Comau, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 3, 2012

357 N.L.R.B. 2294 (N.L.R.B. 2012)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
357 NLRB No. 185
2294
Comau, Inc. and Automated Systems Workers Local
1123, affiliated with Carpenters Industrial
Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America

Comau Employees Association and Automated Sys-
tems Workers Local 1123, affiliated with Car-
penters Industrial Council, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Cases
07–CA–052614, 07–CA–052939, 07–CB–016912
January 3, 2012
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND HAYES
On December 21, 2010, Administrative Law Judge
Geoffrey Carter issued the attached decision. Respond-
ent Comau, Inc. (the Respondent or Respondent Comau)
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respond-
ent filed a reply brief. The Acting General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, the Respondent
filed an answering brief, and the Acting General Counsel
filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions,2 and to adopt the recommended
Order.3

1 The Respondent has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are in-
correct. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
Respondent Comau Employees Association has not filed exceptions
to the judge’s decision. Some of Respondent Comau’s arguments in
support of its exceptions would, if successful, require overturning the
judge’s findings that Respondent CEA violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act by accepting recognition from and entering into a collective-
bargaining agreement with Respondent Comau. However, for the
reasons discussed below, we find no merit in those arguments.
2 We adopt the judge’s finding that Respondent Comau violated Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act by telling employees that they could be disciplined or
discharged if they did not sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
However, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s further finding
that Respondent Comau violated 8(a)(1) by making statements and
engaging in other conduct “that had a reasonably tendency to coerce
employees” to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms, as such findings
would be cumulative and would not materially affect the remedy.
3 For the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in J. Picini Floor-
ing, 356 NLRB 11 (2010), Member Hayes would not require electronic
distribution of the notice.
On February 10, 2011, after the judge issued his decision in this
case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan issued a decision denying the Acting General Counsel’s request for
The central unfair labor practice issues before the
Board in this case are whether the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5), (2), (3), and (1) of the Act by withdraw-
ing recognition from Automated Systems Workers Local
1123, affiliated with the Michigan Regional Council of
Carpenters (the Union or ASW) and thereafter recogniz-
ing the Comau Employees Association (CEA) and enter-
ing into a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA
containing a union-security clause. The judge found the
violations, rejecting the Respondent’s reliance on an em-
ployee petition opposing continued representation by the
Union and requesting that the Respondent recognize the
CEA, because he found that the petition was tainted by
the Respondent’s unremedied unfair labor practice found
in Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB 75 (2010) (Comau I). We
adopt the judge’s findings for the reasons set forth in his
decision, as further explained and clarified below.
I.
The Respondent builds assembly lines and specialty
tools for the automotive industry. For many years, unit
employees at the Respondent’s Southfield, Michigan
facility were represented by an in-house union, originally
called the PICO Employees Association and later re-
named the Automated Systems Workers Union. In 2007,
the unit employees voted to affiliate the ASW with the
Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (MRCC).4
As a result of the affiliation, the employees’ dues in-
creased from $20 a month to $20 a month plus 2 percent
of wages.
In January 2008, the Respondent and the Union com-
menced negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
agreement to replace the existing agreement that was set
to expire on March 2, 2008. Health insurance was a con-
tentious issue throughout the negotiations. Under the
expiring agreement, Respondent was self-insured and
employees received no-cost health, vision, and dental
coverage. Early in the negotiations for a successor
agreement, the Respondent proposed replacing the exist-
ing plan with the plan that the Respondent provided to its
nonunit employees. Under the plan proposed by the Re-
spondent, coverage would be reduced in some respects
and unit employees would be required to pay premiums
for the first time.
The Union rejected the Respondent’s healthcare pro-
posal and proposed that the Respondent participate in a

a preliminary injunction under Sec. 10(j) of the Act. Glasser v. Comau,
Inc., No. 2:10-CV-13683, 767 F.Supp.2d 778 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9,
2011). For the reasons set forth in Coronet Foods v. NLRB, 981 F.2d
1284 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the court’s findings and conclusions in the 10(j)
proceeding are not binding on the Board in this proceeding.
4 The merger was effective on March 31, 2007.
COMAU, INC. 2295
plan underwritten by the MRCC. Like the plan in the
expiring agreement, the MRCC plan would be offered at
no cost to the employees. The Respondent indicated that
it was open to considering the MRCC plan if it would be
less expensive for the Respondent than the plan in the
expiring agreement.
On December 3, 2008, before the parties had fully ex-
plored the cost of switching to the MRCC plan, the Re-
spondent declared impasse and announced that it would
implement its final offer, including its healthcare pro-
posal. The Respondent implemented most of the provi-
sions of its final offer on December 22. However, be-
cause of the administrative burden associated with
changing healthcare plans, the Respondent announced
that the new healthcare plan would not be implemented
until March 1, 2009.
Notwithstanding the Respondent’s declaration of im-
passe, the parties continued to negotiate over the alterna-
tive healthcare plan proposed by the Union. Although
the parties made significant progress in the negotiations,
the Respondent unilaterally implemented its own
healthcare plan on March 1, 2009. As a result, employ-
ees were forced to pay premiums for the first time,
through payroll deduction. The premiums ranged be-
tween $57.28 and $453.05 per month depending on the
type of coverage chosen (individual, two-person, family,
high or low deductible).5
On November 5, 2010, the Board issued its decision
and order in Comau I, reported at 356 NLRB 75, finding
that any impasse that existed over healthcare in Decem-
ber 2008, when the Respondent announced that it was
implementing its final offer, was broken as a result of the
significant progress that the parties made in the negotia-
tions over the alternative healthcare plan proposed by the
Union. The Board therefore found that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by implement-
ing the healthcare plan in its final offer in the absence of
an agreement or a bona fide impasse.
The Decertification Petition
Shortly after the Respondent announced on December
3, 2008, that it planned to implement its final offer, the
Union’s executive committee (which was comprised
primarily of unit employees) began to discuss decertify-
ing the Union. In late December or early January 2009,
committeemen David Baloga and Daniel Malloy pre-
pared a decertification petition. Bologa testified that the
primary impetus behind the decertification effort was the
Respondent’s announcement that it intended to imple-
ment the new healthcare plan.

5 Employees could also pay an additional $321.04 to $507.26 per
month to cover a child between 19 and 25 years of age.
After preparing the decertification petition, the execu-
tive committee turned it over to employee William Rush-
ing to circulate. Between February 19 and 28, 2009, 84
of the approximately 234 bargaining unit employees
signed the petition (36 percent). On March 1, 2009, the
Respondent implemented the new healthcare plan. Over
the next 9 days, 34 more employees signed the decertifi-
cation petition (15 percent). Rushing filed the petition on
April 14, 2009.
In a Decision and Order dated December 14, 2010, the
Regional Director for Region 7 dismissed the petition
because he found that there was a causal relationship
between the Respondent’s unlawful implementation of
the new healthcare plan and the employees’ disaffection
from the Union. By unpublished Order dated March 11,
2011, the Board denied the Respondent’s request for
review.6
The Disaffection Petition
Meanwhile, in December 2009, while Comau I was
still pending before the judge, unit employee Harry Yale
prepared and began circulating a disaffection petition.
The petition stated:

We, the employees of Comau, Inc., in the bargaining
unit of the Automated Systems Workers Local 1123 (a
Division of the Michigan Regional Council of Carpen-
ters) declare by our signatures below that we no longer
want to be represented by that Union, and we request
that Comau, Inc., immediately stop recognizing that
Union as our collective bargaining representative.

We no longer want to be represented by the [ASW] be-
cause of the excessive dues that Union charges us each
month and because it has not come through on its
promises to increase job opportunities for us– and not
because Comau, Inc. in the last year or so unilaterally
implemented new terms of employment for us includ-
ing the Company health care plan.

We also declare by our signatures below that we want
to be represented by the Comau Employees' Associa-
tion, and we request that Comau, Inc. immediately
begin recognizing the Comau Employees' Association
as our collective bargaining representative.

6 The Board did not pass on the Regional Director’s finding of a
causal nexus between the Respondent’s unfair labor practice and the
employees’ disaffection, and instead found that the affirmative bargain-
ing order in Comau I precluded a question concerning representation
from being raised.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2296
103 of the then-178-member bargaining unit signed the
petition (58 percent).7 On December 22, 2009, Yale deliv-
ered the petition to human resources manager Fred Begle,
who verified the signatures and determined that it had been
signed by a majority of the unit employees. On the same
day, the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union
and granted recognition to the CEA. The Respondent and
the CEA subsequently negotiated a collective-bargaining
agreement, which by its terms is effective from December
22, 2009, to April 13, 2013.
II.
The Board has long held that an employer may not
lawfully withdraw recognition from a union where it has
committed unfair labor practices that have a tendency to
cause the loss of union support. Olson Bodies, Inc., 206
NLRB 779, 780 (1973). The Board considers several
factors in determining whether such a causal relationship
exists: (1) the length of time between the unfair labor
practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the na-
ture of the illegal acts, including the possibility of their
detrimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) any possi-
ble tendency to cause employee disaffection from the
union; and (4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on the
employees' morale, their organizational activities, and
membership in the union. Master Slack Corp., 271
NLRB 78, 84 (1984).
The judge found that all four of the above factors sup-
port a finding that there is substantial causal connection
between the Respondent’s unremedied unfair labor prac-
tice found in Comau I and the Union’s subsequent loss of
majority support reflected in the disaffection petition.
We agree with the judge, for the reasons stated in his
decision and for the additional reasons stated below.
As to the first factor, 9 months passed between the Re-
spondent’s implementation of the new health care plan
and the circulation of the disaffection petition. While
this is a relatively long period, contrary to the Respond-
ent and our dissenting colleague, it does not preclude a
finding of a causal relationship,8 especially where, as

7 The parties stipulated that there were 178 employees in the bar-
gaining unit on December 22, 2009. No stipulation was offered con-
cerning the number of employees in the bargaining unit on April 14,
2009, when the decertification petition was filed. However, according
to the judge’s unexcepted to factual finding, the bargaining unit was
comprised of approximately 234 employees on that date.
8 Tenneco Automotive, Inc., 357 NLRB 953, 960 (2011) (causal con-
nection found where unfair labor practices occurred 11 months before
withdrawal of recognition); Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services,
346 NLRB 1319, 1328–1329 (2006) (finding that a 6–8 month period
was not too long to preclude finding a causal connection); AT Systems
West, 341 NLRB 57, 60 (2004) (causal connection found where unfair
labor practice occurred 9 months before withdrawal of recognition);
Columbia Portland Cement v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1992)
(same, passage of 1 year).
here, the violation is ongoing, rather than an isolated
occurrence. The employees in this case were reminded
throughout the 9-month period of the unilateral imple-
mentation of the healthcare plan by significant recurring
deductions from their paychecks to cover insurance pre-
miums. In these circumstances, the passage of time
would not dissipate the coercive effect of the unfair labor
practice on the unit employees.
As to the second and third factors, we find that the na-
ture of the violation was such that it was likely to have a
detrimental and lasting effect on employees and to cause
employee disaffection from the Union. The Respond-
ent’s unilateral change in healthcare substantially
affected all, or nearly all, unit employees and it di-
rectly impacted their compensation. In this regard,
the employees went from paying no health insurance
premium to hundreds of dollars every month in some
cases.9 It follows that such a change would under-
mine the employees’ confidence in the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative. Priority One
Services, 331 NLRB 1527, 1527 (2000) (finding that 9.5
percent increase in health insurance premiums had a ten-
dency to cause erosion of union support, and thus tainted
decertification effort, because the change “substantially
affect[s] all unit employees and directly impact[s] em-
ployee compensation, one of the fundamental subjects
concerning which employers must bargain pursuant to
Section 8(d) of the Act.”); Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 336
NLRB 1066, 1067–1068 (2001) (finding that unilateral
reduction in waiting-time and lost-time pay had a ten-
dency to undermine employees’ confidence in the union
and to cause erosion of union support); Powell Electrical
Mfg. Co., 287 NLRB 969, 976 (1987), enfd. as modified
906 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 1990) (unilateral imple-
mentation of contract offer without valid impasse con-
tributed to employee disaffection and tainted petition on
which withdrawal of recognition was predicated); Page
Litho, Inc., 311 NLRB 881 (1993) “It is well settled that
the real harm in an employer's unilateral implementation
of terms and conditions of employment is to the Union's
status as bargaining representative, in effect undermining

9 For these reasons, we disagree with our dissenting colleague’s view
that the implementation of the Respondent’s plan could not realistically
have had a lasting detrimental effect on the unit employees, and we find
LTD Ceramics, Inc., 341 NLRB 86, 88 (2004), cited by him, to be
distinguishable. In LTD Ceramics, the Board found no causal nexus
between the employees’ disaffection and the respondent’s premature
implementation of an improved attendance policy that was sought by
the union and had been tentatively approved by the parties in their
contract negotiations. Here, in contrast, the Union vigorously opposed
the healthcare plan that was implemented by the Respondent, and the
implemented plan was not an improvement over the previous plan,
which was offered free of cost to the employees.
COMAU, INC. 2297
the Union in the eyes of the employees.” (citing NLRB v.
C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 430 fn. 15 (1967)).
Further, as the Board found in Penn Tank Lines, supra,
“[w]here unlawful employer conduct shows employees
that their union is irrelevant in preserving . . . their wag-
es, the possibility of a detrimental or long-lasting effect
on employee support for the union is clear.” Id. at 1067.
As to the final factor, the record shows that the Re-
spondent’s unlawful conduct adversely affected employ-
ee morale and the Union’s organizational activities and
membership. Indeed, the implementation of the new
insurance plan appears to have directly affected employ-
ees’ support for the Union. Examination of the decertifi-
cation petition reveals that between February 19 and Feb-
ruary 28, 2009, 84 of the approximately 234 bargaining
unit employees signed the decertification petition (36
percent). Nearly all (78) of the 84 signatures were ob-
tained on a single day February 19. Between February
19—and February 28, only 6 new signatures were added.
On March 1, a Sunday, the Respondent implemented the
new healthcare plan. On Monday, March 2, 13 new sig-
natures were added, 21 more signatures were added be-
tween March 3 and 10. The additional 34 signatures
obtained after March 1, resulting in a majority, repre-
sented about 15 percent of the bargaining unit. This se-
quence of events supports the inference that the Re-
spondent’s implementation of the new healthcare plan
was a substantial factor motivating employees to sign the
petition after March 1. No other reason has been offered
to explain the sudden resurgence of interest in the decer-
tification petition.10

10 The conclusion that the unlawful implementation of the healthcare
plan added significantly to the disaffection that began when the Re-
spondent initially announced its intention to implement the plan in
December 2008, is confirmed by committeeman Malloy’s testimony
that, while members of the bargaining unit were upset when the Re-
spondent announced that it was imposing its last best offer, once the
insurance premiums began coming out of the employees’ checks in
March 2009, the employees “wanted to fry us. They wanted to fry the
committee, they wanted to fry Pete [Reuter] and Darrell [Robertson]
. . . because we were promised all along that . . . they would work to
keep us from having to pay anything.” Rushing, who circulated the
decertification petition, also testified that beginning in March 2009,
somewhere between 20 and 50 employees approached him while he
had the decertification petition “in [his] hand” to express their discon-
tent over the unlawfully implemented healthcare plan.
As found by the judge, the employees’ discontent was kept alive
during the 9 months between the implementation of the new healthcare
plan on March 1, 2009, and the circulation of the disaffection petition
in December 2009, through the weekly payroll deductions for insurance
premiums and through the unfair labor practice hearing in Comau I, in
November 2009. Darrell Robertson testified in the latter regard:
Q. BY MS. PRING KARPINEN: Was the membership aware of
the unfair labor practice hearing that was held over the healthcare
issue in November of 2009?
. . . .
In sum, applying all of the Master Slack factors to the
instant facts, we agree with the judge that a causal rela-
tionship has been shown between the Respondent’s un-
lawful unilateral change and the Union’s subsequent loss
of majority support. Accordingly, the unilateral change
tainted the petition.11
On exceptions, the Respondent primarily argues that
the judge erred in finding that the unfair labor practice
caused the employees’ disaffection, because the disaffec-
tion arose prior to, and independently of, the Respond-
ent’s unlawful conduct. In this regard, the Respondent
points out that the decertification effort began in Decem-
ber 2008 and was largely completed before the
healthcare plan was implemented on March 1, 2009.
Accordingly, the Respondent argues that the unlawful
implementation of the healthcare plan could not have
caused the disaffection.
The Respondent’s argument is faulty both legally and
factually. The Board has held that it will only examine
the factors that were actually relied upon by an employer
when determining the adequacy of an employer’s defense
to a withdrawal of recognition allegation. In RTP Co.,
334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001), enfd. 315 F.3d 951 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 811 (2003), the Board ex-
plained:

In analyzing the adequacy of an employer's de-
fense to a withdrawal of recognition allegation, the
Board will only examine factors actually relied on
by the employer. Conduct of which the employer
may have been aware, but on which the employer
did not base its decision to withdraw recognition
from the Union, is of no legal significance.
Here, we find, contrary to the Respondent's con-
tention, that the February 25 employee petition was
the true cause of the Respondent's decision to with-
draw recognition from the Union. . . .
. . . The Respondent did not withdraw recogni-
tion because of “other factors” of which it was
aware. Instead, as the judge stated, “the Respondent

THE WITNESS: After it happened, it was discussed at every
meeting.
Q. BY MS. PRING KARPINEN: How many employees would
you say brought that matter up to you, the matter of unfair labor
practice hearing?
A. I mean, I couldn't count. Many, you know, just to me per-
sonally probably over 40.
The hearing, while it may have also promised a remedy, served to
remind employees of the Resondent’s unilateral change in the health
benefits.
11 Like the judge, we therefore find it unnecessary to pass on the
Acting General Counsel’s allegation that the disaffection petition was
tainted by the involvement of nonsupervisory leadmen acting with the
apparent authority of the Respondent.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2298
did not feel confident withdrawing recognition from
the Union until it had confirmation regarding the
withdrawal petition.”
The Respondent's “other factors” are irrelevant
because the Respondent did not rely on them in
withdrawing recognition. Inasmuch as the record
shows that none of the “other factors” played any
part whatsoever in the Respondent’s decision, we
find that they have no legal significance. Id. (Foot-
note, citations, and internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)

As in RTP, the Respondent here withdrew recognition
based on the December 2009 disaffection petition alone,
and not based on “other factors” (such as the April decer-
tification petition). In its December 22, 2009, Notice to
Employees that it was withdrawing recognition from the
Union and extending recognition to the CEA, the Re-
spondent explained that “the Company received today a
group of petitions signed by a substantial majority of
employees in the ASW unit, which requested that the
Company withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC
Union and instead recognize the [CEA] as their exclusive
collective-bargaining representative.” The notice went
on to state that the Respondent had “checked and verified
all of the signatures on the petitions” and “determined
that this change in bargaining representative is desired by
a clear majority of the employees in the unit.” The no-
tice did not refer to or rely on other evidence of disaffec-
tion that arose prior to the Respondent’s unfair labor
practice. Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry in this
case is whether there is a causal nexus between the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practice and the December 2009
disaffection petition. Other evidence of disaffection of
which the Respondent may have been aware, but on
which the Respondent did not base its decision to with-
draw recognition from the Union, is of no legal signifi-
cance under Board law.
Moreover, we would reach the same result in this case
even if we were to consider the preexisting evidence of
disaffection—i.e., the decertification effort. As dis-
cussed above, the evidence establishes that the decertifi-
cation effort was driven by the Respondent’s announce-
ment in December 2008 that it intended to implement the
new healthcare plan. Committeeman Baloga, who
helped prepared the decertification petition, was asked
at the hearing, “[W]hat prompted these discussions
about the decertification petition,” and he responded,
“guys [were] bombarding [the committee] daily with
their dissatisfaction of this contract and the way it's
going with the medical” and “we seen what was com-
ing with the insurance, and that was probably the
final straw.” (Emphasis added.) Baloga testified
further:
Q. You talked about dissatisfaction in early '09
that you heard at executive committee meetings. . . .
A. Yes.
Q. And you mentioned only the insurance being
an issue?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's because the company announced in
December [2008] that it was implementing the in-
surance?
A. Correct. (Emphasis added.)

It is true, as the Respondent points out on exceptions, that
the Respondent’s announcement (and subsequent conduct
aimed at preparing employees for the implementation of the
healthcare plan) was not itself unlawful. However, given
the close link between the announcement of the new
healthcare plan and its subsequent implementation, we think
it is reasonable to infer that if the Respondent had bargained
in good faith over the alternative healthcare plan proposed
by the Union, instead of going forward with the implemen-
tation of its own healthcare plan despite the absence of an
agreement or a bona fide impasse, much of the discontent
that originally provoked the decertification effort would
have been defused.
We also find no merit in the Respondent’s argument
that the judge improperly ignored or minimized the tes-
timony of employees that they rejected the Union for
reasons other than the new healthcare plan. The Re-
spondent argues that this testimony precludes any finding
of a causal nexus between the Respondent’s unlawful
conduct and the Union’s loss of majority support. The
Board has held, however, “that it is the objective evi-
dence of the commission of unfair labor practices that
has the tendency to undermine the union, and not the
subjective state of mind of the employees, that is the rel-
evant inquiry in this regard.” Bunting Bearings Corp.,
349 NLRB 1070, 1072 (2007), quoting AT Systems West,
341 NLRB 57, 60 (2004). In other words, the Board’s
usual approach is to assess the tendency of unfair labor
practices to cause disaffection, instead of relying on em-
ployees’ recollection of subjective motives for withdraw-
ing support from the union.12 Hence, the testimony of

12 Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342 NLRB 434, 434 fn. 2 (2000) (“The
Master Slack test is an objective one . . . [t]he relevant inquiry at the
hearing does not ask employees why they chose to reject the Union.”);
C.F. Martin & Co., 252 NLRB 1192, 1192 fn. 2 (1980) (specifically
disavowing reliance on employees’ “subjective testimony” about the
relative importance of unremedied unfair labor practices in their deci-
sion to withdraw support from the union). See also Wire Products Mfg.
Corp., 326 NLRB 625, 627 fn. 13 (1998), enfd. mem. sub nom. NLRB
v. R.T. Blankenship & Associates, 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the Board applies an objective, not a subjective, test). While the
COMAU, INC. 2299
employees concerning the relative importance of the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practice in their decision to with-
draw support from the Union is irrelevant under extant
Board law, as is the language on top of the December
2009 disaffection petition stating that the signatories
were not motivated to sign the petition by the unlawful
implementation of the new healthcare plan.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the employees’
subjective reasons for rejecting the Union, some of the
reasons given are entirely consistent with a finding that
the disaffection was causally related to the Respondent’s
unlawful conduct. Several employees testified, for ex-
ample, that they felt union dues were too high. Others
testified that they were disappointed with the Union’s
failure to deliver on its promise of greater bargaining
strength following the Union’s affiliation with the
MRCC in 2007. The evidence establishes that the em-
ployees’ resentment over dues and the Union’s broken
promises were strongly linked to the Respondent’s an-
nouncement and implementation of the new healthcare
plan. As discussed above, when the Union affiliated
with the MRCC in March 2007, dues increased from $20
per month to $20 per month plus 2 percent of wages.
Yale testified that the employees were willing to the pay
the increased dues because, among other things, they

Board did not “disturb” the judge’s reliance on petition signers’ testi-
mony in Master Slack, supra, 271 NLRB at 78, fn.1 and 84–85, it did
not do so only in the “context” of violations committed 10 years before
the signing of the petition, which had been significantly remedied be-
fore the circulation of the petition.
Applying these same principles, we find that the judge did not abuse
his discretion by refusing to allow testimony from up to 90 additional
employees regarding their reasons for withdrawing support from the
Union. As the Board recently explained in SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC,
357 NLRB 79, 83 (2011):
To the extent that an employer seeks to elicit employee testimony
about their reasons for signing documents supporting or rejecting a
union, the Board and the courts have long recognized the inherent un-
reliability of such testimony. As the Supreme Court observed in up-
holding the Board’s rule prohibiting employers from demanding em-
ployee testimony explaining why they signed authorization cards,
“employees are more likely than not, many months after a card drive
and in response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony
damaging to the union, particularly where company officials have
previously threatened reprisals for union activity in violation of §
8(a)(1).” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969).
Consequently, in logic that applies equally here, the Court explained
that questioning employees about the subjective motives for their rep-
resentation preferences would result in “endless and unreliable in-
quiry.” Id.; see also Ladies Garment Workers Local 153 v. NLRB, 443
F.2d 667, 668–669 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For those reasons, as well, we
are unwilling to subject petition signers to ex post facto examination
about their reasons for supporting decertification.
See also Hopkins Nursing Care Center, 309 NLRB 958, 958 fn. 4 (1992)
(test for conduct warranting setting aside election results is objective; the
Board asks whether the conduct has the tendency to interfere with employ-
ees’ freedom of choice and the employees’ subjective reaction is irrelevant).
believed the Union would have more bargaining strength
after the affiliation.

Q. Was the promise of jobs as you've just de-
scribed, was that one of the reasons for the ac-
ceptance of those very significantly greater dues that
the MRCC would be charging?
A. That and the fact that we were going to get all
kinds of help in bargaining our contracts and have a
little more strength than just being a small affiliate,
not an affiliate union.

The employees put up with the higher dues from
March 2007 until early 2009. When it began to appear
that the affiliated Union would not be able to prevent the
implementation of the new healthcare plan, however, the
employees felt that they were not getting the increased
bargaining strength they were paying for. This is reflect-
ed in employee Andy Katsiyiannis’ testimony when
asked why he signed both the decertification petition and
the disaffection petition:

I felt I wasn't represented by the MRCC, by the
ASW. . . . [A]ll they had been doing is taking mon-
ey. . . . [N]one of the promises that were ever made
ever came through. It didn't matter what it was.
I mean, one of the main things when we first got
into this union was they were going to save money
on our health insurance, and that cost savings with
the company was going to be—the company would
save money, plus we'd get a raise out of the deal.

In the same vein, employee Richard Mroz testified that he
was willing to pay the increased dues because he thought
the affiliation would benefit the employees. However, he
became disenchanted with the leadership of the Union when
it failed to deliver on its promises with respect to,
among other things, healthcare:

A. [P]romises, a lot of things that they said that
they were going to do did not . . . happen. I wasn't—
I wasn't confident they were doing enough for me as
a member.
Q. And what did—like what kinds of things?
. . . .
A. The insurance, it just seemed kind of funny
that if we wanted to get or go through the insurance
through the MRCC, why would the company stop
that? I just couldn't understand it.

Employees were also upset over the prospect of having
two large deductions from their paychecks. As employee
Timothy Robertson testified, employees were willing to
tolerate a payroll deduction for either dues or health in-
surance premiums, but they were not willing to tolerate
both:
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2300

The issue of healthcare started coming up about middle
of negotiations, and, you know, with the talk of dues
and everything, . . . what I was hearing was that it's ei-
ther-- . . . . Guys were upset. It was either dues or in-
surance payments.

Bologa similarly testified:

Q. Now, it is a fact also that you heard a lot of
dissatisfaction about the ASW and its representation
of people, did you not?
A. I've heard all kinds of reasons, right.
Q. Including about the dues structure?
A. The dues along with the insurance was a big
problem. (Emphasis added.)

We acknowledge that a number of employees testified
that they were dissatisfied with the Union for reasons
wholly unrelated to the new healthcare plan. Several
employees testified, for example, that they were upset
over the Union’s failure to protect unit jobs, to provide
jobs for laid-off members, and/or to provide job training.
Other testified that they were upset over the transfer of
funds from the ASW treasury to the MRCC treasury.
However, the Board has never held that in order for a
nexus to be established under the Master Slack causation
test, the employer’s unfair labor practices must be the
only factors causing disaffection. As the Board held in
Hillhaven Rehabilitation Center, 325 NLRB 202, 205
(1997), “Evidence that [an employee] initiated the peti-
tion effort for reasons other than the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices, or that these reasons may also have influ-
enced other employees who signed the petition does not
negate the factors supporting the finding of a causal rela-
tionship between the Respondent’s unlawful conduct and
the employees’ expression of disaffection,”) vacated in
part on other grounds sub nom. Rehabilitation &
Healthcare Center of Cape Coral v. NLRB, 178 F.3d
1296 (6th Cir. 1999). See also Tenneco Automotive, su-
pra, 357 NLRB 953, 961 (finding causal nexus between
disaffection and employer’s unfair labor practices, de-
spite evidence that other factors may have contributed to
the disaffection.). Here, the record establishes that the
Respondent’s unfair labor practice was a substantial and
aggravating cause of the Union’s loss of majority sup-
port, even if it was not the only cause.
Finally, the Respondent contends that the decision to
pursue the disaffection petition in December 2009 was
born out of frustration that the Union had “block[ed] the
employees’ much-desired vote” on whether to decertify
the Union, by filing unfair labor practice charges over the
implementation of the new healthcare plan. This argu-
ment finds support in the testimony of Rushing and Yale
that by December 2009, employees were growing angry
over the Board’s lack of action on the decertification
petition, and they chose to pursue the disaffection peti-
tion as a means of self-help. In making this argument,
however, the Respondent ignores the critical role that its
own conduct played in precluding a decertification elec-
tion.13 Had the Respondent not unlawfully implemented
the new healthcare plan, the Board presumably would
have processed the petition and held an election. Exam-
ined in this light, the link between the Respondent’s un-
fair labor practice and the disaffection petition is clear.
In short, we find that a preponderance of the evidence
(both objective and subjective) supports the judge’s con-
clusion that there is a causal connection between the Re-
spondent’s unfair labor practice and the Union’s subse-
quently loss of majority support. Accordingly, we adopt
the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5), (2), (3), and (1) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition from the Union based on the tainted disaffec-
tion petition and thereafter recognizing the CEA and en-
tering into a collective-bargaining agreement with the
CEA containing a union security clause.14

13 The Respondent emphasizes that the decertification petition had
garnered enough signatures to require an election before the unfair
labor practice occurred. This argument misses the point. The Re-
spondent’s unlawful implementation of the new healthcare plan in the
absence of an agreement or a bona fide impasse undermined the Union
in the eyes of the employees and made the Union appear powerless.
The unlawful conduct affected all, or nearly all, of the unit employees,
and it had a lasting and detrimental impact on their compensation. In
these circumstances, we have little difficulty in concluding that a fair
election could not have been held while the Respondent’s unfair labor
practice remained unremedied, even assuming the Board had not dis-
missed the petition for other reasons. See, e.g., NLRB Casehandling
Manual (CHM), Sec. 11730, setting forth the Board’s policy of holding
in abeyance the processing of any representation petition where an
unfair labor practice charge is filed alleging conduct which, if proven,
would have a tendency to interfere with the free choice of employees in
an election. See also Big Three Industries, 201 NLRB 197 (1973);
United States Coal & Coke Co., 3 NLRB 398 (1937).
14 We note that the judge analyzed the need for an affirmative bar-
gaining order under the criteria set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. We adopt the judge’s analysis of
this issue, and agree that the requirements of the court for an affirma-
tive bargaining order have been met in this case. We adhere, however,
to the view that an affirmative bargaining order is “the traditional,
appropriate remedy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful
collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of employ-
ees.” Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64, 68 (1996).
We find that the judge properly ordered the Respondent to withhold
recognition from the CEA “unless and until that labor organization has
been certified by the Board.” See NLRB v. Mine Workers District 50
(Bowman Transportation, Inc.), 355 U.S. 453 (1958). We further find
that the judge properly ordered the Respondent to restore recognition to
the ASW, even though the ASW has ended its affiliation with the
MRCC and has affiliated with the Carpenters Industrial Council (CIC).
See generally The Raymond F. Kravis Center for the Performing Arts,
351 NLRB 143 (2007), enfd. 550 F.3d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding
COMAU, INC. 2301
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent Employer, Comau, Inc.,
Southfield, Michigan, and its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, and the Respondent Union, Comau Employ-
ees Association, Southfield, Michigan, and its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.

MEMBER HAYES, dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority's adoption of the judge's
finding that Respondent Comau, Inc. violated Section
8(a)(5), (2), (3), and (1) of the Act when it withdrew
recognition from Automated Systems Workers Local
1123 (ASW), and then recognized and entered into a
collective-bargaining agreement with the Comau Em-
ployees Association (CEA). Contrary to the judge's con-
clusion, I would find that, under the applicable Master
Slack1 analysis, the Respondent’s implementation of a
new healthcare plan on March 1, 2009, did not taint the
unit employees’ December 22, 2009 petition supporting
the Respondent’s actions. I would therefore dismiss all
but one complaint allegation relevant to this matter.2
I. BACKGROUND OF FACTS
ASW was an unaffiliated union until it merged with
the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(MRCC) on March 31, 2007. After the merger, the unit
employees’ dues deduction increased from $20 a month
to $20 a month plus 2 percent of pay.
Contract Negotiations. With the collective-bargaining
agreement expiring in March 2008, the Respondent and

that when there is a union merger or affiliation, an employer’s obliga-
tion to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union continues unless
the changes resulting from the merger or affiliation are so significant as
to alter the identity of the bargaining representative). The Respondent
does not contend that the ASW’s identity has changed so significantly
as a result of its disaffiliation from the MRCC and affiliation with the
CIC as to alter its identity.
1 Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984).
2 The CEA did not file exceptions and the Respondent did not pro-
vide supporting argument specific to the judge's finding that the Em-
ployer violated Sec. 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(3) and that the CEA violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2), respectively, by extending and accepting recog-
nition and by entering into a collective-bargaining agreement at a time
when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of the unit
employees. Nevertheless, all of these unfair labor practices turn on the
contested finding that the Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition
from ASW. In light of my dissent, I would reverse the judge's finding
as to these issues.
I agree with majority that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
telling employees that they could be disciplined or discharged for not
signing dues-checkoff authorization forms, and that it is unnecessary to
pass on additional allegations of coercive statements because such
findings would be cumulative and would not affect the remedy.
the Union commenced negotiations for a successor
agreement in January 2008. The Respondent's initial
proposed healthcare plan required the employees to pay
health insurance premiums for the first time, and at sig-
nificant amounts. On August 22, 2008, the Union pro-
posed that the Respondent contribute instead to the
healthcare plan underwritten by the MRCC, and the Re-
spondent was open to this suggestion.
The parties failed to reach agreement, and the Re-
spondent declared impasse on December 3, 2008. The
Respondent stated that it would implement most of its
last best offer, and subsequently implemented its last best
offer on December 22, 2008. However, it announced
that the proposed new healthcare plan would not be im-
plemented until March 1, 2009.
Notwithstanding the impasse, the Respondent and Un-
ion continued to negotiate about a healthcare plan until
March 20. At the same time, the Respondent continued
to discuss the plan with employees and prepare the pa-
perwork. The Union assisted the Respondent in signing
up employees for the new plan because it was concerned
that there could be a gap in coverage if an agreement was
not reached. Ultimately, the Respondent implemented its
plan on March 1.
The Board addressed the parties’ negotiations in an
earlier proceeding and found that the impasse with regard
to the healthcare plan was broken in January 2009 when
the Respondent increased its proposed contributions to
the MRCC plan. Consequently, the Board found that the
Respondent unlawfully implemented the new healthcare
plan.3
The Decertification Petition
After the Respondent announced that it was imple-
menting its last best offer, employees began to voice
their discontent with the Union. Employee discontent
was not limited to the impending health insurance premi-
ums. Employees expressed discontent with the Union's
inability to negotiate a new contract; the higher dues; the
Union's failure to provide promised training and job
placements; the Union's failure to protect the employees’
jobs from other contractors and members of other unions;
and the handling of approximately $250,000 in ASW’s
treasury prior to the merger.
A decertification petition was circulated in February
2009. By February 28, 36 percent of the bargaining unit
had signed the petition. After the Union promised to
place employees who had been laid off into other jobs,
the filing of the petition was delayed. However, when
the job placements did not materialize, the petition was
filed with the Board on April 14, 2009, with the signa-

3 Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB 75, 83 (2010).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2302
tures of 51 percent of the bargaining unit. When the Un-
ion met with employee Willie Rushing (who circulated
the petition) to discuss the reasons for the decertification
petition, Rushing repeated the concerns expressed by the
employees (described above). Rushing added that he had
concerns about the quality of the MRCC healthcare plan
and thought the proposal was made belatedly. On March
11, 2011, almost 2 years later, the Board denied the Re-
spondent's Request for Review of the Regional Director's
December 14, 2010 dismissal of the decertification peti-
tion, finding that the affirmative bargaining order in Co-
mau I precluded a question concerning representation
from being raised.
The Disaffection Petition
In December 2009, employees started circulating an-
other petition. This disaffection petition stated that the
employees wanted to be represented by the CEA and
requested that the Respondent recognize it. The petition
included language stating that the signers were not moti-
vated by the implementation of the new health insurance
plan.4 When the petition was delivered to the Respond-
ent on December 22, 2009, 58 percent of the bargaining
unit had signed the petition. The same day, the Re-
spondent withdrew recognition from the Union and rec-
ognized the CEA. In April 2010, the Respondent and the
CEA negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement,
which is effective from December 22, 2009, through
April 13, 2013. This new agreement maintained the new
healthcare plan implemented by the Respondent on
March 1, 2009.5
II. ANALYSIS
The Board has long held that an employer may not
withdraw recognition from a union based on employee
disaffection if there is a causal nexus between the disaf-
fection and unremedied unfair labor practices. AT Sys-
tems West, Inc., 341 NLRB 57, 59 (2004) (citing Olson
Bodies, Inc., 206 NLRB 779, 780 (1973)). Other than in
cases involving a general refusal to recognize and bar-
gain, the Board requires “specific proof of causal rela-
tionship” between the unfair labor practice and the loss
of support. Lexus of Concord, 343 NLRB 851, 852
(2004) quoting Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp.,
322 NLRB 175, 177 (1996), enfd. in relevant part and

4 Of the 20 employee witnesses who were permitted to testify, 3 cit-
ed the implementation of the new healthcare plan as the reason for their
disaffection. Four other employees cited it as a source of dissatisfac-
tion but not the only source.
5 On February 10, 2011, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan denied the Acting General Counsel’s
request for a 10(j) injunction, finding no evidence that that implementa-
tion of the new healthcare plan led to the disaffection petition. I had
declined to authorize this 10(j) request.
remanded in part 117 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To
make this determination, the Board considers four fac-
tors: (1) the length of time between the unfair labor prac-
tices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of
the violations, including the possibility of a detrimental
or lasting effect on employees; (3) the tendency of the
violation to cause employee disaffection; and (4) the ef-
fect of the unlawful conduct on employees’ moral, or-
ganizational activities, and membership in the union.
Master Slack Corp., supra, 271 NLRB at 84. Under this
test, I find that there is insufficient evidence of a causal
nexus between the Respondent’s implementation of a
new healthcare plan and the employees’ disaffection peti-
tion.
First, the implementation of the new healthcare plan
was remote in time from the disaffection petition, which
was circulated and submitted to the Respondent in De-
cember 2009, 9 months after implementation of the
plan.6 Secondly, particularly in the factual context of this
case, the possibility that the Respondent's implementa-
tion of a new healthcare plan could have a detrimental or
lasting effect on employees is limited. It is the only un-
fair labor practice at issue here, and in cases involving
unilateral changes to benefits, the Board regularly relies
on other unfair labor practices to find a causal nexus.7
This is not a situation where the Respondent engaged in
bad-faith bargaining that could undermine the ASW in
the eyes of the employees. Quite the opposite, the parties
had been negotiating for over a year when the Respond-
ent implemented the new healthcare plan, and they con-
tinued to negotiate until about 3 weeks later. It was ob-
vious from these negotiations that there was going to be a
change from the existing healthcare plan, either to the

6 While the Board has found causal nexus where at least 9 months
had passed between the unfair labor practice and the withdrawal of
recognition, those cases involved additional and more pervasive unfair
labor practices. See e.g., AT Systems West, supra (causal nexus found
where nine months passed between employer’s unlawful solicitations to
decertify and direct dealing and withdrawal; only three months had
passed between parties’ settlement agreement and withdrawal); Colum-
bia Portland Cement Co., 303 NLRB 880 (1991), enfd. 979 F.2d 460,
465 (6th Cir. 1992) (causal nexus found where employer withdrew
recognition a year after it was ordered to reinstate unlawfully dis-
charged employees and accept strikers’ offers to return to work). Con-
trary to the majority, I would not render consideration of this factor
nugatory in any instance of a unilateral change because of its continu-
ing nature.
7 See e.g., Goya Foods, 347 NLRB 1118 (2006) (causal nexus found
where unfair labor practices include unilateral changes in work condi-
tions and discharge of three active union employees and suspension and
underemployment of a fourth); Penn Tank Lines, 336 NLRB 1066
(2001) (causal nexus found where unfair labor practices include unilat-
eral reduction in employee pay and discharge of active union support-
er).
COMAU, INC. 2303
Respondent’s proposed plan or to the MRCC plan.8 In
fact, the ASW assisted the Respondent with signing up
employees for the new healthcare plan because it was
concerned that there could be a gap in coverage if the
parties did not reach agreement. Further, as stated above,
there were some employee misgivings about the MRCC
plan. Viewed in this context, the implementation of the
Respondent’s plan could not realistically have had a last-
ing effect or more than a modest detrimental effect, if
any, on unit employees. See LTD Ceramics, Inc., 341
NLRB 86, 88 (2004) (causal nexus not found where uni-
lateral change was a premature implementation of a ten-
tatively approved and improved policy after over a year
of negotiations).
Third, the Respondent's implementation of the new
healthcare plan did not have a tendency to cause employ-
ee disaffection. To the extent that the judge relied on
Priority One Services, 331 NLRB 1527 (2000), to essen-
tially find that the single unfair labor practice here had
the inherent tendency to cause employee disaffection,
that notion was overruled by the Board in Saint Gobain
Abrasives, Inc., 342 NLRB 434 (2004).9 In light of the
parties’ lengthy negotiations as discussed above, and
evidence of preexisting disaffection (discussed below), it
is unlikely that the implementation of the new healthcare
plan here had the tendency to cause employee disaffec-
tion by itself.
Finally, the implementation of the new healthcare plan
did not lead to the decline in employee morale and par-
ticipation in the Union’s activities and membership. Ev-
idence that employee disaffection arose prior to, and in-
dependently of, the unfair labor practice is relevant to the
inquiry of causal nexus, and here, there is substantial and
undisputed evidence that employee disaffection with the
Union existed prior to the implementation of the new
healthcare plan.10 Lexus of Concord, supra, 343 NLRB

8 Thus, the effect of the unilateral healthcare plan change was not,
as the majority suggests, an increase in payments from zero to hundreds
of dollars for unit employees.
9 The Board stated that “the real test is whether there is a causal nex-
us between the change and the loss of support for the Union. The use
of a conclusionary phase can be no substitute for an evidentiary inquiry
into this matter. To the extent that Priority One Services is to the con-
trary, it is overruled.” Id., supra at 434, fn. 4.
10 The majority dismisses the evidence of preexisting disaffection
stating that, under RTP Co., 334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001), enfd. 315 F.3d
951 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 811 (2003), the Board can
only examine factors that were actually relied upon in evaluating a
defense to a withdrawal of recognition. Since the Respondent with-
drew recognition based on the December 2009 disaffection petition, the
majority finds that evidence of preexisting disaffection, i.e., the decerti-
fication petition, are of no legal significance. The majority’s reading of
RTP is unduly restrictive. Obviously, the disaffection petition did not
arise out of a vacuum. The facts show, and the majority even recogniz-
es, that the disaffection petition is inextricably linked to the decertifica-
at 852–853 (no causal nexus found where there was evi-
dence of preexisting disaffection at least two months
before the unfair labor practice). In addition to the
healthcare premiums, the employees expressed discon-
tent with the Union's effectiveness at bargaining; the high
dues; the Union's failure to provide promised training
and job placements; the Union's failure to protect mem-
bers from losing jobs to competing employees; and the
handling of the $250,000 in ASW’s treasury. In fact,
only three of the 20 employee witnesses cited the imple-
mentation of the new healthcare plan as the reason for
their disaffection.11
Furthermore, the judge and the majority ignore the
possibility that employee disaffection could have been
caused by the ASW’s actions as the employees’ bargain-
ing representative. With higher dues, employees reason-
ably had high expectations for the ASW. In addition to
the concerns described above, employees questioned the
quality of the MRCC healthcare plan, which also was not
proposed until 8 months into negotiations. Significantly,
the ASW was unable to negotiate a successor agreement
after a year of negotiations, and the Respondent declared
a lawful impasse. It is at least as likely that the ASW’s
poor performance as a bargaining representative caused
employee disaffection.
In sum, I would find that under the Master Slack test,
there is insufficient evidence to establish that a causal
nexus exists between the Respondent's implementation of
the new healthcare plan and the disaffection petition.
Consequently, the Respondent did not improperly rely on
the disaffection petition, signed by 58 percent of the em-
ployees, to withdraw recognition from the ASW and to
recognize the CEA as the employees’ majority choice for
collective-bargaining representation on December 22,
2009.

tion effort. To the extent that the reasons that drove the decertification
effort are evidence of preexisting disaffection, they are relevant to the
inquiry of causal nexus. Lexus of Concord, supra at 852–853.
11 The majority finds that the judge did not improperly ignore this
testimony because the subjective state of mind of the employees for
rejecting the Union is irrelevant. Saint Gobain, supra at 434 fn. 2.
However, the decertification petition and the employees' testimony
expressing disaffection with the Union are objective evidence of preex-
isting employee disaffection. Id. (number of employees who expressed
dissatisfaction with union prior to unilateral change in healthcare bene-
fits is an objectively ascertainable factor to be considered in determin-
ing causation).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2304
Sarah Pring Karpinen and Darlene Haas Awada, Esqs., for the
Acting General Counsel.
Thomas G. Kienbaum and Theodore R. Opperwall, Esqs., of
Birmingham, Michigan, for the Respondent Employer
(Comau).
M. Catherine Farrell and David J. Franks, Esqs., of Bloom-
field Hills, Michigan, for the Respondent Union (CEA).
Edward J. Pasternak, Esq., of Southfield, Michigan, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEOFFREY CARTER, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, from August 31–September 3,
2010, and from September 16–17, 2010. The charge in Case 7–
CA–52614 was filed on December 29, 2009, and was amended
on January 8, 2010. The charge in Case 07–CA–02939 was
filed on May 20, 2010, and was amended on July 8, 2010, and
further amended on July 23, 2010. The charge in Case 07–CB–
016912 was filed on May 20, 2010, and was amended on June
9, 2010, and further amended on July 8, 2010. The consolidat-
ed amended complaint was issued on July 30, 2010, and alleges
that Comau, Inc. (Comau or Respondent Employer (RE)) vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the Act by: failing and
refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Au-
tomated Systems Workers Local 1123 (ASW, ASW/MRCC1 or
Charging Party); dominating and interfering with the admin-
istration of, and rendering unlawful assistance to, a labor organ-
ization; discriminating against employees and thus encouraging
membership in a labor organization; and interfering with, re-
straining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The consolidated amended
complaint also alleges that the Comau Employees Association
(CEA or Respondent Union (RU)) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (b)(2) of the Act by: restraining and coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; and
attempting to cause Comau to discriminate against its employ-
ees such that Comau would violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Both Comau and the CEA filed timely answers denying the
alleged violations in the consolidated amended complaint.
This case follows on the heels of Case 07–CA–052106, de-
cided by Administrative Law Judge Paul Bogas on May 20,
2010, and adopted by the Board on November 5, 2010. See
Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB 75 (2010). During trial, I took judicial
notice of the legal and factual findings in Judge Bogas’ deci-
sion, and advised the parties that they could make any relevant
arguments about those findings (including the weight that the
findings should carry). Those findings became binding authori-
ty when the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rulings, findings, and
conclusions, and adopted his remedy and recommended order
(with minor modifications to each that are not relevant to my
analysis).

1 The ASW/MRCC abbreviation is used for all time periods during
which the ASW was affiliated with the MRCC.
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs3 filed

2 The trial transcript is generally accurate, but I make the following
corrections to clarify the record: (a) at Tr. 203–845, all references to
“Harry Hale” should read “Harry Yale”; (b) at Tr. 484, L. 23, “away”
should be “weight”; (c) at Tr. 601, L. 1, “Carey” should be “Harry”; (d)
at Tr. 643, L. 3, “not” should be “reflect”; (e) at Tr. 797, L. 19, “Kim
Kayka” should be “Jim Kayko.” In addition, at various points in the
transcript, the record did not record (or mislabeled) the charging party’s
attorney’s (Ed Pasternak) responses to my inquiries about objections to
exhibits. The record should reflect that I admitted the following two
exhibits into evidence over the charging party’s objection: RE Exhs. 12,
15. Finally, I note that while the exhibit files generally are correct, I
excluded Acting GC Exhs. 22 and 25–30 from the record (those exhib-
its were erroneously placed in the admitted exhibits file).
3 I have also considered the posttrial motions filed by the parties.
The Acting General Counsel filed a motion to substitute the table of
contents and table of authorities in its posttrial brief. Given the fact that
the Acting General Counsel only seeks to make clerical corrections to
its brief, and given that no other party has opposed the motion, I will
grant the Acting General Counsel’s request and will include the revised
table of contents and table of authorities in the post-trial materials that
will be forwarded to the Board if any exceptions are filed.
On October 8, 2010, Comau filed a motion to supplement the record
with the transcript and exhibits from an October 5, 2010 deposition of
David Baloga in connection with a 10(j) petition that is currently pend-
ing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan. The proffered records included cover sheets from the
ASW/MRCC’s meetings in 2008 (showing the number of members
who attended each meeting), and Mr. David Baloga’s posttrial deposi-
tion testimony about those documents. The Acting General Counsel
opposed Comau’s motion, and I denied Comau’s motion to supplement
the record in an order dated October 14, 2010.
In its posttrial brief, Comau (in part) asked me to reconsider my rul-
ing on its motion to supplement the record. See RE Br. at 15. The
Acting General Counsel, meanwhile, filed a motion to strike section C
of Comau’s posttrial brief on the theory that Comau argued evidence
that is outside of the record. Given these filings, I have reviewed my
decision to deny Comau’s motion to supplement the record, and I stand
by my decision to deny Comau’s motion to supplement. Comau made
a strategic decision during trial not to introduce the ASW/MRCC 2008
meeting attendance figures into evidence, and it cannot now introduce a
new issue at trial that it could have litigated in the original hearing. See
RE Br. at 14; compare Winkle Bus Co., 347 NLRB 1203, 1211 fn. 4
(2006) (ALJ permitted the General Counsel to supplement the record
with an exhibit that, by prior agreement, the Respondent did not pro-
vide until after trial, and that corrected an error in another exhibit al-
ready admitted into the record). More important, however, the issue is
moot. As noted below, I have determined that although meeting at-
tendance figures may be relevant as a general matter to showing a
causal link between an unfair labor practice and a subsequent loss of
union support. See Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984), the
limited ASW/MRCC meeting attendance figures that were admitted
into evidence in this case are not sufficiently reliable for me to draw
any meaningful conclusions about whether the various attendance
fluctuations resulted from Comau’s unfair labor practice. See infra, fn
15.
Finally, I have decided to grant in part and deny in part the Acting
General Counsel’s motion to strike section C of Comau’s posttrial
brief. Baloga’s posttrial affidavit has not been admitted into the record,
and thus I will strike the portions of Comau’s brief that refer to the
affidavit’s contents. See RE Br. at 15. Similarly, I will strike the por-
tions of Comau’s brief that characterize the contents of RE Exh. 11,
because the contents of that rejected exhibit were never placed on the
COMAU, INC. 2305
by the Acting General Counsel, Respondent Employer, and
Respondent Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Employer Comau operates plants in the Detroit,
Michigan area to design, build, sell, and install automated in-
dustrial systems. In 2009, Respondent Employer derived gross
revenue in excess of $1 million, and sold goods and provided
services valued in excess of $50,000 from its Michigan facili-
ties directly to customers located outside of Michigan. Re-
spondent Employer admits, and I find, that at all material times
it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent Union
admits, and I find, that at all material times it has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I
also find that, at all material times, the Charging Party has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.4
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
A. Comau’s Organizational Structure
Comau, Inc. designs and builds automated equipment (tool-
ing systems, robotic applications, etc.) for a variety of custom-
ers, including Chrysler, General Motors, Ford Motor Company.
Comau’s headquarters are located in Southfield, Michigan, and
additional facilities are located in Novi, Michigan. Tr. 102,
573–576.
At each facility, Comau generally has departments that are
led by supervisors. Each department is separated into work
centers (or teams), each of which has an assigned “leader” who
(among other qualifications) is able to provide team and indi-
vidual leadership for the other employees in the work center,
and is highly skilled and experienced in the work that employ-
ees carry out in the work center.5 Tr. 580, 594–595, 599; GC
Exh. at 45–52. There are approximately 30 leaders in the bar-
gaining unit, each of whom receives a slightly higher wage
(approximately one additional dollar per hour) for performing

record. See RE Br. at 14. The Acting General Counsel’s motion to
strike is denied as to the remaining portions of Section C of Comau’s
brief, because the remaining portions of Section C are arguments that
Comau made in anticipation of a contrary argument that the Acting
General Counsel might make in its own posttrial brief.
4 Both Comau and the CEA admit that from 2001 to March 2007, the
ASW (formerly known as the PICO Employees Association) was a
labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Testimony presented
at trial demonstrated (without dispute) that the ASW continued its
status as a labor organization from March 2007 to the present. (Tr. pp.
103–104, 367) On March 1, 2010, the ASW changed its affiliation
from the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters (MRCC) to the
Carpenters Industrial Council (CIC). Notwithstanding this change, the
ASW continued its affiliation with the United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters, and retained its same officers. Tr. 104.
5 Many of the shop floor employees also have several years of expe-
rience, though they have not taken on the role of leader. Tr. 602.
the leader position.6 Tr. 592–593. Several leaders have simul-
taneously served as union officers. Tr. 123–126, 384–385,
1044–1045.
When projects come to Comau, the design group outlines the
project as a whole, and then managers assign the work needed
to complete that project to one or more of the work centers. Tr.
590–591. As the project proceeds, leaders receive instructions
through an automated computer system, and then communicate
those instructions to the individual workers on their teams. Tr.
600–601.
Leaders perform a variety of functions in connection with
their role as the intermediaries between the employees in their
work centers and management. When they first receive work
assignments and the corresponding blueprints, leaders may
request specific employees to be assigned to their teams. Tr.
601, 604, 1005. Leaders also attend a project kickoff meeting
with a representative from management and the project manag-
er. Tr. 609, 873, 1005. Once the leader’s team is assembled,
the leader assigns specific tasks to individual employees. Tr.
266–267, 606, 682, 874, 1140–1141. As the team members
carry out their assignments, the leader facilitates the overall
project by consulting with the designers as needed, and provid-
ing instructions to the team members about new assignments,
work revisions and corrections, or about how specific tasks
should be performed. Tr. 165, 189, 216–217, 270–272, 340–
341, 437–438, 445–446, 606, 1008. Leaders also stay in con-
tact with management by attending weekly leader meetings and
periodic manpower meetings, and by providing verbal updates.
Tr. 256, 424–425, 440–441, 608, 610–611.7
Leaders also serve as the beginning and end points for com-
munication between employees on the shop floor and manage-
ment. Leaders generally initiate nonconformance reports to
advise management (via a computer database) about problems
or defects in work product that require additional time or mon-
ey to repair. Tr. 697–700. When management decides to au-
thorize overtime for a project, leaders may recommend em-
ployees to perform the overtime work, and leaders notify the
individual employees who have been selected to work the over-
time hours. Tr. 167, 275–277, 443, 612–613, 689–690; GC
Exh. 5. Similarly, employees wishing to take a day off must
first obtain their leader’s approval (and signature on an “absen-
tee report” form) before the paperwork is forwarded to the shop
foreman (or another supervisor) for final signature and approv-
al. Tr. 272–273, 615, 618–619; Respondent Employer (“RE”)
Exh. 14. In some instances, employee leave requests have been
approved without obtaining the supervisor’s signature, leaving
the leader as the only individual to sign the request. Tr. 620–

6 Before March 2001, leaders were identified as supervisors in the
collective-bargaining agreement. Tr. 969. That changed in March
2001 (at the Union’s request), when the new collective-bargaining
agreement was modified to describe leaders as employees who take on
the responsibility of individual and team leadership in particular areas.
Tr. 969–970; Respondent Union (RU) Exh. 9 at 43–47.
7 To carry out these responsibilities, leaders are provided some
equipment that is not generally provided to other employees on the
shop floor. Specifically, leaders have desks on the shop floor, tele-
phones, and have computers with password access requirements. Tr.
264, 647–648, 653, 701, 995, 999–1000, 1006, 1008–1010.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2306
621; GC Exhs. 40 (Grayson); 41 (Sobeck); and 42 (Constan-
tine).8
B. Union History at Comau
For a number of years (dating back to at least the 1980s), the
PICO Employees Association (PEA) served as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative for all full-time and regular
part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors
and field service employees (hereafter, the bargaining unit) at
Comau (and at Comau’s predecessor, Progressive Tool and
Industries Co. (PICO)).9 Tr. 102–103, 236, 861. The PEA was
not affiliated with a larger union—instead, it was solely com-
posed of Comau employees. In 2004, the PEA changed its
name to the ASW, but otherwise maintained its leadership,
bylaws and overall structure. Tr. 140, 757, 862.
In 2007, the ASW began exploring the possibility of affiliat-
ing with a larger union. After gauging the interest of various
larger unions in such an affiliation, the ASW decided to affili-
ate with the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the
MRCC).10 Tr. 103; GC Exh. 34. Proponents of the merger
hoped that the affiliation with the MRCC would (among other
things) enhance the ASW’s bargaining strength, and also in-
crease training and job opportunities for members of the bar-
gaining unit. Tr. 762–763, 1012, 1051, 1117; RU Exh. 2; RE
Exh. 13 (pp. 590–592). On the other hand, opponents of the
merger expressed concerns about the substantial increase in
union dues (an increase from $20 per month to the ASW, to
$20 per month (to the ASW) plus an additional 2 percent of all
wages (excluding vacation) per month to the MRCC), how the
balance in the ASW treasury (approximately $250,000) would
be handled, and the wisdom of associating with a union of car-
penters given that the ASW bargaining unit was composed of
machinists, and given that the MRCC already had several
members laid off. Tr. 723–724, 863–867, 974, 1013–1014,
1017–1018, 1111.

8 Occasionally, Comau has called upon individual leaders to take on
specific additional responsibilities. For example, in connection with its
hiring decisions, management asked leader James Reno to review ap-
plicant résumés and provide his opinion about the applicant’s ability to
operate the company’s boring mills. Tr. 658–659, 669; GC Exhs. 46–
48. In another instance, leader Nelson Burbo communicated with an
outside vendor to arrange a meeting about options for upgrading the
Company’s equipment. Tr. 695; GC Exh. 50.
9 During the relevant time period, the bargaining unit was defined as:
“[a]ll full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance em-
ployees, inspectors and field service employees, employed by [Comau]
at and out of its facilities located at 20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph
Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi,
Michigan; and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located at
21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all office
clerical employees, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.”
Comau, 356 NLRB 75, 76 fn. 2. The current bargaining unit is sub-
stantially similar, though the language was modified slightly after Co-
mau recognized the CEA as the unit’s collective bargaining representa-
tive. GC Exh. 1(bb) at 2.
10 The MRCC is also referred to as the Millwrights. Tr. 355–356.
The terms were used interchangeably during the trial.
The ASW bargaining unit voted to approve the merger with
the MRCC, effective March 31, 2007. Tr. 103, 867. In con-
nection with the merger, the ASW underwent the following
changes: a) executive board members Pete Reuter and Darrell
Robertson terminated their employment with Comau and be-
came full time employees of the MRCC (they also continued to
serve on the ASW/MRCC’s executive board); and b) the ASW
became subject to the MRCC’s bylaws. Tr. 142, 764–765,
769–770, 1018–1019.11
C. Contract Negotiations—2008–2009
In 2008, the ASW and Comau began negotiations for a new
collective-bargaining agreement, since the existing agreement
(effective from March 7, 2005 to March 2, 2008) was due to
expire. Tr. 809–810; GC Exh. 32. The parties extended the
collective-bargaining agreement through December 21, 2008,
while negotiations proceeded. Jt. Exh. 2. The issue of health
insurance coverage became a sticking point between the parties.
Comau, 356 NLRB 75, 77. Under the previous collective-
bargaining agreement, incumbent unit employees were not
required to pay any premiums for the company-provided
healthcare coverage. Although Comau used a self-insured
health plan, the coverage was provided through Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross). Under Comau’s proposed
contract, Comau would still be self-insured and coverage would
still be provided through Blue Cross, but the unit employees
would be required to pay health insurance premiums for cover-
age. Id.
The amounts of the proposed employee premiums were sig-
nificant. Comau’s last best offer provided that each employee’s
premium payment would be between $57.28 and $453.05 per
month, depending on the level of benefits chosen, the type of
coverage (individual, two-person, or family), and the extent of
the cost increases during the term of the contract. The employ-
ees could also pay an additional $321.04 to $507.26 per month
to obtain coverage for a child between 19 and 25 years of age.
Comau’s new plan also reduced the employees’ coverage in
some respects. Id.
At a December 3, 2008 bargaining session, Comau declared
that the parties were at impasse, gave 14 days notice that it was
canceling the contract extension, and stated that it would im-
pose its last best offer on December 22 when the prior contract
ceased to apply. During this same timeframe, Comau sent a
letter to bargaining unit employees to describe the key changes
that would be imposed on December 22. In addition to notify-
ing the unit about new rules regarding tardiness, seniority, over-
time pay and other issues, Comau also notified employees that,
effective March 1, 2009, it would no longer offer the existing
health insurance plans, but would instead offer healthcare cov-
erage though other, employee-paid premium-required, medical
plans. Comau, supra at 4; see also. Jt. Exhs. 1, 2.
Notwithstanding Comau’s declaration of impasse, Comau
and the ASW continued to negotiate about health insurance.
Specifically, from December 8, 2008, through March 20, 2009,

11 The ASW/MRCC still maintained its old bylaws, but to the extent
that those conflicted with the bylaws of the MRCC, the MRCC bylaws
controlled.
COMAU, INC. 2307
the parties (using healthcare insurance subcommittees) met on
approximately 10 occasions for negotiations regarding
healthcare insurance. Each party’s subcommittee had the au-
thority to enter into tentative agreements regarding employee
health insurance, subject to final approval by the union mem-
bership (as to the ASW) and by Comau’s full negotiating com-
mittee and/or upper management. Comau, supra at 5. Among
other proposals, the subcommittees discussed the
ASW/MRCC’s suggestion that Comau stop paying to finance
its own self-insured health insurance plan and instead make
contributions to help cover the cost of insuring unit employees
under a health insurance plan provided through the MRCC.12
Id. In particular, the parties discussed the amount that Comau
would pay to the MRCC plan for the employees’ health insur-
ance on a weighted average per-employee basis. Id. Comau
initially offered (on December 8, 2008) to pay a weighted aver-
age of $766 per employee/per month, and on December 18,
2008, increased its contribution offer to $820 per employee/per
month. Id.
Any prior impasse regarding healthcare ceased to exist on
January 7, 2009, when Comau made a written proposal that
significantly increased the per employee contribution that Co-
mau was offering to make to provide coverage under the
MRCC health insurance plan. Comau, supra at 9. Not only did
Comau increase its contribution offer on January 7, 2009 (the
weighted average is not known)—it again increased its contri-
bution offer (in response to an ASW counteroffer) on February
5, 2009 (to a weighted average of $835 per employee per
month).13 Id. at 5 fn.13. Meanwhile, Comau continued to pre-
pare for implementing its new health insurance plan (as out-
lined in the imposed last best offer) in January 2009, as it met
with unit employees to discuss the plan and complete the pa-
perwork needed to enroll employees in the plan. Id. at 4; Tr.
937, 941.
D. Early 2009—Employees Circulate a Decertification
Petition and Comau Unilaterally Implements Its
New Health Insurance Plan
In the weeks after Comau announced that it would be impos-
ing its last best offer, employees began to voice their unhappi-
ness with the ASW/MRCC. The prospect of paying significant
health insurance premiums was a prominent concern, since the
new premiums would be yet another deduction from employee
paychecks. Tr. 186–187, 399–400, 772, 817, 833–834, 1151–
1152; RE Exh. 13, pp. 542, 554–555, 561–562, 568, 576–577,
586, 595. However, other latent discontent with the
ASW/MRCC also rose to the surface, as various employees
believed (in different degrees) that the ASW/MRCC: was not

12 The anticipated benefit of this proposed arrangement would be
that unit employees would be spared the cost of paying for health insur-
ance premiums, while Comau would realize a savings in cost since its
contributions to the MRCC healthcare plan would be lower that the
amount that Comau was paying to maintain its self-insured healthcare
plan.
13 Negotiations continued from this point until March 20, 2009. The
ASW essentially agreed to the $835 per employee/per month contribu-
tion amount that Comau offered, but other issues remained unresolved.
Comau, supra at 5–6, 9.
effective in attempting to negotiate a new contract (Tr. 186–
187, 1117–1118); charged unduly high dues that came with
little or no resulting benefit to the bargaining unit (Tr. 400, 740,
773, 1110, 1157; RE Exh. 13, pp. 554–555, 571, 578, 613);
failed to deliver on its promises to provide bargaining unit
members with training and job placements (Tr. 825, 1050,
1110–1112, 1133, 1153, 1195–1196; RE Exh. 13, pp. 592–593,
604, 610–612); did not protect bargaining unit members from
losing job openings at Comau to contractors or members of
other unions (Tr. 776–778, 1203–1204; RE Exh. 13, pp. 529–
530, 610–611); and improperly claimed the entire balance of
the ASW dues account (approximately $250,000) at the time of
the March 2007 merger (Tr. 741–742, 1111).
In January 2009, the ASW/MRCC executive committee (mi-
nus Darrell Robertson and Pete Reuter) met to discuss how to
respond to the concerns expressed by various members of the
bargaining unit about the ASW/MRCC. Tr. 375, 774, 778–779.
After some discussion, the executive committee researched the
process for decertifying the ASW/MRCC (including consulting
with an NLRB employee and obtaining materials from the
NLRB website), and committee members Dave Baloga and
Dan Malloy prepared a decertification petition. Tr. 376–377,
780–781, 1021–1022.
On February 18, 2009, employee Frederick Lutz signed a
written request that the ASW executive committee initiate de-
certification proceedings from our ASW 1123/UBC/MRCC
representation. RU Exh. 1; Tr. 726–727. Based on that re-
quest, the executive committee members began gathering em-
ployee signatures (including their own) on the decertification
petition, and also on individual forms authorizing the CEA to
serve as the bargaining unit’s collective bargaining representa-
tive. Tr. 782, 787, 1023; RU Exhs. 3, 8. However, later in
February 2009, the executive committee transferred the respon-
sibility of circulating the petition to employee Willie Rushing,
after being warned (by Pete Reuter) that any executive commit-
tee member who circulated the petition could (among other
things) be sued or disciplined by the ASW/MRCC. Tr. 787–
788, 790–791, 879–880, 940–941. Once Rushing received the
petition and the accompanying authorization for representation
forms, he turned the materials over to unit employees who
passed the materials around in Comau’s facilities to obtain
additional signatures.14 Tr. 880–881, 886. Bargaining unit
employees who signed the decertification petition in February
2009 were aware that the new health insurance plan and premi-
ums would take effect on March 1, 2009. RE Exh. 13, pp. 554–
555, 557–558, 560, 574, 585.
On March 1, 2009, Comau unilaterally implemented the new
health insurance plan contained in its imposed last best offer.
Comau, supra at 9. As the Board has found, Comau’s unilateral
action was an unfair labor practice because the ASW/MRCC
had not agreed to the health insurance plan, and because the
previously declared impasse (declared by Comau in December

14 While the petition circulated, ASW/MRCC executive committee
members who signed the petition subsequently redacted their names
and signatures from the petition, citing ongoing concerns that the ASW
would take action against them for participating in the decertification
effort. Tr. 886–887, 1048, 1173, 1181.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2308
2008) was subsequently broken by (at the latest) January 2009
when Comau and the ASW/MRCC resumed negotiations about
employee health insurance. Id.
In the 9 days that followed Comau’s unlawful unilateral ac-
tion, 3415 additional employees signed and dated the decertifi-
cation petition. RU Exh. 3. In addition, employee discontent
with the ASW/MRCC intensified.16 As Daniel Malloy testi-
fied, while members of the bargaining unit were upset in De-
cember 2008 when Comau imposed its last best offer, once the
health care premium money came out of the checks in March
2009, the bargaining unit employees “wanted to fry us. They
wanted to fry the committee, they wanted to fry Pete [Reuter]
and Darrell [Robertson] . . . because we were promised all
along that . . . they would work to keep us from having to pay
anything.” Tr. 833.
Rushing returned the completed decertification petition and
authorization for representation forms to Dan Malloy. Tr. 887.
Initially, Malloy (with the agreement of others) decided to de-
lay filing the petition in hopes that the ASW/MRCC would
deliver on some new promises (by Reuter) to place employees
who had been laid off from Comau in other jobs. Tr. 793–794,
888, 1025; RE Exh. 13, pp. 602–603. When those job place-
ments did not materialize, Rushing retrieved the petition from

15 The decertification petition in the record has been redacted to
eliminate the names and addresses of the employees who signed the
document (thus leaving only the date of signature). Tr. 886–887. To
the extent that ASW/MRCC executive committee members signed the
petition, those signature lines were fully redacted (by members of the
ASW/MRCC) to obscure the entries in full, including the date of signa-
ture. The count (34) of signatures entered on or after March 1, 2009,
referenced herein does not include any of the fully redacted entries
(whether made by the executive committee or otherwise) on the peti-
tion. The petition as a whole contains 105 signatures (again, excluding
the 13 fully redacted entries), most of which were entered on February
19, 2009. RU Exh. 3. I note that although I am not including the 13
redacted petition entries in my calculations (since the redactions ren-
dered the entries null and void), my analysis would remain the same
even if the 13 redacted entries were counted.
16 The Acting General Counsel presented the cover sheets of
ASW/MRCC meeting minutes to demonstrate the change in
ASW/MRCC meeting attendance in this time period (and to suggest
that the decline in attendance was caused by the March 1 unfair labor
practice). The cover sheets reflect the following attendance figures:
January 7, 2009 (62 members attended); January 22, 2009 (69 mem-
bers); February 4, 2009 (45 members); February 24, 2009 (50 mem-
bers); March 4, 2009 (35 members); April 1, 2009 (29 members); May
6, 2009 (26 members); June 3, 2009 (32 members); July 1, 2009 (32
members); August 5, 2009 (29 members); September 2, 2009 (28
members); and November 3, 2009 (12 members). See GC Exhs. 9–13,
15–21. I have given limited weight to these meeting attendance figures
because while the numbers do show a downward trend in 2009, the
record does not include attendance figures from 2008. Without the
comparison data from 2008, I cannot rely on the meeting attendance
figures to conclude with any confidence that attendance declined be-
cause of (among other possibilities) Comau’s unfair labor practice on
March 1, routine fluctuations that occur every year, or because of a
spike in attendance (and then a return to normal levels) after Comau
imposed its last best offer in December 2008.
Malloy and filed the decertification petition with the NLRB on
or about April 14, 2009. Tr. 888.17
E. Employee Discontent Persists as Employees Await
Action on Decertification Petition
In May 2009, Rushing met with MRCC director Doug Buck-
ler to discuss the rationale for the decertification petition. Con-
sistent with the concerns expressed by other employees, Rush-
ing told Buckler (and also Reuter) that he was unhappy with:
the MRCC’s failure to provide training in skilled trades that it
promised; the fact that the MRCC issued him a journeyman
card that was limited to the ASW, and thus had little to no val-
ue in making him eligible for other jobs; the high cost of
MRCC union dues; the transfer of the ASW dues account bal-
ance to the MRCC; and the quality of the MRCC health insur-
ance that the ASW/MRCC proposed in negotiations (belatedly,
in Rushing’s view) as an alternative to Comau’s health insur-
ance plan. Tr. 914–921. Rushing also continued to monitor the
status of the decertification petition periodically at the NLRB
because he was getting pressure from bargaining unit employ-
ees, particularly when employees received another paycheck
with ASW/MRCC union dues deducted. Tr. 891.
F. December 2009 Disaffection Petition
On November 19, 2009, Comau, the ASW and Rushing par-
ticipated in a Saint Gobain hearing before Judge Bogas in Case
07–RD–003644 regarding decertification petition and pending
charges. See RE Exh. 13; see also Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342
NLRB 434 (2004). The decertification petition ultimately
stalled.
In late 2009, Rushing obtained the contact information for a
consulting firm to seek assistance with the pending decertifica-
tion petition. Tr. 894–895, 1026. Rushing passed the consult-
ant’s information on to Harry Yale.18 Tr. 895. With the con-
sultant’s assistance, Yale prepared a disaffection petition (a/k/a
“Dana” petition), as well as a revocation of dues-checkoff au-
thorization form. Tr. 1027; RU Exhs. 6, 7. Each page of the
disaffection petition contained the following language at the top
of the page:

We, the employees of Comau, Inc. in the bargaining unit of
the Automated Systems Workers Local 1123 (a Division of
the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters) declare by our
signatures below that we no longer want to be represented by
that Union, and we request that Comau, Inc. immediately stop
recognizing that Union as our collective bargaining repre-
sentative.

We no longer want to be represented by the Automated Sys-
tems Workers Local 1123 (a Division of the Michigan Re-
gional Council of Carpenters) because of the excessive dues

17 The parties have stipulated that on December 22, 2009, there were
178 employees in the bargaining unit. There was no stipulation pro-
posed or offered about the unit’s membership on April 14, 2009. How-
ever, the evidence in the record indicates that the bargaining unit in-
cluded between 234 and 237 employees as of April 14, 2009. RE Exh.
13, pp. 527, 600.
18 Yale served as an ASW/MRCC executive committee member un-
til July 2009, when he lost his bid for reelection to the committee.
COMAU, INC. 2309
that Union charges us each month and because it has not
come through on its promises to increase job opportunities for
us—and not because Comau, Inc. in the last year or so unilat-
erally implemented new terms of employment for us includ-
ing the Company health care plan.

We also declare by our signatures below that we want to be
represented by the Comau Employees’ Association, and we
request that Comau, Inc. immediately begin recognizing the
Comau Employees’ Association as our collective bargaining
representative.

RU Exh. 6.
On December 15, 2009, Yale placed copies of both the disaf-
fection petition and revocation of dues-checkoff forms in bind-
ers, and placed the materials on his desk at Comau for employ-
ees to review and sign on their break time.19 Tr. 897–898,
1029–1030. On his own time, Yale also took the binders to
other Comau facilities in the area for members of the bargain-
ing unit to review and sign the petition and dues-checkoff revo-
cation form. Id. At each facility, employees generally passed
the materials around for review, but occasionally did so during
work time. Tr. 1065–1066, 1112, 1124, 1140. The petition
generally was circulated without much discussion, other than
describing the petition as a document about getting out of the
union. Tr. 158, 1124, 1153–1154. Some employees testified
that they did read the language at the top of the disaffection
petition before they signed the document. Tr. 1116, 1133–
1134, 1142, 1202–1203.
Employee Rich Mroz, however, had a somewhat different
experience with the disaffection petition. As Mroz explained,
initially one of his leaders (Nelson Burbo) at the Novi facility
approached him and advised him about the disaffection petition
that was circulating. Burbo then asked Mroz if he was happy
with the ASW/MRCC, to which Mroz responded that although
he was not happy with the Union, he thought it might be a bad
time to get out of the Union in light of the ongoing dispute with
Comau about health insurance benefits. Tr. 158–159. On an-
other day, another leader (James Reno) invited Mroz (who was
on his work time) to speak to Yale, who was visiting the facili-
ty. Mroz agreed to speak with Yale, and reiterated his concern
that it might be a bad time for the disaffection petition. Yale
did not disagree with that opinion, but asserted that the MRCC
was not going to get anywhere with its efforts to recover the
money that members of the bargaining unit spent to pay the
new health insurance premiums. Tr. 160–161. Mroz also
asked if his leaders signed the petition,20 to which Yale replied

19 In this same time period, several employees objected to the fact
that MRCC dues were deducted from their annual holiday check. By
tradition, Comau closes its facilities for a period of time in December,
and issues its employees a holiday check for a predetermined number
of hours as a bonus payment. Tr. 898. Although MRCC dues were
deducted from holiday checks in 2007 and 2008, several employees
objected when MRCC dues were deducted from holiday checks in
2009, and expressed frustration that the April 2009 decertification
petition remained unresolved. Tr. 899, 903, 1217–1219; GC Exh. 55.
20 Mroz expressed concern about going against the opinion of his
leaders about the petition, and thus running the risk of the leaders tak-
ing an adverse action against him as a result. Tr. 162–163, 165.
that Mroz’s leaders did sign the petition, as did a majority of
employees in the unit. Tr. 162. Mroz agreed to sign the peti-
tion after confirming that his brother also signed the document,
but noted that the information he received from Yale did influ-
ence his decision to sign. Tr. 162–163, 192.
On or about December 21, 2009, Yale received the complet-
ed disaffection petition and revocation of dues-checkoff author-
ization forms.21 See RU Exh. 6 (final signatures dated Decem-
ber 21, 2009). Yale notified Comau human resources director
Fred Begle on December 21 or 22 that he planned to give him
the documents, and actually delivered the materials to Begle on
December 22, 2009. Tr. 1076, 1085, 1088; RE Exh. 1 at 12.
Begle accepted the petition, and advised Yale that he (Begle)
would verify the signatures on the petition.22 Tr. 1032, 1085,
1088. Begle then compared the signatures on the disaffection
petition with sample signatures obtained from individual em-
ployee files, and determined that 103 members of the bargain-
ing unit (out of a total of 178 employees in the unit) signed the
disaffection petition. Tr. 964–965, 1076–1078; RE Exh. 1 at
27.
On December 22, 2009, after verifying the signatures on the
disaffection petition, Comau notified the bargaining unit that a
majority of employees in the unit requested that Comau with-
draw recognition from the ASW/MRCC Union and instead
recognize the Comau Employees’ Association (CEA) as the
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative. Jt. Exh.
4; see also Jt. Exh. 5. Accordingly, effective December 22,
2009, Comau withdrew recognition from the ASW/MRCC,
stopped withholding ASW/MRCC dues from the paychecks of
unit employees, and immediately recognized the CEA as the
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative. Id.
G. The CEA Becomes the Unit’s Collective-Bargaining
Representative
In February 2010, the CEA elected the following individuals
as its officers: Yale (president); Rushing (secretary); Jeffrey H.

21 Other than the acts of its alleged agents (Yale, Burbo, and Reno)
as described herein, there was limited evidence that Comau facilitated
or participated in the circulation of the disaffection petition. Baloga
testified that he saw two employees on layoff status approach the bind-
er with the petition, but the record does not show that Comau gave
those individuals access to the shop floor (as opposed to an employee
using his or her own scan card to allow access, or a Comau clerical
employee allowing access without management’s knowledge). Tr.
286–288, 628–629, 949. Similarly, while Baloga testified that Comau
generally enforced rules for when materials can be circulated on the
shop floor, there is no evidence that Comau officials knew the disaffec-
tion petition was being circulated before December 21, 2009, and de-
cided not to enforce the rules for circulating such materials. Tr. 284–
285, 353. I have considered an excerpt from Comau’s position paper
(read by the Acting General Counsel into the record as an admission by
a party opponent) on the latter issue, and do not find a basis to conclude
that Comau was aware that the disaffection petition was being circulat-
ed before the petition was nearly (if not fully) completed. See RU Exh.
6 (indicating that most employees signed the petition on or before De-
cember 18, 2009, shortly after the document began circulating).
22 Begle asked Yale to keep the revocation of dues-checkoff authori-
zation forms while the signatures on the petition were being authenti-
cated. Yale delivered the revocation of dues-checkoff forms to Begle
on January 11, 2010. Tr. 1032–1033.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2310
Brown (vice president); Fred Lutz (treasurer); Jim Morabito
(committeeman); Chris Economides (committeeman); and Jim
Kayko (committeeman). Tr. 729; 907–908; 981; 1038; 1174–
1075. The CEA and Comau subsequently negotiated a new
collective-bargaining agreement that was then ratified by the
CEA membership in April 2010. Tr. 217–218, 907–908, 1040;
Jt. Exh. 3 (noting that the contract was effective from Decem-
ber 22, 2009 through April 13, 2013). The collective-
bargaining agreement included the following union security
clause:

a) Seniority employees shall be required, as a condition of
continued employment, to become dues paying members of
the [CEA]. Dues will be collected by the Company the last
week of each month by payroll deduction. Any uncollected
dues for the current month will be reported to the CEA by the
Company. The CEA will then specify which of those uncol-
lected dues must be collected from the November vacation
pay check each year or as soon as administratively possible.
The Company will remit payment of collected dues to the
CEA by wire transfer, to the CEA bank account, within seven
(7) days or as soon as possible as it becomes administratively
possible.

b) In addition to the above, non-seniority employees with
more than thirty (30) days service shall be required, as a con-
dition of continued employment, to become dues paying
members of the association.

Jt. Exh. 3 at 1–2.23
H. The CEA Asks Employees to Sign Dues-Checkoff
Authorization Forms
In May 2010, CEA committeemen distributed union dues-
checkoff authorization forms for employees to sign to authorize
Comau to collect dues by automatic payroll deduction. Tr.
982–83; RE Exhs. 6, 9(a). Several employees signed the form
without objection. Tr. 983. However, some employees (at
least initially) declined to sign the form.24 One such employee

23 The 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agreement between the
ASW and Comau contained a similar provision. GC Exh. 32 at 2.
24 In connection with this issue, the Acting General Counsel present-
ed a chain of emails provided by ASW/MRCC President Darrell Rob-
ertson. See GC Exh. 6. Part of that exhibit includes an email sent on
May 14, 2010, by Comau administrative assistant Jill Opasik to various
Comau personnel (including Fred Begle, Duane Jerore, and James
Kayko). Opasik’s email listed employees who had not signed a dues-
checkoff authorization form, and stated that the employees could be
terminated if they did not sign the form by May 18, 2010. Id. at 2.
Another portion of the email chain suggests that Jerore forwarded
Opasik’s email to five employees (Al Redd, Ronald Krieger, Gary
Hilliker, James Wheeler, and Robert Fox). Id. at 1. However, in the
text of Jerore’s message, he referred the employees to a notice that was
apparently attached to his email, but was not entered into the trial rec-
ord. Id.
I have given little weight to GC Exh. 6 for the following reasons: (a)
no testimony was offered about Opasik’s role with Comau or her au-
thority to speak for Comau as an agent, and thus the content of her e-
mail is hearsay; and (b) the Acting General Counsel did not call any of
the five employees who purportedly received Jerore’s forwarded mes-
sage to testify as witnesses during the trial, and thus the record contains
was Nizar “Bill” Akkari, a machinist who was working at the
Novi facility. Tr. 215–216. In May 2010, Akkari was ap-
proached on two occasions by Jim Kayko, who asked Akkari if
he was willing to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.
Akkari refused on both occasions. Tr. 220–221, 986–987.
After the second refusal, Kayko advised Akkari that he would
probably need to speak to Fred Begle about the issue. Tr. 221,
988. During Akkari’s next shift at work, the night-shift super-
visor (Matthew Parsons) notified Akkari that Begle was at the
Novi facility and wished to speak with him. Tr. 222. Akkari
accordingly met with Begle (and Parsons) in an available of-
fice, and Begle advised him that he would be terminated if he
did not sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.25 Begle did
not offer Akkari any option to pay union dues by any other
means besides automatic payroll deduction. Tr. 223–224, 227.
Akkari relented and signed the dues-checkoff authorization
form.26 Tr. 218–219; GC Exh. 37.
Employee Gasper Calandrino reported a similar experience
at the Jefferson North Assembly Plant, one of Comau’s field
service locations.27 Tr. 410. In May 2010, Site Supervisor
Duane Jerore advised Calandrino that he should review a dues-
checkoff authorization form, sign it, and return the form to him.
Calandrino complied with Jerore’s request, but since he did not
want dues deducted from his paycheck (preferring instead to
pay dues in person and receive a receipt), Calandrino wrote on
the form “I do not authorize the company to payroll deduct.”
Tr. 413. Jerore agreed to turn the annotated form in to Fred
Begle,28 but advised Calandrino that “[y]ou could be disci-

no information (beyond the uncorroborated exhibit itself) about what
information these employees ultimately received from Jerore.
25 I have credited Akkari’s account of this conversation. Begle was
present in the courtroom during Akkari’s testimony (as one of Comau’s
designated assistants), and did not dispute Akkari’s account when he
later testified as one of Comau’s witnesses. Tr. 1084. I have consid-
ered the fact that Comau impeached Akkari’s testimony on a narrow
point, insofar as Akkari incorrectly asserted that he never before was
required to sign a dues-checkoff authorization form (compare Tr. 231
with RE Exhs. 19–20), but that limited impeachment did not undermine
the credibility of Akkari’s overall testimony, which was corroborated
by other witnesses and was not contradicted by Begle.
26 Dave Baloga also testified that Kayko approached him about sign-
ing a dues-checkoff authorization form. According to Baloga, he reluc-
tantly signed the form after being told that the contract prevented him
from simply paying dues in cash at union meetings. Tr. 290; GC Exh.
38. Kayko, meanwhile, testified that Baloga simply signed the form
when asked to do so, saying, I might as well. Tr. 989; see also Tr. 447
(Christopher Bloodworth testimony that in February 2010, Jeffrey H.
Brown approached both him and Baloga about the dues-checkoff au-
thorization form. Both Bloodworth and Baloga refused to sign the form
at that time); Tr. 982–983 (describing Kayko’s efforts to ensure that he
asked employees about the dues-checkoff authorization form “in the
right way”). The limited testimony offered about Baloga’s exchange
with Kayko was equally credible and plausible, and thus I have afford-
ed the testimony equal weight.
27 Periodically, Comau assigns employees to off-site locations to
work on projects. The assignments are field service assignments. Tr.
411.
28 It is not clear what happened to the form that Calandrino annotat-
ed. No annotated form was presented at trial or entered into the trial
record.
COMAU, INC. 2311
plined or up to a discharge on something like that,” and added
that “chances are we’ll probably get a phone call from Fred.”
Tr. 414.
The next day at work, Calandrino received a message that he
needed to see Jerore in the office. Jerore told Calandrino that
before he began his shift, they needed to call Begle about the
dues-checkoff authorization form. Tr. 415. In the ensuing
telephone conversation with Begle, Calandrino confirmed that
he did not wish to authorize payroll deduction for dues, again
noting his preference for having a receipt for individual pay-
ments. Begle responded by stating that payroll deduction is
more convenient, and then asked Calandrino if he was aware of
the consequences, which included being disciplined or termi-
nated if his dues were late or went into arrears. Begle added
that Calandrino had been a good employee and had been at
Comau for a long time, and stated that he would hate to see
disciplinary action or discharge happen if Calandrino did not
keep up with his dues payments. Tr. 416–417. Feeling pres-
sured, Calandrino signed a new dues-checkoff authorization
form.29 Tr. 417; GC Exh. 35.
Jeffrey T. Brown testified about his experience with the
dues-checkoff authorization form at Comau’s Southfield com-
plex (specifically, at the Arlens facility, one of the three build-
ings at the complex). Tr. 490, 495–500. CEA treasurer Fred
Lutz first approached Jeffrey T. Brown about signing a dues
authorization form in February 2010, prompting Brown to ad-
vise Lutz that he did not want to, and would not, sign the form.
Tr. 496. Lutz told Brown that he was going to provide Begle
with a list of all employees who did not sign the dues-checkoff
authorization form, and Brown responded that if Begle gave
him a letter that his job was at risk if he did not sign, then
Brown would sign the form. Id.
Lutz again approached Jeffrey T. Brown about the dues-
checkoff authorization form in May 2010. Brown accepted the
form, but did not sign it. Tr. 496; 734. Lutz checked back with
Brown twice more about the form, and on the second visit,
Brown asked about the possibility of paying dues in cash. Lutz
responded that he (Lutz) would have to speak with Begle about
that, and a few minutes later, returned to Brown and advised
him that they both needed to speak with Begle in Begle’s office
(located in the Comau Center, another building at the South-
field complex). Tr. 497–498; 735. At the meeting with Begle,
Begle asked Brown why he did not wish to sign the dues-
checkoff authorization form, and Brown explained that he pre-
ferred to pay in cash since the Company was into his paycheck
more than enough already. Tr. 498–499. Begle initially ex-
pressed some reservations about having CEA officials collect
$20 in cash every month from various employees, but liked
Brown’s proposal that he pay a full year of dues in cash ($240).
Lutz, however, asked Brown what would happen if he was laid
off in 6 months. Unsure of the intent behind Lutz’s question,
Brown did not respond. Tr. 499. After some additional chit-
chat, Brown decided he was done with the conversation and

29 Calandrino’s testimony was uncontradicted, even though Begle
was present in the courtroom for his testimony and later testified for
Comau. Tr. 1084.
handed over a signed dues-checkoff authorization form.30 Tr.
499; GC Exh. 36.
I. Comau and the CEA Attempt to Clarify Their Positions
About Dues-Checkoff and Other Methods of Paying CEA Dues
On June 9, 2010, Comau (through Begle) posted a notice to
the bargaining unit about the dues-checkoff authorization
forms. The notice stated:

The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced
into signing dues authorization forms. We have investigated
this allegation and do not believe it to be factually accurate.
Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, howev-
er, we want to confirm the following:

While the contract contains a requirement that employees be-
come dues paying members, the contract does not require that
dues be paid through a payroll deduction authorization, with
dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It
is up to you whether you wish to authorize payment of your
dues in that manner.

In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization
form under the mistaken assumption that the Company re-
quired this, you should feel free to rescind the authorization
and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indi-
cate to me in writing.

RE Exh. 9(b). Two employees subsequently rescinded their
dues-checkoff authorization forms based on Comau’s notice,
and received refunds from Comau for any dues that were paid
by undesired payroll deductions. Tr. 1083–1084.
Akkari admitted that he saw Comau’s notice about the dues-
checkoff authorization forms after it was posted, and he admit-
ted that he did not request that Comau rescind the authorization
form that he signed. Tr. 229; see also Tr. 501 (Jeffrey T.
Brown also saw the letter). Akkari explained, however, that he
did not take Comau up on its June 9, 2010 offer because he felt
like Comau was playing games, and because he saw the CEA’s
letter of understanding posted on the Novi shop floor stating
that the only acceptable method for paying dues (other than
payroll deduction) was by certified cashier’s check. GC Exh.
2; Tr. 230, 242–244; see also Tr. 502 (Jeffrey T. Brown saw the

30 I have credited Brown’s version of the conversation. Begle testi-
fied at trial, but did not challenge Brown’s account of their conversa-
tion. Tr. 1084. Lutz also testified, but stated on direct that he did not
remember the whole conversation with Begle. Tr. 737. However, Lutz
answered, yes when asked to affirm the accuracy of closed/leading
questions about the conversation with Begle during cross examination.
Tr. 748. Lutz’s demeanor and answers were tentative and uncertain,
and generally indicated that Lutz was having trouble remembering the
details of the interactions that he had with Brown and other employees
in the relevant time period. Finally, Brown’s credibility was bolstered
by the corroborating testimony that employee Chris Bloodworth offered
about his own interaction with Lutz. According to Bloodworth, Lutz
approached him at the Arlens facility and stated that Begle wanted Lutz
to bring Bloodworth over to talk about the dues-checkoff authorization
form. Not wanting to cause any problems with his job status, Blood-
worth agreed to sign the form. Tr. 449. Lutz was not questioned about
his interaction with Bloodworth.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2312
CEA’s letter of understanding posted at the Arlens facility).
CEA’s letter of understanding stated:

Subject: union dues by means other than direct deposit.

1. Certified cashiers check, is the only acceptable
method of payment. Made out to the Comau Employees
Association.
2. Payment must be received by the end of the 3rd
week of every month (Friday is considered the last day of
the work week).
3. Payment must be hand delivered to the union presi-
dent, vice-president or treasurer. (Mailing is not accepta-
ble)
President: Harry Yale
Vice President: Jeff H. Brown
Treasurer: Fred Lutz
4. Late payments will not be accepted as a general
practice, and disciplinary action will be instituted, up to
and including discharge. As per the union by-laws gov-
erning dues payments, and as stated in our labor agree-
ment (Section # 3.2).
5. If there is an acceptable reason for a late payment
(field service, etc.) the $10.00 late fee will still be applied.
6. If these terms are not acceptable, then direct deposit
is the only other means of payment.

GC Exh. 2. Before the letter of understanding was posted, Yale
sent it to Begle for review. GC Exh. 53 (email sent on May 21,
2010).
On June 18, 2010, Harry Yale sent an email to Jim Kayko
(and cc’ed to Fred Begle) to instruct Kayko to deliver a copy of
the letter of understanding to an employee (Ken Skrbalo) who
rescinded his dues-checkoff authorization. GC Exh. 54. Per
Yale’s email, if Skrbalo did not pay his dues by the following
Friday, “we will start the proceedings as stated in the contract
and by-laws.” Id. Notwithstanding the terms stated in the letter
of understanding, Yale ultimately permitted Skrbalo to pay his
dues for the year by personal check.31 Tr. 1059–1060.
J. The Board Rules That Comau Committed An Unfair Labor
Practice by Unilaterally Implementing its Healthcare Plan
on March 1, 2009
On November 5, 2010, the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rul-
ings, findings, and conclusions in case number 7–CA–52106.
Comau, 356 NLRB 75 (2010). In particular, the Board adopted
Judge Bogas’ finding that Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by unilaterally implementing a new health insurance plan in
the absence of an agreement or a bona fide impasse with the
ASW/MRCC. Id. at 1 fn. 5.

31 Yale asserted that the CEA never enforced the terms of its letter of
understanding. Tr. 1059–1060. There is no evidence, however, that the
CEA advised the bargaining unit as a whole of any decision not to
enforce the letter of understanding.
Discussion and Analysis
A. Comau’s Decision to Withdraw Recognition from the ASW
and Recognize the CEA
1. Complaint allegations and asserted legal theories
The principal issues in this case turn on whether Comau ran
afoul of the Act when (on December 22, 2009) it withdrew
recognition of the ASW/MRCC as the bargaining unit’s exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative, and recognized the
CEA as the unit’s new representative.
The complaint specifically alleges that Comau: failed to bar-
gain collectively and in good faith with the ASW when it with-
drew recognition from the ASW (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5)
and (1)); dominated, interfered with, and rendered unlawful
assistance to the CEA when, in the absence of the support of an
uncoerced majority of employees, Comau recognized the CEA
as the unit’s exclusive bargaining representative, entered into a
collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that contained a
union-security clause, and deducted CEA union dues from em-
ployee wages pursuant to the union security clause (in violation
of Sec. 8(a)(2) and (1)); and discriminated against employees
regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment
(and unlawfully encouraged membership in the CEA) by enter-
ing into a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that
contained a union-security clause (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(3)
and (1)). GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 24–26.
As for the CEA, the complaint alleges that at a time when the
CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in
the unit, the CEA: unlawfully obtained recognition from Co-
mau as the unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative
(in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)); and attempted to cause Comau
to discriminate against its employees via the CEA collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause (in violation of
Sec. 8(b)(2) of the Act. GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 28–29.
At trial, the Acting General Counsel offered two legal theo-
ries to support the allegations in the complaint regarding Co-
mau’s decision to withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
First, the Acting General Counsel asserted that the December
2009 disaffection petition that Comau used to conclude that the
ASW did not represent a majority of employees in the unit was
tainted by Comau’s prior unfair labor practices (specifically,
Comau’s March 1, 2009 implementation of its new health in-
surance plan). Second (and in the alternative), the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel asserted that the disaffection petition was tainted
because certain individuals (Harry Yale, James Reno, and Nel-
son Burbo) who circulated it did so with the apparent authority
of Comau. As described below, I find that the Acting General
Counsel has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the disaffection petition was tainted by a prior unfair labor
practice.32

32 Because I have found that the disaffection petition was tainted by
the unfair labor practice that Comau committed on March 1, 2009, I
need not rule on the Acting General Counsel’s alternative theory that
the petition was tainted because it was circulated by employees who
were Comau’s agents. However, I note that I have made findings of
fact (including credibility findings) that are relevant to that theory,
should further analysis be necessary.
COMAU, INC. 2313
2. The December 2009 disaffection petition was tainted
by Comau’s March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice
A union is irrebuttably presumed to continue to enjoy the
support of a majority of the unit employees while a collective
bargaining agreement is in effect. Lee Lumber & Building
Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 176 (1996). After the contract
expires, the union still is presumed to enjoy majority status, but
the presumption is rebuttable. In such a situation, an employer
may rebut the presumption and withdraw recognition if it can
show that the union in fact no longer has the support of a ma-
jority of the unit employees. Id. at 176–177; Champion Home
Builders Co., 350 NLRB 788, 791 (2007); see also Levitz Fur-
niture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 725 (2001) (overrul-
ing precedent that also allowed an employer to withdraw
recognition from a union based on a good-faith doubt about the
union’s continued majority status).33
However, an employer may not lawfully withdraw recogni-
tion from a union where it has committed unfair labor practices
that are likely to affect the union’s status, cause employee dis-
affection, or improperly affect the bargaining relationship.
Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791. Not every unfair
labor practice will taint evidence of a union’s subsequent loss
of majority support; in cases involving unfair labor practices
other than a general refusal to recognize and bargain, there
must be specific proof of a causal relationship between the
unfair labor practice and the ensuing events indicating a loss of
support. Lee Lumber, 322 NLRB at 177. In determining
whether a causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair
labor practices and the loss of union support, the Board consid-
ers the following factors: (1) the length of time between the
unfair labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the
nature of the violations, including the possibility of a detri-
mental or lasting effect on employees; (3) the tendency of the
violation to cause employee disaffection; and (4) the effect of
the unlawful conduct on employees’ morale, organizational
activities, and membership in the union. Champion Home
Builders, 350 NLRB at 791 (citing Master Slack Corp., 271
NLRB 78, 84 (1984)).34

33 While Comau has argued that it was legally obligated to withdraw
recognition from the ASW/MRCC when it received the December 2009
disaffection petition, the Board has clearly stated that an employer with
objective evidence (such as a disaffection petition) that a union has lost
majority support withdraws recognition at its peril. Levitz Furniture
Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB at 725 (noting that an employer in that
circumstance runs the risk of being found to have violated Sec. 8(a)(5)
if it is later shown that the union had not lost majority support). The
Board also explained that as an alternative to simply withdrawing
recognition based on the objective evidence, an employer lawfully may
file an RM petition for an election and continue to recognize the in-
cumbent union while the election proceedings are ongoing. Levitz,
supra at 724.
34 The Master Slack test is an objective test aimed at evaluating
whether a causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair labor
practices and subsequent loss of union support. See Saint Gobain
Abrasives, 342 NLRB at 434 fn. 2 (noting that it is not relevant to ask
individual employees why they chose to reject the union); AT Systems
West, 341 NLRB 57, 60 (2004) (subjective state of mind of the em-
ployees is not relevant). During trial, I permitted Comau and the CEA
to present evidence about the objective circumstances that may have
In this case, a few preliminary facts are clearly established.
The Board has determined that Comau committed an unfair
labor practice on March 1, 2009, when it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by changing employees’ healthcare benefits
without the ASW/MRCC’s consent and in the absence of a
bona fide impasse. Comau, 356 NLRB 75, 85 (2010). In addi-
tion, there is no dispute that the ASW/MRCC had actually lost
majority support by December 22, 2009, as indicated by the
fact that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit (103
employees out of 178 in the unit at the time) signed a Decem-
ber 2009 disaffection petition stating that they no longer wished
to be represented by the ASW/MRCC. See RU Exh. 6. Final-
ly, it is undisputed that Comau recognized the CEA as the bar-
gaining unit’s exclusive collective bargaining representative on
December 22, 2009, and subsequently entered into and adhered
to a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that includ-
ed a union security clause. See findings of fact (FOF), above,
sec. II(G).
The question in dispute is whether there is a causal relation-
ship between the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice and the
loss of majority support for the ASW/MRCC that was evident
on December 22, 2009. To examine that issue, a review of the
operative facts is warranted. Comau declared impasse in De-
cember 2008, and based on that impasse, imposed its last best
offer (including the new health insurance plan, which would
take effect on March 1, 2009) on December 22, 2008. See
FOF, above, sec. II(C). The impasse regarding employee
health insurance coverage was broken on January 7, 2009. Id.
Comau, however, continued to prepare employees for the effec-
tive date of the health insurance plan set forth in Comau’s im-
posed last best offer. Id. In February 2009, employees began
circulating a petition to decertify the ASW/MRCC. See FOF,
above, sec. II(D). While employees had a variety of reasons to
be unhappy with the ASW/MRCC and therefore sign the peti-
tion,35 the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan was prominent
among those reasons. Of the 103 employees that ultimately
signed the decertification petition, all did so on or after Febru-
ary 19, 2009 (i.e., within days of the March 1 effective date of
the healthcare plan), and 34 did so on or after March 1, 2009.
Id. Once the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan took effect,
bargaining unit discontent with the ASW/MRCC reached a new

caused employee disaffection independent of the March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice. However, I did not permit the CEA to call (as it pro-
posed) between 20 to 90 witnesses to testify about their subjective
reasons for signing the December 2009 disaffection petition, because
the witness’ subjective reasons are not relevant to the inquiry, and the
witnesses’ expected testimony about the objective circumstances was
cumulative.
35 Those reasons include employee impressions that the
ASW/MRCC: was not effective in attempting to negotiate a new con-
tract; charged unduly high dues that came with little or no resulting
benefit to the bargaining unit; failed to deliver on its promises to pro-
vide bargaining unit members with training and job placements; did not
protect bargaining unit members from losing job openings at Comau to
contractors or members of other unions; and improperly claimed the
entire balance of the ASW dues account (approximately $250,000) at
the time of the March 2007 merger.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2314
high, and carried forward36 to December 2009, when Harry
Yale prepared and circulated the disaffection petition that Co-
mau relied on when it withdrew recognition from the
ASW/MRCC on December 22, 2009. FOF, above, sections
II(E), (F).
Turning to the relevant factors, 9 months passed between the
March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice in this case and Comau’s
December 22, 2009 decision to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC. That length of time does not, per se, preclude a
finding of a causal relationship. See, e.g., AT Systems West,
341 NLRB 57 (2004) (unfair labor practice was within 9
months of the withdrawal of recognition that it caused); Co-
lumbia Portland Cement v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir.
1992) (same, but with a passage of 1 year). More important,
the facts of this case show that the March 1, 2009 unfair labor
practice had a more immediate effect on the bargaining unit, as
the bargaining unit unhappiness with the new health insurance
premiums drove (at least in part) the contemporaneous decerti-
fication petition that employees signed in February and March
2009, and filed in April 2009. Thus, the December 2009 disaf-
fection petition was essentially an effort to renew the Spring
2009 decertification movement that started just before the uni-
laterally imposed healthcare plan (unlawfully) took effect.
The evidentiary record and applicable case law also show
that the nature of the unfair labor practice here included the
possibility of a detrimental and lasting effect on employees, as
well as a tendency to cause employee disaffection (factors 2
and 3). The fact that Comau imposed the new health care plan
and its accompanying employee-paid premiums unilaterally is
particularly significant. It is well established that when an em-
ployer makes unilateral changes to terms and conditions of
employment, those changes harm the union’s status as the bar-
gaining representative because the employer’s actions under-
mine the union in the eyes of the employees and give the im-
pression that the union is powerless. Priority One Services,
331 NLRB 1527, 1527 (2000) (collecting cases); see also Goya
Foods, 347 NLRB 1118, 1120–1121, 1123 (2006) (unilateral
changes to working conditions are likely to have an impact on
union support); Penn Tank Lines, 336 NLRB 1066, 1067–1068
(2001) (unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employ-
ment minimize the influence of organized bargaining and show
employees that their union is irrelevant, thereby creating a clear
possibility of a detrimental or long lasting effect on employee
support for the union). The Board also has recognized that
unilateral increases in employee health insurance premiums can
undercut the union’s ability to function as the employees’ bar-
gaining representative, because the unilateral changes substan-
tially affect all unit employees and directly impact employee

36 Employee discontent about the health insurance plan was kept
alive by a variety of factors, including: the ongoing, significant deduc-
tions from employee paychecks to pay the premiums required for the
unilaterally imposed health insurance plan; meetings with the
ASW/MRCC about the decertification petition that touched on health
insurance (among other issues); and the November 19, 2009 St. Gobain
hearing in Case 07–RD–003644 in which several employees testified
(and were reminded of the fact) that the new health insurance (and its
cost) was among their concerns when they signed the decertification
petition.
compensation, one of the fundamental subjects of bargaining.
Priority One Services, supra (discussing the effect of a 9.5 per-
cent increase in health insurance premiums). The unilateral
change to employee health care at issue in this case was even
more significant than the change discussed in Priority One
Services, because instead of a percentage increase to premiums
that employees were already paying (as in Priority One), Co-
mau’s unilaterally changed employee health insurance premi-
ums from zero (since Comau paid all costs under the 2005–
2008 contract) to hundreds of dollars per month in some cases.
Finally, the record shows that Comau’s unilateral change to
its employee health insurance plan had an adverse effect on
employee morale, and on the ASW/MRCC’s organizational
activities and membership. The new health care plan played a
significant role in motivating employees to sign the spring 2009
decertification petition37—indeed, all employees signed within
days (on either side) of the effective date of the new health
insurance plan, and 34 employees signed after March 1, 2009.38

37 As part of their defense, the Respondents maintain that employee
disaffection with the ASW/MRCC preceded the March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice. The record does show that before March 1, 2009, there
was some employee discontent with the ASW/MRCC about issues such
as high union dues, the ASW/MRCC’s failure to provide training and
job placements, and the ASW/MRCC’s failure to protect bargaining
unit members from losing Comau job opportunities to workers that did
not belong to the bargaining unit. Several of those sources of discon-
tent, however, had been present since the ASW/MRCC merger in
March 2007, but were tolerated to some degree with the hope that in the
end, the merger would be beneficial. More important, even though
there were other reasons for bargaining unit employees to be unhappy
with the ASW/MRCC, the fact remains that Comau’s unilateral imposi-
tion of the health insurance plan had a reasonable tendency to (and did,
in fact) cause employee disaffection with the ASW/MRCC.
38 The Respondents contend that the Acting General Counsel is lim-
ited to arguing events that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, the day
that the health insurance plan took effect (and thus the date of the unfair
labor practice). While it is true that March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice
is the only one at issue, the facts about that unfair labor practice are not
limited to March 1 and after, particularly on the issue of whether a
causal relationship exists between the unfair labor practice and the loss
of union support. Simply put, this is not a case where the unfair labor
practice occurred on a specific date and took everyone by surprise. To
the contrary, Comau announced the March 1, 2009 health insurance
plan effective date in December 2008, and held meetings in January
2009 to prepare employees for the change. Thus, the new health insur-
ance plan (which ultimately was found to be an unfair labor practice)
was on the minds of employees at least by January 2009, after the im-
passe had been broken and before the decertification petition began
circulating. To the extent that the Respondents suggest that they were
not given an opportunity to litigate this issue (employee sentiment
before March 1, 2009), I note that the record demonstrates that the
contrary is true. The Respondents presented extensive testimony about
factors that could have caused employee disaffection before March 1,
2009 (to support their defense that employee discontent preceded the
unilateral change to the employee health insurance plan), and the par-
ties offered exhibits (most without objection) relating to events that
occurred before March 1, 2009. See, e.g., RE Exh. 13 (transcript of the
November 19, 2009 St. Gobain hearing regarding the decertification
petition circulated in February and March 2009).
That being stated, the fact remains that even if the causation analysis
were limited to events that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, there is
ample evidence that links the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice with
COMAU, INC. 2315
In addition, as witness Daniel Malloy explained, members of
the bargaining unit were upset when Comau imposed its last
best offer (in December 2008), but when the health insurance
premiums began coming out of employee paychecks in March
2009, employees wanted to fry the ASW/MRCC leadership
because it failed to deliver on its promise to protect employees
from having to pay the premiums.39 Those sentiments persisted
for the rest of 2009, as employees pursued the decertification
petition with the Board (particularly after receiving yet another
paycheck with unwanted deductions), questioned the
ASW/MRCC’s efforts to address the issue of employee
healthcare at meetings, and ultimately renewed the effort to get
rid of the ASW/MRCC by circulating the December 2009 dis-
affection petition.40
Thus, all of the factors outlined in Master Slack demonstrate
that Comau’s unilateral implementation of its new employee
health insurance plan on March 1, 2009, had a causal relation-
ship to the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC and in turn, the
December 2009 disaffection petition.41 The disaffection peti-

the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC leading up to the December
2009 disaffection petition. See discussion accompanying this footnote,
supra.
39 The Respondents suggest that employee discontent about the
health insurance plan did not arise until March 6, 2009, the actual date
that the first premiums were deducted from their paychecks. See RE
Br. at 11. The purpose of that argument is to suggest that employees
who signed the decertification petition between March 1 and March 5
(28 employees out of the 34 that signed the petition on or after March
1) were not aware of the March 1 unfair labor practice because the first
health insurance premiums were not deducted from their paychecks
until March 6. I do not find this argument to be persuasive. First, the
Board has ruled that the unfair labor practice occurred on March 1,
2009, and that ruling is binding for purposes of my analysis. Second,
as discussed above, the March 1, 2009 effective date of the health in-
surance plan was well publicized, and naturally was on the minds of
employees for some time. Once March 1 arrived, the health insurance
plan took effect, and there was no question that health insurance premi-
ums would be deducted from employee paychecks. Just as a reasonable
employee would be aware of a forthcoming reduction in wages, I find
that a reasonable employee would have been aware of the forthcoming
new healthcare premiums both when the decertification petition was
circulated in late February 2009, and when the new health insurance
plan took effect on March 1, 2009.
40 I have considered the fact that that December 2009 disaffection
petition included language at the top of each page stating that the em-
ployees who signed the petition were not motivated to do so by Co-
mau’s unilateral implementation of the health insurance plan. As a
preliminary matter, the fact that the drafters of the petition thought such
a disclaimer was necessary supports my finding that the health insur-
ance plan and the accompanying premiums remained points of concern
for bargaining unit employees. More important, the petition language
cannot immunize the petition from the effects of the March 2009 unfair
labor practice that the Board found in the earlier Comau, 356 NLRB 75,
86–87. As indicated above, see fn. 34, supra, the Master Slack causa-
tion test is an objective, not a subjective, test that evaluates (among
other things) the tendency of the violation to cause employee disaffec-
tion, and whether the nature of the violation includes the possibility of a
detrimental or lasting effect on employees. The subjective views of
employees about a past unfair labor practice and its effects are not
relevant to the Master Slack inquiry.
41 The cases that Comau and the CEA cited in arguing that Comau’s
March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice did not cause the ASW/MRCC to
tion therefore was tainted by the March 1, 2009 unfair labor
practice, and it was unlawful for Comau to rely upon the De-
cember 2009 disaffection petition as its basis for withdrawing
recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
Based on my finding that the December 2009 disaffection
petition was tainted by the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice,
I find that Comau committed the following violations:

By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on De-
cember 22, 2009 and subsequently refusing to bargain with
the ASW/MRCC, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57, 61 (2004).

By extending recognition to the CEA and entering into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with the CEA when the CEA
did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, Comau interfered with the formation and ad-
ministration of a labor organization in violation of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. AM Property Holdings Corp., 352
NLRB 279, 281 & n.10 (2008); AT Systems West, supra at 62.

By giving effect to the union security clause in its collective
bargaining agreement with the CEA at a time when the CEA
did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, Comau encouraged membership in a labor
organization and discriminated against employees regarding
hiring and the terms and conditions of employment, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Caldor, Inc., 319
NLRB 728, 739 (1995).

I also find that the CEA committed the following violations in
connection with Comau’s withdrawal of recognition of the
ASW/MRCC and recognition of the CEA:

lose support are distinguishable. See RE Br. at 34–35; RU Br. at 20–
23. Specifically, the decisions that the Respondents cited (as examples
of cases where the Board or the Federal court of appeals held that prior
unfair labor practices did not have a causal relationship to the loss of
union support) are fact driven decisions that bear little similarity to this
case. See Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791–792 (no causal
relationship found where all but one of the unfair labor practices oc-
curred 5–6 months before the disaffection petition, and the record did
not show that employees knew about the more recent violation; the
nature of violations did not support a finding of taint because they were
isolated and/or brief events; the record did not show that the violations
had a tendency to cause employee disaffection towards the union; and
the record did not show that the scheduling disputes had an adverse
effect on employee morale, organizational activity or union member-
ship); Garden Ridge Management, 347 NLRB 131, 134 (2006) (same,
regarding the effect of a bargaining session scheduling dispute); Master
Slack, 271 NLRB at 84–85 (same, where the unfair labor practices were
committed 8–9 years before the withdrawal of recognition and backpay
issues were still being litigated, and there was limited evidence that the
backpay dispute had an adverse effect on employee morale, organiza-
tional activity or union membership); Pleasantview Nursing Home v.
NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 764 (6th Cir. 2003) (same, regarding the effect of
an employer’s breach of its duty to collect union initiation fees and its
unilateral decision to increase the wages of 6 employees in the 78-
employee bargaining unit); see also Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342
NLRB at 434 (cited by the CEA, and only standing for the proposition
that a hearing is necessary to determine whether the employer’s unilat-
eral change to employee health insurance had a causal nexus to em-
ployee disaffection).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2316
By accepting recognition from Comau and by entering into a
collective-bargaining agreement with Comau when it did not
have the uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 732
(1961); United Workers of America, 352 NLRB 286, 286
(2008).

By maintaining a union security clause in its collective bar-
gaining agreement with Comau at a time when the CEA did
not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bar-
gaining unit, the CEA caused and attempted to cause Comau
to violate Section 8(a)(3) by encouraging membership in a la-
bor organization and discriminating against employees re-
garding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
Through these actions, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(2) of
the Act. Rockville Nursing Center, 193 NLRB 959, 965
(1971).
B. Comau’s and the CEA’s Conduct in Asking Employees
to Sign Dues-Checkoff Authorization Forms
1. Complaint allegations
In addition to the larger issues (discussed above) related to
Comau’s decision to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC and recognize the CEA as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative for the bargaining unit, the Act-
ing General Counsel also alleged that both Comau and the CEA
violated the Act when they asked employees to sign dues
checkoff authorizations for paying CEA dues.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that in May 2010, Comau
threatened employees at the Jefferson North, Novi and South-
field facilities with termination if they failed to authorize auto-
matic dues deduction payments to the CEA (in violation of Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act). GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 19, 27. The complaint
also alleged that in May 2010, the CEA threatened employees
at the Novi and Southfield facilities with loss of employment if
they failed to authorize automatic dues deduction payments to
the CEA (in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act). GC Exh.
1(v), pars. 23, 28.
2. Both Comau and the CEA violated the Act by conduct
that reasonably could coerce employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms
There is no dispute that under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment that contains a valid union-security clause, an employee
may be required to pay union dues as a condition of employ-
ment, and may be discharged for failing to pay the required
dues. Longshoreman ILA Local 1575, 322 NLRB 727, 729
(1996). However, a union may not compel union members to
execute dues-checkoff authorizations as a condition of their
employment; nor can a union threaten to cause employees to be
discharged if they fail to execute dues-checkoff authorizations,
because the execution of a dues-checkoff authorization is en-
tirely voluntary. Id. at 729–730 (noting that a union’s threat to
cause discharge under these circumstances would violate Sec.
8(b)(1)(A)). More generally, a union violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act if it engages in conduct that may reasona-
bly tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of
Section 7 rights. Culinary Workers Local 226 (Casino Royale,
Inc.), 323 NLRB 148, 159 (1997).
Similarly, an employer may not lead employees to believe
that the dues-checkoff authorization method for fulfilling their
financial obligations to their union is compulsory. Rochester
Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 262 (1997). An employer that di-
rects employees to sign dues-checkoff forms authorizing deduc-
tion of dues under the threat of losing their employment has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their protected Section 7 rights, in violation of Section
8(a)(1). Id. An employer also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act if the employer’s conduct or statements have a reasonable
tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce union or protected
activities. Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant, 330 NLRB 1339, 1339
fn. 3 (2000) (noting that the employer’s subjective motivation
for the statements is not relevant); see also Park N’ Fly, Inc.,
349 NLRB 132, 140 (2007).
a. Comau violations
In this case, the facts demonstrate that in May 2010, Comau
management personnel spoke with three employees who initial-
ly declined to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms: Gaspar
Calandrino (Jefferson North field service location) Nizar Akka-
ri (Novi facility); and Jeffrey T. Brown (Southfield facility).
Comau Human Resources Director Fred Begle specifically
warned Akkari that he could be terminated if he did not sign the
form. Site Supervisor Duane Jerore similarly warned Calan-
drino that he could be disciplined or discharged if he did not
sign a dues-checkoff authorization form. See FOF, above, Sec.
II(H). Those explicit (and uncontested) statements each violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1), as the threat of losing employment or being
disciplined had a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari and
Calandrino in the exercise of their protected Section 7 rights to
choose whether or not to sign the dues-checkoff authorization
forms. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra at 262.42
I also find that Begle’s statements to Calandrino (in a fol-
lowup conversation that Jerore joined), and Begle’s statements
to Jeffrey T. Brown violated Sec. 8(a)(1). In those exchanges,
although Begle did not explicitly link the failure to sign the
dues-checkoff authorization form with possible discipline or
termination, Begle questioned the employees about their refusal
to sign the form, questioned the reliability of paying by other
means (such as cash), and (as to Calandrino) warned of conse-
quences that could result if he chose another method of pay-
ment and fell behind with his dues. See FOF, above, Sec.
II(H). Viewing those statements as a whole, along with the
context of Begle taking the unusual step of having a shop floor
employee brought to a private office to speak with him (in per-
son as to Brown, and by phone as to Calandrino), I find that
Begle’s remarks to Calandrino and Jeffrey T. Brown had a

42 As noted in the statement of facts, I do not give weight to the con-
tent of GC Exh. 6, a chain of emails apparently initiated by Jill Opasik
regarding employees who had not yet signed a dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion form. Among other things, the record does not establish Opasik’s
role as a Comau supervisor or agent, and also does not establish with
sufficient reliability that her specific comments reached any bargaining
unit employees. See fn. 24, supra. In light of those shortcomings, the
exhibit does not demonstrate that Comau violated the Act.
COMAU, INC. 2317
reasonable tendency to coerce those employees in exercising
their Section 7 rights.
b. CEA violations
The Acting General Counsel also presented evidence about
the role that two CEA committeemen (James Kayko and Fred
Lutz) played in asking employees to sign dues-checkoff author-
ization forms.
I recommend dismissing the allegations in paragraph 23(a)
of the complaint because the evidence that the Acting General
Counsel presented about James Kayko’s conduct falls short of
proving a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Kayko did ask Ak-
kari to sign a dues-checkoff authorization form, but he did not
suggest that any adverse employment action would result when
Akkari refused. Kayko did mention that Akkari might be con-
tacted by Fred Begle about the matter, but he did not participate
in any ensuing conversations between Akkari and Begle, or
suggest that the possible contact with Begle would involve any
adverse consequences. See FOF, above, section II(H). View-
ing Kayko’s conduct as a whole, I find that his actions or
statements did not have a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari
to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.
As for Kayko’s interactions with Dave Baloga (also covered
by Paragraph 23(a)), I find that both witnesses were equally
credible in their respective accounts of Kayko’s request that
Baloga sign a dues-checkoff authorization form. Since the
Acting General Counsel bears the burden of proving the allega-
tions in its complaint by a preponderance of the evidence, the
tie between Kayko’s and Baloga’s testimony leads me to find
that the Acting General Counsel did not demonstrate that the
CEA (through Kayko) violated the Act in its interactions with
Baloga about the dues-checkoff authorization form. See Cen-
tral National Gottesman, 303 NLRB 143, 145 (1991) (finding
that General Counsel did not meet its burden of proof because
the testimony that the allegation occurred was equally credible
as the testimony that denied the allegation); Blue Flash Ex-
press, 109 NLRB 591, 591–592 (1954) (same), questioned on
other grounds, Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Lutz’s interactions with Jeffrey T. Brown are different in
character, and do establish that the CEA (through Lutz) violat-
ed Section 8(b)(1)(A). See GC Exh. 1(v), par. 23(b). Lutz’s
initial requests that Brown sign a dues-checkoff authorization
form were merely requests that were not linked to any threat of
adverse employment action. However, when Brown refused to
sign the form, Lutz escorted Brown to Begle’s office, and also
participated in Begle’s meeting with Brown. Lutz’s presence at
the meeting served as a CEA endorsement of Begle’s remarks
and of Begle’s treatment of Brown’s refusal to sign the dues-
checkoff authorization form as a point of concern. Further, like
Begle, Lutz questioned the reliability of paying dues by means
other than dues checkoff. Taking the totality of the circum-
stances into account, Lutz’s conduct and statements to Jeffrey
T. Brown had a reasonable tendency to coerce Brown to sign
the dues-checkoff authorization form, and thus violated the Act.
3. Comau did not cure its violations of the act regarding
dues-checkoff authorization forms
As part of its response to the allegations in the complaint re-
garding the dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau con-
tends that any violation that Begle committed was cured by the
June 2010 memorandum that Comau posted in the workplace.
RE Br. at 25 (citing RE Exh. 9(b)).43 In so arguing, Comau
invokes Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138
(1978), which explains that an employer may relieve itself of
liability for unlawful conduct in some circumstances by repudi-
ating the conduct. Id. at 138. To be effective, the repudiation
must be: timely; unambiguous; specific in nature to the coer-
cive conduct; adequately publicized to the employees involved;
free from other proscribed illegal conduct, and accompanied by
assurances that the employer will not interfere with employees’
Section 7 rights in the future. Id.; see also Cintas Corp., 353
NLRB 752, 753 fn. 8, 769 (2009). The employer also must not
engage in proscribed conduct after the repudiation. Id.
Comau’s effort at repudiation (sent by Begle) read as fol-
lows:

The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced
into signing dues authorization forms. We have investigated
this allegation and do not believe it to be factually accurate.
Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, howev-
er, we want to confirm the following:

While the contract contains a requirement that employees be-
come dues paying members, the contract does not require that
dues be paid through a payroll deduction authorization, with
dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It
is up to you whether you wish to authorize payment of your
dues in that manner.

In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization
form under the mistaken assumption that the Company re-
quired this, you should feel free to rescind the authorization
and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indi-
cate to me in writing.

RE Exh. 9(b). The repudiation does not satisfy the standard set
forth in Passavant because (among other things) it was not
specific to the nature of the misconduct. The memo makes no
reference to the threats of termination that Comau communicat-
ed to employees, nor does it address the other actions and
statements that Comau took that had a reasonable tendency to
coerce employees to sign the dues-checkoff authorization forms
in the first instance. The attempted repudiation was therefore
incomplete.44 Accordingly, my finding that Comau violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act remains unchanged.

43 The CEA did not address the substantive issues concerning the
dues-checkoff authorization forms in its posttrial brief. It did, however,
deny the allegations in its answer to the complaint. The record does not
show that the CEA repudiated (or attempted to repudiate) any viola-
tions associated with the dues-checkoff authorization forms. The CEA
did issue a letter of understanding (that authorized payment by cashier’s
check under certain parameters), but the letter of understanding did not
address or repudiate any previous violations of Sec. 7 rights.
44 Comau’s memorandum was also ambiguous because it did not ad-
dress restrictions that the CEA placed (with Comau’s tacit consent) on
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2318
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on
December 22, 2009, as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
2. By extending recognition to the CEA as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative on De-
cember 22, 2009, when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau violated
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
3. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with
the CEA (effective December 22, 2009) when the CEA did not
represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, Comau violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By giving effect to the union-security clause in its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the CEA (effective December
22, 2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an unco-
erced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau
encouraged membership in a labor organization and discrimi-
nated against employees regarding hiring and the terms and
conditions of employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
5. By telling employees at the Novi and Jefferson North fa-
cilities in May 2010 that they could be disciplined or dis-
charged if they did not sign dues-checkoff authorization forms,
Comau interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the
exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
6. By making statements to employees and engaging in con-
duct in May 2010 that had a reasonable tendency to coerce
employees at the Southfield and Jefferson North facilities to
sign dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau interfered with,
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of Section 7
rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By accepting recognition from Comau on December 22,
2009, as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining
representative when it did not have the uncoerced support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
8. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement effec-
tive December 22, 2009, with Comau when it did not have the
uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. By maintaining a union-security clause in its collective-
bargaining agreement with Comau (effective December 22,
2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA caused
and attempted to cause Comau to violate Section 8(a)(3) by
encouraging membership in a labor organization and discrimi-

other forms of payment. In a letter of understanding, the CEA advised
the unit that any employee who elected not to use dues-checkoff was
required to pay dues by hand delivering a certified cashiers check to
Harry Yale, Fred Lutz, or Jeffrey H. Brown. Comau was aware of the
restrictions that the CEA imposed (since Yale presented the letter of
understanding to Begle for review), and essentially acquiesced to the
restrictions by allowing them to persist even after Comau issued its
June 2010 memo. See FOF, above, sec. II(I).
nating against employees regarding hiring and the terms and
conditions of employment. Through these actions, the CEA
violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
10. By making statements to employees and engaging in
conduct in May 2010 that had a reasonable tendency to coerce
employees at Comau’s Southfield complex to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms, the CEA restrained or coerced
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices stated in conclusions 1–10
above are unfair labor practices that affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and(7) of the Act.
12. I recommend dismissing the allegations stated in para-
graph 23(a) of the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. While most of the remedies that I
will require will be set forth in the Order attached to my deci-
sion,45 the Acting General Counsel’s request for an affirmative
bargaining order requires specific attention.
The Board consistently has held that an affirmative bargain-
ing order is the traditional, appropriate remedy for a Section
8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate unit of employees. Caterair
International, 322 NLRB 64, 68 (1996). Applying that princi-
ple, the Board recently ruled that an affirmative bargaining
order was warranted as a remedy for an employer’s unlawful
withdrawal of recognition from a union. Vincent/Metro Truck-
ing, 355 NLRB 289, 289 (2010). In so ruling, the Board exam-
ined the facts of the case under District of Columbia Circuit
precedent that states that an affirmative bargaining order must
be justified by reasoned analysis that includes an explicit bal-
ancing of three considerations: (1) the employees’ Section 7
rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act override the rights
of employees to choose their bargaining representative; and (3)
whether alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the viola-
tions of the Act. Id. (citing Vincent Industrial Plastics v.
NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Adhering to the Board’s approach, I have analyzed the facts
of this case under the three-factor balancing test outlined by the
District of Columbia Circuit.

(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case will vindicate
the Section 7 rights of the employees who supported the

45 To the extent that I will require Comau and the CEA to reimburse
bargaining unit members for the CEA fees and dues that were collected
unlawfully on or after December 22, 2009, that remedy is required
because the CEA collective-bargaining agreement and union-security
clause were unlawful. I will also require Comau and the CEA to reim-
burse bargaining unit members for daily compound interest on any such
reimbursement amounts as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Cen-
ter, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). I will not require any reimbursement of CEA
dues based on the violations associated with coercion in obtaining dues-
checkoff authorization forms. See Rochester Mfg., 323 NLRB at 263
(no reimbursement required if affected employees were subject to a
lawful union-security clause obligating them to pay dues).
COMAU, INC. 2319
ASW/MRCC and were denied the benefits of that union’s
collective-bargaining by Comau’s unlawful decision to with-
draw recognition. To the extent that some employees may
still oppose the ASW,46 an affirmative bargaining order will
not unduly prejudice their Section 7 rights because the affirm-
ative bargaining order is temporary. In addition, it bears re-
peating that Comau committed an unfair labor practice that
had a causal relationship to ASW/MRCC’s loss of employee
support, and thus to the December 2009 disaffection petition
that served as the springboard for Comau to withdraw recog-
nition.47 Under those circumstances, it is only by restoring the
status quo ante and requiring Comau to bargain with the ASW
for a reasonable period of time that employees will be able to
fairly decide for themselves whether they wish to continue to
be represented by the ASW.

(2) The affirmative bargaining order also serves the policies
of the Act by fostering meaningful collective bargaining and
industrial peace. It removes Comau’s incentive to delay bar-
gaining in the hope of further discouraging support for the
ASW. It also ensures that the ASW will not be pressured, by
the possibility of another decertification or disaffection peti-
tion, to achieve immediate results at the bargaining table fol-
lowing the Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice and
the issuance of a cease-and-desist order.

(3) A cease-and-desist order, without a temporary decertifica-
tion bar, would be inadequate to remedy Comau’s and the
CEA’s violations, because it would permit a decertification
petition to be filed before Comau had afforded the employees
a reasonable time to regroup and bargain through the ASW in
an effort to reach a collective-bargaining agreement. Such a
result would be particularly unfair in circumstances such as
those here, where the nature of Comau’s unfair labor practice
likely created a lasting negative impression of the ASW in the
bargaining unit, and where Comau immediately recognized a
replacement union (the CEA) that has been able to develop re-
lationships with bargaining unit employees while the ASW
litigated its charges. I find that those circumstances outweigh
the temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order will
have on the rights of employees who oppose ASW’s contin-
ued union representation.

See Vincent/Metro Trucking, supra at 1–2 (citing similar issues
that weighed in favor of an affirmative bargaining order); Spec-
trum Health-Kent Community Campus, 353 NLRB 996, 996–
997 (2009) (same); AT Systems West, 341 NLRB at 63 (same).
Based on my analysis under the three-factor balancing test ap-
plied by the Board, I find that an affirmative bargaining order
with a temporary decertification bar for a reasonable period of

46 After Comau withdrew recognition, the ASW changed its affilia-
tion (in March 2010) from the MRCC to the CIC. Both entities are part
of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
47 The Board’s decision concerning this unfair labor practice (the
March 1, 2009 unilateral implementation of a new health care plan for
employees) also contains an affirmative bargaining order. Comau, 356
NLRB 75, 87.
time is necessary in this case to fully remedy Comau’s unlawful
withdrawal of recognition of the ASW.48
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended49
ORDER
A. The Respondent Employer, Comau, Inc., Southfield,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Withdrawing recognition from the ASW and refusing to
meet and bargain in good faith with the ASW as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative for the following bargain-
ing unit of Comau employees:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, inspectors and field service employees,
employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michi-
gan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and
machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River, Novi,
Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located
at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but exclud-
ing all office clerical employees, and guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.

(b) Extending recognition to the CEA as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative where the
CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in
the unit.
(c) Entering into and adhering to a collective bargaining
agreement with the CEA when the CEA does not represent an
uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, with
the exception of any provisions in the current agreement that
establish wages or benefits for bargaining unit employees.
(d) Giving effect to the union security clause in its collective
bargaining agreement with the CEA where the CEA does not
represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, and thereby encouraging membership in the CEA and
discriminating against employees regarding hiring and the
terms and conditions of employment.

48 I have considered the fact that after Comau withdrew recognition
from the ASW/MRCC, the ASW subsequently (in March 2010)
changed its affiliation from the MRCC to the CIC (still within the Unit-
ed Brotherhood of Carpenters). The CEA suggests that the bargaining
unit should not be forced to accept the ASW/CIC as its bargaining
representative, since the unit did not vote to affiliate with the CIC.
While the CEA’s argument has some superficial appeal, I find that as
an equitable matter, the ASW should not be penalized for continuing to
conduct its operations while this litigation was pending. It should come
as no surprise that the ASW made various decisions (including the
decision to affiliate with the CIC) since December 22, 2009, the date
that Comau withdrew recognition. To the extent that the bargaining
unit may be unfamiliar with (or skeptical of) some of the changes that
the ASW has made, it will be up to the ASW to persuade the unit
(while the affirmative bargaining order is in effect, and beyond) that the
changes are beneficial.
49 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2320
(e) Telling employees that they could be disciplined or dis-
charged if they did not sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(f) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has a rea-
sonable tendency to coerce employees to sign dues-checkoff
authorization forms.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain for a reasonable period of time with
the ASW as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions
of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody the
understanding in a signed agreement:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, inspectors and field service employees,
employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michi-
gan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan; and
machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River, Novi,
Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located
at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but exclud-
ing all office clerical employees, and guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.

(b) Withdraw recognition from the Comau Employees Asso-
ciation as the representative of employees in the bargaining unit
unless and until that labor organization has been certified by the
Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
those employees.
(c) Jointly and severally with the Comau Employees Associ-
ation, reimburse with interest all present and former bargaining
unit employees for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys
paid by them or withheld from them on or after December 22,
2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-bargaining agree-
ment and union-security clause.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Southfield, Michigan, and in Novi, Michigan, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix–Notice to Employ-
ees.”50 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 7, after being signed by Comau’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by Comau and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intra-
net or an internet site, or other electronic means, if Comau cus-
tomarily communicates with its employees by such means.51
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure

50 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
51 The notice posting language provided herein (specifically regard-
ing distributing notices electronically) is consistent with the Board’s
recent decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010).
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, Comau has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, Comau shall duplicate and mail,
at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees
and former employees employed by Comau at any time since
December 22, 2009.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
B. The Respondent Union, Comau Employees Association
(CEA), Southfield, Michigan, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Accepting recognition from Comau as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative and engag-
ing in bargaining with Comau when it does not have the unco-
erced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
(b) Entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with
Comau, and enforcing its collective-bargaining agreement with
Comau when it does not have the uncoerced support of a major-
ity of employees in the bargaining unit.
(c) Maintaining a union-security clause in its collective-
bargaining agreement with Comau at a time when the CEA
does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, thereby causing and attempting to cause Co-
mau to violate Section 8(a)(3) by encouraging membership in a
labor organization and discriminating against employees re-
garding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
(d) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has a rea-
sonable tendency to coerce Comau employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Jointly and severally with Comau, Inc., reimburse with
interest all present and former bargaining unit employees for all
initiation fees, dues, and other moneys paid by them or with-
held from them on or after December 22, 2009, under the
CEA’s unlawful collective-bargaining agreement and union-
security clause.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un-
ion offices in Southfield, Michigan, and Novi, Michigan, copies
of the attached notice marked “Appendix–Notice to Members
and Employees.”52 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
CEA’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the CEA
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members and Comau em-

52 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
COMAU, INC. 2321
ployees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting
of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other
electronic means, if the CEA customarily communicates with
its members by such means.53 Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the CEA to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, CEA has gone out of business
or closed its offices involved in these proceedings, the CEA
shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all individuals who were members of the CEA or Comau
bargaining unit employees at any time since December 22,
2009.
(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies
of the notice for posting by Comau, if willing, at all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this No-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties

WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the ASW and re-
fuse to meet and bargain in good faith with the ASW as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative for the following
bargaining unit of Comau employees:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, inspectors and field service employees,
employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 210175 Telegraph Road, Southfield,
Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan;
and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility
located at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but
excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT extend recognition to the CEA as the bargain-
ing unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative where

53 The notice posting language provided herein (specifically regard-
ing distributing notices electronically) is consistent with the Board’s
recent decision in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010).
the CEA does not represent an uncoerced majority of employ-
ees in the unit.
WE WILL NOT enter into or adhere to a collective-bargaining
agreement with the CEA when the CEA does not represent an
uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, with
the exception of any provisions in the current agreement that
establish wages or benefits for bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT give effect to the union security clause in the
collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA where the CEA
does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, and thus encourage membership in the CEA
and discriminate against employees regarding hiring and the
terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they may be disciplined or
discharged if they do not sign dues-checkoff authorization
forms.
WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct that has
a reasonable tendency to coerce employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL withhold recognition from the CEA as your repre-
sentative unless it has been certified by the Board as your ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the ASW for a reasonable
period of time and put in writing and sign any agreement
reached on terms and conditions of employment for our em-
ployees in the bargaining unit:

All full-time and regular part-time production and mainte-
nance employees, inspectors and field service employees,
employed by Comau at and out of its facilities located at
20950, 21000, and 210175 Telegraph Road, Southfield,
Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi, Michigan;
and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility
located at 21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but
excluding all office clerical employees, and guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL reimburse bargaining unit employees for any initia-
tion fees, dues, and other moneys that were collected on or after
December 22, 2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause.

COMAU, INC.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2322
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer.
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection.
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

WE WILL NOT accept recognition from Comau as the bargain-
ing unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative and
engaging in bargaining with Comau when we do not have the
uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit.
WE WILL NOT enter into a collective-bargaining agreement
with Comau or enforce our collective-bargaining agreement
with Comau when we do not have the uncoerced support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT maintain a union-security clause our collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Comau at a time when the CEA
does not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, thereby causing and attempting to cause Co-
mau to violate Section 8(a) (3) by encouraging membership in a
labor organization and discriminating against employees re-
garding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct that has
a reasonable tendency to coerce Comau employees to sign
dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL reimburse bargaining unit employees for any initia-
tion fees, dues and other moneys that were collected on or after
December 22, 2009, under the CEA’s unlawful collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause.

COMAU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION