Concrete Joists & Products Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 1958

120 N.L.R.B. 1542 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

1542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Concrete Joists & Products Co., Inc. and United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No. 13-RC-5677. June
18, 1958
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed, a hearing was held before Rush F. Hall,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. • The Employer contests the Board's jurisdiction in this matter.
Concrete Joists & Products Co., Inc., the Employer herein, is an
Illinois corporation engaged in the manufacture of concrete blocks
and concrete joists in Chicago Heights, Illinois. Precast Concrete
Products of Illinois, Inc., Bridgeview, Illinois, and Precast Concrete
Co., Inc., Gary, Indiana, are corporations engaged in the manufacture
of concrete blocks. Precast Trucking Co., Inc., Chicago Heights,
Illinois, own 12 trucks which it leases exclusively to the above-named
corporations. The principal office of each of these four corporations
is located at 540 East 16th Street, Chicago Heights, Illinois, where
the- plant of Concrete Joists & Products Co., Inc., involved in this
proceeding, is also situated. Ben Lange, also identified as B. G. Lange,
is president, Arthur Beaver is vice president, and Duane Lange is
secretary-treasurer of each of the four corporations. These individ-
uals also serve as the only directors of these corporations.
Ben Lange, father of Duane Lange, owns a controlling interest in
the Employer, while the corporate officers share substantially equal
financial interest in the other corporations. Duane Lange is manager
of all of the corporations. He signs all checks. With the assistance
of two bookkeepers, he keeps all payroll and financial records for the
four corporations which use the same auditor. He is also in charge
of personnel matters and is presently handling all labor relations for
the four corporations, although some of the current contracts with
various unions were previously negotiated by Ben Lange. The three
manufacturing corporations have the same sources of supply but have
their own customers. There is practically no interchange of employees
or, equipment among the plants.
In view of the foregoing, we find, contrary to the Employer's con-
tention, that Concrete Joists & Products Co., Inc., Precast Concrete
Products of Illinois, Inc., Precast Concrete Co., Inc., and Precast
Trucking Co., Inc., constitute a single employer within the meaning
of Section 2 (2) of the Act.' Moreover, as the record shows that during
the most recent 12-month period the combined direct and indirect out-
flow of all 4 corporations is in excess of $100,000, we find that the
1 Cf T. P. Taylor cE Company, Inc, et at, 118 NLRB 376.
120 NLRB No. 198.
CONCRETE JOISTS & PRODUCTS CO., INC. 1543
Employer is engaged in 'commerce within the meaning of the Act
and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein 2
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain
employees of the Employer.'
3. The Employer and, the Intervenor contend, and the Petitioner
denies, that a current collective-bargaining agreement between the
Employer and the Intervenor, covering employees involved herein,
constitutes a bar to this proceeding.
A contract between the Employer and Intervenor for the term from
November 1, 1956, until October 31, 1957, contained a 60-day notice
clause. On' August 20, 1957, before the 60-day notice period, the
Petitioner sent a letter by registered mail with return receipt requested,
addressed to "B. G. Lange, General Manager, Pre-Cast Concrete Joists
& Products Inc., 540 East 16th Street, Chicago Heights, Illinois," in
which it demanded recognition as representative for collective-bar-
gaining purposes of employees "in your plant." The return receipt
was signed by B. G. Lange and was dated August 21, 1957. On that
day Petitioner filed the representation petition in this case using the
same-name and address of the,Company'as that set forth-in its letter
demanding .recognition. On October 18, 1957, the Employer and
Intervenor executed a contract for the term from November 1, 1957,
until October 31, 1958. On January'23, 1958, a first amended petition
was filed reflecting the correct name of the Employer, "Concrete Joists
and Products Co., Inc."
• The Employer argues, in effect, that because of the Petitioner's
inaccuracy in stating the Employer's name both in the claim and the,
original petition, the original petition was a nullity and that the
contract subsequently executed 'on October 18, 1957; barred the
amended petition. The Employer, however, does not deny receipt of
the letter claiming recognition, nor does it deny that, in response to
the Regioi ial Director's inquiry regarding commerce data on the initial
petition, it responded, before the amended petition was filed, by
supplying information relating only to the Employer named herein.
It is clear from the foregoing, that, notwithstanding the fact that
the Employer's name was riot"accurately designated in the Petitioner's
claim for recognition or in the original petition, the claim and the
petition were sufficient to put the Employer on notice that the Peti-
tioner was seeking to represent its employees. In these circumstances,
we find that the misnomers were of no consequence. As the original
2 The T H. Rogers Lumber Company, 117 NLRB 1732; Pacific Fine Arts, et al, 116
NLRB 1607 We find no merit in the Employer's objection to the acceptance of eviden-
tiary material in the form of letters from companies doing business with the Employer
as commerce data. Pearl Curtains , Inc., 118 NLRB 1120, and cases cited therein
8 United Construction Workers, Division of District 50, United Mine Workers of Amer-
lea, intervened in this proceeding upon the basis of a contractual interest.
1544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
petition was timely filed before the 60-day notice period in the ex-
piring contract and before the October 18 contract was executed, we
find that the contract does not bar a present determination of rep-
resentatives. The Employer's motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground of contract bar is therefore denied.'
Accordingly, we find that a question affecting commerce exists con-
cerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the
meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The parties are in general agreement with respect to the scope
of the appropriate unit. However, the Employer and Intervenor con-
tend that the unit description should be consistent with the one con-
tained in their contract rather than that described in the petition. It
is admitted that the same employees would be included and excluded
under either unit description, and it is further admitted that certain
phrases used in the contract-such as fiduciary relationship-have not
been clearly defined by the parties. In these circumstances, and in
view of the fact that the unit described in the petition is consistent
with common Board terminology, we shall reject the Employer and
the Intervenor's contentions in this matter.
We find that all production and maintenance employees at the Em-
ployer's plant, 540 East 16th Street, Chicago Heights, Illinois, ex-
cluding' office employees, professional employees, truckdrivers, guards,
and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (c) of the Act.
5. After the close of the hearing, the Intervenor, which has never
been in compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act, filed
a motion with the Board, requesting a place on the ballot in any elec-
tion directed herein. For the following reasons, upon reevaluation of
Board policy in light of recent court and Board decisions, we grant
the motion.
The UMW is at present the incumbent union and has a labor con-
tract covering the very employees who will vote in this election.
Although it has not complied with the filing requirements of the Act,
the UMW was nevertheless, in accordance with Board practice, per-
mitted to intervene and to participate fully in the hearing held herein .5
Its purpose in intervening was to bar, by its present contract, an elec-
tion's being held by virtue of a petition filed by another labor or-
ganization. It failed in this respect, not because of its status as a
noncomplying union, but because of established contract-bar doc-
trine-doctrine which the Board applies impartially in all represen-
* Whiteacre Greer Fireproofing Company, 100 NLRB 1107. In view of our disposition
of the issue of contract bar, we need not determine whether the 60-day notice clause in
the old contract qualified as an automatic renewal clause.
e See Sterling Faucet Company , 119 NLRB 1225 ; Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
87 NLRB 463.
CONCRETE JOISTS & PRODUCTS CO., I-NC. 1545
Cation cases, without regard to 'the compliance or noncompliance of
the labor organization involved 6
By designating the ballot herein as off-limits to the UMW, our
dissenting colleagues would be adhering to a persistent practice of
dubious parentage. The practice came into being in 1947, accom-
panied by no statement whatever as to the reasons for its adoption; 7
it was subsequently justified on the ground that the Act provides that
a noncomplying labor organization shall not be the beneficiary of a
Board investigation of a question concerning representation; 8 and it
has since been followed as a matter of course, and with no further
explication or justification.9 Recent court and Board decisions have,
however, shown this practice to be unsound as a matter of law, and
unwise as a matter of policy.
The law interposes no impediment to placing a noncomplying union
on the' ballot in a Board-directed election where the noncomplying
union is not a petitioner under Section 9 (c) of the Act. The Supreme
Court made this plain in the Arkansas Oak Flooring 10 and Bowman
Transportation, 120 NLRB 1147 11 cases. In Arkansas Oak Floor-
ing, the Court pointed out that by its noncompliance with Section
9 (f), (g), and (h) of the - Act, a union makes itself ineligible
for the various benefits offered by the Act, but it does not thereby
exempt itself from the Act's other applicable provisions. The Court
said : 12
Subsection (f), (g), and (h) of Section 9 merely describe ad-
vantages that may be gained by compliance with their conditions.
The very specificity of the advantages to be gained and the ex-
press provision for the loss of these advantages imply that no
consequences other than those so listed shall result from non-
compliance.
"See West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company, 118 NLRB 1595 ( Member Jenkins,
who dissented in that case, considers himself bound by the majority decision therein)-;
American Aniline Products, Unit of Koppers Company, Inc., 119 NLRB 57.
7 Sigmund Cohen Mfg. Co. Inc., 75 NLRB 177.
8 Herman Loewenstein Inc, 75 NLRB 377, 381.
8 See, for example, CongoleusmNairn, Inc., 115 NLRB 1202; The M. B. Farrin Lumber
Co., 117 NLRB 575; The Evening News Association d/b/a Detroit News, et al., 119 NLRB
845; Eastern Sugar Associates (a Trust ) d/b/a Central Juncos, 119 NLRB 493.
10 United Mine Workers of America , et al. v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62.
In this case , the question was whether a State court could enjoin peaceful picketing by
a noncomplying union which was the majority representative of the employees, and which
was seeking recognition from the employer. The Court pointed out that the employer
was obligated under the Act's provisions to recognize a noncomplying majority
representative.
N. L. R. B. v. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, et al, 355 U. S 453
Here the question was whether the Board could properly order an employer to withhold
recognition from an assisted, noncomplying, union until the union had been certified by
the Board The Court held that the Board's order was not appropriate
12 351 U. S at 73, 74, 75
1546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 7 recognizes the right of the instant employees "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing." .. .
Section 9 (a) provides that representatives designated or
selected . . . by the majority of the employees in a unit appro-
priate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representative of
all the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining... .
Under these Sections and by virtue of the conceded majority
designation of the union, the employer is obligated to recognize
the designated union. [Emphasis supplied.]
In the Bowman case, the Court pointed out that the Board could
not, through the requirement of a Board certification, make non-
compliance a reason for denying employees the "right" to choose a
noncomplying union in an election. It said specifically with respect
to a Board-conducted election involving a noncomplying union : 18
Nothing in the subsections [subsections (f), (g), and (h) of
Section 9] . . . is a barrier to the conduct by the Board of an
election not followed by certification... .
Largely on the basis of the Court's pronouncements in the Bowman
case, the Board recently, and rightly, in Retail Associates, decided to
place noncomplying unions on the ballot in elections brought about by
employer-filed petitions.14 This approach was followed and applied
in the later Sterling Processing case, which was a consolidated pro-
ceeding involving both an employer-filed and a union-filed petition.15
By its decisions in Retail- Associates and Sterling Processing, the
Board brought its RM practice into line with the rule of the Harris
Foundry case, under which for many years the Board has placed
noncomplying unions on the ballot in decertification elections.16 The
Board has itself thus recognized that there is no legal obstacle to the
conduct of elections involving noncomplying unions which do not
occupy the status of petitioners in RC cases.
The question, then, is one of the proper administration of the Act.
In Retail Associates, the Board recognized the admonition laid down
72 355 U S at 461.
14Retatil Associates , Inc, 120 NLRB 388, overruling the doctrine first announced in
Herman Loewenstein, Inc, 75 NLRB 377, and recently affirmed in Darling and Company,
116 NLRB 374.
Under the Loewenstein doctrine , the Board equated an employer -filed petition with a
union-filed petition, and ruled that in either case a question concerning representation
was "raised by a labor organization ." By this reasoning the Board found in Section 9 (f)
and (h ) a legal impediment to an election , on an employer-filed petition , that involved a
noncomplying union . Obviously, even without reference to the precedents adverted to in
the text, the reasoning of the Loewenstein doctrine cannot be applied in the context of
the situation here considered , where a question concerning representation was manifestly
"raised" by a complying labor organization.
15 Sterling Processing Corporation, 120 NLRB 567.
10 Harris Foundry & Machine Company, 76 NLRB 118.
CONCRETE JOISTS & PRODUCTS CO., INC. 1547
by the Supreme Court in the Bowman case to the effect that, when
dealing with a noncomplying union, not only the Act's objective of
denying the benefits of the Act to such a union, but also the "rights"
of the employees and the employer must be taken into account.
Balancing these considerations, the Board was "very impressed" with,
and regarded as "decisive" the Court's "vigorous emphasis" upon the
'`employees' full choice of bargaining representative." Tho Board
said:
... it is the Board's opinion that any benefit which the union
may derive from having its status determined in a Board election
should be regarded, as the Court appears to have suggested in
Bowman, as of an incidental character and not contrary to the
letter and spirit of Section 9 (f), (g), and (h).
If, as a matter of policy, the rights of employees to a full choice
"of bargaining representative were "decisive" in Retail Associates, we
perceive no reason why those same rights should not be decisive in
this proceeding. In our opinion, employee rights ought not to be
made to depend upon the vagaries of whether a petition is filed by
an, employer or by a union 'opposed to a noncomplying claimant.
Having effected, in Retail Associates, a change in RM practice with
'respect to noncomplying unions, consistency now requires that the
Board alter its practice with respect to noncomplying intervenors in
RC cases.
There are a number of other policy considerations which our dis-
senting colleagues have apparently overlooked in reaching their con-
clusion. In the first place, the omission of a noncomplying
intervenor from the ballot is unfair to a petitioning, complying, union,
for it gives the noncomplying union a substantial, unfair advantage.
In an election providing only a simple "yes" or "no" choice with re-
spect to the petitioning union, the "no" votes, represent a pooling of
the votes of both the noncomplying union's adherents and those
;employees who are bona fide opposed to representation by any union
;whatsoever. In such a situation, without any further breakdown of
,the votes, the petitioning union is forthwith defeated if the "yes"
,votes do not exceed the "no" votes. On the other hand, if the voters
were given an opportunity to make a precise, rather than the present
vague choice, the indecisive and, in many cases, misleading results
described above would not occur."
In the past, on numerous occasions, complying unions have called
the Board's attention to the unfairness of the practice which our
dissenting colleagues would perpetuate. In at least one case, a com-
17 where the voteis are accorded a three-way choice, the petitioning union need not
secure a clear majority on the first ballot. Under Board practice, if there is no majority
choice, a runoff election involving the first two choices would then be directed.
1548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plying petitioner withdrew, with prejudice, from a Board-directed
election after the Board had rejected its repeated requests to place a
noncomplying intervenor on the ballot.18 On the other hand, non-
complying unions have repeatedly sought to capitalize on the present
rule; campaigning with such slogans as "A 'NO' VOTE IS DEFI-
NITELY A VOTE FOR DISTRICT 50"; "VOTE `NO'-RETAIN
DISTRICT 50." 19
The foregoing amply demonstrates that if meaningful election re-
sults are to be obtained, noncomplying unions must be placed on the
ballot so that they, like other competitors, can claim only the votes of
their true adherents, and not be permitted to lay claim to all the "No"
votes, a dubious and disturbing practice which adherence to former
policy not only encourages, but, in a negative sense, requires 2°
In the second place, were the Board to adhere to its present practice,
it would be undermining at least two important principles of law-the
Curtis Brothers 21 rule and the rule of the Arkansas Oak Flooring
case.12 In Curtis Brothers, the Board ruled that recognition picketing
by a minority union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. The
result reflected by a preceding Board election is certainly a practicable
and convincing way of establishing tie minority or majority status
of the union concerned. As indicated above, the omission of a non-
complying claimant from the ballot leads only to an inconclusive, if
not completely erroneous, conclusion as to that union's status. In
Curtis Brothers type cases, therefore, the omission of- the noncom-
plying union from the ballot not only obscures the proof of the union's
status, but also unnecessarily complicates the tasks of the Board, the
General Counsel, the Regional Offices, and the litigants, By the same
token, to the extent that the Board-conducted election fails to measure
the real status of a claimant, the principle of Arkansas Oak Flooring,
that an employer must bargain with a noncomplying majority
representative, is also unnecessarily jeopardized.
Summarizing : The purpose of an election is to obtain a clear,
precise, and definitive result. The present practice of the Board
serves only to obscure or defeat the real wishes of the employees, and
concomitantly to obscure and frustrate the rights, duties, and
privileges of the unions and employers involved. In order to avoid
Is Northern Indiana Public Se; vice Co, Case No. 13-RC-4971 (not published).
10 Ibid.
20 Contrary to our dissenting colleagues' assertion, we are not requiring that noncomply-
ing unions with "just a scintilla of an interest in the employees involved in an election"
appear on the ballot therein. As in all other cases involving intervention, an intervening,
noncomplying union does so voluntarily and permissibly when it possesses either a con-
tract or a showing of interest. As in all other cases, the right to withdraw its interven-
tion at any time during the proceeding is preserved.
21 Curtis Brothers, Inc, 119 NLRB 232 Although Member Fanning agrees that the
Intervenor should be accorded a place on the ballot, he does not rely upon the Curtis
Brothers decision as a reason for this result.
22 United Mine Workers of America, et al . v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62.
CONCRETE JOISTS & PRODUCTS CO., INC. 1549
these equivocal and meaningless results, and in order more effectively
to carry out the full purposes of the Act, we shall permit henceforth
all intervenors to appear on the ballot without regard to their com-
pliance status. Accordingly,, we shall grant the motion of the Inter-
venor herein and place its name on the ballot. However, should this
Intervenor win the election, we shall merely certify the arithmetical
results 23 '
[Text of-Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
ChAiRMAN LEEDOM and MEMBER BEAN, dissenting in part :
We-agree with the majority's decision to direct an election herein.
However, we do not agree with their decision to place the United Mine
Workers on the ballot. In our opinion the Bowman decision neither
requires nor supports the granting of the motion before us. Nor do
we find, contrary to our colleagues opinion, that consistency with the
Board's recent Retail Associates decision requires placing a noncom-
plying union on a ballot in a representation proceeding instituted by
a complying union petitioning under Section 9 (c) (1) (A) (i) of the
Act.
In the Bowman decision, the Supreme Court was directly concerned
with evaluating the limits of the Board's discretionary authority in
fashioning unfair labor practice remedies under Section 10 (c) of the
Act. The issue arose there because the Board required as part of the
remedy for an 8 (a) (2) violation, a Board certification which was
available only through the use of Section 9 (c) procedure and for
which a noncomplying union could not petition. Had the noncom-
plying union been eligible for such a certification, there would have
been no necessity for the Court's concern with the nature of the Board's
remedial order in that case. Indeed, in posing the issue before it in the
Bowman case, the Supreme Court noted that the union was not in
compliance and stated that "It is therefore not eligible for a Board
certification. . . ." Consequently, the Court was concerned that the
Board's remedial order should not require the denial of privileges and
rights beyond those specifically designated as the penalty for non-
compliance. Thus, in its evaluation of the Board's order, the Court
took into consideration the right of employees to be represented by a
union of their own choosing, without regard to that union's eligibility
for a Board certification, and the limits of the denial of privileges.
The Court emphasized the necessity of considering all the circum-
stances so that undue emphasis upon the forfeiture would not dimin-
ish the rights intended to remain intact.
The result of this evaluation was the finding that the Board could
not, by means of a 10 (c) remedial order, impose a greater limitation
23 See Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra; Sterling Processing Corporation , supra.
1550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
upon employees' rights to be represented by a noncomplying union
than the Act itself had placed, as a part of the, penalty for noncom-
pliance, upon a union's right to represent employees. However, there
is a clear distinction between a union's right to represent employees
and its right, to avail itself of Board procedure to facilitate the enforce-
ment of that right. The fact that the Court, by way of dictum, sug-
gests that the Board may properly regard an election as the appropri-
ate means of determining that the adverse effects of the unfair labor
practice have been dissipated and that, with a view to that end,, it
may develop a procedure to accomplish this either under its own
auspices or within some other forum which it may regard as acceptable
does not constitute, as the majority finds, a holding that noncomplying
unions have a right to the benefits of a 9 (c) ballot 24 Such a conclu-
sion is contrary to the initial premise of the Bowman decision. That
decision, therefore, in no way determines the right of a noncomplying
union to appear on the ballot in a 9 (c) election, but rather, emphasizes
the rights of representation without the use of the 9 (c) election
procedure.
In Retail Associates, the Board took cognizance of the emphasis
placed by the Supreme Court upon the protection of rights in the
administration of the Act. There, the Board decided that a noncom-
plying union should be placed on the ballot in it representation pro-
ceeding initiated by an employer under Section 9 (c) (1) (B). Thus,
in the context of a proceeding based upon an employer petition,, the
right of the employer to obtain a resolution of a question concerning
representation and the right of employees to have representation. of
their choosing was given decisive weight, even though the noncomply-
ing union had forfeited the privilege of petitioning the Board on its
own behalf. Therefore, contrary, to the opinion of our colleagues,
the decisive factor was not the right of a noncomplying union to have
its representative status determined by the Board, or to seek the bene-
fits of Section 9 (c) on its own behalf.
In the instant case, the rights and restrictions to be considered are'
primarily those of the noncomplying union, for it is the noncomply-
ing union which, by its own motion, is seeking the benefits of the Board
election on its own behalf. The employer has not indicated by an RM
petition a desire to know the degree of representation held by the non-
complying Intervenor among the employees.25 Nor are the employees
deprived of any right to select or reject the complying petitioner. If
the employees desired a determination of the Intervenor's status by
a' It is incorrect to say , as our colleagues do, that "the law interposes no impediment
to placing a noncomplying union on the ballot in a Boaid-directed election " Such an
impediment exists by law in Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act
25 Cf Sterling Processing Corporation , footnote 15, supra.
CONCRETE JOISTS & PRODUCTS CO., INC. 1551
a Board ballot they could have filed an RD petition which would
require the noncomplying incumbent union to appear on the ballot.26
Even without the filing of an RD petition, the employees' right to be
represented by the noncomplying union without the use of the 9 (c)
election procedure remains intact, and they may by other means com-
municate their desire to the employer with full protection of their
rights.27 To grant -the Intervenor's motion in these circumstances
would be tantamount to aiding and abetting a noncomplying union's
efforts to obtain a benefit which the Act specifically denies. We cannot
in good conscience, nor do we believe the Supreme. Court intended that
we should, by circumventional means, repeal Section 9 (f), (g), and
(h) of the Act. From the majority's decision herein, only one short
step is required to permit a noncomplying union to petition the Board
on its own behalf. We would not propose to permit a noncomplying
union to accomplish by indirection what Congress expressly provided
that it could not do directly in order to obtain the benefits of the Act
on its own behalf.
The majority further attempts to justify placing a noncomplying
union on the ballot in this RC case on the ground that -its -absence from
the ballot would permit it to take advantage of the uncertain element
in the "No" votes, and claim them as its own. The short answer to
this argument exists in the fact, as pointed out above, that any uncer-
tainty could appropriately be removed by the filing of an RM or RD
petition. Further, if the majority, believes that the mere placing of
a noncomplying union's name on the ballot in an RC case will entrap
such a union into establishing its minority status for the benefit of a
possible Curtis type unfair labor practice case, they overlook the fact
that an intervening union can, merely by withdrawing from the ballot,
maintain its anticipated position concerning a "No" vote., If the basic
premise of the majority' s argument were carried to its logical con-
clusion, the Board would have to adopt a policy of requiring all
unions, with just a scintilla of an interest in the employees 'involved
in an election, to appear on the ballot therein, and further forbid any
union the right of withdrawal from an election. Such a policy would
destroy rather than foster the rights of all parties concerned.
For the foregoing reasons, we would not place the United Mine
Workers on the ballot in the election, directed herein.
m Cf. Harris Foundry & Machine Company, footnote 16, supra
n We regard the Harris Foundry, Retail Associates and Sterling Processing cases as dis-
tinguishable from the instant one for the simple reason that in those cases it was either
the employer or the employees who were seeking the benefits granted them by the Act, and
the Board, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Bowman, gave the full benefit
of those rights without regard to the compliance status of the union involved. However,
in the instant case, it- is the noncomplying union alone which despite the forfeiture of
rights required by Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act, for noncompliance, is seeking
on its own behalf the benefits of Section 9 (c).