24, 1976. Because of subsequent alleged misconduct which
resulted in charges being filed in Case 16-CA-6502, the Regional Director
229 NLRB No. 109
Respondents are admittedly joint employers and shall be
referred to in the singular - violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by giving employees the impression that bargaining
with the Union 2 would be futile; promising benefits for not
supporting the Union and threatening more arduous work
if they supported the Union; and soliciting and encourag-
ing employees to circulate a petition to reject the Union as
bargaining representative. The amendment alleges that the
Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the
Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.
Respondent denied the critical allegations in the com-
plaint. Both Respondent and General Counsel have filed
briefs.
Upon the entire record, and my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, whose parent company is a Delaware
corporation, maintains office facilities and principal places
of business in Fort Worth, Texas, where it is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of leatherworking tools.
Respondent, during the year before the issuance of the
complaint, shipped products valued in excess of $50,000
from Fort Worth directly to States other than Texas.
Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
After the employees selected the Union in a Board-
conducted election, the Union was certified on June 5,
1975, as the exclusive bargaining representative in the
following admittedly appropriate unit of Respondent's
employees:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by the Employer at its 1001 Foch Street, Fort Worth,
Texas, location, excluding office clerical employees,
professional and technical employees, guards, watch-
men and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Bargaining began shortly thereafter. In late August 1975,
Plant Foreman Bill Sanders approached employee Pauline
Frazier, a member of the Union's negotiating team, at her
work station. He asked about her family and how the
Union was doing. She said "OK." He said that the
employees were wasting their time and that the Union
would never get a contract signed. She disagreed, saying it
"might not be a good one, but we'll get one." He replied
that "this Company won't sign a contract" and said if she
set aside the settlement agreement and issued the original consolidated
complaint covering all charges. No question is presented by Respondent
concerning the propriety of setting aside the settlement agreement.
2 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.
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CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY
repeated his remarks he would deny them. Frazier
mentioned the remarks to a number of other employees.
In January 1976, the parties reached an agreement and
an employee ratification vote was scheduled on January 20
to approve the contract. On January 19, Supervisor Linda
Dixon approached employee Kathy Easterwood and told
her it would be too bad if the union contract were voted in
because the employees would be getting a 20-cent raise and
she knew they were worth 20 cents "right then." The next
day, Dixon approached Easterwood and employee Debbie
Hightower and said she hoped the contract was voted in
because it would mean more money for her "because the
company would have more money to pay her." Dixon also
approached employee Billy Lytle3 and told him that the
employees "could make more money if the Union was not
there" and that it would be difficult to keep anyone
working for only a 20-cent increase in pay. The contract
was ratified by the employees on January 20.
The next next day, General Manager Fred Absher
approached Lytle and said he wanted to talk to him. He
said he noticed that Lytle was displeased with the Union
and read from notes telling Lytle how an antiunion petition
could be circulated. His instructions were as follows:
You and many others have told me or other members
of management that you do not desire to be represented
by the Union and would like to do something about it. I
have talked with our attorney and he has advised me to
tell you that you have the following rights: 1. If you
desire to circulate a petition opposing the union, you
are free to do so. 2. The law prevents our company
from assisting you in circulating a petition. 3. If you do
intend to circulate a petition opposing the union it
should be done on your own time. 4. The petition
should state as follows: Employees of Craftool do not
want to be represented by the Carpenters Union.
Interested employees should sign name and date. These
petitions should be given to me.
He also read this statement to other employees. It was read
to employees Karen Donahew and Billy Smith on their
worktime.
Lytle went to Supervisor Dixon's desk and borrowed
paper and pencil and circulated a petition with the
language indicated by Absher. He removed Respondent's
letterhead from the paper. He circulated one petition on
January 22 during the night shift and apparently on
nonworking time. On January 22, Supervisor Dixon came
to Lytle and said that Absher suggested it would be a
"good idea" if he got a female employee, Karen Donahew,
to circulate a petition because the women employees would
identify more readily with her. Lytle did so and Donahew
circulated the petition and turned it in the next day,
January 23. These three petitions were turned into Night
Foreman Uriah Cleaver and eventually to Absher. Absher
told Cleaver that employees would be passing around the
petitions and that they were to be turned in to him. About
3 Lytle had recently been reemployed by Respondent in December 1975
as an employee. He served an earlier stint with Respondent 2 years before as
a supervisor. He had supervised Dixon when she was a rank-and-file
employee,
4 The above findings of fact are based primarily on the testimony of
this time, Lytle saw Absher in the restroom and asked him
whether, since the contract had been ratified, the petitions
were too late; Absher replied they "would help."
Also at this time, other petitions were circulated at the
plant including some on the day shift. Some were
circulated during working hours and working time. They
were also turned into Absher within a week and all the
petitions were mailed to Respondent's counsel.
On or about January 27, Dixon approached Lytle and
told him that because of the union contract the employees'
breaks would be shortened. The next day, Dixon came
back to Lytle and said that Kathy Easterwood had gone to
the Union and reported the incident about the breaks and
the old policy on breaks was being reinstituted. Dixon
continued by saying that she was not going to be as "nice"
to Easterwood from there on by allowing her to do "a lot of
the easy work which comes into the back of the shop."
In February, Lytle had a change of heart and joined the
Union. He began circulating prounion petitions at the
plant in support of a union meeting to be held on March 8.
He and Easterwood received a warning on this date for
excessive conversation during worktime several days
before.
On February 19, the parties entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement, effective February 23, 1976, and to
expire on June 5, 1976, one year after the date of the
Union's certification. Article II of the contract accorded
the Union exclusive recognition in the unit found appropri-
ate by the Board.
On March 8, 1976, the Respondent filed an election
petition with the Board's Regional Director in Case 16-
RM-533 asserting that the petitions circulated in late
January showed that more than a majority of its employees
did not wish to be represented by the Union. On March 8,
Respondent notified the Union of this action and stated
that it intended to terminate the existing agreement upon
its expiration. On April 30, 1976, the Regional Director
dismissed the petition because a complaint had issued
alleging that the Respondent had unlawfully participated
in the circulation of the petitions. Respondent filed a
request for review of the Regional Director's decision and
it was denied on May 18, 1976. The Board concluded that
"insufficient grounds have been alleged for reversing the
Regional Director" and the dismissal of the petition was
affirmed.
On June 7, 1976, by letter from Respondent's counsel,
Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union. The
letter was a response to the Union's letter requesting
bargaining on a new agreement to replace that which
expired on June 5. Respondent relied upon its previously
filed election petition and stated that it had a good-faith
doubt of the Unions' majority status.
By letter dated June 22 the Union again requested
bargaining and there has been no response by Respon-
dent.4
employees Frazier, Lytle, Easterwood, and Hinds who I found to be candid
and reliable witnesses. In many instances their testimony was not
controverted. For example, Sanders could not recall the conversation with
Frazier, and Absher could not recall the restroom conversation with Lytle.
To the extent there are conflicts, I reject the testimony that is contrary to
(Continued)
635
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. Discussion
I. Statements by Supervisor Dixon
General Counsel asserts that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by virtue of Supervisor Dixon's
statements on January 19 and 20 to the effect that she
knew the employees were worth more than the 20-cent
increase they were getting in the union contract right then;
that she hoped the contract was voted in because
Respondent would have more money for her; and that
Respondent could pay employees more than the Union
could get for them. General Counsel urges that these
statements constitute promises of benefit in order to
encourage employees not to support the Union. I disagree.
The statements contain nothing which a reasonable person
could regard as a believable promise of benefit; they are
opinions of a low level supervisor as to the economic
package obtained by the Union, an opinion which
naturally enough reflects management's views. Such
opinions are not unlawful, particularly when, as here, they
come from a supervisor who had no apparent authority to
grant or recommend general wage increases and whose
words I cannot conclude were interpreted as reflecting a
promise by Respondent's management to reward nonsup-
port of the Union by granting economic benefits.
Other assertions of 8(a)(1) misconduct are more signifi-
cant.
It is alleged that Dixon threatened to assign employee
Easterwood more arduous work because she went to the
Union to protest a reduction in breaktime which was later
rescinded. Although the indication not to be nice to
Easterwood hardly warrants Federal intervention, Dixon
went on and clearly threatened she would not allow
Easterwood to do "a lot of the easy work" in the shop.
There is no doubt that the reason for this threat was to
punish Easterwood for having utilized her union represen-
tative as she was entitled to do under Section 7 of the Act.
Moreover, unlike the other statements of Dixon discussed
above, she had the power to effectuate this threat. She did
have the authority to assign work to employees. Such
remarks could well make employees feel that Respondent,
through Dixon, would retaliate against them for going to or
supporting the Union as Easterwood did. This contitutes a
violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
Another allegation involves the statement by Production
Foreman Sanders in August 1975 that the Company would
not sign an agreement. This statement was made by a high-
ranking responsible management official; it was repeated
to a number of employees; and it was made during
obviously hard and tough bargaining. The law requires an
employer to make a good-faith effort to reach agreement
and to execute any agreement reached (Section 8(d) of the
Act). The impact of Sanders' statement was clearly that,
because of management's resistance to collective bargain-
that I have credited. Dixon, for example, testified that she told Lytle to get
Karen Donahew to help in circulating the petitions; Lytle said she
mentioned that Absher had suggested this. I credit Lytle's account of the
conversation. Dixon seemed to have considerable difficulty recalling the
relevant events with precision, and Absher, who had suggested circulating
petitions in the first place, did not deny that he suggested Donahew to
Dixon.
I The testimony on this point is rather imprecise. Karen Donahew
ing, utilization of the Union for this purpose would be
futile. The statement interfered with employee rights to
bargain collectively through their representative and is
violative of the Act.
2. Circulation of the petitions
The most significant issue in this case is whether, as
General Counsel asserts, Respondent unlawfully assisted in
the circulation of the antiunion petitions in late January
1976. If so, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
which prohibits interference with employee rights under
Section 7 to select or reject a bargaining representative.
Respondent urges that there was no violation and,
although it does not contend that the antiunion petitions
were the result of a spontaneous movement, it suggests that
its own involvement was benign since General Manager
Absher simply told the employees their legal rights in
response to employee remarks of displeasure with the
Union. I find that the Respondent's assistance and
involvement in the circulation and collection of the
petitions was unlawful, that its conduct suggested Respon-
dent's sanction, support, and sponsorship of the petitions
and thus was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
First of all, it must be kept in mind that the petitions
were circulated and collected well within the Union's
certification year. The petitions stated that the signers did
not wish to have the Union represent them. But some 8
months before, the employees voted in a secret ballot
election to have the Union represent them and the Board
certified the results. It is settled law that a union's majority
status is irrebuttably presumed to continue for I year,
absent special circumstances not alleged or present here.
Ray Brooks v. N.LR.B., 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
Secondly, the employees had just ratified a collective-
bargaining agreement entered into by the Union. It
appears that not all employees were pleased at the results;
it was the Union's first contract, its term was short and it
came after months of bargaining despite a management
official's remark that Respondent would never sign a
contract. There is testimony that some employees spoke
against the Union and the bargain it struck during the
period of the ratification vote. Absher had conversations
with some employees who expressed opposition to the
Union.5
Absher's response to this situation was to read a
prepared statement to those employees who had expressed
opposition to the Union, suggesting the desirability of
circulating a petition rejecting the Union. Thus, Respon-
dent, through a high management official, initiated the
suggestion of circulating a petition. Absher also suggested
how the petition should read, i.e., that the employees did
not wish to be represented by the Union. He then advised
that the petitions should be turned in to him. I find that
this conduct constituted unlawful interference. Absher
testified that she had asked Absher "what the people that didn't want to be
in the Union could do about it"; Billy Smith testified she asked "was there
anything we could do." Absher testified that the employees wanted to know
how they could get rid of the Union, but he failed to describe with
particularity what was said in those conversations. Lytle admitted he
expressed dissatisfaction with the Union, but, again, his testimony does not
describe with particularity how his dissatisfaction was expressed.
636
CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY
suggested a precise course of action which clearly indicated
Respondent's sponsorship and support despite its admoni-
tion that it could not "assist" employees. His suggestion
also converted employee dissatisfaction into the formal and
legally significant consequence of having employees peti-
tion to reject the Union as bargaining representative.
Furthermore, Absher himself initiated the conversation
which prompted Lytle to circulate the first petitions, using
Respondent's stationery to prepare the petitions. Supervi-
sor Dixon readily helped and transmitted the suggestion
from Absher that a female employee be used to help
circulate the petitions. Absher himself told Lytle that the
petitions "would help" even though a contract had been
ratified. Moreover, Lytle, who later switched and support-
ed the Union, was a former supervisor who had just
returned to work for Respondent. Other petitions were
circulated on the day shift on working time and Absher's
instructions were read to some employees on their
worktime. Respondent's officials knew that the petitions
were being circulated, and they were turned in to
Respondent, as Absher directed, mailed to Respondent's
counsel, and used to attempt to remove the Union as
bargaining representative on a petition filed by Respon-
dent. In these circumstances, Respondent clearly gave the
impression that it sanctioned and indeed was sponsoring
the circulation of the petition.
As I have indicated above, the evidence shows that the
Respondent went beyond simply advising employees of
their legal rights or responding to employee dissatisfaction.
Respondent's assistance included the suggestion of a
specific course of action and other aid. Significantly,
nowhere in the instructions, which purported to tell
employees their legal rights, was there any statement about
the legal requirement which flowed from the Union's
certification, i.e., that the Union's majority status was
presumed for I year. This omission highlights the danger to
employee rights when an employer suggests a specific
course of action in rejecting an incumbent union to
employees not fully versed in the law. The risk of
misunderstanding inherent in such a situation renders
suspect suggestions of support by an employer in this
sensitive area, which is a matter for employees alone to
resolve. As the Board stated in Texas Electric Coop, Inc.,-
Treating Division 197 NLRB 10, 15 (1972):
[W]hether or not Respondent was privileged in advis-
ing employees, pursuant to their request, of the manner
in which they could withdraw from the Union, such a
privilege avails it nothing here. As the Board stated in
River Togs, Inc., 160 NLRB 58, 60-61, "by assisting in
the preparation of the petition and by permitting its
circulation in part on working time, in the presence of
and with the knowledge of supervisors, Respondent
gave employees the impression that the petition was
being circulated with its approval and thus restrained
and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).30
30 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's decision in this respect (382 F 2d 198). This was occasioned,
however, not because the court was of the opinion that the principle
enunciated by the Board was wrong. but because it thought that the
evidence did not support the Board's conclusion.
For all of the above reasons, I conclude that Respon-
dent's suggestion of and participation in the circulation
and collection of the antiunion petitions was unlawful. See
also Edward Fields, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 325 F.2d 754, 760
(C.A. 2, 1963).
3. The withdrawal of recognition
As indicated, Respondent withdrew recognition at the
expiration of the bargaining agreement and the Union's
certification year on June 7, 1976. The only stated reason
for the withdrawal and conceded refusal to bargain was the
assertion that a majority of the employees had signed
petitions stating they did not wish to be represented by the
Union in late January 1976. Those petitions had been
submitted by Respondent to the Board in March 1976 in
support of its petition to secure a new election. The petition
was dismissed by the Regional Director and the Board
affirmed. Because of my findings that the relied-upon
petitions were secured through unlawful assistance by
Respondent and because they were secured in the context
of unfair labor practices, I find that Respondent could not
properly rely in good faith on those petitions in withdraw-
ing recognition from the incumbent union and I therefore
find that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the
Act.
To insure the stability of established bargaining relation-
ships and to prevent recurring interference with industrial
peace, the Board and the courts have circumscribed the
conditions under which an employer may lawfully with-
draw recognition from a duly recognized bargaining agent.
These well-settled principles are as follows:
Absent special circumstances, a union enjoys an
irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year
after its certification. Thereafter, the presumption is
rebuttable, and an employer who has a reasonable basis
in fact to doubt an incumbent union's majority status
and who asserts that doubt in good faith may refuse to
recognize and bargain with the union. N.LR.B. v.
Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966);
Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951). See Brooks v.
N.LR.B., 348 U.S. 96, [98-104] (1954). [Bally Case &
Cooler, Inc. of Delaware v. N.L R.B., 416 F.2d 902, 904-
905 (C.A. 6, 1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. 910 (1970).]
To rebut that presumption, the employer must show either
that "the union, in fact, no longer enjoyed majority support
on the date of refusal to bargain, or that the refusal to
bargain was predicated upon a reasonably grounded good
faith doubt of majority support." Terrell Machine Company
v. N.LR.B., 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (C.A. 4, 1970), cert.
denied 398 U.S. 929. However, as the Board has stated:
"Once a union has established its majority through
certification, as here, its majority is presumed to
continue [beyond the certification year] unless rebut-
ted. But, an employer may without violating the Act
withhold further bargaining and insist that a union
reestablish its majority if it can establish a good-faith
doubt of continued majority. . .This showing must, of
course, be made in an atmosphere free of employer
637
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
conduct aimed at causing disaffection." [Texas Electric
Coop, Inc., 197 NLRB 10, 15-16, quoting Firestone
Synthetic Rubber & Latex Company, Division of the
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 173 NLRB 1179,
1180 (1968). See also Medo Photo Supply Corporation v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944).]
Applying these principles, I find that Respondent's
refusal to bargain was unlawful. As I have found,
Respondent was unlawfully involved in the circulation of
the antiunion petitions. I have also found that Respondent
engaged in other coercive and unlawful conduct including
a suggestion that it would never sign a contract and that
recourse to the Union would subject employees to more
arduous work assignments. Thus, in showing lack of union
majority or a good-faith doubt of such majority, Respon-
dent seeks to rely on evidence - the antiunion petitions -
tainted by its own misconduct and secured in a context of
unfair labor practices. Accordingly, I find that Respondent
has not shown the requisite lack of union majority or good-
faith doubt of such majority on June 7, 1976, when it
withdrew recognition from the Union. 6
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. By suggesting that its employees circulate petitions
repudiating the Union and by assisting its employees in the
circulation and collection of the petitions, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By threatening assignment of more arduous work to
employees for utilizing or filing grievances with their union
representative and by suggesting that it would never sign a
contract with the Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
3. By withdrawing recognition from and refusing to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the unit described in
section II, A, above, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
4. These unfair labor practices found above affect
interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
THE REMEDY
Since I have found that Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act, my recommended Order will require
Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act,
6 Although I do not reach the issue, I would have considerable difficulty
in accepting Respondent's reliance, in withdrawing recognition, on the
antiunion petitions as evidence of lack of majority or good-faith doubt of
majority as of June 5, 1976, even if they were untainted by Respondent's
unfair labor practices. The petitions were 5 months old and there was no
evidence submitted by Respondent as to the status of the Union on the date
of the refusal to bargain or any reasonably related time frame. Indeed, the
record evidence suggests that Union strengthened its hand after circulation
of the petitions. The leading antiunion employee, Lytle, changed horses and
including the immediate resumption of bargaining with the
Union.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 7
The Respondent, Craftool Manufacturing Company and
Craftool Company, Subsidiaries of Tandy Corporation and
Tandy Craftool Mfg. Co., Fort Worth, Texas, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) In any manner or by any means, including orders,
directions, instructions, requests, suggestions, or appeals or
by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect,
causing, inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting em-
ployees to repudiate United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, or to rescind the authority of the foregoing
named labor organization to represent them for purposes
of collective bargaining.
(b) Threatening to assign more arduous work to
employees for filing grievances with or supporting United
Brotherhood of Carpenters or stating that Respondent
would not sign a collective-bargaining agreement with
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, or any other labor
organization.
(c) Failing or refusing to bargain with United Brother-
hood of Carpenters as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of its employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by the Employer at its 1001 Foch Street, Fort Worth,
Texas, location, excluding office clerical employees,
professional and technical employees, guards, watch-
men and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is
found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended:
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain with United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
became an active union supporter who passed out prounion leaflets at the
plant. And the Union secured an agreement, albeit one of short duration,
which it actively administered.
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
638
CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY
of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit respect-
ing rate of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions
of employment, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its premises in Fort Worth, Texas, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein.
s In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to
post this notice.
The law gives you the rights:
To form, join, or help unions
To choose a union to represent you in
bargaining with us
To act together for your common interest or
protection
To refuse to participate in any or all of these
things.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more difficult work
if you try to get the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
to help you with a grievance.
WE WILL NOT do or say anything to persuade you or
help you to stop the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
from being your representative in dealing with us about
your wages and about the conditions under which you
work.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your
rights.
WE WILL recognize the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters as your representative in dealing with us
about your wages and about the conditions under
which you work.
WE WILL bargain and deal with the United Brother-
hood of Caprenters, about your wages, working hours,
and any other condition under which you work. If we
come to an agreement about any of these things with
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, WE WILL put
that agreement in writing and sign it.
WE WILL respect your right to deal with us through
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
CRAFTOOL MANUFACTURING
COMPANY AND CRAFTOOL
COMPANY, SUBSIDIARIES OF
TANDY CORPORATION AND
TANDY CRAFTOOL MFG.
Co.
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