Coors Container Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 29, 1978

238 N.L.R.B. 1312 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Coors Container Company and Aluminum Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO. Case 27-CA 5327
September 29, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNIN(; AND MEMBFIRS PNELI.()
ANI) TRU SI) AII1
On February 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Earldean V. S. Robbins issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief; the General Coun-
sel filed cross-exceptions and an answering brief' and
a brief in support of cross-exceptions, and the Re-
spondent subsequently filed an answering brief to the
General Counsel's cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law, Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent. Coors Container Company,
Golden, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order.
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative L aw Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dri Wall Products. Inc., 91
NL RB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3. 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings.
In making credibility resolutions with regard to the content of the conver-
sation between the guard Estala and employees Mugge and Clements, the
Administrative Law Judge incorrectly attributed toe counsel for the Respon-
dent a question she had asked of Estala. Estala testified that he had asked
Mugge to remove the boycott sign from the window of the truck in which he
was riding, but denied having requested of Mugge that the sign be surren-
dered to him. Estala stated that when Mugge refused to remove the sign he
"asked him again for it." Contrary to what is related in the Decision, it was
Administrative Law Judge Robbins. not counsel for the Respondent., who
responded to Estala's testimony with the query "You again asked him to give
it to you?" While we correct the Decision on this point, we do not find that
it in ans was affects the Administrative La.lw Judge's credibility resolutions
DECISION
SIAIEMEN1 OFI tIF CASI
EARI.I) IAN V.S. RoBHINs, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard before me in Denver. Colorado, on
October 20 and 21. 1977. The charge was filed by Alumi-
num Workers International Union, AFL CIO, herein
called the Aluminum Workers, and served on Respondent
on April 18, 1977. The complaint, which issued on July 22.
1977, alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(I) and
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The principal issue herein is whether Respondent dis-
charged employee Mark Mugge and disciplined employee
Andrew Clements for displaying a sign supporting a union
boycott. Also at issue is whether Respondent violated the
Act by promulgating and enforcing a rule prohibiting the
display on company property of signs supporting a union
boycott and by interrogating employees as to their union
sympathies.
U pon the entire record, including my observation of' the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
brief' filed by the parties. I make the following:
FINDING(S OF FA(CI
1. JtU RISI)i( TION
Respondent, a Colorado corporation with its principal
office and place of business located in Golden. Colorado, is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of aluminum cans.
Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business op-
erations, annually purchases and receives goods and materi-
als valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points and
places outside the State of Colorado.
The complaint alleges. Respondent admits, and I find
that Respondent is, and at all times material herein has
been, an employer engaged in commerce and in operations
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. I.ABO)R OR(GANIZArlON
The complaint alleges. Respondent admits, and I find
that the Aluminum Workers and the Brewery, Bottling,
Can and Allied Industrial Union, Local 366, AFL-CIO,
herein called Brewery Local 366, both are now, and both
have been at all times material herein, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
ll. THE ALI.E(EIF) IUNFAIR LABOR PRA( II(TiS
A. Facts
Respondent is a wholly owned subsidiary of Adolph
Coors Brewery Company. Respondent's facility is located
in an industrial park shared with its parent company and
other subsidiaries. Beginning on or about April 4, 1977.'
All dates herein will be in 1977 unless otherwise indicated.
238 NLRB No. 185
1312
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
and continuing throughout the time pertinent herein, cer-
tain employees of the Brewery were engaged in a strike and
picketed at the various gates to the industrial park where
Respondent's facility is located. Therefore, Respondent's
employees have to cross the picket line in order to report to
work. Respondent's employees are not on strike.
The striking brewery employees have initiated a boycott
against Coors beer and in connection therewith have dis-
tributed boycott signs suitable for display on automobiles.
Donald C. Long, who was in charge of the daytime secu-
rity operation, testified that the president of the parent
company2 instructed him to stop, detain, and secure identi-
fication of any employee displaying a boycott sign. In com-
pliance therewith he instructed' the guards under his super-
vision that if they observed any vehicle displaying any fbrm
of a boycott sign the vehicle was to he detained and identi-
fied, and Long was to be notified. He further testified:
Q. Did you give them any further instructions?
A. As far as the stickers themselves, I did, yes. I said
the stickers were to be removed from the vehicles; you
are to ask the individual to remove the stickers.
Q. Did you tell your guards what they were to ad-
vise people who would not remove the stickers from
the vehicle?
A. Well, in a matter of sense, yes, and in a matter of
sense, no. I said that I was to be notified of any circum-
stances that would happen. I told my guards and su-
pervisors this would not be allowed.
Q. And you told them to contact you if that hap-
pened?
A. Immediately.
S
Q. Did you give any further instructions?
A. This is exactly what I said: "We have had too
many strike breakers--people busting through the
gate." What I mean by that, they drive the vehicle
through our guard station with the stickers on, and it's
quite possible more than possible-whoever displays
one of these boycott-scab-beer signs is a striker and
that we have got to maintain the security of the plant.
If they got on the plant, they could be setting bombs,
anything. I wanted everybody on the plant site stopped
that displayed any type of these signs.
Guard Paul Estala testified that at the security meeting a
day or two before April 13, Long instructed them to stop
cars displaying boycott signs. He further testified without
contradiction:
Q. Do you recall any more specifically what Mr.
Long said, what your duties or responsibilities were
regarding the stickers, or posters?
A. Yes: that we were supposed to tell the employees
that they were not permissible [sic] inside the plant,
especially displaying them and that all this was doing
Apparently security protection In the complex is provided by the parent
compan)
This was done at scheduled, daily meetings of day-shift guards held im-
mediately prior to the beginning of their shift
was just riling the pickets and making them more ex-
cited and-
Q. And that was the reason for the rule?
A. Yes, and also that there were some stickers [sic]
that were going inside the plant.
Q. Have you had strikers going in the plant before
this?
A. Yes, one.
Q. When did that occur?
A. Oh, within the first week of the strike.
Q. You said and let [sic] us to believe that your pur-
pose--that the way Mr. Mugge and Mr. Clements
were displaying the sign was defeating your purpose. If
they had driven through with the "Boycott Coors"
sign, it would have riled up the picketers?
A. That's right, sir.
TtiE WITNESS: The people that are displaying the
signs are just saying okay, that they're with the strikers
and they become more aggressive toward the non-
strikers.
JU DGE ROBBINS: Is that your opinion or was this
something that was discussed in the meeting?
TIuE WITNESS: This is what was told to me in the
meeting.
On the morning of April 13, Mugge and Clements were
stopped by Estala as they were leaving Respondent's prem-
ises at the end of the graveyard shift in Clements' truck.
Clements and Mugge creditably testified that as they ap-
proached the guard checkpoint on the North Service Road
approximately 200 to 300 feet from the McIntyre exit from
Respondent's project,' they displayed a sign reading "Boy-
cott Coors . . . Scab Beer."
As they approached the guard checkpoint, Estala noticed
the sign and motioned for them to stop, which they did.
Thereafter a conversation ensued, the details of which are
in dispute. Mugge testified that Estala told them to remove
the sign and give it to him. Both Mugge and Clements re-
plied no. Estala then said, are you sympathetic with the
strike. Mugge said they were using the sign to get through
the picket line safely, that the truck was private property
and he did not feel that they should have to remove the
sign. Estala again inquired if they were sympathetic to the
strike. Mugge said there was a memo out that they had to
cross the picket line or be subject to termination.' Estala
replied "that's right, so?" and said if they were union sym-
pathizers, he did not think they should be in the plant work-
ing. Estala said they could not display the sign on company
property. Mugge said he did not believe that the truck was
company property, that it was private property. Estala re-
quested their company identifications and directed them to
pull off the roadway and wait for a guard officer.
Clements testified that when Estala got to the truck he
They were about I- to 2 miles from any production facility.
'Mugge testified that he saw such a memo posted on bulletin boards both
in the work area and in the lunchroom.
1313
1 L
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
demanded that they remove the sign and give it to him.
Clements replied no and started to explain why not, but
Estala interrupted and said something to the effect that if
they were sympathizing with the Union they should not be
working there. Mugge then said something to the effect that
the truck and the sign were private property. He is unsure
as to Estala's reply but thinks he recalls Estala again saying
that union sympathizers should not be working for Coors.
Estala also said it was his job to confiscate that sign. Estala
then directed them off the roadway and called for a guard
officer. Both Clements and Mugge admit that the conversa-
tion was heated. Clements testified that both Mugge and
Estala were practically yelling.
Estala testified that as he was directing traffic he noticed
an oncoming vehicle with a "Boycott Coors" sign displayed
in the windshield. Because of the sign he motioned the vehi-
cle to stop. Clements was driving and Mugge was in the
passenger seat. According to Estala, he asked "could you
please take off the sign." When Mugge and Clements re-
plied no, he asked if they were Adolph Coors strikers. They
said no. Estala asked them to produce their company iden-
tification, at which point Mugge became belligerent. Mugge
said "you mother-fucker Mexican can't tell me what to dis-
play in my property." Estala said they were on Coors' prop-
erty. Mugge said no, this is my property. He said he was not
going to remove the sign because he could display anything
he wanted on his private property. Estala said the truck was
Mugge's property but it was on company premises so he
had to remove the sign.
Estala further testified "I asked him again for it. He
wouldn't do this." However, when counsel for Respondent
responded "you asked him again to give it to you?", Estala
testified "I didn't ask him to give it to me." He claims that
he merely asked them to remove the sign. Estala then called
for assistance. When asked if he, at any time, asked Mugge
or Clements if they were union sympathizers, Estala testi-
fied, "if I did, I don't recall, but I'm almost sure I didn't."
He denies saying if they were union sympathizers, they
should not come to work.
After a few minutes, Douglas McClure, lieutenant in
charge of the day shift of the security department at
Adolph Coors, arrived in response to Estala's call for assist-
ance.6 According to Mugge, McClure asked them to remove
the sign because it would aggravate the strikers. Mugge said
the truck was private property and he felt they could dis-
play the sign. Either Mugge or Clements said they were
using the sign to prevent or forestall any damage by the
strikers as they crossed the picket line. At some point they
had much the same conversation as to private property as
they had earlier with Estala. McClure then instructed Esta-
la to get a tape recorder. When Estala returned, McClure
asked questions and attempted to tape the discussion but
Mugge and Clements would not talk.7
Clements testified, as to this conversation, in essential
agreement with Mugge. Estala testified that McClure asked
why they were displaying the sign. Mugge said he could do
anything he wanted in his property. Estala asked Clements
6 Estala had called for Donald Long, the day shift commander, who was
unavailable.
7 McClure and Estala testified that the tape was garbled and no voice
could be heard.
who owned the vehicle and requested the registration.
Mugge kept insisting it was his property. He then got out of
the vehicle and said "you mother-fucker don't know your
job, I'm going to turn you in to Art Larsons and Bob Bales9
and they will deal with you." Mugge then wrote their
names on the back of the boycott sign.
McClure testified that when he arrived on the scene,
Estala came over to him and explained that he was having
a problem with Mugge, that he had requested the removal
of the boycott sign but that Mugge had refused. Estala fur-
ther said that Mugge was belligerent and used foul lan-
guage to him. McClure then walked over to Clements' truck
and asked why they refused to remove the sign. Mugge said
it was his vehicle, his home away from home, and no one
could force him to remove the sign. McClure asked why he
was displaying the sign. Mugge said it was his vehicle, his
home, and he could display what he wished. McClure said
the displaying of the sign was defeating their purpose, that
it agitated the strikers because it was a morale booster for
the strikers to see such signs inside the premises. He again
requested that the sign be removed. Mugge said no.
According to McClure, Estala asked for the registration.
Mugge then stated it was Clements' truck. McClure went to
the front of the vehicle to talk to Estala. Mugge got out of
the truck with the sign, banged his fist on the hood and
said, "you mother-fuckers don't even know your job. I want
your mother-fuckers names, I'm going to turn you in to Art
Larsen, he'll deal with you." McClure asked Estala to get
the tape recorder.' 0 Shortly thereafter he called for Long's
assistance.
Long arrived shortly thereafter. McClure told him
Mugge and Clements were displaying a boycott sign and
would not remove it and Long was given the vehicle regis-
tration and the identification cards. Clements testified that
Long said they should not display the boycott sign because
it would lower the morale of the employees at work. Clem-
ents said they were leaving the premises. Long's only re-
sponse was "oh."
Mugge testified that when Long arrived they discussed
the sign and why it was displayed, engaging in almost the
same conversation as that with McClure. Long returned
their identifications, told them they could leave but that he
was going to recommend disciplinary action to Bob Bales.
Long testified he asked Clements if it was his truck.
Clements said it was. He asked Clements to remove the
sign. Mugge said "you better make that beaner" back off,
that Mexican mother-fucker has no right to tell me what to
do with my property." Long said it was Clements' truck,
that he was addressing himself to Clements and would ap-
preciate it if Mugge would stay out of the conversation until
spoken to. Long further said he considered Mugge's lan-
guage offensive and uncalled for and he would not accept
such language in his presence. Long then told Clements he
could keep the sign but he should leave the premises. He
further said he would have a report made and would rec-
Larson is group vice president of manufactunng operations.
9 Bales is director of employee services.
'i According to McClure, the purpose of the tape recorder was to stop
Mugge from using foul and abusive language.
" A derogatory remark refemng to persons of Spanish-Amencan descent.
1314
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
ommend that some action be taken as a result of the inci-
dent. Mugge and Clements then left the premises.
Long testified that immediately thereafter he reported the
incident to Bales. When he told Bales that an employee had
refused to remove a boycott sign, Bales' response was, "so
what if he didn't want to remove it, what's really wrong
here." Long said that was not the issue, that, to him, the
issue was that Mugge was very offensive to Estala, that he
took it as a racial slur and felt that his men should not be
subjected to that type of language. Bales agreed and said he
would have to investigate.
Bales testified in substantial agreement. According to
him, the specific language that Long reported as offensive
was "Mexican mother-fucker." "taco vender," and "bean-
er." Later that morning. Bales reported the incident to Lar-
son.' 2 The two of them interviewed Estala and McClure.
Bales testified that Estala stated that when he requested
removal of the sign, he was hit with a barrage of somewhat
hostile language but did not relate in detail the language
used. He did state that he had been called a mother-fucker
and that at one point Mugge got out of the truck, banged
his fist on the hood and said you motherfuckers don't know
what you're doing. Bales inquired if any racial slurs had
been used and Estala said no." Both Estala and McClure
submitted written reports which were in substantial agree-
ment with their testimony herein.
Richard Heller, superintendent in Respondent's manu-
facturing operation, testified that on April 13 he was noti-
fied of the incident by his immediate supervisor, Peter Mar-
tin, vice president of manufacturing. Thereafter he met with
Bales and reviewed the written reports from the guards.
Larson, Bales, and Heller discussed the situation. None of
them testified in much detail as to this discussion. They all
agreed, however, that they reached a consensus that if the
facts, as reported by the guards, proved to be accurate and
no additional substantial evidence was discovered, it would
be necessary to terminate Mugge for insubordination and
gross misconduct.
According to Heller, they discussed how serious they
considered the offense to be, whether it was something that
could be overlooked. They considered the fact that these
were "very trying times," a fairly new strike, the Company's
effort to retain employees, and "a security force that is try-
ing to keep with it for the good of the company and the
employees." They considered whether they could permit
employees to get away with treating guards in this manner
and still maintain control of security, and agreed that they
could not. Larson testified that they discussed whether they
should be more lenient or stricter than they' would be in
normal circumstances and decided they should not. Ac-
cording to Heller, there was no discussion as to whether the
conduct was gross misconduct, but it was apparent during
the discussion that they all considered such conduct to be
serious.
Shortly before the II p.m. start of Clements' and
Mugge's shift, Heller and Mugge's immediate supervisor,
Glenn Kline,' 4 stopped Mugge and Clements as they were
x1 Bales testified that it was established practice to notify the group vice
president of an) incident involving employees in his division.
1i Estala said he responded in this manner because he did not want to give
the appearance of being on a personal vendetta.
14 Kline. whose title is supervisor, end division, is an admitted supervisor.
about to enter the plant. They had Mugge wait in Bales'
office and escorted Clements to an adjacent conference
room. I arson and Bales were already there. According to
Clements he was asked to read the reports from Estala and
McClure and to comment on their accuracy. He read the
reports. said they were basically correct but added that he
thought Estala's attitude and general behavior were rather
gruff. lte was questioned regarding Mugge's language dur-
ing the conversations with the guards. whether he used any
expletives. Clements said he wasn't positive, he could nei-
ther affirm or deny, that such words were just harmless
slang words that he hears all the time. He was asked why he
had the boycott sign. He replied, to facilitate passing
through the picket line. He was asked if there was any pos-
sible ulterior motive for the sign. He replied, no. Again he
was asked if there was another motive for the sign, like
harassing the guards. Clements replied that he had noticed
that the sign lifted the morale of the picketers.
The testimony of Heller, Bales. and Kline is in basic
agreement with that of Clements as to this interview, except
that they testified that Larson read the reports to Clements.
Kline testified that after Larson read the reports, Clements
said it was accurate. Bales and Kline testified that Clements
was specifically asked if the expletives set forth in the report
were used. Kline, Heller, Larson, and Bales all testified that
Clements said it was. According to Bales and Larson, Clem-
ents first said he did not recall. After the question was asked
several times, Clements said "yes, I believe that was said."
Kline testified that the conversation was "just more or
less trying to ask why, to find out why they had the sign and
why they wouldn't take it down. And Clements said. 'The
strikers at the gate-the picketers-are damaging vehicles
and I did not want my vehicle damaged." Larson replied
that Respondent would pay for any damage. Clements said
he did not know that. Clements was questioned as to when
the sign was displayed. He replied, 200 or 300 yards before
the guard station. One of them then told Clements "what
you do with the sticker after you get outside of the gate, we
have no control over, but as long as you're inside the gate
and on company property, you should not-and we're ask-
ing you not to show the signs." Clements said, "Well, we
could put it on after we passed the guards. We had plenty
of distance." Larson's replied "That's fine if you think it
would prevent your vehicle from damage, fine."
Clements was instructed to wait outside while Mugge
was interviewed. Mugge testified that Larson read the
guard reports. Mugge produced his written account of the
incident. Mugge was asked if he had used any profanity,
specifically the vulgarity reported by the guard. Mugge re-
plied that he did not make any direct statements to the
officers but that he did use expletives'6 when he was in the
truck discussing the situation with Clements but that he did
not recall the exact words he had used. Mugge further testi-
fied "it got down to the point where I asked Art [Larson]
you know, it's up to you, you're the boss here. You're the
one that is going to have to make the decision whether I get
15 Kline testified that he thinks Larson made this statement, that Larson
was the management spokesman.
'1 This is Mugge's terminology. Mugge admits that his remarks to Clem-
ents were probably made in a loud tone of voice.
1315
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fired or reprimanded and I see all the testimony there in
front of you to make your own decision and he told me he
would have to terminate me and I told him I believed he
was making an incorrect decision." Mugge further testified
that he was told that he was being terminated because of
the foul language used by him. Mugge also described the
guard's attitude as hostile.
Heller, Bales, and Kline testified in essential agreement
with Mugge's account. Heller testified that both Mugge and
Clements were questioned as to their characterization of the
guard's attitude as hostile or aggressive and the only expla-
nation they received was that the guard's tone of voice was
not belligerent or nice, that he had not been friendly. Kline
testified that he asked Mugge why he refused to remove the
sign. Mugge replied that it was for the protection of the
truck. Someone asked why he did not remove the sign and
then display it again after passing the guard station if that
was his main concern. Larson then said, "you know, Mark,
that you have had encounters with guards before." Mugge
shrugged as if in agreement.
After Mugge left, Clements returned. According to Clem-
ents, Larson talked about loyalty to Respondent, that it was
not a proper demonstration of loyalty to display the sign.
Larson said it was a point in Clements' favor that he had
not argued with the guard. He then explained to Clements
that Mugge had been discharged, that this was not the first
time that Mugge had a confrontation with a guard." and
that the language used by Mugge would not be tolerated.
He further said they did not want to see Mugge go because
he was a good employee, that they liked people who spoke
outs Clements testified that he was told that he would re-
ceive a verbal warning for refusing to remove the boycott
sign and that it was made very clear to him that such signs
would not be tolerated.
On April 14, a record of verbal warning was placed in
Clements' file. It was noted therein that this did not consti-
tute a written reprimand but that the warning was firm and
any repetition would probably result in a written reprimand
and/or disciplinary action. As to reason, the record of ver-
bal warning merely states that it was issued "in conse-
quence of involvement in disturbance at Northeast Service
Road Gate."
Mugge's Termination Report Form, signed by Kline and
initialed by Heller, Martin and Bales, evaluates him as
above average in job interest and safety, below average in
attitude and attendance and average in all other respects. In
the section completed by Personnel, the reason is listed as
"Discharge-Insubordination." The section completed by
supervisor states, inter alia:
Reason: See Attached Endorsement. Insubordination
Gross Misconduct.["9] Employee's strong points: Mark
was always lookingfor better methods of operation.
' This incident involved Mugge's refusal to permit a guard to search his
vehicle without a search warrant which, according to Bales, precipitated a
somewhat emotional argument. The situation was resolved when a supervi-
sor intervened. There was no use of profanity during the interchange. It was
concluded that Respondent's position was weak since employees had not
been informed that their vehicles were subject to search and an apology was
issued to Mugge.
1s Clements testified that this portion of the conversation is not clear in his
mind.
19 "Insubordination Gross Misconduct" was added in the personnel office.
Employee's weak points: Mark was anti-establish-
ment and caused unrest among his co-workers.
Comments: Mark was terminated because of reasons
stated on attached endorsement.
The attached endorsement referred to therein is a memo,
dated April 13, from Heller to Martin regarding the meet-
ing resulting in Mugge's termination. The account is consis-
tent with the testimony herein. Additionally, it states that
Mugge stated that this was the first time the sticker had
been displayed and also that on entering the premises prior
to their shift that day, he and Clements had stopped to talk
to the picketers for several minutes. Heller characterized
these statements as directly contradictory to Mugge's pro-
fessed concern regarding the possibility of the picketers
damaging the vehicles.
Kline testified that in using the term "anti-establishment"
he was referring to Mugge's negative attitude toward those
in authority. In support thereof he related an incident that
occurred after he became a supervisor. According to him,
he and Mugge had a good working relationship, but
Mugge's attitude changed as soon as Kline became a super-
visor. During his first "contact" meeting with Mugge in his
office, Kline said "I see we have got a problem here. I'm
new at this and I haven't been a supervisor for very long,
and if I'm doing something wrong that is antagonizing you,
I would appreciate you letting me know." Mugge said, "no,
that's not it; you're management." Kline responded, "Hey,
wait a minute, I'm the same guy I was befbre. I'm only
about a month and a half older than I was before." Mugge
said, "you're wearing that god-damned white shirt and that
means you're management. That's all there is to it."20 Ac-
cording to Kline, he interpreted this as being anti-establish-
ment.
As to the comment, "caused unrest among his co-work-
ers," Kline testified that he was referring to several inci-
dents where Mugge objected to or refused to perform tasks
which he considered not properly the job of an operator.
Several times one of the machines stopped when the setup
man was on break. When the leadman told him to get the
machine back in operation, Mugge's reply was, it's not my
responsibility, I'm only an operator, I don't have to do it.
Kline had to specifically instruct him that this was the re-
sponsibility of an operator. Two leadmen reported to Kline
that Mugge's refusals caused other operators to question
why Mugge was permitted to not do things that they were
required to do. Another incident mentioned by Kline was
when Mugge was told to pick up lids from the floor-a job
which everyone performs because it is a hazard, Mugge
replied, "I don't have time. I can't do it and I don't want to
do it.""
Heller testified that he agreed with Kline's notation as to
Mugge's weak points. According to him, he interpreted this
remark to mean that Mugge always looked at the negative
20 Mugge did not deny this conversation.
21 These incidents occurred around October 1975. At around this same
time, Kline recommended a final warning to Mugge for job performance,
precipitated by his causing the scrapping of a number of tubes totaling about
120 pounds of scrap for I hour of operation without Mugge doing his quality
checks. Mugge requested and Kline agreed, in accordance with Respon-
dent's practice, to remove the warning if there was no repetition within a
year
1316
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
side of any type of change, that the Division has been in-
volved in a lot of changes and innovation of practices and
that Mugge always seized on the minuses, and was never
constructive in viewing changes. According to Hellei. this
caused problems. Mugge was always a factor to be over-
come because he always promoted the negative side. He
considered everything management did was wrong and he
always tried to point out to everyone the negative side of
things. Mugge had 6-1/2 years' seniority and was admit-
tedly a satisfactory operator.
On April 13 or 14, a memo from Heller was distributed to
end division supervisors, the body of which states:
Mark [Mugge] was terminated at 11:00 p.m. tonight.
Doubtlessly this will be widely spoken about. You will
need to know these details in order to keep the grape-
vine from distorting these events. Where possible, I'd
even recommend feeding this information to your
crews either formally or informally.
Wednesday morning at 6:30 Mark and Andy Clem-
ents were leaving the plant via the N. Valley Service
Road eastbound in Andy's truck. There was a "Boy-
cott Coors" sign in the window. A. Coors Security
stopped them and told them the sign was not permitted
on Company property. Mark became abusive and in-
subordinate to the Security personnel. He has been ter-
minated for this.
Andy was silent and did not abuse the Security per-
sonnel. It was his truck and the sign was never re-
moved. Thus a verbal warning was issued and it has
been made clear to Andy that we will not tolerate such
signs on employees or vehicles belonging to employees
while they are on Company property.
Thereafter, the following two memos, dated April 14 and
signed by Larson, were placed on all bulletin boards:
TO: Al.I EMPLOYEES
FROM: ART LARSON
A very unfortunate incident occurred on Wednesday
morning as two Coors Container Company employees
were leaving at the end of Graveyard shift. Because the
vehicle in which they were riding prominently dis-
played a Boycott Coors sign in the windshield, the ve-
hicle was stopped by Brewery security personnel and
the individuals were asked to remove the sign while
they were on Company premises. One of the persons in
the vehicle used veryt abusive language toward the se-
curity officer and continued to use abusive language
when other security personnel appeared at the scene.
Like everyone else here, our security officers have a
specific assignment and a job to do. We do not expect
that any employee of Coors Industries need be sub-
jected to foul, obscene, obnoxious or abusive language.
After a very thorough and extensive investigation, the
employee mentioned above was terminated for gross
misconduct. This memo is intended to dispel any ru-
mors concerning the above incident. Please understand
that we cannot and will not tolerate such language un-
der any circumstances. We sincerely believe there will
not be any further incidents like this.
TO: ALL EMPLOYEES
FROM: ART LARSON
SUBJECT: BOYCOTT STICKERS
Unfortunately, it has been reported that some Coors
Container Company employees have Boycott Coors
stickers affixed to their automobiles. We cannot, under
any circumstances, rationalize this activity for any em-
ployee and we want to take this opportunity to point
out that no automobile bearing any sort of boycott
stickers or posters will be allowed on Company prem-
ises. Any cars bearing such stickers will be denied ac-
cess at the gate. Additionally, we cannot and will not
tolerate the display of these signs anywhere on Com-
pany premises.
B. Credibility Resolutions
Most of the facts herein are undisputed. A major excep-
tion involves Mugge's use of the term mother-fucker. Estala
and McClure testified that the term was directed toward
them. Mugge testified that he did use vulgar or profane
language. that he does not recall what terms he used but
that they were not spoken directly to the guards, rather they
were used in discussing the incident with Clements. I do not
credit Mugge that the remarks were not directed to the
guards. During the disciplinary interviews. Clements agreed
with the written report of Estala and McClure that Mugge
had called them mother-fuckers. In any event, even assum-
ing, arguendo, that he did not make the remarks directly to
the guards, Mugge admits that he used expletives which he
cannot recall specifically and that he was speaking in a loud
tone of voice. I perceive little difference between making a
derogatory statement directly to the guards and making
such statements about the guards to Clements in the pres-
ence of the guards.
The other principal areas of dispute concern the conver-
sation between Estala, Clements, and Mugge: specifically,
whether Estala asked them to give him the boycott sign,
whether he asked if they were union sympathizers. whether
he told them that if they were union sympathizers they
should not be working, and whether Mugge and Clements
told him they were displaying the sign to facilitate passage
through the picket line. I have carefully considered the con-
flicting evidence, and based on the mutually corroborative
testimony of Mugge and Clements, certain inherent incon-
sistencies in Estala's testimony, and my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, I credit the testimony of Clem-
ents and Mugge, both as to the content of the conversation,
except as noted above, and as to Estala's hostile attitude.
Clements particularly impressed me as a reliable witness
who was trying to be honest in his answers. Estala, on the
other hand, impressed me as being overly concerned with
projecting an image of himself as remaining cool under at-
tack and that at times he was tailoring his testimony to this
end. I am particularly skeptical of his testimony that al-
though he was heated and angry inside, he never permitted
his feelings to surface. Clements credibly testified that
Mugge and Estala were practically yelling at each other.
Also, Estala testified that he called for help because he felt
insulted by Mugge's remarks. Yet Long creditably testified
1317
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he gave specific instructions that he was to be called if
anyone was detained for displaying a boycott sign. Further,
Estala's testimony, "I asked him again for it" tends to sup-
port Mugge's and Clements' testimony that he asked them
to give him the sign. It was only after counsel for Respon-
dent responded to this testimony by asking "You asked him
again to give it to you?" that Estala denied asking for the
sign.
Also suspect is Estala's testimony that he never noticed
Respondent's identification sticker displayed on the front
windshield and that he inquired if they were Adolph Coors
strikers. It is undisputed that the various companies in the
complex issued their employees distinctive stickers required
to be displayed on the front windshield of their vehicle,
which by color and shape quickly identified the Employer.
Looking for such stickers is clearly a responsibility of
guards whose duty is to permit the passage of nonstriking
employees only.22 Considering that this and other testimony
by Estala tends to buttress the probability that the testi-
mony of Mugge and Clements in this regard is the more
reliable and that it points up certain inconsistencies in Esta-
la's testimony, and for the other reasons noted above, I
discredit Estala where his version of the conversation differs
from that of Clements and Mugge.
With the exceptions noted above, there is no substantial
disagreement in the testimony as to the incident with Mc-
Clure. Also, there is no substantial disagreement in the tes-
timony as to the incident with Long and as to the disciplin-
ary interviews. Some witnesses were more detailed in their
account of certain aspects of the conversations, and I find
that a composite of the testimony in these respects more
accurately reflects what occurred.
C. Conclusions
Respondent argues that the displaying of the boycott sign
is not protected concerted activity because (I) the sign
"promote[s] a boycott of the only product sold by the em-
ployer's related companies, Coors beer, on Company prem-
ises" and neither Mugge nor Clements was employed by the
Company on stike or was a member of the striking bargain-
ing unit; and (2) the display of the sign was motivated by
fear, citing N.L.R.B. v. Union Carbide, 440 F.2d 54 (C.A. 4,
1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 826: G. & P. Trucking Com-
pany, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 539 F.2d 705 (C.A. 4, 1976), both
cases involving refusals to cross picket lines.
The cases cited in support of the latter contention are not
determinative. I am bound by Board precedent which has
not been reversed by the Supreme Court or the Board itself.
Insurance Agents International Union, AFL-CIO (The Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America), 119 NLRB 768,
772, 773 (1957). It is well-established Board law that an
employee's motive for honoring a picket line is irrelevant.
Rather, it is the nature of the activity itself which is deter-
minative of its protected status. The Cooper Thermometer
Company, 154 NLRB 502, 504 (1965); Nuodex Division of
Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 176 NLRB 611 (1969); Congoleum
Industries, Inc., 197 NLRB 534 (1972); G. & P. Trucking
Company, Inc., 216 NLRB 620, 624 (1975). For reasons set
22 Estala testified that their pnncipal job was to keep strikers beyond the
picket line.
forth below, I find that the same rationale applies to the
situation herein. Moreover, during the disciplinary inter-
view, Clements said one of the reasons for displaying the
sign was that it boosted the morale of the picketers. Fur-
ther, it was apparent during the disciplinary interview that
Respondent did not believe they were motivated by fear.
Accordingly, I reject Respondent's contention in this re-
gard.
The first contention, however, raises a more troublesome
issue. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees "the right
to self-organization . . . and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... " Yet all such concerted ac-
tivity is not protected. The Board and the courts have
found concerted activity for the objectives set forth in Sec-
tion 7 to be unprotected if they are unlawful, violent, in
breach of contract, or indefensible because they show a dis-
loyalty to the employer deemed unnecessary to carry on the
workers' legitimate concerted activities. N.L.R.B. v. Wash-
ington Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962). It is
this last category which is involved herein. In such cases, an
accommodation must be sought between the "undisputed
right of self-organization assured to employees . . . and the
equally undisputed right of employers to maintain disci-
pline .... Opportunity to organize and proper discipline
are both essential elements in a balanced society." Republic
Aviation Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 797 798
(1945).
Respondent argues that the displaying of the boycott sign
constitutes the type of disloyalty to it which would remove
the activity from the protection of the Act. Specifically Re-
spondent contends that for an employee, currently on its
payroll, to promote, on its premises, a boycott of the only
product sold by the Employer's related companies-Coors
beer is "indefensible," constituting unprotected disloyalty
to the Employer within the meaning of N.L.R.B. v. Local
Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers [Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company], 346
U.S. 464 (1953).
In that case, certain employees were discharged solely
because they sponsored or distributed to the public "hand-
bills making a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the
quality of the Company's product and its business policies,
in a manner reasonably calculated to harm the Company's
reputation and reduce its income." Even though there coex-
isted a labor dispute arising out of current contract negotia-
tions, the handbill made no reference thereto.
The Court's rationale in Jefferson Standard Broadcasting,
supra at 476-477, was as follows:
Their attack related itself to no labor practice of the
Company. It made no reference to wages, hours or
working conditions .... The attack asked for no public
sympathy or support.... [Though remaining on the
employer's active payroll, they engaged in a] continu-
ing attack, initiated while off duty, upon the very inter-
ests which the attackers were being paid to conserve
and develop. Nothing could be further from the pur-
pose of the Act than to require an employer to finance
such activities.... [They] attacked public policies of
the Company which had no discernible relation to [the
labor] controversy. The only connection between the
1318
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
handbill and the labor controversy was an ultimate
and undisclosed purpose or motive . . . that, by the
hoped-for financial pressure, the attack might extract
from the company some future concession.... It was a
concerted separable attack purporting to be made in
the interest of the public rather than in that of the
employees..... Even if the attack were to be treated, as
the Board has not treated it, as a concerted activity
wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned in
§7, the means used . . . in conducting the attack have
deprived the attackers of the protection of that section,
when read in the light and context of the purpose of
the Act.
Respondent, relying on certain decisions by circuit
courts, interprets Jefferson Standard Broadcasting to apply
to all boycotts of an employer's product by employees on its
active payroll. N.L.R.B. v. Knuth Brothers, Inc., 537 F.2d
950 (C.A. 7, 1976); N.L.R.B. v. National Furniture Manu-
facturing Co., 315 F.2d 280 (C.A. 7, 1963): Hoover Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 191 F.2d 380, 389 (C.A. 6, 1951). I do not read
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting so broadly: nor does the
Board. The Patterson-Sargent Conipany, 115 NLRB 1627,
1629 30 (1956): Edir., Inc., d/b/a/ Wolfie's, 159 NLRB 686
(1966); Frontier Guard Patrol. Inc., et al., 161 NLRB 155
(1966); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 168 NLRB 955 (1967): Tex-
aco, Inc., 189 NLRB 343 (1971); Knuth Bros., Inc.. 218
NLRB 869 (1975); Community htospital of Roanoke Valley.
Inc., 220 NLRB 217 (1975); cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Works,
Inc., 186 NLRB 1050, 1054, 1063 64 (1970).
Under the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting rationale, an
essential element is that the attack upon the employer's
product be separable from a coexisting labor dispute or that
it constitute public disparagement of the quality of the em-
ployer's product. Neither element is present here. The sign
was distributed by Adolph Coors Brewery strikers in sup-
port of their current strike. The wording "BOYCOTT
COORS-SCAB BEER" clearly refers to a labor contro-
versy. The word "scab" has a well-known connotation in
our society. It has been defined as "a term used quite
broadly by union men to refer to an individual who contin-
ues to work for a company while a strike is in progress or
who accepts employment during a strike. It is also applied
to individuals who are not on strike or independent non-
union workers who go through a picket line." "Roberts'
Dictionary of Industrial Relations," BNA (1966).
The sign contains no language in disparagement of Coors
Beer.2 A display of the sign constitutes an enlistment of
support for the cause of the Brewery strikers." It is immate-
rial that the strikers are employees of Adolph Coors Brew-
ery. The companies are affiliated, their products are interre-
lated, they occupy the same premises and share certain of
23 Respondent's parent company produces the beer. Respondent makes the
cans in which the beer is packaged. I agree with Respondent that in the
circumstances an attack on Cooxrs Beer would be essentially an attack on
Respondent's product.
14 As noted above, I consider an employee's motivation in engaging in
protected concerted activity to be irrelevant. But even assuming, arguendo,
that such a consideration might have some relevance in some circumstances,
I think that in the circumstances herein it is immaterial. Regardless of the
reason, the displaying of the sign directly enlisted support for the strikers
and, as such, was making common cause with them.
the same services. Respondent admits, and I agree, that an
attack on one is an attack on the other.
This situation is analogous to non-bargaining-unit em-
ployees of the same employer making common cause with
the employees engaged in a labor controversy. Respon-
dent's employees have a substantial ana legitimate interest
in the strike against the Brewery because of the possible
reciprocal effect improved conditions there might have on
their own future conditions of employment. The same
would he true even if the Brewery and Respondent were
unrelated, for employees can reasonably expect that im-
provement in working conditions in the area or in the gen-
eral industry might inure to their future benefit. It is well
established that such support is for mutual aid and protec-
tion whether it involves another unit of the same employer
or a unit of a different employer. Signal Oil and Gas Conm-
pany, 160 NLRB 644 (1966).
Accordingly, I find that the display of the boycott signs
was protected concerted activity under the Act. However,
an employer may, in some circumstances, proscribe such
activity where it is necessary to maintain production and
discipline. Republic Aviation Co. v. N.L.R.B.. supra,. Flori-
dan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 137 NLRB 1484 (1962).
Here there is no showing of such special circumstances.
Certainly none existed in the circumstances surrounding the
display of the sign by Mugge and Clements. The sign was
displayed inside Clements' truck. They were some distance
away from any work location. There had been no incidents
among Respondent's employees arising out of the strike,
and, in any event, the wording of the sign was not unduly
provocative. The Board has long recognized that the term
"scab" is not so opprobrious as to justify barring its use in
the workplace. Caterpillar Tractor Company, a Corporation,
113 NLRB 553 (1955), enforcement denied 230 F.2d 357
(C.A. 7, 1965).
As to the general prohibition against the display of boy-
cott signs, no special circumstances were shown to exist
anywhere on Respondent's premises which would justify, in
the interest of the maintenance of production and disci-
pline, restricting the employees' right to engage is such ac-
tivity. In fact the testimony of Long makes apparent that
Respondent's main concern was that the signs would boost
the morale of the strikers. I therefore find that the rule pro-
mulgated by Respondent prohibiting the display by em-
ployees of boycott signs was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Similarly, Respondent violated the Act by the ac-
tion of Estala and McClure in asking Mugge and Clements
to remove the sign. In doing so, Estala and McClure were
following Respondent's specific instructions.
Respondent contends that Clements was given a verbal
warning and Mugge was discharged because they' engaged
in misconduct during the confrontation with the guards. As
to Clements, the misconduct alleged was the refusal to obey
a "reasonable request" of the guard to remove the boycott
sign. As to Mugge, the misconduct alleged was the "foul"
language he used in his conversation with the guards.
Respondent argues that guards are special employees
with respect to the authority they have over other employ-
ees, that when they act in their guard capacity, they are
acting on behalf of Respondent as representatives of man-
agement. Respondent further argues that in stopping Clem-
ents' truck and asking that the boycott sign be removed, the
1319
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
guards were acting fully within the scope of express author-
ity given them by Respondent and, as such, the guards were
"agents of Respondent management representatives." I
agree with Respondent that in stopping Clements' truck
and seeking the removal of the boycott sign Estala and Mc-
Clure were acting within the scope of express authority
given them by Respondent. As such, they were agents of
Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
Respondent argues that orders from the guards should be
obeyed unless doing so would be a safety hazard. Respon-
dent seems to be trying to make some distinction between
disciplining Clements because he refused to remove the sign
and disciplining him because he refused to obey a "reason-
able order" of "authority figures" to remove the boycott
sign." I find this a distinction without substance. As noted
above, the displaying of the boycott sign was protected con-
certed activity, and Clements and Mugge were acting
within the protection of the guarantees under Section 7 of
the Act when they refused to remove the sign. Floridan
Hotel, supra, Newport Division of Winrex Knitting Mills,
Inc., 216 NLRB 1058 (1975).
Accordingly, I find that by issuing a verbal warning to
Clements for refusing to remove the boycott sign, Respon-
dent has violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. I fur-
ther find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)( ) of the
Act when Estala asked Mugge and Clements if they were
union sympathizers and told them that if they were they
should not be coming to work, and during the disciplinary
interview when they were interrogated as to why they dis-
played the sign.",
The sole remaining issue is Mugge's discharge. Respon-
dent contends that Mugge was discharged solely because he
called Estala and McClure "mother-fuckers." As set forth
above, I find that Mugge did address them as such. How-
ever, it is well settled that not every impropriety committed
in the course of Section 7 activity deprives the offending
employee of the protective mantle of the Act. A line must
be drawn between situations where employees exceed the
bounds of lawful conduct in a "moment of animal exuber-
ance"2" or in a manner not activated by improper motives,
and those flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so vio-
lent or of such serious character as to render the employee
unfit for further service. The employee's right to engage in
concerted activity permits some leeway for impulsive be-
havior, which must be balanced against the employer's
right to maintain order and respect. Where the conduct oc-
curs in the course of protected activity, the protection is not
lost unless the impropriety is egregious. N.L.R.B. v. Thor
Power Tool Company, 351 F.2d 584, 587 (C.A. 7, 1965):
Webster Clothes, Inc., d/bla Webster Men's Wear, a Subsid-
iary of Beck Industries, Inc., 222 NLRB 1262 (1976); Hous-
ton Shell & Concrete Co., A Division of McDonough Co., 193
NLRB 1123 (1971); Red Top, Inc., 185 NLRB 989 (1970).
I do not consider Mugge's conduct egregious. Although
vulgar and not to be condoned, the use of vulgarities and
2I I note no effort was made to communicate this "distinction" to Clements
when he received the verbal warning.
26 Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, this was fully liti-
gated at the hearing.
27 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, etc. v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
obscenities is a reality of industrial life. [he guards admit
the term is not alien to them, and McClure testified it did
not particularly disturb him. It is undisputed that it is em-
ployed in Respondent's plant, generally with impunity, and
although the record establishes that some employees have
been discharged for reasons which include the use of ob-
scenities, there is no evidence that any employee has been
discharged solely for using obscenities. 2i Rather, there is
evidence that such conduct has resulted in lesser disciplin-
ary action.
Even assuming, arguendo, that it was Respondent's prac-
tice to discharge employees for such conduct arising outside
the context of protected concerted activity, here the lan-
guage was employed in direct response to Estala's insistence
that Clements and Mugge cease engaging in the protected
activity of displaying a boycott sign. They were stopped
and detained while they were off duty. Estala's attitude was
hostile and he made coercive remarks as to their support of
the strike. In these circumstances, I consider Estala's ac-
tions to be provocative, resulting in an emotional confron-
tation, and I find that Mugge's use of such vulgarity in the
context herein was not of such a serious nature as to de-
prive him of the protection of the Act. Associated Grocers of
New England, Inc., 227 NLRB 1200 (1977); Webster's
Clothes, Inc., supra, Finesilver Manufacturing Com2pany, 220
NLRB 648 (1975): The May Department Stores Company,
d/bla The May Company, 220 NLRB 1096 (1975): The
Contract Knitter, Inc., 220 NLRB 558 (1975); Red Top, Inc.,
supra.
I further find that Mugge was discharged, at least in part,
because he displayed and refused to remove the boycott
sign. " Accordingly, I find that Mugge was discharged in
violation of Section 8(a)( 1) and (3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Brewery, Bottling, Can and Allied Industrial Union,
Local 366, AFL-CIO and Aluminum Workers Interna-
tional Union, AFL CIO, are both labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees as to their sympathies
with regard to the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph
Coors Brewery and their reasons for displaying boycott
signs; and by telling employees that if' they sympathized
with the strike, they should not be coming to work, Respon-
dent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
4. By promulgating and enforcing a rule prohibiting em-
ployees from displaying "Boycott Coors" signs in support
of the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph Coors Brewery,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By discharging Mark Mugge and reprimanding An-
drew Clements for displaying and refusing to remove a
"s The documentary evidence introduced by Respondent shows that the
discharges involve conduct additional to the use of profanity or vulgarity
291 find the evidence insufficient to establish that a motivation for Mugge's
discharge was his prior activity on behalf of the Aluminum Workers.
1320
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
"Boycott Coors" sign, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( 1) and
(3) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Titl Rl inEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.
Having found that Respondent discharged Mark Mugge
in violation of Section 8(a)( ) and (3) of the Act, it is recom-
mended that Respondent offer Mugge immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make
him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a
result of the discrimination against him by payment to him
of a sum of money equal to that which would have been
earned as wages during the period from the date of his
discharge to the date on which Respondent offers reinstate-
ment less his net earnings, if any, during the said period.
with interest thereon to be computed in the manner set
forth in F. .Woolworth (Compall', 90 NLRB 289 (1950).
and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 3
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record. and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent. Coors Container Company. Golden.
Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns. shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging, reprimanding, or otherwise discriminat-
ing against employees becuase they display' "Boycott
Coors" signs in support of the Brewery Local 366 strike at
Adolph Coors Brewery.
(b) Promulgating and enforcing a rule prohibiting em-
ployees from displaying "Boycott Coors" signs in support
of the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph Coors Brewery.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees as to their sympa-
thies with regard to the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph
Coors Brewery or their reasons fbr displaying "Boycott
Coors" signs.
(d) Telling employees that if they sympathize with the
Brewery' Local 366 strike at Adolph Coors Brewery they
should not be coming to work.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
"See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co. 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
)1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 .46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions. and Order, and all objections thereto shall he deemed
waived for all purposes
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Expunge from its records all memoranda of, or refer-
ence to, the verbal warning given Andrew Clements on
April 14. 1977. because he displayed and refused to remove
a "Boycott Coors" sign in support of the Brewery Local 366
strike at Adolph Coors Brewery.
(b) Offer Mark Mugge immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent job and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by
reason of Respondent's discrimination against him in the
manner and to the extent set forth in the section here enti-
tled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records and reports, social security payment records.
timecards, personnel records and reports. and all other rec-
ords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due and
the right of reinstatement under the terms of this recom-
mended Order.
(d) Post at its facility in Golden, Colorado, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said no-
tice. on forms provided bh the Regional Director for Re-
gion 27. after being duly signed by Respondent's represent-
ative. shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27 in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
it has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced b, a Judgment ofa United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National l.abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the Uniled States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPEN DIX
NornEi To EMPI.()YEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR REI ATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties were represented and
afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of
their respective positions, it has been found that we have
violated the National Labor Relations Act in certain re-
spects, and we have been ordered to post this notice and to
carry out its terms.
The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as em-
ployees, certain rights, including the rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help a union
To bargain collectively through a representative
of your own choosing
1321
DECISIONS OF NATIONAI. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL. NOT discharge, reprimand, or otherwise
discriminate against employees because they display
"Boycott Coors" signs in support of the Brewery Local
366 strike at Adolph Coors Brewery.
WE WILL NOT promulgate or enforce a rule prohibit-
ing employees from displaying "Boycott Coors" signs
in support of the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph
Coors Brewery.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees as to
their sympathies with regard to the Brewery Local 366
strike at Adolph Coors Brewery or their reasons for
displaying the above-described "Boycott Coors" signs.
WE WI.l1. NOT tell employees that if they sympathize
with the Brewery Local 366 strike at Adolph Coors
Brewery they should not be coming to work.
WI WILL N)t in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights set forth above, which are guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act.
Wt wil.i expunge from our records all memoranda
of, or reference to, the verbal warning given to Andrew
Clements because he displayed and refused to remove
a "Boycott Coors" sign in support of the Brewery Lo-
cal 366 strike at Adolph Coors Brewery.
WE will. offer Mark Mugge immediate and full re-
instatement to his former job or. if that job is no longer
available, to a substantially equivalent job, without
prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed by him.
WEi wil. make Mark Mugge whole for any loss of
earnings which he may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him.
COORS CONTAINER COMPANY
1322