Commonwealth Communications, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 765 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 765
Commonwealth Communications, Inc. and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
Union 98, AFL–CIO–CLC. Case 4–CA–25782
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On July 13, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Margaret
M. Kern issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and
supporting briefs, and the Respondent filed briefs in op-
position.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions only to the
extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
We reverse the judge’s dismissal of the complaint and
find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
by failing to comply with a request for information from
the Charging Party, International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Local 98. As set forth below, the Respon-
dent’s obligation to provide this information is defini-
tively resolved by our finding on the threshold issue—
i.e., that the collective-bargaining agreement entered into
between the Respondent and IBEW Local 98, by its
terms, was unambiguously multisite in scope. Because
we reject the Respondent’s assertion that the material
terms of this agreement were ambiguous, we find that the
judge erred in relying on the extrinsic evidence proffered
by the Respondent to support its contention that the
agreement covered only one construction project.
Background
The judge has provided a comprehensive account of
the material facts, which we shall restate to the extent
here relevant. The Respondent is engaged in the business
of installing and servicing local telephone and telecom-
munications services in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
On May 1, 1995,2 Lombardo and Lipe, a primary electri-
cal contractor in large-scale renovation construction,
awarded to the Respondent a telephone-cabling contract
for work at two terminals at the Philadelphia Airport.
The airport used an AT&T Systemax telephone system,
for which the Respondent was an AT&T-approved ven-
dor, and its employees were trained and certified for that
purpose by AT&T. However, because IBEW Local 98
members already performed a significant volume of other
work at the airport, Lombardo and Lipe “strongly en-
couraged” the Respondent to “work with Local 98” on
this project.3

1 The General Counsel and the Charging Party have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy
is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined
the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1995.
At this time, the Respondent had a bargaining relation-
ship with Communications Workers of America Local
13571, confirmed in a succession of collective-
bargaining agreements dating back to 1981. Stuart Kirk-
wood, the Respondent’s vice president of operations,
testified that he contacted Local 13571 and obtained its
agreement for him to use IBEW members to perform the
less-skilled, laborer-type work that would be required on
the airport project, while CWA members would perform
the skilled work. Kirkwood also obtained a copy of Local
98’s “Letter of Assent” form through which employers
became signatories to Local 98’s area collective-
bargaining agreement (Commercial Agreement) negoti-
ated with the Philadelphia Division of the Pennsylvania-
Delaware-New Jersey Chapter of the National Electrical
Contractors’ Association (NECA). Kirkwood filled out
and signed the Letter of Assent.
The credited testimony establishes that on July 20,
Kirkwood and Ed Kovatch, the Respondent’s director of
employee relations, went to Local 98’s office for a meet-
ing with John Dougherty and James Farrow, respectively
Local 98’s business manager and its business agent. Dur-
ing the meeting, which lasted several hours, Kirkwood
proffered Dougherty the copy of the Letter of Assent he
had already signed. Kirkwood, Kovatch, and the union
officials also reviewed a copy of the Commercial
Agreement, page by page. Toward the end of the meet-
ing, Kirkwood was given two new copies of the Letter of
Assent to sign, both of which had been filled out by Lo-
cal 98 staff. One of those copies was in the same format
as the one Kirkwood had previously filled out. The other
copy was attached to a copy of the Commercial Agree-
ment itself as page 18—i.e., as the signature page of the
entire contract. Kirkwood and Dougherty signed both of
these copies of the Letter of Assent. The relevant terms
of both the Letter of Assent and the Commercial Agree-
ment are reviewed in detail below.
The credited testimony and documentary exhibits estab-
lish that the Respondent subsequently employed 20 CWA-
represented employees and 18 IBEW-represented employ-
3 Lombardo and Lipe was a signatory to the area IBEW collective-
bargaining agreement described below.
335 NLRB No. 62
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 766
ees on the airport project, beginning in late July. On Janu-
ary 20, 1997, Local 98 Business Agent Timothy Browne,
believing that the Respondent was covered by the IBEW
contract for all the work it performed in Local 98’s juris-
diction, sent the Respondent a written request for certain
specified information—specifically, for copies of docu-
ments concerning any and all work performed by the Re-
spondent after July 20, and all the employees it employed
in such work. Browne sent this request because he had
seen trucks belonging to the Respondent in the Philadel-
phia area (away from the airport), and he had heard that
the Respondent was obtaining employee referrals from a
nonunion agency which Philadelphia employers were
known to use to recruit non-IBEW employees.
In response to Browne’s request, the Respondent pro-
vided documents relating solely to the work it performed
at the airport. Browne then filed the charge that initiated
this matter, alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1).
The General Counsel and Local 98 contend that when
Kirkwood and Dougherty signed the Letter of Assent on
July 20, the Respondent became a signatory to the Com-
mercial Agreement with respect to all work the Respon-
dent performed within Local 98’s jurisdiction. The Re-
spondent contends that the agreement it made with Local
98 was strictly limited to the airport project and that Lo-
cal 98 was therefore not entitled to the requested infor-
mation regarding other jobsites. As indicated above, the
issue effectively turns on whether the terms of the Letter
of Assent and the Commercial Agreement, as executed
by both parties, unambiguously establish the scope of the
collective-bargaining agreement. If the written terms
were not ambiguous and extended the scope of the con-
tract to multiple sites, the information requested per-
tained to matters covered by the agreement and was ac-
cordingly relevant. As the judge correctly stated, evi-
dence extrinsic to the written terms of the contract pur-
porting to show that the contract applied only to a single
site could properly be considered only if the applicable
written terms were ambiguous.
The following provisions in the IBEW’s collective-
bargaining agreement and the letter of assent provide the
basis for our conclusion that the parties unambiguously
agreed to a multisite bargaining agreement. Section 1.01
of the Commercial Agreement, which covered the period
May 1, 1994 to April 20, 1997, provided that the contract
would “remain in effect” for that period “unless specifi-
cally provided for herein.” Section 2.03(h) provided, in
pertinent part:

[I]n order to protect and preserve, for the Employees
covered under this Agreement, all work heretofore per-
formed by them . . . it is hereby agreed as follows: If
and when the employer shall perform any work of the
type covered by this Agreement, under its own name or
under the name of another as a corporation, company,
partnership, or any other business entity . . . the terms
and conditions of this Agreement shall be applicable to
all such work. [Emphasis added.]

Further, section 2.03(c) provided that:

The Employer agrees to notify the Business Manager
of the Union on forms furnished by the Union, of the
receipt of all contracts secured within its jurisdiction.

Finally, the last page of the contract (entitled “Geographical
Jurisdictional Lines of Local Union 98, IBEW”) specified,
on a road and county basis, the Local’s jurisdiction, which
extended to four counties containing and surrounding Phila-
delphia.
The Letter of Assent stated, in pertinent part:

In signing this letter of assent, the undersigned firm
does hereby authorize [the Association] as its collective
bargaining representative for all matters contained in or
pertaining to the current and any subsequent approved
Inside Commercial labor agreement between [NECA]
and Local Union 98, IBEW.

The judge found that the language in the Letter of As-
sent and the Commercial Agreement was ambiguous
because it referred to covered work as “electrical work”
and “electrical construction work,” and the contract con-
tained no further definition of these terms and no listing
of specific job classifications. She also found the Com-
mercial Agreement ambiguous because at various points
it alternately referred to “members” and “employees” in
a manner she found to be inconsistent. On the basis of
these ambiguities, the judge found that the parol evi-
dence rule did not bar the consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence for the purpose of determining whether the parties’
agreement was limited to the airport project. Based on
such extrinsic evidence and on her crediting of testimony
given by Kirkwood, the judge concluded that the agree-
ment between the Respondent and Local 98 was re-
stricted to the airport project, and that Local 98 conse-
quently had no basis for requesting information concern-
ing the Respondent’s other projects. The judge accord-
ingly recommended that the charge be dismissed.
Analysis
We find, as a preliminary matter, that the judge relied
on provisions that are extraneous to the question of
whether the agreements pertained to multiple jobsites or
just the airport project. Contrary to the judge, the absence
of a clear definition of “electrical work” or “electrical
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 767
construction work” and some inconsistent references to
“members” and “employees” in the Letter of Assent and
the Commercial Agreement do not create an ambiguity
with respect to whether the scope of the parties’ agree-
ment was single-site or multisite. Any arguable ambigu-
ity which may exist regarding those terms pertained
solely to the question of which employees on a site
would be covered by the agreement and for what type of
work. Such ambiguity is entirely irrelevant to the issue of
whether the agreement was multisite in scope. Also, with
respect to the airport project, there is no indication in the
record that the Respondent and Local 98 had any con-
flicting interpretations concerning the terms the judge
found ambiguous, and the Respondent did not base its
denial of Browne’s information request on any dispute
over the meaning of these terms.
We recognize that the Letter of Assent and the Com-
mercial Agreement do not contain a traditional recogni-
tion provision defining the scope of the unit. However,
the Commercial Agreement contains unambiguous lan-
guage that precludes limiting the contract solely to one
project. First, section 2.03(h), quoted in full above, pro-
vides that when an employer covered by the agreement
“shall perform any work of the type covered by this
Agreement . . . the terms and conditions of this Agree-
ment shall be applicable to all such work.” The generic
reference to “work of the type covered by this Agree-
ment” and the specific extension of the agreement to “all
such work,” in the absence of any other express limita-
tion, clearly establish a comprehensive application of the
agreement to multisite settings. The Union’s geographic
jurisdiction is also specifically defined elsewhere in the
contract as covering the four counties comprising the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. Further, the provision
obligating the employer to notify the union of contracts
secured within its jurisdiction would be irrelevant if the
agreement were not envisioned as a multisite agreement.
Our dissenting colleague does not dispute that if the
agreements are unambiguous as to scope, then the prof-
fered parol evidence need not be considered and the Re-
spondent was obligated to comply with the information
requests. However, he asserts that the parties’ agreements
were ambiguous, based on additional language in the
contract and the letter of assent. Specifically, he cites
section 2.09, which provides:

The Employer agrees that, if it has not previously done
so, it will recognize the Union as the exclusive collec-
tive bargaining agent for all employees performing
electrical work within the jurisdiction of the Union on
all present and future job sites, if and when a majority
of the Employer’s employees authorized the Union to
represent them in collective bargaining.

He also references the following language in the Letter of
Assent:

The Employer agrees that if a majority of its employees
authorize the Local Union to represent them in collec-
tive bargaining, the Employer will recognize the Local
Union as the NLRA Section 9(a) collective bargaining
agent for all employees performing electrical construc-
tion work within the jurisdiction of the Local Union on
all present and future job sites.

In our dissenting colleague’s view, section 2.09 and the
Letter of Assent effectively limit the application of the par-
ties’ agreement to the airport project, with the application to
other sites to be conditioned on majority authorization.
However, the foregoing provisions bear not on the
scope of the initial bargaining relationship but on its na-
ture, namely whether the bargaining agreement relating
to these construction electricians was an 8(f) agreement
or a 9(a) agreement. It is clear that the Respondent and
Local 98 entered into their bargaining relationship under
a classic “pre-hire” arrangement contemplated by Section
8(f) of the Act, for which the Union was not required to
establish majority support. The contractual references to
majority support were clearly intended to satisfy the re-
quirements of John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375
(1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889
(1988), which established new requirements for an 8(f)
representative to achieve 9(a) majority status.4
It would be anomalous to override the explicit lan-
guage denoting multisite work scope with an interpreta-
tion that would alter the scope of the unit based on
whether some of the employees covered by the “pre-
hire” agreement express support for the union that al-
ready lawfully represented them. Neither the Respondent
nor our dissenting colleague has presented any convinc-
ing argument why the scope of the 8(f) bargaining unit
should be viewed as ambiguous in light of provisions
relevant only for 9(a) purposes, particularly given the
language in section 2.03(h).

4 Significantly, the Letter of Assent requires the Respondent to rec-
ognize the Union, upon majority authorization, as “the NLRA Section
9(a) collective bargaining agent.” Representational status under Sec.
9(a), unlike under Sec. 8(f), requires majority support. Thus, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the Letter of Assent and the Commercial
Agreement required majority authorization only to change the Union’s
representational status from Sec. 8(f) to Sec. 9(a), not to establish initial
recognition.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 768
We accordingly find that in their totality the provisions
addressing the scope of the unit are unambiguous.5 It is
undisputed that Kirkwood and Kovatch received and
reviewed a complete copy of the Commercial Agreement
before Kirkwood signed the Letter of Assent.6
We agree with the judge that the cases cited by the
General Counsel involving the use of letters of assent to
bind employers to IBEW-NECA bargaining agreements
are not determinative here. In those cases, the terms of
the underlying bargaining agreements were not in con-
troversy, whereas the terms of the bargaining agreement
are the central issue here. However, the contract terms at
issue here have been drafted to apply as a general matter,
apparently without controversy, to all employers and
employees in the Philadelphia area who are covered by
Local 98’s Commercial Agreement.
For all of these reasons, we find that the parties’ writ-
ten agreement clearly was not restricted to the airport
project, and the judge should not have relied on extrinsic
evidence to vary the terms of the written agreement.
America Piles, Inc., 333 NLRB 1118 (2001) (where
agreements are clear that they are not project agreements,
parol evidence could not be introduced to vary their
terms); W. J. Holloway & Son, 307 NLRB 487, 487 fn. 1
(1992) (extrinsic evidence may be used to “explain or
clarify” but not to “invalidate and nullify” parties’ writ-
ten agreement).
Our finding that the Respondent’s agreement with the
IBEW was not restricted to the airport project bears on
the question of whether the General Counsel has the ini-
tial burden of establishing the relevancy of the informa-
tion requested by the Union, which pertained to work
performed by the Respondent in the Philadelphia area,
within the geographical scope of the Commercial
Agreement and the Local’s jurisdiction. When a union
seeks information pertaining to employees within a bar-
gaining unit, the information is presumptively relevant to
the union’s representational duties, and the General
Counsel may establish a violation for the employer’s

5 In Sansla, Inc., 323 NLRB 107 (1997), cited by the Respondent,
the final written contract contained explicit, project-specific language,
and thus we found that the employer was bound only by a single-site
agreement.
6 The judge and our dissenting colleague place significance on the
fact that Respondent’s Kirkwood had testified he would not have en-
tered into the agreement with IBEW without CWA’s consent, implying
that CWA’s forbearance was required in view of that existing bargain-
ing relationship. The record establishes, however, that the Respondent
was not dependent on CWA’s willingness to allow the IBEW to repre-
sent some of the Respondent’s employees at the airport project. At the
time, art. XXIII, sec. 1(1)(A) of the Respondent’s agreement with the
CWA stated that “this labor agreement and the assignment of work
under this labor agreement shall not apply to any new customer or
client [except under circumstances not present here].”
failure to furnish it without any further showing of rele-
vancy. Branch International Services, 313 NLRB 1293,
1296 (1994).7 Whether or not the presumption applies,
we apply a “liberal, discovery-type standard” in deter-
mining relevancy. Id., citing NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
Because we have found that the parties’ agreement
brought the Respondent under the Commercial Agree-
ment and consequently ran to the extent of Local 98’s
geographic jurisdiction, the information requested by the
Union pertained to terms and conditions of employment
of employees within the scope of the bargaining unit.
This information, therefore, was presumptively relevant,
and the Respondent was required to provide it. Gary’s
Electrical Service Co., 326 NLRB 1136 (1998). The Re-
spondent’s failure to do so consequently violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1).8
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Commonwealth Communications, Inc., Dal-
las, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns or representatives, shall take the following ac-
tions:
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 (the Union)
by failing and refusing to fully comply with or tardily
complying with the Union’s request for information rele-
vant to and necessary for the negotiation or administra-
tion of its collective-bargaining agreement, and necessary
for the performance of the Union’s representational du-
ties.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the Act.
(a) To the extent it has not already done so, immedi-
ately comply with the request for information from the
Union dated January 20, 1997, with respect to all infor-
7 Where information requested is about matters outside the unit that
might have a bearing on the employment terms and conditions of the
unit employees, the burden is on the General Counsel to prove rele-
vancy in order to establish a violation on the basis of the employer’s
failure to furnish the requested information. See, e.g., Reiss Viking, 312
NLRB 622, 626 (1993), and cases there cited.
8 In their briefs, the General Counsel and the Charging Party respec-
tively acknowledge that Browne’s information request, dated January
20, 1997, “may have been inartfully drafted . . . and/or overbroad,” and
“not crystal clear” in scope. Accordingly, in ordering the Respondent to
comply with the request, we will require the production only of such
information and documents which pertain to work performed by the
Respondent within Local 98’s geographic jurisdiction.
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 769
mation and documents sought pertaining to work per-
formed by the Respondent within Local 98’s geographic
jurisdiction.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Dallas, Pennsylvania jobsite and all other sites from
which its employees are assigned or referred to work,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9 Cop-
ies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 4, after being signed by the Respon-
dent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since January 20, 1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsi-
ble official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I find that the Respon-
dent’s failure to furnish requested information did not
violate the Act. Rather, I find that the information re-
quested by the Union (IBEW) was not relevant to the
unit employees represented by IBEW. As discussed be-
low, the parties’ 8(f) agreement was a single-project
agreement. By contrast, the IBEW’s information request
was premised on the assumption that the agreement be-
tween Respondent and IBEW covered all other projects
performed by Respondent within IBEW’s geographic
jurisdiction. Inasmuch as I find, in agreement with the
judge, that the contract is limited to one project (Phila-
delphia airport), and inasmuch as the nonsupplied infor-
mation concerned the Respondent’s presence at other
jobsites, I would dismiss the 8(a)(5) complaint.
The Respondent has a long-term 9(a) relationship with
the Communication Workers of America (CWA), which,
until the instant controversy, represented all of the Re-
spondent’s employees. On May 1, 1995, the Respondent

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
was awarded a subcontract to perform telephone cabling
work for Lombardo and Lipe, the primary electrical con-
tractor on a large-scale construction project at the Phila-
delphia Airport. The Respondent was an AT&T-
approved vendor for the AT&T Systemax telephone sys-
tem used at the airport, and its employees had been
trained for that purpose by AT&T. At the time, IBEW
performed a significant amount of work for other em-
ployers at that project. Stuart Kirkwood, the Respon-
dent’s vice president of operations, obtained the consent
of CWA to use IBEW members for the less skilled, la-
bor-type work on the job. CWA members would per-
form the more skilled jobs. Kirkland credibly testified
that, absent that consent, he would not have entered into
the subcontract with Lombardo & Lipe. Kirkland also
credibly testified that, at a meeting between representa-
tives of the Respondent and IBEW, he made it clear to
the IBEW that the CWA represented the Respondent’s
employees and that any agreement with IBEW would
have to be limited to that airport job. He also told the
IBEW, over no objection, that he would divide the work
between the CWA employees who were certified on the
Systemax system and the IBEW employees who were
not. The parties (Respondent and IBEW) signed two
Letters of Assent-A and a Commercial agreement. These
documents are described below.
On January 20, 1997, IBEW Business Agent Timothy
Browne sent the Respondent a written request for copies
of documents concerning any and all work performed by
the Respondent after July 20, 1995.1 Browne testified
that his request was prompted by his observation of the
Respondent’s trucks in other areas of Philadelphia.
Browne had heard that the Respondent was using a non-
union agency to obtain employee referrals. The Respon-
dent responded to the request by sending data pertaining
only to the airport jobsite.
My colleagues conclude that the Commercial Agree-
ment and the Letters of Assent refer unambiguously to
any and all work performed by Respondent within
IBEW’s jurisdiction. Thus, according to the majority, it
is clear that the agreements were not confined to the air-
port project, and parol evidence to the contrary should
not be considered.
1 On this date of the signing of the IBEW Letter of Assent, the air-
port project was about 2-½ months underway.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 770
I disagree. In reaching their conclusion, my colleagues
drew a distinction between the definition of IBEW work
and the geographic scope of the agreement. They con-
clude that there may be some ambiguity on the former
point, but they contend that there is no ambiguity on the
latter point, i.e., that the agreement clearly covers all of
Respondent’s sites, present and prospective.
I disagree. The Commercial Agreement refers to rec-
ognition at “all present and future job sites,” if and when
a majority of the Employer’s employees authorized the
Union to represent them in collective bargaining (em-
phasis supplied). The phrase “all present and future job
sites” is repeated in the Letters of Assent, but that lan-
guage is again conditioned upon the “majority” require-
ment. Thus, a reasonable reading of the agreement is
that the contract applies to the Airport Job under Section
8(f), but that application to other sites would depend on
majority status. There is no claim that the Union had
majority status at these other sites.2
My colleagues interpret the contract as covering multi-
ple sites, with the proviso that some sites would remain
under Section 8(f) and others (where majority is shown)
would be under Section 9. I shall assume arguendo that
this is a reasonable reading of the contract. However,
another reasonable reading of the contract is that the Re-
spondent recognized the Union as the 8(f) representative
for the airport project, but it was unwilling to recognize
the Union at all for other sites unless majority status was
shown. That status has not been shown.
Based on the above, I concluded that the documents
are not clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, I would
consider, as did the judge, the parol evidence. That evi-
dence clarifies the ambiguity. It is abundantly clear, as it
was to the judge, that the parties’ agreement was limited
to the airport project.
Since the parol evidence makes it clear that the parties
intended to restrict the contract to the airport site, the real
issue in this case is whether the Board will ignore that
relevant evidence. In my view, the contract is suffi-
ciently ambiguous as to warrant consideration of that
evidence.
Since the contract was limited to the airport project,
the Union had no basis for requesting that the Respon-
dent furnish information concerning work on projects
other than the airport project, and the Respondent was
justified in not furnishing such information. Accord-
ingly, I find that the Respondent has not violated Section
8(a)(5), and I would dismiss the complaint.

2 The other phrases in the documents (“any” and “all” work) at least
arguably refer to the type of work performed, rather than to the location
of the work.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires an employer to bar-
gain in good faith with the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of its employees, and to provide relevant in-
formation requested by the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative for the purpose of carrying out its representa-
tional duties.
WE WILL NOT refuse or fail to provide relevant in-
formation requested by the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Local 98 for the purpose of carrying
out its representational duties.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL immediately comply with the request for in-
formation from the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers, Local 98 dated January 20, 1997.
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.

Peter C. Verrochi, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jerome A. Hoffman, Esq. and Matthew Lee Weiner, Esq., for
the Respondent.
Stephen J. Holroyd, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARGARET M. KERN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me on December 8, 1998, in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.1 The complaint, which issued on May 29, 1998,
was based upon an unfair labor practice charge and an amended
charge filed on February 27 and March 6, 1997, by the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 98, AFL–CIO–
CLC (Local 98 or the Union) against Commonwealth Commu-
1 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript
is hereby granted.
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 771
nications, Inc. (Respondent). It is alleged that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing
to provide the Union with requested information. For the rea-
sons set forth herein, I recommend dismissal of the complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE FACTS
A. Background
Respondent is engaged in the business of providing local
telephone and telecommunications services and installing tele-
phone communications equipment at locations in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey. Since 1981, the Communications Workers of
America (CWA) has been the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of Respondent’s installation, maintenance, and service
employees. Respondent and the CWA have been party to a
series of collective-bargaining agreements, including agree-
ments effective 1993–1996 and 1996–1999. Prior to the events
herein, the CWA agreement covered all of Respondent’s em-
ployees and Respondent did not regularly employ electricians.
Respondent maintains that the CWA is the 9(a) representa-
tive of its employees. The recognition clause contained in each
negotiated collective-bargaining agreement reads as follows:

The company hereby recognizes the officers and agents of the
[CWA] as the exclusive collective bargaining representative
for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment, for its Installation, Maintenance and Service
employees, but specifically excluding clerical employees; also
confidential, professional and supervisory employees as de-
fined in the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as
amended.

Neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party challenged
Respondent’s assertion of the CWA’s 9(a) status at the hearing
or in their briefs. I therefore find, based upon the evidence, that
the CWA has been, at all times relevant herein, the 9(a) repre-
sentative of Respondent’s employees in the described unit.
B. Local 98’s Collective-Bargaining Agreements
Local 98 is party to a Commercial Agreement with the
Philadelphia Division of the Penn-Del-Jersey Chapter of the
National Electrical Contractors’ Association. The relevant
Commercial Agreements in this case were effective from May
1, 1994, to April 20, 1997, and from May 1, 1997, to April 20,
2000. The agreements provide that they continue in effect from
year to year unless changed or terminated upon written notice
at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the agreements.2
The 1994–1997 Commercial Agreement contained the fol-
lowing language at section 2.09:

The Employer agrees that, if it has not previously done so, it
will recognize the Union as the exclusive collective bargain-
ing agent for all employees performing electrical work
within the jurisdiction of the Union on all present and future
job sites, if and when a majority of the Employer’s employ-
ees authorized [sic] the Union to represent them in collec-
tive bargaining.

At page 18 of the same agreement is an “Individual Letter of
Assent-A” in which the following language appears:

In signing this letter of assent, the undersigned firm does
hereby authorize [the association] as its collective bargain-
ing representative for all matters contained in or pertaining
to the current and any subsequent approved Inside Commer-
cial labor agreement between [the association] and Local
Union 98, IBEW.

The Employer agrees that if a majority of its employees author-
ize the Local Union to represent them in collective bargaining,
the Employer will recognize the Local Union as the NLRA
Section 9(a) collective bargaining agent for all employees per-
forming electrical construction work within the jurisdiction of
the Local Union on all present and future job sites.

The terms “electrical work” and “electrical construction
work” are not defined either in the Commercial Agreement or
in the Letter of Assent. Nor is there any other definition of the
work covered by the Commercial Agreement as testified to by
John Dougherty, business manager for Local 98:

Q: And is that your understanding of what is covered
by this agreement . . . it covers more than electricity—
electrical work?
A: It covers exactly what I told you it covered.
Q: Which includes more than electricity?
A: Yes.
Q: Now can you tell me where in General Counsel Ex-
hibit 2 there is a definition of electrical work?
A: No. There’s nothing in here that explicifies [sic] a
definition.
Q: Is there a definition of the work that is covered?
A: I think I already answered that no.
Q: The answer is no?
A: I already answered that no.

Section 2.03(c) requires an employer to notify Local 98 of all
contracts secured within its jurisdiction. Section 2.03 (g) pro-
hibits the subcontracting of “any work in connection with elec-
trical work” to any non-IBEW signatory employer “in the juris-
diction of this or any other local union.”
As to the types of employees covered by the Commercial
Agreement, there is no recognitional clause per se and no

2 By letter dated May 2, 1997, Respondent attempted to terminate its
contractual relationship with Local 98. It is not in dispute that this
attempt was untimely.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 772
clearly defined bargaining unit. Reference is made in sections
2.01(b) and 5.02 to journeyman electricians and apprentices,
and Appendix A sets forth wage rates for journeymen and ap-
prentices. Section 5.09 refers to “electrical workers.” Article VI
refers to journeymen, journeymen/wiremen, and apprentices.
Section 2.03(a) is a 30-day union-security clause which applies
to “all employees.” Section 3.07 provides for an employer to
withhold working dues from IBEW members, not all employ-
ees. Section 2.03(d) requires the employer to furnish to the
Union on a monthly basis the names of union members em-
ployed, not the names of all employees. Section 3.04 requires
the employer to make pension and benefit contributions for “all
employees covered under the terms of this Agreement” calcu-
lated as a percentage of the gross labor payroll paid to “em-
ployees in the bargaining unit represented by the Union under
this Agreement.” Section 3.09 authorizes a work stoppage by
“electricians” should an employer fail to pay the wages and
benefits provided for in the Commercial Agreement. Section
4.10 sets forth the obligations of an employer to pay travel and
living expenses and to make fringe benefit contributions when
an employee is required to travel from one job to another both
within the jurisdiction of Local 98 and outside the jurisdiction
of Local 98. The geographic jurisdiction of Local 98 is set forth
in detail on the last page of the Commercial Agreement. There
is no hiring hall provision.
In addition to the Letter of Assent-A contained in the Com-
mercial Agreement, there is a second version of the Letter of
Assent-A used by Local 98 which is a preprinted form. The
second version contains most of the same language as is con-
tained on page 18 of the Commercial Agreement. In the pre-
printed form, however, there is a series of blank spaces for
insertion of information and accompanying explanatory foot-
notes. In the blank space which calls for a description of the
type of work covered by the Letter of Assent, there is a footnote
instruction which reads as follows:

TYPE OF AGREEMENT. Insert type of agreement.
Example: Inside, Outside Utility, Outside Commercial,
Outside Telephone, Residential, Motor Shop, Tree Trim-
ming etc. The Local Union must obtain a separate assent
to each agreement the employer is assenting to.

C. Dougherty’s Testimony re: Local 98’s Jurisdiction
Dougherty was questioned abut the type of “electrical work”
his members perform, and he testified that the work includes
heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC), fire alarm, all
types of security, all types of telecommunications, phone, fiber,
copper, land, power distribution, transformer, all types of new
construction, major renovation, moves, adds and changes, satel-
lite, CATV, fiber, high voltage installation, high voltage main-
tenance, high voltage testing, power distribution, power analy-
sis, lighting, all types of AC and DC installations, remote con-
trol, wireless systems, and nurse’s call.
D. The Philadelphia Airport Job
The genesis of the dispute in this case surrounds the subcon-
tracting of work to Respondent by Lombardo and Lipe, the
primary electrical contractor on a large-scale construction pro-
ject at the Philadelphia Airport. Lombardo and Lipe’s employ-
ees are represented by Local 98. On May 1, 1995, Respondent
was awarded a subcontract to perform telephone cabling work
for Terminals B and C. Respondent was an approved certified
vendor for the AT&T Systemax system used at the airport, and
Respondent’s CWA-represented employees had been trained
and certified by AT&T to perform the work specified in the
subcontracting agreement.
Stuart Kirkwood, vice president of operations, testified that
at the pre-bidder’s conference, Respondent was “strongly en-
couraged to work with Local 98 because they had a presence at
the airport.” Respondent consulted with the CWA and obtained
the CWA’s consent to use Local 98 members on the job. Ac-
cording to Kirkwood, without the CWA’s consent, Respondent
would not have bid on the job. It was resolved that the CWA
members would perform the skilled work and the Local 98
members would perform the less skilled, laborer-type work
such as pulling cables.
On July 12, someone in Respondent’s sales office in Phila-
delphia faxed Kirkwood a copy of the preprinted Letter of As-
sent-A form. In the blank which called for a specification of the
type of work covered by the agreement, Kirkwood typed “In-
side Telephone Cable Work at Philadelphia Airport.” Kirkwood
also typed in the name of Local 98, Respondent’s name and
address, and he signed the document. Kirkwood was uncertain
at the time of his testimony if he mailed the completed form
back to Respondent’s sales office or to Local 98. He did recall
that a meeting was scheduled with Dougherty for the following
week.
E. The Signing of the Letter of Assent
Kirkwood testified that he met with Dougherty at the Un-
ion’s office on July 20, 1995, for 3 hours. He was certain of the
date and time because the appointment had been entered into
his daily calendar which was introduced into evidence. Also
present at the meeting were Ed Kovatch, then Respondent’s
director of employee relations, James Farrow, business agent
for the Union, and another individual from Local 98 whose
name Kirkwood could not recall. Kirkwood gave Dougherty a
copy of the Letter of Assent he had filled out the week before
and said: “This is what we’re here to discuss, the Philadelphia
Airport job, and this is the Letter of Assent that we were led to
believe we have to sign.” According to Kirkwood, they “dis-
cussed just . . . initially, just that job.” The Commercial Agree-
ment was reviewed page by page with Kovatch, after which
Kirkwood and Kovatch were taken on a tour of the Union’s
facility. When they returned from the tour, Kirkwood was pre-
sented with a Letter of Assent with multiple carbon copies at-
tached. In the blank space where Kirkwood had previously
typed “Inside Telephone Cable Work at Philadelphia Airport”
the words “Inside Commercial” appeared instead. Kirkwood
remarked about the change in language and Dougherty assured
Kirkwood that the Union knew which work the assent agree-
ment referred to, but that the reference to “Inside Commercial”
coincided more with the types of work specified in the footnote
at the bottom of the Letter of Assent.
Kirkwood testified that the reason Kovatch attended the
meeting was because Kovatch negotiated all of Respondent’s
labor contracts. Kirkwood and Kovatch made it clear to
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 773
Dougherty and Farrow that the CWA represented Respondent’s
employees and that any agreement “was just for the airport
project, and that we were covered by a union contract.” Kirk-
wood told Dougherty that Respondent’s CWA employees were
trained and certified by AT&T to work on the Systemax system
and that he could not give this work to Dougherty’s men. He
did assure Dougherty that he would give other work to the Lo-
cal 98 members on the job. Dougherty stated that Local 98
wanted to get more involved in telecommunications work, but
voiced no objection to Kirkwood’s assignment of the work. He
did say that he hoped that the relationship between Respondent
and Local 98 could go further and that they could work together
on other projects. Kirkwood told Dougherty that the Respon-
dent could not fulfill a number of the terms contained in the
Commercial Agreement and Dougherty responded that it was a
“standard document, and that’s how it was.” Kirkwood again
received “verbal assurances from . . . Dougherty that he knew
what we were doing. He would help us try to accomplish what
we [had] to at the airport.” Kirkwood and Dougherty both
signed the two Letters of Assent-A (the one at p.18 and the
preprinted form) and the Commercial Agreement.
Dougherty was called as a witness for the General Counsel
on his case in chief and again on his rebuttal case. On his first
trip to the witness stand, Dougherty testified that he met with
Kirkwood a single time in May 1995 in Local 98’s boardroom.
Farrow was present at this meeting and a fourth person whose
identity Dougherty could not recall. Dougherty was clear in his
recollection that no Letter of Assent was signed by Kirkwood
during this meeting. When he was shown the Letter of Assent
on which Kirkwood had typed “Inside Telephone Cable Work
at Philadelphia Airport,” Dougherty testified that he had never
seen the document before. Dougherty acknowledged that dur-
ing the course of this meeting in May, Kirkwood mentioned the
fact that Respondent had a collective-bargaining agreement
with the CWA. According to Dougherty, it was not until 2
months after his face-to-face meeting with Kirkwood that
Dougherty executed the Letter of Assent-A which contained the
words “Inside Commercial.” He could not recall how he came
into possession of that document, but he was certain that he
signed it in his office, alone, on July 20 and that Kirkwood’s
signature, also dated July 20, was already on the document. He
was unable to adequately explain how Kirkwood’s signature
was dated July 20 since Kirkwood was not in Local 98’s offices
that day.
Dougherty was present in the hearing room during Kirk-
wood’s testimony. When he was recalled to the stand as a re-
buttal witness, he was asked again about the date of his meeting
with Kirkwood. Dougherty testified, “I recall meeting with him,
and I said it was around the time that I previously stated . . . in
that vicinity, April, May, June, July, somewhere . . . prior to
that job in ’95.” Counsel for the General Counsel then asked
Dougherty if the Letter of Assent and the Commercial Agree-
ment were signed at that meeting, and if Kirkwood’s testimony
had refreshed his recollection. Dougherty engaged in a dis-
course for four transcript pages:

I know I signed that document on the 20th because that’s the
date that was on it, and I would have signed it. No, I did not
sign in front of Mr. Kirkwood . . . And, yes, I did take them
on a tour . . . And, no, we weren’t trying to get into the com-
munication field, much like we weren’t trying to get into the
electric field . . . And yes, in the conversation, we had some
discussion about the lack of people . . . the educated people in
the field in general and how we talked about not only the
CWA being a farce, but the IBEW 1448 . . . There was no
reason for me, in this conversation, to break any rules be-
cause, to get to your point, why would I sign a one job agree-
ment? There was no reason. I controlled the job. My contrac-
tor had . . . three other bids. There was four people looking at
this job . . . I left the room . . . and said, here’s my deal, I don’t
need you, either you take it or leave it. When I get back, if
your signature is on it, I’ll sign it and process it. Now, that’s
probably the way the thing developed . . . I take it from A to Z
and tell you what our work is. I explained to Mr. Kirkwood,
emphatically, that there was no need for him to do something
that he was uncomfortable with because I controlled this job
. . . So, from John Dougherty’s standpoint, there was no need
to have CCI sign an agreement with me.

Dougherty was asked if, during this meeting, there was any
discussion about the agreement being limited to the airport job.
Dougherty responded, “There might have been . . . from the
CCI side of the table . . . could they just, probably, do an agree-
ment, you know, and walk away from it, and I told them I never
do them agreements.” Dougherty further testified that he was
unaware that Respondent had CWA-represented employees at
the airport, and that it was his understanding that other than
Local 98 members, the only employees Respondent employed
at the airport were two or three members of IBEW Local 1448
for a couple of days. Dougherty testified that there was a Local
98 shop steward on the job, but that the steward never reported
the presence of CWA employees to him.
Respondent’s records establish that from July 1995 through
March 1996, 20 CWA-represented employees worked 2693.25
hours or 46 percent of the total hours worked, and 18 Local 98-
represented employees worked 3209 hours or 54 percent of the
total hours worked on the airport job.
Farrow also testified as a rebuttal witness for the General
Counsel. He recalled attending a meeting in 1995 at which
Dougherty and Kirkwood were present. Farrow testified that
Kirkwood was given an agreement to sign, but when asked
whether the agreement was signed during the meeting, he testi-
fied, “not to my knowledge.” When asked whether there was a
discussion about limiting the assent agreement to the Philadel-
phia Airport job, he again testified, “not to my knowledge.”
Farrow corroborated Dougherty’s testimony that Local 98 has
never entered into a single site contract.
F. The Information Request
By letter dated January 20, 1997, Timothy Browne, a Local
98 business representative, made the following request of the
Respondent:

Please send me copies of the following in accordance
with our agreement:
1. Copies of quarterly reports to PA Dept. of Revenue
showing wages since 7/20/95.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 774
2. Copies of WC23 reports filed since 7/20/95.
3. Copies of quarterly reports to the Philadelphia Dept.
of Revenue showing wages paid since 7/20/95.
4. Copies of commercial association agreements and
subassociation agreements for inside commercial work
performed since 7/20/95.
5. List of all employees, and the hourly rate paid to
each person on each job employed on all inside Commer-
cial job sites since 7/20/95.
6. Copies of all weekly time and payroll records for all
employees since 7/20/95 showing hours worked and
hourly rates paid on each job site.
7. Copies of quarterly reports to the IRS since 7/20/95.

Browne explained that he had seen Respondent’s trucks in
the area and that the purpose of the request was to find out what
jobs Respondent had within Local 98’s jurisdiction. He testified
that when he prepared the information request, he was of the
understanding that the agreement between Respondent and
Local 98 covered all of Respondent’s employees employed
within Local 98’s jurisdiction, not just electricians, and further,
that he was unaware of the collective-bargaining relationship
between Respondent and the CWA.
By letter dated February 5, 1997, Respondent responded to
the information request by sending certified payrolls from the
airport job reflecting hours worked and rates of pay. Respon-
dent did not provide any information for any other jobsite.
Browne testified that he looked at the payrolls and determined
that the information related only to the airport job. Since the
information he was requesting was for other jobs Respondent
may have had within Local 98’s jurisdiction, Browne did not
communicate further with Respondent and filed the instant
unfair labor practice charge.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Applicability of the Parol Evidence Rule
It is alleged in the complaint that Local 98 is the limited ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative in the following
unit: “journeymen electricians or apprentices performing ‘in-
side commercial’ work for Respondent within the Union’s
‘Geographical Jurisdictional Lines’ as set forth in the [Com-
mercial] Agreement, including Article II thereof.” It is the Gen-
eral Counsel’s position that the 1994–1997 and 1997–2000
Commercial Agreements extend to all projects of Respondent
within the geographic jurisdiction of Local 98. Respondent
maintains that the agreement it signed on July 20, 1995, was
project specific applying only to the Philadelphia Airport.
It is not in dispute that the recognition extended to Local 98
was as an 8(f) representative and there has never been a de-
mand by Local 98 for recognition as the 9(a) representative of
any of Respondent’s employees. Thus, there is no presumption
regarding the scope of the unit. In the construction industry, a
single employer unit will normally be deemed appropriate for
the purposes of conducting an election. John Deklewa & Sons,
282 NLRB 1375 (1987). Where as here there is no claim of
3 This was a typographical error and should have read “UC-2 re-
ports” which are reports filed by employers in the State of Pennsylvania
for unemployment claims.
majority status and no petition filed, the determination of the
scope of the unit must be based upon a review of the contrac-
tual agreements and, if appropriate, parol evidence.
In the Commercial Agreement there is conditional language
that if and when a majority of employees authorizes the Union
to represent them, the employer will recognize the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of “all employees perform-
ing electrical work”. In the Letters of Assent, the same lan-
guage appears except that the recognition will be extended to
“all employees performing electrical construction work.” The
Board has previously determined that this language constitutes
a continuing request by a union for 9(a) recognition and a con-
tinuing, enforceable promise by an employer to grant voluntary
recognition on that basis if and when the Union demonstrates
majority support. Goodless Electric Co., 321 NLRB 64, 66
(1996). In this case, therefore, there is a continuing demand by
Local 98 to represent those of Respondent’s employees who
perform either electrical work or electrical construction work.
There is no evidence, however, that there has been a showing of
majority support for Local 98 by any grouping of employees.
Cf. Oklahoma Installation Co., 325 NLRB 741 (1998). Thus,
the units described in the Commercial Agreement and in the
Letters of Assent, couched only in terms of when there is a
showing of majority status, are of no assistance in determining
the scope of the unit agreed to by the parties on July 20, 1995,
when the 8(f) relationship was established.
The critical flaw in the Commercial Agreement is the ab-
sence of a definition of the work covered. In his brief, the Gen-
eral Counsel relies on the extrinsic testimony of Dougherty to
describe the myriad types of work which Dougherty deems to
be “electrical work.” There is nothing in the four corners of the
Commercial Agreement or the Letters of Assent, however, that
sets forth the types of work testified to by Dougherty. The Gen-
eral Counsel strenuously argues against consideration of extrin-
sic evidence to resolve the issue of whether these agreements
were project specific, but relies on extrinsic evidence, specifi-
cally Dougherty’s testimony, to define the scope of the work. It
cannot reasonably be argued that extrinsic evidence should be
considered for the purpose of defining the scope of the work
covered by the Commercial Agreement, but should not be con-
sidered in determining whether the agreements were project
specific. Indeed, the two issues go hand in hand. Resolution of
the issue of the scope of the work in this case necessarily re-
solves the issue of whether the agreement was project specific.
In addition to the absence of any definition of work covered
by the Commercial Agreement, there is no recognition clause
defining the specific job classifications covered by the agree-
ment. Most of the provisions of the Commercial Agreement
refer to journeymen and apprentice electricians. However, the
30-union security clause applies to “all employees” of Respon-
dent. In the absence of an exclusive hiring hall provision, the
union security clause presumably extends to all employees of
Respondent, including those represented by the CWA. This is
inconsistent with the balance of the agreement which appears to
apply only to members of Local 98.4
4 The testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses on this point is
equally ambiguous. The appropriate unit alleged in the complaint is
COMMONWEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 775
This case is distinguishable from the Board’s recent decision
in Sommerville Construction Co., 327 NLRB 514 (1999). In
Sommerville, a nonunion contractor signed an agreement with
the Bricklayers recognizing the union “as the sole and exclusive
collective-bargaining representative for and on behalf of the
employees of the employer now or hereinafter employed within
the territorial or occupational jurisdictions of the union.” The
Board affirmed Judge Gross’ view that this clear recognitional
language belied any suggestion that the parties intended only a
single-project agreement. In Cowboy Scaffolding, Inc., 326
NLRB 1050 (1998), relied on by the General Counsel in this
case, the bargaining unit was defined by specific types of em-
ployees performing work within a defined geographic area. In
rejecting the employer’s argument that the agreement was pro-
ject specific, the Board concluded that the language of the col-
lective bargaining was plain and unambiguous and extended to
all projects of the employer for the life of the agreement. Sig-
nificantly, the Board considered the conduct of the parties at
and after the signing of the agreement to conclude that nothing
therein cast doubt as to the intentions of the parties as embodied
in the collective-bargaining agreement.
I further reject as unsupported the General Counsel’s sugges-
tion that the Board has previously determined that Letters of
Assent used by IBEW locals bind each and every signatory
employer to a term agreement rather than a project specific
agreement. There is no question that Letters of Assent used by
the IBEW have been determined to be effective in binding sig-
natory employers to applicable association collective-
bargaining agreements. Reliable Electric Co., 286 NLRB 834
fn. 5 (1987). Respondent concedes that it is bound to the Com-
mercial Agreement by virtue of executing the Letters of Assent.
Respondent’s challenge is not to the enforceability of the Let-
ters of Assent but to the ambiguity in the terms of the Commer-
cial Agreement itself. None of the cases cited by the General
Counsel and the Union discuss agreements negotiated between
Local 98 and the Penn-Del-Jersey chapter of NECA. Each cited
case involved different IBEW locals and different chapters of
NECA. Kirkpatrick Electric Co., 314 NLRB 1047 (1994)
(IBEW Local 136 and Birmingham Division, Central Missis-
sippi Chapter); Bufco Corp., 291 NLRB 1015 (1988) (IBEW
Local 16 and Evansville Division, Southern Indiana Chapter);
Electrical Workers IBEW Local 532 (Brink Construction), 291
NLRB 437 (1988) (IBEW Local 532 and NECA-Western);
Stack Electric, 290 NLRB 575 (1988) (IBEW Locals 110 and
292 and the Minneapolis and St. Paul Chapters); City Electric,
288 NLRB 443 (1988) (Local 1317 and Laurel Division, Cen-
tral Mississippi Chapter); Reliable Electric Co., 286 NLRB 834
(1987) (IBEW Local 68 and the Rocky Mountain Chapter);
Leapley Co., 278 NLRB 981 (1986) (IBEW Local 26 and
Washington D.C. Chapter); Watt Electric Co., 273 NLRB 655
(1984) (IBEW Local 584 and Eastern Oklahoma Chapter);
Hayden Electric, Inc., 256 NLRB 601 (1981) (IBEW Local 728
and Florida East Coast Chapter); and Nelson Electric, 241

limited to journeymen and apprentice electricians. Browne testified that
he believed the unit consisted of all of Respondent’s employees.
Dougherty similarly testified that he believed Local 98 represented all
of Respondent’s employees on the jobsite.
NLRB 545 (1979) (IBEW Local 669 and Western Ohio Chap-
ter). Thus, the General Counsel and Charging Party’s prediction
that a successful challenge by the Respondent to the validity of
the Commercial Agreement in this case would have nationwide
implications and would serve to undermine the entire construc-
tion industry is just so much saber rattling.
The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law which
requires that when parties have made a contract and have ex-
pressed it in a writing to which they have all assented as the
complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence of
antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admit-
ted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. Al-
though evidence outside the agreement may not be introduced
to vary its terms, evidence may be introduced for the purpose of
ascertaining the correct interpretation of the agreement. South-
ern California Edison Co., 295 NLRB 203, 218 (1989), petition
for review denied 927 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and Inter-
Lakes Engineering Co., 217 NLRB 148 (1975). Where suffi-
cient ambiguity exists in the language of the document itself,
extrinsic evidence is properly resorted to determine the agree-
ment’s meaning. Sansla, Inc., 323 NLRB 107 (1997); and Op-
erating Engineers Local 3 (Joy Engineering), 313 NLRB 25 fn.
2 (1993). I find that such ambiguity exists in this case because
of the lack of any definition of the work covered by the agree-
ment and because of the conflicting references as to whether
the agreement covers all employees or just members of Local
98. It is therefore appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence to
resolve the issue of whether this Commercial Agreement was a
term agreement or project specific.
B. The Extrinsic Evidence
Dougherty testified with certainty on direct examination that
the only meeting he ever had with Kirkwood was in May 1995
and that the Letter of Assent was not signed during the course
of that meeting. Dougherty insisted that he signed the Letter of
Assent when he was alone in his office on July 20. After Kirk-
wood credibly testified that his 3-hour meeting with Dougherty
took place on July 20, and after he produced his written diary
corroborating that fact, Dougherty testified with equal certainty
on rebuttal that he signed the agreement on July 20 during the
course of his meeting with Kirkwood. In an effort to rehabili-
tate his witness, the General Counsel asked Dougherty a simple
question, that is, if Kirkwood’s testimony had refreshed
Dougherty’s recollection about the meeting. His answer was
anything but simple, but nonetheless revealing. In a rambling
discourse, Dougherty boasted that there was no reason for him
to sign a single project agreement because he “controlled the
job” and that he told Kirkwood on July 20 “here’s my deal. I
don’t need you, either you take it or leave it.” He explained
“from John Dougherty’s standpoint, there was no need to have
CCI sign an agreement. . . . ” Of course, that was not the case,
as an examination of the chronology of events demonstrates.
Respondent had been awarded the subcontract from
Lombardo & Lipe on May 1, at a time when Respondent had no
relationship with Local 98. On July 20, Respondent had an
executed subcontracting agreement in hand and a unionized
workforce certified to perform the work involved. Moreover,
Kirkwood had the consent of the CWA to share the airport
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 776
work with Local 98. The consent was limited to the airport job
and I credit Kirkwood’s testimony that absent that consent, he
would not have entered into the subcontract with Lombardo &
Lipe. The sum of this evidence shows that it was Respondent,
not Local 98, who was in control and that the only reason Re-
spondent agreed to sign any agreement with Local 98 was at the
request of Lombardo & Lipe to ensure labor peace. Confronted
with these realities, it was in Dougherty’s interest to sign an
agreement, even one limited to a specific project, so as to be
able to demonstrate to Respondent that his members were as
qualified as CWA members to perform telecommunications
work. The longstanding efforts of Local 98 to have its members
perform telecommunications work is well documented, Electri-
cal Workers IBEW Local 98 (Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593
(1999); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 98 (Lucent Technolo-
gies), 324 NLRB 226 (1997); and Electrical Workers IBEW
Local 98 (Lucent Technologies), 324 NLRB 230 (1997), and
this was the setting in which the July 20 meeting took place.
Kirkwood’s recitation of the events of July 20 was credible,
plausible, and consistent with the other evidence in the case. I
credit Kirkwood’s testimony that he made clear to Dougherty
and Farrow that the CWA represented Respondent’s employees
and that any agreement would have to be limited to the airport
job. Dougherty admitted in his rebuttal testimony that that there
“might have been” a discussion about limiting the agreement to
just the airport job, although he claimed to have rejected the
idea. I further credit Kirkwood’s testimony that he told Dough-
erty that he would divide the work between the CWA employ-
ees who were certified on the Systemax system and the Local
98 employees who were not. Dougherty voiced no objection
and told Kirkwood that Local 98 wanted to get more involved
in telecommunications work and that he hoped they could work
together on future projects. Thus it is clear that Dougherty was
willing to have a limited presence with Respondent at the air-
port job in order to achieve his long term goal of having his
members perform telecommunications work in the Philadelphia
area.
I discredit Farrow’s testimony which was not only contradic-
tory of Kirkwood’s credible testimony, but contradictory of
Dougherty’s testimony as well. On rebuttal, Dougherty admit-
ted that the Letters of Assent and the Commercial Agreement
were signed during the course of the July 20 meeting. Farrow
testified that to his knowledge they were not signed during the
meeting. Dougherty admitted that there was discussion about a
project specific agreement and Farrow testified that there was
no such discussion. The inconsistencies between the General
Counsel’s witnesses further lead me to conclude that they are
not credible in their recollection of the events of July 20, 1995.
The events following the July 20 meeting further corroborate
Kirkwood’s testimony. When work commenced at the airport,
Respondent’s workforce was divided roughly in half between
members of the CWA and members of Local 98. I reject as a
complete fabrication Dougherty’s testimony that he was un-
aware of the presence of CWA employees at the site. Local 98
had a steward at the job and obviously observed the 20 CWA
members working side-by-side with the 18 Local 98 members.
At no time did Local 98 object to the CWA’s presence, file a
grievance, or take any other adverse action.
For all of these reasons, I conclude the agreement entered
into by the Respondent and Local 98 on July 20, 1995, was a
single project agreement limited to the Philadelphia Airport.
C. The Request for Information
Since the agreement between Respondent and Local 98 was
limited to the airport job, Respondent’s obligation to provide
relevant information to the Union was similarly limited. The
purpose of the Union’s information request was to ascertain
Respondent’s presence at other jobsites. As such the request
sought irrelevant information and the Respondent’s failure to
provide the information did not violate the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not violated the Act as alleged in the com-
plaint.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]