Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 16, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 1127 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

BRAEBURN ALLOY STEEL DIV. 1127
Braeburn Alloy Steel Division , Continental Copper &
Steel Industries , Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO . Case 6-CA-6009
April 16, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On October 20, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Samuel M. Singer issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed a brief and limited cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
only to the extent consistent with this Decision.
The Administrative Law Judge found, inter alia,
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by bypassing the recognized bargaining
representative, the International Union, and by
dealing instead directly with officers and committee-
men of the International's Local Union. For the
following reasons we disagree with this conclusion
and dismiss the complaint.
The United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
here called International, has been for many years
the recognized bargaining agent for Respondent's
production and maintenance employees at its Brae-
burn plant, which alone is involved in this proceed-
mg.' The employees at the plant are members of the
International's Local 1084 which designates certain
of its members as bargaining committeemen but
which, as is agreed, is not itself a recognized
bargaining agent either individually or jointly with
the International. Typically, in the past, all bargain-
ing on the union side has been done by an
International representative accompanied by Local
committeemen.
In August 1971, -the International served on
Respondent notice to negotiate a new agreement to
succeed the then current one which was to terminate
on November 1, 1971. Rather fruitless negotiation
meetings took place in October. Respondent would
not accept the International's proposals which
included substantially increased economic benefits,
and on November 1 the employees rejected Respon-
dent's counteroffer, more modest in its improve-
ments, and then struck. About 10 days later,
Respondent notified Ivanusic, the International
representative, that it had decided for economic
reasons to shut down its Braeburn plant. Shortly
thereafter it advised the International that it could
not continue its operations at Braeburn absent an
agreement making possible a substantial reduction in
costs. December 1971 and January 1972 saw Respon-
dent proceed with its plans for liquidation.
However, in early February 1972,2 employees and
members of the Local bargaining committee sought
to induce Respondent to abandon its plan to close
down Braeburn, and, on February 17, Grotta,
Respondent's director of labor relations, told Ivanu-
sic that he was now authorized to negotiate on
reopening the plant. On February 26 Respondent
met with Ivanusic and the Local bargaining commit-
teemen from all three units and offered a 3-year
contract until March 1, 1974, providing, inter alia, for
substantial reductions in various costs. No agreement
was reached, but union representatives agreed to
present the offer to unit employees for their consider-
ation.
Thereafter, as the record shows, Respondent
attempted at various times to persuade Local officers
and committeemen to effectuate acceptance and
execution of its proposed agreement of the 26th.
Thus, in response to the request of two Local
committeemen and without consulting the Interna-
tional, Respondent modified the "extra" vacation
provision of its February 26 offer. Further, it sought
from Local representatives statements acknowledg-
ing the Local membership's ratification of its offer of
February 26; and on March 9 it met with the
production and maintenance committee, in the
absence of Ivanusic, in an unsuccessful attempt to
have the committee sign the contract. Then, again in
Ivanusic's absence, it met with the Local's officers
and committeemen on March 14 and finally did
secure their signatures on the agreements for all
units. At all times material herein, the International
has refused to sign these agreements.
In finding, essentially on these facts, that Respon-
dent, by dealing directly with the Local and its
committeemen and by executing collective agree-
ments with them covering the units represented by
the International, bypassed the latter in derogation
I Actually the International is also the certified bargaining agent for small units have thus normally followed the lead of the production and
units of Respondent's Braeburn clerical and technical employees The maintenance group, our discussion for purposes of simplicity and clarity
practice in the past has been for the International and Respondent to agree deals , unless otherwise indicated , directly with that large group.
first on a production and maintenance contract and then for the technical 2 All dates hereinafter occurred in 1972 unless otherwise indicated.
and clerical units to agree to such contract with minor variations As the two
202 NLRB No. 171
1128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of its exclusive bargaining rights under Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, the Administrative Law
Judge rejected Respondent's contention that the
International was "estopped from denying the
existence of a valid agreement" by virtue of certain
statements made by its principal representative,
Ivanusic, during the period of time that Respondent
was dealing with the Local representatives. We
disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's con-
clusion that the International's conduct here, in the
person of Ivanusic, does not throw a different light
on what, absent that conduct, might well have been
unlawful conduct by Respondent.
Without question Ivanusic acquiesced in the direct
contacts between Respondent and Local representa-
tives. Thus, he knew that such direct contacts were
being made, but at no time did he seek to interpose
the International's exclusive representative status
and stop- either Respondent or Local representatives
from communicating directly with one another. On
the contrary, the record abundantly shows that
Ivanusic by his conduct directly encouraged Respon-
dent and Local committeemen to deal directly with
one another with respect to the February 26 offer.
Immediately after the February 26 meeting, Ivanusic
told representatives of Respondent that he had no
doubt that the employees would go for Respondent's
offer which, however, he added, the International
would not approve. Nevertheless, he voiced the
opinion to Respondent that, as had occurred on
occasions in the past with locally approved contracts,
the International might dust put it "in a drawer"-a
statement surely implying possible International
acquiescence in, if not formal approval of, a locally
reached agreement . On March 9, when Grotta,
Respondent's chief negotiator, telephoned him about
a company meeting in progress with the Local
committee concerning signing of a contract based on
the company offer, Ivanusic made no objection to
such a meeting being held. Rather he simply stated
that if he were a Local representative he would sign
the contract but that the International would not.
And several days later after meeting with the Local
committee, Ivanusic reported to Respondent he was
sure the Local committee would sign the contract,
repeated he would if he were a Local representative,
and then added his by now customary disclaimer
that the International would not approve, again
suggesting that the International might do no more
than put the contract "in a drawer." He also stated
that he would have breakfast with the Local
committee later in the morning of that day, March
14, at which time the committee would make its final
decision on signing the contract-a statement this
time surely recognizing the substantial area of
authority vested in the committee. Also, the record is
devoid of evidence to show that Ivanusic took any
steps to prevent Respondent' s meeting with Local
representatives that morning for the purpose of
securing their signatures on its proposed agreement,
which was in fact signed at that time and shortly
thereafter placed in effect, while the record affirma-
tively shows that Ivanusic facilitated Respondent's
course of conduct by encouraging Local representa-
tives to proceed on their own-and absent Interna-
tional approval-with consideration of the Compa-
ny's February 26 offer. This is shown by Ivanusic's
failure to attend the Local meeting of which he had
notice and at which the Local membership voted on
the company offer, and by his several comments to
Local officers and committeemen that he would sign
the proposed contract if he were a Local representa-
tive.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the
International Union through its agent Ivanusic
acquiesced in and encouraged Respondent's direct
dealings with the Local representatives concerning its
February 26 contract proposals and that it also
facilitated such direct dealings by encouraging Local
representatives to work directly with Respondent
concerning its proposals. Consequently, Respon-
dent's conduct complained of here did not constitute
unlawful bypassing in negotiations of the established
recognized bargaining representative but was, on the
contrary, conduct acquiesced in, and encouraged by,
that bargaining representative. Therefore, we find
contrary to the Administrative Law Judge that such
conduct did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act. As we have found that Respondent's conduct
leading up to the execution of the contract on March
14, 1972, was not unlawful, we further find, contrary
to the Administrative Law Judge, that Respondent's
placing in effect new terms and conditions of
employment specified in that agreement was not
unlawful under Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Accordingly, we shall dismiss the entire complaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
DECISION
SAMUEL M. SINGER , Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was tried before me in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
on July 26-27, pursuant to a charge filed on April 10 and
complaint issued on May 15, 1972. In general, the
complaint alleges that Respondent , in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the National Labor Relations Act, has
failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Charging
Party (International) as the exclusive bargaining represent-
BRAEBURN ALLOY STEEL DIV. 1129
ative of its employees by bypassing International and
executing a collective agreement with one of its locals; and
by unilaterally, without prior notice and consultation with
International, instituting certain work rules. At the hearing,
the complaint was amended to allege that a strike called by
International in July 1972 was an unfair labor practice
strike.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to be heard, to examine, and to cross-examine witnesses.
Subsequent to the trial on September 5, 1972, briefs were
filed by the parties. Upon the entire record' and my
observation of testimonial demeanor of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent , a Delaware corporation, with its principal
place of business in Hillside , New Jersey, is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of specialty steel . Solely involved
here is its facility at Braeburn , Pennsylvania . Respondent
annually sells to purchasers in other States , and purchases
and receives from sellers in other States , goods and
materials valued in excess of $50 ,000. I find that at all
material times Respondent has been and is an employer
engaged in commerce and operations affecting commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
The Charging Party (International) is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Past contractual relations
Respondent and International have had a long history of
contractual relations dating back to 1940 in regard to the
Company's production and maintenance employees. In
December 1945 and again in January 1963, International
was certified as exclusive representative of Respondent's
office clericals and technical employees, respectively. Prior
collective agreements, including the last 3-year contract,
expiring on November 1, 1971, expressly stipulated that the
agreements were between Respondent and "the United
Steelworkers of America, or its successor."2 Historically,
company officers would meet with an International staff
representative and production and maintenance employees
(committeemen of Local 1084) and negotiate a contract to
be approved and signed by Respondent's officials and top
International officers (including President Abel, other
officers, and District 19 Director Hart) as well as by the
staff representative and committeemen. After the pro-
duction and maintenance collective agreement was settled,
I Transcript corrected by my order on notice, dated September 5, 1972
Respondent's motion, dated September 6, 1972, for additional corrections is
hereby granted General Counsel's objection to two corrections proposed by
Respondent is overruled
2 This practice was in accord with International's constitutional
provision that International "shall be the contracting party in all collective
agreements" and all agreements "shall be signed by the International
officers." Under its constitution, no subordinate body, including officers or
the "economics" agreed to would be applied to the other
two units (plant clericals and technical employees), with
the International staff representative for the other two
units and his committeemen confining their negotiations to
noneconomic items. Although separate agreements are
signed for all these units, all have common effective and
termination dates.
2. The abortive October negotiations for a new
agreement ; the November 1 strike call
On August 25,3 International served on Respondent
notice that its contracts would terminate on November 1
and requested a meeting to negotiate new agreements. On
August 31, Respondent answered it would be "very happy"
to negotiate subject to the limitation of the Presidential
Executive Order relating to "freezing wages and puce
increases." The parties thereafter met three times in
October. The Company was represented by Grotta (its
chief spokesman and also an attorney and director of
industrial relations for the parent company-Continental
Copper and Steel Industries), by Wolfson (group vice
president and an officer of Continental as well as general
manager of the Braeburn Division), and by Stanton
(director of industrial relations for Braeburn). The Union
was represented by its chief spokesman Ivanusic (Interna-
tional staff representative) and by approximately eight
production and maintenance employees and occasionally
(in post-October meetings) by Malec (International staff
representative for the office clerical and technical units)
and employees serviced by Malec. In the October meet-
ings, Grotta took the position that because of the
Company's condition Respondent could not even "consid-
er the steel package or. . .pattern" (i.e., the economic
terms already settled by "Big Steel" and International), but
that it was willing "to do something because of the cost of
living." When Ivanusic turned down Respondent's eco-
nomic offers, Grotta asserted that the Union was "unrealis-
tic" and that the plant could close down and the men
"would lose their jobs," pointing to another company
division which was forced to liquidate because the union at
that installation (not connected with International) was
unreasonable. Ivanusic commented that the Company's
offers "would be disposed of by the membership." At the
October 29 meeting, Grotta made his final offer of a 3-year
contract with a 3-percent "economic package" (wages and
fringe benefits) increase for the first year, the same
percentage increase for the second year, and a 3 1/2-
percent increase the third year; or, in the alternative, a 1-
year contract with a 3-percent increase.4 After caucusing
on the offer, Ivanusic and his committee submitted the
proposal to the membership, which rejected it and voted to
strike upon termination of the current agreement (Novem-
ber 1).
agents of locals, is empowered to act for or bind International except "upon
express authority" given by the constitution or written approval of the
International president or executive board
3 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates cover the August 1971-July 1972
period.
4 According to Grotta, the percentage increase International obtained
under the "basic steel contract" had averaged about 5 1 /2 percent.
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. The November 10-February 17 discussions
concerning liquidation and phaseout of company
operations
On November 10, Industrial Relations Director Grotta
notified International Representative Ivanusic of the
Company's "final decision" to close down the Braeburn
Division, offering to meet with him to discuss orderly
liquidation .5 Thereafter, until February 17, the parties
discussed the "phaseout" operations and the employees'
right to terminal benefits such as severance pay and
pensions. In a meeting held on November 17, attended by
Ivanusic, Malec, and their committees, the Union pro-
posed a 1-year extension of the last collective agreement,
but the Company answered that "this came pretty late in
the game," after the employees already resorted to a strike;
however, it was indicated that the proposal would be
considered further. On November 17, Grotta wrote the
Union to "confirm" the parties' understanding regarding
the closing and liquidation of the plant, including the
withdrawal of the pickets from around the premises, and
the return of employees beginning with November 29 to
complete the work in progress and phase out all operations.
At a meeting held on November 23, Ivanusic handed the
Company a letter offering to have the employees "return to
work immediately upon the same terms and conditions as
were in effect up to October 31, 1972." During the
discussion on liquidation, Ivanusic asked the Company
"what would it take to keep the plant open." Respondent's
representatives stated that "we needed a 20 percent
reduction in costs" through a reduction (5 percent) in past
wages, elimination of all "extra vacations" received under
the expired contract, and an increase in productivity.6
Ivanusic rejected the offer, counterproposing a 2-year
extension of the prior agreement with a waiver of one of
the "extra" weeks of vacation stipulated in the old
contract.?
There followed an exchange of correspondence covering
the phaseout operations. Among other things, Respondent
agreed to reopen the plant and recall some of the
employees on December 27 in order to complete the work
in progress and to "liquidate" inventory machinery and
other materials.8
Around February 8, Wolfson (general manager of
Braeburn and group vice president of the parent, Conti-
nental) received a petition from employees (union and
nonunion) appealing to the Company to reconsider its
decision to terminate operations at Braeburn. A day or two
later, Yeager and Moret, two of the eight production-
maintenance committeemen (who did not sign the peti-
tion), arranged to see Wolfson to discuss what steps could
be taken to keep the plant open. Both had heard "rumors
going around that . . . Mr. Wolfson couldn't understand
why some of the committee wasn't going to see him" about
5 Grotta stated that he was sending a copy of the November 10 letter to
Malec, the International representative who handled "the other two
units . . .namely, the office and clerical employees and the technical
employees."
6 The expired contract provided for "regular" vacations, based on length
of service, and "extra" vacations (2 weeks for 50 percent of the work force
with highest seniority and I week for the rest)
7 Concurrently with its November 23 offer to return to work, the Union
ceased picketing and abandoned the strike
this matter. When they told Wolfson that some of the men
thought "there may be a chance to save the mill," the latter
answered that he also "hated to see the plant go down."
Wolfson said that he was going to the Company's
headquarters in New York on February 17, and asked if
the committee could "recommend anything that [he] could
take back to show the board of directors and [Company
President] Fielder" to persuade them to keep the plant
open. Yeager said they "couldn't give him anything like
that until the whole committee drafts something up."9
On February 17, representatives of Respondent and of
International met in New York. Grotta informed the
Union of the employee petition and of telegrams received
from mayors of two communities requesting the Company
to reconsider its decision to close the plant. To Grotta's
statement that he had been authorized to negotiate further
if the Union would come up "with any suggestions with
respect to opening up the plant," Ivanusic responded that
the matter would be taken up at a union meeting.
4. The February 26 meeting concerning the
possible reopening of the plant
The parties met on February 26 to discuss the terms of
reopening the plant. The Union was represented, by an
"enlarged committee" consisting of its two International
staff representatives (Ivanusic and Malec) and members of
the negotiating committees for all three units-all members
of Local 1084. Ivanusic started the meeting by asking
"what is it going to take to open up." After referring to its
losses because of the shutdown, Respondent's chief
spokesman Grotta stated that the Company "would be
willing to open up" if the Union agreed to extend the
expired collective agreement until March 1, 1974, and to
eliminate "all extra vacations, both to senior and junior
people-two weeks in the case of senior and one week in
the case of the juniors." Grotta indicated further that the
Company would have to be empowered to eliminate or
combine jobs in all three units, subject to review by a Joint
Labor-Management Productivity Committee in each unit;
that operations "shall be continued" and uninterrupted*for
coffeebreaks or wash-up periods, although employees
would be permitted to drink coffee at their stations; that
the Company would be entitled to formulate "reasonable"
work rules, not violative of the collective agreement, to be
"posted" throughout the plant subject to the Union's right
to question their reasonableness through the contractual
grievance machinery; that Respondent be empowered to
establish "new incentives" in the hammer shop in accord-
ance with proper engineering practices "without reference
to any other clause of the Agreements"; and that any past
practices contrary to these terms "shall have no force and
effect" and "shall be disregarded by the Joint Labor-
s The findings herein before made concerning the past contractual
relations between the parties and the negotiations in October and
November are based on substantially undisputed evidence and the
composite credited testimony of company and union officials (including
Grotta and Ivanusic)
9 The findings in the foregoing paragraph are based on the credited
mutually corroborative testimony of Yeager and Moret and in part on that
of Wolfson. The latter stressed that he had agreed to see the committeemen
pursuant to his "open door" policy
BRAEBURN ALLOY STEEL DIV.
Management Productivity Committees or in any arbitra-
tion procedures." 10 At the end of the meeting the Union
agreed to present the Company's proposals to the member-
ship.
As the Company's representatives were leaving, Interna-
tional Representative Ivanusic accosted Grotta in the hall
and told him that while "there was no question in his mind
that the rank-and-file [Local] would go" for the Compa-
ny's reopening offer, he thought that Grotta "ought to
know" that Ivanusic's supenor, District Director Hart,
"will probably", oppose and "not sign it" because Interna-
tional had recently been able to secure the basic steel
industry, "package" from other holdouts (i.e., competitors
of Respondent such as Vasco) "at the last minute" under
threat of strike. When Grotta remonstrated that "Braeburn
couldn't compare with these other companies like Vasco"
because Braeburn was "very small" in comparison and was
in "financial difficulty," Ivanusic observed that it could
well be, as had happened before, that International might
just decide to put the contract approved by the local "in a
drawer" and forget about it-citing an instance when this
had happened and the employer in effect operated without
a collective agreement."
5._ Respondent's individual dealings with
employees to secure approval of its February 26
reopening proposals
Two days later (Monday, February 28) employees
Yaeger and Moret at their own request met with General
Manager Wolfson. They told Wolfson' and Industrial
Relations Director Stanton, who was also present, that the
senior employees were very, much concerned about the
Company's February 26 reopening proposal regarding
vacations (i.e., the suggested loss of the two "extra" weeks
vacation to which they were entitled under the expired
contract-supra, fn. 6) and suggested that the Company's
reopening offer would have a better chance of passing at
the scheduled February 29 Local ratification meeting if
Respondent agreed to give the senior men at least one
"extra" week. Wolfson said he would "contact" New York.
The next day (Tuesday, February 29), before the member-
ship meeting, Stanton asked Yaeger and Moret to meet
with him and Wolfson, which they did. Wolfson informed
them that New York "would go along" with their proposed
change on vacation.12 At these two employees' request,
Wolfson agreed to reduce the Company's proposals,
including the new vacation provision, to writing in order to
present them to a membership meeting that afternoon.13
10 According to Company Representative Grotta, the above company
"reopening" proposals (except on vacations) were exactly those contained in
G.C Exh 12, which the Company reduced to writing after the February 26
meeting at the request of the Union
11 The findings in this section are based pnmanly on the composite
testimony of Grotta and Ivanusic The latter admitted telling Grotta that if
the contract was approved by the employees "it would probably be put in a
drawer" and "just [be] forgotten" by International, but Ivanusic also
insisted that he had warned Grotta that International "could not agree to
such an agreement as was proposed" on February 26 Grotta conceded that
Ivanusic had given such warning, that he was told Ivanusic's supenor
(District Director Hart) "would not sign it," that past contracts always bore
Hart's and other International officials' signatures, and that Ivanusic had
said there was "a possibility" that the International would not sign the
agreement even if the employees voted for it
1131
At the meeting held that afternoon, the production and
maintenance employees approved the Company's reopen-
ing proposals by a vote of about 134 to 39. When Yaeger
notified Wolfson of the vote, the latter said that he was
"happy" but asked if Ivanusic had attended the meeting.
Yaeger said he had not. Nevertheless, Company Chief
Negotiator Grotta "proceeded to draw up an agreement, a
formal agreement of [sic] supplement." On March 1, the
employees in the technical unit and those in the office and
clerical unit also voted to accept Respondent's reopening
proposal. Malec, the International's staff representative for
these two units, testified credibly that he was not aware of
these meetings and that he had not recommended approval
of the company proposals to anyone. Ivanusic testified
credibly that although he knew of the maintenance-
production unit meeting, he "refused to be a party to it."
Shortly after the production-maintenance ratification
meeting, Industrial Relations Director Stanton approached
employees Yaeger and Moret and told them that the
Company wanted "a letter, saying that the body had voted
and accepted the Company's proposal." When Yaeger
mentioned that he "didn't know how to draft" one,
Stanton said that the other two units had already signed
such letters and he could come to his office to "draft one
up together." The letter was thereafter prepared in the
office, but, after Yaeger discussed it with other committee-
men, it was decided not to sign it and the letter was
destroyed. Stanton then called the production-mainte-
nance committee to Wolfson's office. Wolfson told the
committee that he had been unable to reach Ivanusic and
asked why the committee had not signed the letter. One of
the committeemen said that even if the committee
approved the Company's proposals, "it wouldn't mean
anything any way, without the International's signature on
it.,, 14
6. The International's refusal to sign Respondent's
proposed agreement; Respondent's continued
attempts to secure the Local's approval of the
agreement; and the Local's ultimate execution
thereof
On March 8, Industrial Relations Director Stanton
telephoned International Representative Ivanusic and told
him that the contracts were ready for signature and that he
wanted to meet with him and the Local's negotiation
committee to sign the documents. Ivanusic said it "would
serve no useful purpose" because he could not sign it.15
Stanton nonetheless met with the committee on March 9
12 According to Stanton , this concession was worth approximately
$40,000 annually
13 The above findings are based pnmanly on the credited testimony of
Yaeger, in substantial part corroborated by Moret and Wolfson.
14 Based on Yaeger's credited, substantially uncontradicted testimony
Stanton admitted asking Yaeger to prepare the letter and that it was typed
by Stanton's secretary
15 Both Ivanusic and Stanton testified regarding this incident . According
to Stanton , in answer to his observation , "Well, what about the committee if
they don't sign these, if you are not coming over " Ivanusic responded, "It is
entirely up to the committee " I do not credit this testimony since Stanton's
own version makes it clear that Ivanusic in this very conversation indicated
that International was still holding out for the steel industry basic
agreement Stanton quoted Ivanusic as stating that a competitor at "the last
Continued)
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and "solicited their signatures ," but (in Stanton 's words)
"they would not sign if the International did not sign."
Stanton immediately reported the incident to Chief
Company Negotiator Grotta, who told Stanton "to keep
the committee in his office " until he telephoned Ivanusic.
According to Grotta , Ivanusic denied instructing the
committee not to sign the agreement and quoted Ivanusic
as saying that "if he was in their position, that he would
sign ." After relaying this information to Stanton and to
Local President Smith (who was in the plant with the
committee), the latter stated that the committee would visit
the International office on the following day to settle the
matter . In his conversation with Smith , Grotta warned that
"this Company is fed up with the way that this thing had
been handled , and we are going to seek legal remedies
against the International , as well as the individuals who
were involved" because of the losses Respondent sustained
by its announced offer to reopen the plant.
Grotta immediately called the International 's office to
speak with International President Abel in order to give
him "our side of the story, before he [Abel] met with the
committee ." He ultimately spoke with one of Abel 's aides
(Assistant General Counsel Lawson ) who told him that he
already had met with the committee , that "the agreement
in its present form" would not be signed by International,
and that if Grotta wished to carry on further negotiations
he should do so with Ivanusic.
On March 13 , Grotta _met with Ivanusic and his
production-maintenance committee , just before a regularly
scheduled Local 1084 meeting . After reviewing his previous
(March 9) conversations with Local President Smith, his
later exchange with the International 's (Assistant General
Counsel) Lawson , and his earlier (February 26) talk with
Ivanusic (supra, sec . A,4). Grotta warned that in view of
the International 's refusal to sign his previously prepared
reopening agreement , Respondent was "going definitely to
proceed" against the International , the Local, "and the
individuals concerned" for damages . According to Grotta,
he told them that this was the time "to make up their
minds" to sign and that he also wanted the Local officers'
signatures . Further, according to Grotta , the committee-
men stated that they were "in favor of the settlement" and
"would like to sign" the Company's proposed agreement,
but hesitated because Ivanusic had warned them they
might be brought up on charges . Grotta assured them that
if they signed the agreement he "would recommend to the
Company that they absolve you from any personal
liability." The committee promised to consider the matter
at the membership meeting that night and to inform Grotta
of its position.
At the Local meeting held that night (March 13),
Ivanusic ' told the membership that the International would
still not sign the Company's proposed reopening agree-
ment. The meeting "got a little rowdy" and Ivanusic
requested the membership to "just let" him talk it over with
the Local 's committee . Ivanusic then met with the
committeemen and reaffirmed the International's decision
moment. agreed to the steel package" after "it looked like" It would face
a strike
16 As previously noted (supra, sec A,1), all past contracts were signed for
the International by Hart and by International officers such as Abel, as well
not to sign, but said that, "with all the pressure" they were
under, their willingness to sign the agreement was
understandable. According to Ivanusic, he said, "If I was
on the local committee, I would, sign it, but as an
International representative, I wouldn't sign it."
Having heard nothing from the Union by 11 o'clock that
night (March 13), Grotta telephoned the union hall, but
obtained • no information until around 2 a.m., when
Ivanusic visited Grotta's motel. According to Grotta,
Ivanusic told him that the "probability" was that the
contract would not be signed by his supervisor, Hart (the
district director) and a member of the International
executive board), explaining that there was "a political
situation" between Hart and International President Abel
regarding the forthcoming union election.16 Further,
according to Grotta, Ivanusic again indicated that "as far
as he was concerned, this thing will be put in a drawer";
that Ivanusic had told the committeemen that if he were in
their position, he would sign; and that Ivanusic mentioned
he would breakfast with the committee at 9 a.m., at which
time the committee would make a "final decision" on
signing the document. Ivanusic testified credibly that he
told Grotta "there is no doubt in my mind that the
committee is going to sign it, but I can't," again explaining
that Hart "would not approve it."
Later in the morning (March 14), the Local's officers and
its production-maintenance committee met with Respon-
dent and signed the Company's proposed agreement.
Immediately afterward, Industrial Relations Director
Stanton called in the committeemen for the technical unit
and for the office and clerical unit to sign separate
agreements, which they did.17 He gave the committees
copies of the agreements to submit to International; and
signed a separate agreement with the Local under which
the latter undertook "to persuade the International Union
to execute the agreements" signed with all three units. The
document also provided that in the event the International
sought to revoke Local 1084's charter or remove its officers
for signing the agreements, the officers (and the signing
committeemen) "will be released from any liability" by
Respondent. When Stanton called Ivanusic on March 15
or 16 to ascertain if the International would sign the
Agreement, the latter said "no". International has since
continued its refusal to sign the agreements.
7. Application and enforcement of the March 14
agreements; the July 19 strike called by
International
Industrial Relations Director Stanton testified that, after
execution of the March 14 agreements by Respondent and
the Local, the Company "gradually increased [its] forces"
and at the time of the hearing was "in full production." It
was stipulated that the Company has applied and enforced
the' provisions of these agreements. The Productivity
Committee (consisting of company and Local representa-
tives), established for the first time by these agreements,
has met and engaged in discussions leading to elimination
as by the International representative (Ivanusic).
17 As in the case of the production -maintenance unit, the staff
representative for these two units (Malec) was not present.
BRAEBURN ALLOY STEEL DIV.
of various job categories. Grievances of various types
(respecting vacations, insurance, holiday pay, etc.) have
been processed thereunder. Respondent has also posted a
set of rules and regulations subsequent to execution of 'the
agreements.18
On July 19, International commenced to picket Respon-
dent's plant with signs reading, "Unfair Labor Practice, No
Contract with the United Steelworkers of America." The
pickets consisted of International representatives and of
members working for employers other than Respondent.
Although Respondent's employees have not participated in
the picketing, all (except a few, mainly office, employees)
have refused to cross the picket line.19
B. Conclusions
1. Respondent's execution of the March 14
collective agreement with the Local, in derogation
of International's exclusive representative status
The legal principles here applicable are settled. "The
National Labor Relations Act makes it the duty of the
employer to bargain collectively with the chosen represent-
atives of his employees. The obligation being exclusive
...it exacts `the negative duty to treat with no other.' "
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 683-84.
Accordingly, an employer may not bypass and ignore the
exclusive bargaining representative and sign a collective
agreement with any other labor organization, even if such
other labor organization happens to be a subordinate body
or local of a certified International-unless, of course, the
International, by delegation or course of conduct, has
agreed to bind itself by or has ratified acts of its local. See
N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 350, 362; Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v.
N.L.R.B, 270 F.2d 40, 45-46 (C.A. 3); Independent Stave
Company, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 352 F.2d 553, 558-561 (C.A. 8);
General Transformer Company, 173 NLRB 360, 370-76.
Here, International has been the exclusive bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees in all three units
(production-maintenance, office clerical, and technical) for
many years. All prior collective agreements (including the
3-year contract which expired on November '1, 1971)
expressly identified the contracting party as International,
although, as was the practice, committeemen of Local 1084
servicing the Braeburn Division had participated in the
negotiations along with International representatives. And,
in accordance with International's constitutional require-
ments, the agreements had to be and consistently were
signed by International officers (including district director
19 having jurisdiction in the area) in order to be binding
and effective. The 1971-72 negotiations commenced in the
usual pattern in October when Respondent met with
International Representative Ivanusic and Local commit-
teemen to discuss the Company's contract proposals,
which turned out to be considerably below the Internation-
al's "Big Steel" settlement "package." In November and
is These rules and regulations vary only in minor part from those in
effect previously Contrary to General Counsel's contention (br p 11, In 9),
the provisions pertaining to "continuous" operations, coffeebreaks, working
time, and "reporting on and off" are substantially the same (see Resp. Exh
I I and 12)
1133
thereafter, they discussed the Company's decision to close
and "phase out" its operations at Braeburn and the
Union's counterproposals as to what it "would...take to
keep the plant open." Rejecting various union proposals
for extensions of the last agreement, Respondent indicated
that the Union's decision to strike and the steps the
Company itself already took to cease operations required it
to effect a 20-percent reduction in costs-comprising a
reduction in past wages, elimination of "extra vacations,"
and an increase in productivity. Finally, at the February 26
meeting at which International Representatives Ivanusic
(representing the major production-maintenance unit) and
Malec (representing the other two units) were present,
Respondent's chief spokesman, Grotta, offered "to open
up" the plant if the Union agreed to a more-than-2-year
extension of the last (expired) agreement on condition that
all "extra vacations" (2 weeks for the senior and 1 week for
the more junior employees) were eliminated and the
Company were permitted to effect certain savings through
job eliminations and other methods. Although the Union
agreed to present the Company's proposals to the member-
ship and Ivanusic opined that the employees "would go"
for them, Ivanusic also told Grotta that he "ought to
know" that Ivanusic's superior (District Director Hart)
"will probably" oppose them because International recent-
ly had been able to secure from other holdouts (Respon-
dent's competitors) the full basic steel industry "package."
When Grotta remonstrated that Braeburn's size and
financial situation defied comparison, Ivanusic indicated
that International might decide , as sometimes in the past,
to put the contract (if approved by the Local) "in a
drawer" and just "forget" it.
Thereafter Respondent seized the opportunity to insure
the Local's acceptance of its proposals by directly dealing
with employees over the head of International. Within 2
days (February 28), two production-maintenance commit-
teemen (Yaeger and Moret) suggested to General Manager
Wolfson that an improvement in the company proposal
(allowing at least one "extra" vacation week to senior
employees) would make the company offer more palatable
for passage at the upcoming Local February 29 meeting.
Wolfson promised to discuss the matter with the main
office in New York and later informed the committeemen
that Respondent "would go along" with their suggestion
regarding the Company's vacation proposal, even though
the change (according to company estimates) would cost
Respondent $40,000 annually. Later, after each of the three
bargaining units voted to accept the Company's proposals,
Company Negotiator Grotta "proceeded to draw up" the
"formal" reopening agreements. Industrial Relations Di-
rector Stanton solicited from employees Yaeger and Moret
a letter to the effect that the production-maintenance unit
had "accepted the Company's proposal." When Yaeger
indicated he "didn't know how to draft" one, Stanton
helped prepare it in his office. The production-mainte-
nance committee, however, refused to sign the letter and it
was thereupon questioned about it by General Manager
19 As noted at the outset of this Decision , at the hearing General Counsel
amended the complaint to allege that the July 19 work stoppage by the
Company's employees was an unfair labor practice strike, l.e, "caused and
prolonged by the unfair labor practices of the Respondent "
1134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Wolfson . One of the committeemen told him that the
committee 's approval "wouldn ' t mean anything anyway,
without the International 's signature on it."
During its dealings with employees , as well as afterward,
International continued in its refusal to approve and sign
Respondent 's proposed "reopening" agreement . On March
8, Ivanusic told Industrial Relations Director Stanton it
"would serve no useful purpose" to meet with him because
he could not sign it . Stanton nonetheless admittedly
"solicited" the committeemen 's signatures, but (as Stanton
put it) the latter "would not sign if the International did
not sign ." Chief Negotiator Grotta then took the matter up
with Ivanusic , who reiterated his view that his superiors
would not approve the agreement , although (as he told
Grotta) if he were in the committee 's position , he would
sign it . Grotta then warned the committee that he would
take legal action against them as "individuals ," as well as
against International , unless they signed . He reiterated this
warning at a March 13 meeting with the committee and
Ivanusic . When the committeemen indicated they were "in
favor of the settlement ," but feared signing it because they
might be subjected to union charges, Grotta assured them
that as far as the Company was concerned he would see to
it that Respondent would "absolve [them] from any
personal liability" if they affixed their signatures. At a
meeting with the committeemen held shortly afterward,
Ivanusic reaffirmed International 's unwillingness to sign,
although he also told them that "with all the pressure"
brought against them he himself would sign the agreement
if he were on the committee . Ivanusic repeated this to
Grotta before the committee made its "final decision"; he
also told Grotta that he had no doubt that the Local would
sign the agreement , but added "I can't" because his
superior (Regional Director Hart) "would not approve it"
On March 14 , Respondent and the Local signed copies of
the reopening agreement (which the Company had
proposed to International on February 26 and had
modified as to vacations 2 or 3 days later in response to
employee suggestions), separately for each of the three
bargaining units. In another document signed simultane-
ously, the committee undertook "to persuade the Interna-
tional Uhion to execute the agreements" and Respondent,
in turn , agreed to release the signing employees (officers
and committeemen) "from any liability" if the Internation-
al took union action against them . International has
continued in its refusal to sign the agreements.
Based on the foregoing and the entire record , I find and
conclude that by dealing directly with the Local and its
committeemen and by executing collective agreements
with them covering the units represented by International,
Respondent bypassed the latter in clear derogation of its
exclusive bargaining authority , in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
I am not persuaded by Respondent 's contention that
International is "estopped from denying the existence of a
valid agreement" (br. pp . 20, 25) because of certain
statements made by International Representative Ivanusic.
Thus, even if, as Respondent urges (br. p. 21), "[t]hrough-
out negotiations , Ivanusic had stated that any proposal of
Respondent would be decided upon by the rank -and-file,"
Ivanusic's statements amounted to nothing more than that
the Company 's proposals would be subject to membership
ratification-a far cry from an authorization that the
membership , the Local , or its committeemen were free to
negotiate and conclude an agreement opposed by Interna-
tional . See General Transformer Company, 173 NLRB 360,
371. Ivanusic 's statements that , if he were part of the Local
committee , he personally would sign the reopening
agreement clearly implied-what he expressly stressed-
that as an International representative he could not sign it.
Ivanusic 's further remarks, that if the contract were
approved by the employees it "might " or even "probably"
would be placed in a drawer and "forgotten" by Interna-
tional , were in no sense promisory but merely conjectural,
and certainly did not bind or estop International. In any
event , it is clear that Respondent was not misled by them.
To begin with , Ivanusic repeatedly put Respondent on
notice that International-at times naming his own
superior (Regional Director Hart)-opposed the agreement
and would settle for nothing less than the "steel package" it
had recently been able to secure from competitors.
Furthermore , Respondent knew that , as in all prior
collective agreements , Hart 's and other International
officers' signatures were prerequisites to a viable collective
agreement . Indeed , the very agreements it executed with
the Local on March 14 provided spaces 'for such signa-
tures; and , concurrent with the signing of these agree-
ments, Respondent gave the Local 's officers and commit-
teemen copies to submit to International-exacting from
them written commitments to attempt "to persuade the
International Union to execute the agreements"-hardly
consistent with Respondent 's current claim that execution
by International was not required . Finally, on March 15 or
16, Respondent 's industrial relations director, Stanton,
himself , solicited International to sign the agreements.
The foregoing also disposes of Respondent 's unsupport-
ed claim (br. p. 20) that "past dealings have demonstrated"
that International officials ' signatures on collective agree-
ments constituted a mere "formality." Respondent chooses
to ignore the fact that past agreements have always been
between Respondent and International . Under the circum-
stances, I see nothing significant in the claim stressed by
Respondent (br. p. 22), that subsequent to March 14 "the
International never disavowed the existence of the new
contract" and did not request further bargaining . Interna-
tional's opposition to the agreement was repeatedly made,
known before March 14 , and was reiterated on March 15
or 16. In any event, International preserved its rights by
filing the unfair labor practice charges herein on April 10.
I find that the evidence with regard to the negotiations
and Respondent's conduct surrounding execution of the
March 14 agreements with the Local amply support the
conclusion that Respondent was attempting to avoid its
statutory responsibility and that its present claim that
International is "estopped from denying the existence of a
valid contract" is an afterthought contrived to justify its
unlawful action in dealing with and signing the March 14
BRAEBURN ALLOY STEEL DIV. 1135
agreements with the Local in derogation of the exclusive
representative status of International. 20
2. The alleged unilateral changes in working
conditions
As shown supra (sec. A,7), it was stipulated that the
Company has since March 14 applied and enforced the
agreements it, signed with the Local. These agreements
provided, among other things, for a change in vacations; 21
established a Joint Productivity Committee for each of the
three bargaining units; empowered Respondent to elimi-
nate' and combine jobs, subject to review by these
committees; provided for continuous and uninterrupted
operations without coffeebreaks and wash-up periods;
authorized Employer self-formulation and posting of
"reasonable" work rules; and authorized Respondent to
establish "new incentives" in the hammer shop. It was also
provided that past practices contrary to these terms "shall
have no force and effect."
As Respondent points out (br. p. 26), if the agreements
entered into on March 14 were lawful, there would be no
need to consider the alleged unilateral violations. Having
found that they were not, it is necessary to consider
whether Respondent wrought any changes in preexisting
terms and conditions of employment, i.e., those in effect
prior to the November 1, 1971, expiration date of the last
collective agreement.
I have already noted (supra, fn. 18) that, contrary to
General Counsel's claim, the rules announced and posted
since March 14 vary in only minor and insignificant
respects from those previously in effect; and that the
provisions for "continuous" operations, coffeebreaks,
wash-up time, and "reporting on and off" are substantially
the same as before. Accordingly, I find no illegal unilateral
company action with respect to these matters. However, it
appears that the new March 14 agreements did bring about
changes respecting vacations, established for the first time
Joint Productivity Committees, and empowered Respon-
dent,to establish "new incentives" in the hammer shop.22
The record also shows that Respondent has eliminated
certain jobs in accordance with the terms and procedures
provided by the new'agreements.23
I find that the above changes, effected through and by
virtue of the unlawful March 14 collective agreements
executed in derogation of the International's exclusive
20 The cases relied on by Respondent are distinguishable on their facts
Thus as to Ste Genevieve Local 169 (Mississippi Lime Company), 191 NLRB
No 115, and United Cement, Lime Gypsum Workers (Nevada Cement
Company, 173 NLRB 1390-two cases where an International was found to
have violated Sec 8(b)(3) of the Act for refusing to sign an employer-
proposed contract accepted by the locals-Respondent states (br pp.
23-24) that the "Board rejected [therein] the Union's contention that the
Local did not have authority to accept the employer's proposal under the
International Constitution since (1) the International Representative had
assured the employer it would have a contract if the Local membership
approved the employer's proposal, (2) he made no mention of the Local's
lack of authority, (3) the Union's conduct was not contrary to any of the
provisions of the International Union Constitution and any deviations were
sanctioned by the International Union representative " Respondent's
quoted analysis, even if taken at face value, itself shows that the cited cases
are wholly inapplicable to the facts here Moreover, in both cases the Board
stressed that the International representative had apparent authority to bind
the International Here, Ivanusic (the chief union negotiator and spokesman
for the production-maintenance unit) had neither actual nor apparent
bargaining authority, were violative of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act. See N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736.
Respondent's conduct was unlawful, even "without also
finding [the Company] guilty of overall subjective bad
faith." Katz, 396 U.S. at 747. Moreover, the fact that
Respondent had discussed and may even have reached an
impasse on any of these subjects (e.g., vacations) does not
exculpate its conduct. Before an impasse may be raised as
a defense to a charge of refusal to bargain, it must appear
that the employer complied with his statutory obligation to
bargain. See N. L. R. B. v. A ndrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130,
136 (C.A. 9); Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America (Bethelehem Steel Company), v. N.L.R.
B., 320 F.2d 615, 621 (C.A. 3). This it did not do here
where it bypassed the statutory representative in conclud-
ing the unlawful March 14 agreements.
I conclude that Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of
employment.
3. Status of the strike
Although International filed unfair labor practice
charges alleging violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) on
April 10, it did not call a strike against Respondent until
July 19. The pickets-International representatives and
members employed by employers other than Respondent
-carried signs reading "Unfair Labor Practice, No
Contract with the United Steelworkers of America."
I find and conclude that insofar as International is
concerned the strike was caused by Respondent's unfair
labor practices, including its execution of the March 14
collective agreements with the Local, in derogation of
International's exclusive bargaining authority. See Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. N.L.RB., 350 U.S. 270, 278; N.L.R.B. v.
Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 269 (C.A. 2).
It is well settled that in an unfair labor practice strike, the
employer is under a legal duty to reinstate unfair labor
practice strikers upon request, even if to do so requires the
employer to discharge their replacements. Presumably it is
on the basis of this rule that General Counsel urges (br. p.
21) that Respondent's employees who refused to cross the
picket line be granted the "unfair labor practice striker
status and provide[d]. . .all the benefits of such status." In
my view, the peculiar circumstances in this case do not
warrant application of the usual rule. It will be recalled
authority to do so; and he repeatedly warned Respondent that its proposals
would not receive international approval. Malec , the International
representative who spoke for the two other units (office clerical and
technical employees), was not even contacted by Respondent before it
requested the Local to sign the contracts covering those units
2i I e, elimination of "extra" or bonus vacations-senior employees to
receive I instead of 2 weeks as formerly, and junior employees (who
formerly received I week) to receive none
22 While, as Respondent claims (br p 27), the preexisting 1968-71
collective agreement authorized it to establish "new incentives," the
procedures for doing so imposed on it substantial limitations ; under the new
agreement the new incentives could be established "without reference to
any other clause of the Agreements "
23 1 reject Respondent's claim (br p. 26) that under the 1968-71
agreement Respondent "did not have to bargain with the Union"
concerning elimination (and combination ) of lobs The Union did not waive
such right to bargain under sec 2 ("Management " clause) and 10
("Seniority"), the provisions Respondent relies on
1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that after the Local signed the March 14 agreements,
employees in all units returned to work-notwithstanding
Respondent's unfair labor practices. It was not until
International set up its own picket line that the employees
withdrew their services-perhaps out of reluctance to cross
a picket line' for fear of International sanctions. In any
event, it would appear that in a case like this, where
employees had returned to work under the peculiar
circumstances described-based upon their own "ratifica-
tion" of their local committeemen's "agreement"-the
employees should in fairness be regarded as estopped from
claiming advantage by reason of their own acts.
I conclude that although the July 19 strike was an unfair
labor practice strike vis-a-vis International, the strikers
who had previously returned to work despite Respondent's
unfair labor practices do not occupy the status of unfair
labor practice strikers.24
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
3. At all material times, said Union (International) has
been and is the exclusive bargaining representative for
purposes of collective bargaining of Respondent's employ-
ees in the production and maintenance, office clerical, and
technical employee units described in the complaint, by
virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by bypassing said International in derogation of its
exclusive bargaining authority, by dealing directly with a
local thereof not the statutory representative of its
employees, and by executing the March 14 collective
agreements with said Local covering the units represented
by International.
24 The record does not disclose whether all of Respondent's employees
were recalled or returned to work between March 14 and July 19 Moreover,
it may be that some actually refused to return to work because of the unfair
labor practices. The entire matter may be explored later in compliance
5. Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by unilaterally, and in derogation of Internation-
al's exclusive representative status, instituting changes in
terms and conditions of employment by virtue of the
above-mentioned collective agreements.
6. The strike called by International on July 19 was and
is an unfair labor practice strike, but employees who had
returned to work between March 14 and July 19, as a result
of the March 14 collective agreements between Local 1084
and Respondent, do not qualify as unfair labor practice
strikers even though they did not cross International's
picket line on and after July 19.
7. The unfair labor practices enumerated in above
paragraphs 4 and 5 affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
"Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, Respondent should be required to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent will be
required to cease and desist from performing or giving
effect to its March 14 agreements with Local 1084; and to
bargain collectively, upon request, with International as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the
appropriate units and embody in signed agreements any
understandings reached. In his brief (p. 21), General
Counsel states "inasmuch as the unilateral changes
involved the elimination of certain jobs [under and by
virtue of the March 14 agreements], Respondent should
[also] be ordered to reinstate any employees who lost their
jobs by reason of these unlawful changes and to pay them
backpay." I agree and the order will so provide.25
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
proceedings if not adjusted prior thereto
25 Backpay with interest thereon shall be computed in the manner set
forth in F W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716