Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 4, 2020

2019002668 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/826,068 03/14/2013 Larry Wolcott 007412.01800 4536
71867 7590 08/04/2020
BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD
ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 007412
1100 13th STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
CELANI, NICHOLAS P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-71867@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LARRY WOLCOTT and KEVIN JOHNS
Appeal 2019-002668
Application 13/826,068
Technology Center 2400

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., ERIC B. CHEN, and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 21–25. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Comcast Cable
Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “manag[ing] distributed computing tasks
based on information received at lower levels of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model.” Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a first computing device and from a second
computing device, a request for station maintenance according
to a Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
(DOCSIS), wherein the request comprises:
first data indicating an available computational
resource for the second computing device, or
second data indicating an available storage
capacity for the second computing device; and
responsive to determining, based on the first data or the
second data, that the second computing device is able to
perform one or more operations for a distributed computing
task associated with resource data, transmitting, to the second
computing device, a portion of the resource data to cause the
second computing device to perform, for the portion of the
resource data, the one or more operations.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Dale US 2004/0006771 A1 Jan. 8, 2004
Bitran US 2005/0022247 A1 Jan. 27, 2005
Krause US 2005/0190794 A1 Sept. 1, 2005
Guha US 2005/0243610 A1 Nov. 3, 2005
Kolze US 2010/0142553 A1 June 10, 2010
Messier US 2011/0041136 A1 Feb. 17, 2011

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–15 and 21–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–3.
Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite. Final Act. 3–4.
Claims 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 23 are rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Messier, Bitran, and Kolze. Final Act. 4–13.
Claims 5 and 13 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Messier, Bitran, Kolze, and Guha. Final Act. 13–14.
Claim 9 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Messier, Bitran, Kolze, and Krause. Final Act. 14–15.
Claim 12 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Messier, Bitran, Kolze, and Dale. Final Act. 15–16.
Claims 21, 22, 24, and 25 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Messier and Bitran. Final Act. 16–20.
OPINION
The Judicial Exception Rejection of Claims 1–15 and 21–25
Claims 1, 10, and 21 are the independent claims. The Examiner
determines the following:
As per claims 1-15, 21-25 they are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101
because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception
(i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea)
without significantly more. Claims 1-15, 21-25 are directed to
the abstract idea of obtaining and comparing intangible data.
Claim 1 is representative. Claim 1 is directed to receiving a
message from a device that comprises data indicating at least one
of an available computational resource, and then “responsive to
determining” that the device is able to perform an operation,
transmitting data to the device. Thus the claim obtains (receiving
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a message . . . indicating at least one of an available
computational resource) and compares (determining that [the
device] is able to perform one or more operations) intangible
data. The claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the remaining steps are all conventional pre-
solution data gathering steps (e.g. receiving information in a
message used to make the decision) and insignificant post-
solution conventional implementation (e.g. transmitting data to
the selected device). Claims 5 and 13 are the only dependent
claims with subject matter that may constitute significantly more,
but they fail to be significantly more because while they do
provide some semblance of a standard (determining RAM is
above a minimum for the task) they fail to nominate how the
minimum required is determined.
Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 18–27.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see
also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Are the claims patent-eligible?
Step 1
Claims 1, 10, and 21 recite a method, which falls within the “process”
category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we must determine whether the claim
recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a

3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If
both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under
the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
Step 2A, Prong One
Independent claim 1 recites the following steps:
[i] receiving, by a first computing device and from a
second computing device, a request for station maintenance
according to a Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
(DOCSIS), wherein the request comprises:
first data indicating an available computational
resource for the second computing device, or
second data indicating an available storage
capacity for the second computing device; and
responsive to [ii] determining, based on the first data or
the second data, that the second computing device is able to
perform one or more operations for a distributed computing
task associated with resource data, [iii] transmitting, to the
second computing device, a portion of the resource data to
cause the second computing device to perform, for the portion
of the resource data, the one or more operations.
Step [i] recites collecting data (“receiving . . . a request for station
maintenance”), which is an “observation.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. Thus, step [i] recites the abstract concept of “[m]ental
processes.” Id.
Step [ii] recites analyzing data (“determining, based on the first data
or the second data”), which is a combination of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, step
[ii] also recites the abstract concept of “[m]ental processes.” Id.
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Thus, the claim recites collecting and analyzing data. Such mental
processes, which could alternatively be performed by a human using pen and
paper, have been held by the courts to be abstract ideas.
The Federal Circuit has held that if a method can be performed by
human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is merely an
abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101. CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] method
that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and
is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has found
claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis” as directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the steps [i]–[ii] recited in
independent claim 1 all describe the abstract idea. The abstract idea, even
when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have
been done with pen and paper, remains an abstract idea. CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Thus, we determine claim 1 recites a judicial exception.
Claim 10 also recites collecting data (“receiving . . . a message”),
which is an “observation,” which is the abstract concept of “[m]ental
processes.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 10 also
recites analyzing data (“determining, based on the first data or the second
data”), which is a combination of “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion,” which is the abstract concept of “[m]ental processes.” 2019
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Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, we determine claim 10 also
recites a judicial exception.
Claim 21 also recites collecting data (“receiving . . . a message”),
which is an “observation,” which is the abstract concept of “[m]ental
processes.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 21 also
recites analyzing data (“determining, based on the first data or the second
data”), which is a combination of “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion,” which is the abstract concept of “[m]ental processes.” 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, we determine claim 21 also
recites a judicial exception.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Because claims 1, 10, and 21 recite a judicial exception, we next
determine if the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
In addition to the limitations of claim 1 discussed above that recite
abstract concepts, steps [i]–[ii] of claim 1 further recite “a first computing
device” and “a second computing device.”
The Specification does not provide additional details that would
distinguish the additional limitations from a generic implementation of the
abstract idea. See Spec. ¶ 31 (describing system architecture 400 including
various devices operating as resource brokers and resource kernels).
We do not find the recited computer-related limitations are sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Specifically,
there is no improvement to the functioning of the computer, but, instead, the
computer merely implements the abstract idea. In this case, we do not see
any particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; nor do
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we see any transformation. That is, we do not see any of the additionally
recited elements applying or using the judicial exception in any meaningful
way beyond generally linking the judicial exception to the recited elements.
Put another way, the claim recites collecting and analyzing data—
mental processes. The additional recited claim elements merely implement
these mental processes, and the Specification does not provide additional
details that would distinguish the implementation from a generic
implementation. See Spec. ¶ 31.
Claim 1’s final step [iii] of “transmitting, to the second computing
device, a portion of the resource data to cause the second computing device
to perform, for the portion of the resource data, the one or more operations”
also does not add any meaningful limitations to the abstract idea because it
merely is directed to the insignificant post-solution activity of transmitting
data. See MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Thus, we determine claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception because
claim 1 does not recite additional elements that integrate the recited judicial
exception into a practical application.
Claim 10 recites similar additional limitations as claim 1 (“a first
computing device,” “a second computing device,” “transmitting . . . a
portion of the resource data”). These additional elements do not integrate the
recited judicial exception into a practical application. Claim 10 further
recites an initial preliminary step of “transmitting . . . a ranging response that
comprises an indication that the ranging response is a request for data
associated with a capability of the second computing device to perform a
distributed computing task associated with resource data.” This additional
step also does not add any meaningful limitations to the abstract idea
because it merely is directed to the insignificant pre-solution activity of
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transmitting data. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Thus, we determine claim 10 is
directed to a judicial exception because claim 10 does not recite additional
elements that integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application.
Claim 21 recites similar additional limitations as claim 1 (“a first
computing device,” “a second computing device,” “transmitting . . . a second
portion of a content item”). These additional elements do not integrate the
recited judicial exception into a practical application. Claim 21 further
recites additional extra-solution and post-solution steps of
performing, by the first computing device, for a first
portion of a content item, the one or more operations; and
after the second computing device performs, for the
second portion of the content item, the one or more operations,
receiving, by the first computing device and from the second
computing device, data resulting from the second computing
device performing, for the second portion of the content item,
the one or more operations.
These additional steps also do not add any meaningful limitations to the
abstract idea because they merely are directed to the insignificant extra-
solution activity of performing operations (“performing . . . the one or more
operations”) and the insignificant post-solution activity of receiving data
(“receiving . . . data”). See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Thus, we determine claim
21 is directed to a judicial exception because claim 21 does not recite
additional elements that integrate the recited judicial exception into a
practical application.
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Is there something else in the claims that ensures that they are
directed to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept?
Step 2B
Because claims 1, 10, and 21 are directed to a judicial exception, we
must determine, according to Alice, whether these claims recite an element,
or combination of elements that is enough to ensure that the claim is directed
to significantly more than a judicial exception.
Regarding the “first computing device” and the “second computing
device,” the conventional or generalized functional terms by which the
computer components are described reasonably indicate that Appellant’s
Specification discloses conventional components. See Spec. ¶ 31. Further,
the Specification does not provide additional details about the computer that
would distinguish the recited components from generic implementation
individually and generic implementation in the combination. See Spec. ¶ 31.
In view of Appellant’s Specification, the claimed computer
components are reasonably determined to be generic, purely conventional
computer elements. Thus, the claims do no more than require generic
computer elements to perform generic computer functions, rather than
improve computer capabilities.
Regarding the “transmitting,” “receiving,” and “performing”
(processing) steps variously recited in claims 1, 10, and 21, our reviewing
court has recognized that receiving, processing, and storing data as well as
receiving or transmitting data over a network are well-understood, routine,
and conventional activities. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs.
Inc., 811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components, such as
an “interface,” “network,” and “database,” fail to satisfy the inventive
concept requirement); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607
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(Fed. Cir. 2016); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d 1350. There is no indication that the
recited elements override the conventional use of known features or involve
an unconventional arrangement or combination of elements such that the
particular combination of generic technology results in anything beyond
well-understood, routine, and conventional data gathering and output. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”); Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d
1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he invocation of ‘already-available
computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance . . .
amounts to a recitation of what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.’” (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018))); buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Accordingly, we determine that claims 1, 10, and 21 are not directed
to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept. We also determine that
claims 2–9, 11–15, and 22–25 are not directed to significantly more than a
patent ineligible concept
Appellant’s Arguments
Claim 1
Appellant presents the following principal argument: “[The claimed]
features are a particular way to cause performance of one or more operations
for a distributed computing task. See, e.g., specification, paragraph [03]. In
particular, the features relate to the non-conventional use of ‘a request for
station maintenance according to a Data Over Cable Service Interface
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Specification (DOCSIS).’” Appeal Br. 31; see also Appeal Br. 34 (citing
Spec. ¶ 3) (“[R]eceiving ‘a request for station maintenance according to a
Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS)’ is directly
related to one of the problems being solved (e.g., finding a particular way to,
based on information received at lower levels of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model, cause performance of distributed computing
tasks).”), Reply Br. 7–8 (“[C]laim 1 is not directed to a mathematical
concept, is not organizing human activity, and is not a mental process.”).
Appellant’s arguments do not show Examiner error because, above,
we apply the 2019 Revised Guidance and determine that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Specifically, we
determine that the overall process provided by the claims describes a
combination of “observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, the overall process provided by the
claims recites mental processes that are recognized as abstract ideas. Id.
Further, for the reasons discussed above, we determine that the claims are
directed to these mental processes without significantly more. Appellant’s
identified improvements are improvements to the abstract idea because, for
example, data is collected (“receiving . . . a request for station
maintenance”), and data is analyzed (“determining, based on the first data or
the second data”), which are a combination of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion.” Id. Thus, the identified improvements recite the abstract
concept of “[m]ental processes.” Id. In reaching our conclusion, we
recognize Appellant’s utilization of lower levels of the OSI model. See Spec.
¶ 3. However, the OSI model itself is composed of abstraction layers, and
we do not see any particular improvements to technology. Therefore, on the
record before us, the claim limitations do not improve the functionality of
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the various hardware components, nor do they achieve an improved
technological result in conventional industry practice. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Claim 8
Appellant presents the following principal argument: “[T]he features
of claim 8 improve the computer-related technology of transcoding by
causing performance of one or more operations for a distributed computing
task.” Appeal Br. 38.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, we determine claim 8 recites
additional details of the abstract idea and additional insignificant extra-
solution activity for similar reasons discussed above when addressing claim
1. Put another way, applying distributed computing to transcoding does not
provide an improvement to the technology of transcoding. We agree with the
Examiner that Appellant’s invention does not improve the computer. See
Ans. 23–24.
Claim 9
Appellant presents the following principal argument: “[T]he features
of claim 9 improve the computer-related technology of ‘ingesting the video
data into a video-on-demand service,’ as recited in claim 9.” Appeal Br. 39.
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, we determine claim 9 recites
additional details of the abstract idea and additional insignificant extra-
solution activity for similar reasons discussed above when addressing claim
8. Put another way, applying distributed computing to transcoding does not
provide an improvement to the technology of transcoding. We agree with the
Examiner that Appellant’s invention does not improve the functioning of the
computer. See Ans. 24–25.
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Claim 10
Appellant presents arguments similar to those presented for claim 1.
See Appeal Br. 39–41.
Appellant’s arguments do not show Examiner error because, above,
we apply the 2019 Revised Guidance and determine that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. See Ans. 25.
Claim 14
Appellant presents arguments similar to those presented for claim 8.
See Appeal Br. 41–42.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, we determine claim 14 recites
additional details of the abstract idea and additional insignificant extra-
solution activity for similar reasons discussed above when addressing claim
8. See Ans. 25.
Claim 21
Appellant presents arguments similar to those presented for claim 1.
See Appeal Br. 42–44.
Appellant’s arguments do not show Examiner error because, above,
we apply the 2019 Revised Guidance and determine that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. See Ans. 25.
Claim 25
Appellant presents arguments similar to those presented for claim 8.
See Appeal Br. 44–45.
Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, we determine claim 25 recites
additional details of the abstract idea and additional insignificant extra-
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solution activity for similar reasons discussed above when addressing claim
8. See Ans. 25.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 and
21–25.

The Indefiniteness Rejection of Claims 5 and 13
The Examiner concludes claims 5 and 13 are indefinite because “[t]he
terms ‘minimum amount of RAM required[’] and ‘minimum amount of
processor cycles required’ in Claims 5 and 13 are vague because they fail to
provide a standard for determining the minimum requirement.” Final Act. 4.
Appellant argues one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood how to determine the recited minimums. See Appeal Br. 45–49;
see also Reply Br. 8–9.
In response, the Examiner explains one of ordinary skill in the art
would not have understood how to determine the recited minimums for the
full scope of the claim, and “required” is a relative standard. See Ans. 27–30.
We do not see any error in the Examiner’s conclusion of
indefiniteness.
We agree with the Examiner that “required” may mean different
things to different artisans. We do not see a standard for determining the
minimum requirement and Appellant has not directed us to one in the
Specification.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and 13.

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The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 23 over
Messier, Bitran, and Kolze
Claim 1
The Examiner finds Messier, Bitran, and Kolze teach all limitations of
claim 1. Final Act. 4–6; see also Ans. 3–9. In particular, the Examiner finds
Messier teaches all limitations of claim 1 except for “a request for station
maintenance according to a Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
(DOCSIS)” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner finds
Bitran teaches “a message according to a Data Over Cable Service Interface
Specification (DOCSIS).” Final Act. 6 (citing Bitran ¶ 12). The Examiner
reasons
[i]t would have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill at the
time of Applicant’s invention to combine the method of Messier
with the DOCSIS standard in order to increase interoperability
by conforming to a standard. Further[,] it would [have been]
obvious because applying a known technique for predictable
results is obvious.
Final Act. 6 (citing MPEP § 2143). The Examiner finds Kolze teaches “a
request for performing station maintenance.” Final Act. 6 (citing Kolze ¶¶ 9,
10; Messier ¶ 23). The Examiner reasons
[i]t would have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill at the
time of Applicant’s invention to combine the method of modified
Messier with the station maintenance method in order to control
upstream bandwidth and further because it [would have been a]
simple combination . . . for predictable results and further
because it [would have been] applying a known messaging
technique for predictable results.
Final Act. 6 (citing MPEP § 2143, Kolze ¶ 10).
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Appellant presents the following principal argument: There is no
motivation to combine the references. See Appeal Br. 9–16; see also Appeal
Br. 12 (“Bitran and Kolze fail to close that non-obvious gap because both
fail to provide any motivation for using a request for station maintenance for
a purpose that is unrelated to station maintenance.”), 14 (“Based on the
manner in which Messier obtains the information and based on the manner
in which Kolze distinguishes between the ranging request message and
normal data traffic, one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to
combine Messier, Kolze and Bitran.”), Reply Br. 2–5.
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary
skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its
patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used
to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. Ag Pro, Inc.,
425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson’s-Black Rock[, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are illustrative—a
court must ask whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Appellant’s arguments do not show Examiner error for the following
reasons:
Messier discloses distributed computing. See Messier Title. Messier
further discloses “the base node 104 may be configured to determine the
available nodes by broadcasting a signal to the plurality of nodes in a
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determined range.” Messier ¶ 23. Messier further discloses “the signal may
include queries related to details of the plurality of nodes, such as,
processing capability, status, distance, network throughput, range, and the
like.” Messier further discloses “availability of one or more nodes in the
plurality of nodes may be determined by the base node 104 based upon
responses to the broadcast signal received from the plurality of nodes.”
Messier ¶ 23. Messier further discloses information for determining
available nodes may include “storage capacity.” Messier ¶ 23. Thus, when
these disclosures in Messier are considered together, Messier discloses a
messages comprising “first data indicating an available computational
resource for the second computing device, or second data indicating an
available storage capacity for the second computing device” as recited in
claim 1. See Messier ¶ 23.
Bitran discloses “two-way transmission of digital data according to
the DOCSIS (Digital Over Cable Interface Specification) standard.” Bitran
¶ 12. Thus, Bitran discloses a message “according to a Data Over Cable
Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS)” as recited in claim 1. See Bitran
¶ 12.
The DOCSIS standard of Bitran is readily-applicable to Messier’s
messages because Messier discloses broadcasting a signal and receiving
responses—two-way data transmissions—and Bitran discloses a standard for
two-way data transmission. See Messier ¶ 23, Bitran ¶ 12. In short, using
Bitran’s transmissions according to DOCSIS in Messier’s messages would
have been a predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417;
see also Final Act. 6.
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Kolze discloses a “Registration Request” and a “Registration
Response.” Kolze ¶ 9. Kolze further discloses “request[ing] upstream
bandwidth.” Kolze ¶ 10. Thus, Kolze discloses “a request for station
maintenance” as recited in claim 1. See Kolze ¶¶ 9–10.
We determine it would have been obvious to further modify Messier,
in light of Kolze’s teaching of a request for station maintenance, such that
the details of a node used to determine the node’s availability for distributed
processing are sent as part of a request for station maintenance. See Messier
¶ 23, Kolze ¶¶ 9–10. The request for station maintenance of Kolze is readily-
applicable to Messier’s messages because Messier discloses sending the
details of a node that are used to determine the node’s availability for
distributed processing, and Kolze discloses sending a request for station
maintenance. See Messier ¶ 23, Kolze ¶¶ 9–10. In short, sending the
information together would have been a predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR,
550 U.S. at 417; see also Final Act. 6.
Because Appellant has not demonstrated that the Examiner’s
proffered combination would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult
for one of ordinary skill in the art,” we agree with the Examiner that the
proposed modification would have been within the purview of the ordinarily
skilled artisan. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d
1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
We appreciate Appellant’s argument that Messier’s information
would be transmitted as part of normal traffic, and not as part of Kolze’s
request for station maintenance. However, for reasons explained above, we
determine a skilled artisan would not have been so limited in their
consideration of Kolze.
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We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Claim 3
Claim 3 further recites “the request comprises a ranging request
conforming to the DOCSIS standard, and wherein the ranging request
comprises the first data or the second data.”
In rejecting claim 3, the Examiner finds Kolze teaches a ranging
request, and Messier teaches the first data or the second data. Final Act. 7
(citing Kolze ¶ 18, Messier ¶ 23, MPEP § 2143); see also Ans. 9–10.
Kolze discloses “[a] ranging request is transmitted by a CM at
initialization and on request from the CMTS to determine network delay and
request power adjustment.” Kolze ¶ 18.
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
“[B]y occurring after the devices are connected to the network 122,
the information of Messier is akin to the normal data traffic of Kolze. Kolze
distinguishes the ranging request message from the normal data traffic.”
Appeal Br. 17; see also Appeal Br. 19. “The Examiner, additionally, has
failed to provide an articulated reason with a rational underpinning as to why
one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Messier and
Kolze.” Appeal Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 5–7.
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Kolze teaches “the request comprises a ranging request conforming to
the DOCSIS standard” as recited in claim 3. See Kolze ¶ 18. Messier teaches
“the first data or the second data” as recited in claim 3. See Messier ¶ 23.
We determine it would have been obvious to further modify Messier,
in light of Kolze’s teaching of a ranging request, such that the ranging
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request includes the first data or the second data as recited in claim 3. See
Kolze ¶ 18, Messier ¶ 23. The ranging request of Kolze is readily-applicable
to Messier’s messages because Messier discloses sending the details of a
node that are used to determine the node’s availability for distributed
processing, and Kolze discloses sending a ranging request. See Messier ¶ 23,
Kolze ¶ 18. In short, sending the information together would have been a
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; see also
Final Act. 7.
We appreciate Appellant’s arguments but for reasons explained
above, we determine a skilled artisan would not have been so limited in their
consideration of Kolze.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3.
Claim 8
The Examiner finds Messier and Bitran teach the further recited
limitations in claim 8. Final Act. 9 (citing Messier ¶¶ 23, 25, 28, 29, Fig. 4;
Bitran ¶¶ 32, 37; MPEP § 2143); see also Ans. 10–13.
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
i. “Neither Messier nor Bitran contemplate performing
transcoding by a distributed computing system.” Appeal Br. 20.
ii. “Because the alleged transcoding is required to be able to
transmit downstream to the set-top box of Bitran, one of ordinary skill would
not have concluded that the alleged transcoding of Bitran could be
performed by the set-top box.” Appeal Br. 21.
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
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Regarding Appellant’s argument (i), applying the known technique of
distributed processing to improve the known operation of transcoding would
have been a predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417;
see also Final Act. 9.
Regarding Appellant’s argument (ii), this argument does not show
Examiner error because “[d]istributing the transcoding would not mean that
that resultant transcoded data could not be transmitted downstream, or that
the system would not work.” Ans. 13.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8.
Claim 10
Claim 10 recites similar limitations as claim 1. In addition, claim 10
recites the following initial step:
transmitting, by a first computing device and to a second
computing device, a ranging response that comprises an
indication that the ranging response is a request for data
associated with a capability of the second computing device to
perform a distributed computing task associated with resource
data.
The Examiner finds Messier and Kolze teach this initial step. Final
Act. 9–10 (citing Messier ¶ 23, MPEP § 2143), 11 (citing Messier ¶ 23;
Kolze ¶¶ 10, 18; MPEP § 2143); see also Ans. 13–14.
Appellant presents similar arguments as presented with respect to
claim 1. See Appeal Br. 22. These arguments are not persuasive for the
reasons discussed above when addressing claim 1.
Appellant further argues the following: “[B]y occurring after the
devices are connected to the network 122, the signaling of Messier is akin to
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the normal data traffic of Kolze. Kolze distinguishes the ranging response
from the normal data traffic.” Appeal Br. 23. “It is non-obvious for a ranging
response to comprise ‘an indication that the ranging response is a request for
data associated with a capability of the second computing device to perform
a distributed computing task associated with resource data,’ as recited in
claim 10.” Appeal Br. 23–24.
These further arguments also are not persuasive of any Examiner
error.
Kolze discloses “[a] ranging request is transmitted by a CM at
initialization and on request from the CMTS to determine network delay and
request power adjustment. The CMTS responds to the ranging request.”
Kolze ¶ 18. Thus, Kolze teaches “transmitting, by a first computing device
and to a second computing device, a ranging response” as recited in claim
10. See Kolze ¶ 18.
Messier discloses “availability of one or more nodes in the plurality of
nodes may be determined by the base node 104 based upon responses to the
broadcast signal.” Messier ¶ 23. Thus, Messier teaches “a request for data
associated with a capability of the second computing device to perform a
distributed computing task associated with resource data” as recited in claim
10. See Messier ¶ 23.
We determine it would have been obvious to further modify Messier,
in light of Kolze’s teaching of a ranging response, such that the ranging
response includes an indication that the ranging response is a request for
data associated with a capability of the second computing device to perform
a distributed computing task associated with resource data as recited in claim
10. See Kolze ¶ 18, Messier ¶ 23. The ranging response of Kolze is readily-
applicable to Messier’s messages because Messier discloses sending a
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broadcast signal where the responses of the broadcast signal are used to
determine availability of one or more nodes, and Kolze discloses sending a
ranging response. See Messier ¶ 23, Kolze ¶ 18. In short, sending the
information together would have been a predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR,
550 U.S. at 417; see also Final Act. 9–11.
We appreciate Appellant’s arguments but for reasons explained
above, we determine a skilled artisan would not have been so limited in their
consideration of Kolze.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10.
Claim 14
Appellant presents similar arguments as presented with respect to
claim 8. See Appeal Br. 24. These arguments are not persuasive for the
reasons discussed above when addressing claim 8.
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14.
The Remaining Claims
Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 2, 4, 6, 7,
11, 15, and 23. See Appeal Br. 9–24; see also Reply Br. 2–7.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 4, 6, 7,
11, 15, and 23.

The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 5 and 13 over Messier, Bitran, Kolze,
and Guha
Appellant does not present arguments for this ground of rejection. See
Appeal Br. 9–49; see also Reply Br. 2–9.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and 13.
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The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 9 over Messier, Bitran, Kolze, and
Krause
Claim 9 further recites
wherein the resource data comprises video data, wherein the
transcoding task is performed as part of a process for ingesting
the video data into a video-on-demand service, and wherein the
second computing device is able to access the video data via the
video-on-demand service after the ingesting.
In making the rejection, the Examiner finds Messier, Bitran, and
Kolze teach most of the limitations. Final Act. 15 (citing Bitran ¶¶ 5, 30,
35); see also Ans. 14–15. The Examiner finds Krause teaches video-on-
demand. Final Act. 15 (citing Krause ¶ 61). The Examiner reasons
[i]t would have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill at the
time of Applicant’s invention to combine the method of modified
Messier with the video on demand in order to leverage
processing power of distributed computing for delivering video
on demand. It would also [have been] obvious to apply a known
technique to an element for predictable results.
Final Act. 15 (citing MPEP § 2143).
Appellant presents the following principal argument: “Neither
Messier, Bitran, nor Krause contemplate causing one or more operations for
a transcoding task to be performed by ‘[a] second computing device [that] is
able to access the video data via the video-on-demand service after the
ingesting.’” Appeal Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 6–7 (“[T]he second
computing device, which will later be able to access the video data, is also
performing a part of the transcoding task.”). “By failing to provide any
evidence in support of the conclusion that ‘distributed computing [could be
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used] for delivering video on demand,’ the Examiner is relying upon
impermissible hindsight.” Appeal Br. 26.
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Bitran discloses video data and its consumption. See Bitran ¶¶ 5, 30,
35. Thus, Bitran teaches “wherein the resource data comprises video data” as
recited in claim 9. Krause discloses video-on-demand. Krause ¶ 61. When
combined with the other references, Krause teaches “wherein the
transcoding task is performed as part of a process for ingesting the video
data into a video-on-demand service, and wherein the second computing
device is able to access the video data via the video-on-demand service after
the ingesting” as recited in claim 9.
The Examiner has provided a reason to combine the teachings of the
various references that is rational on its face and supported by evidence from
the record. See Final Act. 15 (“leverage processing power of distributed
computing for delivering video on demand”); see also Messier Abstract
(describing distributed computing).
Further, applying the known technique of distributed processing to
improve the known operation of transcoding for video-on-demand would
have been a predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417;
see also Final Act. 15.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9.

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The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 12 over Messier, Bitran, Kolze, and
Dale
Appellant does not present arguments for this ground of rejection. See
Appeal Br. 9–49; see also Reply Br. 2–9.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12.

The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 21, 22, 24, and 25 over Messier and
Bitran
Claim 21
The Examiner finds Messier and Bitran teach all limitations of claim
21. Final Act. 17–18. In particular, the Examiner finds Messier teaches
“performing, by the first computing device, for a first portion of a content
item, the one or more operations” as recited by claim 21. Final Act. 18
(citing Messier ¶ 22).
Appellant argues: “[T]he combination of Messier and Bitran fail to
teach or suggest ‘performing, by the first computing device, for a first
portion of a content item, the one or more operations,’ as recited in claim
21.” Appeal Br. 28. “Messier does not describe an embodiment where the
base node is operating as a non-peer node and is part of the available nodes.”
Appeal Br. 29 (citing Messier
¶¶ 17, 22–23). “[T]he base node of Messier, when combined with Bitran to
be compatible with DOCSIS (a Data Over Cable Service Interface
Specification), would necessarily lose the mobile capacity of a peer node.”
Appeal Br. 29.
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In response, the Examiner explains that the base node assigning itself
a task does not require the base node to be a peer node. See Ans. 16 (citing
Messier ¶¶ 21, 22).
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Messier discloses “the base node may be a peer device.” Messier ¶ 21.
Messier further discloses “the base node may include a non-peer device.”
Messier ¶ 21. Thus, Messier discloses that the base node, which corresponds
to the recited “first computing device,” may be a peer or non-peer device.
See Messier ¶ 21.
Messier further discloses “[i]n one embodiment, the available nodes
may also include the base node, such as the base node (peer device) 104.”
Messier ¶ 22 (emphasis added). Messier’s use of “such as” suggests that
there are other alternatives for an available base node, specifically, this
language suggests that a non-peer device base node may be available.
Thus, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, Messier suggests an
embodiment where the base node is operating as a non-peer node and is part
of the available nodes. When these teachings are combined with the
teachings of Bitran relating to DOCSIS, the cited prior art teaches the argued
limitation of claim 21.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.
Claim 25
The Examiner finds Messier and Bitran teach all limitations of claim
25. Final Act. 19–20. In particular, the Examiner finds Messier teaches
distributed computing aspects of claim 25. See Final Act. 19–20 (citing
Messier ¶¶ 23, 25, 28, 29, Fig. 4). In particular, the Examiner finds Bitran
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teaches the transcoding aspects of claim 25. See Final Act. 20 (¶¶ 32, 37).
The Examiner reasons
[i]t would [have been] obvious to apply the technique of
transcoding to the system of Messier because it is [a] simple
substitution of one known command for another for predictable
results . . . and because it is [an] application of a known technique
to improve a system and for predictable results.
Final Act. 20 (citing Messier ¶ 3, MPEP § 2143) (emphasis omitted).
Appellant presents arguments similar to those presented with respect
to claim 8. See Appeal Br. 30.
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness.
Applying the known technique of distributed processing to improve
the known operation of transcoding would have been a predictable use of
prior art elements according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; see also Final Act. 20.
Further, “[d]istributing the transcoding would not mean that that
resultant transcoded data could not be transmitted downstream, or that the
system would not work.” Ans. 13; see also Ans. 18.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.
The Remaining Claims
Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 22 and 24.
See Appeal Br. 27–30; see also Reply Br. 2–7.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 22 and 24.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 21–25 is affirmed.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15, 21–25 101 Eligibility 1–15, 21–25
5, 13 112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 5, 13
1–4, 6–8,
10, 11, 14,
15, 23
103(a) Messier, Bitran,
Kolze
1–4, 6–8,
10, 11, 14,
15, 23

5, 13 103(a) Messier, Bitran,
Kolze, Guha
5, 13
9 103(a) Messier, Bitran,
Kolze, Krause
9
12 103(a) Messier, Bitran,
Kolze, Dale
12
21, 22, 24,
25
103(a) Messier, Bitran 21, 22, 24,
25

Overall
Outcome
1–15, 21–25

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2017).
AFFIRMED