COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 20, 2021

2020003449 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/812,867 11/14/2017 Alan Ramaley 26141.0277U1 9094
16000 7590 10/20/2021
Comcast
c/o Ballard Spahr LLP
999 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30309-4421
EXAMINER
PETERSON, TERRIKA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2426
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/20/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatentmail@ballardspahr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALAN RAMALEY
____________

Appeal 2020-003449
Application 15/812,867
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
JASON V. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 2–16. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Comcast
Cable Communications Management, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/812,867

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The present invention relates generally to redirecting content players
to a segment of an advertisement for an initial request. See Spec., Abstr.
Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is
representative of the appealed claims:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, from a device, a request for a content
stream, wherein the content stream comprises one or more
segments of a content item and one or more segments of an
advertisement, and wherein the request indicates a requested
starting point in the content stream; and
based on determining that the request for the
content stream is an initial request for the content stream:
generating an identifier associated with the
request, and
sending, to the device, a redirect message
comprising an instruction to initiate the content stream at a
second point in the content stream that corresponds to an initial
segment of the one or more segments of the advertisement, and
wherein the second point in the content stream is different than
the requested starting point.

Appellant appeals the following rejections:
R1. Claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Gould (US
2017/0308681 A1, published Oct. 26, 2017) and Cheng (US 2014/0189139
A1, published July 3, 2014). Final Act. 2–14.
R2. Claims 6, 13, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Gould, Cheng, and Ahanger (US
2009/0007172 A1, published Jan. 1, 2009). Final Act. 14–16.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
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thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

ANALYSIS
First, Appellant contends that the combined teachings of Gould and
Cheng fail to teach or suggest the claimed initial request for content stream,
as set forth in claim 1. Specifically, Appellant contends that “Gould does
not indicate that the ‘first communication’ is an initial communication”
(Appeal Br. 5), “instead [this communication] follows some other request
for ‘media content.’” Id. Appellant further contends that “the Examiner
even intimated that Gould does not teach the recited limitation, and merely
teaches ‘requesting a content item.’” Id. Appellant also contends that
“Cheng does not cure the deficiency of Gould” (id. at 6) because “an initial
playback start time [, as disclosed by Cheng,] is not analogous to an initial
request for content from a device, as claimed.” Id. In essence, Appellant
contends that neither Gould nor Cheng teaches or suggests determining that
the request for the content stream is an initial request for the content stream,
as set forth in independent claims 1 and 14.2
In response, the Examiner explains, “[t]he mere fact [that] Gould
teaches authenticating the device to use [the] content delivery network, does
not remove the fact that Gould still has the request for the content causing
the generation of the identifier.” Ans. 3 (emphasis added). The Examiner
further reasons, “[t]he fact that the unique identifiers need to be generated
indicated that it is the first request.” Id. We agree with the Examiner.
Specifically, Gould discloses a method for delivering media content
and advertising content that includes: “authenticating at least one of the

2 Independent claim 8 does not include this limitation.
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subscriber and/or client device to access content . . . ; receiving a first
communication from the client device for delivery of the IP packetized
media content; causing generation of a unique session identifier relating to
the first communication . . . ; transmitting a manifest file.” Gould ¶ 16.
Gould further discloses that “the one or more unique identifiers are [a] ‘per-
session’ unique identifier that uniquely represents the client’s request for a
session (e.g., a video session) . . . [and] can be used to authenticate the
request.” Gould ¶ 136. In other words, Gould teaches that when a client
requests content, a unique identifier is generated per-session, e.g., at the
initial instance of a video session, and that this unique identifier can be used
to authenticate the request.
Appellant argues that “Gould fails to teach or even consider an
order/iteration of a request for a content stream, such as whether a request
for a content stream is an initial request, a second request, a third request, or
so on, and under Gould, any request would cause the generation of an
identifier.” Reply Br. 2–3. This argument is unpersuasive. Gould expressly
states “receiving a first communication from the client device . . . [which
causes the] generation of a unique session identifier.” See Gould ¶ 16.
Gould further teaches that an identifier is generated “per-session,” not per
request. Id. at 136. As such, Gould at least teaches delivery “sessions” and
receiving a first communication, i.e., a first request, within a particular
session that triggers the generation of the unique identifier for that session.
Appellant fails to persuasively distinguish Gould’s aforementioned
teaching from the claimed based on determining that the request for the
content stream is an initial request for the content stream: generating an
identifier associated with the request.
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Additionally, the Examiner finds that Cheng also “teaches the initial
playback start time reflects the requested seek position, meaning an initial
request for content.” Ans. 4. For example, Cheng discloses that “a playback
segment according to one embodiment includes an initial playback start time
and an initial playback rate.” Cheng ¶ 65. We agree with the Examiner that
Cheng’s reference to the “initial playback start time” suggests an initial
playback request. Thus, like Gould, Cheng also suggests the claimed initial
request for content stream.
Second, Appellant contends that the cited art fails to teach or suggest
the claimed redirect message, as set forth in claim 1. Specifically, Appellant
contends that “a redirect message sent based on an initial request implies
that the redirect is sent before playback has begun. Accordingly, Gould
fails to teach the recited claim limitations.” Appeal Br. 8.
In response, regarding claim 1, the Examiner finds that “the claim
language merely implies that the redirect message is sent after the request
[and] [n]othing in the claim language requires the redirect message to be
sent before playback has begun.” Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner.
For example, claim 1 merely recites “a redirect message comprising
an instruction to initiate the content stream at a second point . . . different
than the requested starting point.” See Claim 1. Claim 1 does not
necessarily require that the redirect message be sent before playback has
begun, as argued by Appellant—merely that at some point a redirect
message initiate content at a second point. Thus, Appellant’s argument is
not commensurate with the scope of claim 1 (or claims 8 and 14).
In any case, Gould teaches “the client may reach a trigger (such as a
URL redirect trigger . . .), indicating that content may no longer be provided,
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and/or alternate content is needed.” Gould ¶ 122. Thus, Gould clearly
teaches a redirect message that indicates alternate content.
Appellant also contends that “Cheng does not teach sending a redirect
message to a point in a stream that is different than a requested point in the
stream.” Id. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Cheng teaches
“allowing users to play media fragments in various orders at various times.”
Final Act. 3, citing Cheng ¶ 17. Therefore, we find that the combined
teachings of Gould and Cheng teaches the claimed redirect message . . . to
initiate the content stream at a second point.
Third, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to
combine Gould’s teachings with Cheng’s teachings “so that the content
request . . . can be further specified by a timestamp . . . allowing users to
play media fragments in various orders at various times.” Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends that “a content request being timestamped is not
contemplated by Gould. Accordingly, the motivation relied upon by the
Office Action to combine Gould and Cheng is not rationally supported.”
Appeal Br. 10.
However, there is no requirement that the problem solved by the
secondary reference be discussed by the primary reference to apply the
teachings of the secondary reference in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Supreme Court has held that in analyzing the obviousness of combining
elements, a court need not find specific teachings, but rather may consider
“the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in
the art” and “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill
in the art would employ.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
421 (2007). To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the
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predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions,” and the basis for an obviousness rejection must include an
“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” Id.
Here, the Examiner has found actual teachings in the prior art and has
provided a rationale for the combination. Further, the teachings suggest that
the combination involves the predictable use of prior art elements according
to their established functions. Specifically, the Examiner clarifies that “the
content segments . . . have the timestamp, not the request . . . [and] Cheng’s
timestamps of the segments would allow playback [of] the received chunks
[of data in] Gould using a ‘Seekbar’ to change the playback position”
(Ans. 5), and this is “proper motivation” to combine the teachings. Id. We
agree with the Examiner. Accordingly, the Examiner has provided sufficient
motivation for modifying Gould with the teachings of Cheng.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 8, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over at least
Gould in view of Cheng, likewise with the rejection of dependent claims 2–
7, 9–13, and 15–20, which are not argued separately with particularity.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.
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In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–12,
14–19
103 Gould, Cheng 1–5,
7–12,
14–19

6, 13, 20 103 Gould, Cheng,
Ahanger
6, 13, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED