Coplay Cement Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 12, 1989

292 N.L.R.B. 309 (N.L.R.B. 1989)

COPLAY CEMENT CO
Coplay Cement Company and Independent Workers
of North America
Coplay Cement Company , Employer-Petitioner and
Independent Workers of North America and
Local Lodge D485 , International Brotherhood
of Boilermakers , AFL-CIO and the Internation
al Brotherhood of Boilermakers Cases 25-CA-
18724 and 25-RM-538
January 12, 1989
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF RUNOFF ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFT
On July 8, 1988, Administrative Law Judge
Norman Zankel issued the attached decision The
Charging Party filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed a brief in support of
the judge's decision
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, i rec-
ommendations,2 and conclusions and to adopt the
recommended Order
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative
law judge is adopted and the complaint in Case 25-
CA-18724 is dismissed
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the objections filed
in Case 25-RM-538 are overruled
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the challenges to
the ballots of J Bennett B Brady , A Mee, M
Perrone, G Pumaso (or Pomasl), and P Roberson
in Case 25-RM-538 are sustained
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 25-RM-538 is
severed from Case 25-CA- 18724 and remanded to
the Regional Director for Region 25 for the pur
pose of conducting a runoff election
DIRECTION OF RUNOFF ELECTION
It is directed that the Regional Director shall
conduct a runoff election at a time and place to be
determined by him, among those employed during
1 The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge s credibility
findings The Board s established policy is not to overrule an administra
tive law judge s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard
Dry Wall Products 91 NLRB 544 (1950) enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir
1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re
versing the findings
2 In the absence of exceptions we adopt pro forma the judge s recom
mended disposition of the challenged ballots
309
the payroll period used in the prior election, to de-
termine whether they desire to be represented for
collective bargaining by Local Lodge D485, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, AFL-CIO
and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers
Steve Robles Esq for the General Counsel
Frank H Stewart and Susan D Jansen Esqs (Taft Stet
tinius & Hollister) of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the
Employer/Petitioner
Thomas E Cooper, Coordinator, of Westmont Illinois
and Bernard N Katz and Ehssa B Katz Esqs (Meranze
and Katz) of Philadelphia Pennsylvania for Inde
pendent Workers of North America, the Charging
Party/Intervenor
Fred 0 Towe Esq (Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
Baird), of Indianapolis Indiana for the Boilermakers
Unions
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NORMAN ZANKEL, Administrative Law Judge These
cases came before me on January 5 and 6 1988, at Lo
gansport Indiana The allegations in Case 25-CA-18724
that the Employer committed unfair labor practices
evolved from a charge filed by Independent Workers of
North America (IWNA) on June 15, 1987 1 A complaint
and notice of hearing issued on July 29
The complaint alleges that the Employer violated Sec
tion 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) by engaging in a variety of conduct in April and
June that interfered with, restrained, and coerced em
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Sec
tion 7 of the Act
Specifically, the complaint alleges that G Uding, the
Employers president in late April threatened employees
with wage reductions if they were to select Boilermakers
Lodge D485 (Lodge D485) as their collective bargaining
representative threatened to engage in protracted litiga
tion to deprive employees of their representational rights
threatened employees that negotiations would begin at
square one if they were to select either IWNA or
Lodge D485 as their collective bargaining representative
and promised to issue an employee handbook if the em
ployees did not select IWNA or Lodge D485 as their
collective bargaining representative
Also, the complaint alleges that on June 4 and 5
Uding threatened employees with a wage reduction if
they were to select either IWNA or Lodge D485 as their
collective bargaining agent and promised to institute a
grievance procedure if the employees would not select
IWNA or Lodge D485 to bargain collectively on their
behalf
The representation case (25-RM-538) arose from the
Employer having filed on April 16 a petition for a rep
resentation election The petition was processed and, on
a record hearing conducted by a hearing officer the Re
gional Director for Region 25 issued a Decision and Di
1 All dates are in 1987 unless otherwise indicated
292 NLRB No 40
310 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rection of Election on May 20 That decision ordered a
representation election among an appropriate unit of em
ployees at the Employers Logansport Indiana facility 2
The Regional Directors decision gave the employees an
opportunity to vote either for IWNA or Lodge D485 to
be their collective bargaining agent or for no collective
bargaining representative
A secret ballot election was conducted under Board
auspices on June 16 The results were inconclusive A
total of 69 ballots were cast Of these 8 votes were cast
for IWNA, 24 votes were cast for Lodge D485, and 31
votes were cast for no representation by either IWNA or
Lodge D485 Also six ballots were challenged by both
IWNA and Lodge D485 Those ballots are determinative
of the election results
Both IWNA and Lodge D485 filed timely objections
to the conduct of the election IWNA s objections are
coextensive with the complaint allegations Lodge
D485 s objections are identical to the unfair labor prac
tice allegations, except they omit any reference to the al
leged promise of a grievance procedure as objectionable
conduct
On September 3 the Regional Director issued a Sup
plemental Decision, Order Directing Hearing, Order
Consolidating Cases, and Notice of Hearing That docu
ment combined resolution of the unfair labor practice al
legations, the election objections and challenged ballots
in the instant proceeding
The Employer filed a timely answer to the complaint
The answer admitted some of the allegations, but denied
that the Employer engaged in any of the alleged unfair
labor practices
All parties were given an opportunity to present wit
nesses and to examine and cross examine them 3 to
present documentary evidence and to make oral argu
ment Posthearing briefs have been received from coun
sel for each of the parties
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses and after due consideration of
the briefs I make the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I JURISDICTION
The Employer a Pennsylvania corporation is engaged
in the business of quarrying limestone and clay and the
manufacture, sale and distribution of cement The Em
ployer s principal office and place of business is located
at Nazareth Pennsylvania It maintains and operates
other facilities at Egypt, Pennsylvania and at Speed and
Logansport, Indiana Only the Logansport facility is
principally involved in these proceedings
During the 12 months immediately preceding com
plaint issuance a representative period, the Employer
sold and shipped goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 from its Logansport facility directly to points
outside Indiana, and also purchased and received prod
ucts goods, and materials exceeding $50,000 in value at
that facility directly from points outside Indiana Fur
ther the Employers gross revenues exceeded $500,000
in the 12 months before the complaint issued
The Employer admits the record reflects and I find
that it is and, at all material times, has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2) (6), and (7) of the Act
The parties agree, the record reflects, and I find that
IWNA4 and Lodge D485 are and, at all material times
have been labor organizations within the meaning of Sec
tion 2(5) of the Act
II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Background
Lodge D485 was the collective bargaining agent of the
Logansport production and maintenance unit from 1967
Successive collective bargaining agreements covered
those employees from that date until Jcne 24 1984 the
expiration date of the most recent agreement
Between 1967 and 1984, the Logansport facility was
owned and operated by Louisville Cement Co In Febru
ary 1985, the instant Employer acquired that facility
The Employer then engaged Lodge D485 in collective
bargaining negotiations for a contract to replace that
which had expired In May 1985 after impasse (a condi
tion uncontested) the Employer implemented the terms
of what then was its most recent contract offer The unit
employees worked under those terms from May 1985
until April 1986
In April 1986 the Employer submitted new contract
proposals to Lodge D485 The relationship between
those parties between April and September 1986 is un
clear However two noteworthy events occurred (1)
the Employer unilaterally implemented the terms of its
April 1986 proposals one of which effectuated a $2 per
hour reduction in wages of unit employees 5 and (2) a
dissident faction of Lodge D485 formed IWNA
IWNA immediately began an organizational campaign
at a number of cement plants In early 1987 IWNA filed
representation petitions for representation elections at the
instant Employers three Pennsylvania plantss and also
its plant in Frederick Maryland
On March 27, a majority of Logansport unit employ
ees who attended a meeting called by IWNA voted to
disaffiliate from Lodge D485 C Newell formerly presi
2 The following unit was found appropriate
All production and maintenance employees store room clerks
chemical analysts and control room operators at the Employers Lo
gansport Indiana facility but excluding office clerks purchasing and
payroll clerks professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act
3 With a single exception all witnesses were sequestered General
Counsel witness C Newell remained in the hearing room throughout the
trial to assist counsel for the General Counsel if necessary No party ob
jected to Newell s presence for such purpose I find that Newell s pres
ence neither affected his testimony nor that of any other witness
4 The Employers answer initially denied IWNA s status as a labor or
ganization The answer was amended orally at the hearing to reflect the
Employer now admits IWNA is a labor organization
5 The September 1986 implementation of the April proposals is not the
subject of unfair labor prance allegations in the instant case
6 On June 11 1987 a Board conducted election was vacated by the
Board on March 16 1988 (288 NLRB 66) on grounds it had been con
ducted among employees in an inappropriate bargaining unit The
Boards decision sustained the Employers contention that the only appro
priate unit consists of all three of its Pennsylvania plants
COPLAY CEMENT CO
dent of Lodge D485, became president of IWNA The
Employer was advised of the disaffiliation vote a few
days later The Employer posted a notice that advised
employees that it did not recognize IWNA as a viable
labor organization and that a Board election was needed
As earlier reported the Employer filed the instant RM
petition on April 16 7
The Employers president, G Uding, held several
meetings at the Logansport facility with bargaining unit
employees On April 21 Uding conducted one large
meeting in the lunchroom and two or three small group
meetings at various work stations
Uding also met with unit employees on June 4 and 5
As earlier noted, some of Uding's statements on April 21
and June 5 and 6 are the subject of the instant unfair
labor practice allegations and election objections
B Credibility
Whether Uding made the remarks alleged as unfair
labor practices and grounds to set aside the instant elec
tion, turns on determination of the witnesses relative
credibility
My credibility resolutions are based essentially on my
observation of witness demeanor, the weight of the re
spective evidence established, admitted, or uncontrover
table facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable infer
ences, which may be made from the record as a whole
Gold Standard Enterprises, 234 NLRB 618 (1978), V & W
Castings 231 NLRB 912 (1977) Northridge Knitting
Mills 223 NLRB 230 (1976)
Also, I have carefully weighed all the testimony, bear
ing in mind the general tendency of witnesses to testify
in terms of their personal impressions or interpretations
of what was said to or heard by them
I have considered the personal interests of all wit
nesses in the outcome of this litigation and applied the
principle that testimony of current employees against
their employers interests is not likely to be false See
Our Way Inc, 268 NLRB 394, 402 (1983), Shop Rite Su
permarket 231 NLRB 500 (1977)
In assessing credibility in this case I have also applied
the notion that a trier of fact need not discredit a witness
simply because all of that witness testimony is not be
lieved Nothing is more common than to believe some
and not all of what a witness says Edwards Transporta
tion Co , 187 NLRB 3 3-4 (1970), enfd per curiam 449
F 2d 155 (5th Cir 1971) Wilco Energy Corp 246 NLRB
851 fn 1 (1979)
Finally I have particularly reviewed and studied the
situations that the parties have cited in their posthearing
briefs as specific examples of adverse reflections on the
testimony of opposing witnesses
The General Counsel produced five witnesses Each
was employed by the Employer at the time he testified
These witnesses presented testimony concerning what
Uding said during the April and June meetings with unit
employees
The Board conducted election was held in the instant RM case on
June 16 but the ballots were impounded until August 17 The results
appear above in the statement of the case section
311
The Employers witnesses consisted of Uding, six cur
rent employees and also its labor relations manager
The opposing witnesses testimony provides direct
conflicts on virtually each material statement allegedly
made by Uding Nonetheless I do not discredit any of
the witnesses who testified My observation of witness
demeanor persuades me that each witness strived to tell
the truth according to his personal perceptions and
recollection I attribute testimonial variations to indlvid
ual human differences in cognition and comprehension
The instant issues challenge the propriety of several of
Uding s remarks during his April and June meetings with
unit employees Uding provided extremely comprehen
sive descriptions of his version of those meetings His
testimony was direct, certain, clear, concise, and precise
In contrast, the General Counsel's witnesses were
somewhat selective in their recall of relevant comments,
in some instances were self contradictory, presented criti
cal testimony only after counsels leading questions, were
imprecise, presented fragmented testimony, and corrobo
rated the Employers witnesses in respects that tend to
support the accuracy of the Employer's version of
events
The General Counsel argues (posthearing brief, pp 8-
9) that the testimony of unit employees who testified on
behalf of the Employer contains similar defects and is
equally vulnerable to rejection as probative evidence I
concede that these witnesses testified in staccato fashion
needed to be prodded by leading questions, and were
vague in some respects Nonetheless, my overall reliance
on the Employers version for factual findings is unaf
fected This is so for two reasons First, it is principally
Uding s straightforward forthright, and inherently con
sistent testimony that is the foundation on which my
findings have been made Second, I attribute the testimo
vial deficiencies among the Employers employee wit
nesses to my observation made at trial that each of
those witnesses patently had been subject to minimal pre
trial preparation or none at all In such a context it is
not surprising that memories would be imperfect and
need jogging In any event, none of these witnesses testi
mony comprises the sole basis of any of my factual find
ings on the substantive issues
C The April 21 Meeting
Complaint8 paragraphs 5(a)(i-iv) allege Uding threat
ened wage reductions protracted litigation, a return to
square one, and issuance of an employee handbook con
tingent on election results
General Counsel witnesses M L Rance and K Lef
fert both testified during their direct examination, that in
the April meeting with employees Uding said if the em
ployees voted for representation by IWNA negotiations
would go back to Square One Their description of
this remark was quite abbreviated
Though he was explicitly asked to describe what
Uding said in as much detail as he could recall Rance
8 Discussion of the allegations of unlawful activity in April will not
appear in the order set forth in the complaint because I deem it neces
sary to interweave observations and conclusions concerning witness reli
ability
312 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testified only that he heard Uding say if we voted for
IWNA we d have to start at square one and claimed he
had no recollection of any explanation of that remark by
Uding Leffert recalled that an employee asked whether
Uding meant that wages would return to minimum wage
rates, and that Uding answered he believed that would
not happen Neither Rance nor Leffert provided a con
text out of which such a comment sprang
General Counsel witness Newell gave the most com
prehensive and explicit account of what occurred during
the employee group meetings Newell took notes as
Uding spoke In his own words Newell claimed he at
tended the meetings to see if the company went off
base During direct examination Newell was asked to
tell the judge in as much detail as you can recall, what
Mr Uding said at the April meeting Interestingly,
Newell did not at all testify that Uding made the
Square One remark, as described by Rance and Lef
fert In fact Newell expressly testified during cross ex
amination that he did not hear Uding or any other su
pervisor say anything about starting from square one
I conclude the above accounts present such a confused
state concerning the alleged threat to begin negotiations
at square one as to render them as unreliable bases for
factual findings 9 ,
Uding unequivocally denied he used the phrase
square one I credit his denial based on my assessment
of Uding s overall reliability and the confusing character
of the countervailing testimony
Uding s testimony reflects that he used the term
ground zero in April but that it referred to his discus
sion of parallel circumstances between the Logansport
facility and the Employers plants in Pennsylvania
In part, Uding spoke of the pending representation pe
tition at the Pennsylvania locations (see fn 6 above and
accompanying text) In relevant part Uding s version re
flects that his use of the words ground zero related to
the situation in Pennsylvania and that he told the Lo
gansport employees the Pennsylvania facilities were op
erating under implemented terms and conditions
[and] not the old expired contract The union orga
nizers have shown no enthusiasm for accepting that so
we d [the parties to Pennsylvania negotiations] have to
go back to the beginning and negotiate a contract that
was acceptable to both parties
In fact the Board s decision involving the Pennsylva
ma locations (see fn 6 above) recites that the most recent
collective bargaining agreement there had expired on
April 30 1984 that the Pennsylvania plant unions and
the Employer negotiated for new contracts from June
1984 through March 1986 with no success, and that the
Board s Regional Office hearing on the Pennsylvania pe
tition was conducted sometime during the spring of 1987
I find this chronological scenario lends plausibility to
Uding s recitation of what he said about the Pennsylva
nia situation to Logansport employees in April
9 Compounding the confusion is Rance s testimony that in a June em
ployee meeting he heard Uding say that well start from page one if
the employees vote for Lodge D485 Such a comment is not alleged as a
violation and no other witness gave such testimony
On all relevant discussion above I find Uding did not
use the phrase Square One during the April meeting
with employees that he used the phrase ground zero
but in a manner that does not violate Act Rance s direct
examination concerning the alleged threat to engage in
protracted litigation is devoid of any question or answer
concerning that subject 10 However during cross exams
nation Rance spontaneously recalled that Uding said if
the employees voted for IWNA it would be tied up in
court for a couple of years Rance was not sure whether
Uding said this in April or June Rance was confronted
with his prehearing affidavit In that document he as
serted They [employer representatives] never told me
that they would tie this up in litigation in Court for two
years to keep this union out I find this apparent contra
diction, together with Rance s failure to testify on this al
leged threat during direct examination and his uncertain
ty concerning when the alleged threat was made im
pacts adversely on his testimonial reliability
The reliability of Rance and Leffert is further dimin
fished by their testimony that Uding allegedly threatened
a wage reduction if the employees voted for Lodge
D485 Rance testified that Uding during the April meet
ing said if we voted for the Boilermakers he d [Uding]
have to take about $2 00 an hour right off the top so
they could be competitive down the road Lefferts ver
sion differs According to Leffert Uding said, If the
Boilermakers won the election there would automatically
be a $2 00 cut in wages because they would go for a 3-5
year contract No other General Counsel witness tests
fled concerning this incident The differences in these
versions though arguably inconsequential underscore
the hazard in relying on either version for factual find
rags
The danger becomes more prominent when Rance s
and Lefferts wage cut testimony is compared to that of
employee G Wallace Wallace a General Counsel wit
ness also testified regarding the alleged $2 wage cut
During his direct examination Wallace was presented
leading questions concerning this issue Wallace an
swered he did not recall whether Uding made any com
ment about wages During cross examination Wallace
became more specific First Wallace said he did not
recall that Uding said there would be a $2 per hour
wage cut Wallace then was confronted with his prehear
mg affidavit after which he explicitly denied that any of
the Employers representatives said wages would be cut
$2 an hour
The inconsistencies, variations and waffling present in
the General Counsels witnesses testimony on the al
leged $2 wage cut threat simply make it extremely diffi
cult if not impossible, to use that testimony as a founda
tion for the factual findings sought by the General Coun
sel This is especially true when a comparison is made
between that testimony and that presented by the Em
ployer s witnesses
Uding and J Coale the Employers labor relations
manager both recalled that Uding referred to a $2 per
hour wage reduction However Uding and Coale were
10 The threat of protracted litigation will be further discussed below
COPLAY CEMENT CO 313
more comprehensive in their description of the context
in which that subject had been raised than were the Gen
era] Counsels witnesses
Uding flatly denied he said anything about a wage cut
being dependent on the outcome of a representation elec
tion Instead Uding testified that at the April meeting
an employee asked why it had been necessary to ample
ment wage reductions at Logansport (I have earlier re
ported the Employer s implementation of a $2 per hour
wage reduction in September 1986 See sec II A
above) Uding testified he explained the reduction was
economically motivated and mentioned specific factors
Coale provided uncontested factual background for
Uding s testimony Coale described the conditions under
which the bargaining unit operated after the June 1984
expiration of the most recent collective bargaining agree
ment
Viewed together, and considered in connection with
my observation of witness demeanor I find Uding s and
Coale s testimony a plausible account of what Uding said
to employees in April concerning a $2 wage reduction i i
Also, I credit Uding s denial he told the employees they
would suffer a $2 an hour wage cut if they voted for
Lodge D485
Finally, as instances in which General Counsel wit
nesses corroborated Uding s testimony the following are
cited Newell and Wallace agreed Uding told the em
ployees he could not promise them anything and Leffert
and Wallace conceded that Uding s statements concern
ing promulgation of an employee handbook (alleged as
an unlawful promise of benefit) were made in response to
an employee question and consisted of a brief description
of Uding s personal experience with similar conditions at
a different plant
Wallace presented the most comprehensive accounts
of certain events among General Counsels witnesses
His testimony was designed to prove that Uding threat
ened protracted litigation in the event IWNA was select
ed bargaining representative and also promised to estab
lash an employee handbook if the employee would not
select either IWNA or Lodge D485 as their representa
tive
Wallace testified Uding spoke about litigation and a
handbook However I find Wallace s description of the
litigation comment contains uncertainty that persuades
me that reliance on Wallace s recount of what Uding
may have said is not as valid as reliance on Uding s de
scription of the same subject Thus Wallace testified that
Uding said if either union got in, he would go-could
tie it up in courts for two years Clearly the quoted tes
timony shows Wallace was unsure whether Uding said
he would go to or could tie it up in courts
Moreover the complaint (par 5(a)(ii)) specifically as
serts Uding s alleged threat was conditional on the em
ployees selecting IWNA as bargaining representative
Wallace s quoted testimony reflects that Uding condi
11 Employees M Mee J Thomson and W Platt testified on the Em
ployer s behalf that Uding did not say there would be a $2 wage reduc
tion I have accorded the testimony of these three witnesses some but
not dispositive probative value As earlier reported I have concluded
that none of the testimony of employee witnesses who testified in this
case is as reliable a source for factual findings as Uding
tioned the alleged threat on the employees selection of
either IWNA or Lodge D485 as their bargaining agent
Further, Rance Leffert, and Newell all testified this al
leged threat was conditioned on a vote in favor of
IWNA Wallace s account is obviously different from
other General Counsel witnesses
Uding acknowledged he spoke of court proceedings
during his April employee meeting Uding s account is
direct and marked with considerably more clarity than
the totality of what exists from General Counsels wit
nesses Regarding this allegation, Uding told the employ
ees the Employers position was that IWNA was not a
viable legitimate labor organization ( It is undisputed that
IWNA had no formal structure at that time Only the
vote of disaffiliation reported above in sec II, A had
occurred) Uding recalled he also told the employees
that the Employer had taken the same position in the
proceedings pending at its Pennsylvania facilities
Coale testified he heard Uding speak of litigation
during the April meeting In straightforward narration,
Coale testified an employee asked how the Pennsylvania
operations related to the rival claims of IWNA and
Lodge D485 at Logansport Coale recalled that Uding
said the Pennsylvania issue was still in a litigation proc
ess, which could be protracted and tied up it courts for
an extended period of time
Documentary evidence (E Exh 11), a June 11 memo
randum from J Gaffney, the Employers vice president
tends to support the accuracy of the combined testimony
of Uding and Coale That memorandum is addressed to
the Logansport employees It advises them of the current
status of the pending representation elections at the
Pennsylvania facilities The employees were notified (1)
the Pennsylvania election would proceed as scheduled
on June 11 but that the ballots would be impounded
pending the Board s resolution of the multiplant issue (2)
the Board had agreed to more fully review the Employ
er s position on that issue which had been made initially
in November 1986, (3) the Employer had no indication
the length of time this review process will take and (4)
the Employer would keep the employees apprised of fur
ther developments
In my view the contents of Gaffney s June 11 memo
randum provides greater legitimacy to Uding s and
Coale s versions of what Uding said about litigation than
to the varying versions presented by General Counsel s
witness I find that documents references to the Pennsyl
vania election the Employers position and the apparent
delay to be caused by impoundment of ballots and fur
ther Board review are wholly consistent with and natu
ral extensions of the Employers version of what Uding
told employees in April about litigation Accordingly I
adopt that version as the most reliable indicator of what
occurred concerning the alleged threat of protracted liti
gation
As indicated above Wallace also was presented to
support the allegation that Uding unlawfully promised
employees a benefit Specifically, the complaint (par
5(a)(iv)) alleges Uding told the Logansport employees in
April, that the Employer would promulgate an employee
314 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
handbook if the employees would refrain from selecting
either IWNA or Lodge D485 as their bargaining agent
As earlier reported, both Wallace and General Counsel
witness Leffert testified Uding s comments about a hand
book were stimulated by a question from another em
ployee during the April meeting
Wallace testified an employee (unnamed) asked who
would take care of problems that we had if we had no
union committee Leffert recalled the question was
asked in somewhat different form namely, that the em
ployee asked If we don t have a union contract how
will we know what our working conditions are like? 12
Wallace, during his direct examination, claimed with
certainty that Uding answered the question by saying
he would set up a handbook to use as a guideline
and rules and they would go around and get the prior
ities of the employees before this was done Wallace
however agreed during cross examination, that Uding
clearly told the employees he could not promise them
anything and that the handbook was a device used in a
nonunion plant with which Uding had experience in
similar situations
Leffert, when pressed for specificity during cross ex
amination, testified in a manner more consistent with
Wallace s cross (rather than direct) examination Leffert
testified Uding answered the employees question by
saying at a plant I ve had an experience that was non
union, we had it in a handbook
Both Coale and Uding testified on the handbook alle
gation
Coale s account was perfunctory compared with
Uding s Nonetheless they testified consistently Coale
merely recalled that an employee asked how a plant
could operate without a union contract and that Uding
answered that in his experience in a nonunion situation in
Towanda, Pennsylvania a handbook had been devel
oped
Uding s handbook testimony was more specific He re
called the question as Leffert described it Uding asserted
he was asked how employees would know what were
their benefits if the plant were nonunion Uding claimed
he told them I could not tell them we would provide
them with any particular instrument to do that but I re
called from my experience what we had done in other
nonunion plants-that from my experience we had used
a handbook to describe benefits Uding emphasized he
repeatedly said he could not promise anything He also
unequivocally denied that he spoke of a committee to es
tablish priorities
I credit Uding s account of what he said concerning a
handbook The cross examination of Wallace and Leffert
are not vastly different 13 Uding was unshaken through
out his testimony on the handbook Wallace was not as
steady as witness on this subject
Moreover I find an item of documentary evidence
tends to support Uding s testimony that he simply an
swered an employees question without promising any
thing A memorandum, dated May 26 from Plant Man
12 1 do not find these different versions of the question significant
is Even if I were to credit fully Wallace s version (during his direct
examination) I find nothing in Wallace s testimony that conditions the
handbook on employee rejection of both labor organizations as alleged
ager W G Biehl to the Logansport employees refers to
an employee handbook In relevant part the memoran
dum states Certainly an operation like Logansport
needs guidelines, policies and procedures with or without
a union In other non union operations, an Employee
Handbook replaces the contract so that employees un
derstand job bidding, length of service provisions, vaca
tion procedure, etc This quoted language, albeit au
thored by Biehl and not Uding, is couched in the same
factually innocuous terms as Uding claims he used when
he spoke of a handbook in April 14
I find Uding s handbook remarks far removed from sit
uations when the Board has found violations In the in
stant case as noted above, I find nothing Uding said re
garding a handbook conditioned its promulgation on
how the employees would vote Even if such a promise
were to be implied, the more reliable and credited ac
count of Uding s comment eliminates the inherent vice of
such implication namely, that the handbooks contents
would contain solutions to specific employee problems
I do not adopt Wallace s testimony that Uding said the
Employer would solicit employees priorities as an initial
phase of compiling an employee handbook This elimi
nates a critical element of General Counsels case The
account that I have adopted at most, reflects that a
handbook, if issued, would contain the Employers exist
ing personnel practices and employee benefits
I consider it straining to ascribe the sinister meaning
requested by General Counsel to Uding s handbook
statements Neither the question Uding was asked, nor
his answer in my opinion rose to the level of seeking
suggesting , or inducing the nature of, or solutions to any
employee problems There is no reliable evidence what
ever that Uding questioned employees about their per
ceived problems or solicited them for future presentation
Simply stated, I conclude Uding, in effect, was asked
what if anything would replace their union contract as
a compendium of benefits rules and regulations and he
answered that an employee handbook had served that
purpose elsewhere Absent cogent evidence of the criti
cal element of solicitation of grievances I am unable to
conclude the Employer committed the alleged violation
involving an employee handbook
On all the foregoing I find there is insufficient evi
dence to sustain the allegations of complaint paragraphs
5(a)(i-iv) and shall recommend their dismissal
D The June Meetings
Complaint paragraphs 5(b)(i-u) allege Uding again
threatened to reduce wages and also to institute a griev
ance procedure, both contingent on election results
1 Wage reduction threat
The alleged June threat to reduce wages is based on
Rance s testimony that Uding conducted another em
ployee meeting on June 4 or 5 and that what Uding said
was similar to the first one (April meeting) but was
worded a little different In relevant part, Rance
14 Interestingly no effort was made to allege any part of Biehl s
memorandum constitutes a violation of the Act
COPLAY CEMENT CO 315
claimed Uding said If we voted for the Boilermakers
he d have to take right off the top so that they could be
comparative (sic) a couple of years down the road
Employee D Zinsmaster was presented as a General
Counsel witness apparently to provide a meaningful
background to this part of Rance s testimony Zinsmaster
testified Uding used the phrase ground zero 15 during a
discussion among Uding and employee D Brady and
G D Haas shortly after Uding conducted his large
group employee meeting in June
According to Zinsmaster, who approached the other
three men in the midst of their conversation, Uding said,
111 tell you what, I know what happens if you do go
with a union We re going to start at ground zero Zins
master asserted that Brady asked, What do you mean
by ground zero starting at minimum wage? and Uding
replied, No Not quite that far
Brady and Haas testified that Brady asked Uding
whether his reference to Square One during the main
meeting with employees meant that they would return
to minimun wage and that Uding answered in the nega
Live 16
Uding did not remember whether he said anything
about minimum wage However, he recalled that, in
June, an employee asked him to explain what he meant
by his ground zero expression in April (see sec II C,
above) Uding testified he explained in June as he had in
April, that the attitude of union officials at the Pennsyl
vania locations toward operating under the implemented
work conditions made it likely the parties would have
to go back to the beginning in negotiating terms of a
new contract Uding denied he used the phrase Square
One in June
I find Uding s description of this event more reliable
than Rance s for the various reasons previously stated
concerning testimonial reliability As earlier indicated, I
find Rance s testimony punctuated with flaws His testi
mony concerning the June threat of wage reduction does
not even conform to the allegation Rance testified that
Uding s statement was conditioned on a vote favorable
to Lodge D485, but the complaints allegation avers the
alleged threat was to be carried out if the employee
voted for either Lodge D485 or IWNA Such a deviation
between pleading and proof is serious It is not easily
correctible by the oft used motion to conform pleadings
to proof That motion relates to such minor matters as
errors in dates, etc I view the difference between the al
legation of threatened wage reduction in June and the
supporting testimony as one of critical substance
I find Uding s account, which I adopt, contains no un
lawful threat of wage reduction In essence, he repeated
what he told the employees in April about the Employ
er s need to be competitive Even if I were to adopt
Rance s recollection that Uding also said he d have to
take right off the top that statement has no proscribed
meaning
15I have found the quoted phrase was used by Uding at the April
meeting See sec II C above Rance recalled Uding used the phrase
page one in June To avoid further confusion I shall focus only upon
the thrust of General Counsels posthearing argument See G C Br p 5
16 Interestingly the complaint only alleges the square one phrase as
a violation in April No such allegation is made about June
I conclude the later discussion among Zinsmaster,
Brady, Hass, and Uding fails to establish an unlawful
taint to Uding s June comments regarding wages First,
Uding candidly gave his explanation of the term ground
zero to Brady I have found his explanation plausible
and lawful
Second, neither Zinsmaster's nor Brady s testimony
necessarily bears the threatening or coercive impact sug
gested by General Counsel In posthearing brief, General
Counsel argues that Uding s statement that his remarks
do not mean wages would go quite ( as) far as mini
mum wage signifies Uding is thus threatening employ
ees that although their wages might not drop as far as
minimum wage they would drop if either union
won the election (G C Br 5 )
The General Counsels quoted assertion is speculative
In fact there is contradictory evidence on this issue Al
though Zinsmaster and Brady claimed Uding connected
his minimum wage remark to the election outcome, Haas
explicitly repudiated such an attribution Haas was asked,
Now, did you ever hear Mr Uding state that if there
was a union elected there would be a cut in wages'
Haas answered, No (Tr 239) Haas was then asked to
describe what Uding said to him and Brady Haas re
sponded, The main thing I guess I remember about it
was the reference to Square 1 Mr Uding had made a
reference to Square 1 as far as negotiations goes during
the main meeting and Dave [Brady] asked him what he
meant by Square 1, was that minimum wage or what,
and Mr Udmg said no Haas was then asked, Do you
recall anything else about that conversation with Mr
Uding and Mr Brady? Haas answered, Just general
things I remember him [tiding] talking about a lot of-
we were there quite a while As far as specifics that
kind of stuck in my mind because I had some question
about what he meant about it too (Tr 240 )
In my view the totality of Haas testimony shows that
Haas heard Uding say nothing that connected a wage cut
to the election outcome and that Uding merely reiterated
his explanation to the effect that a return to beginning of
negotiations would be what the union leaders would re
quire
2 Promise of grievance procedure
Complaint paragraph 5(b)(n) alleges Uding promised
in June to institute a grievance procedure if the employ
ees would not select either IWNA or Lodge D485 as
their bargaining agent
Rance testified concerning this allegation He claimed
he heard Uding tell the employees in June that If (they)
vote for neither (union), we can represent you the best
we know how We can come around and get your prior
ities and draw up our policies from there General
Counsel contends that this testimony of Rance proves
Uding impliedly promised a grievance procedure/
mechanism as alleged when viewed together with cer
tarn of Newell s testimony
Newell s account is somewhat different Newell re
called that Uding, in June, was asked by an unidentified
employee for something in black and white so they
could know more about what would happen once the
316 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union is voted out According to Newell, Mr Uding
stated that the first thing that would take place once the
union was voted out, there would be an employee hand
book made up, and it would be made up of priorities and
concerns of the employees
As earlier reported, Uding steadfastly maintained he
repeatedly told the employees he could not promise
them anything Some of the employee witnesses con
firmed this Also Uding unequivocally denied he said
anything regarding setting employees priorities
I have extensively discussed the complaint allegation
of the promise of an employee handbook in April (see
sec II C above) I have also found that, in the credibil
ity contest between Rance and Newell (on the one hand)
and Uding (on the other) a fair assessment of their total
testimony and demeanor has convinced me it is Uding s
version of events that is the most reliable and trustwor
thy To the extent my former comments, observations
and conclusions on the handbook and credibility issues
apply to the alleged June promise of a grievance proce
dure they are incorporated by reference at this juncture
Based on my earlier findings, I credit Uding s denial that
he said the Employer would determine employees prior
ities
Indeed, Newell s direct examination testimony that
Uding discussed priorities in June proved to be self con
tradicted During cross examination Newell was shown
notes he made contemporaneous with Uding s June 4 re
marks Newell's notes stated, The first thing they would
do with no union is ask employees about their priorities,
but during cross examination Newell disclaimed that
Uding was that precise Thus Newell testified No,
that s not exactly what he [tiding] said that s what
I wrote down to remind me of the question that was
asked
Newell s additional testimony on this issue is an uncan
ny replay of the credited account of the alleged April
promise of an employee handbook Newell finally ac
knowledged an employee said he would like to see
something in black and white they wanted to know
what would happen with, you know, referring to what
would be done without a union (Tr 136-137 )
The state of the entire record as relates to testimonial
reliability and both the allegation of the April handbook
promise and the June promise of grievance procedure"
persuade me that Uding did not promise a grievance pro
cedure mechanism in June
E Conclusion
On all the foregoing, I find the Employer did not
engage in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in par
garaph 5 of the complaint
III THE REPRESENTATION CASE
A The Objections
As indicated above in the statement of the case sec
tion both labor organizations filed objections to the elec
17 Significantly Newell s direct testimony that a handbook with em
ployee priorities was offered by Uding in June is not explicitly alleged as
a violation
tion Those objections encompass and are coextensive
with each unfair labor practice allegation
I have found the Employer committed none of the al
leged unfair labor practices "I My overall findings and
conclusions regarding the unfair labor practice allega
tions show there is no reliable evidence to sustain any of
the objections Accordingly, I find there is no merit to
any of the objections I shall recommend they be over
ruled
B The Challenged Ballots
1 The facts
IWNA and Lodge D485 challenged the ballots of J
Bennett, B Brady A Mee, M Perrone, G Pomaso (or
Pomasi) and P Roberson on the ground they are tempo
rary summer employees The Employer contends the
challenges to these ballots should be overruled because
the six employees share a sufficient community of inter
est with other unit employees to render them eligible
voters
The parties waived presentation of testimonial evi
dence regarding the challenged ballots Instead, they sub
mitted this issue on stipulated facts 19 and agreed their
stipulation contained all the relevant facts on which the
challenged ballots may be resolved 20
Based on the submitted facts I find the following At
least during the summers of 1983 through 1987, the Em
ployer hired individuals who worked during the summer
season Preference was given to relatives of current em
ployees These summer employees were hired during
that time of year (generally end of May through August)
because it is the Employers busiest work season These
employees were used, in part as vacation relief person
nel for regular bargaining unit employees
The summer employees typically are college students
but there is no connection between their job assignments
and education level They are hired into entry level posi
tions, and receive the rate of pay designated for that
level (bracket 1)
The summer employees work under the same supervi
sors as undisputed bargaining unit employees and per
form job tasks identical to regular bracket 1 entry level
employees Those tasks include such things as cleanup
loading unloading spillage, and raw delivery of materi
al
The summer employees were required to pay union
initiation fees and dues when a union security agreement
was in effect However since the expiration of the most
recent collective bargaining agreement between Lodge
D485 and the Employer on June 24 1984 (see sec II A
above) no such requirement existed and no evidence or
stipulation was offered to show to what extent if at all
19 In its posthearing brief IWNA urges me to find objectionable con
duct based on violations of the Act neither alleged in the complaint nor
explicitly in its objections E g see p 8-13 IWNA brief I decline to do
so
19 The stipulation appears at pp 11-20 of the transcript
20 In addition E Exh 1 was received as a summary of hiring of
summer employees 1983-1987
COPLAY CEMENT CO 317
any summer employee paid union dues or initiation fees
after June 24, 1984
The summer employees always have been required to
undergo a probationary period The probationary re
quirement recurs each summer Until the Employer s
September 1986 implementation of new employment
conditions (see sec II, A, above), the probationary
period was 30 days Since September 1986, the proba
tionary period has been 90 days
Fringe benefits such as group health and life insurance
and holidays are available to summer employees only
after completion of their probationary period The
summer employees do not accrue vacation benefits They
do receive credits toward the Employers pension plan
but do not work enough time in any year to accrue suffi
cient credits to establish a vested right in the pension
plan The summer employees are entitled to bereavement
pay and shift premiums, but there is no evidence any re
ceived same
When hired, there is no understanding between the
summer employees and the Employer that they will con
tinue their employment at the end of the summer on a
regular full time or a regular part time basis However
at summer s end the summer employees are evaluated as
any other entry level employee and those who have per
formed well and have a good work record are encour
aged to return the following summer, and those who
have not performed well are not so encouraged
The summer employees participate in the Employer s
overtime equalization program That is, they share avail
able overtime equally only within their labor classifica
tions, but do not work overtime available in other job
classifications until after such overtime has been offered
to the regular full time bargaining unit employees
Finally the documentary evidence (E Exh 1) shows
the following recurring hirings of summer employees 21
J Pasquale-1983 and 1985
T Decker-1983 and 1985
J McMillen-1985 and 1986
B Biehl-1985 and 1986
D Pugh-1985 1986 and 1987
B Brady-1985 1986 and 1987
K Wolford-1985 and 1986
J Bennett-1986 and 1987
Thus of the six employees whose ballots were chal
lenged only two J Bennett and B Brady returned to
work during the summer of 1987 after having worked
for the Employer at least one previous summer Both
Bennett and Brady also had worked in 1986 and Brady
worked also in 1985 Neither of them worked under the
terms of any collective bargaining agreement
2 Analysis
I conclude the six individuals whose ballots were chal
lenged were ineligible to vote in the June 16, 1987 repre
sentation election
The relevant facts reflect (using the stipulated words)
that the persons employed as summer help are typical
21 There were no summer employees hired in 1984
ly" college students hired generally' from the end of
May through the end of August Moreover, they were
hired to supplement the work force during the Employ
er s busy season and as vacation replacements No evi
dence was presented to show any of the six challenged
voters fell into any different category Thus, I conclude
that these individuals appropriately are characterized as
students who are summer seasonal employees
The applicable decisional precedent regarding inclu
sion of such persons in bargaining units is clear In Pacif
is Tile & Porcelain Co, 137 NLRB 1358, 1365 (1962), the
Board declared Under our policy students employed
during summer vacation periods are considered tempo
rary employees and are excluded from bargaining units
Nonetheless it is possible that student employees may
be included in a bargaining unit if the circumstances of
their employment show they have a community of inter
est with the acknowledged unit employees with respect
to wages, hours, and working conditions See Dick
Kelchner Excavating Co 236 NLRB 1414, 1415 (1978),
where two students who worked full time during the
summer , on holidays and occasional Saturdays in a situa
tion where the students received the same wage rate and
worked under the same supervision as unit employees
and participated in a Christmas bonus program were in
cluded Compare to Town & Country Supermarkets, 244
NLRB 303 314 (1979) where an individual (S David
son) worked exclusively during the summer and attended
school the rest of the year was excluded The Board ex
cludes persons who work as summer seasonal unless their
employment is regular, of substantial duration and they
are treated the same as other unit employees (Shady
Oaks 229 NLRB 54, 55 (1977) )
The instant record shows only that the subject stu
dents worked in the same jobs and under the same super
vision as unquestioned unit employees at the time of the
instant election The same conditions prevailed in the
two summers immediately preceding the election This
condition prevailed because the Employer unilaterally
extended the probationary period from 30 to 90 days
That extension made it impossible for the students to ac
quire rights to share in the fringe benefits available to the
other employees in their job classifications If a student
returned to work during the next succeeding summer
the probationary requirement again needed to be met
Thus the record provides no basis for a conclusion that
the subject students have any community of interest with
unit employees apart from their shared supervision and
job tasks
On the state of this record commonality of supervi
sion and nature of work is not enough to establish the
requisite community of interest I find the following fac
tors militate against a conclusion that the students had
such a sufficient community of interest with unit employ
ees as to warrant the students inclusion in the bargaining
unit
(a) The instant students did not have an expectancy of
continued employment They started their work with no
understanding about future employment An invitation to
return to work the following summer was dependent on
a satisfactory job evaluation at the completion of current
318 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
summers work This shows the renewal of the job op
portunity was speculative When such absence of expect
ancy of continued employment is coupled (as in this
case) with the lack of participation in the fringe benefits
enjoyed by unit employees the Board finds absent the
community of interest element Georgia Pacific Corp 201
NLRB 831 (1973) and Hygeia Coca Cola Bottling Co
192 NLRB 1127 1129 (1971)
(b) There is no evidence that any of the individuals
whose ballots were challenged continued to work on any
basis during the school year Instead each challengee en
tirely stopped working for the instant Employer at least
until the next summer Thus there is no evidence here of
employment continuity the Board considers tends to
demonstrate the requisite community of interest (See
Giordano Lumber Co 133 NLRB 205, 207 ( 1961), and
Sandy s Stores, 163 NLRB 728, 729 (1967) )
In Photo Drive Up 267 NLRB 329, 348-349 (1983) the
Board let stand its judge s observation from Melba Thea
tre 260 NLRB 18 22 (1982) that The determinative
criteria as to whether students are to be included in a
unit appears to be the regularity of their part time em
ployment which may be as little as one day per week
Century Moving & Storage 251 NLRB 671, 681 (1980)
and cases cited therein In Greg Bunker , the Board of
firmed its judges exclusion of an employee who had
worked two summers, plus one Christmas vacation and
fully intended to return to work as a permanent employ
ee the next summer The affirmance left undisturbed the
judge s conclusion that working successive summers to
gether with one Christmas vacation did not establish the
kind of regularity of part time employment the Board
considers justifies inclusion in a bargaining unit
In the instant case there is even less support than in
Greg Bunker to include the six challenged voters The
most the record shows is that two of them Bennett and
Brady worked two or more summers (including that in
which the instant election was conducted ) and after the
expiration of the most recent collective bagaining agree
ment 22 In my view the bare showing that some students
worked more than one summer does not suffice to con
clude the challengees enjoyed the degree of regular em
ployment to support a claim they had a community of
interest with undisputed bargaining unit employees
I find the facts of Fisher Controls Co 192 NLRB 514
515 (1971), strikingly similar to the instant case In
Fisher, as here students ( 1) were hired during the
summer to fill in for vacationing employees and to aug
ment the work force in jobs required by the employer s
increased seasonal activity (2) were given no definite
commitment for reemployment during succeeding sum
mers (3) received wages comparable to full time em
ployees, and (4) did not receive all the fringe benefits of
the full time employees On those facts the Board found
the summer students were temporary employees They
were excluded from the unit
22 J Pasquale T Decker J McMillen D Pugh B Biehl and K
Wolford also worked two or more summers However because there is
no evidence any of these individuals worked any time other than the
summers indicated on E Exh I or was a student employee at the time
of the election I find nothing in their work history that provides evi
dence of employment regularity
Against the above described backdrop I have weighed
the evidence that shows the student summer employees
were required to pay union initiation fees and dues were
subject to the contractual probationary period and enti
tled to a variety of fringe benefits and that one unidenti
feed student employee used the grievance procedure at
some unidentified time However none of these condi
tions were operative since June 24, 1984, the expiration
date of the most recent collective bargaining agreement
This was two summers before the instant election
On the date of the instant election the employees were
working without a union contract and under terms of
employment unilaterally implemented by the Employer
and vastly different from the contractual conditions in
respects material to resolution of the challenged ballots
Hence, I conclude the evidence of conditions as they ex
isted under an extant contract are of little probative
value on the issue at hand To utilize the former facts as
dispositive of the challenged ballots is conjectural pre
sumptuous and improper It is the reality of employment
conditions as they actually existed for the six challengees
at election time, which must be the guideposts for deter
mining those employees status
On all the foregoing I find each of the six employees
whose ballot was challenged was a temporary student
employee not entitled to inclusion in the bargaining unit
I shall recommend the challenge to each such ballot be
sustained
C Recommended Disposition of the Representation
Case
On the foregoing discussion of the objections and chal
lenged ballots I recommend
l The objections filed by IWNA be overruled
2 The objections filed by Lodge D485 be overruled
3 The challenges to the ballots of J Bennett B
Brady A Mee M Perrone G Pomaso (or Pomasl) and
P Roberson be sustained
4 A runoff election be conducted with voters having
the choice of voting either for Lodge D485 or no union
representation 23 The election should be conducted at a
time deemed appropriate by the Regional Director for
Region 25 of the Board
On the above findings of fact and on the entire record
in the case I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Coplay Cement Company is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act
2 Independent Workers of North America and Local
Lodge D485 , International Brotherhood of Boilermakers
AFL-CIO and the International Brotherhood of Boiler
makers are labor organizations within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act
3 All production and maintenance employees, store
room clerks chemical analysts and control room opera
23 The tally of ballots reveals that IWNA did not receive a sufficient
number of votes to retain that labor organization as a choice in a runoff
election See NLRB Field Manual Sec 11350 1
COPLAY CEMENT CO
tors at the Employers Logansport, Indiana facility, but
excluding office clerks, purchasing and payroll clerks,
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the
Act constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargain
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act
4 The Employer did not engage in any of the unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint
5 There is no merit to any of the election objections
filed by IWNA and by Lodge D485
6 There is merit to the challenges to the ballots of J
Bennett, B Brady, A Mee, M Perrone, G Pomaso (or
Pomasl), and P Roberson
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend
ed24
24 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board s
Rules and Regulations the findings conclusions and recommended
Order shall as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules be adopted by the
ORDER
319
1 The complaint in Case 25-CA-18724 is dismissed in
its entirety
2 The objections filed by IWNA to the June 16 1987
election in Case 25-RM-538 are overruled
3 The objections filed by Lodge D485 to the June 16,
1987 election in Case 25-RM-538 are overruled
4 The challenges in Case 25-RM-538 to the ballots of
J Bennett, B Brady, A Mee M Perrone G Pomaso
(or Pomasl), and P Roberson are sustained
5 Case 25-CA-18724 is severed from Case 25-RM-
538, and the representation case remanded to the Region
al Director for Region 25 for action consistent with the
recommended disposition (see sec III C above) of the
representation case
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur
poses