Constance T. Reeves, Complainant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 6, 2000
01993392 (E.E.O.C. May. 6, 2000)

01993392

05-06-2000

Constance T. Reeves, Complainant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Constance T. Reeves, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01993392

) Agency No. 9862604003

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) by the agency dated February 17, 1999, finding that it

was in compliance with the terms of the January 15, 1999 settlement

agreement into which the parties entered.<1> See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659, 37,660 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to

as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b);

and 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405).

On January 15, 1999 the parties executed a settlement agreement which

provided, in pertinent part, that:

(f ) [complainant] will be allowed to discreetly call home at 7 a.m. when

she works the 6 a.m. shift.

By letter to the agency dated February 1, 1999, complainant alleged that

the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that

the agency reinstate her complaint. Specifically, complainant alleged

that the agency failed to allow her to call home when she worked the 6

a.m. shift. According to complainant, on January 21, 1999, a supervisor

verbally admonished her for calling home.

In its February 17, 1999 FAD, the agency noted that complainant's

only allegation of breach related to paragraph �f � of the agreement.

The agency does not dispute that complainant's supervisor verbally

admonished her for using the telephone and that the admonishment

constituted a violation of the settlement agreement. However, the FAD

found that complainant's supervisor had not been informed of the specific

provisions of the settlement agreement prior to the time of the violation.

After the incident, agency officials took immediate corrective action

by informing complainant's supervisor of the details of the settlement

agreement. The FAD concluded that despite the one allegation made by the

complainant, the spirit and intent of the agreement had been carried out.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The

Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract

between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of

contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has

further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the

contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's

construction. Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties

with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has

generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This

rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on

its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the

instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See

Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377

(5th Cir. 1984).

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(b), when breach of a settlement

agreement has been alleged, an agency has 35 days from the receipt

of an complainant's allegation of breach to resolve the matter. The

Commission interprets that provision to mean that an agency has 35 days

within which to cure any breach that has occurred. See Covington v. USPS,

EEOC Appeal No. 01912311 (September 30, 1991).

Even if the breach were established, the Commission has previously

found that substantial compliance with the terms of a settlement

agreement in cases where agencies have committed, in good faith,

a breach of a provision of the agreement which did not undermine its

purpose or effect. See e.g., Baron v. Dept. of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05930277 (September 30, 1993) (Two week delay in transfer of official

and letter of regret rather than letter of apology found to be substantial

compliance); Ramirez v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930283

(August 12, 1993) (Substantial compliance found notwithstanding dispute

over manner in which overtime opportunities required under agreement

were granted).

In the instant case, we note that the only allegation of breach relates

to paragraph �f� (above). We also find that issue �f� is part of a

more comprehensive agreement between the agency and the complainant.

We find that the agency cured any breach which may have occurred.

We note that the settlement agreement was entered into on January

15, 1999 and that the alleged breach occurred on January 21, 1999,

before the details of the agreement reached complainant's supervisor.

The record establishes that the supervisor responsible for the alleged

breach was immediately corrected and a copy of all of the provisions

of the agreement was transmitted to complainant's direct supervisors.

Regardless of whether any breach occurred, we find that the agency

substantially complied with the terms of the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, the agency's final decision dismissing complainant's

complaint is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 6,2000 ____________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.