Connie G. Castillo, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 15, 2009
0120071164 (E.E.O.C. May. 15, 2009)

0120071164

05-15-2009

Connie G. Castillo, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Connie G. Castillo,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120071164

Hearing No. 460-2006-00143X

Agency No. 1G-773-0002-06

DECISION

On December 27, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

November 30, 2006 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Mail Processing Clerk at the agency's Houston Air Mail Center

(AMC) facility in Houston, Texas. Complainant has worked for the agency

since 1983. In August 2004, complainant accepted an offer of a modified

assignment on Tour I with the hours of 10:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. The duties

of this assignment included signing and throwing express mail, laying

sacks on flats and pallets, elbowing priority and express pouches, making

labels and placards for outgoing mail, providing relief in the office on

Monday nights, monitoring security monitors, and answering the phones.

In October 2004, complainant suffered an injury to her right hand when

she was bitten by an insect. As a result of the injury complainant

suffered nerve damage, swelling of the finger, stiffness and occasional

lack of movement in her right hand. After the October 2004 injury,

complainant continued to work on the August 2004 modified assignment.

Complainant's condition was reassessed monthly by her doctors.

Complainant's limitations have changed over the years. The record

contains an October 29, 2004 Duty Status Report noting among other

limitations complainant is restricted in lifting more than 10 pounds for

eight hours a day, no pulling/pushing, no simple grasping, and no fine

manipulation. On April 4, 2005, complainant was restricted to occasional

lifting of 20 pounds, frequent lifting of 10 pounds, and constant lifting

of only negligible weight. In November 2005, complainant was limited to

lifting up to 10 pounds up to four hours per day and was permitted to

work for four hours of no lifting. On January 16, 2006, complainant's

restrictions were lifting up to 10 pounds and no use of the right arm.

In a January 18, 2006 statement, complainant's doctor stated he could

not determine the date of recovery from the injury; however, he stated it

would probably take up to a year for complainant to recover. On January

23, 2006, complainant's restrictions were lifting up to 20 pounds and

no use of the right arm. On March 22, 2006, complainant was restricted

to lifting up to 10 pounds and no use of the right arm. In May 2006,

complainant was limited to 15 pounds of lifting and no use of right arm.

Complainant was completely incapacitated due to her right hand from May 12

- 17, 2006. In June 2006, complainant could perform no lifting with her

right hand and was completely incapacitated from June 5 - 6, 2006.

On April 4, 2006, complainant was issued a new modified assignment on

Tour II. The duties of the new assignment included monitoring security

monitors, answering telephones in the supervisor's office, and writing

and making placards. The new hours were 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.

On April 21, 2006, a male employee (Person A) was offered an assignment

as a Modified Mail Processing Clerk on Tour I with work hours form

9:00 p.m. - 5:30 a.m. The duties of the modified assignment included

monitoring security monitors, answering the telephone in the supervisor's

office, writing and making placards, and express sign-ins/hang and label

express sacks. The physical requirements of the modified assignment

were: ability to stand and walk up to eight hours, ability to lift up

to 20 pounds occasionally for up to six hours, and ability to write up

to six hours.

On May 24, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was

discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), disability (right

hand), and age (42), when: complainant was issued a new modified job

assignment in April 2006, which changed her reporting assignment from

Tour I to Tour II.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. On October 18, 2006, the agency filed a motion for a

decision without a hearing. Complainant responded to the agency's motion

on October 30, 2006. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to

the case granted the agency's motion for a decision without a hearing

and issued a decision without a hearing on November 27, 2006.

In her decision, the AJ found complainant did not establish a prima facie

case of age discrimination since she failed to show that she was treated

differently than someone outside her group under similar circumstances.

The AJ assumed that complainant established a prima facie case of sex

discrimination noting the employee assigned to her preferred tour was

a male. With regard to her disability claim, the AJ found complainant was

substantially limited in caring for herself and therefore was disabled.

The AJ noted that the agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its actions to move complainant to Tour II: to accommodate

the changing mail flow, the change in her medical restrictions, and

there was insufficient work for complainant to perform for eight hours

on Tour I. Additionally, the AJ noted the agency explained that Person

A moved from Tour III to Tour I based on a grievance settlement.

The AJ found complainant did not show that the agency's actions were

motivated by her disability, sex or age. With regard to the change in

complainant's medical restrictions, the AJ noted that the March 2006

restrictions were somewhat more limiting than her prior restrictions

in that her lifting limitation changed from 20 to 10 pounds; however,

the AJ acknowledged the agency had been working around her changing

limitations without moving her to another tour for years. The AJ noted

that the duties assigned to Person A on Tour I were significantly like

those assigned to complainant while she was on Tour I. With regard to

complainant's argument that if there was eight hours of work for Person

A on Tour I then she should have been left on the tour since she was

senior to Person A, the AJ found that the issue of seniority should be

raised in the grievance process. The AJ noted the reason Person A was

placed on Tour I was because of a grievance he had filed concerning the

tour he had previously been assigned. The AJ found no evidence that the

individuals involved in the grievance intentionally displaced complainant

from Tour I as a result of discrimination.

With regard to a denial of accommodation claim, the AJ noted complainant

had been in a modified position for years as a result of an on-the-job

injury. The AJ noted that when an individual with a disability needs

an accommodation, an employer must first look at the job the individual

was doing at the time the accommodation became necessary. The AJ found

"it is clear the complainant could not perform the essential functions

of the job she had or a regular job to which she could be transferred."

The AJ noted the agency created a job for complainant pursuant to the

workers' compensation statutes. The AJ acknowledged that "[m]aking up a

job is not required by the Rehabilitation Act." However, the AJ noted

that the record showed that "complainant was able to perform the made

up modified job which the agency invented for her." The AJ noted that

the Rehabilitation Act does not require the agency to leave complainant

on the tour of her choice.

The agency subsequently issued a notice of final action fully implementing

the AJ's decision. The agency found that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

Complainant filed the present appeal upon receipt of the agency's final

action. On appeal, complainant states that for the two years prior

to the incident at issue, she worked in the AMC Office, answering the

phone, monitoring the monitors, and making labels. Complainant states

that she held the modified assignment given to her in August 2004,

for three months only. She states that after the injury to her hand

in October 2004, she was given a new assignment to work in the office

answering phones, monitoring, making labels, and serving as relief.

Complainant claims that the agency contradicts itself when it says

there was not enough work for her on Tour I and then shortly thereafter,

Person A was moved to Tour I to perform the same work complainant had

been doing. Complainant acknowledged that the agency accommodated her

in that she "was given the same job on a different Tour." However,

she states that Person A, a male, was allowed to perform her duties on

Tour I while she had more seniority and was moved to Tour II. Moreover,

complainant states that after working on Tour II for a month she was

given a new modified job that went against her restrictions and caused

her an on-the-job injury.

In response to complainant's appeal, the agency argues that the AJ

properly found there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

The agency claims the AJ correctly found complainant failed to show that

the agency discriminated against her.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Upon review, we find the AJ properly found that complainant failed to

identify any similarly situated employees with regard to her claim of age

discrimination. Specifically, the record reveals that complainant was 42

years old at the time she was removed from Tour I. Although complainant

claims that she was subjected to discrimination when Person A was placed

on Tour I shortly after she was removed from that tour, the record shows

that Person A, 58, was substantially older than complainant. Thus,

complainant failed to show that her age played a role in the agency's

decision to move her to Tour II.

With regard to her claims of sex and disability discrimination, we find

the agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for moving

complainant to Tour II. The agency stated complainant was moved to Tour

II as a result of the change in her medical restrictions in March 2006,

and the fact that there was no longer work within her restrictions on Tour

I. While the record reveals that Person A was placed on Tour I shortly

after complainant was removed from that tour and was assigned similar

duties to those that complainant had been performing, the record reveals

this was done as a result of a grievance Person A had settled. There is

no evidence that the individuals involved in the grievance intentionally

displaced complainant from Tour I as a result of her sex or disability.

We find complainant has failed to show that the agency's articulated

reasons for its actions were based on discriminatory animus.

It is not clear that complainant is actually claiming that she was

denied a reasonable accommodation in the instant complaint. To the

extent that she is claiming a denial of a reasonable accommodation, the

only accommodation she appears to be requesting is to have remained on

Tour 1. Complainant has not shown how her claimed disability requires

her to stay on Tour I or how working on Tour II somehow violates any of

her medical restrictions. Thus, we find that complainant has not shown

that she was denied a reasonable accommodation. We also note that the

AJ found, and complainant does not dispute, that complainant could not

perform the essential functions of the job she had at the time her need

for an accommodation arose.1

We note complainant claims on appeal that she was removed from Tour II

one month after she was given the April 2006 modified assignment and that

the new modified job violated her medical restrictions. To the extent

complainant is alleging that she was subjected to discrimination with

regard to a May 2006 modified assignment, we note that this claim was not

accepted for processing by the agency. Moreover, we note complainant did

not challenge the definition of the accepted issues to the agency or while

her case was pending before the AJ. Therefore, we find this issue is

not part of the subject complaint and will not be addressed on appeal.

Accordingly, the agency's final action finding no discrimination is

AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 15, 2009

__________________

Date

1 We do not address in this decision whether complainant was a qualified

individual with a disability.

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