Connecticut Light & Power Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 1032 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Connecticut Light and Power Company and Locals
420 and 457, a/w International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA- 11771
May 31, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On January 26, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Eugene George Goslee issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel resubmitted the brief it filed with the
Administrative Law Judge.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Connecticut
Light and Power Company, Berlin, Connecticut, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE GEORGE GOSLEE, Administrative Law Judge:
This case came on to be heard before me at Waterbury,
Connecticut, on November 29, 1976, upon a complaint'
issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board and an answer filed by Connecticut Light
and Power Company, hereinafter sometimes called the
Respondent. The issues raised by the pleadings relate to
whether or not the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by
I The complaint in this proceeding was issued on July 21, 1976, upon a
charge filed on May 14, 1976, and duly served on the Respondent.
229 NLRB No. 152
acts and conduct hereinafter specified. Briefs have been
received from the General Counsel and the Respondent,
and the briefs have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and having
observed the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I
hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. COMMERCE AND JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
(1) the Respondent is engaged in the State of Connecticut
in the storage, sale, and distribution of gas and electricity;
(2) the Respondent receives gross annual receipts from its
operations valued in excess of $250,000 and annually
purchases goods and materials in interstate commerce
valued in excess of $50,000; and (3) the Respondent is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act,
and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE STATUS OF THE CHARGING UNIONS
The complaint also alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Locals 420 and 457, a/w International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
The complaint alleges that a unit consisting of employees
in 99 separate classifications, exclusive of office clericals,
professionals, guards, and supervisors is a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining. The Respondent's
answer admits that a unit consisting of all production and
maintenance employees employed at its Berlin and other
Connecticut operations, excluding office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, guards and supervisors is a
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The General Counsel's unit description is derived from
Appendix A of the collective-bargaining agreement, which
is essentially a list of employee classifications for wage
purposes, and, accordingly, in the light of the Respondent's
admission by its answer, I find that the following described
unit is a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by the Respondent at its Berlin and other Connecticut
operations, excluding office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
Section 2(1 1) of the Act.
IV. THE UNIONS' MAJORITY STATUS
The General Counsel alleges, the Respondent admits,
and I find that at all times material to this proceeding
Locals 420 and 457 have been and are now the exclusive
bargaining representatives of the employees in the unit
1032
CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER COMPANY
described immediately above for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
V. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
In paragraphs II and 12 of the complaint the General
Counsel alleges that on February 13, 1976,2 the Unions
requested the Respondent to bargain collectively, and that
commencing on or about March 2, and continuing
thereafter, the Respondent refused. In essence, however,
the singular issue presented in this proceeding is whether
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by refusing the Unions' request to supply information and
data concerning (1) a list of equipment used to perform
work by contractors and subcontractors for the Respon-
dent during 1975; and (2) the total cost of each job
contracted out and a breakdown of the costs to complete
the work for the Respondent during 1975. By its answer the
Respondent denies that it has engaged in any unfair labor
practices and affirmatively alleges that (1) the information
requested by the Charging Unions is not relevant and
necessary to the collective-bargaining process; (2) compil-
ing the information requested would be unduly burden-
some; and (3) the complaint improperly alleges a per se
standard of relevancy. The Respondent adduced no
testimony or other evidence in support of its affirmative
defense of the burden of complying with the Unions'
request for information, and consideration herein has been
limited to the issue of necessity and relevancy, and the
issue of the standard of relevancy recited in the complaint.
The record reflects that there has been a collective-
bargaining relationship between the Respondent and the
Unions, or their predecessor locals, since the 1930's, and
the parties have been signatory to a series of collective-
bargaining agreements. During a portion of the time
relevant to this proceeding a bargaining agreement was in
effect covering the period June 1, 1975, to June 1, 1976.
This bargaining agreement was supplanted by a new
agreement for the period June 1, 1976, to June 1, 1977,
which was negotiated during the months of May, June, and
July. The 1975-76 bargaining agreement contained the
following provision with respect to subcontracting, and the
provision was carried over in haec verba in the 1976-77
bargaining agreement:
ARTICLE XVI - CONTRACT WORK
Work regularly performed by employees covered by
this Agreement will not be contracted out if it would
result in loss of continuity of employment or opportuni-
ties for permanent promotions to job classifications
covered by this Agreement.
The issue of the Unions' requests for certain information
pertaining to the Respondent's contracting out of work
predates the timespan of the substantive allegations of the
complaint, and from the record evidence goes back to at
least 1972. The record does not reveal the total extent of
2 All dates recited hereinafter are in 1976. unless specified to the
contrary.
the Unions' prior request, nor the extent of the Respon-
dent's compliance, but it does reveal that the Respondent
has consistently refused to furnish cost information on
grounds that the Company did not consider cost data
relevant for bargaining on the issue of work contracted out.
Upon the testimony of Joseph A. Kelly, business manager
for Local 457, there was further discussion of the Unions'
requests for information prior to the execution of the 1975-
76 bargaining agreement. At that time the Unions gave
notice of intent to file a charge with the Board concerning
the issue of cost data and informed the Company that they
would renew their request in advance of 1976 negotiations
so that they could submit proposals when and if the
information was supplied by the Respondent.
On February 13, in compliance with their 1975 agree-
ment, the Unions sent a letter to the Respondent with the
following requests:
1. The name of each and every contractor & or
subcontractor who performed work during the year
1975.
2. The type of work performed.
3. The number of people employed by the contrac-
tors on such work.
4. Total manhours worked by contractors employ-
ees.
5. A list of equipment used to perform the work.
6. The total cost of each job contracted out and a
breakdown of the costs to the Company to complete
the work.
On March 2, the Respondent replied to the Unions'
request agreeing to provide the names of contractors and
subcontractors, with a description of the work performed,
and further agreeing to provide the Unions with the total
man-hours worked by contractors employees where the
information was readily available. As to the Unions'
request for the number of people employed by the
contractors, the Respondent replied that in many cases this
information would not be available, and in other cases it
would be duplicative of the information requested in item
4. On item 5, the list of equipment used by contractors, the
Respondent replied that compliance would present an
insurmountable task, and that the Company did not
believe it relevant for bargaining. As to cost data, the
Respondent's reply of March 2 referred the Unions to a
prior letter dated June 4, 1975, and added, "the Company
does not consider the cost data relevant for bargaining on
this matter."
On March 24, the Unions again made a request in
writing asking that the Company supply the information
for the reasons related in their letter of February 13. The
Respondent's reply of April 9, 1976, was a terse reference
to contents of its letter of March 2.
The record reveals no further exchange of correspon-
dence between the parties until April 26, when they
exchanged proposals for bargaining on the 1976-77
agreement. The Unions' proposals contained, inter alia, a
1033
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
requested change in article XVI of the agreement, which
would have changed the provision to read as follows:
Any work performed by employees covered by this
Agreement will not be contracted out if it would result
in loss of continuity of employment or opportunities for
permanent promotions to job classifications covered by
this Agreement.
The record does not clearly reveal when negotiations for
the 1976-77 bargaining agreement began, but it does reveal
that there were a series of negotiation meetings between
May 4 and 24, and at some of these meetings there were
discussions pertaining to article XVI and the Unions'
requests for information. According to the testimony of
Business Manager Kelly, the Unions repeated their request
for information and data on the contracting out of work at
a May 4 meeting. The Respondent replied that within a
week or so it would provide, where available, the man-
hours worked by the contractors, but reaffirmed its
position that cost data was not relevant and would not be
provided. During the course of the discussions the Unions
explained the need for the information on grounds similar
to those expressed in their initial letter of request of
February 13, that is relevant to the issue of whether the
bargaining unit employees could do the work cheaper than
contractors, and relevant to the issue of continuity of
employment. A spokesman for the Respondent answered
that as in the past the Company would supply man-hours if
available, but for reasons related in its prior correspon-
dence the Respondent would not supply cost data.
There were further negotiation meetings on May 6 and
11, but according to the testimony of Kelly there were no
discussions concerning information and data on contract-
ing. At a further meeting on May 13, the Respondent
supplied the Union with a 20-page list of contractors who
performed work for the Company during 1975, with the
location and a short description of the work performed. In
addition, the 20-page list provided the Unions with some,
though not all, of estimated man-hours used by the
contractors. Additional lists of contractors were supplied
by the Respondent on May 20 and 24, but like the May 13
list these contained only partial information on estimated
man-hours, and no information on costs or the equipment
used by the contractors. There were some discussions at the
May 18 and 20 negotiations meetings concerning the
contracting out of work and the Unions' requests for
information, but nothing in the record suggests that either
party changed its position with respect to the relevancy of
the data requested. The Unions continued to insist that
cost data was essential to the issue of the continuity of
employment of the members of the bargaining unit, and to
the issue of whether bargaining unit employees could
perform the work cheaper than the contractors. The
Respondent continued to refuse to provide cost informa-
tion for the reasons previously expressed in its initial
written answer of March 2.
John Healey, business manager for Local Union 420,
attended a further negotiations meeting on May 24. A
: Ohio Power Company, 216 NLRB 987 (1975).
4 Tool and Die Makers' Lodge No. 78 of District No. 10 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (Square D
Compane,, Milwaukee Plant), 224 NLRB 111 (1976).
representative for the Unions asked the Respondent about
two contracts that were to be let for work on its Plum Tree
Road and Rockville substations. More particularly, the
Unions asked when the jobs were to commence, what man-
hours would be required, and the costs for the two jobs. A
spokesman for the Respondent replied that the Company
would not get involved in informing the Union about costs,
and the Company was unsure of the total man-hours that
would be required on those two particular jobs. With
reference to the Respondent's generally operating forces,
Healey asked the Respondent how many electricians,
carpenters, and other classifications would be employed on
the Plum Tree Road and Rockville substation contracts.
From Healey's testimony on both direct and cross-exami-
nation, it is clear that he explained to the Respondent the
Unions' concern that, rather than using contractors on the
two substation contracts, the Company could utilize
general operating forces as an alternative to laying off its
own employees. It is equally clear from the record that
Healey explained to the Respondent that without cost and
man-hour data the Unions were in no position to
determine whether bargaining unit employees could per-
form the work more economically, and, therefore, were
unable to formulate a proposal. The Respondent's spokes-
man replied that cost data would not be provided and that
the issue would have to be decided by the National Labor
Relations Board.
The record reveals that there were no further discussions
concerning the requested information and data from May
24 through the date of July 15 when the new bargaining
agreement was executed. There is no contest here,
moreover, that at no time up to the close of the hearing in
this matter has the Respondent complied with the Unions'
requests for cost data and equipment used by its contrac-
tors and subcontractors. Although not alleged as a separate
violation in the complaint, the record is equally clear that
the Respondent did not fully comply with the Unions'
requests for man-hours, and it proffered no evidence that
the information was unavailable or that its assemblage
would impose an undue burden on the Respondent.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Respondent argues that an
employer's duty to furnish information to the bargaining
agent is not unlimited, that only certain information is
presumptively relevant to the bargaining process, while the
relevance of other information, such as that sought here by
the Unions, must be specifically proved. Relying on such
cases as Ohio Power,3 Square D Company,4 and Southwest-
ern Bell,5 the Respondent argues that cost data and
information concerning equipment used by its contractors
and subcontractors has not been proved here to be relevant
to the Unions' obligation to bargain and to protect the
interests of its members in the bargaining unit.
I agree with the Respondent's contention that not all
information is presumptively relevant to the bargaining
process, and that in areas such as contracting and
subcontracting an employer is not obligated to furnish
information unless such precise relevance has been estab-
lished. As the Board held in Southwestern Bell, supra.
5 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 173 N L RB 172. (1968).
1034
CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER COMPANY
It has long been established by court and Board
decisions that certain information is presumptively
relevant because it bears directly on the negotiation or
general administration of the collective-bargaining
agreement. Other information, not so obviously related
to the Union's bargaining or contract administration or
grievance responsibilities, may or may not be relevant,
depending on the circumstances. 6
Southwestern Bell, like the Board's later decision in Ohio
Power, relates to information requested by the bargaining
agents concerning subcontracting, and it is clear that the
doctrine of presumptive relevance does not apply to the
information and data here requested by the bargaining
agents. Agreement with this much of the Respondent's
contention, however, does not require the further agree-
ment that the decisions in those cases are dispositive of the
facts here.7 In Southwestern Bell, the bargaining agent
requested information, including costs, of work contracted
out by the employer for the purpose of processing
grievances alleging violations of the provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement. The employer furnished
all the information, except costs. On the facts, the employer
defended the grievance on grounds that its own employees
were too busy to handle the work, and at no time did the
employer claim that cost was a factor in its decision to
contract out the work. On these limited facts, and in the
absence of any showing of the relevance of costs to the
contractual provisions of the alleged violations, the Board
found that the respondent's obligation to furnish the
requested cost information had not been established. Ohio
Power also involved a request for information concerning
contracting out of work to permit the bargaining agent to
process grievances. In its request the bargaining agent only
suggested the possibility of decreasing the overall costs of
the contracting, and the Administrative Law Judge found
no necessity, therefore, to determine the relevancy or
securability of the cost information. In all other respects
the Administrative Law Judge found that the information
on contracting was relevant to the bargaining agent's
responsibilities to police the contract and process grievanc-
es, the Board affirmed and the order was enforced by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.8
The issue of relevancy here must, as the Respondent
argues be determined in the entire context of the Unions'
request and the measure of the Respondent's compliance
under all of the circumstances attending the dispute. In its
initial request for information, the Unions advised the
Respondent of their need for the information in the
following words:
The Unions feel the information listed below is of
vital importance to us, so that we may analyze the
information and intelligently be prepared to propose to
the Company areas where our members can perform
work now being performed by contractors more
economically resulting in a savings to the Company
and the consumer and also providing our members
"Citing N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See also
Ohio Power Company, supra at 991.
7 Square D Companyv was a CB case, and the issue of relevance was only a
peripheral issue. unrelated to the factual issues of the instant case.
more job security, more opportunity for promotional
advancements and overtime pay when required to meet
the Companies [sic] needs and still reduce their costs.
Following the February 13 request, and in accordance
with its agreement at the conclusion of the 1975 negotia-
tions, the Unions proposed a modification of article XVI of
the bargaining agreement to further restrict the Respon-
dent's right to contract out work which could be performed
by members of the bargaining unit. The Unions' concern
with the amount of work available to the bargaining unit
employees is a matter of obvious concern of any bargaining
agent with responsibilities to its members 9 and in this case
there is evidence that the Unions' concern was accentuated
by recent threats of layoff, some of which had been
accomplished. On July 21, 1975, the Respondent gave
notice to the Unions of intent to lay off a total of 34
employees in its line, electrical, and other departments.
While there is evidence here that some of the layoffs were
accomplished through attrition, and others involved proba-
tionary employees,' 0 that evidence does not negate the
necessity to find that the Unions were concerned with
encroachments on the work available to the bargaining
unit employees, and that this concern was adequately
conveyed to the Respondent in the Unions' February 13
request for information.
The issue of the showing of relevancy made by the Union
in support of its request for information is not limited,
moreover, to their written communication of February 13.
The Unions' request for the information, including infor-
mation on costs, was repeated and discussed on several
occasions during the course of negotiations, both in general
terms and in relation to specific contracts. On the
unrebutted and uncontroverted testimony of Kelly and
Healey, I find that on these occasions the Unions fully
apprised the Respondent that cost information on con-
tracts was necessary to protect bargaining unit work, and,
in order for the Unions to propose and negotiate, this
objective cost information was essential to permit the
Unions to determine whether bargaining unit employees
could perform the work cheaper than the Respondent's
contractors. Under all the circumstances, I find that
Respondent was fully aware of the Unions' needs for the
information requested, as it could equally assess that the
information was relevant to the bargainable issue of
contracting out work.
The Respondent contends, nevertheless, that the rele-
vance of the information desired by the bargaining agent
must be conveyed to the employer as part of the request
and cannot be established by testimony in an 8(a)(5)
proceeding on the issue of why the bargaining agent
needed the information. On the basis of the evidence
reviewed above, I find a plentitude of evidence that the
Unions did convey to the Respondent, both in their initial
request and on later occasions, the basis of relevance for
cost data. Even if contrary facts were found, however, it
would not foreclose a finding that relevance has been
established. The Respondent was fully apprised of the
v N.L.R.B. v. Ohio Power Co., 531 F.2d 1381 (C.A. 6. 1976).
9 Ohio Power, supra at 992.
"' The evidence is that, for purposes material here, probationary
employees are included in the bargaining unit.
1035
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unions' purpose for seeking the information as a result of
the testimony at the hearing, the requests for cost data are
still outstanding, and the Respondent's continuing failure
to comply with the requests can no longer be attributed to
the inadequacy of the communications.'
The Respondent further argues that the record evidence
supports its contention that the Unions were not concerned
in reality with protecting the work of the bargaining unit,
but were really intent on capturing additional work. The
Respondent's argument in this respect is bottomed on the
phraseology of the Unions' proposed amendment to article
XVI; and supposed admissions of the Unions' agents in
their testimony. It can be readily conceded that the
Unions' proposed amendment would have further restrict-
ed the Respondent's authority to contract out work, but I
find no persuasive evidence to support the contention that
the Unions' agents admitted that the capture of additional
work was their real objective. Even if established, however,
I fail to perceive that such evidence would have any
material bearing on the issue of relevancy. I know of no
authority, and the Respondent has cited none, to substanti-
ate the proposition that information is relevant only where
the bargaining agent intends to use it solely for the purpose
of maintaining the status quo, or that information is not
relevant where the union intends to use it to expand the
work potential of the bargaining unit employees. The cost
information requested here was necessary to the Unions to
enable them to intelligently propose and negotiate a
provision to protect the bargaining unit work against
encroachment by the contracting out of work. The
contention that the Unions' proposal was too broad and
would have unduly restricted the Respondent's right to
contract is best answered on grounds that if the Respon-
dent had complied with its obligation to furnish cost
information, the proposal might have been otherwise.
Furthermore, the establishment of the necessary measure
of relevancy does not require that the bargaining agent
forecast why all of the possible information sought may be
important, since "All possible ways in which the informa-
tion may become important cannot be foreseen in advance
of negotiations." 1'2
Finally, relying on language of the United States
Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Truirt,'3 the Respondent
argues that, in addition to the standard of relevancy,
inquiry must be made here as to whether or not, and in all
the circumstances, the Respondent met its obligation to
bargain in good faith.14
There is no general allegation in this complaint that the
Respondent undertook its bargaining obligation in bad
faith, and there is similarly no allegation that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to comply fully with
the Unions' request for man-hours on work it had
contracted out. I have no authority and less inclination to
journey beyond the strict confines of the specific allega-
tions of the complaint. Nevertheless, if, under the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Truitt, the
Respondent's overall good faith is to be measured as a
l Ohio Power, supra, 990-991, fn. 9.
'1 Northwest Publications, Inc., 211 NLRB 464, 466 (1974).
:l N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mg. Co., 351 U.S. 149(1956).
N. L. R.B. v. Truitt, supra at 153 154.
condition of finding that its noncompliance with the
Unions' requests for cost information violated Section
8(a)(5), there is ample evidence to support a finding that its
conduct fell far short of good faith. The Unions made their
request for contract information and data on February 13,
and on March 2 the Respondent agreed to comply in part.
It was not, however, until May 13 when the Respondent
provided any part of the requested information, and it was
not until May 24 that the Respondent supplied a full list of
contractors and subcontractors for the year 1975. Even at
this late date, after proposals had been exchanged and
negotiations were well underway, the Respondent failed to
comply fully with the Unions' request for man-hours, and
there was no explanation afforded to the Unions or
advanced on the record in this proceeding as to why it
failed to do so. The Respondent's failure to comply timely
with the Unions' request, and its additional failure to
comply fully with those items of information it agreed to
provide, is evidence of bad faith.
I find and conclude, accordingly, that, in all of the
circumstances of this case, the Unions demonstrated
precisely the relevancy of the information and data it
requested of the Respondent on and after February 13,
1976, pertaining to costs of work contracted out in the year
1975.15 By failing to comply with the Unions' request in
this respect, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(I) of the Act. I do not find, however, that the General
Counsel has proved that the Respondent also violated the
Act by failing to comply with the Unions' request for a list
of equipment used by its contractors and subcontractors.
In arriving at this finding and conclusion, I have ignored
the Respondent's contention that supplying this informa-
tion would be burdensome and oppressive, since there is no
evidence to support the contention. There is not, however,
adequate evidence that equipment information was rele-
vant to the Unions' statutory obligations to bargain or
police a collective-bargaining agreement. The explanation
for the information contained in the Unions' initial request
of February 13 supports positively the relevance of its
demand for cost data, but this explanation cannot be
logically extended to prove the relevance of a list of the
equipment used by contractors and subcontractors. As to
events after February 13, the extent of the record reveals
that if the matter of contractors equipment was discussed
at all during the course of negotiations, it was only in
passing reference and in the most general terms. The
record is insufficient to support a finding that the standard
of relevance has been met, and I conclude that the
Respondent's obligation to furnish information on contrac-
tors equipment has not been proved. 16
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated and is
violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall order it
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive actions to remedy the unfair labor practices, and to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
i5 Curtiss- Wright Corporation, Wright Aeronautical Division v. N.L.R.B.,
347 F.2d 61 (C.A. 3, 1965), and Ohio Power Company, supra.
16 Southwestern Bell Telephone, supra.
1036
CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER COMPANY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Respondent, Connecticut Light and Power
Company, is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Unions, Locals 420 and 457, a/w International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. At all times material to this case, the Unions have
been the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of
the Respondent's employees in the following described
unit, for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other
terms and conditions of employment:
All production and maintenance employees employed
by the Respondent at its Berlin and other Connecticut
operations, excluding office clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
Section 2(1 1) of the Act.
4. By failing to comply with the Unions' request for
cost information on work it contracted out during the year
1975, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor
practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The General Counsel has not proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
supply the Unions with a list of equipment used by its
contractors and subcontractors during the year 1975.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER t7
The Respondent, Connecticut Light and Power Compa-
ny, Berlin, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to supply Locals 420 and 457,
a/w International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, with information relevant and necessary to the
performance by said Locals of their obligations as the
bargaining representatives of the Respondent's employees
in the bargaining unit described herein.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions to remedy the
unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish to Locals 420 and 457 the total
costs and a breakdown of costs necessary to complete the
work for the Respondent, of all work contracted out in the
year 1975.
(b) Post at its facilities at Berlin and other locations in
Connecticut, copies of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix." 1 8 Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided
by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by the Respondent for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by other materials.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
17 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
is In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WiLL NOT fail and refuse to supply Locals 420
and 457, a/w International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, with information relevant and
necessary to the performance by said Locals of their
obligations as the bargaining representatives of our
employees in the following described bargaining unit:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed by the Connecticut Light and Power
Company at its Berlin and other Connecticut
operations, excluding office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL, upon request, furnish to Locals 420 and
457 the information said Locals requested concerning
the costs of work contracted out by Connecticut Light
and Power Company during the year 1975.
CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND
POWER COMPANY
1037