Complainant,v.Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Aug 28, 2015

01-2012-0682-0500 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 28, 2015)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

,
Complainant,

v.

Robert McDonald,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120120682

Agency No. 200J-0005-2010102660

DECISION
On November 15, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s October 17, 2011,
final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq

. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s
final decision finding no discrimination.

BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an IT Specialist at
the Agency’s VA Network and Security Operations Center in Hines, Illinois. On July 8, 2010,
Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the
bases of her race (African-American), sex (female), color (brown), and in reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity when:

1. Beginning when she was hired in October 2006, Complainant was paid less than
male counterparts;
2. On September 1, 2009, management mandated that Complainant return to work five
weeks after giving birth and without a medical release from her doctor;
3. On September 1, 2009, management denied Complainant’s request to telework as a
condition of her medical recovery after giving birth and to care for her child;
4. On September 11, 2009, management denied Complainant’s request for 12 weeks of
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave;
5. On November 9, 2009, Complainant was moved, “from a team environment work
area where workload was shared, and placed in a work environment where she was
the only employee with more assignments added on;”
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6. On September 1, 2009, management did not inform Complainant of her rights under
FMLA or the family friendly leave policy for federal employees;
7. From September 4, 2009, to June 16, 2010, management denied Complainant
adequate breastfeeding accommodations;
8. Beginning in January 2006, management denied Complainant incentive awards and
recognition;
9. On July 12, 2010, management discussed Complainant’s medical condition with
numerous individuals who had no need to know;
10. On August 31, 2010, management denied Complainant’s request for promotion;
11. On October 20, 2010, management denied Complainant’s request for a tour change;
12. On November 21, 2010, management denied Complainant’s request to telework;
13. From September 2009 to June 2010, Complainant was told by several coworkers
that management was biased against women, pregnant women, and children;
14. On June 6, 2009, management denied Complainant’s request for training;
15. On June 23, 2010, management told Complainant she was erroneously hired and
would have to compete for her job;
16. On October 13, 2010, management removed Complainant from her volunteer
assignment of Primary Employee Association NSOC Representative; and
17. Management subjected Complainant to harassment and a hostile work environment.

On November 29, 2010, the Agency dismissed claims (2)-(5) and a portion of claim (8) as
untimely raised with an EEO Counselor.1

However, the Agency retained and accepted these
claims as background evidence for Complainant’s hostile environment claim. At the conclusion
of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of
investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant’s
request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision
concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as
alleged.
On appeal, Complainant concedes that she cannot establish a prima facie case for claims (8)
and (9). Complainant argues that claims (2)-(5), which were procedurally dismissed as
untimely, should have been accepted for investigation because they constituted a pattern of
ongoing harassment. Complainant also argues the Agency erroneously omitted claim (15). As
to the claims which were investigated, Complainant argues the Agency erred in its finding of
no discrimination.

1 The Agency found claim (8) to be untimely for any incentive awards and recognition
Complainant claimed she had been denied awards and recognition prior to February 26, 2010.
The Agency accepted for investigation any claims that Complainant was denied incentive
awards or recognition occurring after February 26, 2010, which was 45 days prior to her
initial EEO contact.
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29
C.F.R. Part 1614

, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo
standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the
factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the
documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the
record and its interpretation of the law”).
First, we will address the Agency’s procedural dismissal of a portion of the complaint. EEOC
Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of discrimination should be
brought to the attention of the EEO Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged
to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date
of the action. Here, the record discloses that the alleged discriminatory events of claims (2)-(5)
occurred at various dates in September and November 2009. However, Complainant did not
contact an EEO Counselor until April 13, 2010, well beyond the 45-day limitation period.
EEOC regulations provide that the Agency or the Commission shall extend the time limits
when the individual shows that he was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise
aware of them, that he did not know and reasonably should not have known that the
discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented
by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within the time limits, or
for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission. Ellis v. United States
Postal Service

, EEOC Request No. 01992093 (Nov. 29, 2000). We find that Complainant has
presented no persuasive arguments or evidence warranting an extension of the time limit for
initiating EEO Counselor contact. These were discrete events that should have triggered a
reasonable suspicion of discrimination. Therefore, we find that the Agency properly dismissed
these claims as untimely. These claims, however, will be considered as background evidence
as part of a claim of a hostile work environment.
As to claims (8) and (9), on appeal, Complainant has conceded that she cannot establish a
prima facie case of discrimination as to these claims. Therefore, we find that these claims fail
to show Complainant was subjected to unlawful discrimination.

With respect to Complainant’s contention that the Agency improperly omitted claim (15), the
record shows the Agency accepted this claim for investigation in its Partial Acceptance letter
dated November 29, 2010. However, the claim was subsequently omitted from the Agency’s
list of Complainant’s claims beginning with its January 4, 2011 letter accepting amendments to
Complainant’s claims. The record does not support an inference that Complainant withdrew
this claim and the Agency’s brief does not address why this claim was omitted. However, we
find there is sufficient evidence in the record to determine whether claim (15) constitutes a
discriminatory event.
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Regarding claim (1), the United States Supreme Court articulated the requirements for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). To establish a prima facie case of a violation under the EPA,
a complainant must show that she or he received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex
for equal work, requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working
conditions within the same establishment. Sheppard v. EEOC, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02919
(September 12, 2000), req. for reconsideration denied

, EEOC Request No. 05A10076 (August
12, 2003).
Once a complainant has met this burden, an employer may avoid liability only by showing that
the difference in pay is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the
EPA: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production of work (also referred to as an incentive or piecework
system); or, (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. Id. We note that the EPA is
limited to certain sex-based differentials in wages. The EPA does not prohibit discrimination
in other aspects of employment, even those that have compensation-related consequences, such
as hiring, firing, promotion, transfer, or other issues. Wiley v. Department of the Treasury,
EEOC Appeal No. 01972118 (June 27, 2001) (citing Schnellbaecher v. Basking Clothing Co.

,
887 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989) (a claim of discriminatory promotions is beyond the scope
of the EPA but actionable under Title VII)).
The requirement of “equal work” does not mean that the jobs must be identical, but only that
they must be “substantially equal.” Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). The terms skill, effort, and responsibility, “constitute separate tests, each of which
must be met in order for the equal pay standard to apply.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a). The
factors of skill, effort, and responsibility used to measure the equality of jobs are not precisely
definable. Id.

Skill includes such things as “experience, training, education, and ability.” 29
C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). Effort addresses the amount of “physical or mental exertion needed for
the performance of a job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). Responsibility concerns “the degree of
accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the
job obligation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a).
Here, if we assume, arguendo, Complainant has established a prima facie case of a violation
under the EPA, we find that the Agency has shown the difference in pay was justified based on
a factor other than sex. Complainant was hired in October 2006, as one of five IT specialists
starting at a GS-5 level. The record shows that of the five candidates hired at the GS-5 level,
three were male and two, including Complainant, were female. Complainant contends that,
given her work experience and education, she should have been hired at a higher grade level.
She alleges she was hired at a lower grade level due to her sex. The record shows, however,
that the Agency’s human resources office set the grade levels of the applicants for her position
based on their experience and educational background, and that it was determined that
Complainant was appropriately certified at the GS-5 level. Complainant was selected for the
position from the GS-5 certificate and accepted the position at that grade. The selecting official
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(SO) stated that an applicant could appeal the grade level they were rated at prior to accepting
the position, but Complainant did not make such an appeal. Furthermore, the record shows that
male employees hired at the same time as Complainant were also hired at a GS-5 level. As
such, we find that the Agency has established that the pay differential was based on a factor
other than sex.

Next, we address Complainant’s disparate treatment claims. To prevail in a disparate treatment
claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment
action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco
Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary
depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The
burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To
ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc

., 530 U.S.
133 (2000).
Here, we find that assuming, arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of race,
color, sex, and reprisal discrimination, the Agency nonetheless articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. With respect to the previously addressed claim that
Complainant was not paid the same as similarly situated male employees at her institution, we
found that male employees who were hired at the same time as Complainant were also hired at
a GS-5 pay grade. Additionally, a Caucasian female employee was also hired at the same time
as Complainant and at a GS-5 pay grade. While Complainant could have appealed her grade
classification prior to accepting the position, there is no evidence in the record to show she did
so. Further, the SO has shown he was not in a position to hire Complainant at a higher grade
level since the grade levels were determined by human resources prior to the interviews. While
Complainant may feel that her experience and education warranted a higher grade level, she
has not shown the Agency’s articulated reasons for not hiring her at a higher grade level or
paying her the same as employees at higher grade levels is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not shown she was subjected to
unlawful discrimination.

Next we address claim (6), that management did not inform Complainant of her rights under
the FMLA or the Agency’s family friendly employee leave policy. Complainant’s manager,
S1, stated that he did not specifically know what information Complainant received regarding
FMLA but that she received all “communication e-mails that the rest of us in VA get regarding
these programs.” S1 also stated that Complainant never requested information on the FMLA
policy. A human resources officer, HR1, stated that new employees receive information on
FMLA in their orientation packages and it is incumbent on the employee to advise management
they need some type of leave. HR1 stated that once management has been notified the
employee needs leave, they should advise the employee of their rights under FMLA. Even if
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we assume Complainant did not know that FMLA was available and that management failed to
inform her of it, there is no evidence in the record showing management failed to inform her
of its FMLA and family friendly leave policies due to discriminatory animus.

Next, we address claim (7), that management allegedly denied Complainant adequate
breastfeeding accommodations. As a threshold matter, on appeal Complainant argues this claim
should have been examined as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act because,
“nourishment is necessary to maintain the life of a child.” Allegations of disability in the
federal sector are analyzed under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. Nevertheless, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), which amended Title VII, makes it clear that “because of sex” or “on the basis of
sex,” as used in Title VII, includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.” As a result, we have held that Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment against women affected by pregnancy or related conditions. Caldwell v. USPS,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120101263 (Feb. 5, 2013). Furthermore, we have held that Complainant’s
status as a nursing mother is related to pregnancy and childbirth, and thus is protected under
the PDA. O’Brien v. National Security Agency

, EEOC Appeal No. 01951902 (May 27, 1997).
The Agency properly analyzed claim (7) as a claim of sex discrimination, in addition to the
other alleged bases.
As to the merits of claim (7), the record shows and Complainant concedes that when she first
returned to work from maternity leave, in September 2009, management provided her with an
empty office space in order to express milk. The record also shows that on January 29, 2010,
the office was assigned to another employee and Complainant was no longer able to use it.
Another of Complainant’s supervisors, S2, states that after Complainant could no longer use
the office space, Complainant approached her for a new location and S2 arranged for her to
use a conference room as well as a storage room. S2 stated that Complainant never told her
these rooms were inadequate. Subsequently, S2 developed a facility policy providing for
adequate accommodation for breastfeeding employees. Complainant also alleges that
approximately five months later, a white female coworker who had also been pregnant, CW1,
was provided adequate facilities in which to express milk. However, the record shows CW1
was also initially allowed to use the empty office and was also displaced and forced to use the
storage room. Complainant has not shown the Agency’s articulated reasons are a pretext for
discrimination. We find that Complainant was provided adequate accommodations for
expressing milk and furthermore that Complainant has not shown others not in her protected
classes were given superior accommodations.

Next, we address claim (10), that management denied Complainant’s request for a promotion
to a GS-12 level. The record shows that the Agency informed Complainant on June 23, 2010,
that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was conducting an audit of the announcement
under which she had been hired because the Agency had failed to include veteran’s preference.
On August 25, 2010, Complainant sent an email to management, informing them that on
October 15, 2010, she would be eligible for a promotion. In response, management informed
Complainant that promotions for all of those who had been hired under the vacancy
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announcement being audited by OPM were on hold pending the completion of that
investigation into the Agency’s hiring practices. Complainant argues she would not have been
on the erroneously hired certificate had she been hired at a higher grade level. We have
already addressed the matter of Complainant’s hiring in this opinion and found no
discrimination. Here, we find that Complainant has failed to show the Agency’s articulated
reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

As to claim (11), the record shows that S1 informed all of his employees that no customer
service center staff, including Complainant, would have their tour of duty changed during an
upcoming reorganization. In response, Complainant responded by email, stating that “[if] in
fact I cannot retain my current shift due to management’s decision, I request to work back
Sunday-Thursday shift.” S1 states that the phrasing of Complainant’s email led him to believe
that she was only requesting to be returned to her original tour if she couldn’t keep her current
shift. As her shift did not need to be changed, he kept her on her current tour of duty. S1
further stated that Complainant never informed him that she was dissatisfied with this decision
and wished to change her shift. On appeal, Complainant disputes the Agency’s finding she
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. However, even if we assume,
arguendo, Complainant has established a prima facie case, she has failed to show the Agency’s
articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

As to claim (12), the record shows that, during the investigation, Complainant clarified that
management never actually denied her request to telework, but rather her request was delayed
and she was asked to complete forms that others did not have to complete. Complainant alleged
that two other pregnant women were treated more favorably when they requested telework.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that Complainant has established a prima facie case, we find
that management has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. S1 stated
that one of the other women submitted the proper forms and medical documentation for
telework and that management had been notified she was experiencing complications with her
pregnancy. S1’s contention is supported by the record which shows that the first other woman
did, in fact, submit documentation for her telework request. S1 also stated that the second
other woman was not under his supervision and he thus had no knowledge about whether she
teleworked and how it was approved. Complainant’s third level supervisor (S3) stated that
Complainant did not submit sufficient documentation to support her telework request but that,
after reviewing her November 29, 2010 request, it was approved on January 6, 2011. S3’s
position is supported by HR1 who also stated Complainant did not submit the correct
documentation for teleworking. HR1 also asserted that telework is approved at management’s
discretion and operational needs are taken into account in deciding whether to approve
telework requests. Complainant has failed to show the Agency’s articulated reasons are a
pretext for discrimination.

As to claim (13), Complainant alleges that coworkers told her that S1 had previously stated he
did not like children and that “all pregnant women in the Marines are treated the same as all
Marines.” A second individual allegedly told Complainant that S1 would “openly express” that
he did not like children. Complainant alleges other individuals told her similar things about S1.
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S1 denied ever saying he did not like children and stated that he does not have a reputation for
treating male and female employees differently. S3 stated he has never received any complaints
from female employees about S1 being biased. Even if we assume, arguendo, that S1 actually
made these alleged comments, and even if we assume these comments demonstrate a bias
against women, pregnant women, and children, as Complainant alleges, there is no evidence in
the record that S1 directed these comments at Complainant or otherwise discriminated against
her. Further, even if S1 did state that he did not like children, this does not demonstrate that he
was biased against women or pregnant women; nor does it demonstrate he discriminated
against Complainant on the basis of these alleged feelings.

With respect to claim (14), Complainant alleges that her second line supervisor (S4) told her
S3 had stated that pregnant women could not train at the Integrated Operations Center (IOC) in
Washington D.C. S3 denied making this statement but speculated that he may have had a
conversation regarding Complainant where he questioned whether she would be able to travel
depending on where she was in her pregnancy. However, S3 noted that a request was sent out
for volunteers to go to IOC and Complainant never volunteered. Complainant cannot be denied
a training opportunity for which she never applied.

Next we turn to claim (15). As discussed in claim (10), the Agency informed Complainant on
June 23, 2010, that OPM was conducting an audit of the announcement under which she had
been hired because the Agency had failed to include veteran’s preference. While the Agency
did not formally investigate this claim, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to
determine whether this alleged event was discriminatory. The record shows this issue affected
a number of individuals, both inside and outside Complainant’s protected classes. On appeal,
Complainant argues there were other individuals who should have been included on the
erroneous hire list but the Agency kept them off the list due to their veteran status. Even if we
assume, arguendo, that Complainant’s assertion is correct and that certain individuals were
favored due to their veteran status, this is not a basis of discrimination under Title VII. On
appeal, Complainant also contends the Agency deliberately excluded this claim in a rush to
dismiss her claims. There is no evidence in the record to support this assertion. This claim was
initially included in the Agency’s Partial Acceptance letter. While it is unfortunate this claim
was erroneously dropped and the Agency should have been more careful, there is no evidence
to support Complainant’s assertion this was done with a discriminatory motive. We find that
Complainant has not shown she was discriminated against in claim (15).

As to claim (16), S3 stated that Complainant had volunteered to resign her position as primary
employee association NSOC representative since she was going on maternity leave. The record
shows the Deputy Director of the Center spoke with Complainant via email about who would
replace her in this position. He also stated that he mistakenly thought Complainant wanted to
be replaced immediately and once Complainant let him know she wanted to remain in the
position until she left for maternity leave, he reinstated her. Even if we assume Complainant
has established a prima facie case, management has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions and Complainant has not shown this reason is pretextual.

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Finally, to establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) they belong to a
statutorily protected class; (2) they were subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome
verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was
based on their statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of
employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work
environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5)
there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant's] employment and create an abusive working
environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser's
conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the
victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC
Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (Mar. 8, 1994). Whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance. A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as
discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d
1355, 1358 (11th

Cir. 1982).
In assessing whether a complainant has set forth an actionable claim of harassment, the conduct
at issue must viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, considering, inter alia,
the nature and frequency of offensive encounters and the span of time over which the
encounters occurred. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues
of Sexual Harassment, N 915 050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990); Cobb v. Department of
Treasury, Request No. 05910011 (March 13, 1997). However, as noted by the Supreme Court
in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998): “simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the “terms and conditions of employment.” The Court noted that such conduct
“must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, [such] that a reasonable person would
find [the work environment to be] hostile or abusive, and…that the victim in fact did perceive
it to be so.” Id. See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998);
Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden

, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
To support her claim of harassment, Complainant points to all of her other claims as evidence
of a hostile work environment. Complainant’s harassment claim also rests on claims (2)-(5)
which the Agency procedurally dismissed as untimely. However, we consider them here as
background information. While Complainant may have been dissatisfied with how
management handled various matters, there is no evidence that these decisions had any relation
to any of the protected classes cited. Furthermore, Complainant has conceded she never
informed management she was dissatisfied with any of the matters alleged. Harassment must
be more than disagreements, interpersonal friction, or common workplace events. The
Commission finds that since she failed to refute the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
proffered by the Agency for its actions, she necessarily also failed to establish that such actions
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were taken on the basis of her membership in the protected classes. Accordingly, Complainant
failed to establish that she was subjected to a discriminatory hostile work environment. See
Bennett v. Department of the Navy

, EEOC Request No. 05980746 (September 19, 2000).

CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Agency’s final order is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION

(M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant
or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to
establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material
fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices,
or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days
of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or
opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION

(S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil
action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department”
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means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court
has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainants Right to File
a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

August 28, 2015
Date