CPL (Linwood) LLC d/b/a Linwood Care Center

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 5, 2016

04-CA-146362 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 5, 2016)

JD–27–16
Linwood, NJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CPL (LINWOOD) LLC D/B/A
LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS
SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A
LINWOOD CARE CENTER
and Cases 04–CA–146362
04–CA–146670
04–CA–148705
04–CA–165109
1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS EAST
Henry R. Protas, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Louis J. Capozzi, Jr., Esq., and Brandon S. Williams, Esq.
(Capozzi Adler P.C., Camp Hill, Pennsylvania), for the Respondent.
Jay Jaffe, Esq. (1199 SEIU, United Healthcare Workers East,
New York, New York) for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arthur J. Amchan, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania between February 8 and 10, 2016. 1199 SEIU (the Union) filed the initial charges
between February 12, 2015 and November 30, 2015. The General Counsel issued an amended
consolidated complaint covering all 4 charges on February 2, 2016.
The Union has represented the Certified Nursing Assistants, Unit Clerks and Licensed
Practical Nurses at Respondent’s nursing facility in Linwood, New Jersey since December 13,
2013. The Union and representatives of Revera Health Systems, which owned the Linwood
facility through November 30, 2015, met in collective bargaining negotiations on about 3
occasions in 2014 and 8-10 occasions in 2015. The Union and Respondent never reached
agreement on a collective bargaining agreement
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2
In January 2015 a decertification petition was circulated. One allegation in this case is
that labor consultants, alleged to be agents of Respondent, solicited employees to sign the
decertification petition. Linwood filed an RM petition (04-RM-145463) on January 30, 2015
which was dismissed by the Regional Director. The Board on February 17, 2016 declined to
reverse that decision.5
On December 1, 2015, Genesis Healthcare Systems took over ownership of the Linwood
Care Center from Revera Health Systems. There is no dispute that Genesis, which operates the
facility through its subsidiary 201 New Road Operations, LLC, is a successor employer of the
bargaining unit employees.10
The substantive unfair labor practice allegations in this case are as follows:
Respondent, by its human resource director, Rose Przychodzki told an employee that
Respondent could not make schedule changes because employees had chosen the Union as their 15
collective bargaining representative.
Respondent, by its alleged agents, labor consultants Jon Buress and Dan Bryan, violated
Section 8(a)(1) in a variety of ways, including soliciting employee complaints and grievances,
making promises that conditions would improve if employees decertified the Union and 20
soliciting an employee to sign the decertification petition. The General Counsel also alleges that
Buress and Bryan on several occasions created the impression that employees’ protected
activities were under surveillance.
The General Counsel also alleges that Respondent, by Valerie Lowman, then its Director 25
of Nursing, violated Section 8(a)(1) in several respects.
In May 2014, Linwood and the Union reached an agreement on a protocol for the Union
to access the Linwood facility. The General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) in imposing new conditions on this agreement and then revoking it entirely.30
Further, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated the Act in discharging
and/or suspending unit employees without prior notice to the Union and without affording the
Union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain over the discharges and suspensions before they
were implemented. The General Counsel relies on the rationale in Alan Ritchey, 359 NLRB No. 35
40 (2012), a decision invalided by the Supreme Court due to the composition of the Board at the
time.
Finally, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
by unreasonably delaying the furnishing of certain information requested by the Union regarding 40
wages increases, bonuses and disciplinary measures.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Respondent and the Charging Party
Union I make the following45
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3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent CPL, a Delaware limited liability company, owned by Revera Health 5
Systems, operated a skilled nursing facility in Linwood, New Jersey until November 30, 2015.
In 2015, it received gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and purchased and received goods at
the Linwood facility valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points outside the State of New
Jersey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it was an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act at all material times and that the Union is a labor 10
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent 201 New Road, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Genesis Healthcare, Inc., is a
limited liability company which has operated the same facility since December 1, 2015. It is
projected to receive annual gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and to purchase and receive 15
goods at the Linwood facility valued in excess of $5,000 directly from points outside the State of
New Jersey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act at all material times. 201 New Road has
continued to operate the facility in an unchanged form. 201 New Road was put on notice of
CPL’s potential liability in the instant cases and is a successor employer to CPL.20
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Complaint Paragraph 6, alleged unfair labor practice by Rose Pryzchodzki
25
Prior to the Union’s certification in December 2013, a unit employee seeking to have his
or her schedule changed, submitted a request to the human resources department in writing. In
December 2014, unit employee Mary Jo Halpin took a written request for a schedule change to
Respondent’s human resources director, Rose Pryzchodzki. Several days later, Pryzchodzki told
Halpin that she could not change Halpin’s schedule because Respondent was in negotiations with 30
the Union. Further, she told Halpin that there could be no such changes at least until Respondent
and the Union met in contract negotiations in February 2015.1
Complaint paragraphs 7 and 8, alleged unfair practices by Labor Management Consultants as
agent of CPL35
Shortly after the expiration of the Union’s certification year, Respondent CPL’s parent
company, Rivera Health Systems, hired Labor Management Consultants (LMC) to survey and
interview unit employees at the Linwood facility. Two employees of LMC, Jon Buress and Dan
Bryan, were at Linwood from January 21, to February 12, 2015. They walked the halls of the 40

1 Rose Pryzchodzki did not directly contradict Halpin’s testimony, which I credit. Pryzchodzki
testified that she did not recall Halpin coming to her about a schedule change. If she had done so, Rose
Pryzchodzki testified that she would have referred Halpin to the Director of Nursing, Valerie Lowman.
Had she sent Halpin to Lowman, the result would not have been different. Halpin testified that Rose
Pryzchodzki told her in December 2014 that her information came from Lowman.
JD–27–16
4
facility freely, talking to employees one-on-one and in group meetings. I infer from this record
that CPL retained LMC to promote decertification of the Union.
Several unit employees testified as to their interaction with Buress and Bryan. Since
none of this testimony is contradicted, it is credited in its entirety.25
Dan Bryan approached Mary Jo Halpin on several occasions. She agreed to meet Bryan
in a storage area. Halpin asked Bryan what he was doing at the facility. He responded that
Respondent had received an unfavorable employee survey and that Respondent hired LMC to
find out what problems existed.10
Bryan told Halpin that he had spoken to 60 employees and that virtually all complained
about the Director of Nursing, Valerie Lowman. He told Halpin that Respondent would be
getting rid of Lowman.3 Halpin said she didn’t have any problem with Lowman, but complained
about another manager. Bryan responded that possibly Respondent could give the manager more 15
training. Then:
He asked me, he said as a sign of good faith, would I be
willing to sign a paper saying that I didn't want the union,
that way they could get rid of the people that were the problem
and get on with the raises. He had said that he already had a20
bunch of signatures; that mine really wasn't going to matter.
And I ended up, I did sign a paper.
Q. Did he say how many signatures he had?
A.. He said he had like 60 signatures.
Tr. 33-34.25
Bryan presented Halpin with a sheet of lined paper which she signed. The paper may not
have had any writing on the top. If so, language was added after she signed indicating that she
was an employee who no longer wanted union representation, G.C. 4.4
30
At about this time, two employees, Christine Howell and Linda Adams, were also
circulating a decertification petition. Some unit employees were not aware of this.
Dan Bryan also met with unit employee Cassandra Morton. He told Morton that
Respondent’s corporate office had sent him to find out what the problems were at the facility. 35
Bryan solicited Morton to sign a decertification petition. She told Bryan she was not interested.
He told Morton that the 1199 SEIU was a bad union and that employees could select a different
union to represent them.

2 Respondent suggests that several witnesses are not credible because they were “paid” by the Union.
The record shows that Respondent required unit employees who attended bargaining sessions to use
personal time or vacation time to do so. The Union compensated them for lost wages if they did neither,
Tr. 439-440.
3 Lowman’s employment with Respondent ended several months later. The reasons do not appear in
this record.
4 Unit employee Harry Waugh also did not recall any writing at the top of the paper he was asked to
sign.
JD–27–16
5
Unit employee Harry Waugh was approached by Buress on the night of January 28,
2015.5 Buress told Waugh that Revera could do things for the employees if they voted the Union
out. He said that Respondent could not give employees raises until the “union thing” was taken
care of. Further, Buress said that there would be no raises until Respondent and the Union
agreed on a collective bargaining agreement—which could be a very long time. On the other 5
hand, Buress told Waugh that after the Union was voted out, Respondent would grant employees
retroactive raises.
Buress told Waugh that that Respondent would increase its staff once the Union was gone
and he solicited complaints about Nursing Director Valerie Lowman. He showed Waugh a 10
decertification petition and told Waugh that 60% of the employees had already signed it. Buress
also told Waugh that most of the employees who had supported the Union no longer worked at
the facility. He encouraged Waugh to sign a decertification petition; Waugh declined.6
Creating the impression of surveillance by LMC15
Both Buress and Bryan told employees approximately how many employees had signed a
decertification petition. The General Counsel alleges that by doing so they created the
impression that employees’ protected activities were under surveillance.
20
Complaint paragraph 9 (interrogation of new employees by Valerie Lowman; creating an
impression of surveillance)
Unit employee Cassandra Morton attended a meeting with 9-10 other employees in
January or February 2015. Diane Delaney, the Director of the facility, and Valerie Lowman, the 25
Director of Nursing, conducted the meeting. Lowman told the employees that Respondent was
hiring new employees to relieve its staffing problems. Lowman also told the employees at the
meeting that Respondent was telling new employees about a decertification petition and was
asking them if they wanted a union or not, Tr. 67-69.7 Lowman told the employees at the
meeting that 50% of the new hires said they wanted a Union and that 50% said they did not.30
Complaint paragraph 10: restricting and denying the Union access to the facility
In March 2014, the Union assigned administrative organizer Roz Waddell to the Linwood
bargaining unit. In May 2014, Respondent agreed to allow the Union access to the Linwood 35
facility to meet with unit members under the following conditions:
1. A union representative should request access in advance, at least 24 hours but
preferably 48 hours to visit unit employees at the facility
2. The Union would request specific dates and times for such visits, which would be 40
mutually agreed upon.

5 Waugh’s testimony is also uncontradicted and therefore credited.
6 Like the paper given to Mary Jo Halpin, the sheet that Buress wanted Waugh to sign did not have
any printed material on it.
7 Morton’s testimony on this issue is also uncontradicted and therefore credited.
JD–27–16
6
3. The Union representative would remain in the employee break area by the West
Wing.
On March 9, 2015, Roz Waddell emailed Diane Delaney, the facility
administrator/executive director. Waddell advised Delaney that she was planning to come to 5
Linwood on the following weekdays: March 10, 11, 17, and 18 and on weekend days March 14
and 22.
Delaney responded the same day that Waddell could come during certain time periods on
March 11 and 17, but not March 14 and 22 because Delaney would not be available. Instead she 10
offered Waddell a four-hour time block on either March 28 or 29. Delaney complained about the
fact that she had authorized a visit on March 6, but that Waddell did not show up or advise
Delaney that she was not coming.
Waddell arrived at Linwood at 0630 on March 11 at Respondent’s parking lot. Cheryl 15
Holmes, the Assistant Administrator, told Waddell that she had to leave. On March 13, Delaney
sent a letter to Union Vice-President Rhina Molina stating that union representatives were not
allowed in the Linwood parking lot and advising her that union representatives would be allowed
at the facility only under the following conditions that were additional to those agreed upon in
March 2014:20
1. One representative would be allowed at the facility at a time.
2. Union representatives were not to speak to any employees who requested that they
not speak to them.
3. The Union would notify Delaney in advance if the representative was not coming as 25
scheduled.
4. No Linwood property or materials were to be removed from the employee break area
or any other part of the facility.
Delany inferred that Roz Waddell had removed 2 memos, from her to employees, from 30
an employee lounge. She warned that noncompliance with these conditions would cause her to
revoke the Union’s access to the facility.
Waddell also came to the facility on March 14 and March 17. On March 17, Lisa
McConnell, Revera’s regional human resources director, told Waddell that she was not allowed 35
in the parking lot. McConnell allowed Waddell to meet with employees in the breakroom.
The next day, March 18, Waddell and organizer Diego Santelices arrived at the facility.
Assistant Administrator Cheryl Holmes told them that if they did not leave, she would call the
police.40
In April, Respondent took the position that the Union would not be allowed access to the
Linwood facility until the Union’s unfair labor practice charges were resolved. Respondent and
the Union discussed the access issue at collective bargaining sessions on June 2 and 3, 2015; no
agreement was reached. Union organizers have not been to the Linwood facility since March 18, 45
2015 other than on two occasions to discuss disciplinary measures.
JD–27–16
7
Complaint paragraph 11: “The Allen Ritchey issue”
Respondent discharged unit employees Dawn Apella on January 19, 2015; Rose Brewer
on October 14, 2014; Anthony Barker on September 15, 2014, Laurel Bertonazzi on June 9,
2015 and Theresa Reilly on August 19, 2015. It suspended Harry Waugh on March 30, 2015 and 5
Theresa Reilly on November 3, 2015 (after agreeing with the Union to allow Reilly to return to
work after her August discharge). In none of these instances did Respondent notify the Union
beforehand and offer the Union the opportunity to bargain over these disciplinary measures
before they were implemented. Moreover, Respondent, at least with respect to Apella and
Barker, did not promptly notify the Union of the discipline/discharge after the fact. The Union 10
first learned of Apella and Barker’s discharges months after the fact when Linwood responded to
the Union’s information request.
Respondent, when owned by Revera, had a progressive discipline policy, Jt. Exh. 2 pp. 8-
9. That policy had a 4-step procedure leading to termination. However, Respondent retained the 15
right to skip steps and the right to terminate on a first offense. Thus, the disciplinary measures in
this case were “discretionary” within the meaning of the Allen Ritchey decision. Revera also had
an internal grievance procedure. The Union availed itself of this process only with regard to
Theresa Reilly’s August 2015 termination.
20
Complaint paragraph 14: The Union Information Requests
On February 6, 2015, Union attorney Jay Jaffe sent a 4 page letter to Peter Tsoporis,
Revera’s Vice President of Labor Relations, requesting 12 categories of information by February
13. The parties met in collective bargaining negotiations on February 17 and 18. Tsoporis 25
provided some of this information on February 19. Jaffe wrote Tsoporis on March 3, requesting
the balance of the requested information by March 13. Tsoporis responded on March 12,
indicating that certain information had been provided previously, but declining to provide certain
information on the grounds that the Union had not demonstrated its relevance to collective
bargaining. That information was contained in paragraph 9 of Jaffe’s February 6 letter, which is 30
set forth below:
A list of all bargaining unit employees who have been formally reprimanded,
warned, suspended or discharged (including resignation in lieu of discharge) from
December 1, 2013 through the present, as well as the following:35
(a) the complete personnel and departmental files for each such employee,
including prior disciplinary action and employee evaluations;
(b) the notice of reprimand, warning, suspension or dismissal in
connection with each employee;40
(c) A detailed explanation of the reason each employee was reprimanded,
warned suspended or discharged;
(d) All notes, policies, statements, reports, witness statements, video,
audio or electronic evidence, and any other documentation that the
Company referred to or relied on in its decision to reprimand, warn, 45
suspend or discharge each employee.
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8
In his March 12, letter, Tsoporis, in response to paragraph 2(f) of the Union’s request,
provided the names of 4 employees who had received wage increases, the date of the increase,
the reason for the increase, but not the amount of the increases.
On March 23, 2015, Respondent provided the amount of the wage increases for the 4 5
employees and a list of some, but not all employees who had been disciplined since December 1,
2013. Tsoporis did not provide items 9(a)-(d) listed above regarding any disciplined employees.
On March 27, Tsoporis advised the Union that it was cancelling collective bargaining
negotiating sessions scheduled for March 30 and 31, because Respondent deemed the Union’s 10
response to its information request inadequate. He asked Jaffe for information regarding
additional disciplined employees that the Union was aware of.
Jaffe provided Tsoporis the names of 3 other employees whom the Union believed had
been disciplined and 4 additional employees who it believed had received wage increases on 15
March 30. On April 2, Tsoporis provided additional information regarding employees who
received wage increases and a log of employees who had been received reprimands and another
of employees who had been suspended or discharged. For the first time, Tsoporis raised
confidentiality concerns regarding some of the information the Union had requested regarding
disciplined employees, such as their employee evaluations. Respondent received requests that 20
their personnel files be kept confidential from about 7 employees between March 24 and 27,
2015.
By May 14, 2015, Respondent complied with all of the Union’s February 6, 2015
information requests.25
Analysis
Respondent, by Rose Pryzchodzki, violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling Mary Jo Halpin that
her schedule could not be changed because Respondent was in negotiations with the Union.30
An employer’s obligation while bargaining with the certified bargaining representative of
its employees for an initial contract is to maintain the status quo, Daily News of Los Angeles, 315
NLRB 1236 (1994). In this instance the status quo was that employees could request that their
schedules be changed by submitting a written request to the human resources department. By 35
refusing to process Halpin’s request, Respondent altered the status quo and violated Section 8
(a)(5) of the Act. By telling Halpin that it would not process it, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1).
Respondent, by its agents, labor consultants Jon Buress and Dan Bryan, violated Section 40
8(a)1) of the Act by 1) soliciting employees to sign a decertification petition; 2) soliciting
employee grievances and promising to remedy them if employees decertified the Union; 3)
telling employees that no changes in working conditions could be made unless either employees
got rid of the Union or a collective bargaining agreement was signed; 4) interrogating
employees concerning support for the Union.45
JD–27–16
9
First of all, Respondent’s contention that labor consultants Jon Buress and Dan Bryan
were not its agents pursuant to Section 2(13) of the Act, is wholly without merit. The Board
applies common law agency principles in determining who is an agent under the Act. When
applied to labor relations, agency principles must also be broadly construed in light of the
legislative policies embedded in the Act. A party may be bound by the conduct of those it holds 5
out to speak and act for it, even though there is no proof that specific acts were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified. Atelier Condominium & Cooper Square Realty, 361 NLRB
No. 111 (November 26, 2014), slip op. p. 36. Braun Electric Co., 324 NLRB 1, 2 (1997),
Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 279 NLRB 1298, 1299 (1986).8 Statements of a supervisor or
agent may be imputed to an employer even if that employer was not aware that the statements 10
were made, Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1978).
Common law principles incorporate the principles of implied and apparent authority.
Apparent authority is created through a manifestation by the principal to a third party that
supplies a reasonable basis for the latter to believe that the principal has authorized the agent to 15
do the act in question, Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 593 (1996). Another
way the Board has stated this principle is “whether under all the circumstances the employees
would reasonably believe that [a person] was reflecting company policy and speaking and acting
for management,” Community Cash Stores, 238 NLRB 265 (1978).
20
In the instant case, employees could not have believed that Buress and Bryan were not
speaking and acting for management. Why else would the two labor consultants be freely
walking around the Linwood facility, even after hours, asking them questions, encouraging them
to sign decertification petitions and promising to remedy grievances if they would only get rid of
the Union? It would have been unreasonable for employees to have believed that the two 25
individuals were not speaking and acting on behalf of management. Strangers, with no
connection to the owners of the facility, would not have any reason to engage in such activities.
Many of things said and done by Buress and Bryan violated the Act. These include
soliciting employees to sign a decertification petition, Beaird Industries, Inc., 311 NLRB 768 30
(1993); and soliciting employee grievances and explicitly promising to remedy them if
employees abandon their support for the Union, Amptech, Inc., 342 NLRB 1131, 1136-37
(2004). I also find that Buress and Bryan, in asking employees to sign a decertification petition
in the context a decertification campaign, conducted an unlawful interrogation, Hercules
Automotive, 285 NLRB 944, 949 (1987). An employee responding to these consultants would 35
necessarily have to reveal their union sympathies if they declined to sign the petition, as did
Harry Waugh.9
On the other hand, I find that Buress’ statement to Harry Waugh that 60% of employees
had signed a decertification petition would not reasonably lead Waugh to conclude that 40
employees’ protected activities were under surveillance. Grand Canyon Mining Company, 318
NLRB 748, 752-52 (1995), cited by the General Counsel, is distinguishable. In that case the
employee asked the supervisor how he knew the number of employees at a union meeting. The

8 The language of Section 2(13) defining “agent” states that actual authorization or subsequent
ratification of specific acts are not controlling in determining whether a person is an “agent.”
9 There is no evidence that Waugh was an open union supporter in January 2015.
JD–27–16
10
supervisor told him that another agent of the employer had seen 16 employees at the meeting. In
the instant case, there is no evidence regarding the basis for Buress’ claim. It is possible that 1)
he knew the number who signed a decertification petition because he and Bryan had collected
the signatures; 2) he was making the number up out of thin air; or 3) anti-Union employees had
reported this number to him. 5
An employer’s statement that contract negotiations could go on a very long time, is not
per se a violation of the Act. However, in the context of this case, in which Respondent’s
consultants also promised to remedy grievances and expedite wage increases if employees
abandoned the Union, such statements suggest futility in continuing to support the Union and 10
violate Section 8(a)(1), Airtex, 308 NLRB 1135 n. 2 (1992).
Respondent, by Valerie Lowman, violated the Act in interrogating new employees about
their union sympathies and giving employees the impression that their Union activities were
under surveillance.15
Director of Nursing, Valerie Lowman, violated Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating new
employees about their union sympathies in the context of a decertification drive. She also, by
indicating to other employees, the results of her inquiry, gave these employees the impression
that Respondent was keeping track of which employees were pro-Union and which were not. 20
This would reasonably give employees the impression that their Union activities, in general,
were under surveillance by Respondent, Flexsteel Industries, Inc., 311 NLRB 257 (1993).
The Access Issue
25
Board law is clear that when an employer and a union have an agreement allowing the
union access to its property to carry out its representational activities, or the employer has an
established past practice of allowing access, the employer cannot unilaterally alter that
agreement or practice, Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB 848 (1992). The employer’s right to bar
union representatives from its property differs in this situation from one in which there is no such 30
agreement or practice, Turtle Bay Resorts, 355 NLRB 706 (2010) affirming 353 NLRB 1242,
1274-75 (2009).
In the instant case, Respondent unilaterally changed the parties’ agreement by restricting
access to one representative at a time; requiring union representatives to eschew speaking to any 35
employees who requested that they not speak to them and requiring that the Union notify facility
administrator Delaney in advance if the representative was not coming. 10 In adding these
conditions in March 2015, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
A closer question is whether Respondent violated the Act by barring union 40
representatives from its parking lot. The 2014 agreement did not specifically address union
access to the parking lot. However, Organizer Waddell testified that she talked to employees in
the parking lot on about 10 occasions between September 2014 and March 2014. She also
testified that Diane Delaney saw her there a couple of times and greeted her, Tr. 210-11.

10 The fourth condition that the union representatives not remove employer property or materials need
not be discussed since under no circumstances would the Union have a right to do so.
JD–27–16
11
Delaney did not directly contradict Waddell by testifying that she never saw Waddell in the
parking lot prior to March 2015. She testified that she observed Waddell on the sidewalk, which
is public property. On those occasions, Delaney testified she would greet her. The complaint
did not allege that Respondent violated the Act by barring union representatives from its parking
lot. Further, I conclude that whether Respondent had a past practice of allowing union 5
representatives in the parking lot was not fairly and fully litigated. Thus, I decline to address this
issue.
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) in failing to promptly notify the Union of the
discharge or discipline of unit employees10
I decline the General Counsel’s invitation to apply the rationale of the Alan Richey
decision until the Board adopts that rationale; I am bound by existing precedent. Moreover, even
if the Board were to reaffirm its holding in Alan Ritchey, it must decide whether it will apply that
rationale only prospectively, as it did in the 2012 decision or retrospectively.15
However, even under existing Board precedent, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) the Act. An employer has an obligation to bargain with the Union, upon request, concerning
disciplinary matters, even if it has no obligation to notify and bargain to impasse with the Union
before imposing discipline, Fresno Bee, 337 NLRB 1161, 1186-87 (2002); Ryder Distribution 20
Resources, 302 NLRB 76, 90 (1991).
That obligation presumes that an employer will promptly inform its employees’
bargaining representative of all discipline or discharges so that the Union can decide whether or
not to request bargaining. Here there is no evidence that Respondent promptly notified the 25
Union of any discipline or discharge with the possible exception of the November suspension of
Theresa Reilly. With regard to Brewer and Barker, the Union was not aware that they had been
discharged for months until Linwood responded to the Union’s information request.
Delay in Providing Requested Information30
A delay in providing the Union requested information which is relevant to its role of
collective bargaining representative of the employer’s employees may, in some circumstances,
constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635
(2000). However, that does not mean that every failure by an employer to respond within the 35
time frame requested by a union constitutes a statutory violation.
In the instant case, Respondent began responding to the Union’s request 13 days after it
was made and 6 days after the date by which the Union asked for the information. Respondent
continued to provide the requested information in March and early April. The company refused 40
to comply with the request regarding the personnel files of employees of disciplined employees,
first on the grounds of relevance, then on the grounds of confidentiality. By May 14, 2015, 3
months after the date by which the Union asked for the information, Respondent had satisfied the
information request.
45
I find the Respondent did not violate the Act except in making meritless objections to the
personnel files. These files were clearly relevant and Respondent’s belated claims of
JD–27–16
12
confidentiality were likewise meritless. For one thing, Respondent made no attempt to seek an
accommodation with the Union for whatever confidentiality concerns it had. I thus find that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) in failing to provide the disciplinary files more promptly.
REMEDY5
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
10
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended11
ORDER
15
The Respondents, CPL Linwood. d/b/a Linwood Care Center, and 201 New Road
Operations, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
20
(a) Making unilateral changes while collective bargaining negotiations are ongoing, such
as changing its procedures for requesting schedule changes;
(b) Soliciting employees to sign a decertification petition;
25
(c) Soliciting employee grievances and promising to remedy them if employees got rid of
the Union;
(d) Telling employees that no changes to working conditions would be made unless
either employees got rid of the Union or a collective bargaining agreement was signed; 30
(e) Interrogating employees concerning their support for the Union;
(f) Creating the impression that employees’ union or other protected activities were
under surveillance;35
(g) Unilaterally altering its agreement with the Union regarding the Union’s access to its
property;
(h) Failing to promptly notify the Union of any discipline or any discharge of any 40
bargaining unit employee;

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(i) Unreasonably delaying providing information requested by the Union for meritless
reasons.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
5
(a) Comply with the terms of the access agreement with the Union of May 2014;
(b) Promptly notify the Union of any disciplinary action taken against any unit
employee;
10
(c) Maintain the status quo regarding wages, hours and other working conditions until
a collective bargaining agreement has been signed or a legal impasse has been reached;
(d) Bargain in good faith with the Union until a collective bargaining agreement has
been signed or a legal impasse has been reached; 15
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region,
facility copies of the attached notice marked
provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive 20
days in conspicuous places including all p
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, 25
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respon
January 21, 2015.30
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to
35
Dated, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2016.

40

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
13
post at its Linwood, New Jersey
“Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms
laces where notices to employees are customarily
dent at any time since
comply.
Arthur J. Amchan
Administrative Law Judge
a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
JD–27–16
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT make unilateral changes while collective bargaining negotiations are ongoing,
such as changing our procedures for requesting schedule changes.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to sign a decertification petition.
WE WILL NOT solicit employee grievances and promise to remedy these grievances if
employees get rid of the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that no changes to working conditions can be made unless
employees either get rid of the Union or a collective bargaining agreement is signed.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees, including applicants for employment, about the support
or lack of support for a union.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that employees’ union or other protected activities are
under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally alter any agreements we have made with the Union regarding
access to our property.
WE WILL NOT fail to notify the Union promptly of any disciplinary action taken against any
bargaining unit employee.
WE WILL NOT unreasonably delay providing the Union with information it has requested
which is relevant to the Union’s role as collective bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL comply with the terms of our access agreement with the Union of May 2014.
WE WILL promptly notify the Union of any disciplinary action taken against any unit employee.
WE WILL maintain the status quo regarding wages, hours and other working conditions until a
collective bargaining agreement has been signed or a legal impasse has been reached.
WE WILL bargain in good faith with the Union, SEIU 1199 United Health Care Workers East,
until a collective bargaining agreement has been signed or a legal impasse has been reached.
CPL (LINWOOD) LLC D/B/A
LINWOOD CARE CENTER AND ITS
SUCCESSOR 201 NEW ROAD
OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A
LINWOOD CARE CENTER
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative)
The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-146362
or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED,
DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354.