Comfort Inn

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 14, 1991

301 N.L.R.B. 714 (N.L.R.B. 1991)

714
301 NLRB No. 109
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility find-
ings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law
judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant
evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
1 Except as otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1989.
2 Teresa Knick, who was employed by the Respondent for only 1 month,
suggested otherwise. She claims that when she inquired as to what would hap-
pen if the meeting produced no solutions, Asboth replied, ‘‘If you feel this
way, you ought to find another job.’’ Knick was an unimpressive witness, who
would have been discredited in this instance even if her account were not re-
futed by Anderson and Crowder.
3 Asboth credibly, without contradiction, testified that, in the course of this
meeting, Melissa Crowder stated: ‘‘If things don’t go any better, I will quit.’’
Comfort Inn and Melissa C. Crowder. Case 11–CA–
13443
February 14, 1991
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On June 7, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Joel A.
Harmatz issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings,1 findings, and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
dismisses the complaint in its entirety.
Rosetta Lane, Esq., for the General Counsel.
J. Gregory Mooney, Esq. (Collins, Crackel & Mooney), of
Covington, Virginia, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Covington, Virginia, on February 28, 1990, on
an unfair labor practice charge filed on August 2, 1989, and
a complaint issued on September 29, 1989, alleging that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by dis-
charging Angela Anderson and Melissa Crowder because
they engaged in protected concerted activity. In its duly filed
answer, the Respondent denied that any unfair labor practices
were committed. Following close of the hearing, briefs were
filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent.
On the entire record, including my opportunity directly to
observe the witnesses while testimony and their demeanor,
and after considering the posthearing briefs, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Virginia company, operates a motel in
Covington, Virginia. In the course of that operation, during
the past 12 months, a representative period, it received goods
and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points located outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The Respondent’s employment of housekeepers Angela
Anderson and Melissa Crowder ended on July 14, 1989.1
The complaint alleges that both were discharged. However,
there is no testimony to that effect, and both admit to having
quit their jobs. On this state of the record, the General Coun-
sel contends that they were discharged constructively, having
been forced to quit in consequence of their participation,
with coworkers, in efforts to improve working conditions.
The Respondent denies that either was subjected to any form
of compulsion, and, in any event, argues that the termi-
nations were unrelated to any protected activity.
B. The Facts
In late June, the Respondent’s housekeeping unit expressed
dissatisfaction with Betty Linton, their immediate supervisor,
and her assistant, Patty Gaines. On June 29, all maids on
duty, namely, Crowder, Anderson, Teresa Knick, Debbie
Rice, and Glenda Hyler, requested a meeting, and did in fact
meet with Gustav Asboth, the inn’s general manager. Asboth
expressed surprise at the maid’s disenchantment, informing
the group that he was unaware of any problems. In the
course of the meeting, the employees expressed concern over
the Respondent’s practices in the area of sick leave, work
scheduling, and granting days off, as well as the absence of
predictable rules and policies, and inconsistent direction and
harassment by Linton. Crowder testified, with corroboration
by Anderson, that Asboth told them that their ‘‘jobs would
not be jeopardized because we were meeting with him.’’ She
described his posture as receptive and cooperative,2 adding
that Asboth stated that he was very pleased with the maids.3
At the end of the meeting addressed the attendance issues,
stating that he would attempt to work out a scheduling sys-
tem with Linton. He also indicated that he would try to se-
cure additional sick days, while suggesting that the house-
keepers meet with Linton and Gaines.
On July 13, that meeting was held. Attendance was com-
pulsory, and all maids attended, as did the entire manage-
ment staff, including the wife of the owner, Mrs. Sankar.
Asboth opened the meeting with a plea for harmony. It was
Crowder’s impression that ‘‘Basically, . . . he wanted to try
to get something accomplished at this meeting.’’
Asboth credibly testified that, in his opening remarks, he
laid down certain ground rules, stating that this would be an
open forum, allowing dissatisfaction, both by supervision and
employees, to be aired, with a view towards resolving the
715COMFORT INN
4 I reject the General Counsel’s characterization of Linton’s complaint as a
‘‘racial accusation.’’ The three maids admittedly had balked at cleaning Robin-
son’s rooms, on the asserted ground that they were dirty. I also find no basis
for inferring, as suggested by the General Counsel, that Linton on raising this
issue ‘‘intended to create internal conflict among the housekeepers.’’ Finally,
Asboth, contrary to the General Counsel did not ‘‘admit . . . that Linton’s ra-
cial accusations resulted in the meeting becoming a chaotic shouting match
among the housekeepers and between the housekeepers and Linton.’’ This
quotation from the General Counsel’s brief contains three important inaccura-
cies. First, Asboth never acknowledged that ‘‘racial accusations’’ were in-
volved. Second, he simply admitted, on cross-examination, that it was possible
that Linton’s reference to Robinson’s room ‘‘resulted in the maids being angry
at one another.’’ And, finally, there was no evidence that Linton was involved
in the shouting match which ensued.
5 Because Linton criticized, but never formally desciplined Robinson, Ander-
son, and Crowder held to the notion that Linton was afraid of and hence fa-
vored blacks.
6 It is not entirely clear whether Anderson, in this respect, was reacting to
the accusations by coworker, Frances Graham, or attempts by Linton to deflect
her complaints, or both. It was my impression from all the testimony that the
argument with Graham was particularly distressing to her.
7 Myrt Robinson testified that on July 13, after the meeting, Anderson was
upset and crying and said she was going to quit.
conflicts. As matters turned out, the meeting quickly degen-
erated into a cross-fire of recriminations. Linton apparently
was less receptive to the employee initiative. She first stated
that she had a hand full of notes as to what she would say
at the meeting, but the notes were stolen. Moreover,
Crowder, with corroboration from Teresa Knick and Ander-
son, testified that Linton slammed a stack of employment ap-
plications on the desk stating that if the maids did not want
to work here, there were others she could call in. In fielding
the complaints of several different maids, Linton, inter alia,
pointed out that, contrary to their objections, Crowder had
received numerous Fridays off, and that Anderson was
awarded time off to attend family business. In addition,
Linton registered a complaint that Crowder, Anderson, and
Knick did not like to clean the rooms assigned to Myrt Rob-
inson, a maid who was black.4 Apparently, this reference
evoked an internecine screaming match between the maids
themselves, when Frances Graham accused Anderson of ra-
cial prejudice. Anderson became infuriated, denying Gra-
ham’s assertion, but stating that Linton feared blacks.5 Mrs.
Sankar, at this juncture, appealed to Asboth to end the meet-
ing. He did so, with the appeal: ‘‘Well, let’s just all go back
as one big happy family and go back to work.’’
Asboth personally the meeting as follows:
My personal opinion was that it went better than my
expectation. Much better in fact. I was very happy.
There was a couple of sort of sad moments in there
where people got personal. But otherwise, the meeting,
I believe, went very well. Some perceived grievances
were aired, and I might add, on both sides. The super-
visors had as many grievances, I suppose, as the em-
ployees did. A lot of things were talked about at length
and it was all agreed that there was going to be a new
spirit of cooperation and, you know, ironing out dif-
ferences. Well, I walked away from that meeting quite
satisfied. In fact very happy about it. That is why I did
make the statement . . . ‘‘well, there is one big happy
family.’’
After the meeting, at Linton’s invitation, Crowder went to
review a record maintained by the former concerning the
number of Fridays Crowder had been given off that year. In
the process, she allegedly overheard Linton tell Frances
Graham that she believed that Angela Anderson induced Bill
Boguess, a maintenanceman, to steal Linton’s notes.
When she arrived home that evening, Anderson, upset be-
cause of the meeting, telephoned Crowder. In contrast with
Asboth’s impression, they discussed their mutually held view
that the meeting accomplished nothing and ‘‘sounded like a
bunch of squabbling women who hated each other.’’ In
Crowder’s words:
[T]here was a lot of hostility and bickering going on.
It wasn’t supposed to be that way in a business. In
working conditions you shouldn’t be harassed or you
shouldn’t have to come to work nervous. . . .
Anderson felt as if she had been ‘‘picked on’’ at the meet-
ing,6 a reaction exacerbated by Crowder who then told An-
derson that she had overheard Linton implicate Anderson in
the theft of Linton’s notes. They discussed the fact that nei-
ther looked forward to reporting for work the next day.
Anderson then telephoned Emmett Boguess, the son of
Bill Boguess, who also is married to Anderson’s cousin. Em-
mett was also employed at the time by the Respondent as a
maintenanceman. She asked if he knew that she and his fa-
ther had been accused of stealing papers. Emmett Boguess
denied knowledge and became upset. He relates that Ander-
son told him ‘‘that she was quitting and that her and Melissa
wouldn’t be in to work the next day . . . [a]nd that she
hadn’t got to talk to Teresa Knick yet, that she thought she
wouldn’t going to be coming in either.’’
According to Boguess, after Anderson’s call, he tele-
phoned Linton inquiring as to whether she had accused his
father of stealing notes. Linton denied accusing any one in
particular, stating that all she knew was that her papers had
disappeared. Boguess then stated:
Well, you had better be prepared to hire some new help
in the morning because you’ve got two maids [Ander-
son and Crowder] for sure that is not coming in, and
probably three [Knick]. But I know of two, for sure,
that said they would not be there.
Meanwhile, Anderson called Teresa Knick. According to
Knick, Anderson stated, ‘‘She didn’t know how she was
going to be able to face work tomorrow, because she was
just so upset.’’
In the interim, Anderson drove to the home of Emmett
Boguess in search of his father. Emmett Boguess testified
that he informed Anderson that Linton had told him that she
had accused no one of stealing the notes. From Emmett’s
house, and in his presence, Anderson once more called
Crowder, and in the course of their conversation said, ‘‘I feel
like not going to work tomorrow.’’ According to Boguess,
after hanging up, Anderson told him that she was not going
to work tomorrow as she was quitting,7 that Crowder would
not come in, and that she had to check on Knick.
Anderson then went home, again calling Crowder. She
states that in this conversation, they ‘‘agreed to go to work
the next day, because if [they] didn’t [they] would be playing
right into their hands.’’ Anderson also telephoned Knick,
who agreed to meet Anderson and Crowder before work in
716 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 Boguess testified that when he reported for work, Anderson confronted
him stating that he was in trouble because Linton told Asboth that he had
cursed Linton out in their phone conversation of the night before. Boguess
avers that when he asked Asboth about this at the above meeting, the latter
denied this was so.
9 Asboth appears to have been laboring under a state of confusion when he
testified that he was unaware that the maids had reported for work when these
instructions were issued to Linton. In this respect, it is noted that Patty Gaines
testified that, on July 14, Asboth arrived at the inn at 9 a.m. and that Linton
did not meet with him until then. Under all versions, Anderson and Crowder
were already working at that time.
10 R. Exhs. 1 and 2. The inscription on these documents was added in two
stages, and not completed until after the supervisors actually met with Ander-
son and Crowder. Thus, prior to the disciplinary meeting, Gaines had drafted
duplicate summations on each document, limited to the following:
Told Emmett Boguess that she was quitting. He in turn called Betty and
told her she would be 2 maids short on July 14, because they were quit-
ting. This caused her to have to report to work on her day off. They did
report for work.
After the meeting, Gaines supplemented the reprimand, adding the following:
‘‘When confronted with this information, they walked off the job.’’ The final
version of the reprimands included no reference to a suspension.
11 The reason for the inclusion of Knick is not entirely clear. Linton initially
explained that Knick was included because Boguess suspected that she too
might have intended not to report that morning. Later, however, when she was
confronted with similarities in the cases of Knick and Crowder, Linton
changed position, stating that Asboth had instructed her to include Knick ‘‘be-
cause she had an attitude problem.’’ Asboth, on the other hand, denied knowl-
edge as to why Knick was included.
12 Linton admitted that she was unaware that Boguess had talked to Crowder
on the evening of July 13, or that Boguess had heard anything from anyone
other than Anderson, who had telephoned Crowder in his presence.
13 Gaines disagreed with Linton. Her version more closely corresponds with
Asboth’s understanding of what was to take place at the meeting. Thus, she
related that Anderson and Crowder were told that if they signed the written
warning in its initial form, ‘‘that would have been the end of it. However,
if they refused, they would get a five day suspension.’’
14 As Anderson and Crowder left, Knick started to follow, but Linton inter-
vened telling Knick that this had nothing to do with her as ‘‘there was nothing
said about you [Knick] weren’t coming to work.’’ Knick therefore resumed
her duties.
15 Neither document states that the maids were uncooperative, abusive, or
that they refused to sign any reprimand.
the parking lot the next morning so they could report to-
gether.
According to Linton about five maids were scheduled to
work on July 14. Although she was scheduled to begin a 4-
day holiday on July 14, Boguess’ report required her pres-
ence at the inn that morning.
On July 14, Knick, Crowder, and Anderson met in the
motel parking lot. They went to the laundry room where they
clocked in and picked up their cleaning equipment and sup-
plies. Linton, Gaines, and other maids were present as they
arrived. Nothing was said and after clocking in at 8 a.m,
Knick, Crowder, and Anderson left to attend their normal du-
ties.
Earlier that morning, Asboth learned that Emmett Boguess
had warned Linton that ‘‘several of the maids told him that
they will not come in.’’ With Linton, he sought out
Boguess,8 who again confirmed Anderson’s statements to
this effect. When Asboth was advised by Linton that all the
maids had reported, he instructed Linton as follows:
I think the situation is out of control. I don’t know
what these girls are intending on doing, but I think you
better put a stop to this kind of behavior. At least find
out what is going on. . . . [I]f they are this disruptive,
if that is the case where they were going to call in and
threaten . . . quitting—and they changed their mind be-
tween that point of sending a message and then decid-
ing on coming in the next morning, that is really unac-
ceptable behavior.9 And I recommended that she give
them a reprimand. . . . I told her that if she is not sat-
isfied with their version of the story, that she could just
give them a five-day suspension.
In this respect, Linton’s recollection bears greater kinship
with that of Anderson and Crowder. For she claims that on
reporting this development, Asboth stated: ‘‘You talk to them
and let’s write them up for a five-day suspension and see
what the problem is.’’ Consistent with Linton’s under-
standing, two identical reprimands were prepared before she
met with the three maids.10
At 9:30 or 10 a.m., Linton called all three to meet with
her and Gaines in one of the rooms. Linton said, ‘‘I heard
you weren’t coming in to work today,’’11 inquiring as to
why they had told Emmett Boguess that they were going to
quit. They denied having done so. Linton asserts that she be-
lieved Boguess12 and therefore requested that Crowder and
Anderson sign reprimands, ‘‘for five days off because you all
were not coming in today.’’13 Crowder protested, ‘‘You
can’t do that. You can’t give somebody five days off just be-
cause they talked on the phone and said they weren’t coming
in to work today.’’ At this point, Anderson and Crowder
rose, announcing that they would not sign the papers, but
that ‘‘We are going to quit.’’ They walked out, with Crowder
telling Linton, ‘‘she would hear from my lawyer and she
could stick the job up her butt.’’14
According to Asboth, he received a report from Linton
that Anderson and Crowder were uncooperative and abusive,
and that they refused to sign the reprimand, whereupon she
decided to give them a 5-day suspension ‘‘because of their
general behavior.’’15 Anderson credibly testified that, when
informed of the quit, he was ‘‘sorry’’ that the maids had re-
acted in this way. Believing that ‘‘they are hot-headed,’’ he
attempted to correct the situation, approaching them at An-
derson’s car. Anderson accused him of not being much of a
man because he allowed Frances Graham to curse her during
the July 13 meeting. He had no response, but simply lowered
his head to the ground. Asboth then discussed the quit with
Crowder. According to Crowder, she told Asboth that they
had no choice once given ‘‘five days off because of a con-
versation we had on our phones at home.’’ Crowder then
charged that she and Anderson knew they had been dis-
ciplined because they ‘‘wanted to have some things changed
up there.’’ According to Crowder, then Anderson joined in
the conversation. Being upset and crying Anderson protested
to Asboth that she had been accused of stealing and did not
appreciate it. I believed Asboth’s testimony that he con-
fronted the alleged discriminatees, hoping to change their
minds about quitting. His uncontradicted account of the ex-
change was as follows:
As I was walking out of The Comfort Inn . . . I saw
Ms. Anderson’s car. Melissa was coming out of the
building and at that point I attempted to talk to them,
reason with them, cool them off. Explaining to them
that the reprimand process is basically . . . an attempt
at discipline with a positive side to it. That they should
717COMFORT INN
16 The Respondent argues to the contrary. However, deliberations by Ander-
son and Crowder as to whether they would report to work stemmed from the
July 13 meeting and related to a means for relieving their shared frustration
with the lack of progress made at that time. In this light, their discussion bore
a sufficient nexus to ‘‘group goals’’ to itself fall within the protective mantle
of Sec. 7 of the Act. Cox Enterprises, 264 NLRB 878, 879 (1982).
17 This disciplinary response is not mentioned in the complaint. Yet, the
General Counsel argues in her posthearing brief that ‘‘Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it attempted to discipline and thereby con-
structively discharged Crowder and Anderson because of their protected con-
duct [emphasis added].’’ Obviously, the discipline, left unmentioned by the
complaint, has now become the central predicate for the plea that these em-
ployees were victimized by a ‘‘constructive discharge,’’ itself unalleged. In-
deed, the General Counsel has recognized the importance of this aspect of her
case by urging the undersigned ‘‘to affirmatively expunge the discipline from
the personnel records of Crowder and Anderson.’’ These are not the only
unalleged matters that are deemed by the General Counsel to be significant
to her discrimination theory. Thus, she argues that Linton used employment
applications at the July 13 meeting ‘‘as a graphic demonstration of the avail-
ability of replacements . . . intended to curtail any future complaints and con-
certed activity by the housekeepers.’’ Here again, the complaint fails to ad-
dress an important incident. Like it or not, as administrative law judges we
all must accept the fact that, in consequence of Board procedural practices,
the General Counsel is seldom faulted for a lack of precision in drafting com-
plaints. While this policy has its rightful applications, here, we have an un-
complicated and straightforward case, under an extant complaint which defines
a single unfair labor practice, itself, in misleading terms. Yet, the omissions
and variances are pervasive to the point of embarrassment, affecting each and
every actual and potential issue. To make matters worse, the General Coun-
sel’s three witnesses were privy to each incident, and hence the events were
known, or should have been known prior to issuance of the complaint, and
during the 5 months that it lay idle prior to hearing. In this light, I refuse to
dismiss these discrepancies lightly as simple oversight or an act of careless-
ness. In these circumstances, to assist the prosecutorial function by participa-
tion in nebulous determinations of when an issue is and when it is not fully
litigated, and to cull the record independently in furtherance of that process,
would reward a wrong under conditions fostering either indifference to the
pleading process or the type of abuse suggested in this instance.
18 The General Counsel argues that Respondent’s position after the quit
demonstrates its intention to require Anderson and Crowder to give up statu-
tory rights as a condition for continued employment. It is true that Asboth was
receptive to the rehire, if pursued by either, provided they signed the letter
of reprimand and agree to the 5-day reprimand. Firstly, Respondent’s position
after the quit would not necessarily be indicative of its earlier intention. The
pique manifested by the employees might well have induced management to
a hardened stance. More importantly, neither Anderson nor Crowder testified
that such a condition was communicated to them either before or after the
quits, and hence whatever the Respondent’s intent, it could not have been
among the considerations prompting their action during either timeframe.
really not see this in a negative light. And they were
still quite hot. At that point I told them, ‘‘Okay, you’re
so hot-headed now, so frustrated, why don’t you go
home, cool off and call Betty later?’’
Linton confirmed that Asboth subsequently told her that
‘‘both the girls are hot tempered, mad, [and] upset.’’ Linton
states that she was instructed, ‘‘If they call you back and
want their job back in a day or two . . . you talk to them
and you all talk out your differences and let them come back
. . . after the suspension was signed.’’ There was no re-
sponse.
C. Concluding Findings
The General Counsel contends that the action by Anderson
and Crowder in voluntarily terminating their employment
constituted a constructive discharge, violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. In support, the General Counsel does not
argue that the reprimand and/or suspension inherently created
an employment situation so intolerable or impossible as to be
incompatible with their continued employment. See, e.g.,
Bennett Packaging Co., 285 NLRB 602, 607 (1987); accord:
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 890 (1984). Instead,
the General Counsel relies on long-established, settled policy,
to the effect that an employer is guilty of a constructive dis-
charge when employees elect to quit after being offered a
choice between the exercise of Section 7 rights and contin-
ued employment. Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 NLRB 10, 17 (1937);
Block-Southland Sportswear, 170 NLRB 936, 937–938
(1968).
The analysis begins with my endorsement of the General
Counsel’s view that at all times prior to their terminations,
Anderson and Crowder were engaged in activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act when they discussed with management,
and as between themselves, their concerns and strategies for
improving conditions of work. The Respondent, when alerted
to the fact that they might absent themselves from work,
elected to discipline them, and when they reported for work
in timely fashion, but refused to acknowledge a reprimand,
suspended them for 5 days.
There is no doubt that Anderson and Crowder remained
within the protected process when they discussed the pos-
sible refusal to report for work.16 Hence, they could not le-
gitimately be disciplined on that ground.17 However, the
question here is whether, in such circumstances, the offended
employees, having elected to quit, are to be treated as unfair
labor practice strikers, with no right of reinstatement or back-
pay until rejection of their offer to return to work, or as dis-
chargees, whose remedial rights inure from the date on
which they voluntarily terminated.
Any delimitation between these alternatives must take
heed of the fact that ‘‘[t]he Board has long held that there
is no constructive discharge when an employee quits in pro-
test against unfair labor practices.’’ Kogy’s, Inc., 272 NLRB
202 (1984). In other words, the remedial processes under the
Act will view such employees as having no greater rights
than strikers in the ‘‘situation in which an employer’s unfair
labor practices are designed merely to thwart its employees’
union activity while retaining them as employees.’’ See
Block-Southland Sportswear, supra, 170 NLRB at 938. The
General Counsel argues that this was not the case here, be-
cause the continued employment of Anderson and Crowder
was conditioned on their giving up statutory rights. This is
a view of the record which borders on frivolity. There is ab-
solutely no evidence suggesting that this was the case. Nei-
ther Anderson nor Crowder testified that they were ever of-
fered such an ultimatum, or understood that the Respondent
would not retain them if they continued their efforts in quest
of improved working conditions. Moreover, the record fails
to disclose that either was ever told, assumed, or had reason
to believe that their employment was contingent on their ac-
knowledgement and acceptance of the reprimand or 5-day
suspension,18 or their agreement to forbear from challenging
these actions before the National labor Relations Board.
In these circumstances, it is concluded that Anderson and
Crowder voluntarily terminated their employment under con-
ditions which were not subject to remedy under the Act. The
8(a)(1) allegation of the complaint shall be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
718 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
19 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
2. The Respondent did not discharge Angela Anderson and
Melissa Crowder on July 14, 1989, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, because they engaged in concerted activ-
ity protected by Section 7 of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended19
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety.