Cone Mills Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 30, 1968

169 N.L.R.B. 449 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

CONE MILLS CORPORATION 449
Cone Mills Corporation and Local 259 , Textile Work- to cost, actuarial assumptions , and employee cen-
ers Union of America , AFL-CIO, CLC. Cases sus figures. Respondent's assertion that the Union
11-CA-3036 and 11-CA-3038 needed to know only the benefit levels under the
January 30, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND BROWN
On July 12, 1967, Trial Examiner Thomas S.
Wilson issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
The Trial Examiner also recommended that certain
allegations of other unfair labor practices be
dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision with a supporting
brief. The General Counsel also filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor
Relations Board has delegated its powers in con-
nection with this case to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's
Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Ex-
aminer to the extent consistent herewith.
Various Locals of the Textile Workers Union"
represent employees at Respondent's seven plants
in North Carolina. The Union, after terminating ex-
isting contracts at these seven plants, began
negotiations for new agreements in May-November
1965. These negotiations failed to produce any
final, written agreement despite some 39 bargaining
sessions extending into February 1967. The Ex-
aminer found that Respondent's conduct regarding
the pension plan and dues checkoff proposals failed
to satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith and thus
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. We agree with
his findings respecting the pension plan, but dis-
agree with the finding of bad-faith bargaining con-
cerning a checkoff.
The facts, as more fully set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, amply support the finding that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to
provide the Union with information relevant to bar-
gaining on the Company's pension plan proposal,
and by thereafter unilaterally implementing that
proposed plan.2 The Union sought information as
company plan is no defense. For the requested data
was clearly relevant to a comparison of, and bar-
gaining on, the Company's and Union's proposals;
the refusal to make these figures available to the
Union served to frustrate meaningful bargaining. It
is also no defense that Respondent desired quick
union approval of its plan for tax purposes and of-
fered to bargain about changes or improvements in
the plan which it implemented. The Act requires
that a pension plan, as a term or condition of em-
ployment, be instituted through a bargained agree-
ment with the Union, and not unilaterally
established by the Company. Respondent has
defaulted in its bargaining obligation in respect to
the pension plan by withholding relevant informa-
tion from the Union and then imposing its own plan.
Such conduct violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Respondent's bargaining with respect to Union
dues is in a different posture. It is true that Respond-
ent came up with some rather vague and specious
reasons for declining the Union's proposals. And,
as also appears from the Trial Examiner's Decision,
there are other circumstances which render suspect
Respondent's bargaining in the matter of dues col-
lection. But, at the same time, there are factors
which offset these suspicious circumstances. Thus,
we find insufficient evidence of any determination
by Respondent to weaken or destroy the Union.
Respondent has dealt with the Union almost con-
tinuously since the 1930's. And since 1955 the
Union has functioned without any provision for the
checkoff of dues. The present negotiations
produced agreement on many items, including a 6.2
percent wage increase. The checkoff proposals
received much attention throughout the negotia-
tions. And the Company was not shown to have
precluded the Union from exploring the dues col-
lection topic; in fact, it indicated some willingness
to go along on two of the Union's alternatives - col-
lecting dues during work time and providing a dues
collection booth on company property. The record
shows, contrary to the Examiner's finding, that
these two proposals originated with the Union, and
we perceive no basis for terming Respondent's in-
terest in them a sham or "joker." Thus, the bargain-
ing background and overall course o_f the negotia-
tions tend to negate the "bad faith" import of the
above-mentioned evidence. Upon the entire record,
we cannot say that Respondent's bargaining on
checkoff went beyond "hard bargaining" into the
realm of bad-faith bargaining such as would warrant
an 8(a)(5) finding.3
1 For sake of simplicity, the Locals are referred to herein as the continued refusal to provide the requested data and its January 1, 1966,
"Union " unilateral implementation of its own plan fell within the 10(b) period.
2 We agree with the Examiner that these findings are not precluded by S C£ H. K. Porter Co., Inc, 153 NLRB 1370, enfd. 363 F.2d 272
Section 10(b)'s limitations period. The Union made it quite clear that its (C.A.D.C.); Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works , Inc., 160 NLRB 175, enfd.
interest in bargaining on pension plans and request for information ex- 390 F.2d 846 (C.A.D.C.); Alba-Waldensian , Inc., 167 NLRB 695.
tended beyond the December 2, 1965, cutoff date. Thus , the Company's
169 NLRB No. 59
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
The Trial Examiner also concluded that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
discharging greige tender Ralph Johnson. This con-
clusion rests on his subsidiary findings that the
Company "considered Johnson to be the Union's
leader in the workload dispute," and that this
leadership, plus the desire to discourage union ef-
forts to favorably settle the dispute, motivated the
discharge. We do not agree.
It does appear that Johnson complained to the
Union and to fellow employees about the printers
shifting work to the tenders. But there is no
evidence that Johnson was delegated the role of a
union leader or spokesman in this dispute. John-
son's complaint on May 12, which started the
events leading to the discharge, was admittedly
prompted by his personal concern that printer Kirk-
man had failed to do his share of the work, and not
by. any broader interests of the Union. Moreover,
there is insufficient basis for inferring that Respond-
ent viewed Johnson as a union advocate or,
spokeman for other employees. The record shows
that the Company was faced with a troublesome,
longstanding dispute between the printers and the
tenders over the division of work on the printing
machines. Johnson had engaged in conduct which,
in the Company's eyes, hindered the resolution of
this dispute. Respondent had warned Johnson
several times about coming in early and stirring up
"trouble" with employees working on the third
shift. On two occasions, Johnson challenged the
Company to "prove" he was causing trouble. When
charged again with creating "trouble" on May 12,
John anded that Superintendent-Thornburg
"prove it." Thornburg, nnown for his temper, im-
mediately decided to discharge Johnson as a
"troublemaker."
On this record, we find an insufficient showing
that the Respondent, in discharging Johnson, was
unlawfully motivated. As noted, the record does not
establish Johnson's role as a union "leader," and
Johnson's flippant "prove it" response, in the cir-
cumstances described, offered ample legitimate
reason for discharge to the quick-tempered Thorn-
burg. In sum, we find General Counsel has failed to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Company unlawfully discharged Johnson.
Finally, the Trial Examiner found that Respond-
ent violated the Act by discharging eight em-
ployees for participating in a one-half hour, in-plant
"protest" of Ralph Johnson's discharge. Concerted
action to protest the discharge of a fellow employee
is, of course, a protected activity.4 Hence, we adopt
the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent's
discharge of the eight protesters violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.5
4 Summit Mining Corp., 119 NLRB 1668, 1672-73, enfd. 260 F.2d
894, 897 (C.A. 3).
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respond-
ent, Cone Mills Corporation, Greensboro, Nort h
Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the
Union as the representative of all the employees in
the appropriate bargaining units, by failing to pro-
vide information relevant to bargaining on a pension
plan and by unilaterally instituting a plan of its own.
(b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating
against employees for engaging in concerted activi-
ties protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with
the employees' right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action that we
find will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good
faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees in the ap-
propriate units, and embody in a written, signed
document all understandings reached.
(b) Promptly furnish to the Union the requested
information on pension plans.
(c) Upon request of the Union, rescind the pen-
sion plan which the Respondent unilaterally imple-
mented on January 1, 1966.
(d) Offer to each of the employees named below
immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make each of them whole in the manner set forth in
"The Remedy" section of the Trial Examiner's
Decision: Eugene Henley, Edward Dick, Ronald
Gardner, William Tingen, Jr., Lester Flippin, Al-
fred Walker, Noah Lewis, and Jack Wells.
(e) Notify the above-named employees, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
(f) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and re-
5 We also adopt the Eaminer's dismissal of certain other 8(a)(1) allega-
tions.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION 451
ports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Decision.
(g) Post at Respondent's plants herein in the
State of North Carolina, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix."6 Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
11, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(h Notify the Regional Director for Region 11,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
WE WILL respect the rights of our employees
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any
labor organization, or to bargain collectively in
respect to terms or conditions of employment
through said Union, or any representative of
their own choosing, or to refrain from such ac-
tivity, and WE WILL NOT interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer-
cise of these rights. You and all our employees
are free to become members of any labor or-
ganization, or to refrain from doing so.
Dated By
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals En-
forcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate
the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discharge or in other way dis-
criminate against employees for protesting the
firing of another employee or for other con-
certed activities protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
in good faith with the Union as the representa-
tive of all our employees in the appropriate
units.
WE WILL furnish the Union with requested
information concerning pension plans, and,
upon request, rescind the pension plan we in-
stituted on January 1, 1966.
WE WILL offer to each of the employees
named below immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges, and will make each whole
for any loss. of pay he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination practiced against
him together with interest thereon at 6 percent
per annum:
Eugene Henley Lester Flippin
Edward Dick Alfred Walker
Ronald Gardner Noah Lewis
William Tingen, Jr. Jack Wells
CONE MILLS CORPORA-
TION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
Note: We will notify the above-named em-
ployees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 1624 Wachovia Building, 301 North Main
Street, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27101,
Telephone 723-2911.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS S . WILSON, Trial Examiner : Upon separate
charges.duly filed on May 27, 1966 , and on June 2, 1966,
respectively , by Local 259, Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, CLC, hereinafter called the Union,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board , hereinafter referred to as the General Counsel'
and the Board , respectively , by the Regional Director for
Region 11 , Winston-Salem, North Carolina, issued its
consolidated complaint dated July 29, 1966 , against Cone
Mills Corporation , hereinafter referred to as the Re-
spondent.
The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act , 1947, as amended , herein referred to as the
' This term specifically includes the attorney appearing for the General
Counsel at the hearing.
350-212 0-70-30
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Act. The consolidated complaint was further amended on
January 18 , 1967.2
Respondent duly filed answers admitting certain allega-
tions of the complaint and amendment thereto but deny-
ing the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice , a hearing thereon was held in
Greensboro , North Carolina, from March 13 to March
16, 1967, inclusive , before Trial Examiner Thomas S.
Wilson . All parties appeared at the hearing, were
represented by counsel , and were afforded full opportuni-
ty to be heard, to produce , examine and cross -examine
witnesses , and to introduce evidence material and per-
tinent to the issues . At the conclusion of the hearing, oral
argument was waived . Briefs were received from General
Counsel and Respondent on May 1, 1967.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Cones Mills Corporation is now, and has been at all
times material herein, a corporation engaged in the
processing, printing, and finishing of textile products at its
several plants located in the State of North Carolina and
elsewhere. Respondent's Proximity Print Works plant,
White Oak plant, Minneola plant, Edna plant, Salisbury
plant, Granite plant, and Tabardrey plant, all located in
North Carolina, are involved in this proceeding. Respond-
ent, during the past 12 months, which period is represent-
ative of all times material herein, purchases raw materi-
als, goods, and supplies valued in excess of $100,000
from points outside the State of. North Carolina, and in a
like period sold and shipped finished products valued in
excess of $100,000 to points outside the State of North
Carolina.
As these jurisdictional facts are admitted in Respond-
ent's answer, I, accordingly find that at all times materi-
al herein, Respondent was and is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNION INVOLVED
Local 259, Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, CLC, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Refusal to Bargain
1. The facts
There are, as noted above, seven of Respondent's
plants involved in this refusal-to-bargain phase of the in-
stant matter. All seven are located in and around the city
of Greensboro, North Carolina, area: The White Oak and
Proximity Print Works in Greensboro itself, Salisbury
plant at Salisbury, Edna plant in Reidsville, Minneola
plant in Gibsonville, and the Granite and Tabardrey
plants in Haw River.
2 Thus, the General Counsel's pleading in this case consisted of the
consolidated complaint dated July 29, 1966 , and a separate amendment to
complaint dated January 10, 1967. At this hearing the fact that the issues
were stated in two distinct separate documents caused some confusion.
The Trial Examiner suggests that , when separate complaints are con-
The complaint alleged and Respondent's answer ad-
mitted, the appropriate units in each individual plant and
the Union's majority representation therein at all times
material here. Therefore, I find in accordance with such
admission by Respondent.
The evidence showed that for approximately 10 years
prior to 1962, Respondent and the Union had annual col-
lective-bargaining agreements in each of these seven
plants. All these contracts were automatically renewable
in the absence of notice of termination thereof. Since
about 1952 none of these collective-bargaining agree-
ments contained a dues-checkoff clause in favor of the
Union. Prior thereto some of these agreements had con-
tained such a dues-checkoff clause.
Commencing in or about 1962, the agreements at vari-
ous of these plants were terminated by the Union
although recognition of the Union continued and the
Union and Respondent maintained their relationship on
a continuing basis without benefit of written contracts.
The collective agreement at White Oak, Respondent's
largest plant, was terminated by the Union on October
20, 1965, after which time there were no written agree-
ments in effect at any of these plants.
Negotiations looking to a new contract at Edna began
at Edna on May 11, 1965, at Salisbury on October 4,
1965, at Proximity on October 6, at Granite on the morn-
ing of October 12, at Tabardrey on the afternoon of Oc-
tober 12, at White Oak on the morning of November 17,
and at Minneola on the afternoon of that same day. These
so-called negotiations had, at the time of the hearing, con-
tinued through a total of 39 sessions over a period of
better than 21 months through February 24, 1967,
without agreement at any of the seven plants.
Early in the negotiations the Union suggested the
negotiation of one contract to cover all seven plants as the
demands at each of the seven would be similar. Respond-
ent rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it
"preferred" to negotiate for each plant individually as it
had customarily done in the past. The Union acceded to
Respondent's preference.
At the hearing evidence was developed by General
Counsel as to the negotiations at each individual plant
and about all 39 meetings held between May 11, 1965,
and February 24, 1967. This Trial Examiner has no in-
tention of wasting the time and space necessary to
describe the negotiations at each plant because the
testimony of these negotiations at each plant as adduced
by both General Counsel and Respondent sounded like
nothing more than a phonograph playing a broken record
where the needle continues to revolve in one groove only.
This reiteration of the same themes continued more than
1 year and 9 months at each negotiation session no matter
what contract was being there considered. It was a test of
human endurance, to say the very least.
a. The pension plan
At the commencement of negotiations the Union set
forth 12 demands, the same 12 demands at each plant. By
the time of the instant hearing the Union at least had
abandoned six of these and reduced others. Among the
solidated for hearing or amended prior to hearing, better practice dictates
the issuance by General Counsel of a single amended consolidated com-
plaint . This problem is so rampant throughout the various regions of the
Board that it should be corrected.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION
demands made were one for a pension providing $175 per
month, including social security, for employees having 20
years of service and another clause permitting employees
at each plant to have their dues checked off by Respond-
ent to the Union. It was on these two issues that the
negotiations floundered-and ended with diametrically
opposite results. Apparently the parties were in agree-
ment in regard to all other issues.
As found above, the original union demand made in
May 1965, was for a funded pension plan providing each
employee at retirement age, after 20 years' service with
Respondent, a minimum pension of $175 per month, in-
cluding social security, and vesting on all employees after
10 years continuous service but at a proportionately
reduced amount.
On September 29, 1965, Respondent forwarded to the
Union its own counterproposal on the pension plan. This
plan provided a pension figured at $1 per month per year
of service at retirement age of 65 with percentage reduc-
tions thereof on earlier retirement beginning at the age of
60. The plan guaranteed retirees a minimum monthly pen-
sion of $20 a month. But, under the terms of this plan, this
minimum would also be the maximum for those retiring
within the first 20 months of the institution of the pension
plan regardless of the length of the employees' service
with Respondent prior to the establishment of the plan.
The plan also failed to vest rights in an employee prior to
retirement. The plan proposed was companywide and not
restricted to any individual plant.
The first discussion of the Company's proposed pen-
sion plan occurred at the negotiations on the Salisbury
contract on October 4, 1965. At this time the union
representative, Mullins, objected to the proposed plan,
first because those retiring immediately after the institu-
tion of the plan would be deprived of their previous years
of service with Respondent and restricted to a pension of
$20 per month regardless of previous service, because the
employees received no vested rights to a pension prior to
retirement; and further urged that the pension be figured
at $1.50 per month per year instead of the $1 as specified
in Respondent's proposed plan. Vice Presidents Clarence
Cone and John Bagwill for Respondent rejected these ob-
jections out of hand saying that this plan was all Respond-
ent could afford and that it was the "best" possible
pension plan.
On or about October 12, 1965, the Union's research
department in New York City had compiled a com-
parison of Respondent's proposed plan with four other
pension plans which the Union had previously accepted
at mills in nearby North Carolina or Tennessee. This
comparison disclosed a number of shortcomings in the
plan proposed by Respondent. Soon after the receipt of
this comparison Mullins for the Union again rejected
Respondent's proposed plan but offered to accept any
one of the four plans used by the research department in
making its comparison. Cone and Bagwill rejected this
offer stating only that Respondent's plan was all that
Respondent could afford and that it was the "best" of all
pension plans. Thereafter this broken phonograph record
was replayed at each negotiation session at each plant up
to the date of the hearing.
The Union's Regional Director, Paul Swaity, accom-
panied by one Prosten who was the Union's expert on
pension plans, appeared at the negotiations on the Edna
contract on November 9, 1965. Swaity orally requested
the cost of Respondent's proposed pension plan and the
453
actuarial assumptions upon which it was based. Cone an-
swered that the Union did not need to know the cost of
the plan and should be interested only in the benefits
thereunder. Finally, however, Respondent gave an esti-
mated guess that the cost of the plan would be about 5
cents per hour. The Union answered that on what little in-
formation they were able to adduce, it figured the cost at
no more than 1-1/2 or 2 cents. Prosten again requested
that Respondent furnish the cost and the actuarial as-
sumptions upon which the plan was based.
Cone reiterated his refusal again stating that the Union
"did not need" the cost or actuari al figures as the benefits
were all the Union need be concerned with. Before the
meeting ended Swaity had protested that the pension con-
tribution was insufficient, requested a pension based
upon $1.50 (instead of $1) per month per year of service,
and repeated his request for the cost and actual assump-
tions of the plan.
This whole scene was repeated the next day,
November 10, at the Proximity Print Works negotiation
and again on November 11 at the Salisbury negotiations
with Respondent reiterating the negative position it had
originally taken in regard thereto on November 9. In
other words, the phonograph needle remained in the same
groove.
Under date of November 15, 1965, Paul Swaity, on be-
half of the Union, wrote Respondent as follows:
During our recent round of negotiations at the
Edna, Print Works and Salisbury Cone plants we
pointed out the serious shortcomings in the com-
pany's pension proposal. We are particularly con-
cerned that the pension proposed by the company
does not provide for vesting or increased payments
based on years of service.
At our last negotiating conference we brought in a
specialist on pensions in the hope we could prevail
on the company to amend its pension proposal. In
view of the complexity of this subject, it seems clear
that further discussion is necessary before a satisfac-
tory arrangement can be achieved. It is our intention
to submit to the company a pension proposal that
more closely meets the wishes of our people. To do
so, however, requires specific data on which to base
our assumptions.
This will, therefore, confirm our oral request of
November 9, 10 and 11 wherein we requested the
following actuarial information on which the com-
pany's pension proposal is based.
(1) Set of actuarial assumptions, including (a) mor-
tality, (b) turnover, and (c) interest.
(2) Census of employees to be covered by plan, in-
cluding (a) age, (b) length of service, and (c) sex.
I am aware of the company's desire to implement
the pension as quickly as possible. However, this is
a very vital aspect of our contractual agreement and
more discussion is necessary. We will make every ef-
fort to prepare the Union's counter proposal as
quickly as possible after receiving the above actuari-
al data.
It is undisputed that Respondent did not answer this
letter and never supplied the information requested.
About this time Cone announced at one of the negotia-
tion sessions that Respondent intended to put the pension
plan into effect on January 1, 1966, and thus needed the
Union's prompt approval thereof so that the plan could be
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
submitted to the Internal Revenue Service for tax pur-
poses prior to the effective date thereof. The Union
specifically stated that it did not approve Respondent's
proposed plan and wanted further negotiations on it after
receipt of the requested information.3
On December 3, 1965, Swaity wrote Respondent as
follows:
I am deeply disturbed to learn that, notwithstand-
ing my letter to you of October [November] 15th,
the company has decided to implement its pension
proposals without giving the union a chance to sub-
mit its counter proposals.
The subject of a pension is vital to the workers the
union represents at Cone Mills. At our Negotiations
meetings on November 9, 10 and 11, we requested
actuarial information to enable the union to submit
counter proposals that would meet the shortcomings
of the plan the company submitted.
I am at a loss to understand why the company has
not answered my letter of October 15th and, instead,
implemented a pension plan without further notice as
though no collective bargaining relationship existed
with this union.
I can only view this action of the company as a
refusal to bargain on a subject that the NLRB has re-
peatedly held as a mandatory subject for collective
bargaining.
As threatened Respondent made its pension plan effec-
tive as of January 1, 1966, without change and without
the Union's approval but with the stated reservation that
the Union could continue to bargain regarding it if the
Union cared to.
However, despite the Union's objections thereto, this
pension plan has remained without change since January
1, 1966. According to Cone some union members have
since retired and accepted their pensions thereunder; i.e.,
the minimum $20 per month regardless of their previous
length of service.
b. The checkoff
Negotiations between Respondent and the Union
floundered also on the question of union security. Among
the Union's original demands was one that Respondent
permit its employees to have their union dues checked off
monthly by Respondent to the Union.
Admittedly Respondent permitted their employees
without objection to employ such checkoff system to pay
their United Fund contributions, their debts to the credit
union , and their purchase of United States saving bonds
among other things.
The negotiators reached this demand for the first time
at the first negotiation session on May 11, 1965, at Salis-
bury. Cone's prompt answer to this demand of the Union
was in the negative on the ground that "it was not in the
best interest of the Company." Cone gave the same an-
swers throughout every negotiation session to the very
last one on February 24, 1967, when he again refused
Respondent's request on the ground that "it was not in
the best interest of the Company." That in a nutshell is
the history of the negotiations over the checkoff.
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
When it was pointed out to Cone that the checkoff was
used for the above-enumerated purposes, Cone agreed
but distinguished the use of the checkoff for those pur-
poses from its use for the payment of union dues on-the
grounds that its use for the United Fund, credit union and
United States bonds was "in the company's best in-
terests" whereas for union dues was not.
During the course of the negotiations the Union made
several alternative suggestions which were all rejected by
Respondent. One of these was that the union employees
would buy United States bonds in the name of the Union
on the checkoff system which Respondent would turn
over to the Union when paid for. Cone rejected this on
the grounds that it was pure "subterfuge" masking a regu-
lar dues-checkoff system and so was not "in the best in-
terest of the company."
Respondent itself made, two suggestions. Cone said
Respondent would permit a union departmental represent-
ative to collect dues from the employees during working
hours and on company property provided, as Respond-
ent's brief states it, that "such solicitation does not inter-
fere with the work of the employees involved." And at
the Proximity Print Works Respondent said it would
build a permanent booth to be placed at a gate entrance
where dues could be collected by the Union on payday.
In fact Respondent stated it would put this booth on
wheels so that it could be moved from gate to gate. The
Proximity plant has seven such employee entrance gates.
Respondent's brief argues that, if Respondent has been
interested in weakening the Union on this union-security
issue , or preventing it from carrying out its statutory
rights of representation, Respondent would not have of-
fered "these procedures which facilitate the collection of
dues by the Union from its members." The brief further
cites these two offers as proof that the Respondent has
bargained over this issue of union security "with an open
mind and desire to reach an accord." These arguments
must have been made with tongue in cheek. The quoted
proviso in Respondent's offer No. 1 effectively eliminates
that procedure as a method of collecting dues for it is
quite impossible during working hours to solicit dues
from a working employee without "interfering" with his
work, as well as the work of the solicitor. And one booth,
even on wheels, could hardly cover seven gates adequate-
ly for the collection of dues on payday. The jokers in-
herent in each of these so-called offers render each of
them practically useless for the collection of dues. The
making of such offers, contrary to the contention in
Respondent's brief, hardly qualifies as proof of Respond-
ent's bargaining "with an open mind and desire to reach
accord." In fact, it tends to prove the contrary.
When pressed for specific objections to the checkoff
during negotiations, Cone stated that: (1) the Union had
been a source of trouble to the Company during the years
the checkoff had been in existence; (2) the Company's ex-
perience was that it had much less trouble with the Union
when the Union did not have any checkoff; (3) "in 1951
[when the checkoff was still permitted] the Union had a
strike which .. did great harm to the Company"; and (4)
he felt that the 1959 strike at Dwight Mill in Gadsden,
Alabama, was the "direct result" of the checkoff. Hence,
according to Cone, the checkoff was "not in the best in-
8 Admittedly the above is a capsulized account of the negotiations at the
Cone plants . The admitted fact is, however , that the needle remained in
the same groove throughout all the negotiation sessions.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION
terest of the Company."4 Cone ended by stating that he
was not going to grant the checkoff to help the Union
build a "strong" union.
At the hearing--but not during the negotiations - Cone
cited certain other reasons for Respondent's refusal to
grant the checkoff. First, Cone maintained that unions
required to collect their own dues without reliance upon
a checkoff were more responsive to the interests of its
membership and attuned to their desires. Second, Cone
believed that payroll deductions tended to create a feeling
of ill will among the employees and appeared to fear that
dues deductions might alienate employees from their
union on that account. In Cone's mind apparently the
deductions made for the United Fund, credit union or
United States bonds did not create this feeling of ill
will -but union dues deductions would. Third, the collec-
tion of union dues was an internal union matter with
which Cone did not desire to become involved because
the Act requires an employer to maintain a "hands off
policy" in such matters. And lastly as the Union had been
"irresponsible" in the past, Cone did not desire to make
it into a "strong" union 5
Respondent's brief sums up the matter this way: "This
long period of experience of dealing with this Union has
led Respondent to the considered judgment that it does
not advance its interests or those of its employees to
serve as a collecting agent of financial obligations from
the members to the Union. This is particularly true in
view of the type of checkoff clause requested by this
Union (Exhibit A to R: E.3) which is fraught with
problems to Respondent from some of its employees."
[Emphasis supplied j6
Once during the negotiations the Union offered to
withdraw its demand for the checkoff provided that the
Respondent would agree to certain stated financial im-
provements in the contract. Respondent did not choose
to accept the trade.
Thus the matter stood at the time of the hearing. The
Union was still demanding the checkoff. Respondent was
still refusing on the grounds that it "was not in the best in-
terest of the Company" and, as Cone said, Respondent
was going to do nothing to help the Union become a
"strong" union.
2. Conclusions
The history of the negotiation at issue here lead but to
the conclusion that Respondent entered the negotiations
on May 11, 1965, with the fixed determination, adhered
to the very end on February 24, 1967, that it would reach
no collective agreement with the Union except on
Respondent's own terms. To date, Respondent has been
eminently successful in this endeavor.
At the very commencement of the negotiations here the
Union suggested that the parties conduct one set of
negotiations covering all seven of Respondent's plants, a
suggestion of merit from the point of view of efficiency
and timesaving. Cone promptly rejected the idea. The
' Yet, during his testimony, Cone cited this Dwight strike as a "good
strike." It was a "good strike," according to Cone, because Dwight was
not "competitive" in the textile field so that Respondent would have had
to close it anyhow. So the 1959 strike was a "good strike" because it
helped Respondent in so doing. However other testimony indicated that
the purpose of the strike at Dwight was to force Respondent to grant the
same 8-cent wage increase which was at the time going through the
southern textile industry. As a result of this 5-week strike, Respondent
455
only argument he gave for this was that Respondent
"preferred" to negotiate for each plant separately
because it had always been done that way in the past. For
an employer entering negotiations with an open mind and
anxious to reach agreement, this seems a strange, ineffi-
cient, and unbusinesslike decision. For an employer en-
tering the negotiations with a mind determined not to
reach agreement, Cone's decision makes sense. Seven
negotiations can be made to take at least seven times as
long and, if agreement appears imminent at any one point,
a shrewd negotiator can always play one plant off against
another so that agreement can either be forestalled or, at
the worse, interplant union friction can be created.
By the date of the hearing herein the parties had
reached agreement on all items except two: Respondent's
pension plan and the checkoff. But because of these two
items no agreement has been consummated.
Section 8(d) defines the statutory duty to bargain col-
lectively as "the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, ..." The facts here prove that Respond-
ent always had the time and the vice presidents to spare
to sit and chat with representatives of the Union over
wages, hours, and working conditions through 39
meetings covering a period of more than .1 year and 9
months. The facts likewise prove that these vice pres-
idents on these occasions over this period of time did no
bargaining on either of the two issues which divided the
parties, pension plan and checkoff, other than to repeat
over and over again that the pension plan proposed by the
Respondent, being the "best" of all possible pension
plans, would go into effect as of January 1, 1966, that the
Union had "no need" for the cost and actuarial informa-
tion which it had requested from Respondent about that
plan, and "no" to the Union's request for the checkoff.
Respondent most certainly fulfilled the first part of the
mutual obligation required by Section 8(d) "to meet at
reasonable times." But just as certainly Respondent
failed in the second part of that mutual obligation to
"confer in good faith."
While it is also true that Section 8(d) does not require
"concessions" by any party to the negotiations, it still
verges on the unusual, if the bargaining is actually being
conducted in good faith, to find the parties 1 year and 9
months and 38 meetings later in the exact same position
they were in at the very first meeting- as occurred in this
case due exclusively to the incessant repetition
throughout these so-called negotiations of two statements
by Respondent's vice presidents: (1) Respondent's pen-
sion plan being the best possible pension plan was going
into effect on January 1, 1966, regardless of the Union's
opposition thereto; and (2) the checkoff was not "in the
best interest of the Company." The only possible implica-
tion from this incessant repetition was that Respondent
was bound and determined under all circumstances to put
its own pension plan into effect on January 1, 1966,
negotiated the 8-cent wage increase and then closed the Dwight mill. In
addition the Union acknowledged that there had been some irresponsible
local union leaders at Dwight.
5 Cone evaded answering the question as to whether Respondent would
grant the checkoff to a union it considered to be "responsible."
6 There is not one word of testimony in this record that Cone made any
objection to the phraseology of the checkoff authorization card during the
negotiations. In fact the discussion never got that far.
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
without change and that the idea that Respondent would
ever grant checkoff rights was ridiculous.
Of course, the Union could have had seven agreements
on Respondent's terms-but with Respondent's pension
plan unchanged and no checkoff.
This was conclusively proved when the Union offered
to swap its demand for the checkoff for certain economic
benefits and Respondent rejected the challenge. In other
words there was to be no give or take in these negotia-
tions. Any contract executed would be exclusively on
terms predetermined by Respondent- otherwise no con-
tract. This is not bargaining in good faith.
And that is the way it is today; Respondent's pension
without change has been in effect since January 1, 1966,
and no contract has been executed.
a. The pension plan
As regards the negotiations of the pension plan,
Respondent submitted its plan to the Union on Sep-
tember 29, 1965. The Union's research department made
a comparison of the plan submitted with four plans al-
ready in effect, with the Union's consent, at other com-
pany plants in the vicinity by October 12, 1965, which in-
dicated several aspects of the Respondent's plan con-
siderably less favorable to the employees than the other
four plants; to wit, the amount of the pensions, credit for
previous service, the vesting of pension rights, etc. When
the Union offered to accept any of the other four plans in-
stead of Respondent's, Cone rejected the offer on the
grounds that Respondent's was the "best" plan and all
Respondent could afford.7 Then orally on September 9,
10, and 11 and in writing on September 15, and again on
December 3, 1965, the Union requested the cost figure
of Respondent's plan and the actuarial assumptions on
which the plan was based. These requests Respondent
refused and ignored on the grounds, as Cone put it, that
the Union had no "need" therefor as the Union should be
interested only in the benefits provided therein. Cone's
refusal to supply the requested information was thus due
either to his own omniscience in knowing that that infor-
mation would do nobody any good or because Respond-
ent had no intention of bargaining in relation to the plan
it had proposed. Subsequent facts indicate the latter. The
information requested was pertinent to a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining ,8 necessary and important for any
further bargaining or trading on the subject."
Respondent's brief argues that the Union had no
"need" for the facts requested because it actually had
suggested improvements in the amount of the benefits
and in the vesting of rights under the plan without the in-
formation. However the brief fails to consider the fact
that the Union might have preferred to substitute wage in-
creases for the pension plan proposed. In fact, if Respond-
ent's "guess " that the pension plan would cost 5 cents
an hour was true , it is possible that Respondent could
have saved money in such a swap. But Respondent was
adamant-it was Respondent 's pension plan or nothing.
This is not good-faith bargaining.
As the facts requested by the Union and refused by
Respondent were necessary, pertinent and material to
further bargaining on the pension issue , Respondent's
' Cone did not specify the best for whom.
8 Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB 850, enfd. 205
F.2d 131 (C.A. 1). Inland Steel Company v . N.L.R.B ., 170 F.2d 247
(C. A. 7).
refusal to supply same as requested constituted a refusal
to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act. I will recommend that Respondent supply the
requested information.
Respondent's brief introduces the technical defense as
to this information issue that , as Respondent originally
refused the Union's request for the information a couple
of weeks before the Union's written request for the same
sated November 15, 1965, this refusal of information
cannot be found to constitute an unfair labor practice
because of the 6-month limitation of Section 10(b) of the
Act. The charge here was filed June 2, 1966, so that the
critical or 10(b) period began, according to Respondent's
figures, on December 2, 1965. Respondent's contention
might be meritorious if the Union's last request for infor-
mation had been the request of November 15, 1965, but
the facts show without dispute that the Union renewed its
request for this information by letter dated December 3,
1965, which Respondent again chose to ignore. If
Respondent were bargaining in good faith and with an
open mind, there was always a chance that Respondent
might change its mind and supply the requested informa-
tion-although in this case it did not . Because of this
December 3 letter at least, this contention of Respond-
ent's is without merit.
This defense could have merit only on the theory that
once Respondent had said "no," that ended the matter.
This theory tends to confirm the thought that Respondent
did not enter these negotiations with an open mind.
By putting its own pension plan into effect on January
1, 1966, without change and without the Union 's consent
thereto, Respondent unilaterally changed the wages and
working conditions of its employees . By so changing the
wages and working conditions of its employees uni-
laterally and over the Union's objection, Respondent
again violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by failing to bargain
in good faith.
Respondent's brief suggests that Respondent had the
right to make such unilateral changes because an "im-
passe" had developed between the parties on the pension
plan issue . This Trial Examiner cannot agree that an im-
passe had in fact developed. However if, contrary to this
last finding, an "impasse" had in fact developed on the is-
sue, this "impasse" resulted solely from the fact that
Respondent illegally refused to supply information
requested by the Union and required in order to continue
negotiations thereon. Thus this so-called "impasse"
resulted exclusively from the lack of good faith on the
part of the Respondent. This is not the type of "impasse"
which would justify Respondent in unilaterally instituting
the pension plan over the Union's objections.
b. The checkoff
The complaint next alleged that Respondent had failed
to bargain in good faith about union security ; i.e., the
checkoff.
The facts show that Respondent never did bargain
about the checkoff in good faith . At the very first meeting
at which the issue was discussed Cone and Bagwill
refused the checkoff- in fact , ridiculed the idea of a
checkoff-because "it was not in the best interest of the
' Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 154 NLRB 1756, enfd. 358 F.2d 591
(C.A. 1), and see May 11, 1967, address by Stanley S. Surrey, 65 LRRM
53.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION 457
Company. " One year, 9 months, and 38 meetings later
Respondent was still refusing to grant the
checkoff- because "it was not in the best interest of the
Company."
When pressed for reasons as to why the checkoff was
not in the best interest of the Company, Cone quite can-
didly stated that Respondent was not about to help make
the Union into a "strong " union , that Respondent had
had less "trouble" with the Union without the checkoff
than it had had when the Union enjoyed the checkoff
right , i.e., during the period preceding , but including, the
1951 strike, and that the 1959 Dwight strike was the
"direct result" of the fact that the checkoff was in effect
there. Obviously Cone and Respondent equated a
"strong" union with one which received its dues by
means of the checkoff. Equally, obviously neither Cone
nor Respondent wanted a strong union representing its
employees. In this Respondent may well have been
right-from the company standpoint . The same argument
leads to the conclusion that "it is not in the best interest
of' the employer to have any union representing its em-
ployees. Cone, however, did not vocally carry his argu-
ment to the ultimate.
To counterbalance the idea that Respondent had a
closed mind on the checkoff issue , Respondent's brief
points out that Respondent offered : (1) to allow the
Union to have an authorized agent collect dues in the de-
partment of the plant during working time "provided that
that did not interfere with the work," and (2) to build a
permanent booth on wheels where the Union could col-
lect dues at the gate on payday . Respondent's brief ap-
pears to argue that these two offers "to facilitate the col-
lection of dues" proves that the Respondent was bargain-
ing on the issue with an open mind . The bona fides of
these two offers is questionable at the very least because
an employee at work can hardly be solicited for his union
dues on working time "without interfering with his work"
and one permanent booth located at a gate entrance, even
when on wheels, is hardly to be considered an efficient
method for the collection of dues at a plant having seven
entrance gates for employees . These offers would have
hardly facilitated the collection of dues. In fact the jokers
contained in these offers were so obvious that Cone must
have been having his little joke at the Union's expense by
even making the offers.
Cone's arguments , both during negotiations and at the
hearing, suggest also that Respondent recognized the
Union 's need for a steady source of income and had
determined resolutely to refuse any such type of
procedure in order to prevent the Union from having the
capacity to perform its representative functions and
thereby becoming what Cone described as a "strong"
responsible union . Respondent had appreciated those
years without a collective-bargaining agreement and with
a weak representative of its employees and intended to
keep things that way.
At the hearing Cone made the charge that Respondent
refused the right of'checking off union dues because the
Union was "irresponsible" in having caused the 1951 and
1959 strikes but, when asked, refused to make any intel-
ligible answer as to whether the checkoff would be given
to a union which Respondent considered "responsible."
When the Union offered to pay the cost of the checkoff,
Cone refused stating that the cost thereof would be
negligible as the payroll was handled on an IBM machine.
Cone carried his arguments so far as to say that it was
not in "the best interest of the employees " to permit the
checkoff of union dues because that might cause "ill will"
between the employees and the Union. As Cone
discovered no creation of ill will from the checkoff of em-
ployee contributions to the United Fund, the payment of
credit union debts or the purchase of United States
bonds, it is hard to see why the deduction of union dues
would so result, especially as the deduction of union dues,
like the other deductions, would result only from the em-
ployees' own voluntary execution of such a checkoff
authorization. The refusal of the checkoff of union dues
while permitting it for such activities as the United Fund,
the credit union and United States bond proves Respond-
ent's desire to discriminate against the representative of
its employees. It also proves that this discrimination was
being practiced for Respondent 's purposes only and not
that of its employees.
This was further proven when Cone rejected the
Union's suggestion that employees be permitted to
checkoff the amount of their union dues for the purchase
of United States bonds made payable to the Union. Cone
rejected this as a mere "subterfuge." Respondent wanted
a weak union or none at all.
Cone also testified that Respondent rejected the
checkoff of union dues because it was his feeling that a
union forced to collect dues itself from its members was
"more responsive" to the aims and desires of its member-
ship. This contention qualifies both as subterfuge and
evidence of Cone's omniscience. In addition it concerned
a matter exclusively between the member and his union
and of no concern to Cone or Respondent.
When the Union offered publicly to withdraw its
request for the checkoff in return for certain economic ad-
vantages for the employees, Cone rejected the offer.
Cone recognized that he had an issue in the checkoff with
which he could prevent an agreement being reached and
he did not intend to lose it. He was not about to bargain it
away.
Upon the evidence presented here I must find that the
Respondent entered the negotiations with a hermetically
sealed mind on the issue of the granting of the checkoff
for union dues, never bargained in good faith thereon but
instead used the issue to prevent the reaching of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.10
B. The Discharges
1. The facts
Ralph Johnson was first employed by Respondent on
September 25, 1947, and worked continuously thereafter
until his discharge on May 12, 1966.
At the time of his discharge Johnson was a greige or
"gray" tender working on machine No. 3 of Respondent's
10 printing machines in the Proximity Print Works. Each
of these machines is operated by a crew of three men: A
printer, a gray tender and a backtender. On machine No.
10 H K. Porter Company, Inc., 153 NLRB 1370, enfd. 363 F.2d 272
(C.A.D C.); Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, 160 NLRB 175.
458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 the printer was Daniel Kirkman, the gray tender Ralph
Johnson, and backtenderJames "Pete" Johnson.
At Respondent's Proximity plant the tenders were
represented by the Union whereas the printers were
members of a labor organization known as the Machine
Printers Beneficial Association.
For a considerable period of time the tenders had been
complaining that the printers were refusing to do part of
the work which they had been doing for the past 19 years
at least and thus forcing the tenders to do that work
thereby increasing the workload of the tenders.
In the early part of 1966 this workload dispute began
coming to a head with the printers continuing to say more
and more often "that ain't my work" and forcing that
work onto the tenders. Two of the three shifts, at least,
were involved in this workload dispute.
On March 3, 1966, the Union filed a grievance with
Respondent over this workload dispute. At that time
Respondent returned the Union's grievance on the
technical grounds that the grievance failed to specify
specific instances and was not signed by all members of
the complaining group.
However in the early part of April Ben Thornburg, su-
perintendent of the Proximity plant, held a meeting with
the tenders and printers about the dispute. Union Busi-
ness Agent Mullins happened to hear that the meeting
was to be held and attended although without invitation.
At this meeting an attempt was made to work out a job
description of the duties of each of the three members of
the crew. The attempt was unsuccessful as the job
description satisfied none of the parties, particularly the
Respondent which thought that the operation should be
"a team effort" with everybody keeping busy until the
machine was back in operation . During the meeting
Thornburg took occasion to notify Ralph Johnson that
Respondent did not like his arriving at the plant early and
going up and down the line talking and wanted the prac-
tice stopped . Johnson denied causing any trouble and
asked Thornburg to prove it. Thornburg stated that he did
not have to prove it."
Sometime in April a 1-day "holiday" was called to
protest this workload problem.
Finally on May 11, 1966, Thornburg again called each
crew into conference individually and read them a
prepared statement to the effect that from that time on the
operation of the machines was to be "a team effort" dur-
ing color and roller changes with each man keeping busy
until the machine was back in operation. He added "and
that's the way its going to be from now on." Thornburg
first asked Ralph Johnson if he would cooperate with that
program. Ralph agreed "100 percent, if you will carry it
out that way." Pete Johnson also agreed to cooperate.
Kirkman answered, "well, I'm a skilled man, myself" but,
when Thornburg pointed out that both Ralph and Pete
were also skilled men, Kirkman agreed, adding that he
thought he had said "too much." Thornburg again re-
minded Ralph that he wanted Ralph to stop coming in
early in the morning and "causing trouble" by going from
machine to machine. Ralph requested that he call some-
11 This subject came up at this meeting , according to Thornburg's
testimony , because a third shift supervisor [ who did not testify] had
recently told Thornburg that Johnson was arriving early and going up and
down the lines talking and asked Thornburg that it be stopped because his
third shift was not having any workload problems and he, the supervisor,
did not want it to get started on his shift. Admittedly Thornburg and the
supervisor both thought, without having heard any of the conversations,
that Johnson was talking about the workload problem.
body in to prove that he was causing trouble. Thornburg
answered that he did not have to. Thornburg ended the
meeting by saying, "if you boys have any trouble or dis-
agreement about working together on that machine, noti-
fy your supervisor and it will be looked after." Pete and
Ralph returned to the machine. But Thornburg kept Kirk-
man for a few words alone before sending him back to
work.
The following day, May 12, machine No. 3 had to
make a color change about 11:30 a.m. The machine was
stopped. Ralph, as usual, went in search of the four trucks
necessary to remove the boxes to the color room, Pete
began raking color out of one box while Kirkman left for
the restroom. Raking colors out of the box was one of the
jobs which the printers were forcing onto the tenders by
their refusal to consider it part of their, printer's, job.
Ralph secured his trucks and began raking color out of
another box while Pete continued raking colors out of
other boxes. When Kirkman returned from the restroom,
he stood at the workbench watching the others work.
Pete remarked to Ralph, "Is that cooperating?" Ralph
then stopped working and walked to get a sandwich from
a machine some 400 or 500 feet away. Pete continued
working. Kirkman continued watching.
After Ralph finished his sandwich, he went to Super-
visor Billy Gene Thornburg and complained that Kirk-
man was not carrying out his agreement and doing his
share of the work. Billy Gene stated that he would have
to wait until somebody got back from lunch and hastily
left the scene.
According to Ben, Billy Gene reported to his brother,
Ben Thornburg, that he, Billy Gene, had heard that Ralph
was saying that General Manager Gardner would have
Thornburg raking out colors before he would have the
printers do that work and also that Ralph had complained
to him that Kirkman was not keeping his part of the
agreement. 12
Upon receiving this report, Ben Thornburg sent for
Pete Johnson, Kirkman, and the Printers Association
representative to meet with him in the conference room.
At this meeting Thornburg asked Pete if Kirkman was
keeping his agreement and, according to Thornburg's
testimony, Pete answered the question "yes."13 After
receiving this affirmative answer Thornburg then sent
Billy Gene to bring Ralph and Union Representative
Noah Lewis to the conference too.14 With the arrival of
Ralph and Lewis, Thornburg asked, "What's the trouble
on number three?" Ralph answered that Kirkman was not
doing his job whereupon Thornburg continued, "Well, I
understand that you are going up and down the line telling
that Daniel Kirkman is not carrying out his part of the
bargain." Thornburg then asked Pete if Kirkman was
keeping his share of the bargain15 and Pete nodded.
Thornburg turned and said, "Ralph, I warned you about
going up and down the line and stirring up trouble." When
Ralph answered, "Prove it," Thornburg replied that he
did not "have to prove a damn thing" and continued,
"Ralph, I have warned you about going up and down the
line, trying to create trouble. Now, you are just a
Billy Gene Thornburg was not called as a witness.
3 Pete Johnson was not called as a witness.
14 Ralph Johnson testified that he sought out Noah Lewis to accompany
him to the conference room. This conflict is not important enough to be
resolved.
15 Neither Ralph nor Lewis heard this question asked.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION 459
troublemaker." Ralph repeated, "Prove it." Thornburg
said , "Well, its evident that you are just a troublemaker.
I'm discharging you as a troublemaker. Get your
damn clothes and leave."16 Thereupon, about 1:30 p.m.
Ralph walked out of the plant informing a few fellow em-
ployees who inquired that he had been fired.
Upon learning of the discharge of Ralph Johnson, the
plant grapevine began carrying the rumor that there
would be a one-half hour protest work stoppage beginning
at 2 p.m. to protest Ralph's termination.
About 2 p.m., a crowd of employees variously esti-
mated at from 12 to 20 gathered at machine No. 3. One of
the employees present was Pete Johnson. Some of the
machines were shut down while others continued operat-
ing.
Assistant Manager Joseph Wright was promptly in-
formed of the work stoppage and went to the scene where
he estimated some 15 employees had gathered. The first
employee Wright spoke to was Noah Lewis, the union
steward, because, as Wright expressed it, he figured the
union steward "would know what was going on." In
answer to Wright's inquiry if the men were on strike,
Lewis said that they were "protesting the firing of Ralph
... we want you to put him back to work right now" and
suggested further, "Now, Joe, why don't you talk to some
of the boys in here, and we can get this thing settled right
off, and talk to the management just a little bit." Wright
answered, "I ain't got no time for that now" and added
"We have a regular grievance procedure to handle this
sort of thing and we will not put him back to work right
now." He requested Lewis to get the men back to work.
Wright then asked, "Noah, are you on strike? If you are
on strike, you have to leave the plant and if you don't
leave the plant or go back to your job, then I'll have to
discharge you." Lewis again stated that the men were
protesting the discharge of Ralph Johnson. Wright thereu-
pon discharged Lewis.17 -
Employee William Tingen, Jr., said, upon hearing
Wright discharge Lewis, "If you fire Noah, you're going
to have to fire me too." Which Thornburg promptly did,
ordering Billy Gene to escort the two men out of the
plant. 18
Upon seeing Lewis and Tingen escorted from the plant
some of the protesting group returned to work while
others remained standing in the corridor.
Wright then spoke individually with each of the follow-
ing employees: Eugene Henley, Edward Dick, Ronald
Gardner, Lester Flippin, Alfred Walker, and Jack Wells.
These conversations were all similar and went about as
follows, as described by employee Ronald Gardner:
[Wright] said, "What' s going on?"
And I said, "We are protesting Ralph Johnson's
job."
And he said, "Well, is this a strike?"
And I said, "No."
He said, "What are you doing?"
And I said, "I'm protesting."
He said, "Why don't you go back to work?"
And I said, "I will when the rest of the fellows
does."
And he said, "You are terminated."
There were three notable exceptions to this routine.
When Wright told employee Eugene Henley to "go
back to work," Henley answered, "Well, I'm protesting.
IT go back to work as soon as this wrong that I feel has
been committed is right." Wright then ordered Henley to
leave the premises. Then, in Henley's words, "I told him
I would have to be evicted."
When Wright asked employee Ronald Gardner to
leave, Gardner told Wright that he "was going to stay
until 3 o'clock, at the regular quitting time." Wright
discharged him promptly.
When Wright told employee Edward Dick to go back
to his job or he would have to fire Dick, Dick told him, "I
couldn't go back after they had fired all my friends."
Wright discharged him.
About this time someone stated that the half-hour
protest was over and they should go back to work. Ac-
tually Henley, Gardner, and Dick did return to their
machines. However, just about the time they had arrived
at their machines , police officers whom Ben Thornburg
had called also arrived in the plant. Ben Thornburg
pointed out Henley, Gardner, and Dick at their machines
to the officers and said he wanted them arrested for
"trespassing." The officers arrested the three only after
Thornburg had assured them that he-would appear at the
police station to sign warrants for their arrests. The of-
ficers then accompanied the three employees to the patrol
wagon, drove them to the police station where the three
were "booked," fingerprinted, and photographed before
being released.
About 4 p.m., Ben Thornburg appeared at the police
station and signed the warrants for their arrest.
About a week later a hearing was held but it was stipu-
lated that the court dismiss the charges against the three
on the ground that the warrants were improperly drawn.
No further action has been taken in regard thereto.
2. Conclusions
a. The discharge of Ralph Johnson
Why was Ralph Johnson discharged on May 12?
Ben Thornburg who discharged Ralph admittedly told
him that it was because Ralph was a "troublemaker." The
evidence proves that in Thornburg's opinion Ralph was
a "troublemaker" because he was the Union's chief ad-
vocate in the workload dispute which had been simmering
in the Proximity plant for a long period of timer between
the Union representing the tenders and the Printers
Beneficial Association representing the printers.
For reasons best known to itself Respondent ap-
parently did not want to settle this dispute, perhaps
because, as Respondent's brief acknowledges, the prin-
ters had been increasing the workload on the tenders by
refusing to do work which for 19-1/2 years past the prin-
ters had customarily performed and so the settlement
would have had to favor the Union. A settlement in favor
of the Union's position might have enhanced the Union's
reputation among the employees -but as Cone candidly
16 According to Respondent, all discharges have to be cleared by
General Manager Gardner. According to Thornburg, this discharge was
not cleared with Gardner until about 4 o'clock Also according to Ben
Thornburg, he, Thornburg, was at the police station about 4 o'clock.-
17 According to the testimony of Lewis, after Wright said, "I ain't got
no time for that now," be promptly discharged Lewis
is Both Lewis and Wright estimated that their conversation lasted 6 or
7 minutes.
19 According to Personnel Manager Kinney's letter of March 7, 1966,
that dispute had been in existence for 3 years.
460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
acxnowledged , Respondent would do nothing to help the
Union become a "strong union."
When on March 3, 1966, the Union had filed a written
grievance over this workload problem, Kinney by letter
dated March 7 returned the written grievance on the
highly technical grounds that it was not specific enough
and that it was not signed by all members of the affected
group. This latter reason obviously tended to denigrate
the Union's representative capacity.
Respondent 's opinion of Ralph as the ringleader for the
Union in this . dispute was based upon two things: (1)
Ralph did not conceal the fact that he objected to hearing
printer Kirkman say "that ain't my job" to work which
the printers had been doing for 19-1/2 years to Ralph's
personal knowledge and thus forcing extra work onto the
tender; and (2) a report received by Thornburg from a su-
pervisor-who was not called as a witness - who reported
that he feared that Ralph was spreading the workload
dispute to the third shift (which was the only shift unaf-
fected therewith) by coming in early for work and talking
to the third shift tenders.20 As to this latter point it must
be here noted that, even according to Thornburg's
testimony regarding the supervisor 's report to him, the
supervisor had heard none of Ralph 's conversation. But
the fact remains that Respondent through Thornburg con-
sidered Ralph to be the union ringleader in the workload
dispute. `
By the middle of April, however, this workload dispute
had grown to such proportion that Respondent , even in
the absence of a filed grievance, made efforts to
straighten out the dispute by means of . detailed job
descriptions for each of the three jobs. It is to be noted
here that Respondent did not invite the union representa-
tive to this settlement conference but that Mullins , having
by chance heard that the meeting was to take place, at-
tended without invitation . But these detail job descrip-
tions satisfied none of the parties, particularly the
Respondent.
Finally on May 11, again without consulting with the
Union, Thornburg, "settled" this workload dispute on
Respondent's own terms, as was to be customary, by
reading a statement to the individual crews to the effect
that on color and roller changes the crew was to act as a
"team" with everybody keeping busy until the machine
was back in operation. At the conference with the opera-
tors of machine No. 3 Ralph expressed 100 percent
satisfaction "if it was carried out that way." Kirkman's
qualified acceptance thereof based upon the fact that he
"was a skilled man" caused Thornburg to have a few
words in private with Kirkman in the presence of the
Printers Beneficial Association representative before
Kirkman returned to work.
The very next day when the machine was shutdown for
a color change about 11:30 a.m., Kirkman promptly de-
parted for the restroom and, upon his return, stood idly by
doing nothing but watching while Ralph and Pete worked.
Even after Ralph had quit and walked some 400 or 500
feet to get a sandwich and returned, Kirkman was still
idly watching and doing nothing. Ralph thereupon fol-
lowed Thornburg's instructions and reported Kirkman's
inactivity to Supervisor Billy Gene Thornburg.21 Billy
Gene made no attempt to settle the dispute but instead re-
ported to Ben Thornburg.
I here make the finding that Kirkman did nothing dur-
ing this color change and thus failed to cooperate with the
settlement of the workload dispute made by Thornburg
on May 11. This finding is made upon the credited and
uncontroverted testimony of Ralph Johnson.
Upon receipt of Billy Gene's report, Ben Thornburg
had Kirkman, Pete, and the Beneficial Association
representative brought to his office. There, according to
Ben Thornburg's testimony exclusively, he inquired of
Pete if Kirkman had been complying with the May 11
agreement and that Pete thereupon gave the answer
"yes."22
Having thus gotten the desired answer, whether
truthful or not,23 Thornburg had Ralph brought to the
conference and either invited or permitted Union
Steward Noah Lewis to attend also. It is significant that
Thornburg did not question Ralph about the facts of the
matter but instead preemptorily discharged Ralph as a
"troublemaker" without any consideration of the merits
of the grievance at all.
In fact if Thornburg had chosen to get to the merits of
Ralph's grievance, he would have had to discharge Kirk-
man for loafing and breaking the agreement of the previ-
ous day. But the facts might well have justified the
discharge of Ralph for loafing as well.
But instead of that Thornburg carefully discharged
Ralph for allegedly being a "troublemaker" and not for
20 Regardless of Ralph's conversation, the third shift remained unaf-
fected.
21 Billy Gene was not called as a witness so this fact is undisputed.
22 Respondent 's brief indicates that Respondent believes that this
testimony regarding Pete 's affirmative answer as testified to by Ben
Thornburg constitutes a full and satisfactory refutation of Ralph's detailed
testimony showing that Kirkman did no work during color change here in-
volved . This is not so.
Ralph gave an eyewitness account from the witness stand of Kirkman's
activity or lack thereof and was subject to cross-examination thereon.
Thus Ralph 's testimony was affirmative probative evidence that Kirkman
did no work.
On the other hand the testimony given by Ben Thornburg that Pete gave
an affirmative answer to Thornburg 's question is probative evidence that
Pete gave such affirmative answer in answer to the question posed. But on
the question of whether Kirkman was in fact working during the color
change or not, Thornburg's above testimony amounts only to rank
heresay . Thornburg himself had no personal knowledge of whether Kirk-
man worked or not. So the answer to this latter question of Kirkman's
working or not depended upon Pete 's capacity as a witness , Pete's oppor-
tunity for observation of Kirkman 's activities and upon Pete's -not Ben
Thornburg 's -credibility . But under the method by which Respondent
chose to present this evidence regarding Kirkman 's activities , i.e., through
Ben Thornburg's testimony as to what Pete answered , Pete could not be
tested on any of the above matters through cross-examination . Pete was
not presented as a witness and, therefore , could not be cross-examined. So
Thornburg 's testimony as to the contents of Pete's report to him amounts
to nothing but hearsay is not substantive , probative testimony on that
subject given by Ralph.
Of course Respondent could have controverted the testimony of Ralph
Johnson on Kirkman's lack of activity by presenting either Pete Johnson
or Kirkman himself. Respondent chose to present neither as a witness.
The inference is plain.
It should also be pointed out that Ralph testified that Pete said to him in
reference to Kirkman 's lack of activity , "Is this cooperation?" On the
question of Kirkman 's working or not , this report also amounts to hearsay.
Ralph 's eyewitness account of Kirkman 's doings, however , is not hearsay.
11 It is a well-known phenomenon that employers often receive an
answer from employees which the employee believes the employer
desires when that employer questions the employee about union matters
in the absence of the union representative.
CONE MILLS CORPORATION 461
loafing or for failing to keep the agreement of the previous
day. Thornburg was thus saved the embarrassment of
having to discharge Kirkman and thus by implication at
least finding in favor of the Union on the workload
dispute thereby enhancing the Union's prestige. As Cone
frankly stated, Respondent was going to do nothing to
assist the Union to become a "strong" union.
The facts are convincing and consequently I find that
Respondent discharged Ralph Johnson on May 12, 1966,
because he was considered to be the Union's leader in the
workload dispute, because as such he had the temerity to
report Kirkman's failure to comply with the agreement of
May 11, 1966, to his supervisor as ordered so to do by
Ben Thornburg as part of that agreement and in order to
discourage further activities by the Union and its mem-
bers to secure a favorable settlement of the Union's work-
load grievance and to prevent any enhancement of the
Union's prestige among the employees and thus in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
b. Subsequent discharges
Considering the discharge of Ralph Johnson to be un-
fair and a threat not only to Ralph's tenure of employment
but also to their own tenure and conditions of employ-
ment, some 15 to 20 employees ceased work in concert
about 2 p.m. that same day in order to protest the
discharge of Ralph to Respondent.
This concerted action was intended by the employees
as a protest both to the unfair nature of the discharge and
to the threat to their own tenure and conditions of em-
ployment. Such protest was, therefore, a legal protected
concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act, if not also
a union activity due to the nature of the dispute over
which the discharge of Johnson occurred. It is too well
established to require any extended citation of authority
that a concerted stoppage of work, or strike, to protest the
discharge of a fellow employee or supervisor, especially
when, as here, the protested discharge, constituted an un-
fair labor practice, is a legal protected concerted activity.24
Respondent through Assistant Plant Manager Wright
was promptly informed of the protest and its underlying
cause as well as being requested for an immediate con-
ference to settle the grievance or dispute by Union
Steward Noah Lewis. Wright was also informed at that
time that the men intended to return to work after a one-
half hour protest.
Respondent, however, "didn't have no time" for any
such immediate conference or prompt settlement of the
dispute, a reaction or a tactic conducive to enlarging a
relatively minor dispute into a major one. In this it is
reminiscent of the tactics then being utilized by Respond-
ent in its alleged bargaining with the Union. From its ac-
tions throughout Respondent appeared to be aching for a
major labor dispute with the Union and its adherents.
Wright was interested in only one thing: That those
protesting should either work or leave the plant. He was
definitely disinterested in hearing or determining the ex-
isting protest. According to his own testimony, Wright
did suggest that the union steward file a written grievance
over the Johnson discharge .25 This was subterfuge. The
collective agreement at Proximity establishing this
grievance procedure had ended on October 18, 1956. But
at the hearing Wright testified that, despite the absence of
an existing collective agreement, Respondent still
"honored" the grievance procedure established in that
nonexistent collective agreement. However Wright was
highly indefinite as to whether Respondent still
"honored" the arbitration provision of that prior con-
tract
A grievance procedure without some final decisional
procedure such as arbitration is a worthless thing. This is
particularly so when one party thereto is so addicted to
the persistent use of the adamant "no" as this Respond-
ent had proven itself to be during its so-called collective
bargaining. Wright's attitude proved that Respondent was
not about to amicably settle any wrong or dispute with the
Union. Respondent was accustomed to giving any and all
orders without let or hindrance from any source, particu-
larly from a group of employees or the Union. Respond-
ent intended to keep it that way.
And so Wright preemptorily discharged eight em-
ployees for their concerted act in protesting Respondent's
discharge of Ralph Johnson even though those employees
were then and there engaged in a protected concerted or
union activity and thus Wright and Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Five of these employees, Noah Lewis, William Tingen,
Jr., Lester Flippin, Alfred Walker, and Jack Wells were
discharged for their part in the protected concerted
protest and immediately left the plant. On the other hand
Eugene Henley, Edward Dick, and Ronald Gardner were
discharged by Wright for the same reason but refused to
leave the plant because at the end of the half-hour protest,
they intended to, and did, return to work. But Plant Su-
perintendent Ben Thornburg discharged them again while
they were at work and had policemen remove them from
the building as "trespassers." Obviously the last three,
like the first five, were fired for their part in engaging a
protected concerted protest in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1).
In its brief, Respondent stresses the fact that the
protesting employees left their machines "without per-
mission of their supervisors" and complains that this
protest action was "premeditated and planned." The Act
contains no requirement that employees have the permis-
sion of their supervisors to engage in protected concerted
activities. Nor is there any requirement in the Act that
such activities be unpremeditated or unplanned. Any
such requirements would effectively nullify the Section
7 right which guarantees employees the right to engage in
protected concerted activities.
Although not citing the cases, Respondent's brief treats
this protest action as though it was a Fansteel case, 306
U.S. 240; or a Clinchfield Coal case, 145 F.2d 66 (C.A.
4); or a Southern Steamship Company case, 316 U.S. 31.
This case is none of these.
24 For one of the more recent cases on the point see Lee Cylinder of
Golay & Co., Inc., 156 NLRB 1252, enfd. (but with this point expressly
left undecided) 371 F.2d 259 (C.A. 7).
Cases cited by Respondent for the opposite proposition are inapposite
under the facts of the instant case.
25 Respondent 's brief says- "A grievance procedure existed for handling
discharges and grievances in the operation of the department but this was
not resorted to by the discharges on 12 May "
zs In Cone Mills v. N.L.R.B., 373 F.2d 595 (C.A. 4), Respondent had
maintained the opposite position , i.e., that contractual "super seniority"
for union stewards did not survive the decease of the collective agreement
upon which that superseniority was based. It almost seems that Respond-
ent's position on this matter depended upon the exigencies of the particu-
lar situation confronting it at the moment
462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This case involves a peaceful concerted cessation of
work to protest an unfair labor practice by Respondent.
There was no violence. There was no profanity. There
was no seizure of the plant. There was no prevention of
operations . There was no loss to Respondent beyond that
which would have been caused by a cessation of work.
There was no misconduct. All eight dischargees are thus
entitled to reinstatement with backpay.27 The Trial Ex-
aminer so finds.
c. Interference, restraint, and coercion
In addition to the above General Counsel presented
testimony of four employees regarding some six short one
or two sentence conversations had with minor super-
visors in three of Respondent's plants. With one or two
exceptions these conversations were denied by the super-
visors involved.
As these conversations, even assuming they were had,
contribute nothing to the determination of this case and
would be merely cumulative as far as the remedy is con-
cerned , I will recommend the dismissal of the allegations
of the complaint relating to them.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UPON
COMMERCE
above, I will recommend that Respondent promptly
supply the Union with the information regarding the pen-
sion plan as requested heretofore and that, upon request,
Respondent bargain in good faith with the Union as such
representative and embody any agreement reached into
a written signed document.
In regard to the checkoff issue the General Counsel in
his brief states:
With reference to the 8(a)(5) portion of the Order
and Notice, General Counsel would contend that
such Order and Notice contain specific directions
with reference to Respondent's position on the
Union's security*issue as shown in this record. Thus,
Respondent should be directed to refrain from taking
the position that checkoff gives the Union the power
to operate and it will not permit such a situation to
develop again.
On the same point Respondent's brief contains the fol-
lowing:
Quite simply, the Union prefers that it be relieved
of all responsibility and obligation to collect dues and
fees from its members and have this obligation as-
sumed by the Respondent, and upon its failure to ac-
complish this end at the bargaining table it resorted
to the National Labor Relations Board for an order
which would produce this result.
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Respondent described in section I, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affir-
mative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
I have found that Respondent discriminated in regard
to the hire and tenure of employment of the following
named individuals on May 12, 1966: Ralph Johnson, Eu-
gene Henley, Edward Dick, Ronald Gardner, William
Tingen, Jr,, Lester Flippin, Alfred Walker, Noah Lewis,
and Jack Wells, and that none of them did anything which
would bar his reinstatement, so accordingly I will recom-
mend that Respondent offer each of the aforementioned
employees, immediate and full reinstatement to his
former, or substantially equivalent, position without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges
and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suf-
fered by reason of said discrimination against him by pay-
ment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he
would have earned as wages from the date of the dis-
crimination to the date of his reinstatement , less his net
earnings during such period, in accordance with a formula
set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum.
Having further found that Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively with the Union in good faith as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the majority of
Respondent's employees in the appropriate units found
*
In summary, it is clear that the Board is being
asked to do by order what the charging Union has
failed to do at the bargaining table, by demonstra-
tions, by public appeals, and by strikes. [Citations
omitted.]
Regardless of these suggestions I have only made the
usual and customary recommendation in refusal-to-bar-
gain cases that "upon request Respondent bargain in
good faith ... etc.," with the Union as the representative
of its employees in the appropriate units above.
If I possessed the authority, which I do not, I would
recommend that Respondent grant the checkoff and thus
complete the collective agreements now under negotia-
tion. Admittedly the checkoff will cost Respondent
nothing in time, labor, or expense and, if it should, the
Union has offered to repay such cost. But primarily I
would make this recommendation to forstall future
damage to Respondent, the Union and the employees
which I forsee to come out of the present dispute. I fear
the present recommendations will prove futile due to the
fact that the record here proves that, while Respondent
has made one concession to the Act in that it will sit and
talk interminably around the negotiation table, it still has
shown no conception of the meaning of "good faith." This
inevitably will result in aggravated labor strife damaging
to all parties concerned.
Because of the variety, extent, and type of the unfair
labor practices engaged in by Respondent, I sense an op-
position by_ Respondent to the policies of the Act in
general, and hence I deem it necessary to order Respond-
ent to cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon the rights guaranteed its employees in Section 7 of
the Act.
27 See N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CONE MILLS CORPORATION 463
1. Local 259, Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, CLC, is a labor organization admitting to
membership employees of Respondent.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of each of the individuals named hereinafter,
by discharging each of them on May 12, 1966, thereby
discriminating against them because of their concerted
and union activities and discouraging union membership
and activities among its employees , Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act: Ralph
Johnson , Eugene Henley , Edward Dick, Ronald
Gardner, William Tingen, Jr., Lester Flippin, Alfred
Walker,_Noah Lewis, and Jack Wells.
3. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
Local 259, Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, CLC, as the exclusive representative of
Respondent's employees in the appropriate units found
above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]