Columbia Typographical Union No. 101

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 1973

207 N.L.R.B. 850 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101 , international
Typographical Union of North America , AFL-CIO
(Byron S. Adams Printing , Inc.) and William H.
Culpepper . Case 5-CB-1210
December 12, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On November 21, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, the Charging Party filed an answering
brief combined with a motion to strike Respondent's
exceptions, Respondent filed an opposition brief
thereto together with a motion for leave to include an
addendum to its exceptions, Respondent also filed a
motion for leave to file a supplemented statement,
and the Charging Party filed an opposition brief
thereto.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions, briefs,
and motions 1 and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge only to the extent consistent herewith.
Respondent and Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc.,
herein called Adams, are parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement which provides, in pertinent
part, that the chapel chairman is Respondent's
representative of the employees, that the composing
room foreman is management's representative, and
that the foreman shall be a member of Respondent in
good standing and shall not be subject to fine,
discipline, or expulsion by Respondent "for any act
in the performance of his duties as foreman, where
such action is authorized by this Agreement." The
agreement also contains a grievance procedure which
culminates in binding arbitration covering "contro-
versies or disagreements . . . limited exclusively and
specifically to differences in the interpretation and
enforcement of the terms of this Agreement, includ-
ing the question of whether the disputed issue is
covered by the terms of this Agreement....
The controversy here in issue arose because Chapel
Chairman Manbeck allegedly interfered with the
production of the composing room employees while
carrying out his union duties as steward. That
controversy was heightened when Composing Room
Foreman Culpepper ordered Manbeck out of the
composing room for overstaying a company-imposed
time limitation during which he was permitted to
carry on his union function , and became severe when
the two men exchanged remarks which led Culpep-
per to dare Manbeck to remain, and Manbeck's
acceptance of the challenge. Manbeck was then
treated as a trespasser and was arrested when he
subsequently refused to leave at the request of the
police.
Later that month, when Manbeck was working in
the composing room as a substitute,. Culpepper
invited him into a proofreading room in which
Culpepper had installed a recorder which taped their
ensuing conversation pertaining to various griev-
ances and shop problems. Manbeck was unaware of
the taping until the conclusion of their discussion, at
which time he accused Culpepper of violating both
his constitutional and union rights.
Respondent thereupon instituted internal union
charges against Culpepper which ultimately resulted
in Culpepper's expulsion from the Union, a $5,000
fine for causing Manbeck's arrest for "trespassing" in
the composing room, and a $1,000 fine for utilizing
the tape recorder without Manbeck's knowledge or
consent.
Culpepper's expulsion caused Manbeck to instruct
the composing room employees not to take orders
from Culpepper because he no longer was a union
member, as required by the collective-bargaining
agreement . Culpepper's attempt to do so resulted in a
1-day strike during which time the Company's
attempt to subcontract its work was nullified by
Manbeck's threat to picket the subcontractor. In any
event, the strike terminated under a still-operative
arrangement whereby Culpepper articulates work
orders to a company-designated acting foremen who
is a union member in good standing and who, in
turn, passes on the orders to the employees. At least
one of the two employees designated as acting
foreman since the conclusion of the strike has spent
approximately 50 percent of his time in that capacity,
for which he has received no additional pay.
Following the close of the hearing, the Board
issued its Houston Chronicle2 decision which further
articulated its Collyer rule.3 Respondent thereupon
t Inasmuch as Respondent 's exceptions are sufficiently clear and 2 Houston Mailers Union No. 36 a/w International Mailers Union
adequately set forth its position, we hereby deny its motion for leave to (Houston Chronicle Publishing Company), 199 NLRB No. 69.
include an addendum to its exceptions. We also deny Respondent's motion 3 Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB
for leave to file a supplemented statement because the matters raised therein 837.
have no substantive bearing on the issues involved herein.
207 NLRB No. 125
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 851
moved the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the
complaint and allow the parties to resolve the dispute
pursuant to their contractual grievance-arbitration
machinery, citing Houston Chronicle and Collyer as
authority. The Administrative Law Judge denied
Respondent's motion on the ground that Houston
Chronicle is distinguishable from this proceeding,
and found that Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by fining and expelling
Culpepper, by striking Adams, and by threatening to
picket the company to which Adams attempted to
subcontract. Inter alia, he also ordered Respondent
to reimburse Adams "for one half the amount [the
two acting foremen] have been paid .... "
We disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that this proceeding is distinguishable
from Houston Chronicle and, consequently, with his
denial of Respondent's motion to defer to the
grievance-arbitration procedure. There is no element
of the controversy which is not cognizable of
resolution through that procedure, including the
strike and its aftermath, for those activities are
interwoven in the basic dispute. This dispute encom-
passes matters, rights, and obligations set forth with
some particularity in ' the parties' collective-bargain-
ing agreement, and is cognizable in a forum which
the parties have contractually committed themselves
to utilize in the first instance. Accordingly, for the
reasons set forth in the Washington Post case,4 we
shall dismiss the complaint herein and defer to the
contractual grievance-arbitration machinery in ac-
cordance with the governing principles of Collyer,
Houston Chronicle, and related cases, subject to
reservation of appropriate jurisdiction.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed; provided,
however, that jurisdiction of this proceeding is
hereby retained for the limited purpose of entertain-
ing appropriate and timely motions for further
consideration upon a proper showing either (a) that
the dispute has had, with reasonable promptness
after the issuance of this Decision and Order, been
resolved by amicable settlement in the grievance
procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or
(b) that the grievance or, arbitration procedures have
not been fair and regular or have reached a result
which is repugnant to the Act.
MEMBER JENKINS,'dissenting:
This is the third in a series of cases5 in which this
same Respondent impermissibly sought to interfere
with or control the supervisory functions of one of its
members through the imposition of internal union
disciplinary measures for reasons which have no
bearing on the parties' collective-bargaining agree-
ment and which are beyond the scope of, and not
resoluble through, the contractual grievance proce-
dure; i.e., by fining and expelling Culpepper because
he took lawful steps within his supervisory capacity
to terminate the steward's unwarranted interference
with production.
It is also one of a long series of cases in which my
colleagues, through application of the Collyer rule,
have denied the employer's statutory rights and
remedies under Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by
requiring the parties to consider and determine,
through the contractual forum, public rights which
exist solely by virtue of the Act and independently of
any contractual obligations.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the dissent
in the Washington Post case, 207 NLRB No. 123, and
in Collyer, Houston Chronicle, and related cases, I
would decide this case on the merits.
A Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, International Typographical
Union of North America AFL-CIO (The Washington Post Company), 207
NLRB No. 123.
5 Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, International Typographical
Union of North America, AFL-CIO (The Washington Post Company), 207
NLRB No. 123; Columbia Typographical Union No 101, International
Typographical Union of North America, AFL-CIO [The Washington Post
Company] (Washington Publisher 's Association), 207 NLRB No. 124.
DECISION
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held on September 11, 12, and 13,
1972, at Washington, D.C., on complaint of the General
Counsel against Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,
International Typographical Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent or the Union.
The charge was filed on January 19, 1972, and amended on
March 1, 1972, by William Culpepper, and the complaint
issued on March 21, 1972. The issue of the case is whether
the Respondent restrained and coerced Byron S. Adams
Printing Inc., of Washington, D.C., in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. Briefs were filed by all parties.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc. is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Publishers Company, Inc., a District of
Columbia Corporation engaged in the business of commer-
cial printing. During the 12 months preceding issuance of
the complaint, a representative period, Adams purchased
and received materials and supplies in its District of
Columbia place of business valued in excess of $50,000,
and performed services for and shipped printed materials
to persons and corporations valued in excess of $50,000. I
find that Adams is an employer within the meaning of the
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Act and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 of the statute.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,
International Typographical Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On February 22, 1972, the Respondent Union called a
strike by all the employees in the composing room of
Adams Printing Company to force it to remove William
Culpepper, the general foreman, from his position as
management representative, and to replace him with
another union member. Its reason for doing this was
because Culpepper had placed a limitation upon the length
of time the Union's steward could discuss union matters
with the employees inside the composing room, while they
were at work, and while they were being paid to work. I
find that by imposing a fine upon Culpepper, himself a
union member, by expelling him from union membership,
and by so striking the Company, the Respondent coerced
the employer in the selection of its representative in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act, as alleged in the
complaint.
The pertinent facts are plain and not really disputed. For
some years the Union has been the bargaining agent, under
successive written contracts, for the 15 or 20 employees in
the composing room. Its steward, here called chapel
chairman, at the time of the event was Jesse Mambeck. He
was discharged in an economic reduction in force on
December 17, 1971.1 He continued thereafter with great
frequency to come to the plant, stayed both before and
during the work shift, and talked to the employees while
they were at work. Again and again Culpepper, the general
foreman, told him to leave, but Mambeck refused; Hurbert
Jacobs, the manager of the entire Company, told him the
same thing, but was similarly rebuffed. Finally, by letter
dated January 7, 1972, the Company limited the steward's
time in the shop to 15 minutes before each of the two shifts
then in operation, plus 20 minutes after the start of each
shift, with another 30 minutes during the lunch of each
shift. The latter read as follows:
As Vice President and Chapel Chairman you are
entitled to enter our plant, but your presence here for
an unreasonable period of time is an unwarranted
interference with production. We feel it would be
reasonable for you to be here 15 minutes before the
start of the work shift and to remain a reasonable time
1 Among the distracting colorations placed into the record by the
Respondent was the question whether the steward retained employee status
after December 17. The question is irrelevant to the issues raised by the
complaint ; it would therefore be pointless to discuss here the evidence
indicating that he worked occasionally as a substitute proofreader,
beginning at the earliest during March 1972 . In insisting upon a reasonable
limit to the steward's time for carrying on union activities in the shop during
working hours the employer never predicated its position upon any
assertion that Mambeck was not an employee.
2 The general foreman and the steward disagreed at the hearing as to the
words they exchanged that morning . Culpepper said he simply ordered the
past the start of the shift. We believe 20 minutes would
be a reasonable time.
You are not to interfere with the work flow or
production in any way, if there are any complaints or
grievances , these should not be discussed on company
time.
The next day Mambeck answered the Company in
writing, saying he would refuse to abide by the direction.
Among other grounds he based his refusal on the assertion
that the collective-bargaining agreement in effect con-
tained no "restrictive language" in this respect, that he
would "be the judge of my own duties as a union official,"
and that he would be governed by "union laws" in the
matter and not by "unilateral edict of management
officials."
On January 11 Mambeck was back in the composing
room, talking to the employees, and stayed beyond the
now allotted 20 minutes after the shift had started working.
Culpepper told him to leave and he refused. The Company
called the police, the police asked him to leave, he refused
again, and he was arrested.2
The next thing that happened is that Mambeck, and the
president of Local 101, Raymond Hall, filed internal union
charges against the foreman. The charge was processed in
regular fashion, Culpepper was found guilty, and the
membership voted, on February 20, to fine him $5,000 and
to expell him from the Union. As stated in the Union's
report to its members, Culpepper was fined and expelled
"for causing the arrest of the chapel chairman for alleged
`trespassing .' " The Company and Culpepper were advised
and on the next workday, February 22, Mambeck came to
the plant to give effect to the expulsion. He gathered all the
employees of the composing room and instructed them to
refuse to accept any work orders from Culpepper because
he was no longer a union member. The foreman then
ordered the men to work, they refused, and he discharged
every one of them then and there. At the hearing Mambeck
testified he told Culpepper that day, in the presence of all
the employees ". . . if you will leave the room we will go to
work. If you don't, then we are not going to work." With
this statement by the steward, the Respondent's conten-
tion, that the work stoppage resulted from the Company's
discharge of the men, merits no comment. It was a strike to
force the Employer to replace Culpepper with a union
member more amenable to the Union's view of how the
Company should conduct its labor relation.
Later in the day the Employer contracted out the work in
progress, apparently to other shops run by other companies
owned by the same parent organization, Publisher's
Company, Inc. The Union's officers then advised the
parent Company that the subcontracting would not be
man to leave ; Mambeck testified he was on his way out and the foreman
dared him to remain . Here again a question totally irrelevant to the case was
raised, for it is clear on Mambeck 's own story that by the time the police
arrived he had deliberately sat down again and in fact refused their request
to depart . He conceded his indifference to the foreman by testifying he then
told him ; "I'm not working for you today . I'll come back when I please and
take care of union business." As he would have it by that time it had
become a test of wills between him and the foreman . I credit Culpepper's
version , but all that matters is that the 20 minutes after starting time had
elapsed and Mambeck did refuse to leave . Indeed it was with reluctance
that the police had to handcuff him, for he is 76 years old and a gentleman.
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 853
permitted, that it would picket the other plants if
necessary,3 and the strike was settled that night. The basis
of settlement was that the Company capitulated complete-
ly to the Union's demands. The men returned the next
morning; in Culpepper's place the Company designated
one of the lower foremen, Lawrenson, as acting general
foreman. The arrangement was that Culpepper would
articulate work orders to Lawrenson, who then, because he
was a member of the Union in good standing, passed on
the orders to the men. With this, work was resumed, and it
has continued in this fashion to this day. Some time in
April Lawrenson returned to another job and another
union member-Charles Shaugruie-took his place as
acting general foreman and has since been passing
Culpepper's orders on to the men. Culpepper never paid
the union fine and was never reinstated into the Union.
Analysis
The law is clear. Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act reads as
follows "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agent-to restrain or coerce . . . an
employer in the selection of his representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances." Culpepper is concededly a supervisor; it is no
less clear that he speaks for management in the "adjust-
ment of grievances." Apart from other evidence that he
represents, and has represented, the Company in specific
disputes with union agents, the very act by him which the
Union found anathema and for which it punished him
went to the heart of labor relations. Mambeck said all he
did in the shop was check to see if the employees had
things to complain about, whether they were being paid
properly, whether work assignments conformed with the
contract provisions, etc. This was purely a concern with the
grievance procedure. Further, no question here of direct as
distinguished from indirect coercion of the employer. See,
San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18, (Northwest
Publications, Inc.) , 172 NLRB 2173. There can be no more
direct force exerted by a union upon an employer than
pure strike action to win a demand-legal or illegal.
A number of arguments are advanced in defense and all
ultimately rest upon the fact that the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Union and this Company requires
union membership by the general foreman; the Respon-
dent calls this one phrase "the heart of the whole case."
None of the contentions suffices to defeat the complaint.
There is no legal precedent for the proposition that a
contract clause requiring union membership by supervisors
as a condition of employment is not in itself an unfair labor
practice. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Local 134 (Illinois Bell Telephone Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 81
LRRM 2257 (C.A.D.C., 1972) In. 69. And in Toledo Blade
Co., 175 NLRB 1072, involving another local of the parent
organization of the Respondent Union here, the Board
adopted the following language of the Trial Examiner:
3 The Respondent's threat to picket other companies, albeit seemingly
primary employers, appears in the testimony of two witnesses Robert Orth,
president of Type, Incorporated, a subsidiary of Publisher's Company, said
Mambeck called to tell him "that Type, Incorporated, and Merkle Press
would be involved in a picket line operation...." According to Mambeck
he told Orth ". . . we are doing Merkle work down here, and we are having
". . . such discipline by a union, even though the employer
may have consented to the compulsory union membership
of the supervisor under a union security clause, is an
unwarranted `interference with the employer's control over
its own representatives,' and deprives the employer of the
undivided loyalty of the supervisor to which it is entitled."
Accord: IBEW Local 134 v. N.L.R.B., supra, 81 LRRM at
2263.
The Union reads its contract as limiting the Company so
that any and every member of management may engage in
only those managerial acts specified in haec verba in the
agreement. An extension of this argument is that because
the contract does not specify how much time the steward
or the employees may devote, during working hours, to
discussion of union affairs, they all may do so without
limit. From this it follows, according to the Respondent,
that it may force the removal of any foreman doing
anything not conceded to him by the Union, or from
imposing any limitation upon union activities during
working hours, and never mind Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the
statute. Thus, according to Vitto, a witness for the
Respondent, when asked by Culpepper to leave the
composing room, Mambeck answered "I'll leave when I
get through . . . he would leave when he got through with
his Union business ." Earisman, also called by the Respon-
dent, testified Mambeck told Culpepper on the composing
room floor "he [Culpepper] is not supposed to be out on
the floor formanizing [sic]."
There is nothing in the contract that limits the right of
the Employer to run its business, to expect people to work
during the time for which they are being paid, or to take
any action in the interest of the Company. Indeed this is
the very area, external to union affairs, of which the
relevant cases speak. "The supervisor-employer relation-
ship is impermissably affected in an adverse manner,
through the union's subversion of the undivided loyalty
owed by the supervisor to his employer when he is properly
acting to further the interests of his employer." IBEW,
Local 134 v. N.L.R.B., supra. This statutory protection
from union coercion afforded the employer by the statute
cannot be denied by any innuendo or strained reading of
its collective-bargaining agreement. For the argument that
the Adam Company waived its legal rights under Section
8(b)(1)(B) the Respondent relies entirely'upon a contract
clause which reads the foreman "shall not be subject to
fine, discipline, or expulsion by the Union for any act in
the performance of his duties as foreman, when such act is
authorized by this Agreement." This is hardly that "clear
and unmistakable language" requisite under the law for
depriving unions of their statutory prerogatives. Timken
Roller Bearing Company, 138 NLRB 15. The employer's
rights merit no less protection. To the contrary, what is
written into the contract, albeit not in so many words, is
that the employees will work for their pay, and that the
employer may see to it at any time that they do so. Such
reading of the contract is dictated of necessity from the
trouble. It may eventuate in having pickets around this place ." I find, as
alleged in the complaint , that by threatening to picket the premises of Type,
Incorporated, and of Merkle Press, in furtherance of its object of forcing the
removal of Culpepper from the employ of the Adams 'Printing Co, the
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
fact it provides the employees will be paid so much or so
much. Republic Aviation Corporation v. N.LR.B., 324 U.S.
793, In. 10. In Timken Roller Bearing the Board considered
statutory rights enjoyed by unions, and said that every
such right "exists by virtue of the statute apart from any
contract concession by the employer." No less do the rights
of employers under this statute have validity apart from
union concessions. But even assuming there was any
disagreement between Mambeck and Culpepper over the
import of the existing contract, the Company was still
entitled to the supervisor's "undivided loyalty." Meatcut-
ters Union Local 81 [Safeway Stores] v. N.L.R.B., 458 F.2d
794 (C.A.D.C., 1972).
Both parties to the underlying dispute-the Union and
the Company-offered evidence to prove an ancient
personal animosity between the steward and the general
foreman. It is all beside the point; neither is obligated to
like the other, so long as each keeps his activities within the
ambit alloted him by the scheme of the statute. Compare:
Signal Manufacturing Company, 150 NLRB 1162, enfd. 351
F.2d 471 (C.A. 1, 1965), cert denied 382 U.S. 985 (1966).
A final argument is that because this Company, and
others in the immediate geographical area, permitted the
Respondent's agents to engage in union activities during
working hours with the employees without limitation, the
Respondent has forever surrendered the right to impose
any limitation upon the conduct. The short answer to this
is that no party-union or employer-surrenders any
statutory right "simply because it was unsuccessful in
obtaining a provision in the contract requiring" the other
party to abide by rules of law.
One day, while Mambeck was in the plant as usual, the
foreman invited him to his office to discuss a number of
issues in dispute between them. The two sat and conferred
for about 30 minutes. Culpepper's recollection was that
they talked about the justification or absence of justifica-
tion for the December layoff, the proper method for the
steward to obtain payroll information for union purposes,
the kind of work orders the employees were required to
accept from the foreman, etc. ". . . I told him that as far as
I was concerned, he could make a grievance on any issue
he would like to. I would like the disruption of the
composing room to stop, and we would argue the grievance
down at the Printing Industry of Washington." Mambeck
testified Culpepper wanted to talk to him "about union
matters, as a chairman, not as an individual employ-
ee...... He added they discussed "the layoff, which I
considered illegal, and how we could settle this thing? .. .
it was a conference of the Union representative and the
foreman." At the end of the meeting Mambeck first
became aware that there was a recording machine on the
desk and that it had been functioning during the
conference. He accused Culpepper of infringing upon his
Constitutional rights. Some words were exchanged, and the
upshot of this incident was that when charges were filed
against Culpepper later, after Mambeck had been arrested,
an added charge was based on this hidden use of the
recording device. The union trial committee found Culpep-
per guilty as charged and he was fined an additional $1,000
for the offense.
I find that by imposing this additional fine on the general
foreman as punishment for the manner in which he chose
to carry on his negotiations with the union representative
the Respondent committed a further unfair labor practice
in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. The confer-
ence with which the Union found fault was strictly part of
the collective-bargaining procedure, a discussion of the
merits of grievance matters. The general foreman chose to
do it his way, to look after the interests of management by
recording the steward's words with precision and with the
steward off guard. He did not thereby inhibit Mambeck;
he did nothing to interfere with the union representative's
freedom in his functioning as the spokesman of the
majority agent. It would not be conducive to the entire
precess of collective bargaining if one party could dictate
the exact manner in which the other must conduct itself in
negotiations, or in grievance handling. Free collective
bargaining means that neither party coerces the other. The
apparent difficulty here arises from the same anomoly that
underlay the basic disagreement between these two men
and which lead to Culpepper's expulsion and the strike.
The foreman wears two hats; under the scheme of the
statute, and particularly Section (8)(b) (1)(B), the manage-
ment figure-like his counterpart, the union man-must be
free to act independently of any improper force exerted by
the other.4
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom,
and from like or related conduct, and that it take certain
affirmative action which I find necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act. The Respondent must rescind its action
fining William Culpepper and expunge all records of those
fines from its files, as well as any record of the expulsion of
Culpepper from union membership. Part of the Union's
unlawful coercion upon the Company was to compel it to
hire two union members through whom the general
foreman must convey his work orders or directions to the
rank-and-file employees. The evidence shows that through-
out the time these two men, first Lawrenson and then
Shaugruie, functioned in this manner, one half of their time
was devoted to regular production work and one half
merely to passing the general foreman's orders on to the
employees. That situation is still prevailing. The Respon-
dent must be ordered to reimburse the Company therefore
for one half the amount these two men have been paid
since the time of the strike in February 1972, and until such
time as the use of these men or anyone like them is no
longer compelled upon the Company.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By fining William Culpepper $1,000 for the use of a tape
recording machine in a grievance meeting and $5,000 for
° On November 9, 1972, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the field of developing law it is best for the Board to ennunciate principles in
complaint, citing Houston Mailers Union No. 36 as authority. The motion is the first instance.
denied as in my opinion the cited case is distinguishable. In any event in a
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101
imposing a time limitation upon the Union steward's
privilege to conduct union activities during working hours
in the shop, by expelling William Culpepper from the
Union, by striking the Adams Printing Company to force
the removal of its general foreman, and by threatening to
picket the. premises of Type Incorporated, and Merkle
Press, in furtherance of this unlawful pressure upon the
Adams Company, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Sections 8(b)(1)(B) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, I issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, International
Typographical Union of North America, AFL-CIO, the
Respondent herein, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Fining, expelling, or otherwise disciplining supervi-
sors of Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., for the purpose of
restraining and coercing that Company in the selection of
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or
adjustment of grievances.
(b) Engaging in a strike against that Company or
threatening to picket related companies for the same
purpose.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., in the selection of
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Rescind and expunge from its files all records of the
fines levied against William Culpepper and advise him in
writing that the said fines have been rescinded and that the
records of such fine have been expunged.
(b) Reimburse Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., in the
manner set forth under the section entitled "Remedy"
above, for monies paid to members of the Respondent
Union for functioning as substitute general foremen forced
upon that Company by the Respondent.
(c) Post at its office and meeting hall and at any bulletin
boards maintained by it at the Byron S. Adams Printing,
Inc., company plant, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Furnish the Regional Director signed copies of said
notice for posting by Byron S. Adams Printing, Inc., if
willing, in places where notices to its composing room
employees are customarily posted.
855
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fine, expell, or otherwise discipline
William Culpepper or any other supervisor of Byron S.
Adams Printing, Inc., who is a member of this labor
organization, for mechanically recording a grievance
procedure conversation with representatives of our
Union or for imposing a time limitation upon any of
our representatives for purposes of carrying on union
business in that Company's composing room during
working hours.
WE WILL NOT engage in a strike against the Byron S.
Adams Printing, Inc., or threaten to picket the premises
of Type, Incorporated, or Merkle Press, for purposes of
forcing the Adams Company to remove its general
foreman.
WE WILL rescind and expunge from our files all
records of the fines levied against William Culpepper
and of his expulsion from our organization.
WE WILL reimburse the Byron S. Adams Printing,
Inc., for monies paid to any of our members for
functioning as substitute general foremen in the
Company's composing room.
BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
form the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board's Office, Federal Building, Room
1019, Charles Center, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, Tele-
phone 301-962-2822.