Concord Docu-Prep, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 17, 1973

207 N.L.R.B. 981 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

CONCORD DOCU-PREP, INC.
Concord Docu-Prep, Inc. and Office and Professional
Employees Union, Local 29, Office and Profession-
al Employees International Union, AFL-CIO.
Case 20-CA-7705
December 17, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On June 21, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Irving
Rogosin issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, the General Counsel refiled
his brief to the Administrative Law Judge and, in
addition, filed limited cross-exceptions, to which
Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Concord Docu-Prep,
Inc., Concord, California, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A 3). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRVING RoGosiN, Administrative Law Judge: The
complaint, as amended, issued October 20, 1972, alleges
1 Designations herein are as follows: The General Counsel, unless
otherwise noted or required by the context, his representatives at the
hearing (Messrs. Klein and Kmtz appearing at the pretrial conference);
Concord Docu-Prep, Inc., Respondent, the Company, or the Employer;
Office and Professional Employees Union, Local 29, Office and Profession-
al Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, the Union or the Charging
Party; the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat.
519, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq. ), the Act; the National Labor Relations
981
that since about August 15, 1972, Respondent has refused
to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive
representative of its employees in an appropriate unit,
despite the Union's status as majority representative, and
since October 1972, has made unilateral changes in wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of employment, without
first bargaining with the Union as exclusive representative
of the unit employees, thereby engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.' Respondent's answer to the
original complaint, as well as to the amendment, admits
the jurisdictional and procedural, but denies the substan-
tive, allegations of the complaint. In its answer to the
amendment to the complaint, Respondent also raises issues
regarding the validity or propriety of the amendment.
Pretrial hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge James T. Barker, on February 7, 1973, at San
Francisco, California. The General Counsel and Respon-
dent were represented by counsel, and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard. On prior oral notice to Respon-
dent's counsel, the General Counsel filed an amendment to
the complaint, alleging that Respondent had further
refused to bargain, in October 1972, by instituting
unilateral changes in working conditions, without first
bargaining with the Union. Respondent strenuously
objected to the amendment , and moved for a bill of
particulars, additional time in which to answer the
amendment, and a continuance of the hearing scheduled
for February 20. The amendment to the complaint was
allowed, and the General Counsel was directed to furnish
Respondent with an informal statement of particulars on
which the amendment was based. The General Counsel
complied by letter to Respondent's counsel, dated Febru-
ary 7, 1973. Request for permission to file an interlocutory
appeal from the Administrative Law Judge's ruling was
filed with the Board . On February 16, 1973, the Board
denied the request with leave to raise the issues at the
hearing on the merits.
Hearing on the complaint, as so amended, was held from
February 20 to 23, both inclusive, and on February 26, 27,
and March 20, 1973, at San Francisco, California. The
General Counsel and Respondent were represented by
Counsel, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses , to introduce oral
and documentary evidence relevant and material to the
issues, to argue orally, and to file briefs and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties waived
oral argument and reserved the right to file briefs.
At the outset of the hearing, Respondent renewed its
motion to dismiss the allegations contained in the amended
complaint upon substantially the same grounds urged at
the pretrial conference . The motion was denied.2 At
various stages during the hearing, Respondent renewed the
motion to dismiss the allegations of the amendment to the
Board, the Board. The charge was filed on August 16, 1972. Unless
otherwise stated, all events occurred in 1972.
2 The principal ground for the motion was that the allegations of the
amendment were not sufficiently related to the facts alleged in the unfair
labor practice charge . Although offered additional time to prepare to meet
any issues newly raised , Respondent's counsel declined , stating that he
required no additional time , In any event, the issues raised by the
amendment were fully litigated at the hearing.
207 NLRB No. 145
982 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complaint, objected to and moved to strike the testimony
of various witnesses on hearsay and other grounds, and
made a variety of other motions. Where rulings on such
motions or objections were reserved , said motions are
hereby denied and the objections overruled. Pursuant to an
extension of time duly granted, briefs were filed on April
24, 1973. No proposed findings of fact or conclusions of
law have been filed by any of the parties. Respondent's
unopposed motion to correct the record , in stated respects,
is hereby allowed and made part of the record.
Upon the entire record in the case and, based upon the
appearance and demeanor of the witnesses , and the briefs,
which have been carefully considered, the undersigned
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, Respondent has admitted, and it
is hereby found that during the 12-month period ending
June 30, 1972, E. D. S. Service Corporation, herein called
E.D.S., Respondent's predecessor, was engaged in the
business of rendering computer data services at its place of
business at Concord, California. During said 12-month
period, E.D.S. purchased materials directly from suppliers
located outside the State of California, valued in excess of
$50,000, and provided services directly to customers
located outside the State of California, valued in excess of
$50,000.
The complaint further alleges, Respondent has admitted,
and it is hereby found that, on about July 1, 1972,
Respondent purchased the facility and operations of
E.D.S., located at Concord, California. It is further alleged
that, projected on a 12-month basis, it may reasonably be
expected that Respondent will purchase materials directly
from suppliers located outside the State of California,
valued in excess of $50 ,000, and will provide services
directly to customers located outside the State of Califor-
nia, valued in excess of $50,000.
On the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record,
it is hereby found that, at all times material herein,
Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce
and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Office and Professional Employees Union, Local 29,
Office And Professional Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO, the Union herein, is, and at all times material
herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Prior to July 1, 1972, E.D.S. was engaged in the business
of processing data relating to medical, dental, and drug
claims for Medicare, Blue Shield, and other governmental
agencies and insurance carriers . The actual work of data
processing is performed by key disc operators, principally
women , constituting the bargaining unit.
On or about May 30, 1972, the Board certified the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employ-
ees, in the appropriate unit therein described. About July 1,
Respondent acquired the business of E.D.S., and has since
operated the same business , at the same location, utilizing
the same equipment and personnel as its predecessor.
There is no issue of successorship in the technical sense,
since Respondent admittedly agreed to continue in effect
all the terms and conditions of employment, including
benefits enjoyed by the employees while the business was
conducted by E.D .S. In fact, two notices to this effect were
posted in the plant , one over the printed name of John H.
Hickey, Respondent 's president, on July 14.
On July 6, Union Representative Richard ' Delaney
notified E.D.S. by letter of the names of the Union's
negotiating committee, consisting of two employees from
each of three shifts, with one alternate each for the day and
swing shifts. The committee included Terrie Ramsey, swing
shift, Alyce Shutzbaugh, day shift, and Susan Moan, grave
(yard) shift . Next day, July 7, Delaney wrote Hickey
notifying him of the Union's certification, enclosing a copy
of a proposed contract covering unit employees, and
requesting commencement of negotiations on one of
several alternate dates.
On July 12, 1972, Robert J. Scolnik wrote the Union that
he had been retained as labor counsel for Respondent and
confirmed that his client would recognize and bargain with
the Union under the Board certification issued in Case
20-RC-10573. Following a series of telephone conversa-
tions between Scolnik and Delaney , a meeting was
scheduled for July 26. On July 19, Delaney transmitted
copies of a proposed contract, together with a copy of the
letter previously sent to E.D .S., furnishing the names of
members of the negotiating committee.
On July 21, in a four-page, single-spaced letter, ad-
dressed to Delaney, in his official capacity , sent by
certified mail, Scolnik undertook to summarize the
substance of the preliminary telephone conversations in
which he had engaged with Delaney. Scolnik's letter was
devoted chiefly to the issue of whether employee-members
of the union negotiating committee should be permitted to
attend the bargaining meetings, and asserted that Respon-
dent would decline to release employees from working
shifts in order to participate in negotiations. In his
telephone discussions with Scolnik, Delaney had protested
that the Union was entitled to have a representative from
each shift present during negotiations , and had maintained
that the Board would sustain the Union 's position.
The meeting scheduled for July 26, was held at 3:15 p.m.
at union headquarters . Present on behalf of Respondent
were Scolnik , Respondent's principal negotiator through-
out all meetings, and President Hickey; 3 attending on
behalf of the Union were Delaney, Terrie Ramsey, and
Linda Murphy, of the swing shift, and Kathy McGuire and
Sherry Lee, of the graveyard shift. Delaney called Scolnik's
attention to what he regarded as- inaccuracies and
misstatements in Scolnik 's letter of July 21 . Although there
3 Hickey, though m attendance at the heanng, did not testify.
CONCORD DOCU-PREP, INC. 983
was perfunctory discussion regarding other issues, includ-
ing modifications in the dress code, later mentioned, and
the existing incentive bonus plan, the discussion was
devoted primarily to the size and composition of the union
negotiating committee. The Company's initial position, as
expressed by Scolnik, was that there was no need for
employee representation on the negotiating committee or,
indeed; for any negotiating committee whatever, on the
premise that since the Union was exclusive representative,
its business representatives could adequately represent the
interests of the employees. The Union at first proposed a
committee of six employees, two from each shift. In view of
the Company's apparent intransigence on this issue, the
union representative indicated that he might find it
necessary to file an unfair labor practice charge. The
Company maintained that if the Union insisted on its
position, the Company would not release any employee-
member from his shift to attend a negotiating meeting.
This would necessarily result in a committee of four
employees, at most, although Respondent gave no indica-
tion that a committee of that size would be acceptable, but
still adhered to its position that no employee committee
was necessary, a position of which Respondent still hoped
to convince the Union. The meeting ended inconclusively.
On July 28, Scolnik wrote Delaney, by certified mail,
that it might 'be desirable to maintain "fairly detailed
minutes" of negotiation meetings, and enclosed a four-
page, single-spaced typewritten memorandum concerning
the July 26 meeting, and requested the union representative
to sign two copies and return one to Scolnik. The, letter
suggested that Delaney propose revisions or corrections, if
necessary, and send Scolnik copies. Scolnik also recom-
mended that the parties alternate in preparing minutes
and, while charging the Union with -breaking off and
refusing to continue negotiations pending the filing of
unfair labor practice charges by the Union, offered to
resume negotiations, proposing a meeting on August 1,
1972, at Scolnik's office.
Delaney did not comply with Scolnik's request to sign
and return the minutes, or propose corrections and
revisions, primarily because he felt that the general tenor of
the minutes left an erroneous impression ' of what had
occurred, and that the parties might be better employed
engaging in substantive negotiations. After the July 26
meeting, Delaney was succeeded by Senior Union Repre-
sentative Joe C. Nedham, who had been on vacation.
The next meeting was held on August 9 at Scolnik's
office. The Union was represented by Nedham, and a
negotiating committee consisting of Terrie Ramsey and
Christine Straughn. As the first order of business, Nedham
proposed a negotiating committee, consisting of two
employees from each of the two nonworking shifts, and
one, from the working shift, with the proviso that if
negotiations continued into the next shift, one of the two
representatives from that shift would return to work so that
no more than one employee would be away from his shift
at a time. Scolnik said that he would respond to this
proposal after he had had an opportunity to caucus with
his client that day. Later, Scolmk reported that he had not
had an opportunity to discuss the matter, and that he
would notify the Union of Respondent's position later in
the week.
Among other topics discussed, the matter of the dress
code was relatively high on the list of priorities. Admitted-
ly,- E.D.S. had enforced a rigid dress code, which regulated
the type of apparel that could be worn at work. Suggestions
were made by both sides as to the type of apparel which
might be acceptable, with the understanding that a joint
announcement would be made to the employees of the
dress code finally agreed upon, for a trial period.
Employees wearing unacceptable attire would be furnished
with smocks, instead of being sent home, under former
policy, it being understood that the negotiating committee
would participate in "policing" the dress code. Although
various types of apparel were discussed, no final agreement
was reached as to which items were or were not acceptable.
It was agreed that Respondent would submit to the Union
a summary of items of attire which would be regarded
acceptable or unacceptable and as to which the Union
could comment .4
On August 10, Scolnik wrote Nedham, enclosing a copy
of minutes purporting to reflect what occurred at the
meeting the day before. According to these minutes,
Nedham had proposed to compromise the issue concerning
the number of members on the negotiating committee by
reducing the size of the committee to one employee from
each shift instead of two. Under Scolnik's version of this
proposal, if this was acceptable to the Company, the Union
would waive its right to file unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. According to these minutes, Scolnik stated
that the Company would consider the problem and advise
the Union of its position, and that this was acceptable to
Mr. Nedham. Other subjects brought up at this meeting,
related primarily to the matter of the dress code, which
Respondent had agreed to relax in certain areas. Again, a
place was provided for Nedham's signature to these
minutes. Nedham declined to sign these minutes because
of what he regarded as misstatements, distortions, and
"editorializing" by Scolnik. In any event, it should be
noted that the Union had at no time agreed that Scolnik
should take official minutes of the negotiation meetings,
much less to be bound by them unless it raised specific
objections to the contents of the minutes or proposed
minutes of its own. Nor could counsel by this stratagem
impose a'duty on the Union to object to the contents of the
minutes on peril of being held- to have assented to or
acquiesced in the matters contained in the minutes.
Enclosed with the covering letter was a draft of a
Revised Dress Code, purporting to enumerate various
items of attire which were acceptable, as well as those
which were not. Also enclosed was a document, entitled
"Joint Announcement to All Employees," purporting to set
forth the policies with regard to the relaxation of the strict
rules of the dress code, under an agreement to be jointly
4 By way of illustration, these involved the issue of whether wearing regard to the relatively few male employees, the issue of whether they would
nylon hose, colored or otherwise , so-called coordinated slack outfits, hot be permitted to wear dress slacks, long- or short -sleeved shirts, colored
pants, jumpsuits, deans , Levis, or denims , halter tops, zones, clogs or treads, shirts, long hair, beards and mustaches , were all subjects to be considered
long dresses , and niicromim skirts would or would not be acceptable. With under a revised dress code.
984 DECISIONS OF, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arrived at with the Union, on a 30-day trial basis. As
appears from the document itself, both the Company and
the Union were expected to sign this document.
According to Nedham, it was not until August 14 that he
saw for the first time the letter dated August 10, enclosing
copies of the proposed minutes, as well as the letter of
August. 11, enclosing drafts of the statement of company
policy and joint announcement. Having already arranged
for the attendance of the employee negotiating committee,
Nedham decided to wait until the meeting to notify Scolnik
of his misunderstanding of the Union's position with
respect to the size of the negotiating committee.
The next, and final, meeting was held at the Union's
conference room in Oakland on August 15 at 10 a.m.
Scolnik and Hickey appeared for Respondent, and the
Union was represented by Nedham and five employee-
members of the negotiating committee, consisting of two
employees from each of the two nonworking shifts, and
one employee from the working shift. When Scolnik and
Hickey realized that the Union was apparently adhering to
its position, that it was entitled to have a committee of five,
Scolnik and Hickey caucused briefly, and then announced
that unless two employees were dismissed, Respondent
would refuse to negotiate further. The Union declined to
accede to Respondent's request. Charging the Union with
bad faith, and breach of its agreement to reduce its
negotiating committee to three, Scolnik and Hickey walked
out of the meeting, but Scolnik asked Nedham if he would
prepare the minutes of that meeting. Nedham replied
jocularly that Scolnik was being paid enough to prepare
the minutes himself.
No further negotiations were held. Instead, Scolnik
wrote Nedham on August 15, by certified mail, advising
him that the Company was ready and willing to resume
negotiations "upon request," at the same time and place,
presumably at the Union's headquarters. When Scolnik
failed to receive an immediate reply, he again wrote
Nedham, on August 18, withdrawing his previous request
to hold a meeting at the union conference room, and
proposed instead that his original suggestion that the
location of meeting places be alternated and that the next
meeting should therefore be held in his office. In other
respects, Scolnik stated that the Company was ready and
willing to resume negotiations, upon request. On August
28, Scolmk wrote Nedham, purportedly furnishing certain
information requested at the August 9 meeting in regard to
the Respondent's incentive bonus plan, which is not in
issue in this proceeding. On August 31, Scolnik submitted a
copy of the minutes of the August 15 meeting together with
a covering letter.
On September 29, Nedham wrote Scolnik reiterating the
Union's position as to the size of the negotiating commit-
tee, namely two from each nonworking shift, and one from
the working- shift, and proposed that negotiations be
resumed, pending investigation by the Board, and offering
to negotiate with a committee of three limited to one from
each shift. The letter also commented with regard to items
on the dress code, and requested further information
regarding the incentive plan.
On October 4, Scolnik replied to Nedham's letter, asking
for clarification with respect to the Union's offer to resume
negotiations "conditionally." More importantly, however,
Scolnik charged the Union with a breach of the agreement,
allegedly reached on the size of the negotiating committee,
and, in effect, called upon the Union to acknowledge that
it had committed a breach of its agreement, and to assure
that this would not happen again. Reiterating that the
Union had failed to bargain in good faith, and was
attempting to repudiate agreements allegedly reached
regarding the dress code, Scolnik concluded by saying that
the only solution appeared to be litigation.
On October 27, Nedham replied to Scolnik's letter of
October 4, reiterating the Union's willingness to resume
negotiations upon Respondent's terms with regard to the
size of the negotiating committee, reserving its right,
however, to a five-person committee in the event of a
favorable determination of that issue by the Board.5
Respondent failed to reply to Nedham's letter.
The evidence fairly establishes that Respondent abruptly
terminated negotiations on August 15, and has since failed
to meet with the Union, ostensibly because of Respon-
dent's claim that the Union had breached its agreement on
August 9, regarding a three-member committee. Respon-
dent argues that the logic of the situation supports its
position that the Union had agreed to a three-member
committee as a compromise between the Union's initial
position, that it was entitled to six employees on the
committee (two from each of the three shifts), and
Respondent's original position that there was no necessity
for a negotiating committee consisting of employee
members. According to Scolnik, Nedham did not mention
the figure two or five during this discussion, merely
proposing a total of three employees, one from each shift.
It is undisputed, however, that there was some discussion
as to what would happen if the negotiating meeting ran
beyond the shift on which a member of the committee was
employed. If Scolnik's version of the Union's proposal is
correct, and there were to be only three employees on the
committee, the release of an employee to return to work on
his shift could deprive the Union of a representative from
that shift during negotiations. The issue, however, is not
whether a union is entitled to have a specified number of
employees on a negotiating committee, or whether an
employer may determine the number of employees who
may serve on such committee. While admittedly an
employer may not dictate the choice of bargaining
representative, by the same token, a union may not
arbitrarily decide on the number of employee representa-
tives it chooses to serve on such committee. Such
determinations must obviously be made on the basis of
reason and necessity, including the dimensions and scope
of the employer's operations, the number of employees
involved, the number of shifts, and other relevant factors.6
The question to be determined is whether Respondent's
5 In explaining his delay in answering Scolnik's letter of October, 4, employees who were becoming increasingly impatient . Under the circum-
Nedham testified that he regarded Scolnik's letter as a final determination stances, Nedham's delay in replying to Scolnik's letter can hardly be
to resort to litigation instead of further negotiations , but that he finally took regarded as evidence of the Union's unwillingness to continue negotiations
the initiative in an effort to resume negotiations at the behest of the 6 There were approximately 150 employees working for E.D.S. on three
CONCORD DOCU-PREP, INC.
action in admittedly breaking off negotiations on August
15, allegedly because it had concluded that the Union had
reneged on its agreement to conduct negotiations with a
three-member committee, constituted a refusal to bargain.
Scolnik was positive that agreement had been been
reached, fortifying his position by his account in the
minutes of the meeting which he had prepared, a copy of
which he had sent the Union. Needham was equally
certain that no such agreement was reached and rejected
any suggestion that his failure to challenge the accuracy of
Scolnik's minutes constituted acquiescence in Scolnik's
assertions. It may be assumed that Nedham was under no
legal duty to respond, and that his failure to do so did not
result in agreement with Respondent's position on the
subject of the three-member committee. It is obvious that
there was a misunderstanding and that wishful thinking on
both sides had influenced their conclusions. In any event, it
is evident that there was no meeting of the minds on the
subject matter.
Be that as it may, the evidence fairly establishes that
Respondent insisted upon agreement on the size and
constituency of the Union's negotiating committee, a
nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining, as a
precondition to further negotiations. Furthermore, by
refusing to continue negotiations on the ground that the
Union had allegedly breached its agreement regarding a
nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining, Respon-
dent compounded its refusal to bargain. Judged in
retrospect, by the contents of Respondent's reply of
October 4, to Nedham's offer to resume negotiations upon
Respondent's terms regarding the size of the negotiating
committee, the, conclusion is all but inescapable that
Respondent utilized the issue of disagreement as to the size
and composition of the committee to frustrate collective
bargaining regarding mandatory subjects.
Nor is Respondent's contention, that it was unwilling to
resume negotiations because the Union had failed to keep
its alleged agreement regarding the dress code, substantiat-
ed by the record. Contrary to Scolnik's testimony, that the
revised dress code proposal represented an agreement
reached with the Union on August 9, it is apparent from
Scolnik's letter of August 11, and the proposed joint
announcement that agreement had not been reached on a
variety of items- of apparel, Furthermore, it is obvious that
the parties intended to issue a joint announcement after
agreement had been reached between the parties, as
exemplified by Respondent's draft of the revised dress
code.
1. The alleged unilateral changes
a. The withholding of wage increases
Official policy with regard to "Performance, Salary And
Promotions," adopted without change by Respondent, is
contained in what has been referred to as the E.D.S. Blue
Book, entitled "you and your company." Copies of this
booklet were furnished all newly hired employees who
were required to sign a form in the back of the booklet
shifts, at the time of the representation proceeding, and presumably the
same number were employed by Respondent.
985
acknowledging that the employee has received and read its
contents.
Under the heading "Performance Evaluations," after a
probationary period, an evaluation is made at least once
every 6 months by the supervisor or manager to discuss the
employee's "production, attitude and attendance," with
suggestions as to possible need for improvement. Prod-
uction is defined as including (1) "amount of data
prepared, (2) the degree of correctness, (3) the efficient use
of your time." The concluding paragraph of this section
reads:
Salary will not be discussed in this evaluation. The
purpose is to keep you informed about your perform-
ance and thereby assist you in increasing your
effectiveness in your job and the company.
Under the "Salary Increases," the booklet provides:
Salaries are reviewed within sixty days after a
Performance Evaluation for all employees other than
those who are in the introductory period of their
employment.
Increases must be earned by each individual based
solely upon their merits of production, attendance, and
attitude. Passage of time only becomes a factor when
an employee has reached a high level of performance
and maintains it. Cost of living increments are built
into raises achieved by our employees.
Witnesses for the General Counsel,7 however, all of
whom had been employed by E.D.S. about 2-1/2 years,
testified that when they were hired, they were told that,
after a 90-day probationary period, and every 6 months
thereafter, they could expect a regularly scheduled wage
increase if their performance met adequate standards of
production, attitude, and attendance. In accordance with
this policy, employees received periodic evaluations by
their shift supervisors, and this evaluation was discussed
with the employees in a private interview with the
manager. If, according to General Counsel's witnesses,
performance in regard to production, attendance, and
attitude was satisfactory, the employee would receive a
raise shortly after the review.
Both Ramsey and Kessler received wage increases while
employed by E.D.S. after their probationary period,
Ramsey receiving more than one raise while so employed.
Shutzbaugh received a raise at the end of her probationary
period, although she conceded that other employees did
not receive a raise at the expiration of their probationary
period. Kessler testified that, although she did not receive
her raise promptly after her evaluation and review, this was
contrary to company policy as stated to her by E.D.S.
management representatives. It is evident, however, that
Kessler was probably denied later raises, at least in part,
because of the imposition of governmental wage and price
controls. Moan did not receive her wage increase following
completion of her period of probation until more than 6
weeks later, and then only after repeatedly complaining to
her supervisor and manager. Her increase, moreover, was
not retroactive to the completion of her probation.
On July 14, when Respondent posted the notices
announcing that it was continuing the terms, conditions of
7 Teme Ramsey, Sue Moan, Alyce Shutzbaugh, and Kathy Kessler.
986 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment, and benefits which had prevailed under
E.D.S., Ramsey asked Supervisor Patricia B. "Pat"
Finkelstein whether existing wage policies would be
continued . Her supervisor said that they would. In about
mid-October, when, according to her calculations, she
would have become entitled to a wage increase, Ramsey
asked Finkelstein when she could expect her raise.
Finkelstein told her that no raises could be granted
because of the breakdown in union negotiations, and that
all raises would have to be approved by the union
negotiating committee . Ramsey told Finkelstein that she
had discussed the matter with a Board agent, and had been
informed that regularly scheduled raises were permissible
during negotiations,, and could not be granted or withheld
on the basis of union considerations. Finkelstein retorted
that that was not her understanding.
On or about November 20, Ramsey asked Richard
Finucan, Respondent's manager, whether the employees
could expect any raises. Finucan told her that he had a list
in his desk drawer of employees who were due for raises,
which he had submitted to Hickey, but that Hickey told
him, on advice of counsel, to withhold all raises because of
the state of negotiations. Ramsey repeated what she had
been told by the Board agent, regarding the granting or
withholding of wage increases during negotiations, and
protested that the Company could grant raises but was
refusing to do so. Finucan, according to Ramsey, acknowl-
edged that that was essentially correct.
In mid-January 1973, Ramsey again discussed the
subject of wage increases with Finucan. Again, he referred
to lists in his desk drawer of employees who were due to
receive raises , stating that he had submitted the list to
President Hickey but that Hickey had again said that he
had been instructed by counsel to withhold raises because
of the breakdown in negotiations.
In November, Moan had a 6-month evaluation interview
with Finucan in his office. Because, according to Moan,
her production had increased substantially, she asked him
if she could expect a raise. Fmucan told her that no raises
would be forthcoming because of the breakdown in
negotiations, and that all raises would have to be submitted
to the Union for approval. During this discussion, Finucan
mentioned that he had three, separate lists of employees:
one for employees who were overdue for raises; another
for employees who were then due for raises; and a list of
employees scheduled to receive raises in the future.
In September or October, Kessler also spoke to Finucan
about the matter of raises. On this occasion, Finucan
removed from his desk drawer a list, containing two
columns, and explained to Kessler that one consisted of
employees due for raises in November, and the other for
8 The above findings are based on the credible and substantially
uncontradicted testimony of the named employees. Finucan did not testify.
On Tuesday, February 27, 1973, while the hearing was in progress,
Respondent moved for a 60-day continuance, upon the representation,
supported by a doctor's certificate, that Finucan had been hospitalized with
a heart condition, and would be unable to testify for at least 3 weeks.
Respondent was thereupon granted a continuance until March 20, 1973.
When the hearing was reconvened, on March 20, Respondent 's counsel
announced that he did not intend to call Finucan as a witness, and that his
decision was not based on reasons relating to Fmucan's health or physical
condition. Under all the circumstances , the testimony of the witnesses
concerning remarks made to them by Finucan, related above, are credited
those due after the first of the year. Finucan told Kessler
that, according to records and policies of E.D.S., she would
be due for a raise after the first of the years
According to Finkelstein, when she was originally hired
by Hank Falck, manager of E.D.S., she was told that she
would be "eligible for consideration" for a raise after a 90-
day probationary period and every 6 months thereafter.
This is consistent with Respondent's position, as expressed
in the Blue Book, that while evaluations were to be made at
least once every 6 months, and salaries reviewed within 60
days thereafter, "increases [would have to be] earned by
each individual based solely upon their merits of prod-
uction, attendance, and attitude."
Thus, it is evident that Respondent's policy did not
contemplate automatic, regularly scheduled wage increases
even where the employee had satisfied all the performance
requirements. Whatever may be said as to the fairness or
equity of such a policy, the record fairly establishes that
Respondent retained absolute discretion in the granting of
wage increases, irrespective of whether the employee
merited an increase based on the criteria laid down in the
Blue Book. Nor does the fact that employees who testified
for the General Counsel actually received raises after given
periods warrant a contrary conclusion. The most that can
be said is that under Respondent's policy merit raises in
unspecified amounts might be granted at the Employer's
sole discretion.
The record reveals, however, that Respondent had
decided to grant raises to some unidentified employees but
withheld such action because the Company was engaged in
negotiations with the Union. Thus, at least two employees
testified credibly and without contradiction that Manager
Finucan had told them that he had prepared several lists of
categories of employees who were entitled to raises or
whose raises were overdue, as well-as those who would
become entitled to raises in November.9
It is significant that, according to the unrefuted testimo-
ny of witnesses for the General Counsel, both Supervisor
Finkelstein and Manager Finucan told them that the
Company had determined that no wage increases would be
granted pending the outcome of the negotiations. This
supports the inference that Respondent had decided upon
the granting of merit increases to certain employees, but
resorted to the pendency of negotiations as justification for
the denial of these wage increases. It is well settled that the
decision of whether to grant or withhold merit wage
increases must be determined without regard to questions
of union considerations.10 It should be noted that at no
time did Respondent notify the Union that it had decided
to grant certain eligible employees merit wage increases
and request the Union's approval of such action. Instead,
9 Although the General Counsel subpenaed the production of these lists,
Respondent's counsel, in declining to comply with the subpena, represented
that no such lists existed , although no probative evidence was offered to
support this statement . As has already been noted, Finucan did not testify.
It is, therefore, found that, whether lists such as those described by the
General Counsel's witnesses had, in fact, been compiled or were in
existence , Fmucan told these employees, in effect, that the Company had
determined to grant merit increases to employees who had become entitled
to them
10 Pacific Southwest Airlines, 201 NLRB 647; The Gates Rubber Co, 182
NLRB 95. Cf. N.LR.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
CONCORD DOCU- PREP, INC. 987
Respondent sought to place the onus for the withholding of
such increases on the Union.
It is, therefore, found that, although Respondent did not
maintain a policy of granting automatic , regularly sched-
uled wage increases after performance evaluations, Res-
pondent had decided to grant merit increases to various
eligible employees, which it subsequently withheld, ostensi-
bly because of the pendency of bargaining negotiations. By
so doing, Respondent has unilaterally changed the terms
and conditions of employment of its employees, without
first notifying or negotiating with the Union , as exclusive
bargaining agent, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
b. The institution of the revised dress code
As has already been found, no final agreement had been
reached between the parties regarding the revised dress
code prior to August 15 or at any time thereafter. The fact
that the parties had contemplated the posting of a "Joint
Announcement to All Employees," embodying the revised
policy, which never materialized, is ample evidence that no
agreement had been reached. Nevertheless, although no
impasse on this issue had been reached , in about mid-
September, Respondent unilaterally instituted a revised
dress code.
Aside from its contention that the parties had reached
agreement on this issue at the August 9 meeting, a position
not borne out by the record, Respondent maintains that
employees on the first and third shifts, having learned that
changes in the dress code had been discussed between the
Company and the Union, in effect, jumped the gun, and
put the changes into effect on their own initiative. When
employees on the second or night shift protested to
Supervisor Finkelstein that they were being unfairly
discriminated against by being required to adhere strictly
to the existing dress code , while employees on the other
shifts were being permitted to disregard it, Finkelstein
consulted President Hickey. He instructed her to notify the
employees on her shift that the revised code would be
applied uniformly to all employees. After commending her
employees for exercising restraint in not following the lead
of the employees on the other shifts, Finkelstein informed
them of Hickey's decision.
The implication in Respondent's argument, that the
situation somehow got out of hand after employees learned
of negotiations concerning the dress code, is unconvincing.
Considering 'the' strictness with which the code had
previously been enforced , it is difficult to believe that
Respondent would have tolerated any deliberate deviation
from the code. Without regard to whether disciplinary
action might have been warranted , all that was required
was to apprise the employees that negotiations regarding a
revised dress code were underway, and that a joint
announcement would be issued when agreement was
reached. Failing to do this, Respondent confirmed and
ratified the action of its employees, and unilaterally
instituted the revised dress code.
c. Reduction in cleanup time
In or about mid-September Supervisor Finkelstein
announced to all unit heads under her supervision that
cleanup time at the end of the swing shift would be
reduced from 5 to 3 minutes . According to her, all units of
employees on the second shift , excepting those processing
so-called Boston claims , had always been allowed only 3
minutes cleanup time. In or about mid-1971 , while E.D.S.
was still the employer, employees handling Boston claims
were allowed an additional 2 minutes, for a total of 5
minutes cleanup time because of the additional work
involved. In July or August 1972, work on the Boston
claims was discontinued, and, according to Finkelstein, the
Company reverted to its former policy of 3 minutes
cleanup time.
Finkelstein made the announcement of the change in
cleanup time to all unit heads, notwithstanding that only
two of the units had worked on the Boston claims. Apart
from the testimony of General Counsel's witnesses, notably
Shutzbaugh, who had worked for Respondent and its
predecessor for a total of 2 1/2 years, that cleanup time
had always been 5 minutes on all- shifts , it is undisputed
that employees processing Boston claims had been allowed
5 minutes cleanup time.
As to these employees, at least, the Union was entitled to
prior notice and an opportunity to bargain about the
reduction in cleanup time . Whether Respondent took the
action with respect to all employees because of the loss of
the Boston claims or because, as Respondent claimed,
employees generally had been abusing the cleanup time
allowed, the fact remains that Respondent took unilateral
action on a matter involving the terms and working
conditions of its employees, without affording their
exclusive representative an opportunity to bargain on the
subject. As a change in working conditions , this was a
subject concerning which Respondent had a duty to
bargain with the Union, and by failing to do so,
Respondent has violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
Summary and Conclusions
It is undisputed that only three negotiating meetings took
place between the parties , on July 26, August 9, and
August 15 . The first meeting was devoted primarily to the
size and composition of the Union 's negotiating commit-
tee, a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Despite some desultory discussion on contract matters, the
issue concerning the negotiating committee overshadowed
all other issues . The August 9 meeting was occupied largely
with the subject of the dress code, and procedures for
revising and implementing the code, with the understand-
ing that a joint announcement would be made by
Respondent and the Union . The final meeting on August
15, terminated abruptly with the Respondent's insistence
that the Union had breached an agreement allegedly
arrived at as to the number of persons to serve on the
negotiating committee . With regard to the dress code,
despite its commitment to issue a joint announcement,
Respondent unilaterally instituted a revised code , ostensi-
bly because employees on one shift had, on their own
initiative , put the changes into effect.
At each stage of the negotiations , Respondent, through
Scolnik, its principal negotiator , by the stratagem of
submitting purported minutes of the meetings, sought to
988 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obtain firm commitments concerning subjects raised at
these meetings , by regarding the Union's failure to respond
as acquiescence in Respondent's position. When the Union
attempted to set the record straight, at subsequent
meetings, it was sharply denounced for having allegedly
revoked its interim agreement. The technique of attempt-
ing to reduce to writing interim agreements at each stage of
negotiations may have a salutary purpose. But to attempt
to accomplish this by preparing self-serving minutes of
negotiation meetings, and imposing the burden on the
other side of refuting the contents of the minutes, could
conceivably lead to an interminable controversy over
whether the minutes correctly reflected what had taken
place at the meetings. Had the Union notified Respondent
of its objection to the minutes and drafted and submitted
its own minutes, Respondent would undoubtedly have
found matters over which to take issue. Such collective-
bargaining techniques would have the effect of substituting
debate over form for genuine negotiation over matters of
substance. Moreover, the insistence on agreement on issues
at each stage of negotiations before proceeding to the next
stage is not conducive to genuine, good-faith collective
bargaining. It is common knowledge that parties may,
during later stages of negotiations , make concessions as a
quid pro quo over matters on which they had been unwilling
to yield earlier. Respondent's policy of insisting on interim
agreements had the effect of fragmenting the collective-
bargaining process and replacing flexibility with rigidity.
In fact, Respondent's approach to collective bargaining
by the use of its minutes, especially when considered in
light of its final letter to the Union, proposing that the
controversy had perhaps best be litigated, strongly suggests
that in the drafting of these minutes, Respondent was
concerned more with making a record for use in any future
litigation than with furthering the purposes of collective
bargaining.
Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire
record, it is hereby found that, by terminating or
suspending negotiations on August 15, and thereafter
failing and refusing to resume negotiations upon request,
purportedly because the Union had failed to adhere to an
agreement allegedly reached regarding the size and
composition of the negotiating committee, and the revised
dress code, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of
the Act.
It is further found that, by its unilateral action in
withholding merit wage increases, instituting a revised
dress code, and reducing employees' cleanup time, without
prior notice to and negotiation with the Union, Respon-
dent has engaged in further unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The record clearly establishes that, on September 29, the
Union offered to resume negotiations on Respondent's
own terms regarding the size of the Union's negotiating
committee. On October 4, Respondent rejected this offer,
contending that it was not required to bargain on a
conditional basis, demanded an apology from the Union
for its alleged breach of purported interim agreements,
and, in effect, defied the Union to proceed to litigation of
the refusal to bargain issues.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Respondent, described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several states and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees in an appropriate unit
despite the Union's majority status. It will, therefore, be
recommended that Respondent bargain collectively with
said Union upon request.
It has further been found that Respondent unlawfully
withheld merit increases from employees whom it had
found eligible for such increases, thereby unilaterally
changing the wages and terms and conditions of employ-
ment of its employees without prior consultation and
negotiation with the Union. It will, therefore, be recom-
mended that Respondent be required to grant those
employees the increases to which they would have been
entitled, under Respondent's preexisting policy (except to
the extent that any such increases may have been affected
by existing governmental wage regulations).
It has also been found that Respondent unilaterally, and
without prior notice to and negotiation with the Union,
reduced employees' allotted cleanup time. It will, therefore,
be recommended that Respondent be required to restore to
all its employees the amount of cleanup time previously
enjoyed by the employees in accordance with preexisting
company policy.
Nothing herein shall be deemed to require or permit
Respondent to alter or modify changes in the dress code or
other terms and conditions of employment previously
accorded to its employees.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Concord Docu-Prep, Inc., Respondent herein, is,
and all times material herein has been, an employer
engaged in commerce and in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
2. Office And Professional Employees Union, Local 29,
Office And Professional Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO, the Union herein, is, and at all times material
herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time clerical and data
CONCORD DOCU-PREP, INC. 989
processing employees employed by Concord Docu-Prep,
Inc., at its California location, including all _ key disc
operators, control clerks and unit heads; excluding
confidential employees, managerial employees, sales per-
sonnel, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute, and at all times material herein have constitut-
ed, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Office And Professional Employees Union, Local 29,
Office And Professional Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, was on July 1, 1972,
and at all times material thereafter has been, the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit, for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing, since August 15, 1972, and at all times
thereafter, to bargain collectively with Office And Profes-
sional Employees, Local 29, Office And Professional
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive representative of Respondent's employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit, making unilateral changes in
wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment,
including withholding merit wage increases, in disregard of
its preexisting policy because of union considerations;
instituting a revised dress code; and reducing employees'
cleanup time, without notification to or negotiation with
the exclusive representative of Respondent's employees, in
September and October 1972, thereby refusing to bargain
collectively with Office And Professional Employees
Union, Local 29, Office And Professional Employees
International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive represent-
ative of Respondent's employees in the aforesaid appropri-
ate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
6. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, thereby
violating Section 8(a)(1) thereof.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I make the following
recommended:
ORDERI'
Concord Docu-Prep, Inc., Respondent herein, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Office And
Professional Employees Union, Local 29, Office And
Professional Employees International, AFL-CIO, as the
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
exclusive representative of all the employees in the
appropriate unit above described.
(b) Unilaterally making any changes in wages, hours, or
terms or conditions of employment, including withholding
of merit increases in disregard of its preexisting policy;
instituting a revised dress code; and reducing employees
cleanup time , without prior notification to or negotiation
with the Union, as exclusive representatives of its employ-
ees in the appropriate unit.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist Office And Professional Employees Union,
Local 29, Office And Professional Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other protected concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection' guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is
found, will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Office And
Professional Employees Union, Local 29, Office And
Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the
appropriate unit described above and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) Grant those employees who would have been entitled
to merit increases under Respondent's preexisting policy,
such increases (except to the extent that any of such
increases may have been affected by existing governmental
wage regulations).
(c) Restore to all its employees the amount of cleanup
time previously enjoyed by the employees in accordance
with preexisting company policy.
(d) Post at its place of business in Concord, California,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12
Copies of this notice on forms to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 20, shall, after being signed
by Respondent's duly authorized representative, be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notice to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. It is
12 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
990 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
further recommended that, in all other respects, the
complaint be dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Office And Professional Employees Union, Local 29,
Office And Professional Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
our employees in the appropriate unit described below.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally make any changes in
wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment,
including withholding of merit increases in disregard of
our preexisting policy; institute a revised dress code; or
reduce employees cleanup time, without prior notifica-
tion to or negotiation with the Union, as exclusive
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the right to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist Office And Professional Employees Union,
Local 29, Office And Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection or to refrain
from any and all such activities, except to the extent
that said right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as
provided in the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
amended.
WE WILL bargain collectively with the above-named
Union, as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the appropriate unit described below, with respect to
rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
WE WILL grant those employees who would have
been entitled to merit increases under our preexisting
policy, such increases (except to the extent that any
such increases may have been affected by existing
governmental wage regulations).
WE WILL restore to all our employees the amount of
cleanup time previously enjoyed by them in accordance
with our preexisting policy.
The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time clerical and
data processing employees employed by Concord
Docu-Prep, Inc., at its Concord, California
location, including all key disc operators, control
clerks and unit heads; excluding confidential
employees, managerial employees, sales person-
nel guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
All our employees are free to become and remain or
refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
above-named labor organization or any other labor
organization.
CONCORD DOCU-PREP, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, 13018 Federal Building, Box
36047, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California
94102 Telephone 415-556-0335.