Country Life Insurance Company and Country Mutual Insurance Companyv.Companion Property and Casualty Insurance Company

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2010

No. 91184015 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2010)

Mailed:
September 28, 2010

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

Country Life Insurance Company and Country Mutual Insurance
Company
v.
Companion Property and Casualty Insurance Company
________

Opposition No. 91184015
against Serial No. 77238256
_______

Helen Hill Minsker, Marc S. Cooperman, and Katherine L.
Fink of Banner & Witcoff, Ltd. for Country Life Insurance
Company and Country Mutual Insurance Company.

B. Craig Killough and John William Fletcher of Barnwell
Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC for Companion Property and
Casualty Insurance Company.

_______

Before Grendel, Walsh and Ritchie, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Ritchie, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Companion Property and Casualty Insurance Company
(“applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the mark REAL SOLUTIONS. REAL PEOPLE. REAL SMART. (in
standard character format) for services recited as “insurance
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Opposition No. 91184015
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underwriting in the field of property and casualty
insurance” in International Class 36.1
Country Life Insurance Company and Country Mutual
Insurance Company (collectively “opposer”) has opposed
this application on the ground of priority of use and
likelihood of confusion, alleging that applicant’s mark,
when used in connection with the identified services, so
resembles the following registered marks as to be likely to
cause confusion, to cause mistake or to deceive, under
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d):

for, “underwriting life, casualty
and health insurance” in
International Class 36;2

for, “financial services,
namely, estate trust
management services; financial
retirement plan management
services; financial estate
planning; financial custodial
services; financial investment
management; financial
planning; banking and savings
and loan services; financial

1 Application Serial No. 77238256 was filed on July 25, 2007,
based upon applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention to use
the mark in commerce.

2 Registration No. 2373053 issued on August 1, 2000. Sections
8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged. Renewed.

Opposition No. 91184015
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investment advisory services;
financial research; financial
estate trust management and
administration; fiduciary
representation services;
investment consultation;
financial analysis and
consultation; cash management;
financial retirement plan
trustee services; financial
management in the field of
farm management services” in
International Class 36;3

Applicant, in its answer, denied the salient
allegations of these claims and raised the separate
affirmative defenses of laches and estoppel. However,
during discovery, applicant admitted that it had “not
produced any evidence in support of” either of its two
affirmative defenses, (Applicant’s Responses to Requests for
Admissions #41 and 42). Applicant was likewise unable to
respond to interrogatories requesting information regarding
the two affirmative defenses, stating only: “Discovery is
ongoing in this matter” (Applicant’s Responses to
Interrogatories #12 and 13). Applicant did not directly
discuss the affirmative defenses in its trial brief, nor did
it address its failure to do so during discovery.

3 Registration No. 2373053 issued on December 4, 2001.
Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.

Opposition No. 91184015
- 4 -
Accordingly, we consider applicant’s affirmative defenses to
be waived.
I. THE RECORD AND EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
In addition to the pleadings and the file of the
involved application, the record also includes the
testimonial depositions of the following individuals:
1. William O. Bearden, Ph.D, dated December 9,
2009, testifying as an expert for
applicant.
2. Laura Robinson, Vice President for Claims
Administration for Companion Property and
Casualty Group, dated December 9, 2009;
3. Doyle Williams, Chief Marketing Officer,
for opposer, dated September 16, 2009;
4. Randall Lorimor, Manager of Advertising and
Marketing Media for opposer, dated
September 15, 2009;
In addition, both parties submitted extensive notices
of reliance on each other’s discovery responses as well as
on various records of the USPTO, and opposer included in
its notice of reliance the discovery deposition of Laura
Robinson and of Shannon Bedenbaugh, Commercial TPA Claims
Manager for Companion Third-Party Administrators.
Opposition No. 91184015
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Opposer objects to applicant’s submission of the
testimony and report of Dr. William O. Bearden. Opposer
contends that, contrary to applicant’s assertions, Dr.
Bearden is not an appropriate expert in this case and thus
should not be qualified as such. (Opposer’s brief at 25).
In particular, opposer claims that Dr. Bearden’s testimony
and report are improper expert testimony under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 US 579 (1993), “and will not assist the Board in
understanding the evidence or determining any facts in
issue.” Id. Opposer asserts that Dr. Bearden’s testimony
and report are, contrary to the requirements of FRCP 702 and
Daubert, not based on “reliable principles and methods
reliably applied” Id., at 26. Among other things, opposer
objects that (i) Dr. Bearden based his testimony on
erroneous legal premises (such as that the target markets
for applicant and opposer differ, without regard to their
respective identifications); (ii) Dr. Bearden is not
sufficiently familiar with the insurance industry in
particular, nor with opposer in particular, to be qualified
as an expert; and (iii) Dr. Bearden did not proffer any
specific methodology in his expert report as the basis for
his conclusions, nor did he conduct a survey or study,
Opposition No. 91184015
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although he admitted that these could have been done. Id.
at 25-29.
When asked at his testimony deposition “on what subject
have you been asked to testify?” Dr. Bearden responded as
follows:
“Similarities and dissimilarities of the marks,
commercial impression that they make, appearance
and connotation of the marks, the mark’s intended
audience or consumers of the products for the two
companies using the marks, the extent to which
the marks are, similar marks are used in the
marketplace.”
(Bearden depo. at 7-8)
Dr. Bearden’s expert report discusses these topics and
his conclusions in further detail, as do his testimony and
discovery depositions. We find Dr. Bearden amply qualified
to give his opinion on these topics. His education and
background information make clear that is an expert on
consumer behavior and marketing. He has a bachelor’s degree
in industrial management from Clemson University, with a
master’s degree in business administration from the
University of South Carolina, where he also obtained a Ph.D.
in business administration. He has a chaired professorship
at the University of South Carolina, where he has been a
full professor for the past twenty years, and he has a list
of publications on consumers and marketing spanning multiple
pages. Although Dr. Bearden has not previously served as an
expert in a Board proceeding, he has been qualified as an
Opposition No. 91184015
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expert in litigations involving trademarks and related
matters. With this background, and on this record, we see
no reason not to qualify Dr. Bearden as an expert in this
proceeding. Neither do we find the topics on which Dr.
Bearden is testifying to be at all irrelevant, as opposer
suggests. (Opposer’s brief at 29). Rather, we will
consider Dr. Bearden’s testimony for such probative value as
it may have.
On the other hand, as applicant in fact urges us, we
need not give great credence to the testimony, including the
report, of an expert such as Dr. Bearden. Interestingly,
applicant in its brief cited for this proposition the case
of Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 6
USPQ 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1988).4 Dr. Bearden, as we discuss
herein under the section marked “Likelihood of Confusion,”
did not pretend to offer much if any insight into the
insurance industry, nor on how consumers of insurance in
particular would view the marks at issue in this case.
Rather, he focused his findings on an analysis of the
meaning of the marks in general, and in the context of some
brief background digging (including Internet searches) into
how many other, somewhat similar marks exist in the

4 We would appreciate it if, in accordance with our rules, counsel
would be sure to include the USPQ cites to all cited cases.
Opposition No. 91184015
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insurance industry overall. With this in mind, while we do
find him to be an expert on consumer behavior and marketing,
it is not anathema for us to also find, as we do, that his
testimony and report are entitled to only “modest weight”
and are no substitute for our own judgment in this
proceeding. See Id.; see also Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v.
Vigilanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1399, 1401-1402 (TTAB 2010),
citing The Mennen Co. v. Yamnouchi Pharma. Co., Ltd., 203
USPQ 302, 305 (TTAB 1979) (holding the “opinions of
witnesses, including those qualified as expert witnesses, on
the question of likelihood of confusion are entitled to
little if any weight and should not be substituted for the
opinion of the tribunal charged with the responsibility for
the ultimate opinion of the question.”).
Opposer also objects “that Companion is relying on
admissions regarding third party websites” primarily on the
ground that the content of those websites is hearsay.
(Opposer’s brief at 29, citing opposer’s responses to
Requests for Admissions 116-213). Applicant responds that
the website content is not hearsay. The nature of the
objection is not entirely clear to us inasmuch as opposer
denied the salient requests for most of the admissions
requested in the referenced RFAs. Accordingly, we consider
the objection to be moot.
Opposition No. 91184015
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II. FACTUAL FINDINGS
Opposer is in the business of insurance and financial
services. (Lorimor depo. at 64). Opposer sells various
types of insurance, including life, casualty, and health
insurance. Id. at 32, and Ex. 9 to 42. Opposer sells its
insurance products primarily through captive agents, who
work exclusively for opposer. Id. at 61.
Opposer developed the mark REAL PEOPLE REAL ANSWERS
REAL QUICK, as shown below, with the help of an advertising
agency, in 1999. (Oppr’s Response to Interrogatory #3).

Opposer has been using the marks in association with its
insurance services continuously since 1999. (Oppr’s
Response to Interrogatory #23);(Lorimer depo. at 19, and Ex.
8). Although opposer filed exhibits and testimony
containing its advertising budget under a protective order,
we note that the number for the past decade was in the tens
of millions, with about half spent on mass media. Opposer
features the mark on nearly all mass media advertisements,
and in all its brochures. Id. at 32.
Opposition No. 91184015
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Applicant is also in the insurance business. (Robinson
depo. at 7-8). Contrary to opposer’s use of captive agents,
applicant sells policies exclusively through independent
agents. Id. at 8. Nevertheless, applicant sells the same
types of insurance, including property and casualty.
(Appl’s response to RFA #2).
Applicant developed its mark, REAL SOLUTIONS. REAL
PEOPLE. REAL SMART. in conjunction with an internal company
contest. (Robinson depo. at 21-22);(Benenbaugh depo. at 15-
16 and Ex 4). Although applicant currently has an intent-
to-use application, it has also admitted to use of the mark
in connection with its insurance services since “on or about
August 22, 2007.” (Appl’s Response to Interrogatory #2).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Opposer’s Standing and Priority
Opposer’s standing is a threshold inquiry made by the
Board in every inter partes case. In Ritchie v. Simpson,
170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Federal
Circuit enunciated a liberal threshold for determining
standing, i.e., whether one’s belief that one is or will be
damaged by the registration is reasonable and reflects a
real interest in the case. See also Jewelers Vigilance
Opposition No. 91184015
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Committee Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 2 USPQ2d
2021, 2023 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and Lipton Industries, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Company, 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA
1982). Opposer has properly made its pleaded registrations
of record. We consider this sufficient to establish
opposer’s interest and, therefore, standing to oppose
registration of applicant’s mark, in this proceeding. See
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
Moreover, because opposer has established that it owns
valid and subsisting registrations of its pleaded marks,
Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in this case as to the
marks therefore and goods and services covered thereby. See
King Candy Company v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d
1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974); and Carl Karcher Enterprises
Inc. v. Stars Restaurants Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1125 (TTAB 1995).
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) must be based on
an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that
are relevant to the factors bearing on a likelihood of
confusion. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also Palm Bay Imports,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
Opposition No. 91184015
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396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re
Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and In re Dixie Restaurants Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Opposer
must establish that there is a likelihood of confusion by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In considering the evidence of record on these factors,
we keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by
Section 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in
the essential characteristics of the goods and differences
in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). See also
In re Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209
(TTAB 1999) and the cases cited therein. The relevant
du Pont factors in the proceeding now before us are
discussed below.
For our analysis of the likelihood of confusion, we
have chosen to focus on the most relevant registration
pleaded by opposer, Registration No. 2373053, since it
covers the most relevant services. If we find a likelihood
of confusion with applicant’s services vis-à-vis this mark,
then the analysis will be moot as to opposer’s other pleaded
registration. Likewise, if we do not, then we would not
find it for the other.
Opposition No. 91184015
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The Services
The application identifies “insurance underwriting in
the field of property and casualty insurance” while
Registration No. 2373053 identifies “underwriting life,
casualty and health insurance.” We find these to be legally
identical. Accordingly, we find that this du Pont factor
strongly favors finding a likelihood of confusion.
The Channels of Trade and Classes of Purchasers
Under the third du Pont factor, we consider evidence
pertaining to the similarity or dissimilarity of the trade
channels in which and the purchasers to whom applicant’s and
opposer’s services would be marketed. Notwithstanding
applicant’s arguments to the contrary regarding the actual,
current channels of trade and classes of purchasers, with no
limitations or restrictions as to trade channels or classes
of purchasers in their respective identifications of
services, we note that neither applicant nor opposer is
restricted in its marketing devices. Accordingly, we must
presume that each enjoys the possibility of marketing
through standard channels of trade and to all classes of
purchasers as would be available for its identified
services, regardless of what the evidence might show to be
the actual trade channels and purchasers for their services.
Packard Press Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56
USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Octocom Systems Inc. v.
Houston Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d
1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Opposition No. 91184015
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In this case, because opposer’s services and
applicant’s services as identified in the application and
Registration No. 2373053 are legally identical, we presume
that the respective services are or will be sold in the same
trade channels and to the same classes of purchasers. Brown
Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752 (TTAB 2009); Genesco
Inc. v. Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260 (TTAB 2003); In re Smith and
Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994). Accordingly, we find
that this du Pont factor also weighs heavily in favor of
finding a likelihood of confusion.
Consumer Sophistication
Applicant argues that insurance customers are
sophisticated and that insurance is not an “impulse
purchase.” (Appl’s brief at 24, citing Bearden depo. at 19-
20). However, we note that Dr. Bearden was brought on as an
expert in marketing and consumer behavior. There is no
indication of record that he has any particular background
in, or knowledge regarding, the insurance business nor the
sophistication of consumers therein.
To the contrary, documents from the advertising agency
that created opposer’s mark note that customers include
laypersons with no special sophistication, who give little
thought to their insurance purchase. See Williams depo. Ex
73, a 2008 memo stating:

Insurance is a relatively low-involvement
category, . . . Most people don’t give it a lot
of thought unless they are shopping for a policy,
which is usually precipitated by an increase in
Opposition No. 91184015
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their premium or a change in benefits by their
current insurance company.
Acc. Williams depo. at 33. We note that the applicable
standard of care is that of the least sophisticated
consumer. Alfacell Corp. v. Anticancer, Inc., 71 USPQ2d
1301, 1306 (TTAB 2004). Accordingly, we find that, at best,
this du Pont factor is neutral. It certainly does not weigh
significantly in applicant’s favor, as applicant argues.
The Marks
Preliminarily, we note that the more similar the
services at issue, the less similar the marks need to be for
the Board to find a likelihood of confusion. Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874,
23 USPQ2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We consider and compare
the appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression
of the marks in their entireties. Palm Bay Imports Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
In comparing the marks, we are mindful that the test is
not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to
a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
impression so that confusion as to the source of the goods
and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely
to result. San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD
Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3
(CCPA 1977); Spoons Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23
USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff'd unpublished, No. 92-
Opposition No. 91184015
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1086 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992). The proper focus is on the
recollection of the average customer, who retains a general
rather than specific impression of the marks. Winnebago
Industries, Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335,
344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190
USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
The mark in the Registration No. 2373053 consists of
the six words REAL PEOPLE REAL ANSWERS REAL QUICK, as shown
below.

The mark in the application also consists of six words,
REAL SOLUTIONS. REAL PEOPLE. REAL SMART. We note that there
is substantial overlap in the words used in these marks.
Both contain the words “REAL PEOPLE,” and both contain the
pattern REAL ___ REAL ___ REAL ___. Moreover, while opposer
uses the term “REAL ANSWERS,” applicant uses “REAL
SOLUTIONS.” Although both Dr. Bearden and Ms. Robinson
insist that “solutions” are not quite the same as “answers,”
neither is (nor professes to have consulted) a linguistics
expert. Opposer, meanwhile, has submitted ample evidence
that in fact the dictionary indicates otherwise. Indeed,
they are synonyms.
Opposition No. 91184015
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When confronted with a dictionary definition from
Webster’s, Dr. Bearden agreed that the definition of
“answer” was shown to be “the solution to a problem.”
(Bearden depo. at 37). Asked if he agreed with the
definition, he stated: “The solution to a problem. You can
use the word, it can be used interchangeably in some
context.” Dr. Bearden further agreed that the words “REAL
PEOPLE” were the same in both marks. Id. at 105 (“If you
wrote Real People up on the wall twice, I mean, the two
words are identical.”) Nevertheless, overall, Dr. Bearden
indicated that in his expert opinion, the commercial
impression of the marks differ. Id. at 12. In particular,
he noted that the visual placement of ”REAL PEOPLE” is
different, and that the short interpretation by consumers is
different (people, answers, quick v. solutions, people,
smart). While Dr. Bearden’s brief, if unelaborated
conclusions are interesting, we note again that he admits to
not having performed any tests, or otherwise obtaining any
empirical evidence, to prove them. Accordingly, they are
not dispositive in our analysis, and we accord little
probative value to his conclusions. We keep in mind that
consumers (including unsophisticated ones) will be
confronted with overlapping words, in the same pattern,
containing in-part the same meaning when looking for the
Opposition No. 91184015
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same insurance services. That is, in addition to the marks
both containing the words “REAL PEOPLE” and “REAL ANSWERS”
(or its synonymous “REAL SOLUTIONS”), we find that consumers
are likely to find similarity in the identical structure of
the marks, found in the pattern of REAL ___ REAL ___ REAL
___, three times. With all this, we also keep in mind that
opposer’s mark is arbitrary for its services.
In sum, the marks in their entireties have similarities
in appearance, sound, connotations and commercial
impressions. Accordingly, we find this du Pont factor to
favor finding a likelihood of confusion.
Number and Nature of Third Party Use
Applicant argues that under the sixth du Pont factor,
it is important that we consider in this case, the “number
and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” To
this end, applicant submitted into the record via various
means third-party registrations and third-party websites
containing various iterations of the term “REAL PEOPLE,” or
in some cases a pattern of REAL __ REAL __ in double, or in
at least one case triple as in the two marks at hand REAL
___ REAL ___ REAL ___.
It is axiomatic that absent evidence of actual use,
third-party registrations have little probative value
because they are not evidence that the marks are in use on a
commercial scale or that the public has become familiar with
Opposition No. 91184015
- 19 -
them. See Smith Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Stone Mfg. Co., 476 F.2d
1004, 177 USPQ 462, 463 (CCPA 1973) (the purchasing public
is not aware of registrations reposing in the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office). See also In re Hub Distributing,
Inc., 218 USPQ 284, 285 (TTAB 1983).

[I]t would be sheer speculation to draw
any inferences about which, if any of
the marks subject of the third party
(sic) registrations are still in use.
Because of this doubt, third party (sic)
registration evidence proves nothing
about the impact of the third-party
marks on purchasers in terms of dilution
of the mark in question or conditioning
of the purchasers as their weakness in
distinguishing source.
In re Hub Distributing, Inc., 218 USPQ at 286.

The third-party websites, similarly, are not especially
helpful in showing the extent of consumer exposure.
In particular, applicant cites the following third-
party registrations and uses as evidence of the weakness of
opposer’s mark:

MARK COMPANY TYPE OF USE
Real People. Wise
Choices.5
Sterling Life
Insurance Company.
Used on website to
sell life and
health insurance.
Real Service. Real
Savings.
GEICO Registration No.
3314725

5 The evidence indicates that this mark was changed after a cease
and desist letter sent by opposer objected to Sterling’s use of
“Real People. Real Choices. Real Service.” (Williams depo. at
85).
Opposition No. 91184015
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Real Choices(SM)
Medical Plans.
ASSURANT “Use” in evidence
by testimony
(Robinson depo. at
28)
Real Select. AIG Testimony states:
“Insurance product
called Real
Select” Id. at
29.
Real Advice from
Real People.
Independent Capital
Management
“Use” in evidence
by testimony. Id.
at 29.
Real Fast for
Business Owners.
Guardian Life
Insurance Company
“Use” in evidence
by testimony. Id.
at 29.
Real Life Stories. Life and Health
Insurance Foundation
Specific “use” not
in evidence.6
Real Stories Real
People: One
Woman’s
Experience.
Mutual of Omaha “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Auto Insurance – Stackpoint.com “Existence of

6 See Robinson depo. at 30, as cited in applicant’s brief at 20:
Q: Are you familiar with Life and Health Insurance Foundation
Insurance for Education?
A: I am from looking on the Internet. It’s a foundation, if you
will, that – very sad. It’s life insurance for parents and the
children have gone on to use the death benefits to provide
educational opportunities for themselves. They have “Real Life
Stories” on their mark.
Opposition No. 91184015
- 21 -
Real Answers by
Real People.
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
“Testimonials from
Real People.” and
“Success Stories
from Real People.”
Vital One Health “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Solving Real
Problems for Real
People.
Justhealthnow “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real People Paying
Attention to
People Like You.
Union State “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real People. Real
Savings.
Americaninsureall.com “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real People. Real
Savings.
Expressinsurance.com “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real people
working together
for your . . .
Eckert Insurance “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real People. Real
Benefits.
Delta Dental. “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Providing Real
Life Financial
Fidelity National
Financial Solutions,
“Existence of
webpage” admitted
Opposition No. 91184015
- 22 -
Solutions. Inc. to by opposer.
Real Insurance.
Real Time.
Really!
Smokey Insurance
Company
“Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real Data. Real
Time.
Affiliate Network
Service.
“Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.
Real People – Real
Service.
RHSC “Existence of
webpage” admitted
to by opposer.

We do note that none of the marks cited by applicant
are exactly the same as those at issue in this case, nor do
many have the exact pattern of three times showing REAL ___
REAL ___ REAL ___. Nevertheless, we do find that the number
of marks with the shared term “REAL PEOPLE” in the insurance
industry, coupled with the number of at least two times REAL
___ REAL ___ pattern (not necessarily together with “REAL
PEOPLE”) makes an adequate showing that the term “REAL
PEOPLE” perhaps has a highly suggestive significance in the
insurance business.
We deem this du Pont factor to favor applicant
somewhat.
Conclusion
In summary, we have carefully considered all of the
evidence and arguments of record relevant to the du Pont
Opposition No. 91184015
- 23 -
likelihood of confusion factors including those not
specifically discussed herein. We conclude that despite a
number of third-party uses of the term REAL PEOPLE showing
some possibly suggestive significance of the term, with
legally identical services moving in the same channels of
trade to the same purchasers, and similar marks, there is a
likelihood of confusion between applicant’s REAL SOLUTIONS.
REAL PEOPLE. REAL SMART. mark for “insurance underwriting in
the field of property and casualty insurance,” and opposer’s
Registration No. 2373053 for

for “underwriting life, casualty and health insurance.”
Decision: The opposition is sustained.