Cortica, Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 22, 2022

2021001944 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/267,990 05/02/2014 Igal Raichelgauz COR-062ME-CIP 1006 158341 7590 03/22/2022 Cortica Ltd. 103 Allenby Street Tel Aviv, 6513443 ISRAEL EXAMINER NILSSON, ERIC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2122 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/22/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): eofficeaction@appcoll.com karen.moses@cortica.com patents@cortica.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _______________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _______________ Ex parte IGAL RAICHELGAUZ, KARINA ODINAEV, and YEHOSHUA Y. ZEEVI _______________ Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 Technology Center 2100 _______________ Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, and 19-24. Appellant has canceled claims 6, 12, and 18. See Appeal Br. 10-13. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2019). Appellant identifies Cortica Ltd. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to determining a correlation between at least one keyword and a multimedia content item. Spec. ¶ 17. In an embodiment, “the context of the multimedia content element is determined and used in order to determine correlative keywords.” Spec. ¶ 17. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics: 1. A method, comprising: generating, by a signature generator system, at least one signature to a at least one multimedia content element; searching for at least one potentially correlative keyword that has at least one keyword signature that is correlative to the at least one signature of the at least one multimedia content element; wherein the keyword differs from the at least one signature of the keyword; determining a context of the multimedia content element, and determining a context signature; the context being determined based on a correlation between a plurality of signatures of a plurality of objects that appear in the at least one multimedia content element; and determining the correlation of each of the at least one keywords to the at least one multimedia content element based on the context of the at least one multimedia content element; wherein the determining of the correlation comprises: assigning, for each one of the at least one keyword, a quality score that reflects the correlation between a signature of each one of the at least one keyword and the context signature; and storing the quality score of the each one of the at least one keyword in a data warehouse. Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 3 The Examiner’s Rejections 1. Claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, and 19-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2-6. 2. Claims 1, 5, 8-11, 13, 17, 20, and 21 stand rejected under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Arngren et al. (US 2013/0226930 A1; Aug. 29, 2013) (“Arngren”) and Y. Chen et al., CLUE: Cluster-Based Retrieval of Images by Unsupervised Learning, IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14, no. 8, 1187-1201 (2005) (“Chen”). Final Act. 8-12.2 3. Claims 2-4 and 14-16 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Arngren, Chen, and Lin et al. (US 2011/0296315 A1; Dec. 1, 2011) (“Lin”). Final Act. 12-14. 4. Claims 7 and 19 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Arngren, Chen, and Vedantham et al. (US 2008/0049789 A1; Feb. 28, 2008) (“Vedantham”). Final Act. 14-15. 2 We note that in the statement of rejection, the Examiner indicates the claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). See Final Act. 8. However, the body of the rejection relies on the combined teachings of Arngren and Chen. See Final Act. 8-12. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant understands that the rejection is based on the combined teachings of Arngren and Chen and that the claims are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See Appeal Br. 5. Appellant does not allege any prejudice due to the error in the Examiner’s statement of rejection. Accordingly, we treat the Examiner’s typographical error as harmless. As such, we refer to the rejection of claims 1, 5, 8-11, 13, 17, 20, and 21 as being rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 4 5. Claim 22 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Arngren, Chen, and Castro et al. (US 2008/0201361 A1; Aug. 21, 2008) (“Castro”). Final Act. 15-16. 6. Claims 23 and 24 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Arngren, Chen, and Adams JR et al. (US 2004/0111432 A1; June 10, 2004) (“Adams”). Final Act. 16-17. ANALYSIS3 Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 6-8. In particular, Appellant argues the claims are directed to an improvement in computer processing technology and amount to significantly more than the alleged abstract idea. Appeal Br. 6-8. The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office 3 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed August 3, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 20, 2020 (“Ans.”); and the Final Office Action, mailed April 1, 2020 (“Final Act.”), from which this Appeal is taken. Appellant did not file a Reply Brief. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims or issues, such arguments are considered waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 5 Guidance”).4 If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per the Office Guidance, this first inquiry (“Step 2A”) has two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite (i.e., set forth or describe) a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea such as a mental process), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. MPEP § 2106.04(d). If the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step (“Step 2B”) is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; see also MPEP § 2106.05. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer 4 The Office Guidance, as well as guidance set forth in the Berkheimer Memorandum, have been incorporated into the latest revision of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2103-2106.07(c) (9th ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020). Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 6 components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of a “computer” or “computer readable medium” does not make a claim otherwise directed to a process that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” patent eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (explaining mental processes are not patentable); MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III). We conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea. More specifically, Appellant’s claims generally describe determining a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element. This is consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Spec. ¶¶ 2 (describing the invention as “matching a plurality of keywords to the analyzed multimedia content”); 8 (describing the invention as “determining the correlation of at least one keyword to a multimedia content element”); 17 (further describing an embodiment of the invention in which “the context of the multimedia content element is determined and used in order to determine correlative keywords”). But for the recitation of the various computing elements (e.g., signature generator system, ad-serving system, data warehouse, and neural network), which we find are generic computer components performing generic computing Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 7 functions (as discussed further below; see also Spec. ¶¶ 18-22, 58), determining a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element is a series of observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions that can be performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper. Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that the concept of determining a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element is a mental process (e.g., observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions) that is applied and performed in a computing environment-i.e., an abstract idea.5 See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III); see also Elec. Pwr. Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, a[re] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); Content Extraction & Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that claims drawn to collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected set, and storing the recognized data were patent ineligible, noting that “humans 5 Although we describe the abstract idea slightly differently than the Examiner, the Examiner’s characterization of the abstract idea is not erroneous. “An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The level of abstraction an examiner uses to describe an abstract idea need not “impact the patentability analysis.” Apple, 842 F.3d at 1241. That is true here. Regardless of the level of generality used to describe the abstract idea recited, the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the district court’s abstract idea of organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract concept.”). Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 8 have always performed these functions”); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “the collection, storage, and recognition of data” to be abstract); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding the parsing, comparing, storing, and editing of data to be abstract); Evolutionary Intelligence LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F. App’x 679, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (affirming the District Court’s determination that “searching and processing [stored] data” was a patent-ineligible mental process). Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim limitations that describe (i.e., recite) the concept of determining a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element, emphasized in italics: 1. A method, comprising: generating, by a signature generator system, at least one signature to a at least one multimedia content element; searching for at least one potentially correlative keyword that has at least one keyword signature that is correlative to the at least one signature of the at least one multimedia content element; wherein the keyword differs from the at least one signature of the keyword; determining a context of the multimedia content element, and determining a context signature; the context being determined based on a correlation between a plurality of signatures of a plurality of objects that appear in the at least one multimedia content element; and determining the correlation of each of the at least one keywords to the at least one multimedia content element based on the context of the at least one multimedia content element; wherein the determining of the correlation comprises: Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 9 assigning, for each one of the at least one keyword, a quality score that reflects the correlation between a signature of each one of the at least one keyword and the context signature; and storing the quality score of the each one of the at least one keyword in a data warehouse. Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d)(II) (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h). Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claim does not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). The additional elements beyond the judicial exception are (i) a signature generation system (see, e.g., claims 1, 11, and 19); (ii) a data warehouse for storing data (see, e.g., claims 1, 11, and 17); (iii) an ad- serving system / system node (see e.g., claims 2, 5, and 4); (iv) a web browser (see, e.g., claims 2 and 14); (v) a neural network (see, e.g., claims Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 10 23 and 24); and (vi) a database (see, e.g., claim 13). None of the identified elements are a particular machine sufficient to confer patent eligibility to the judicial exception. At the outset, we note that whether a judicial exception is performed by a particular machine may be a clue of patent eligibility, but it is not a stand-alone test. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Analyzing multimedia content to determine a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element on a computing platform (e.g., using a signature generation system or neural network) is merely applying the judicial exception using a generic computing component. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72 (explaining that “to transform an unpatentable [judicial exception] into a patent-eligible application of [the judicial exception], one must do more than simply state the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; Versata Dev. Group v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”); MPEP § 2106.05(b). In addition, receiving the multimedia content element (such as via an ad-serving system and web browser) and storing the scored keywords (such as in a data warehouse) are extra-solutions activities that do not confer patent eligibility. See, e.g., Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (explaining that “selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 11 mental processes”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’g 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”). Further, the additional limitations related to describing that the keyword is different from the at least one signature of the keyword or how the context is determined merely refine the abstract idea and do not confer patent eligibility. In addition, contrary to Appellant’s assertions (see Appeal Br. 6-8), we do not find the claim is directed to an improvement to computer functionality or a technical field. “To be a patent-eligible improvement to computer functionality, we have required the claims to be directed to an improvement in the functionality of the computer or network platform itself.” Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2020). As discussed above, the claims are directed to determining a correlation of keywords to a multimedia content element based on the context of the multimedia element. That is, the claims are not improving the computing platform by saving memory resources and processing (see Appeal Br. 8), but uses a computing platform to correlate keywords to a multimedia content element using the context of the multimedia content element. Any purported improvement, however, relates to the abstract idea, and does not improve a computer, technology, or a technical field. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We . . . look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 12 abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.”) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); cf. Customedia, 951 F.3d at 1365 (determining that “the claimed invention is at most an improvement to the abstract concept of targeted advertising wherein a computer is merely used as a tool. This is not an improvement in the functioning of the computer itself.”); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims of the ’999 patent do not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem. Instead, they recite a purportedly new arrangement of generic information that assists traders in processing information more quickly.”). For at least the foregoing reasons, the claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Because we determine the claim is directed to an abstract idea, we analyze the claim under step two of Alice (i.e., step 2B of the Office Guidance) to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77-79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I). Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the claim adds a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 13 at a high level of generality. MPEP § 2106.05(II). “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. Here, Appellant’s claim does not recite specific limitations (alone or when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well understood, routine, and conventional. Rather, the Specification describes the computing platforms (e.g., signature generator system, ad-serving system, data warehouse) system at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 18-22, 58. More particularly, the Specification describes a machine “comprising any suitable architecture . . . such as one or more central processing units (‘CPUs’), a memory, and input/output interfaces.” Spec. ¶ 58; see also Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324- 25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components, such as an “interface,” “network,” and “database,” fail to satisfy the inventive concept requirement); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and [a] ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims.”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network-with no further specification-is not even arguably inventive.”). To the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek to tie-up (i.e., preempt) an abstract idea (see Appeal Br. 7), we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. “‘[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.’” FairWarning IP LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 14 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Further, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5, 7- 11, 13-17, and 19-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Rejections under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Appellant argues that Chen, as relied on by the Examiner, fails to teach determining a context signature or determining a correlation between at least one keyword and the context signature. Appeal Br. 5-6. More particularly, Appellant asserts that separate keyword-based and feature- based searches in Chen fail to teach a correlation between at least one keyword and the context search. Appeal Br. 6. Additionally, Appellant argues Chen relates to the content, not context, of images. Appeal Br. 6. Further, Appellant asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Arngren and Chen. Appeal Br. 5-6. Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 15 Appellant’s arguments are unavailing. As set forth in the claim language, context of a multimedia content element is “determined based on a correlation between a plurality of signatures of a plurality of objects that appear in the at least one multimedia content element.” Claim 1. Chen relates to cluster-based retrieval of images. See Chen, Title. As relied on by the Examiner, Chen teaches an image (i.e., multimedia content element) as a collection of features and “ranks the relevance between the query image and any target image in proportion to a similarity measure calculated from the features.” See Final Act. 9-10 (citing Chen at 1187); Ans. 3-4. Chen describes that similarity measures capture certain facets (i.e., similarity-based semantics) of image content. Chen at 1187. The Examiner finds the plurality of features in Chen teaches a context signature of the image. Ans. 3. Further, the Examiner finds Chen teaches determining a similarity (i.e., correlation) found between keywords and the context signature to reduce the semantic gap (i.e., the difference between the semantics of an image and the similarity-induced semantics of the image) in an image-based retrieval system by providing information believed to be relevant to the query. Ans. 3; see also Chen at 1187-88. Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of Examiner error. As described in Chen, traditional content-based image retrieval systems did not account for similarity information between target images. See Chen at 1188. Chen describes selecting a query image and target images according to a similarity (i.e., correlation) measure. See Chen at 1188. In addition, contrary to Appellant’s assertions (see Appeal Br. 5-6), we find that the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 16 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). In particular, the Examiner determines an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Chen’s teaching of a context signature and a correlation between a keyword and the context signature with Arngren’s keyword-based search to improve user interaction with an image retrieval system and yield a more robust signature-based system. See Final Act. 11 (citing Chen at 1188); see also Ans. 4 (citing Chen at 1199). For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1. For similar reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 11, which recites similar limitations and was not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 6; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2-5, 7-10, 13-17, and 19-24, which depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not argued separately with particularity. See Appeal Br. 6; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, and 19-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, and 19-24 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2021-001944 Application 14/267,990 17 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, 19- 24 101 Eligibility 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, 19- 24 1, 5, 8-11, 13, 17, 20, 21 103(a) Arngren, Chen 1, 5, 8-11, 13, 17, 20, 21 2-4, 14-16 103(a) Arngren, Chen, Lin 2-4, 14-16 7, 19 103(a) Arngren, Chen, Vedantham 7, 19 22 103(a) Arngren, Chen, Castro 22 23, 24 103(a) Arngren, Chen, Adams 23, 24 Overall Outcome 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, 19- 24 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED