Comenity LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 25, 2021

2020005551 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/660,713 03/17/2015 Richard Barber AINSWORTH III ADS-045 5794
45588 7590 01/25/2021
ALLIANCE DATA C/O WAGNER BLECHER LLP
123 WESTRIDGE DRIVE
WATSONVILLE, CA 95076
EXAMINER
HENRY, MATTHEW D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/25/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents@wagnerblecher.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD B. AINSWORTH III, JAMES WALZ,
CHRISTIAN BILLMAN, UCHENNA CHILAKA, and ADAM KOLTNOW
____________

Appeal 2020-005551
Application 14/660,713
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1 and 3–18, which constitute all of the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Comenity
LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “a device, system, and method for
enabling a break-down of a leaderboard into one or more mini-
leaderboards.” Spec. ¶ 10. Users “can track their performance subjective to
others” using leaderboards that “visually display where a user stands in
regards to others.” Id. Typically, a “user remains unaware of how his
performance compares to performance of participants whom the user
personally knows” and instead “only knows how he has performed as
compared with the public at large.” Id. The present invention “enable[s] the
user to modify an ongoing leaderboard to only display the user’s
performance in comparison with a selected category of people.” Id.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium
having instructions embodied therein that when executed causes
a computing device to perform a computer-implemented
method for gamification based performance tracking, said
computer-implemented method comprising:

accessing a leaderboard comprising a set of participants;

receiving, from a first participant of said set of participants, a
selection of less than all of said set of participants to form a
second set of participants,

each participant of said second set of participants personally
known to said first participant, and

each participant of said second set of participants further
comprising an identifiable qualifying characteristic unique to
said selection in addition to being personally known to said first
participant;

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parsing said leaderboard into at least one sub-leaderboard to
include only said second set of participants;

updating the at least one sub-leaderboard in real-time; and

providing a mobile device notification in real-time to a mobile
device of each participant in the second set of participants as
the at least one sub-leaderboard is updated,

the mobile device notification provided as motivation to one or
more participants in the second set of participants.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1 and 3–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 11.
Claims 1, 3–16, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Rao et al. (US 2014/0164037 A1, published June 12,
2014) (“Rao”) and Gorman et al. (US 2013/0171593 A1, published July 4,
2013) (“Gorman”). Final Act. 17.
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Rao, Gorman, and Heintz et al. (US 2001/0025253 A1, published Sept. 27,
2001) (“Heintz”). Final Act. 35.
ANALYSIS
Section 101 Rejection
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted).
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“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’
to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019
Guidance”); October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg.
55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019
PEG Update”). The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now
incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106
(9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).2
We first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56; MPEP
§ 2106.04(a)) and § 2106.04(d).

2 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
3 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Step 2A, Prong One
Under the first step of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner finds
that the claimed steps “are directed towards the abstract idea of Organizing
Human Activity because the received leaderboard/participant data is being
filtered/analyzed into sub-leaderboards based on certain characteristics of
the participants to display motivation for the participants, which is managing
interactions between people.” Final Act. 13; see Ans. 4.
Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s determination
that the claims are directed to certain methods for organizing human activity
under Step 2A, Prong One. Appellant argues that the claimed invention is
not directed toward the abstract idea of organizing human activity. Appeal
Br. 8–9. According to Appellant, the claim “provides a specific way to
reduce the size of a leaderboard in gamification based performance tracking
to a smaller participant sub-group whose membership is defined by a
specific participant in the sub-group, in order to provide relevancy to the
participants in the sub-group.” Id. at 9. Appellant argues that the claim does
not recite an “open-ended management of interactions between people”
because the claims “are not open-ended.” Id.
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We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite
certain methods of organizing human activity. See Final Act. 12–13; Ans.
3–4; 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appellant’s Specification describes the problem
that a “user remains unaware of how his performance compares to
performance of participants who the user personally knows” in typical
leaderboard systems. Spec. ¶ 10. To solve this problem, the Specification
describes “switching from an ongoing leaderboard that is global, to a
localized sub-leaderboard.” Id. ¶ 11. For example, claim 1 recites a “non-
transitory computer-readable storage medium having instructions embodied
therein that when executed causes a computing device to perform” the
following steps:
accessing a leaderboard comprising a set of participants;

receiving, from a first participant of said set of participants, a
selection of less than all of said set of participants to form a
second set of participants,

each participant of said second set of participants personally
known to said first participant, and each participant of said
second set of participants further comprising an identifiable
qualifying characteristic unique to said selection in addition to
being personally known to said first participant;

parsing said leaderboard into at least one sub-leaderboard to
include only said second set of participants;

updating the at least one sub-leaderboard in real-time; and

providing a mobile device notification in real-time to a mobile
device of each participant in the second set of participants as
the at least one sub-leaderboard is updated,

the mobile device notification provided as motivation to one or
more participants in the second set of participants.
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Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Independent claim 12
recites similar limitations. See id. at 32 (Claims App.).
Appellant has not persuasively argued why the italicized claim
limitations above do not recite “certain methods of organizing human
activity”—specifically, “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people.” See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52;
MPEP 2106.04(a), 2106.04(a)(2)II. For example, the Specification
describes that the sub-leaderboard “can be used by a single retailer to
provide gamification for sales associates competing within a store” and “a
game-play style of motivation to each of the participants on the sub-
leaderboard.” Spec. ¶ 33. The Specification further describes “providing a
game type scenario, e.g., gamification,” to result in the store “seeing an
increase in whatever metric they have correlated with the sub-leaderboard
. . . due to an increase in competitive spirit, rewards motivation, and the like
that invigorates the associates.” Id. ¶ 38. Based upon this disclosure, we
agree with the Examiner that the claims, managing interactions and
relationships between members of leaderboards and sub-leaderboards, recite
certain methods of organizing human activity.
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity as identified in the 2019 Guidance and MPEP,
and thus an abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong Two
In determining whether the claims are “directed to” the identified
abstract idea, we next consider whether the claims recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the
reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
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elements) recited in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; MPEP
2106.04(d).
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the claims “do not account for
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception (e.g.[,] abstract idea)
into a practical application because the claimed structure is merely adding
the words to apply it with the judicial exception and mere instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer.” Final Act. 14; see Ans. 4–5.
Here, the claimed invention merely uses generic computer components to
collect, analyze, and display data (i.e., the steps are “computer-
implemented” using “non-transitory computer readable storage medium,
instructions, computing device, participants, and mobile device”). See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 23, 25, 39–47; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Specification describes that embodiments
“can operate on or within a number of different computer systems including,
but not limited to, general purpose networked computer systems, embedded
computer systems, routers, switches, server devices, client devices, various
intermediate devices/nodes, stand-alone computer systems, distributed
computer systems, media center, handheld computer systems, multi-media
devices, and the like.” Spec. ¶ 40; see also id. ¶¶ 41–43. The system
includes components such as “an operating system,” “applications,”
“modules,” and “data,” which “resid[e] in one or some combination of
computer usable volatile memory,” “computer usable non-volatile memory,”
and “data storage unit.” Id. ¶ 47. Therefore, the claimed computer
components used to perform the claimed steps/functions, such as the
“computing device” and “mobile device,” are generic computer components.
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Simply implementing an abstract idea using conventional machines or
devices adds nothing of substance. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an
abstract idea ‘while adding the words ‘apply it’ is not enough for patent
eligibility.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84–85 (explaining that “simply
implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine” does not
suffice for patent eligibility) (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64–65, 71).
Further, as the Examiner explains, the claimed “receiving/storing
data” (i.e., claimed “receiving . . . a selection”) and “displaying data” (i.e.,
claimed “providing a mobile device notification . . . to a mobile device”)
merely add insignificant extra-solution activity (e.g.[,] mere data
gathering).” Final Act. 14; see Ans. 6. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have held that
mere ‘[data-gathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim
statutory.’”).
Appellant argues that the “claimed features allow an improvement in
mobile device notification during gamification by reducing the number of
notifications sent/received and focusing the notifications to specific and
relevant participants,” which “would streamline the system which would
save messaging/data costs for the participants while also increasing the value
of the notifications being received.” Appeal Br. 11. According to
Appellant, the claimed “features of the reduced size sub-leaderboard, and the
requirements for being included as a participant in the sub-leaderboard
group” results in “the amount of notification provided to the participants
mobile device would be reduced to a manageable amount while also being
relevant.” Id.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions. See Final Act. 13–14; Ans. 4–6.
First, Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the
claim. Nothing in the claimed steps, to select participants to form a sub-
leaderboard and parse the leaderboard into the sub-leaderboard, describes
improvement to messaging and notifications. The claimed steps encompass
parsing a leaderboard into just one sub-leaderboard and updating the sub-
leaderboard just once, which would not “streamline the system.”
Furthermore, Appellant has not sufficiently shown that the claims are
directed to an improvement to the computer system or technological process.
Rather, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claimed “parsing
said leaderboard into at least one sub-leaderboard to include only said
second set of participants” limitation “further narrows the abstract idea by
filtering out the leaderboard in a specific manner based on human user input,
where the general purpose computer components are merely being used to
implement the abstract idea.” Ans. 5–6 (citing Spec. ¶ 20). Here, the
Specification describes that the invention “filter[s] out participants of the
first set of participants that do not have the [predefined] identifiable
qualifying characteristic.” Spec. ¶ 21. The claimed “parsing said
leaderboard into at least one sub-leaderboard to include only said second set
of participants” that are each “personally known to said first participant” and
that each comprises “an identifiable qualifying characteristic unique to said
selection,” in light of the Specification, improves leaderboard membership
and participation. In other words, the claimed steps, to select participants for
a sub-leaderboard and parse the leaderboard to the sub-leaderboard, merely
improve the abstract idea.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the claims fail to integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application.
Step 2B
Turning to step two of the Alice/Mayo framework, we look to whether
the claims (a) add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply
append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP 2106.05.
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements claimed (i.e.,
“non-transitory computer readable storage medium, instructions, computing
device, participants, and mobile device”) “merely facilitate the claimed
functions at a high level of generality” and “perform conventional
functions.” Final Act. 15. We further agree with the Examiner that the
claimed “steps/functions” are “well-known, routine, and conventional
steps/functions.” Id.
As discussed above, the Specification describes the claimed computer
components generically and evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 23, 25, 39–47. For example, the Specification explains that the
“computer systems” include “general purpose networked computer systems,
embedded computer systems, routers, switches, server devices, client
devices, various intermediate devices/nodes, stand-alone computer systems,
distributed computer systems, media center, handheld computer systems,
multi-media devices, and the like.” Spec. ¶ 40. Appellant does not direct
our attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the claimed
computer components perform anything other than the well-understood,
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routine, and conventional functions. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims,
understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-
shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for
gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.”); Alice,
573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks
insufficient to add an inventive concept).
When viewed as a whole, nothing in the claims adds significantly
more (i.e., an inventive concept) to the abstract idea. The claimed “non-
transitory computer-readable storage medium having instructions embodied
therein that when executed causes a computing device to perform a
computer-implemented method” amounts to no more than mere instructions
to apply the abstract idea using generic computer components, which is
insufficient to provide an inventive concept. Furthermore, we are unable
discern anything in the claims, even when the recitations are considered in
combination, that represents something more than the performance of
routine, conventional functions of a generic computer. That is, the claims at
issue do not require any nonconventional computer components, or even a
“non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces,” but merely call for performance of the method “on a set of generic
computer components.” Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Given the claimed generic computer components performing generic
computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each
independent claim does not supply an “inventive concept” that renders the
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claim “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Thus, the claims do not
satisfy § 101 under Mayo/Alice step two.
For at least the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1 and 12 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter, as well as dependent claims 3–11 and 13–18, which were not
separately argued. See Appeal Br. 13.
Section 103 Rejections
Independent Claims 1 and 12
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Rao
and Gorman teaches or suggests “receiving, from a first participant of said
set of participants, a selection of less than all of said set of participants to
form a second set of participants, each participant of said second set of
participants personally known to said first participant,” as recited in
independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claim 12?
The Examiner relies on Gorman to teach the foregoing limitation.
Final Act. 20–21 (citing Gorman ¶¶ 72, 119, 137, and 143). Specifically, the
Examiner finds that Gorman teaches “displaying a leaderboard by filtering
out particular users (e.g. a manager personally knows all the users on a team
and will personally know all users he/she is monitoring) and based on skills
or roles of the user (e.g. identifiably qualifying characteristics).” Final
Act. 21. The Examiner finds that Gorman teaches “how leaderboard
platform creates a mini-social network . . . within the company, showing that
each participant in the sub-leaderboard is personally known to one another,”
and that this “mini-social network is the filtered set of user[s] that would
make up the sub-leader board.” Ans. 6–7 (citing Gorman ¶ 137). According
to the Examiner, Gorman’s filtering leaderboards into sub-leaderboards
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where “a first user is able to search for a specific particular user” by name
“indicat[es] that the first user personally knows the specific particular user
searched for by name.” Id. at 7 (citing Gorman ¶ 137); see id. at 9. The
Examiner also finds that Gorman’s “manager dashboard, which allows a
manager to monitor and track participant progress” teaches that the
“manager personally knows each employee/participant that he/she
manages.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Gorman ¶ 143); see id. at 9–10; Final Act. 21.
Appellant argues that “Gorman does not disclose or suggest ‘each
participant of said second set of participants personally known to said first
participant.” Appeal Br. 19 (emphasis omitted); see Appeal Br. 21–22, 24–
27. Specifically, Appellant argues that “Gorman includes a very long list of
parameters for filtering,” but “does not disclose or suggest filtering based on
personal knowledge.” Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 24–25, 26.
According to Appellant, “a user searching for a participant by typing in
his/her name does not provide any evidence (much less inherent evidence)
that would suggest the user does or does not personally know the
participant.” Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 19. Appellant also
argues that Gorman’s “list of user roles” including “new-hires, associates,
senior associates, partners, assistant managers, managers, regional managers,
and global managers, or virtually any suitable type of user role associated
with one or more positions or titles within an organization,” would “teach
away from the claimed features ‘each participant of said second said of
participants personally known to said first participant.’” Id. at 22–23.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Gorman generally
describes “encouraging regular participation in training and collaborative
activities by employees of an organization . . . through a gamified training
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platform.” Gorman, code (57). Gorman discloses that “the training and
evaluation platform may generate a number of leaderboards and/or allow
users to filter one or more leaderboards based on various parameters.” Id.
¶ 137. As an example, “the platform may generate separate leaderboards for
the users associated with each of the user roles,” and “one or more of the
leaderboards may be made accessible to a limited group.” Id. Additionally,
“users may be able to search through and/or apply filters to one or more of
the leaderboards, such as to search for a particular user or filter the user by
user role.” Id. Gorman also discloses that:
the training and evaluation platform may include an evaluation
application, such as a ‘Manager Dashboard,’ which provides
employers or other organizations associated with the platform
with the ability to track and analyze user activity in the platform
in order to obtain a comprehensive view of how each user
utilizes the training application, interacts with other users, and
participates and performs.
Id. ¶ 143. In other words, Gorman teaches a leaderboard participant filtering
the leaderboard based on participant-related parameters. This includes a
participant employer filtering the leaderboard user participants to track how
participants interact, participate, and perform.
We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that Gorman teaches, or at
least suggests, that the selected set of participants are personally known to
the first participant as required by the claim. See Ans. 6–10. Claim 1 recites
“receiving . . . a selection of less than all of said set of participants to form a
second set of participants, each participant of said second set of participants
personally known to said first participant.” Appellant’s Specification does
not explicitly define “personally known,” nor does Appellant provide an
interpretation for the term. However, the Specification describes that a user
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compares his performance to “participants who the user personally knows”
rather than “the public at large.” Spec. ¶ 10. We agree with the Examiner
that “the broadest reasonable interpretation of ‘personally known’ includes
knowing the name of the other person (by specifically typing in someone’s
name), a manager managing a group of employees, or being connected in a
social network.” Ans. 9. In addition, Appellant even admits that in typing a
person’s name, “[i]n some cases, the search is for a person that is personally
known to the searcher, but in other cases it is not.” Appeal Br. 18.
For at least the above reasons we sustain the Examiner’s § 103
rejection of independent claims 1 and 12.
Dependent Claims 3–11 and 13–18
Appellant does not separately argue patentability for dependent claims
3–11 and 13–18. See Appeal Br. 28–29. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s § 103 rejections of dependent claims 3–11 and 13–18.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1 and 3–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–18 101 Eligibility 1, 3–18
1, 3–16,
18 103 Rao, Gorman 1, 3–16, 18
17 103 Rao, Gorman, Heintz 17
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Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–18

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED