Comau, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Dec 21, 2010

07-CA-052614 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 21, 2010)

JD–66–10
Southfield, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
COMAU, INC.
and Cases 7–CA–52614
7–CA–52939
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WORKERS LOCAL 1123,
affiliated with CARPENTERS INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL,
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA
and
COMAU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CEA) – Party in Interest
and
COMAU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CEA)
and Case 7–CB–16912
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS WORKERS LOCAL 1123,
affiliated with CARPENTERS INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL,
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND
JOINERS OF AMERICA
Sarah Pring Karpinen and Darlene Haas Awada, Esqs.
for the Acting General Counsel.
Thomas G. Kienbaum and Theodore R. Opperwall, Esqs.
of Birmingham, Michigan, for the Respondent Employer (Comau).
M. Catherine Farrell and David J. Franks, Esqs.,
of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for the Respondent Union (CEA).
Edward J. Pasternak, Esq., of Southfield, Michigan,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
GEOFFREY CARTER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Detroit,
Michigan, from August 31 - September 3, 2010, and from September 16–17, 2010. The charge
in Case 7–CA–52614 was filed on December 29, 2009, and was amended on January 8, 2010.
The charge in Case 7–CA–52939 was filed on May 20, 2010, and was amended on July 8,
2010, and further amended on July 23, 2010. The charge in Case 7–CB–16912 was filed on
May 20, 2010, and was amended on June 9, 2010, and further amended on July 8, 2010. The
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consolidated amended complaint was issued on July 30, 2010, and alleges that Comau, Inc.
(Comau or Respondent Employer (RE)) violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the Act by:
failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Automated Systems
Workers Local 1123 (ASW, ASW/MRCC1 or Charging Party); dominating and interfering with
the administration of, and rendering unlawful assistance to, a labor organization; discriminating
against employees and thus encouraging membership in a labor organization; and interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act. The consolidated amended complaint also alleges that the Comau Employees
Association (CEA or Respondent Union (RU)) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the Act
by: restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act; and attempting to cause Comau to discriminate against its employees such that Comau
would violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Both Comau and the CEA filed timely answers denying the alleged violations in the
consolidated amended complaint.
This case follows on the heels of Case 7–CA–52106, decided by Administrative Law
Judge Paul Bogas on May 20, 2010 and adopted by the Board on November 5, 2010. See
Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 21 (2010). During trial, I took judicial notice of the legal and factual
findings in Judge Bogas’ decision, and advised the parties that they could make any relevant
arguments about those findings (including the weight that the findings should carry). Those
findings became binding authority when the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rulings, findings and
conclusions, and adopted his remedy and recommended order (with minor modifications to
each that are not relevant to my analysis).
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs3 filed by the Acting General Counsel, Respondent Employer and

1 The ASW/MRCC abbreviation is used for all time periods during which the ASW was
affiliated with the MRCC.
2 The trial transcript is generally accurate, but I make the following corrections to clarify the
record: (a) at Tr. 203–845, all references to “Harry Hale” should read “Harry Yale”; (b) at Tr.
484, line 23, “away” should be “weight”; (c) at Tr. 601, line 1, “Carey” should be “Harry”; (d) at
Tr. 643, line 3, “not” should be “reflect”; (e) at Tr. 797, line 19, “Kim Kayka” should be “Jim
Kayko.” In addition, at various points in the transcript, the record did not record (or mis-labeled)
the charging party’s attorney’s (Ed Pasternak) responses to my inquiries about objections to
exhibits. The record should reflect that I admitted the following two exhibits into evidence over
the charging party’s objection: RE Exhs. 12, 15. Finally, I note that while the exhibit files
generally are correct, I excluded Acting GC Exhs. 22 and 25–30 from the record (those exhibits
were erroneously placed in the admitted exhibits file).
3 I have also considered the posttrial motions filed by the parties. The Acting General
Counsel filed a motion to substitute the table of contents and table of authorities in its post trial
brief. Given the fact that the Acting General Counsel only seeks to make clerical corrections to
its brief, and given that no other party has opposed the motion, I will grant the Acting General
Counsel’s request and will include the revised table of contents and table of authorities in the
post-trial materials that will be forwarded to the Board if any exceptions are filed.
On October 8, 2010, Comau filed a motion to supplement the record with the transcript
and exhibits from an October 5, 2010 deposition of David Baloga in connection with a 10(j)
petition that is currently pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. The proffered records included cover sheets from the ASW/MRCC’s meetings in
2008 (showing the number of members who attended each meeting), and Mr. David Baloga’s
Continued
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Respondent Union, I make the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent Employer Comau operates plants in the Detroit, Michigan area to design,
build, sell, and install automated industrial systems. In 2009, Respondent Employer derived
gross revenue in excess of $1 million, and sold goods and provided services valued in excess of
$50,000 from its Michigan facilities directly to customers located outside of Michigan.
Respondent Employer admits, and I find, that at all material times it has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent
Union admits, and I find, that at all material times it has been a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I also find that, at all material times, the Charging Party has
been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.4
_________________________
post–trial deposition testimony about those documents. The Acting General Counsel opposed
Comau’s motion, and I denied Comau’s motion to supplement the record in an order dated
October 14, 2010.
In its posttrial brief, Comau (in part) asked me to reconsider my ruling on its motion to
supplement the record. See RE Br. at 15. The Acting General Counsel, meanwhile, filed a
motion to strike section C of Comau’s post–trial brief on the theory that Comau argued evidence
that is outside of the record. Given these filings, I have reviewed my decision to deny Comau’s
motion to supplement the record, and I stand by my decision to deny Comau’s motion to
supplement. Comau made a strategic decision during trial not to introduce the ASW/MRCC
2008 meeting attendance figures into evidence, and it cannot now introduce a new issue at trial
that it could have litigated in the original hearing. See RE Br. at 14; compare Winkle Bus Co.,
347 NLRB 1203, 1211 fn. 4 (2006) (ALJ permitted the General Counsel to supplement the
record with an exhibit that, by prior agreement, the Respondent did not provide until after trial,
and that corrected an error in another exhibit already admitted into the record). More important,
however, the issue is moot. As noted below, I have determined that although meeting
attendance figures may be relevant as a general matter to showing a causal link between an
unfair labor practice and a subsequent loss of union support (see Master Slack Corp., 271
NLRB 78, 84 (1984), the limited ASW/MRCC meeting attendance figures that were admitted
into evidence in this case are not sufficiently reliable for me to draw any meaningful conclusions
about whether the various attendance fluctuations resulted from Comau’s unfair labor practice.
See infra, fn 15.
Finally, I have decided to grant in part and deny in part the Acting General Counsel’s
motion to strike section C of Comau’s post–trial brief. Baloga’s posttrial affidavit has not been
admitted into the record, and thus I will strike the portions of Comau’s brief that refer to the
affidavit’s contents. See RE Br. at 15. Similarly, I will strike the portions of Comau’s brief that
characterize the contents of RE Exh. 11, because the contents of that rejected exhibit were
never placed on the record. See RE Br. at 14. The Acting General Counsel’s motion to strike is
denied as to the remaining portions of Section C of Comau’s brief, because the remaining
portions of Section C are arguments that Comau made in anticipation of a contrary argument
that the Acting General Counsel might make in its own post-trial brief.
4 Both Comau and the CEA admit that from 2001 to March 2007, the ASW (formerly known
as the PICO Employees Association) was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
Testimony presented at trial demonstrated (without dispute) that the ASW continued its status
as a labor organization from March 2007 to the present. (Tr. pp. 103–104, 367) On March 1,
2010, the ASW changed its affiliation from the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters
Continued
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II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
The Facts
A. Comau’s Organizational Structure
Comau, Inc. designs and builds automated equipment (tooling systems, robotic
applications, etc.) for a variety of customers, including Chrysler, General Motors, Ford Motor
Company. Comau’s headquarters are located in Southfield, Michigan, and additional facilities
are located in Novi, Michigan. Tr. 102, 573–576.
At each facility, Comau generally has departments that are led by supervisors. Each
department is separated into work centers (or teams), each of which has an assigned “leader”
who (among other qualifications) is able to provide team and individual leadership for the other
employees in the work center, and is highly skilled and experienced in the work that employees
carry out in the work center.5 Tr. 580, 594–595, 599; GC Exh. at 45–52. There are
approximately 30 leaders in the bargaining unit, each of whom receives a slightly higher wage
(approximately one additional dollar per hour) for performing the leader position.6 Tr. 592–593.
Several leaders have simultaneously served as union officers. Tr. 123–126, 384–385, 1044–
1045.
When projects come to Comau, the design group outlines the project as a whole, and
then managers assign the work needed to complete that project to one or more of the work
centers. Tr. 590–591. As the project proceeds, leaders receive instructions through an
automated computer system, and then communicate those instructions to the individual workers
on their teams. Tr. 600–601.
Leaders perform a variety of functions in connection with their role as the intermediaries
between the employees in their work centers and management. When they first receive work
assignments and the corresponding blueprints, leaders may request specific employees to be
assigned to their teams. Tr. 601, 604, 1005. Leaders also attend a project kickoff meeting with
a representative from management and the project manager. Tr. 609, 873, 1005. Once the
leader’s team is assembled, the leader assigns specific tasks to individual employees. Tr. 266–
267, 606, 682, 874, 1140–1141. As the team members carry out their assignments, the leader
facilitates the overall project by consulting with the designers as needed, and providing
instructions to the team members about new assignments, work revisions and corrections, or
about how specific tasks should be performed. Tr. 165, 189, 216–217, 270–272, 340–341,
437–438, 445–446, 606, 1008. Leaders also stay in contact with management by attending
weekly leader meetings and periodic manpower meetings, and by providing verbal updates. Tr.
_________________________
(MRCC) to the Carpenters Industrial Council (CIC). Notwithstanding this change, the ASW
continued its affiliation with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, and retained its same
officers. Tr. 104.
5 Many of the shop floor employees also have several years of experience, though they
have not taken on the role of leader. Tr. 602.
6 Before March 2001, leaders were identified as supervisors in the collective-bargaining
agreement. Tr. 969. That changed in March 2001 (at the Union’s request), when the new
collective-bargaining agreement was modified to describe leaders as employees who take on
the responsibility of individual and team leadership in particular areas. Tr. 969–970;
Respondent Union (RU) Exh. 9 at 43–47.
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256, 424–425, 440–441, 608, 610–611.7
Leaders also serve as the beginning and end points for communication between
employees on the shop floor and management. Leaders generally initiate nonconformance
reports to advise management (via a computer database) about problems or defects in work
product that require additional time or money to repair. Tr. 697–700. When management
decides to authorize overtime for a project, leaders may recommend employees to perform the
overtime work, and leaders notify the individual employees who have been selected to work the
overtime hours. Tr. 167, 275–277, 443, 612–613, 689–690; GC Exh. 5. Similarly, employees
wishing to take a day off must first obtain their leader’s approval (and signature on an “absentee
report” form) before the paperwork is forwarded to the shop foreman (or another supervisor) for
final signature and approval. Tr. 272–273, 615, 618–619; Respondent Employer (“RE”) Exh.
14. In some instances, employee leave requests have been approved without obtaining the
supervisor’s signature, leaving the leader as the only individual to sign the request. Tr. 620–
621; GC. Exhs. 40 (Grayson); 41 (Sobeck); and 42 (Constantine).8
B. Union History at Comau
For a number of years (dating back to at least the 1980s), the PICO Employees
Association (PEA) served as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for all full-time
and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors and field service
employees (hereafter, the bargaining unit) at Comau (and at Comau’s predecessor, Progressive
Tool and Industries Co. (PICO)).9 Tr. 102–103, 236, 861. The PEA was not affiliated with a
larger union – instead, it was solely composed of Comau employees. In 2004, the PEA
changed its name to the ASW, but otherwise maintained its leadership, bylaws and overall
structure. Tr. 140, 757, 862.
In 2007, the ASW began exploring the possibility of affiliating with a larger union. After
gauging the interest of various larger unions in such an affiliation, the ASW decided to affiliate
with the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and

7 To carry out these responsibilities, leaders are provided some equipment that is not
generally provided to other employees on the shop floor. Specifically, leaders have desks on
the shop floor, telephones, and have computers with password access requirements. Tr. 264,
647–648, 653, 701, 995, 999–1000, 1006, 1008–1010.
8 Occasionally, Comau has called upon individual leaders to take on specific additional
responsibilities. For example, in connection with its hiring decisions, management asked leader
James Reno to review applicant résumés and provide his opinion about the applicant’s ability to
operate the company’s boring mills. Tr. 658–659, 669; GC Exhs. 46–48. In another instance,
leader Nelson Burbo communicated with an outside vendor to arrange a meeting about options
for upgrading the Company’s equipment. Tr. 695; GC Exh. 50.
9 During the relevant time period, the bargaining unit was defined as: “[a]ll full-time and
regular part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors and field service
employees, employed by [Comau] at and out of its facilities located at 20950, 21000, and 21175
Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and
machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River, Novi, Michigan facility who formerly
worked at its facility located at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all
office clerical employees, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.” Comau, 356
NLRB No. 21, slip op. at 2 fn. 2. The current bargaining unit is substantially similar, though the
language was modified slightly after Comau recognized the CEA as the unit’s collective
bargaining representative. GC Exh. 1(bb) at 2.
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Joiners of America (the MRCC).10 Tr. 103; GC Exh. 34. Proponents of the merger hoped that
the affiliation with the MRCC would (among other things) enhance the ASW’s bargaining
strength, and also increase training and job opportunities for members of the bargaining unit.
Tr. 762–763, 1012, 1051, 1117; RU Exh. 2; RE Exh. 13 (pp. 590–592). On the other hand,
opponents of the merger expressed concerns about the substantial increase in union dues (an
increase from $20 per month to the ASW, to $20 per month (to the ASW) plus an additional 2%
of all wages (excluding vacation) per month to the MRCC), how the balance in the ASW
treasury (approximately $250,000) would be handled, and the wisdom of associating with a
union of carpenters given that the ASW bargaining unit was composed of machinists, and given
that the MRCC already had several members laid off. Tr. 723–724, 863–867, 974, 1013–1014,
1017–1018, 1111.
The ASW bargaining unit voted to approve the merger with the MRCC, effective March
31, 2007. Tr. 103, 867. In connection with the merger, the ASW underwent the following
changes: a) executive board members Pete Reuter and Darrell Robertson terminated their
employment with Comau and became full time employees of the MRCC (they also continued to
serve on the ASW/MRCC’s executive board); and b) the ASW became subject to the MRCC’s
bylaws. Tr. 142, 764–765, 769–770, 1018–1019.11
C. Contract Negotiations – 2008–2009
In 2008, the ASW and Comau began negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
agreement, since the existing agreement (effective from March 7, 2005 to March 2, 2008) was
due to expire. Tr. 809–810; GC Exh. 32. The parties extended the collective-bargaining
agreement through December 21, 2008, while negotiations proceeded. Jt. Exh. 2. The issue of
health insurance coverage became a sticking point between the parties. Comau, 356 NLRB No.
21, slip op. at 3. Under the previous collective-bargaining agreement, incumbent unit
employees were not required to pay any premiums for the company-provided healthcare
coverage. Although Comau used a self-insured health plan, the coverage was provided through
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross). Under Comau’s proposed contract, Comau would still be
self-insured and coverage would still be provided through Blue Cross, but the unit employees
would be required to pay health insurance premiums for coverage. Id.
The amounts of the proposed employee premiums were significant. Comau’s last best
offer provided that each employee’s premium payment would be between $57.28 and $453.05
per month, depending on the level of benefits chosen, the type of coverage (individual, two-
person, or family), and the extent of the cost increases during the term of the contract. The
employees could also pay an additional $321.04 to $507.26 per month to obtain coverage for a
child between 19 and 25 years of age. Comau’s new plan also reduced the employees’
coverage in some respects. Id.
At a December 3, 2008 bargaining session, Comau declared that the parties were at
impasse, gave 14 days notice that it was canceling the contract extension, and stated that it
would impose its last best offer on December 22 when the prior contract ceased to apply.
During this same timeframe, Comau sent a letter to bargaining unit employees to describe the
key changes that would be imposed on December 22. In addition to notifying the unit about

10 The MRCC is also referred to as the Millwrights. Tr. 355–356. The terms were used
interchangeably during the trial.
11 The ASW/MRCC still maintained its old bylaws, but to the extent that those conflicted
with the bylaws of the MRCC, the MRCC bylaws controlled.
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new rules regarding tardiness, seniority, overtime pay and other issues, Comau also notified
employees that, effective March 1, 2009, it would no longer offer the existing health insurance
plans, but would instead offer healthcare coverage though other, employee-paid premium-
required, medical plans. Comau, supra at 4; see also. Jt. Exhs. 1, 2.
Notwithstanding Comau’s declaration of impasse, Comau and the ASW continued to
negotiate about health insurance. Specifically, from December 8, 2008 through March 20,
2009, the parties (using healthcare insurance subcommittees) met on approximately 10
occasions for negotiations regarding healthcare insurance. Each party’s subcommittee had the
authority to enter into tentative agreements regarding employee health insurance, subject to
final approval by the union membership (as to the ASW) and by Comau’s full negotiating
committee and/or upper management. Comau, supra at 5. Among other proposals, the
subcommittees discussed the ASW/MRCC’s suggestion that Comau stop paying to finance its
own self-insured health insurance plan and instead make contributions to help cover the cost of
insuring unit employees under a health insurance plan provided through the MRCC.12 Id. In
particular, the parties discussed the amount that Comau would pay to the MRCC plan for the
employees’ health insurance on a weighted average per-employee basis. Id. Comau initially
offered (on December 8, 2008) to pay a weighted average of $766 per employee/per month,
and on December 18, 2008, increased its contribution offer to $820 per employee/per month.
Id.
Any prior impasse regarding healthcare ceased to exist on January 7, 2009, when
Comau made a written proposal that significantly increased the per-employee contribution that
Comau was offering to make to provide coverage under the MRCC health insurance plan.
Comau, supra at 9. Not only did Comau increase its contribution offer on January 7, 2009 (the
weighted average is not known) – it again increased its contribution offer (in response to an
ASW counteroffer) on February 5, 2009 (to a weighted average of $835 per employee per
month).13 Id. at 5 fn.13. Meanwhile, Comau continued to prepare for implementing its new
health insurance plan (as outlined in the imposed last best offer) in January 2009, as it met with
unit employees to discuss the plan and complete the paperwork needed to enroll employees in
the plan. Id. at 4; Tr. 937, 941.
D. Early 2009 – Employees Circulate a Decertification Petition and Comau
Unilaterally Implements Its New Health Insurance Plan
In the weeks after Comau announced that it would be imposing its last best offer,
employees began to voice their unhappiness with the ASW/MRCC. The prospect of paying
significant health insurance premiums was a prominent concern, since the new premiums would
be yet another deduction from employee paychecks. Tr. 186–187, 399–400, 772, 817, 833–
834, 1151–1152; RE Exh. 13, pp. 542, 554–555, 561–562, 568, 576–577, 586, 595. However,
other latent discontent with the ASW/MRCC also rose to the surface, as various employees
believed (in different degrees) that the ASW/MRCC: was not effective in attempting to negotiate
a new contract (Tr. 186–187, 1117–1118); charged unduly high dues that came with little or no

12 The anticipated benefit of this proposed arrangement would be that unit employees
would be spared the cost of paying for health insurance premiums, while Comau would realize a
savings in cost since its contributions to the MRCC healthcare plan would be lower that the
amount that Comau was paying to maintain its self-insured healthcare plan.
13 Negotiations continued from this point until March 20, 2009. The ASW essentially agreed
to the $835 per employee/per month contribution amount that Comau offered, but other issues
remained unresolved. Comau, supra at 5–6, 9.
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resulting benefit to the bargaining unit (Tr. 400, 740, 773, 1110, 1157; RE Exh. 13, pp. 554–555,
571, 578, 613); failed to deliver on its promises to provide bargaining unit members with training
and job placements (Tr. 825, 1050, 1110–1112, 1133, 1153, 1195–1196; RE Exh. 13, pp. 592–
593, 604, 610–612); did not protect bargaining unit members from losing job openings at
Comau to contractors or members of other unions (Tr. 776–778, 1203–1204; RE Exh. 13, pp.
529–530, 610–611); and improperly claimed the entire balance of the ASW dues account
(approximately $250,000) at the time of the March 2007 merger (Tr. 741–742, 1111).
In January 2009, the ASW/MRCC executive committee (minus Darrell Robertson and
Pete Reuter) met to discuss how to respond to the concerns expressed by various members of
the bargaining unit about the ASW/MRCC. Tr. 375, 774, 778–779. After some discussion, the
executive committee researched the process for decertifying the ASW/MRCC (including
consulting with an NLRB employee and obtaining materials from the NLRB website), and
committee members Dave Baloga and Dan Malloy prepared a decertification petition. Tr. 376–
377, 780–781, 1021–1022.
On February 18, 2009, employee Frederick Lutz signed a written request that the ASW
executive committee initiate decertification proceedings from our ASW 1123/UBC/MRCC
representation. RU Exh. 1; Tr. 726–727. Based on that request, the executive committee
members began gathering employee signatures (including their own) on the decertification
petition, and also on individual forms authorizing the CEA to serve as the bargaining unit’s
collective bargaining representative. Tr. 782, 787, 1023; RU Exhs. 3, 8. However, later in
February 2009, the executive committee transferred the responsibility of circulating the petition
to employee Willie Rushing, after being warned (by Pete Reuter) that any executive committee
member who circulated the petition could (among other things) be sued or disciplined by the
ASW/MRCC. Tr. 787–788, 790–791, 879–880, 940–941. Once Rushing received the petition
and the accompanying authorization for representation forms, he turned the materials over to
unit employees who passed the materials around in Comau’s facilities to obtain additional
signatures.14 Tr. 880–881, 886. Bargaining unit employees who signed the decertification
petition in February 2009 were aware that the new health insurance plan and premiums would
take effect on March 1, 2009. RE Exh. 13, pp. 554–555, 557–558, 560, 574, 585
On March 1, 2009, Comau unilaterally implemented the new health insurance plan
contained in its imposed last best offer. Comau, supra at 9. As the Board has found, Comau’s
unilateral action was an unfair labor practice because the ASW/MRCC had not agreed to the
health insurance plan, and because the previously declared impasse (declared by Comau in
December 2008) was subsequently broken by (at the latest) January 2009 when Comau and
the ASW/MRCC resumed negotiations about employee health insurance. Id.
In the nine days that followed Comau’s unlawful unilateral action, thirty-four15 additional

14 While the petition circulated, ASW/MRCC executive committee members who signed the
petition subsequently redacted their names and signatures from the petition, citing ongoing
concerns that the ASW would take action against them for participating in the decertification
effort. Tr. 886–887, 1048, 1173, 1181.
15 The decertification petition in the record has been redacted to eliminate the names and
addresses of the employees who signed the document (thus leaving only the date of signature).
Tr. 886–887. To the extent that ASW/MRCC executive committee members signed the petition,
those signature lines were fully redacted (by members of the ASW/MRCC) to obscure the
entries in full, including the date of signature. The count (34) of signatures entered on or after
March 1, 2009, referenced herein does not include any of the fully redacted entries (whether
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employees signed and dated the decertification petition. RU Exh. 3. In addition, employee
discontent with the ASW/MRCC intensified.16 As Daniel Malloy testified, while members of the
bargaining unit were upset in December 2008 when Comau imposed its last best offer, once the
health care premium money came out of the checks in March 2009, the bargaining unit
employees “wanted to fry us. They wanted to fry the committee, they wanted to fry Pete
[Reuter] and Darrell [Robertson]. . . . because we were promised all along that . . . they would
work to keep us from having to pay anything.” Tr. 833.
Rushing returned the completed decertification petition and authorization for
representation forms to Dan Malloy. Tr. 887. Initially, Malloy (with the agreement of others)
decided to delay filing the petition in hopes that the ASW/MRCC would deliver on some new
promises (by Reuter) to place employees who had been laid off from Comau in other jobs. Tr.
793–794, 888, 1025; RE Exh. 13, pp. 602–603. When those job placements did not materialize,
Rushing retrieved the petition from Malloy and filed the decertification petition with the NLRB on
or about April 14, 2009. Tr. 888.17
E. Employee Discontent Persists as Employees Await Action
on Decertification Petition
In May 2009, Rushing met with MRCC director Doug Buckler to discuss the rationale for
the decertification petition. Consistent with the concerns expressed by other employees,
Rushing told Buckler (and also Reuter) that he was unhappy with: the MRCC’s failure to provide
training in skilled trades that it promised; the fact that the MRCC issued him a journeyman card
that was limited to the ASW, and thus had little to no value in making him eligible for other jobs;
the high cost of MRCC union dues; the transfer of the ASW dues account balance to the MRCC;
and the quality of the MRCC health insurance that the ASW/MRCC proposed in negotiations
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made by the executive committee or otherwise) on the petition. The petition as a whole
contains 105 signatures (again, excluding the 13 fully redacted entries), most of which were
entered on February 19, 2009. RU Exh. 3. I note that although I am not including the 13
redacted petition entries in my calculations (since the redactions rendered the entries null and
void), my analysis would remain the same even if the 13 redacted entries were counted.
16 The Acting General Counsel presented the cover sheets of ASW/MRCC meeting minutes
to demonstrate the change in ASW/MRCC meeting attendance in this time period (and to
suggest that the decline in attendance was caused by the March 1 unfair labor practice). The
cover sheets reflect the following attendance figures: January 7, 2009 (62 members attended);
January 22, 2009 (69 members); February 4, 2009 (45 members); February 24, 2009 (50
members); March 4, 2009 (35 members); April 1, 2009 (29 members); May 6, 2009 (26
members); June 3, 2009 (32 members); July 1, 2009 (32 members); August 5, 2009 (29
members); September 2, 2009 (28 members); and November 3, 2009 (12 members). See GC
Exhs. 9–13, 15–21. I have given limited weight to these meeting attendance figures because
while the numbers do show a downward trend in 2009, the record does not include attendance
figures from 2008. Without the comparison data from 2008, I cannot rely on the meeting
attendance figures to conclude with any confidence that attendance declined because of
(among other possibilities) Comau’s unfair labor practice on March 1, routine fluctuations that
occur every year, or because of a spike in attendance (and then a return to normal levels) after
Comau imposed its last best offer in December 2008.
17 The parties have stipulated that on December 22, 2009, there were 178 employees in the
bargaining unit. There was no stipulation proposed or offered about the unit’s membership on
April 14, 2009. However, the evidence in the record indicates that the bargaining unit included
between 234 and 237 employees as of April 14, 2009. RE Exh. 13, pp. 527, 600.
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(belatedly, in Rushing’s view) as an alternative to Comau’s health insurance plan. Tr. 914–921.
Rushing also continued to monitor the status of the decertification petition periodically at the
NLRB because he was getting pressure from bargaining unit employees, particularly when
employees received another paycheck with ASW/MRCC union dues deducted. Tr. 891.
F. December 2009 Disaffection Petition
On November 19, 2009, Comau, the ASW and Rushing participated in a Saint Gobain
hearing before Judge Bogas in Case 7–RD–3644 regarding decertification petition and pending
charges. See RE Exh. 13; see also Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342 NLRB 434 (2004). The
decertification petition ultimately stalled.
In late 2009, Rushing obtained the contact information for a consulting firm to seek
assistance with the pending decertification petition. Tr. 894–895, 1026. Rushing passed the
consultant’s information on to Harry Yale.18 Tr. 895. With the consultant’s assistance, Yale
prepared a disaffection petition (a/k/a “Dana” petition), as well as a revocation of dues-checkoff
authorization form. Tr. 1027; RU Exhs. 6, 7. Each page of the disaffection petition contained
the following language at the top of the page:
We, the employees of Comau, Inc. in the bargaining unit of the Automated Systems
Workers Local 1123 (a Division of the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters) declare
by our signatures below that we no longer want to be represented by that Union, and we
request that Comau, Inc. immediately stop recognizing that Union as our collective
bargaining representative.
We no longer want to be represented by the Automated Systems Workers Local 1123 (a
Division of the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters) because of the excessive dues
that Union charges us each month and because it has not come through on its promises
to increase job opportunities for us – and not because Comau, Inc. in the last year or so
unilaterally implemented new terms of employment for us including the Company health
care plan.
We also declare by our signatures below that we want to be represented by the Comau
Employees’ Association, and we request that Comau, Inc. immediately begin
recognizing the Comau Employees’ Association as our collective bargaining
representative.
RU Exh. 6.
On December 15, 2009, Yale placed copies of both the disaffection petition and
revocation of dues-checkoff forms in binders, and placed the materials on his desk at Comau for
employees to review and sign on their break time.19 Tr. 897–898, 1029–1030. On his own

18 Yale served as an ASW/MRCC executive committee member until July 2009, when he
lost his bid for re–election to the committee.
19 In this same time period, several employees objected to the fact that MRCC dues were
deducted from their annual holiday check. By tradition, Comau closes its facilities for a period of
time in December, and issues its employees a holiday check for a predetermined number of
hours as a bonus payment. Tr. 898. Although MRCC dues were deducted from holiday checks
in 2007 and 2008, several employees objected when MRCC dues were deducted from holiday
checks in 2009, and expressed frustration that the April 2009 decertification petition remained
Continued
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time, Yale also took the binders to other Comau facilities in the area for members of the
bargaining unit to review and sign the petition and dues-checkoff revocation form. Id. At each
facility, employees generally passed the materials around for review, but occasionally did so
during work time. Tr. 1065–1066, 1112, 1124, 1140. The petition generally was circulated
without much discussion, other than describing the petition as a document about getting out of
the union. Tr. 158, 1124, 1153–1154. Some employees testified that they did read the
language at the top of the disaffection petition before they signed the document. Tr. 1116,
1133–1134, 1142, 1202–1203.
Employee Rich Mroz, however, had a somewhat different experience with the
disaffection petition. As Mroz explained, initially one of his leaders (Nelson Burbo) at the Novi
facility approached him and advised him about the disaffection petition that was circulating.
Burbo then asked Mroz if he was happy with the ASW/MRCC, to which Mroz responded that
although he was not happy with the Union, he thought it might be a bad time to get out of the
Union in light of the ongoing dispute with Comau about health insurance benefits. Tr. 158–159.
On another day, another leader (James Reno) invited Mroz (who was on his work time) to speak
to Yale, who was visiting the facility. Mroz agreed to speak with Yale, and reiterated his
concern that it might be a bad time for the disaffection petition. Yale did not disagree with that
opinion, but asserted that the MRCC was not going to get anywhere with its efforts to recover
the money that members of the bargaining unit spent to pay the new health insurance
premiums. Tr. 160–161. Mroz also asked if his leaders signed the petition,20 to which Yale
replied that Mroz’s leaders did sign the petition, as did a majority of employees in the unit. Tr.
162. Mroz agreed to sign the petition after confirming that his brother also signed the
document, but noted that the information he received from Yale did influence his decision to
sign. Tr. 162–163, 192.
On or about December 21, 2009, Yale received the completed disaffection petition and
revocation of dues-checkoff authorization forms.21 See RU Exh. 6 (final signatures dated
December 21, 2009). Yale notified Comau human resources director Fred Begle on December
21 or 22 that he planned to give him the documents, and actually delivered the materials to
Begle on December 22, 2009. Tr. 1076, 1085, 1088; RE Exh. 1 at 12. Begle accepted the
_________________________
unresolved. Tr. 899, 903, 1217–1219; GC Exh. 55.
20 Mroz expressed concern about going against the opinion of his leaders about the
petition, and thus running the risk of the leaders taking an adverse action against him as a
result. Tr. 162–163, 165.
21 Other than the acts of its alleged agents (Yale, Burbo and Reno) as described herein,
there was limited evidence that Comau facilitated or participated in the circulation of the
disaffection petition. Baloga testified that he saw two employees on layoff status approach the
binder with the petition, but the record does not show that Comau gave those individuals access
to the shop floor (as opposed to an employee using his or her own scan card to allow access, or
a Comau clerical employee allowing access without management’s knowledge). Tr. 286–288,
628–629, 949. Similarly, while Baloga testified that Comau generally enforced rules for when
materials can be circulated on the shop floor, there is no evidence that Comau officials knew the
disaffection petition was being circulated before December 21, 2009, and decided not to enforce
the rules for circulating such materials. Tr. 284–285, 353. I have considered an excerpt from
Comau’s position paper (read by the Acting General Counsel into the record as an admission by
a party opponent) on the latter issue, and do not find a basis to conclude that Comau was aware
that the disaffection petition was being circulated before the petition was nearly (if not fully)
completed. See RU Exh. 6 (indicating that most employees signed the petition on or before
December 18, 2009, shortly after the document began circulating).
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petition, and advised Yale that he (Begle) would verify the signatures on the petition.22 Tr.
1032, 1085, 1088. Begle then compared the signatures on the disaffection petition with sample
signatures obtained from individual employee files, and determined that 103 members of the
bargaining unit (out of a total of 178 employees in the unit) signed the disaffection petition. Tr.
964–965, 1076–1078; RE Exh. 1 at 27.
On December 22, 2009, after verifying the signatures on the disaffection petition, Comau
notified the bargaining unit that a majority of employees in the unit requested that Comau
withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC Union and instead recognize the Comau Employees’
Association (CEA) as the unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative. Jt. Exh. 4; see
also Jt. Exh. 5. Accordingly, effective December 22, 2009, Comau withdrew recognition from
the ASW/MRCC, stopped withholding ASW/MRCC dues from the paychecks of unit employees,
and immediately recognized the CEA as the unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining
representative. Id.
G. The CEA Becomes the Unit’s Collective Bargaining Representative
In February 2010, the CEA elected the following individuals as its officers: Yale
(president); Rushing (secretary); Jeffrey H. Brown (vice president); Fred Lutz (treasurer); Jim
Morabito (committeeman); Chris Economides (committeeman); and Jim Kayko (committeeman).
Tr. 729; 907–908; 981; 1038; 1174–1075. The CEA and Comau subsequently negotiated a
new collective bargaining agreement that was then ratified by the CEA membership in April
2010. Tr. 217–218, 907–908, 1040; Jt. Exh. 3 (noting that the contract was effective from
December 22, 2009 through April 13, 2013). The collective-bargaining agreement included the
following union security clause:
a) Seniority employees shall be required, as a condition of continued employment, to
become dues paying members of the [CEA]. Dues will be collected by the Company the
last week of each month by payroll deduction. Any uncollected dues for the current
month will be reported to the CEA by the Company. The CEA will then specify which of
those uncollected dues must be collected from the November vacation pay check each
year or as soon as administratively possible. The Company will remit payment of
collected dues to the CEA by wire transfer, to the CEA bank account, within seven (7)
days or as soon as possible as it becomes administratively possible.
b) In addition to the above, non-seniority employees with more than thirty (30) days
service shall be required, as a condition of continued employment, to become dues
paying members of the association.
Jt. Exh. 3 at 1–2.23
H. The CEA Asks Employees to Sign Dues-Checkoff Authorization Forms
In May 2010, CEA committeemen distributed union dues-checkoff authorization forms
for employees to sign to authorize Comau to collect dues by automatic payroll deduction. Tr.

22 Begle asked Yale to keep the revocation of dues-checkoff authorization forms while the
signatures on the petition were being authenticated. Yale delivered the revocation of dues-
checkoff forms to Begle on January 11, 2010. Tr. 1032–1033.
23 The 2005–2008 collective bargaining agreement between the ASW and Comau
contained a similar provision. GC Exh. 32 at 2.
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982–83; RE Exhs. 6, 9(a). Several employees signed the form without objection. Tr. 983.
However, some employees (at least initially) declined to sign the form.24 One such employee
was Nizar “Bill” Akkari, a machinist who was working at the Novi facility. Tr. 215–216. In May
2010, Akkari was approached on two occasions by Jim Kayko, who asked Akkari if he was
willing to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form. Akkari refused on both occasions. Tr. 220–
221, 986–987. After the second refusal, Kayko advised Akkari that he would probably need to
speak to Fred Begle about the issue. Tr. 221, 988. During Akkari’s next shift at work, the night-
shift supervisor (Matthew Parsons) notified Akkari that Begle was at the Novi facility and wished
to speak with him. Tr. 222. Akkari accordingly met with Begle (and Parsons) in an available
office, and Begle advised him that he would be terminated if he did not sign the dues-checkoff
authorization form.25 Begle did not offer Akkari any option to pay union dues by any other
means besides automatic payroll deduction. Tr. 223–224, 227. Akkari relented and signed the
dues-checkoff authorization form.26 Tr. 218–219; GC Exh. 37.

24 In connection with this issue, the Acting General Counsel presented a chain of e–mails
provided by ASW/MRCC President Darrell Robertson. See GC Exh. 6. Part of that exhibit
includes an e–mail sent on May 14, 2010, by Comau administrative assistant Jill Opasik to
various Comau personnel (including Fred Begle, Duane Jerore, and James Kayko). Opasik’s
e–mail listed employees who had not signed a dues-checkoff authorization form, and stated that
the employees could be terminated if they did not sign the form by May 18, 2010. Id. at 2.
Another portion of the e–mail chain suggests that Jerore forwarded Opasik’s e–mail to five
employees (Al Redd, Ronald Krieger, Gary Hilliker, James Wheeler, and Robert Fox). Id. at 1.
However, in the text of Jerore’s message, he referred the employees to a notice that was
apparently attached to his e-mail, but was not entered into the trial record. Id.
I have given little weight to GC Exh. 6 for the following reasons: (a) no testimony was
offered about Opasik’s role with Comau or her authority to speak for Comau as an agent, and
thus the content of her e–mail is hearsay; and b) the Acting General Counsel did not call any of
the five employees who purportedly received Jerore’s forwarded message to testify as
witnesses during the trial, and thus the record contains no information (beyond the
uncorroborated exhibit itself) about what information these employees ultimately received from
Jerore.
25 I have credited Akkari’s account of this conversation. Begle was present in the
courtroom during Akkari’s testimony (as one of Comau’s designated assistants), and did not
dispute Akkari’s account when he later testified as one of Comau’s witnesses. Tr. 1084. I have
considered the fact that Comau impeached Akkari’s testimony on a narrow point, insofar as
Akkari incorrectly asserted that he never before was required to sign a dues-checkoff
authorization form (compare Tr. 231 with RE Exhs. 19–20), but that limited impeachment did not
undermine the credibility of Akkari’s overall testimony, which was corroborated by other
witnesses and was not contradicted by Begle.
26 Dave Baloga also testified that Kayko approached him about signing a dues-checkoff
authorization form. According to Baloga, he reluctantly signed the form after being told that the
contract prevented him from simply paying dues in cash at union meetings. Tr. 290; GC Exh.
38. Kayko, meanwhile, testified that Baloga simply signed the form when asked to do so,
saying, I might as well. Tr. 989; see also Tr. 447 (Christopher Bloodworth testimony that in
February 2010, Jeffrey H. Brown approached both him and Baloga about the dues-checkoff
authorization form. Both Bloodworth and Baloga refused to sign the form at that time); Tr. 982–
983 (describing Kayko’s efforts to ensure that he asked employees about the dues-checkoff
authorization form “in the right way”). The limited testimony offered about Baloga’s exchange
with Kayko was equally credible and plausible, and thus I have afforded the testimony equal
weight.
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Employee Gasper Calandrino reported a similar experience at the Jefferson North
Assembly Plant, one of Comau’s field service locations.27 Tr. 410. In May 2010, Site
Supervisor Duane Jerore advised Calandrino that he should review a dues-checkoff
authorization form, sign it, and return the form to him. Calandrino complied with Jerore’s
request, but since he did not want dues deducted from his paycheck (preferring instead to pay
dues in person and receive a receipt), Calandrino wrote on the form “I do not authorize the
company to payroll deduct.” Tr. 413. Jerore agreed to turn the annotated form in to Fred
Begle,28 but advised Calandrino that “[y]ou could be disciplined or up to a discharge on
something like that,” and added that “chances are we’ll probably get a phone call from Fred.”
Tr. 414.
The next day at work, Calandrino received a message that he needed to see Jerore in
the office. Jerore told Calandrino that before he began his shift, they needed to call Begle about
the dues-checkoff authorization form. Tr. 415. In the ensuing telephone conversation with
Begle, Calandrino confirmed that he did not wish to authorize payroll deduction for dues, again
noting his preference for having a receipt for individual payments. Begle responded by stating
that payroll deduction is more convenient, and then asked Calandrino if he was aware of the
consequences, which included being disciplined or terminated if his dues were late or went into
arrears. Begle added that Calandrino had been a good employee and had been at Comau for a
long time, and stated that he would hate to see disciplinary action or discharge happen if
Calandrino did not keep up with his dues payments. Tr. 416–417. Feeling pressured,
Calandrino signed a new dues-checkoff authorization form.29 Tr. 417; GC Exh. 35.
Jeffrey T. Brown testified about his experience with the dues-checkoff authorization form
at Comau’s Southfield complex (specifically, at the Arlens facility, one of the three buildings at
the complex). Tr. 490, 495–500. CEA treasurer Fred Lutz first approached Jeffrey T. Brown
about signing a dues authorization form in February 2010, prompting Brown to advise Lutz that
he did not want to, and would not, sign the form. Tr. 496. Lutz told Brown that he was going to
provide Begle with a list of all employees who did not sign the dues-checkoff authorization form,
and Brown responded that if Begle gave him a letter that his job was at risk if he did not sign,
then Brown would sign the form. Id.
Lutz again approached Jeffrey T. Brown about the dues-checkoff authorization form in
May 2010. Brown accepted the form, but did not sign it. Tr. 496; 734. Lutz checked back with
Brown twice more about the form, and on the second visit, Brown asked about the possibility of
paying dues in cash. Lutz responded that he (Lutz) would have to speak with Begle about that,
and a few minutes later, returned to Brown and advised him that they both needed to speak with
Begle in Begle’s office (located in the Comau Center, another building at the Southfield
complex). Tr. 497–498; 735. At the meeting with Begle, Begle asked Brown why he did not
wish to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form, and Brown explained that he preferred to pay
in cash since the Company was into his paycheck more than enough already. Tr. 498–499.
Begle initially expressed some reservations about having CEA officials collect $20 in cash every
month from various employees, but liked Brown’s proposal that he pay a full year of dues in
cash ($240). Lutz, however, asked Brown what would happen if he was laid off in six months.

27 Periodically, Comau assigns employees to off-site locations to work on projects. The
assignments are field service assignments. Tr. 411.
28 It is not clear what happened to the form that Calandrino annotated. No annotated form
was presented at trial or entered into the trial record.
29 Calandrino’s testimony was uncontradicted, even though Begle was present in the
courtroom for his testimony and later testified for Comau. Tr. 1084.
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Unsure of the intent behind Lutz’s question, Brown did not respond. Tr. 499. After some
additional chitchat, Brown decided he was done with the conversation and handed over a
signed dues-checkoff authorization form.30 Tr. 499; GC Exh. 36.
I. Comau and the CEA Attempt to Clarify Their Positions
About Dues-Checkoff and Other Methods of Paying CEA Dues
On June 9, 2010, Comau (through Begle) posted a notice to the bargaining unit about
the dues-checkoff authorization forms. The notice stated:
The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced into signing dues
authorization forms. We have investigated this allegation and do not believe it to be
factually accurate. Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, however, we
want to confirm the following:
While the contract contains a requirement that employees become dues paying
members, the contract does not require that dues be paid through a payroll deduction
authorization, with dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It is up to
you whether you wish to authorize payment of your dues in that manner.
In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization form under the mistaken
assumption that the Company required this, you should feel free to rescind the
authorization and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indicate to me in
writing.
RE Exh. 9(b). Two employees subsequently rescinded their dues-checkoff authorization forms
based on Comau’s notice, and received refunds from Comau for any dues that were paid by
undesired payroll deductions. Tr. 1083–1084.
Akkari admitted that he saw Comau’s notice about the dues-checkoff authorization forms
after it was posted, and he admitted that he did not request that Comau rescind the
authorization form that he signed. Tr. 229; see also Tr. 501 (Jeffrey T. Brown also saw the
letter). Akkari explained, however, that he did not take Comau up on its June 9, 2010 offer
because he felt like Comau was playing games, and because he saw the CEA’s letter of
understanding posted on the Novi shop floor stating that the only acceptable method for paying
dues (other than payroll deduction) was by certified cashier’s check. GC Exh. 2; Tr. 230, 242–
244; see also Tr. 502 (Jeffrey T. Brown saw the CEA’s letter of understanding posted at the

30 I have credited Brown’s version of the conversation. Begle testified at trial, but did not
challenge Brown’s account of their conversation. Tr. 1084. Lutz also testified, but stated on
direct that he did not remember the whole conversation with Begle. Tr. 737. However, Lutz
answered, yes when asked to affirm the accuracy of closed/leading questions about the
conversation with Begle during cross examination. Tr. 748. Lutz’s demeanor and answers
were tentative and uncertain, and generally indicated that Lutz was having trouble remembering
the details of the interactions that he had with Brown and other employees in the relevant time
period. Finally, Brown’s credibility was bolstered by the corroborating testimony that employee
Chris Bloodworth offered about his own interaction with Lutz. According to Bloodworth, Lutz
approached him at the Arlens facility and stated that Begle wanted Lutz to bring Bloodworth
over to talk about the dues-checkoff authorization form. Not wanting to cause any problems
with his job status, Bloodworth agreed to sign the form. Tr. 449. Lutz was not questioned about
his interaction with Bloodworth.
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Arlens facility). CEA’s letter of understanding stated:
Subject: union dues by means other than direct deposit.
1.) Certified cashiers check, is the only acceptable method of payment. Made out to the
Comau Employees Association.
2.) Payment must be received by the end of the 3rd week of every month (Friday is
considered the last day of the work week).
3.) Payment must be hand delivered to the union president, vice-president or treasurer.
(Mailing is not acceptable)
President: Harry Yale
Vice-President: Jeff H. Brown
Treasurer: Fred Lutz
4.) Late payments will not be accepted as a general practice, and disciplinary action will
be instituted, up to and including discharge. As per the union by-laws governing dues
payments, and as stated in our labor agreement (Section # 3.2).
5.) If there is an acceptable reason for a late payment (field service, etc.) the $10.00 late
fee will still be applied.
6.) If these terms are not acceptable, then direct deposit is the only other means of
payment.
GC Exh. 2. Before the letter of understanding was posted, Yale sent it to Begle for review. GC
Exh. 53 (e–mail sent on May 21, 2010).
On June 18, 2010, Harry Yale sent an e-mail to Jim Kayko (and cc’ed to Fred Begle) to
instruct Kayko to deliver a copy of the letter of understanding to an employee (Ken Skrbalo) who
rescinded his dues-checkoff authorization. GC Exh. 54. Per Yale’s e-mail, if Skrbalo did not
pay his dues by the following Friday, “we will start the proceedings as stated in the contract and
by-laws.” Id. Notwithstanding the terms stated in the letter of understanding, Yale ultimately
permitted Skrbalo to pay his dues for the year by personal check.31 Tr. 1059–1060.
J. The Board Rules That Comau Committed An Unfair Labor Practice by
Unilaterally Implementing its Healthcare Plan on March 1, 2009
On November 5, 2010, the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rulings, findings and
conclusions in case number 7–CA–52106. Comau, 356 NLRB No. 21 (2010). In particular, the
Board adopted Judge Bogas’ finding that Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally
implementing a new health insurance plan in the absence of an agreement or a bona fide
impasse with the ASW/MRCC. Id. at 1 fn. 5.
Discussion and Analysis
A. Comau’s Decision to Withdraw Recognition from the ASW and Recognize the CEA
1. Complaint allegations and asserted legal theories
The principal issues in this case turn on whether Comau ran afoul of the Act when (on

31 Yale asserted that the CEA never enforced the terms of its letter of understanding. Tr.
1059–1060. There is no evidence, however, that the CEA advised the bargaining unit as a
whole of any decision not to enforce the letter of understanding.
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December 22, 2009) it withdrew recognition of the ASW/MRCC as the bargaining unit’s
exclusive collective-bargaining representative, and recognized the CEA as the unit’s new
representative.
The complaint specifically alleges that Comau: failed to bargain collectively and in good
faith with the ASW when it withdrew recognition from the ASW (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and
(1)); dominated, interfered with and rendered unlawful assistance to the CEA when, in the
absence of the support of an uncoerced majority of employees, Comau recognized the CEA as
the unit’s exclusive bargaining representative, entered into a collective-bargaining agreement
with the CEA that contained a union security clause, and deducted CEA union dues from
employee wages pursuant to the union security clause (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(2) and (1)); and
discriminated against employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment
(and unlawfully encouraged membership in the CEA) by entering into a collective bargaining
agreement with the CEA that contained a union security clause (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(3) and
(1)). GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 24–26.
As for the CEA, the complaint alleges that at a time when the CEA did not represent an
uncoerced majority of employees in the unit, the CEA: unlawfully obtained recognition from
Comau as the unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative (in violation of Sec.
8(b)(1)(A)); and attempted to cause Comau to discriminate against its employees via the CEA
collective-bargaining agreement and union security clause (in violation of Sec. 8(b)(2) of the Act.
GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 28–29.
At trial, the Acting General Counsel offered two legal theories to support the allegations
in the complaint regarding Comau’s decision to withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
First, the Acting General Counsel asserted that the December 2009 disaffection petition that
Comau used to conclude that the ASW did not represent a majority of employees in the unit was
tainted by Comau’s prior unfair labor practices (specifically, Comau’s March 1, 2009
implementation of its new health insurance plan). Second (and in the alternative), the Acting
General Counsel asserted that the disaffection petition was tainted because certain individuals
(Harry Yale, James Reno, and Nelson Burbo) who circulated it did so with the apparent
authority of Comau. As described below, I find that the Acting General Counsel has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the disaffection petition was tainted by a
prior unfair labor practice.32
2. The December 2009 disaffection petition was tainted
by Comau’s March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice
A union is irrebuttably presumed to continue to enjoy the support of a majority of the unit
employees while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect. Lee Lumber & Building Material
Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 176 (1996). After the contract expires, the union still is presumed to
enjoy majority status, but the presumption is rebuttable. In such a situation, an employer may
rebut the presumption and withdraw recognition if it can show that the union in fact no longer
has the support of a majority of the unit employees. Id. at 176–177; Champion Home Builders
Co., 350 NLRB 788, 791 (2007); see also Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717,

32 Because I have found that the disaffection petition was tainted by the unfair labor practice
that Comau committed on March 1, 2009, I need not rule on the Acting General Counsel’s
alternative theory that the petition was tainted because it was circulated by employees who
were Comau’s agents. However, I note that I have made findings of fact (including credibility
findings) that are relevant to that theory, should further analysis be necessary.
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725 (2001) (overruling precedent that also allowed an employer to withdraw recognition from a
union based on a good-faith doubt about the union’s continued majority status).33
However, an employer may not lawfully withdraw recognition from a union where it has
committed unfair labor practices that are likely to affect the union’s status, cause employee
disaffection, or improperly affect the bargaining relationship. Champion Home Builders, 350
NLRB at 791. Not every unfair labor practice will taint evidence of a union’s subsequent loss of
majority support; in cases involving unfair labor practices other than a general refusal to
recognize and bargain, there must be specific proof of a causal relationship between the unfair
labor practice and the ensuing events indicating a loss of support. Lee Lumber, 322 NLRB at
177. In determining whether a causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair labor
practices and the loss of union support, the Board considers the following factors: (1) the length
of time between the unfair labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the
violations, including the possibility of a detrimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) the
tendency of the violation to cause employee disaffection; and (4) the effect of the unlawful
conduct on employees’ morale, organizational activities, and membership in the union.
Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791 (citing Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84
(1984)).34
In this case, a few preliminary facts are clearly established. The Board has determined
that Comau committed an unfair labor practice on March 1, 2009, when it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by changing employees’ healthcare benefits without the ASW/MRCC’s consent
and in the absence of a bona fide impasse. Comau, 356 NLRB No. 21, slip op. at 11 (2010). In
addition, there is no dispute that the ASW/MRCC had actually lost majority support by
December 22, 2009, as indicated by the fact that a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit (103 employees out of 178 in the unit at the time) signed a December 2009 disaffection
petition stating that they no longer wished to be represented by the ASW/MRCC. See RU Exh.
6. Finally, it is undisputed that Comau recognized the CEA as the bargaining unit’s exclusive
collective bargaining representative on December 22, 2009, and subsequently entered into and
adhered to a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that included a union security

33 While Comau has argued that it was legally obligated to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC when it received the December 2009 disaffection petition, the Board has clearly
stated that an employer with objective evidence (such as a disaffection petition) that a union has
lost majority support withdraws recognition at its peril. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333
NLRB at 725 (noting that an employer in that circumstance runs the risk of being found to have
violated Sec. 8(a)(5) if it is later shown that the union had not lost majority support). The Board
also explained that as an alternative to simply withdrawing recognition based on the objective
evidence, an employer lawfully may file an RM petition for an election and continue to recognize
the incumbent union while the election proceedings are ongoing. Levitz, supra at 724.
34 The Master Slack test is an objective test aimed at evaluating whether a causal
relationship exists between unremedied unfair labor practices and subsequent loss of union
support. See Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342 NLRB at 434 fn. 2 (noting that it is not relevant to
ask individual employees why they chose to reject the union); AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57,
60 (2004) (subjective state of mind of the employees is not relevant). During trial, I permitted
Comau and the CEA to present evidence about the objective circumstances that may have
caused employee disaffection independent of the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice. However,
I did not permit the CEA to call (as it proposed) between 20 to 90 witnesses to testify about their
subjective reasons for signing the December 2009 disaffection petition, because the witness’
subjective reasons are not relevant to the inquiry, and the witnesses’ expected testimony about
the objective circumstances was cumulative.
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clause. See findings of fact (FOF), above, sec. II(G).
The question in dispute is whether there is a causal relationship between the March 1,
2009 unfair labor practice and the loss of majority support for the ASW/MRCC that was evident
on December 22, 2009. To examine that issue, a review of the operative facts is warranted.
Comau declared impasse in December 2008, and based on that impasse, imposed its last best
offer (including the new health insurance plan, which would take effect on March 1, 2009) on
December 22, 2008. See FOF, above, sec. II(C). The impasse regarding employee health
insurance coverage was broken on January 7, 2009. Id. Comau, however, continued to
prepare employees for the effective date of the health insurance plan set forth in Comau’s
imposed last best offer. Id. In February 2009, employees began circulating a petition to
decertify the ASW/MRCC. See FOF, above, sec. II(D). While employees had a variety of
reasons to be unhappy with the ASW/MRCC and therefore sign the petition,35 the unilaterally
imposed healthcare plan was prominent among those reasons. Of the 103 employees that
ultimately signed the decertification petition, all did so on or after February 19, 2009 (i.e., within
days of the March 1 effective date of the healthcare plan), and 34 did so on or after March 1,
2009. Id. Once the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan took effect, bargaining unit discontent
with the ASW/MRCC reached a new high, and carried forward36 to December 2009, when Harry
Yale prepared and circulated the disaffection petition that Comau relied on when it withdrew
recognition from the ASW/MRCC on December 22, 2009. FOF, above, sections II(E), (F).
Turning to the relevant factors, nine months passed between the March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice in this case and Comau’s December 22, 2009 decision to withdraw recognition
from the ASW/MRCC. That length of time does not, per se, preclude a finding of a causal
relationship. See, e.g., AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57 (2004) (unfair labor practice was within
9 months of the withdrawal of recognition that it caused); Columbia Portland Cement v. NLRB,
979 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1992) (same, but with a passage of 1 year). More important, the
facts of this case show that the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice had a more immediate effect
on the bargaining unit, as the bargaining unit unhappiness with the new health insurance
premiums drove (at least in part) the contemporaneous decertification petition that employees
signed in February and March 2009, and filed in April 2009. Thus, the December 2009
disaffection petition was essentially an effort to renew the Spring 2009 decertification movement
that started just before the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan (unlawfully) took effect.
The evidentiary record and applicable case law also show that the nature of the unfair
labor practice here included the possibility of a detrimental and lasting effect on employees, as

35 Those reasons include employee impressions that the ASW/MRCC: was not effective in
attempting to negotiate a new contract; charged unduly high dues that came with little or no
resulting benefit to the bargaining unit; failed to deliver on its promises to provide bargaining unit
members with training and job placements; did not protect bargaining unit members from losing
job openings at Comau to contractors or members of other unions; and improperly claimed the
entire balance of the ASW dues account (approximately $250,000) at the time of the March
2007 merger.
36 Employee discontent about the health insurance plan was kept alive by a variety of
factors, including: the ongoing, significant deductions from employee paychecks to pay the
premiums required for the unilaterally imposed health insurance plan; meetings with the
ASW/MRCC about the decertification petition that touched on health insurance (among other
issues); and the November 19, 2009 St. Gobain hearing in Case 7–RD–3644 in which several
employees testified (and were reminded of the fact) that the new health insurance (and its cost)
was among their concerns when they signed the decertification petition.
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well as a tendency to cause employee disaffection (factors 2 and 3). The fact that Comau
imposed the new health care plan and its accompanying employee-paid premiums unilaterally is
particularly significant. It is well established that when an employer makes unilateral changes to
terms and conditions of employment, those changes harm the union’s status as the bargaining
representative because the employer’s actions undermine the union in the eyes of the
employees and give the impression that the union is powerless. Priority One Services, 331
NLRB 1527, 1527 (2000) (collecting cases); see also Goya Foods, 347 NLRB 1118, 1120–
1121, 1123 (2006) (unilateral changes to working conditions are likely to have an impact on
union support); Penn Tank Lines, 336 NLRB 1066, 1067–1068 (2001) (unilateral changes to
terms and conditions of employment minimize the influence of organized bargaining and show
employees that their union is irrelevant, thereby creating a clear possibility of a detrimental or
long lasting effect on employee support for the union). The Board also has recognized that
unilateral increases in employee health insurance premiums can undercut the union’s ability to
function as the employees’ bargaining representative, because the unilateral changes
substantially affect all unit employees and directly impact employee compensation, one of the
fundamental subjects of bargaining. Priority One Services, supra (discussing the effect of a 9.5
percent increase in health insurance premiums). The unilateral change to employee health care
at issue in this case was even more significant than the change discussed in Priority One
Services, because instead of a percentage increase to premiums that employees were already
paying (as in Priority One), Comau’s unilaterally changed employee health insurance premiums
from zero (since Comau paid all costs under the 2005–2008 contract) to hundreds of dollars per
month in some cases.
Finally, the record shows that Comau’s unilateral change to its employee health
insurance plan had an adverse effect on employee morale, and on the ASW/MRCC’s
organizational activities and membership. The new health care plan played a significant role in
motivating employees to sign the spring 2009 decertification petition37 – indeed, all employees
signed within days (on either side) of the effective date of the new health insurance plan, and 34
employees signed after March 1, 2009.38 In addition, as witness Daniel Malloy explained,

37 As part of their defense, the Respondents maintain that employee disaffection with the
ASW/MRCC preceded the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice. The record does show that
before March 1, 2009, there was some employee discontent with the ASW/MRCC about issues
such as high union dues, the ASW/MRCC’s failure to provide training and job placements, and
the ASW/MRCC’s failure to protect bargaining unit members from losing Comau job
opportunities to workers that did not belong to the bargaining unit. Several of those sources of
discontent, however, had been present since the ASW/MRCC merger in March 2007, but were
tolerated to some degree with the hope that in the end, the merger would be beneficial. More
important, even though there were other reasons for bargaining unit employees to be unhappy
with the ASW/MRCC, the fact remains that Comau’s unilateral imposition of the health
insurance plan had a reasonable tendency to (and did, in fact) cause employee disaffection with
the ASW/MRCC.
38 The Respondents contend that the Acting General Counsel is limited to arguing events
that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, the day that the health insurance plan took effect (and
thus the date of the unfair labor practice). While it is true that March 1, 2009 unfair labor
practice is the only one at issue, the facts about that unfair labor practice are not limited to
March 1 and after, particularly on the issue of whether a causal relationship exists between the
unfair labor practice and the loss of union support. Simply put, this is not a case where the
unfair labor practice occurred on a specific date and took everyone by surprise. To the contrary,
Comau announced the March 1, 2009 health insurance plan effective date in December 2008,
and held meetings in January 2009 to prepare employees for the change. Thus, the new health
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members of the bargaining unit were upset when Comau imposed its last best offer (in
December 2008), but when the health insurance premiums began coming out of employee
paychecks in March 2009, employees wanted to fry the ASW/MRCC leadership because it
failed to deliver on its promise to protect employees from having to pay the premiums.39 Those
sentiments persisted for the rest of 2009, as employees pursued the decertification petition with
the Board (particularly after receiving yet another paycheck with unwanted deductions),
questioned the ASW/MRCC’s efforts to address the issue of employee healthcare at meetings,
and ultimately renewed the effort to get rid of the ASW/MRCC by circulating the December 2009
disaffection petition.40
_________________________
insurance plan (which ultimately was found to be an unfair labor practice) was on the minds of
employees at least by January 2009, after the impasse had been broken and before the
decertification petition began circulating. To the extent that the Respondents suggest that they
were not given an opportunity to litigate this issue (employee sentiment before March 1, 2009), I
note that the record demonstrates that the contrary is true. The Respondents presented
extensive testimony about factors that could have caused employee disaffection before March
1, 2009 (to support their defense that employee discontent preceded the unilateral change to
the employee health insurance plan), and the parties offered exhibits (most without objection)
relating to events that occurred before March 1, 2009. See, e.g., RE Exh. 13 (transcript of the
November 19, 2009 St. Gobain hearing regarding the decertification petition circulated in
February and March 2009).
That being stated, the fact remains that even if the causation analysis were limited to
events that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, there is ample evidence that links the March 1,
2009 unfair labor practice with the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC leading up to the
December 2009 disaffection petition. See discussion accompanying this footnote, supra.
39 The Respondents suggest that employee discontent about the health insurance plan did
not arise until March 6, 2009, the actual date that the first premiums were deducted from their
paychecks. See RE Br. at 11. The purpose of that argument is to suggest that employees who
signed the decertification petition between March 1 and March 5 (28 employees out of the 34
that signed the petition on or after March 1) were not aware of the March 1 unfair labor practice
because the first health insurance premiums were not deducted from their paychecks until
March 6. I do not find this argument to be persuasive. First, the Board has ruled that the unfair
labor practice occurred on March 1, 2009, and that ruling is binding for purposes of my analysis.
Second, as discussed above, the March 1, 2009 effective date of the health insurance plan was
well publicized, and naturally was on the minds of employees for some time. Once March 1
arrived, the health insurance plan took effect, and there was no question that health insurance
premiums would be deducted from employee paychecks. Just as a reasonable employee would
be aware of a forthcoming reduction in wages, I find that a reasonable employee would have
been aware of the forthcoming new healthcare premiums both when the decertification petition
was circulated in late February 2009, and when the new health insurance plan took effect on
March 1, 2009.
40 I have considered the fact that that December 2009 disaffection petition included
language at the top of each page stating that the employees who signed the petition were not
motivated to do so by Comau’s unilateral implementation of the health insurance plan. As a
preliminary matter, the fact that the drafters of the petition thought such a disclaimer was
necessary supports my finding that the health insurance plan and the accompanying premiums
remained points of concern for bargaining unit employees. More important, the petition
language cannot immunize the petition from the effects of the March 2009 unfair labor practice
that the Board found in the earlier Comau case, 356 NLRB No. 21, slip op. at 12-13. As
indicated above, see fn. 34, supra, the Master Slack causation test is an objective, not a
subjective, test that evaluates (among other things) the tendency of the violation to cause
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Thus, all of the factors outlined in Master Slack demonstrate that Comau’s unilateral
implementation of its new employee health insurance plan on March 1, 2009, had a causal
relationship to the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC and in turn, the December 2009
disaffection petition.41 The disaffection petition therefore was tainted by the March 1, 2009
unfair labor practice, and it was unlawful for Comau to rely upon the December 2009
disaffection petition as its basis for withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
Based on my finding that the December 2009 disaffection petition was tainted by the
March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice, I find that Comau committed the following violations:
By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on December 22, 2009 and
subsequently refusing to bargain with the ASW/MRCC, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57, 61 (2004).
By extending recognition to the CEA and entering into a collective bargaining agreement
with the CEA when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in
the bargaining unit, Comau interfered with the formation and administration of a labor
organization in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. AM Property Holdings
Corp., 352 NLRB 279, 281 & n.10 (2008); AT Systems West, supra at 62.
By giving effect to the union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement with
the CEA at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees
in the bargaining unit, Comau encouraged membership in a labor organization and
_________________________
employee disaffection, and whether the nature of the violation includes the possibility of a
detrimental or lasting effect on employees. The subjective views of employees about a past
unfair labor practice and its effects are not relevant to the Master Slack inquiry.
41 The cases that Comau and the CEA cited in arguing that Comau’s March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice did not cause the ASW/MRCC to lose support are distinguishable. See RE Brief
at 34-35; RU Br. at 20–23. Specifically, the decisions that the Respondents cited (as examples
of cases where the Board or the federal court of appeals held that prior unfair labor practices did
not have a causal relationship to the loss of union support) are fact-driven decisions that bear
little similarity to this case. See Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791–792 (no causal
relationship found where all but one of the unfair labor practices occurred 5–6 months before
the disaffection petition, and the record did not show that employees knew about the more
recent violation; the nature of violations did not support a finding of taint because they were
isolated and/or brief events; the record did not show that the violations had a tendency to cause
employee disaffection towards the union; and the record did not show that the scheduling
disputes had an adverse effect on employee morale, organizational activity or union
membership); Garden Ridge Management, 347 NLRB 131, 134 (2006) (same, regarding the
effect of a bargaining session scheduling dispute); Master Slack, 271 NLRB at 84–85 (same,
where the unfair labor practices were committed 8–9 years before the withdrawal of recognition
and backpay issues were still being litigated, and there was limited evidence that the backpay
dispute had an adverse effect on employee morale, organizational activity or union
membership); Pleasantview Nursing Home v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 764 (6th Cir. 2003) (same,
regarding the effect of an employer’s breach of its duty to collect union initiation fees and its
unilateral decision to increase the wages of 6 employees in the 78-employee bargaining unit);
see also Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342 NLRB at 434 (cited by the CEA, and only standing for the
proposition that a hearing is necessary to determine whether the employer’s unilateral change
to employee health insurance had a causal nexus to employee disaffection).
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discriminated against employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of
employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Caldor, Inc., 319 NLRB
728, 739 (1995).
I also find that the CEA committed the following violations in connection with Comau’s
withdrawal of recognition of the ASW/MRCC and recognition of the CEA:
By accepting recognition from Comau and by entering into a collective-bargaining
agreement with Comau when it did not have the uncoerced support of a majority of
employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Ladies
Garment Workers v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 731, 732 (1961); United Workers of America,
352 NLRB 286, 286 (2008).
By maintaining a union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement with
Comau at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in
the bargaining unit, the CEA caused and attempted to cause Comau to violate Section
8(a)(3) by encouraging membership in a labor organization and discriminating against
employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment. Through
these actions, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. Rockville Nursing Center,
193 NLRB 959, 965 (1971).
B. Comau’s and the CEA’s Conduct in Asking Employees to Sign
Dues-Checkoff Authorization forms
1. Complaint allegations
In addition to the larger issues (discussed above) related to Comau’s decision to
withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC and recognize the CEA as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative for the bargaining unit, the Acting General Counsel also alleged that
both Comau and the CEA violated the Act when they asked employees to sign dues checkoff
authorizations for paying CEA dues.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that in May 2010, Comau threatened employees at
the Jefferson North, Novi and Southfield facilities with termination if they failed to authorize
automatic dues deduction payments to the CEA (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act). GC
Exh. 1(v), pars. 19, 27. The complaint also alleged that in May 2010, the CEA threatened
employees at the Novi and Southfield facilities with loss of employment if they failed to authorize
automatic dues deduction payments to the CEA (in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act). GC
Exh. 1(v), pars. 23, 28.
2. Both Comau and the CEA violated the Act by conduct that reasonably
could coerce employees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms
There is no dispute that under a collective-bargaining agreement that contains a valid
union-security clause, an employee may be required to pay union dues as a condition of
employment, and may be discharged for failing to pay the required dues. International
Longshoreman’s Association, Local 1575, 322 NLRB 727, 729 (1996). However, a union may
not compel union members to execute dues-checkoff authorizations as a condition of their
employment; nor can a union threaten to cause employees to be discharged if they fail to
execute dues-checkoff authorizations, because the execution of a dues-checkoff authorization is
entirely voluntary. Id. at 729–730 (noting that a union’s threat to cause discharge under these
circumstances would violate Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)). More generally, a union violates Section
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8(b)(1)(A) of the Act if it engages in conduct that may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. Culinary Workers Local 226 (Casino Royale,
Inc.), 323 NLRB 148, 159 (1997).
Similarly, an employer may not lead employees to believe that the dues-checkoff
authorization method for fulfilling their financial obligations to their union is compulsory.
Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 262 (1997). An employer that directs employees to sign
dues-checkoff forms authorizing deduction of dues under the threat of losing their employment
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their protected Section
7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Id. An employer also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
if the employer’s conduct or statements have a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain or
coerce union or protected activities. Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant, 330 NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3
(2000) (noting that the employer’s subjective motivation for the statements is not relevant); see
also Park N’ Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 140 (2007).
a. Comau Violations
In this case, the facts demonstrate that in May 2010, Comau management personnel
spoke with three employees who initially declined to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms:
Gaspar Calandrino (Jefferson North field service location) Nizar Akkari (Novi facility); and
Jeffrey T. Brown (Southfield facility). Comau human resources director Fred Begle specifically
warned Akkari that he could be terminated if he did not sign the form. Site supervisor Duane
Jerore similarly warned Calandrino that he could be disciplined or discharged if he did not sign a
dues-checkoff authorization form. See FOF, above, Sec. II(H). Those explicit (and
uncontested) statements each violated Section 8(a)(1), as the threat of losing employment or
being disciplined had a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari and Calandrino in the exercise of
their protected Section 7 rights to choose whether or not to sign the dues-checkoff authorization
forms. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra at 262.42
I also find that Begle’s statements to Calandrino (in a followup conversation that Jerore
joined), and Begle’s statements to Jeffrey T. Brown violated Sec. 8(a)(1). In those exchanges,
although Begle did not explicitly link the failure to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form with
possible discipline or termination, Begle questioned the employees about their refusal to sign
the form, questioned the reliability of paying by other means (such as cash), and (as to
Calandrino) warned of consequences that could result if he chose another method of payment
and fell behind with his dues. See FOF, above, Sec. II(H). Viewing those statements as a
whole, along with the context of Begle taking the unusual step of having a shop floor employee
brought to a private office to speak with him (in person as to Brown, and by phone as to
Calandrino), I find that Begle’s remarks to Calandrino and Jeffrey T. Brown had a reasonable
tendency to coerce those employees in exercising their Section 7 rights.
b. CEA Violations
The Acting General Counsel also presented evidence about the role that two CEA

42 As noted in the statement of facts, I do not give weight to the content of GC Exhibit 6, a
chain of e-mails apparently initiated by Jill Opasik regarding employees who had not yet signed
a dues-checkoff authorization form. Among other things, the record does not establish Opasik’s
role as a Comau supervisor or agent, and also does not establish with sufficient reliability that
her specific comments reached any bargaining unit employees. See fn. 24, supra. In light of
those shortcomings, the exhibit does not demonstrate that Comau violated the Act.
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committeemen (James Kayko and Fred Lutz) played in asking employees to sign dues-checkoff
authorization forms.
I recommend dismissing the allegations in paragraph 23(a) of the complaint because the
evidence that the Acting General Counsel presented about James Kayko’s conduct falls short of
proving a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Kayko did ask Akkari to sign a dues-checkoff
authorization form, but he did not suggest that any adverse employment action would result
when Akkari refused. Kayko did mention that Akkari might be contacted by Fred Begle about
the matter, but he did not participate in any ensuing conversations between Akkari and Begle, or
suggest that the possible contact with Begle would involve any adverse consequences. See
FOF, above, section II(H). Viewing Kayko’s conduct as a whole, I find that his actions or
statements did not have a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari to sign the dues-checkoff
authorization form.
As for Kayko’s interactions with Dave Baloga (also covered by Paragraph 23(a)), I find
that both witnesses were equally credible in their respective accounts of Kayko’s request that
Baloga sign a dues-checkoff authorization form. Since the Acting General Counsel bears the
burden of proving the allegations in its complaint by a preponderance of the evidence, the tie
between Kayko’s and Baloga’s testimony leads me to find that the Acting General Counsel did
not demonstrate that the CEA (through Kayko) violated the Act in its interactions with Baloga
about the dues-checkoff authorization form. See Central National Gottesman, 303 NLRB 143,
145 (1991) (finding that General Counsel did not meet its burden of proof because the testimony
that the allegation occurred was equally credible as the testimony that denied the allegation);
Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591, 591–592 (1954) (same), questioned on other grounds,
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Lutz’s interactions with Jeffrey T. Brown are different in character, and do establish that
the CEA (through Lutz) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). See GC Exh. 1(v), par. 23(b). Lutz’s initial
requests that Brown sign a dues-checkoff authorization form were merely requests that were not
linked to any threat of adverse employment action. However, when Brown refused to sign the
form, Lutz escorted Brown to Begle’s office, and also participated in Begle’s meeting with
Brown. Lutz’s presence at the meeting served as a CEA endorsement of Begle’s remarks and
of Begle’s treatment of Brown’s refusal to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form as a point of
concern. Further, like Begle, Lutz questioned the reliability of paying dues by means other than
dues-checkoff. Taking the totality of the circumstances into account, Lutz’s conduct and
statements to Jeffrey T. Brown had a reasonable tendency to coerce Brown to sign the dues-
checkoff authorization form, and thus violated the Act.
3. Comau did not cure its violations of the act regarding
dues-checkoff authorization forms
As part of its response to the allegations in the complaint regarding the dues-checkoff
authorization forms, Comau contends that any violation that Begle committed was cured by the
June 2010 memorandum that Comau posted in the workplace. RE Br. at 25 (citing RE Exh.
9(b)).43 In so arguing, Comau invokes Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138

43 The CEA did not address the substantive issues concerning the dues-checkoff
authorization forms in its posttrial brief. It did, however, deny the allegations in its answer to the
complaint. The record does not show that the CEA repudiated (or attempted to repudiate) any
violations associated with the dues-checkoff authorization forms. The CEA did issue a letter of
understanding (that authorized payment by cashier’s check under certain parameters), but the
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(1978), which explains that an employer may relieve itself of liability for unlawful conduct in
some circumstances by repudiating the conduct. Id. at 138. To be effective, the repudiation
must be: timely; unambiguous; specific in nature to the coercive conduct; adequately publicized
to the employees involved; free from other proscribed illegal conduct, and accompanied by
assurances that the employer will not interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights in the future.
Id.; see also Cintas Corp., 353 NLRB 752, 753 fn. 8, 769 (2009). The employer also must not
engage in proscribed conduct after the repudiation. Id.
Comau’s effort at repudiation (sent by Begle) read as follows:
The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced into signing dues
authorization forms. We have investigated this allegation and do not believe it to be
factually accurate. Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, however, we
want to confirm the following:
While the contract contains a requirement that employees become dues paying
members, the contract does not require that dues be paid through a payroll deduction
authorization, with dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It is up to
you whether you wish to authorize payment of your dues in that manner.
In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization form under the mistaken
assumption that the Company required this, you should feel free to rescind the
authorization and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indicate to me in
writing.
RE Exh. 9(b). The repudiation does not satisfy the standard set forth in Passavant because
(among other things) it was not specific to the nature of the misconduct. The memo makes no
reference to the threats of termination that Comau communicated to employees, nor does it
address the other actions and statements that Comau took that had a reasonable tendency to
coerce employees to sign the dues-checkoff authorization forms in the first instance. The
attempted repudiation was therefore incomplete.44 Accordingly, my finding that Comau violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act remains unchanged.
Conclusions of Law
1. By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on December 22, 2009, as the
bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
2. By extending recognition to the CEA as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-
bargaining representative on December 22, 2009, when the CEA did not represent an
_________________________
letter of understanding did not address or repudiate any previous violations of Sec. 7 rights.
44 Comau’s memorandum was also ambiguous because it did not address restrictions that
the CEA placed (with Comau’s tacit consent) on other forms of payment. In a letter of
understanding, the CEA advised the unit that any employee who elected not to use dues-
checkoff was required to pay dues by hand delivering a certified cashiers check to Harry Yale,
Fred Lutz, or Jeffrey H. Brown. Comau was aware of the restrictions that the CEA imposed
(since Yale presented the letter of understanding to Begle for review), and essentially
acquiesced to the restrictions by allowing them to persist even after Comau issued its June
2010 memo. See FOF, above, sec. II(I).
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uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1)
of the Act.
3. By entering into a collective bargaining agreement with the CEA (effective December
22, 2009) when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, Comau violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By giving effect to the union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement
with the CEA (effective December 22, 2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an
uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau encouraged membership in a
labor organization and discriminated against employees regarding hiring and the terms and
conditions of employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. By telling employees at the Novi and Jefferson North facilities in May 2010 that they
could be disciplined or discharged if they did not sign dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau
interfered with, restrained or coerced employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By making statements to employees and engaging in conduct in May 2010 that had a
reasonable tendency to coerce employees at the Southfield and Jefferson North facilities to sign
dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau interfered with, restrained or coerced employees in
the exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By accepting recognition from Comau on December 22, 2009, as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative when it did not have the uncoerced support
of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
8. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement effective December 22, 2009, with
Comau when it did not have the uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. By maintaining a union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement with
Comau (effective December 22, 2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA caused and attempted to cause Comau to
violate Section 8(a)(3) by encouraging membership in a labor organization and discriminating
against employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment. Through
these actions, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
10. By making statements to employees and engaging in conduct in May 2010 that had
a reasonable tendency to coerce employees at Comau’s Southfield complex to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms, the CEA restrained or coerced employees in the exercise of
Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices stated in conclusions 1–10 above are unfair labor
practices that affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and(7) of the Act.
12. I recommend dismissing the allegations stated in paragraph 23(a) of the complaint.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
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effectuate the policies of the Act. While most of the remedies that I will require will be set forth
in the Order attached to my decision,45 the Acting General Counsel’s request for an affirmative
bargaining order requires specific attention.
The Board consistently has held that an affirmative bargaining order is the traditional,
appropriate remedy for a Section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate unit of employees. Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64, 68
(1996). Applying that principle, the Board recently ruled that an affirmative bargaining order was
warranted as a remedy for an employer’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition from a union.
Vincent/Metro Trucking, 355 NLRB No. 50, slip op. at 1 (2010). In so ruling, the Board
examined the facts of the case under District of Columbia Circuit precedent that states that an
affirmative bargaining order must be justified by reasoned analysis that includes an explicit
balancing of three considerations: (1) the employees’ Section 7 rights; (2) whether other
purposes of the Act override the rights of employees to choose their bargaining representative;
and (3) whether alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of the Act. Id.
(citing Vincent Industrial Plastics v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Adhering to the Board’s approach, I have analyzed the facts of this case under the three-
factor balancing test outlined by the District of Columbia Circuit.
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case will vindicate the Section 7 rights of the
employees who supported the ASW/MRCC and were denied the benefits of that union’s
collective-bargaining by Comau’s unlawful decision to withdraw recognition. To the
extent that some employees may still oppose the ASW,46 an affirmative bargaining order
will not unduly prejudice their Section 7 rights because the affirmative bargaining order is
temporary. In addition, it bears repeating that Comau committed an unfair labor practice
that had a causal relationship to ASW/MRCC’s loss of employee support, and thus to the
December 2009 disaffection petition that served as the springboard for Comau to
withdraw recognition.47 Under those circumstances, it is only by restoring the status quo
ante and requiring Comau to bargain with the ASW for a reasonable period of time that
employees will be able to fairly decide for themselves whether they wish to continue to
be represented by the ASW.
(2) The affirmative bargaining order also serves the policies of the Act by fostering
meaningful collective bargaining and industrial peace. It removes Comau’s incentive to
delay bargaining in the hope of further discouraging support for the ASW. It also

45 To the extent that I will require Comau and the CEA to reimburse bargaining unit members
for the CEA fees and dues that were collected unlawfully on or after December 22, 2009, that
remedy is required because the CEA collective-bargaining agreement and union-security clause
were unlawful. I will also require Comau and the CEA to reimburse bargaining unit members for
daily compound interest on any such reimbursement amounts as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). I will not require any reimbursement of CEA dues
based on the violations associated with coercion in obtaining dues-checkoff authorization forms.
See Rochester Mfg., 323 NLRB at 263 (no reimbursement required if affected employees were
subject to a lawful union-security clause obligating them to pay dues).
46 After Comau withdrew recognition, the ASW changed its affiliation (in March 2010) from
the MRCC to the CIC. Both entities are part of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
47 The Board’s decision concerning this unfair labor practice (the March 1, 2009 unilateral
implementation of a new health care plan for employees) also contains an affirmative bargaining
order. Comau, 356 NLRB No. 21, slip op. at 13.
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ensures that the ASW will not be pressured, by the possibility of another decertification
or disaffection petition, to achieve immediate results at the bargaining table following the
Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice and the issuance of a cease-and-desist
order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, without a temporary decertification bar, would be
inadequate to remedy Comau’s and the CEA’s violations, because it would permit a
decertification petition to be filed before Comau had afforded the employees a
reasonable time to regroup and bargain through the ASW in an effort to reach a
collective-bargaining agreement. Such a result would be particularly unfair in
circumstances such as those here, where the nature of Comau’s unfair labor practice
likely created a lasting negative impression of the ASW in the bargaining unit, and where
Comau immediately recognized a replacement union (the CEA) that has been able to
develop relationships with bargaining unit employees while the ASW litigated its
charges. I find that those circumstances outweigh the temporary impact the affirmative
bargaining order will have on the rights of employees who oppose ASW’s continued
union representation.
See Vincent/Metro Trucking, supra at 1–2 (citing similar issues that weighed in favor of an
affirmative bargaining order); Spectrum Health-Kent Community Campus, 353 NLRB 996, 996–
997 (2009) (same); AT Systems West, 341 NLRB at 63 (same). Based on my analysis under
the three-factor balancing test applied by the Board, I find that an affirmative bargaining order
with a temporary decertification bar for a reasonable period of time is necessary in this case to
fully remedy Comau’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition of the ASW.48
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended49
ORDER
The Respondent Employer, Comau, Inc., Southfield, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from

48 I have considered the fact that after Comau withdrew recognition from the ASW/MRCC,
the ASW subsequently (in March 2010) changed its affiliation from the MRCC to the CIC (still
within the United Brotherhood of Carpenters). The CEA suggests that the bargaining unit
should not be forced to accept the ASW/CIC as its bargaining representative, since the unit did
not vote to affiliate with the CIC. While the CEA’s argument has some superficial appeal, I find
that as an equitable matter, the ASW should not be penalized for continuing to conduct its
operations while this litigation was pending. It should come as no surprise that the ASW made
various decisions (including the decision to affiliate with the CIC) since December 22, 2009, the
date that Comau withdrew recognition. To the extent that the bargaining unit may be unfamiliar
with (or skeptical of) some of the changes that the ASW has made, it will be up to the ASW to
persuade the unit (while the affirmative bargaining order is in effect, and beyond) that the
changes are beneficial.
49 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(a) Withdrawing recognition from the ASW and refusing to meet and bargain in good
faith with the ASW as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for the following
bargaining unit of Comau employees:
All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors
and field service employees, employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten
Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located at 21175 Telegraph
Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Extending recognition to the CEA as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-
bargaining representative where the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of
employees in the unit.
(c) Entering into and adhering to a collective bargaining agreement with the CEA when
the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, with the
exception of any provisions in the current agreement that establish wages or benefits for
bargaining unit employees.
(d) Giving effect to the union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement with
the CEA where the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, and thereby encouraging membership in the CEA and discriminating against
employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
(e) Telling employees that they could be disciplined or discharged if they did not sign
dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(f) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has a reasonable tendency to coerce
employees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain for a reasonable period of time with the ASW as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms and
conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees,
inspectors and field service employees, employed by Comau at and out of its
facilities located at 20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield,
Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and machinists
currently working at its 44000 Grand River, Novi, Michigan facility who formerly
worked at its facility located at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but
excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(b) Withdraw recognition from the Comau Employees Association as the representative
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of employees in the bargaining unit unless and until that labor organization has been
certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of those
employees.
(c) Jointly and severally with the Comau Employees Association, reimburse with interest
all present and former bargaining unit employees for all initiation fees, dues and other
moneys paid by them or withheld from them on or after December 22, 2009, under the
CEA’s unlawful collective-bargaining agreement and union-security clause.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Southfield,
Michigan and in Novi, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix –
Notice to Employees.”50 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 7, after being signed by Comau’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by Comau and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if Comau
customarily communicates with its employees by such means.51 Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, Comau has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, Comau shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by Comau at any time since
December 22, 2009.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
The Respondent Union, Comau Employees Association (CEA), Southfield, Michigan, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Accepting recognition from Comau as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-
bargaining representative and engaging in bargaining with Comau when it does not have the
uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
(b) Entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with Comau, and enforcing its
collective-bargaining agreement with Comau when it does not have the uncoerced support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit.

50 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
51 The notice posting language provided herein (specifically regarding distributing notices
electronically) is consistent with the Board’s recent decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No.
9 (2010).
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(c) Maintaining a union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement with
Comau at a time when the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, thereby causing and attempting to cause Comau to violate Section 8(a)(3) by
encouraging membership in a labor organization and discriminating against employees
regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
(d) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has a reasonable tendency to coerce
Comau employees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Jointly and severally with Comau, Inc., reimburse with interest all present and former
bargaining unit employees for all initiation fees, dues and other moneys paid by them or
withheld from them on or after December 22, 2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union offices in Southfield,
Michigan and Novi, Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix – Notice to
Members and Employees.”52 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 7, after being signed by the CEA’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
CEA and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to members and Comau employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the CEA customarily communicates
with its members by such means.53 Reasonable steps shall be taken by the CEA to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, CEA has gone out of business or closed its offices involved
in these proceedings, the CEA shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all individuals who were members of the CEA or Comau bargaining unit employees at any
time since December 22, 2009.

52 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
53 The notice posting language provided herein (specifically regarding distributing notices
electronically) is consistent with the Board’s recent decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB No.
9 (2010).
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(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting by
Comau, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act
not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2010.
____________________
Geoffrey Carter
Administrative Law Judge
JD–66–10
Southfield, MI
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the ASW and refuse to meet and bargain in good faith
with the ASW as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for the following bargaining
unit of Comau employees:
All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors
and field service employees, employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 210175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten
Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located at 21175 Telegraph
Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT extend recognition to the CEA as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-
bargaining representative where the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of
employees in the unit.
WE WILL NOT enter into or adhere to a collective bargaining agreement with the CEA when the
CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, with the
exception of any provisions in the current agreement that establish wages or benefits for
bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT give effect to the union security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement
with the CEA where the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, and thus encourage membership in the CEA and discriminate against
employees regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they may be disciplined or discharged if they do not sign
dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct that has a reasonable tendency to
coerce employees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
JD–66–10
Southfield, MI
WE WILL withhold recognition from the CEA as your representative unless it has been certified
by the Board as your exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the ASW for a reasonable period of time and put in writing
and sign any agreement reached on terms and conditions of employment for our employees in
the bargaining unit:
All full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors
and field service employees, employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 210175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten
Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located at 21175 Telegraph
Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL reimburse bargaining unit employees for any initiation fees, dues and other moneys
that were collected on or after December 22, 2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause.
COMAU, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an Independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and
how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue
Federal Building, Room 300
Detroit, Michigan 48226-2569
(313) 226-3200
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, 313-226-3244.
JD–66–10
Southfield, MI
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union.
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer.
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection.
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT accept recognition from Comau as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-
bargaining representative and engaging in bargaining with Comau when we do not have the
uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with Comau or enforce our
collective-bargaining agreement with Comau when we do not have the uncoerced support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT maintain a union security clause our collective bargaining agreement with
Comau at a time when the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, thereby causing and attempting to cause Comau to violate Section 8(a) (3) by
encouraging membership in a labor organization and discriminating against employees
regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct that has a reasonable tendency to
coerce Comau employees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
JD–66–10
Southfield, MI
WE WILL reimburse bargaining unit employees for any initiation fees, dues and other moneys
that were collected on or after December 22, 2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause.
COMAU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an Independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and
how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue
Federal Building, Room 300
Detroit, Michigan 48226-2569
(313) 226-3200
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, 313-226-3244.