Conte Cuttino

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 30, 2021

2021004022 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/816,248 08/03/2015 Conte Cuttino 06820-P0001B 6214
136531 7590 11/30/2021
The Roy Gross Law Firm, LLC
50 Washington Street, Suite 737/745
Suite 737/745
Norwalk, CT 06854
EXAMINER
ARYANPOUR, MITRA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3711
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CONTE CUTTINO
Appeal 2021-004022
Application 14/816,248
Technology Center 3700
Before DANIEL S. SONG, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
BARRY L. GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, and
25–31. Appeal Br. 2. Claims 2, 3, 5, 8–10, 14, 17, 19, and 22–24 have been
canceled. Id. An oral hearing in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.47 was
held on November 15, 2021, a transcript of which will be entered into the
record in due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to the applicant as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the named
inventor, Conte Cuttino. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a sport-related goal line or boundary
indicator. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A football goal post system to detect movement of a game
object across an invisible plane or line formed by a football
goal post, the system consisting essentially of:
two vertical goal posts, a horizontal bar, and a base,
wherein the horizontal bar connects the two vertical goal posts
and the two vertical goal posts extend upwardly away from the
horizontal bar, and wherein the base supports the horizontal bar,
the horizontal bar being a distance of 10 feet from the ground,
wherein at least one of the two vertical goal posts and
horizontal bar is at least partially hollow and is made of a clear
material;
three sensors, one sensor is located within each of the two
vertical goal posts and one sensor located within the horizontal
bar;
at least one light source located within the two vertical goal
posts and the horizontal bar, the at least one light source
emitting light through said two vertical goal posts and the
horizontal bar, said at least one light source being a series of
light emitting diodes (LEDs) or fluorescent lights;
a solar power source, said power source providing power
for said at least one sensor and said at least one light source,
said power source being positioned within the base or within
the two goal posts or the horizontal bar; and
a game object comprising a signal transmitter embedded in
the game object, the signal transmitter using GPS technology
and/or Bluetooth technology, the signal transmitter being an
electronic chip,
wherein when the game object passes through a line or
invisible plane identified with respect to said two vertical goal
posts, said at least one light source is illuminated to indicate
that a score has been tallied.

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REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Daisher US 2010/0105503 A1 Apr. 29, 2010
Alonso US 2013/0066448 A1 Mar. 14, 2013
Ennis US 8,905,872 B2 Dec. 9, 2014
Dunlop GB 2462624 A Feb. 17, 2010
REJECTIONS2
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References
1, 4, 6, 7, 11–13, 15,
16, 18, 25–31
112(a) Written Description
20, 21 102 Dunlop
1, 4, 7, 11–13, 15, 16,
18, 25, 27–29, 31
103 Dunlop, Alonso, Ennis
6, 26, 30 103 Dunlop, Alonso,
Ennis, Daisher
OPINION
Claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18,
and 25–31—§ 112(a)—Written Description
The Examiner finds that the limitation in independent claims 1 and 18
requiring the horizontal bar of the football goal post to be 10 feet from the
ground is not adequately described. Final Act. 3. The Examiner
acknowledges that a football goal post is disclosed, but finds that “the
application as filed hasn’t established that the goal is an ‘American football’
goal post.” Id. According to the Examiner, “[t]he term ‘Football’
encompasses many different types of games such as Canadian football,
Australian Rules football, Gaelic Football, Rugby Football which also
includes Rugby Union and Rugby league, Touch football, etc.” Id. The

2 The Examiner erroneously lists claim 23 as rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a).
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Examiner thus contends that “[o]ne of ordinary skill would not reasonably
conclude that ‘Football’ refers to and encompasses only ‘American’
football.” Id.
Appellant responds that Figure 1 of the Specification depicts a
football goal post, and that “[i]t is inherent that the football goal post is an
American football goal post.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant also refers to a
Wikipedia article that “refers to American football and football as being
synonymous,” and thus “it is quite clear that American football and football
would be understood by a person of skill in the art to be the same thing.” Id.
We decline to sustain this rejection. While it may be true that the
term “football” is not synonymous with “American football,” Appellant
relies not only on the term “football” in the Specification, but also on the
depiction of goal posts in the Figures, particularly Figure 1. Appeal Br. 6.
The Examiner does not appear to dispute that the goal post depicted in
Figure 1 is of the type used in American football, or that the crossbar of an
American football goal post is mounted 10 feet above the ground.3
Claims 20 and 21—§ 102—Dunlop
Appellant argues claims 20 and 21 as a group. Appeal Br. 17–18. We
select claim 20 as representative of the group, and decide the appeal of this
rejection on the basis of claim 20 alone. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 20 reads as follows:
20. A system to retrofit a preexisting goal with at least one light
source, the system consisting essentially of:
a preexisting goal;

3 We agree with the Examiner, however, that the height at which the goal
post’s cross bar is mounted does not appear to be “critical or essential to the
function of the claimed device.” Ans. 19.
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at least one sensor;
at least one light source configured to be mounted within
the preexisting goal; and
a power source, said power source providing power for said
at least one sensor and said at least one light source,
wherein said system is configured to be used for the
preexisting goal, so as to retrofit the preexisting goal with the at
least one light source by mounting the at least one sensor and
the at least one light source connected to the power source in
order to transform the preexisting goal into a goal having a light
source, such that when a game object passes through a line or
invisible plane detected by the sensor, said at least one light
source is illuminated to indicate that a score has been tallied,
wherein said preexisting goal is selected from a group
consisting of a soccer goal, an ice hockey goal, a basketball net,
a lacrosse goal, a water polo goal, a field hockey goal and
football goal posts, the preexisting goal including at least one
goal post.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Dunlop teaches all of the limitations of
claim 20. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Dunlop 3:4–13, 4:1–4, 6:9–10, 7:1–3); see
Dunlop Fig. 1. Appellant responds that “Dunlop fails to disclose or suggest
the concept of retrofitting a goal post as set forth in Claim 20.” Appeal Br.
17. In particular, Appellant contends that “Dunlop is missing the element of
‘mounting the at least one sensor and the at least one light source connected
to the power source in order to transform the preexisting goal into a goal
having a light source.’” Id. at 18. We disagree. As the Examiner finds,
Dunlop teaches at least one sensor (detection means 16), at least one light
source (indication system 18), and a power source for the at least one sensor
and light source (power supply 40). Final Act. 4–5 (citing Dunlop 3:4–13,
4:1–4, 7:1–3). Further, Figure 1 of Dunlop depicts the at least one sensor
and light source mounted on a goal (soccer goal 12). Dunlop Fig. 1.
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Finally, Dunlop clearly teaches retrofitting preexisting goals with its goal
detection apparatus: “The above described apparatus can be provided as a
kit of parts, or as a retro-fit for existing goals.” Dunlop 6:9–10.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 20 and 21 as anticipated by Dunlop.
Claims 1, 4, 7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18,
25, 27–29, and 31—§ 103—Dunlop, Alonso, Ennis
Appellant argues claims 1, 4, 7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 25, 27–29, and 31
as a group. Appeal Br. 8–17. We select claim 1 as representative of the
group, and decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 1 alone.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner finds that Dunlop teaches the system of claim 1,
including a football goal post, a “plurality of sensors,” at least one light
source, and a game object with an embedded signal transmitter. Final Act.
6–7 (citing Dunlop 3:1–2, 4–13, 15–19, 4:1–4, 6–8, 10–12, 25–27, 5:1–10,
25–27, 6:1–2, 7:1–3, Fig. 1). Regarding the requirement that the system
have three sensors, the Examiner finds that Dunlop “teaches the assembly
may have any number of sensors i.e. only one or more than two meaning
three.” Id. at 6 (citing Dunlop 7:1–3); see Dunlop 7:1–3 (“Two transmitter
modules and two receiver modules are described above. However it may be
feasible to utilize only one transmitter and/or one receiver, or more than two
transmitters and/or receivers.”). The Examiner acknowledges that Dunlop
does not teach: “1) positioning at least one sensor within the cross bar; 2) . . .
utilizing GPS technology within a game ball; [and] 3) utilizing a solar power
source,” and therefore relies on Alonso and Ennis to teach these limitations.
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The Examiner finds that Alonso teaches “to position one or more
sensors within the goal frame, i.e. each goal post upright and the horizontal
member, wherein the goal frame can be for any sports goal including
American Football.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Alonzo ¶¶ 79, 85, Fig. 14)
(underlining omitted). The Examiner determines that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art “to have positioned one or more
sensors in similar or the same positions, given that Alonso teaches such is an
appropriate manner to detect and identify when a game object (ball) crosses
the goal post uprights, for scoring a field goal.” Id. at 8.
The Examiner also finds that Alonso teaches placing GPS sensors
within a game ball. Final Act. 8 (citing Alonso ¶¶ 11, 50, 60, 61, 66, 83,
84). According to the Examiner, it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art “to have used such a sensor for Dunlop’s game ball
given that Alonso teaches such is an appropriate sensor for identify[ing] and
detecting the position of the game.” Id.
Finally, the Examiner finds that Ennis teaches “to use solar power
when goal assembly is used primarily outside and normally exposed to
sunlight.” Final Act. 8. The Examiner determines that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to “to have use such recharging
source for Dunlop’s power supply given that Ennis teaches such is an
appropriate manner for supplying power when the goal system is used
outdoors, since incorporating solar cells into a goal assembly allows sun
exposure to be exploited for recharging the power source.” Id.
We have considered Appellant’s arguments in opposition to the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and are not persuaded of Examiner error.
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Therefore, we sustain the rejection for essentially those reasons expressed in
the Final Action and Answer, and add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellant argues, for example, that Dunlop does not teach three
sensors as claimed. Appeal Br. 11. Dunlop does, however teach “more than
two” transmitters and/or receivers, which, as the Examiner notes, includes
three transmitters/receivers (i.e., sensors). Further, the proposed
combination would exchange Dunlop’s acousto-magnetic sensors with
Alonso’s GPS tags/sensors (Final Act. 8), and Alonzo teaches placing seven
tags/sensors within a football goal post. Alonzo ¶ 85, Fig. 14.4 To the
extent that Appellant is arguing that Dunlop must teach exactly three sensors
because claim 1 uses the “consisting essentially of” transition phrase, this
argument is unpersuasive. “By using the term ‘consisting essentially of,’ the
[claim] drafter signals that the invention necessarily includes the listed
ingredients and is open to unlisted ingredients that do not materially affect
the basic and novel properties of the invention.” PPG Industries v.
Guardian Industries Corp., 156 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We do
not discern any teaching or suggestion in the Specification that using more
than three sensors would materially affect the basic and novel properties of
the invention. One the contrary, the Specification teaches that its football

4 Similarly, Appellant’s arguments that it would not have been obvious to
modify the number of Dunlop’s sensors to an odd number (Appeal Br. 11),
and “magnets in the Dunlop system will be problematic in a football context,
as a football player’s helmet could interfere with the magnets” (id. at 16–17)
are moot, because the rejection as articulated by the Examiner is based on
replacing Dunlop’s sensors with Alonso’s sensors. See In re Merck & Co.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be
established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based
upon the teachings of a combination of references.”)
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goal post system may use “more or less” than three sensors, but does not
teach that doing so would materially affect the operation of the system.
Appellant asserts that “Dunlop’s system is limited in that [it] uses
acousto-magnetic detection whereby there is a metal element in the game
object.” Appeal Br. 16. We disagree. As the Examiner notes (Ans. 20, 21),
Dunlop is not limited to using an acousto-magnetic detection system, but
teaches that “other detection means can by utilized, such as . . . a radio-
frequency system using a radio-frequency tag element.” Dunlop 5:25–6:2.
We likewise disagree that using Alonso’s GPS tags with Dunlop’s system
would “change the principle of operation of Dunlop.” Appeal Br. 16. Since
Dunlop specifically invites using different detection means, using acousto-
magnetic detection would not seem to be a principle of operation of
Dunlop’s system.
Appellant also asserts that the Examiner “has provided no evidence as
to why a person of skill in the art would replace Dunlop’s acousto-magnetic
detection with [Alonso’s] GPS technology.” Appeal Br. 16. Again, we
disagree. The Examiner cites portions of Alonso that teach applying RF
sensors that use, e.g., GPS technology, to a football and goal posts to detect
when the football crosses the goal post uprights. Final Act. 7 (citing Alonzo
¶¶¶ 79, 85, Fig. 14; id. at 8 (citing Alonso ¶¶ 11, 50, 60–61, 66, 73, 83–84).
The Examiner also cites Dunlop for teaching that a radio-frequency (RF)
system using RF tag elements may be used as the detection means in
Dunlop’s system. Id. at 6–7 (citing Dunlop 5:27–6:2).
Appellant also takes issue with the Examiner’s combination of Ennis
with Dunlop and Alonso. Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant first argues that
“Ennis fails to disclose or suggest a power source being positioned within
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the base or within the goal posts,” but rather “the power source [in Ennis] is
external to the soccer goal.” Id. at 13. This argument is unpersuasive,
because it does not address the rejection as articulated by the Examiner. The
Examiner relies on Dunlop, not on Ennis, to teach a power source located
within a goal. Final Act. 7 (citing Dunlop 3:10–12).
Appellant further argues that Ennis’ solar power source “is used for
charging a motor external to a base, not at least one light source, as in the
claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 13. According to Appellant, “[f]or an
American football goal post, . . . it would not be necessary or desirable to
have a motor implemented into such a goal post to transport it.” Id. at 15.
Again, however, the Examiner relies on Ennis only to teach that “it is known
in the art to use solar power when [the] goal assembly is used primarily
outside and normally exposed to sunlight.” Final Act. 8. Ennis is not relied
on for its teaching of using a motor to move a goal post.
As we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 4, 7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 25,
27–29, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dunlop, Alonso,
and Ennis.
Claims 6, 26, and 30—§ 103—Dunlop, Alonso, Ennis, and Daisher
Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of claims 6, 26,
and 30, but relies on arguments made, and found unpersuasive, in
connection with claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8 (referring to “[e]xemplary claim
1]”). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 26, and
30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Dunlop, Alonso, Ennis, and
Daisher.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 6, 7,
11–13, 15,
16, 18, 25–
31
112(a) Written
Description
1, 4, 6, 7,
11–13, 15,
16, 18, 25–
31
20, 21 102 Dunlop 20, 21
1, 4, 7, 11–
13, 15, 16,
18, 25, 27–
29, 31
103 Dunlop, Alonso,
Ennis
1, 4, 7, 11–
13, 15, 16,
18, 25, 27–
29, 31

6, 26, 30 Dunlop, Alonso,
Ennis, Daisher
6, 26, 30
Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 6, 7,
11–13, 15,
16, 18, 20,
21, 25–31

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED