Columbia Typographical Union No. 101

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 1973

207 N.L.R.B. 841 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101
Columbia Typographical Union No. 101 , International
Typographical Union of North America , AFL-CIO
(The Washington Post Company) and Washington
Publisher's Association . Case 5-CB-1158
December 12, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND KENNEDY
On August 23, 1972, Administrative Law Judge 1
Arthur Leff issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, the Charging Party filed an
answering brief, Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, the Charging Party filed a
response brief opposing Respondent's motion to
dismiss the complaint, Respondent filed a brief in
reply thereto, the Charging Party filed a motion
requesting the Board to consider together a series of
related Board and Administrative Law Judge's
Decisions, and Respondent filed a motion in opposi-
tion thereto.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions, briefs,
and motions2 and finds, in accord with certain of
Respondent's exceptions, that this proceeding should
be deferred to the grievance-arbitration procedures
agreed to by the parties for the resolution of disputes.
Therefore, the Board has decided to affirm only
those rulings, findings, and conclusions of the
Administrative Law Judge as are consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The facts herein are relatively simple.
The employees employed by the Washington Post
Company (the Post) in its composing room are
covered by a collective-bargaining contract between
the Washington Publisher's Association and the
Respondent. The contract covers both nonsuperviso-
ry and supervisory employees in the composing
room, including the general foreman.
The contract, in section 20, provides that: "No
foreman shall be subject to fine, discipline or
expulsion by the Union for any act in the perform-
ance of his duties as foreman." In section 20-b of the
agreement, provision is made for assistant foremen
or journeymen to be designated as supervisors, and
that section goes on to provide "the names of the
r The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
2 Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record,
841
foremen and the journeymen designated to act in his
place to be kept conspicuously posted, and the
authority of such foreman and assistants shall be
limited by the terms of this Agreement."
The contract also contains a grievance procedure
culminating in binding arbitration which covers any
controversy involving interpretation or application of
the agreement except discharge, as to which special
provisions are made for appeals.
Here Richter, a rank-and-file employee covered by
the agreement, was discharged by a journeyman
named Williams who had been designated as a
supervisor under the provisions of the agreement
described above. Following the discharge Respon-
dent's chapel chairman called a special meeting of
the chapel membership which considered the facts
relating to the discharge. Williams declined the
chapel chairman's invitation to attend and present
her version of the matter. The chapel membership
voted to challenge the discharge through the contrac-
tual grievance machinery and also fined Supervisor
Williams the sum of $10 for failing to attend the
meeting and defend the discharge.
The disciplinary action imposed by the Union on
Williams was found by the Administrative Law
Judge to be a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
Act. Respondent urges that this was in error and that
the matter should be deferred to arbitration in
accordance with the Board's Collyer policy and
specifically pursuant to the precedent of Houston
Mailers Union No. 36, affiliated with International
Mailers Union (Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.),
199 NLRB 400. We find merit in Respondent's
contention.
As in Houston Chronicle, the parties here have, in
their agreement, specifically dealt with the subject
matter of the propriety or impropriety of the Union's
internal disciplinary actions with respect to foremen.
Thus, Respondent had access to the grievance
procedure of the agreement, including arbitration if
necessary as a means of resolving any dispute
between it and the Respondent with respect to
disciplinary action taken by the Union against the
foreman. While Williams was not a regular foreman,
it is clear that she was designated as a supervisor to
act under section 20-b of the agreement. Whether
and how section 20 applies to persons designated
under section 20-b is clearly a matter of contract
interpretation which can be resolved under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the agree-
ment. Similarly, the issue of whether Williams' fine
for failing to appear and defend the discharge was
prohibited or permitted by the provisions of section
exceptions , briefs, and motions adequately present the issues and positions
of the parties.
207 NLRB No. 124
842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
20 which exempt foremen from such discipline for
"any act in the performance of his duties as
foreman" poses yet another question of contract
interpretation which, in our view , ought to be
resolved through the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract . Indeed the Administrative
Law Judge here dealt extensively with questions of
contract interpretation in his efforts to resolve just
those issues . We think such contract interpretation
functions can best be performed by the parties
through discussions in the course of their grievance
procedure or, if necessary , by an arbitrator skilled in
contractual interpretation.
As pointed out by our dissenting colleague, a
related issue-i.e., the application of the contractual
limitations on the supervisory authority of a journey-
man designated as a supervisor-has already once
been submitted by the parties to arbitration. In our
view that is evidence of the necessity for arbitral
interpretative guidance in resolving disputes such as
the instant one, and we fail to understand why our
dissenting colleague concludes from that fact that
our Collyer rule is beset by "emptiness."
For the above reasons and for the further reasons
explicated in Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,
International Typographical Union of f North America,
AFL-CIO (The Washington Post Company), 207
NLRB No. 123, a case companion to this proceeding,
we shall dismiss the complaint subject to reservation
of appropriate jurisdiction , all as set forth in the
Order below.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed; provided,
however, that jurisdiction of this proceeding is
hereby retained for the limited purpose of entertain-
ing appropriate and timely motions for further
consideration upon a proper showing that (a) the
dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the
issuance of this Decision and Order, been resolved
by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or
submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the griev-
ance or arbitration procedures have not been fair
and regular or have reached a result which is
repugnant to the Act.
MEMBER FANNING , dissenting:
This case involves the same parties, the same
bargaining agreement, and the same basic considera-
tions with which Member Jenkins and I were
concerned in the companion Washington Post case,
207 NLRB No. 123; namely, the role of the Board in
determining whether Respondent utilized internal
union disciplinary measures to compel supervisors to
adhere to union rather than management desires,
and the elimination of consideration of that dispute
by virtue of our colleagues ' determination to defer to
arbitration collateral issues which the Board is fully
capable of determining, but which have no bearing
whatsoever on any of the terms or conditions of the
collective-bargaining agreement and, moreover, are
outside the scope of the contractual grievance-
arbitration machinery.3 Accordingly, for the reasons
set forth in the dissents in The Washington Post,
supra, and in Collyer, Houston Chronicle, and related
cases, supra, I would determine the merits of this
proceeding rather than defer to arbitration.
3 The substance of our colleagues ' deferral order is to compel arbitration
of the contractual limitations , if any, on the supervisory authority of
journeymen designated supervisors such as Williams This is the issue which
Respondent declared at the hearing in the companion Washington Post case,
supra, was not arbitrable and which , moreover , already had been
determined by an arbitration award involving a different journeyman-
designated supervisor . Respondent nevertheless contested that award in
Federal court . These facts alone clearly demonstrate the emptiness of the
Collyer rule and the majority's refusal to decide statutory issues before us.
For the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in the Washington Post
case, supra, it is clear that the arbitration process has not and cannot resolve
the statutory issues in this case.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR LEFF, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed
August 3, 1971, by the Washington Publisher's Associa-
tion, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board, by the Regional Director for Region 5, issued a
complaint, dated October 21, 1971, against Columbia
Typographical Union No. 101, herein the Respondent,
alleging that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Sections 8(b)(1XB) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended . The Respondent filed an
answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor
practices. A hearing was held at Washington, D.C. on
March 28 and 29 and on May 2, 1972. The General
Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respondent filed
briefs on June 29, 1972.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Washington Post Company ("the Post") is engaged
in business at Washington, D.C., as a newspaper publisher,
and, along with two other Washington newspaper publish-
ers, is a member of the Washington Publishers Association
which handles their negotiations and labor relations with
the Respondent. During the past year the Post's gross
volume of business was in excess of $200,000. The Post
regularly carries advertisements of nationally sold prod-
ucts, publishes nationally syndicated articles and news
stories, and ships newspapers to points outside the District
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101
of Columbia. The Respondent admits, and I find, that the
Post is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
This case presents essentially the following question: Did
the Respondent violate Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by
levying upon Arlene Williams, a member of the Respon-
dent employed by the Post allegedly in a supervisory
capacity, a fine of $10 and threatening her with further
disciplinary action because she had refused to comply with
the Respondent's request to appear and testify at a special
chapel membership meeting called to hear the "appeal" of
another member who had been discharged by the Post as a
result of a complaint made against him by Williams? The
Respondent admits that it disciplined Williams for the
reasons stated, but denies that she was a supervisor, and
contends that even if she was, her status was not such as to
qualify her as a management "representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances" within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B). In
addition, the Respondent affirmatively asserts that, as a
matter of law, it cannot be held to have restrained and
coerced the Post by its action against Williams, because the
Post interposed no objection to Williams' attendance at the
chapel meeting, and also because-so the Respondent
claims-the Post "had given its contractual consent to the
union requirement that supervisor-members attend investi-
gative chapel meetings in discharge cases."
B. Background Facts; The Events Leading to the
Fine Imposed on Williams
The approximately 700 employees employed by the Post
in its composing room are covered by the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract between the Washington
Publishers' Association and the Respondent. All rank-and-
file and supervisory employees in the composing room,
including the general foreman who is in overall charge of
its operations, are members of the Respondent. The
collective-bargaining contract states, in section 20 thereof,
that "[n]o foreman shall be subject to fine, discipline or
expulsion by the Union for any act in the performance of
his duties as foreman," but contains no such specific
prohibition with respect to lesser supervisors. Section 20-b
of the contract, which relates to lower echelon assistant
foremen and "supervisors," provides in pertinent part as
follows:
20-b. In offices working day and/or night shifts
and/or third shifts, an assistant foreman may be in
charge of a shift and shall have the full authority in
supervising and directing the shift. . . . Journeymen
I
The chapel chairman is the representative of the Respondent-Union at
the Washington Post chapel which is composed of Respondent's members
843
may be designated as supervisors by the foreman to
supervise certain divisions, such as copy cutter, ad
alley, proofroom, TTS, and make-up, but only the
general foreman may employ, discharge or discipline.
The names of the foreman and the journeymen
designated to act in his place shall be kept conspicuous-
ly posted, and the authority of such foreman and
assistants shall be limited by the terms of . this
Agreement.
The Post operates its composing roam on a 3-shift basis.
The general foreman has overall charge of all three shifts.
Each separate shift (containing approximately 200 or more
employees) also has a shift foreman and an assistant shift
foreman, having supervisory jurisdiction over all compos-
ing room operations. In addition, the Post designates a
separate "supervisor" on each shift for each of the
approximately seven separate divisions in the composing
room, as well as substitute "supervisors who are designated
to serve in their absence. The names of all individuals
designated as shift foremen, assistant shift foremen, and
"supervisors," as well as their substitutes, are posted in the
composing room, as required by the contract.
Arlene Williams, at the time of the events in issue, was
the designated substitute "supervisor" of the TTS (teletype
setting) room. She regularly served 2 days a week as the
"supervisor" in that room, and during the remainder of her
5-day workweek worked as a tape-puncher.
The events leading to the levying of the fine on Williams
were as follows: On Sunday, July 11, 1971, while serving as
"supervisor," Williams discovered, after soiling her ear and
hair, that the receiver of the telephone on her desk in the
TTS room had been covered with ink. She reported this to
G. Whiffen, the substitute shift foreman who was on duty
that day. Whiffen then came to the TTS room and told the
employees that they would not be allowed the use of ' the
TTS telephone that day for any incoming or outgoing calls,
and that all incoming calls for employees would be
transferred to the chapel chairman's desk.' Later in the
day, a call came in on the ITS telephone for employee Ed
Richter. Williams transferred the call to the desk of the
chapel chairman. When Richter learned that a call' had
come in for him that Williams had not allowed him to take,
he approached Williams and berated her for not allowing
him access to the TTS telephone, stating that if it happened
again he was going to "wrap the phone around [Williams']
and Mr. Wiffen's neck." Williams reported this episode'to
the assistant foreman, and the next day to the shift
foreman. Later, she was called to General Foreman
Smith's office to tell him what' had happened. Smith asked
Williams whether she was recommending Richter's dis-
charge, cautioning her to think the matter over carefully
before giving him a reply, as such a recommendation, if
adopted, was likely to subject her to harassment by other
composing room employees. After giving thought to the
question, Williams told Smith she was recommending
discharge action. Later that day, Smith again called
Williams to his office and asked her whether she was
working for the Post.
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
standing by her discharge recommendation. Smith said she
was.
Shortly thereafter, Smith set up a meeting with the
chapel chairman and assistant chapel chairman, to which
Richter and Williams were also called. Smith informed
Richter of the complaint Williams had made against him
and, at Smith's request, Williams then gave her account of
what had happened. Richter was given an oppportunity to
speak in his own defense. There was some further
discussion between Smith and the chapel chairman, Smith
then announced that he was discharging Richter.
The general laws of the International Typographical
Union (ITU) provide, in article II, section 9, that: "A
journeyman who believes he has been illegally or unjustly
discharged shall have a right to appeal to the subordinate
union in the manner provided by the laws of the
subordinate union." At the request of a discharged
journeyman, it is the practice at the Washington Post
chapel for the chapel chairman to call a special chapel
meeting to hear and consider the facts relating to the
discharge. At this meeting, the discharged employee
presents his version of what occurred, other members may
be called upon to relate what they know of the occurrence,
and the management representative responsible for the
discharge action-usually the general foreman-is afford-
ed an opportunity, sometimes availed of, other times not,
to appear at the meeting to present management's version
and defend its action. At the conclusion of the meeting, a
membership vote is taken on whether to support the
grievance of the discharged employee or to uphold
management. The vote taken, however, represents no more
than an expression of membership sentiment. It has no
binding force on either management or the Union. Thus
management has normally adhered to its position despite a
hostile vote. If, as has rarely been the case, the chapel votes
to support management, the matter is not brought to an
end. The discharged employee may still submit his
grievance to the president and executive committee of the
Respondent who then conduct their own independent
investigation to decide whether to carry the protested
discharge through the contract's grievance procedures.
There have been instances when discharge grievances were
carried by the Respondent to arbitration even though the
chapel had voted to uphold management's action.
Richter "appealed" his discharge to the Washington Post
chapel. On July 19, 1971, the chapel chairman called a
special chapel meeting to consider Richter's "appeal."
Prior to the meeting, the chapel chairman requested
Williams to attend the meeting to state her version of the
events giving rise to Richter's discharge. Williams did not
give him a yes or no answer at that time. Before the
meeting was held, Williams informed General Foreman
Smith of the chapel chairman's request and asked Smith
whether she had to attend. Smith told her, in her words
while testifying, that "it was up to me whether to go or
not," but that "if I did not want to go and if I was fined
that the management would pay the fine." Williams did
not attend the meeting , nor did General Foreman Smith.2
Williams testified that her principal reason for not
attending was fear of harassment .3 At the chapel meeting,
the membership heard Richter's version of the events
relating to his discharge and voted to challenge the
discharge by invoking the grievance and arbitration
procedure.
On the day following the special chapel meeting, the
chapel chairman notified Williams in writing that, pur-
suant to article II, section 3, of the chapel laws, he was
assessing her a $10 fine because of her failure to attend the
chapel meeting and give her version of the events, and that
he was also referring the matter to the Respondent's
executive committee for disciplinary action. The section of
the chapel laws to which the letter referred reads as
follows:
When a member of this Chapel is discharged, all parties
involved who do not appear at the Special Chapel
Meeting to give testimony, or appear and refuse to give
testimony, when requested by the Chapel Chairman,
shall be assessed $10 in accordance with local by-laws,
and the [Chapel] Chairman shall file a report with the
president of [the Respondent] requesting that the
matter be presented to the Executive Committee for
disciplinary action against such party.
Williams paid the $10 fine, for which she was reimbursed
by the Post. No further disciplinary action has been taken
against her by the Respondent as a consequence of the
Richter episode.
C. As to the Respondent's Claim that Williams
Was Contractually Required to Attend the Special
Chapel Meeting
The Respondent contends that article II, section 3, of the
Washington Post chapel laws, quoted above, imposed not
only a membership obligation, but, in effect, also a
contractual requirement which obliged Williams, even if a
management representative, to attend the special chapel
meeting called to consider Richter's "appeal" from his
discharge. This is disputed by the General Counsel and the
Charging Party.
To support its contention, the Respondent points to (a)
section 1 -b of the governing collective-bargaining agree-
ment which provides:
The General Laws of the International Typographical
Union . . . not in conflict with law or this Agreement,
shall govern relations between the parties on conditions
not specifically enumerated herein.
(b) the provision of the ITU general laws (article II, section
9), above adverted to, which declares the "right" of a
discharged journeyman "to appeal to the subordinate
union in the manner provided by the laws of the
subordinate union"; 4 and (c) the bylaws of the subordinate
2 Smith was not specifically requested to attend . group of employees that I work with and have a certain amount of them try
3 As Williams put it at one point of her testimony, "Well, I don't feel that to tear me down.
I want to get up and attend a meeting like this where I am in front of a large 4 Article II, section 9, in relevant part, reads more fully as follows:
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 845
union (in this case the Respondent) which permit each of
its chapels to adopt and post its own rules "confined to
chapel matters not in conflict with ITU or local laws." The
Respondent argues that when the foregoing provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreement, of the ITU general
laws, and of the Respondent's laws are linked together and
considered in conjunction with article II, section 3, of the
Washington Post chapel laws, the effect is to incorporate
by reference that chapel rule into the collective-bargaining
contract.
The Respondent's argument breaks down, however, at
the first link of its chain of reasoning. Section 1-b of the
collective-bargaining agreement makes explicitly clear that
not all the ITU general laws are incorporated by reference
into the contract, but only those which (1) are not in
conflict with law or the contract, (2) deal with conditions
not specifically enumerated in the contract, and (3) are of a
nature that govern relations between the contracting
parties. Here, the governing collective-bargaining contract
states expressly that a "discharged employee shall have the
right to appeal in accordance with the provisions of this
contract," and in various of its sections spells out directly,
comprehensively, and unambiguously the applicable pro-
cedures and conditions relating to the consideration and
settlement of discharge disputes .5 Among other things, the
contract makes provision for a detailed grievance proce-
dure, including as a penultimate step submission for
settlement to a joint standing committee composed of
publishers' and union representatives, and, as a final step,
submission to arbitration, of all disputes, including
discharge grievances. The procedures and conditions
relating to discharge grievances that are "specifically
enumerated" in the contract are in clear conflict with the
provisions embodied in article II, section 9, of the ITU
general laws, thereby preempting and displacing the entire
area covered by the provisions of the general laws relating
to discharge "appeals." It is thus clear that the section of
the general laws relating to discharge "appeals" has no
place in the contract. And from this it follows that article
II, section 3, of the chapel laws, which the Respondent says
must be viewed as an extension and elaboration of that
general laws section, also cannot be considered an
incorporated part of the contract.
With respect to article II, section 3, of the chapel laws, it
is further observed that that section on its face governs the
relations of the Respondent and its members, and in no
way even purports to govern the relations between the
Respondent and the employer party to the contract. In the
light of the restrictive language of section 1-b of the
contract, this is a further reason for finding that the
requirements' of that section are not embraced by the
contract. The fact that the Respondent may have consid-
ered its special chapel meetings a desirable procedure for
implementing its investigation of the merits of a discharge
before finally determining whether to file a formal
grievance with respect thereto, does not make it any the
Sec. 9. A journeyman who believes he has been illegally or unjustly
discharged shall have the right to appeal to the subordinate union in
the manner provided by the laws of such subordinate union. If the
subordinate union orders reinstatement the decision must be complied
with until reversed. Either party may appeal to the [ITU] Executive
less an internal union procedure. Contrary to the position
of the Respondent on that score, I know of no rule of law
that holds that where a contract is silent on a subject of this
kind, the customary practice followed by a union in
investigating grievances attains the force of a consensual
contractual procedure by which an employer is bound.
Accordingly, I find that Williams was not contractually
required, either as an employee or supervisor of the Post, to
appear and testify at the special chapel meeting called to
consider Richter's discharge.
D. As to Williams' Status as a Supervisor
As noted above, the collective-bargaining contract
covering the Post's composing room provides for the
designation by the general foreman of journeymen as
"supervisors ... to supervise certain divisions" of the
composing room, among them the TTS division. It does
not, however, expressly define the authority of such
"supervisors" except in terms of limitation, viz, "only the
general foreman may employ, discharge, or discipline."
As a part-time "supervisor," Williams' name was
included on the contractually required list of journeymen-
designated supervisors posted in the composing room.
Along with- other journeymen-designated supervisors,
Williams attended classes and seminars which manage-
ment conducts for those in that category, at which
instructions are given on subjects such as labor relations,
cost controls, management concepts, and human relations,
and at which an evident effort is made to impress upon the
"supervisors" their identification with management. One
item specifically stressed at these classes is the decision of
an arbitrator in a discharge grievance, ruling that under the
contract, "supervisors" are authorized, not merely to direct
the flow of work, but also to direct employees in their
performance of work, and that an employee's refusal to
obey a "supervisor's" order relating to his work constitutes
an act of insubordination and a neglect of duty which is a
dischargeable offense under the contract.
While serving as a part-time "supervisor," Williams did
no physical production work and was paid $7 a day above
her journeyman rate. Her duties, responsibilities, and
authority were the same as those of the full-time "supervi-
sor" whose place she regularly took on his days off. She sat
at a desk in the center of the room which was elevated to
command a view of the 27 teletypesetting machines and
other equipment located in that room. As the only
"supervisor" in that room, Williams was responsible for
assigning work to the TTS employees, ranging in number
from as few as 10 to as many as 27; for seeing to it that the
employees performed their assigned work diligently; for
arranging the acquisition of needed supplies; for reporting
breakdowns of equipment and in some instances arranging
for their repair; and for logging various production
records, including records relating to the progress of
journeymen printers who were being trained to operate
Council as provided herem: Provided, when a subordinate union has
made specific provisions in its contract for reference of controversies
over discharge to a joint agency, the dispute shall be decided as
provided in the contract .
5 Specifically, section 5, 25, 26, and 27.
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TTS equipment. Although the shift foreman and assistant
foreman came into the room at times, they did so mainly to
check on whether the time schedules in the TTS room were
being met, and not to direct the work of individual
employees assigned to that room.
The greatest part of Williams' time while working as a
"supervisor was spent in arranging for the flow or
distribution of copy in the TTS room. There are two types
of copy that come into the room, straight copy and
advertisements. The "supervisor" must decide the type of
copy to be assigned to the individual TTS operator on a
given day or during different times of the same day.
Although the work assignments made are largely routine in
nature, they do require to some extent the exercise of
independent judgment on the part of the "supervisor."
Thus, when new work of a priority nature comes in, the
"supervisor" must make a judgment whether to pull off an
operator from the work he is then doing or to allow him
first to complete the copy he has on hand. In the case of a
rush job, the "supervisor" must consider the relative
swiftness of the available operators who might be given
such work. Not all operators are of equal ability, and there
are some who are not competent to perform certain types
of ad work. When unusually difficult ad copy comes up for
assignment, the "supervisor" must take that into considera-
tion. On days when reproduction work is to be done, the
"supervisor" must decide how many operators may be
placed on such work without hindrance to the regular
production work that must be done that day. Some types
of ad copy are considered by the TTS operators less
desireable to work on than others, and, to avoid grievances,
the "supervisor" must seek over a period of time to effect
an equitable distribution of work.
Except as noted above, a "supervisor" exercises limited
authority. A "supervisor" may give an employee permis-
sion to go to the credit union or to the nurse, and, in cases
of emergency, to leave work early. But, normally, only the
shift foreman can give an employee permission to leave
work before the end of a shift, and an employee desiring
such permission takes it up with the foreman through the
chapel chairman. If a machine breaks down leaving an
employee without work, the "supervisor" sends him to the
foreman for assignment to another division of the
composing room. If an employee is, say, reading a
newspaper when he should be working, the "supervisor"
may order him to return to work, but if the employee does
not heed the order, or engages in some other infraction of
working rules, the "supervisor" can do no more than send
him to the shift foreman. The "supervisor" has no
disciplinary authority. Under the contract such authority is
vested solely in the general foreman. There is nothing in
the contract, however, which prohibits a "supervisor" from
recommending disciplinary action to the general foreman.
Only one instance of a disciplinary recommendation made
by a "supervisor" was brought out at the hearing-the one
relating to Williams' recommendation to Foreman Smith
that Richter be discharged because of the telephone
episode related above. As has been found, Foreman Smith
on that occasion solicited Williams' recommendation
concerning the disciplinary action to be taken, and her
recommendation that Richter be discharged was given
effective weight.
The contract makes no reference to the role of "supervi-
sors" in formal grievance procedures . It is not disputed,
however , that with respect to certain types of employee
grievances of a minor character "supervisors " do have
authority, which Williams has exercised , to effect adjust-
ments . Included among them are individual employee
complaints about work assignments or physical working
conditions , such as complaints about discriminatory or too
arduous work assignments , and gripes about room temper-
ature or other uncomfortable conditions in the TTS room.
Complaints of that kind at times are taken up by
employees directly with the "supervisor " and at other times
presented through the chapel chairman . Richard F.
Lanham , the chapel chairman involved in the Richter
incident, recalled a number of such grievances which he
had taken up with Williams as the "supervisor" of the TTS
room and which he had succeeded in having adjusted at
that level , making it unnecessary for him to carry the
grievances further.
Assessing the foregoing facts, I think there is enough to
show that at the time material herein , Williams was a
supervisor within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act.
It is, of course , well settled that an individual need not
possess all the attributes of supervisory authority enumer-
ated in that section to qualify as a statutory supervisor.
Ohio Power Co. v. N.L.R .B., 176 F .2d 385 (C.A. 6). The
degree of responsibility vested in Williams , and which she
exercised , to assign and direct work of the employees in the
TTS room seems to me alone sufficient to satisfy the
statutory standard of Section 2(11). When serving as
"supervisor," Williams was the only person in the TTS
room charged with the duty of making work assignments.
And, except for occasional visits by foremen or assistant
foremen, she was the only one in that room with delegated
authority to direct the work of TTS employees , numbering
as many as 27. If, as contended by the Respondent, the
only persons in the entire composing room with superviso-
ry responsibility and authority were those classified as
foremen and assistant foremen, the ratio of supervisors to
rank-and-file employees on any given shift would be about
1 to 100 . Even taking into account the journeymen skills of
the composing room employees , such a ratio would appear
to be a highly unlikely and impracticable one from an
operational point of view. Nor is this merely a matter of
conjecture on my part . My view that the Post had a need
for responsible intermediate supervision at the divisional
level, that the Respondent acknowledged that need, and
that the "supervisor" classification was created to meet it,
is fortified by the provisions of section 20-b of the
collective -bargaining contract authorizing the designation
of " `supervisors ' . . . to supervise certain [composing
room ] divisions," the TTS division among them . Addition-
al indicia of Williams ' supervisory authority revealed by
this record , such as her recognized authority to adjust
certain types of grievances and the effective weight which
was given to her recommendation for Richter's discharge,
serve to add strength to the conclusion I reach that
Williams occupied the status of a statutory supervisor.
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101
E. As to Williams' Status as a Management
Representative Within the Ambit of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
In earlier decisions in Section 8(b)(1)(B) cases, the Board
has made it clear that the reference in that section to
"representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances" must be broadly con-
strued.6 Indeed, the Board in a recently decided case
adopted with approval the observation of Trial Examiner
Klein that its earlier decisions had established the legal
principle that
All persons who are "supervisors" within the meaning
of the Act are employers' "representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances" within the purview of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the Act.
See The Newspaper Guild (Times Publishing Company), 196
NLRB 1121. Relying on that stated principle, the Trial
Examiner in that case, with Board approval, found it
unnecessary even to consider whether or not the supervi-
sors there involved had ever represented the employer in
collective bargaining or in the adjustment of grievances.
In the instant case,,there is no need to go that far. For
here the record affirmatively shows that Williams did in
fact act for management in the adjustment of certain types
of grievances. The fact that the grievances with which she
dealt were relatively minor can be of no controlling
significance. The employer's bargaining obligation under
the Act is as much applicable to minor employee
grievances as to major ones. So, too, is management's need
for representation in their consideration and adjustment.
Accordingly, I find, contrary to the Respondent's
contention, that Williams at the times material herein was
a representative of her employer for the purposes of
collective, bargaining and the adjustment of grievances,
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
F. As to the Alleged Unlawful Restraint and
Coercion; Analysis and Concluding Findings
Having determined that Williams was a supervisor as
defined by Section 2(11) of the Act and a management
representative within the contemplation of Section
8(b)(1)(B), I come to the final issue in this case: In the
circumstances of this case, did the Respondent's discipli-
nary action against Williams amount to unlawful restraint
and coercion of the Post within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(B)?
The principles of law that must guide decision on that
issue appear by now to be clearly established by Board and
court precedent. Section 8(b)(1)(B) is to be construed
broadly to accomplish its intended objective, i.e., "to
6 See, e.g., Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P and 272 of The Lithographers, etc
(The Toledo Blade Company, Inc.), 175 NLRB 1072, enfd. 437 F 2d 55 (CA.
6, 1971); International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators (Cork
Insulating Company of Wisconsin, Inc.), 189 NLRB 854; Detroit Newspaper
Printing Pressmen's Union No. 13 (The Detroit Free Press), 192 NLRB 106.
7 See, e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc., supra; Dallas Mailers Union,
Local 143, (Dow Jones Co., Inc.), 181 NLRB 286, enfd 445 F.2d 730
(C.A.D C., 1971); Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P and 272 (Toledo Blade), 437 F.2d
55 (CA. 6, 1971); Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local 49 (General Metal
847
prevent . . . union interference with an employer's control
over its own representatives." Meat Cutters Union Local 81
v. N.L.R.B., 458 F.2d 794 (C.A.D.C. 1972); San Francisco-
Oakland Mailers Union (Northwest Publications), 172
NLRB 2173. "While Section 14(a) permits supervisors to
be union members . . . Congress did not intend thereby to
allow unions to subvert the `undivided loyalty' it clearly
believed such management personnel owe to their respec-
tive employers." Meat Cutters Local v. N.LR.B., supra, at
800. It is now generally recognized that any internal union
discipline that is directed against an employer's representa-
tive, and is designed or has a reasonable tendency to dilute
the representative's fidelity to management's interests by
making him more responsive or subservient to the union's
point of view, is as much within the intended scope of the
8(b)(1)(B) prohibition as a union's direct coercive pressures
against an employer aimed at forcing changes in the
identity of management representatives. Thus, it has been
consistently held that a union violates 8(b)(1)(B) when it
disciplines a supervisor-member for reasons that are
related to, or grow out of, the performance of his duties as
a management representative.? Indeed, the Board has gone
further and has held that, to constitute restraint and
coercion under Section 8(b)(1)(B), it is not even essential
that the discipline imposed on the supervisor-member be
linked to his performance of supervisory, or managerial
functions ; it is enough that the discipline be related in
some manner to an underlying dispute between the
employer on the one hand and the union or employees on
the other.8 Union discipline of a supervisor-member is
viewed by the Board as falling outside the proscription of
8(b)(1)(B) only where the union offense occasioning the
discipline involves a matter purely of internal union
administration, unrelated, either directly or indirectly, to
any dispute between the union and the employer, or to the
supervisor's relationship and fidelity to his employer.9
In the instant case, there can be little doubt that
Williams' failure to appear and "testify" at the special
chapel meeting, the union offense for which she was
disciplined, related to more than a matter of purely union
administration. The meeting which she failed to attend was
concerned with an employee dispute with her employer,
the Post. And the subject about which she would have been
required to "testify" related to conduct she had engaged in
while performing her duties as a supervisor. Quite clearly,
Williams would not have been summoned to attend the
chapel meeting, nor have been subjected to disciplinary
action for nonattendance, but for her involvement in the
Richter discharge which was then being protested by
Richter and which, if not yet a current, was at least a
potential subject of dispute between the Respondent and
the Post.
As found above contrary to the Respondent's conten-
Products, Inc-1 178 NLRB 139, enfd. 430 F.2d 1358 (CA 10, 1970); Detroit
Newspaper Printing Pressman 's Union No. 13, (Detroit Free Press), 192
NLRB 106.
8 See, e.g., Local No. 2150, IBEW (Wisconsin Electric Power Co.), 192
NLRB 77; IBEW (Illinois Bell Telephone Co.), 192 NLRB 85; Carpenters,
District Council of New Mexico (A.S. Homer, Inc.) 176 NLRB 797, enfd. 454
F.2d 1116 (CA. 10, 1972).
9 See, e.g., Local 453, Brotherhood of Painter.% 183 NLRB 187.
848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion, the chapel rule relating to the consideration of
discharge "appeals," under which Williams was summoned
to the special chapel meeting, was an internal union rule,
not part of the contract's grievance procedures. Williams,
in her capacity as a management representative, was
therefore under no obligation to appear at the meeting to
explain, defend, or attempt to justify to the chapel
membership her conduct as an employer representative.
Whether she should, or should not, nevertheless voluntarily
comply with the request was thus a matter for management
decision committed to its discretion. In this case, higher
management, in effect, delegated that management deci-
sion to Williams. But this did not deprive the decision she
made-not to attend the meeting-of its essential charac-
ter as a management decision. On that basis alone it can be
concluded, when 8(b)(1)(B) is read with the gloss of the
broad construction that has been placed on it, that the
disciplinary action taken against Williams for not appear-
ing at the special chapel meeting constituted an unlawful
infringement of the Post's statutory right to have its
management representatives who are also union members
immunized from the enforcement against them of union
obligations relating in any way to their managerial
decisions, functions, or responsibilities.
In any event, I believe a finding of 8(b)(1)(B) restraint
and coercion is dictated in this case , at least at my
decisional level, by the Board's holdings in two cases. In
the San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' case, supra, the Board,
as part of the 8(b)(1)(B) violation there found, held that a
union engaged in unwarranted interference with an
employer's control over its own representatives by citing
certain supervisor-members to appear before its executive
board to account for conduct engaged in by them, and by
subsequently fining them because of their nonappearance.
In Sheet Metal Workers International Union No. 71 (H.J.
Otten Company, Inc.), 193 NLRB 23, the Board reached a
similar result even though no union discipline or express
threat of discipline against the foreman was involved.
There, the Board held it to be violative of Section
8(b)(1)(B) for a union simply to hail a supervisor-member
before its executive board to have him respond to
members' complaints regarding the distribution of over-
time assignments he had made in his capacity as an
employer representative. The Board adopted the reasoning
of Trial Examiner Singer that the union's conduct
... had the natural and forseeable tendency of
restraining or coercing [the supervisor-member] in the
exercise of [a] managerial function on behalf of his
Employer . . . . Summoning a supervisor -member
before the highest official body of the union to respond
to members ' complaints against his role in the
administration of the collective bargaining agreement
necessarily operates to inhibit and restrain the supervi-
sor-member in representing and advancing the view-
point of management , and is therefore coercive upon
the management on whose behalf he acts. The natural
effect , if not the ostensible object, of such action is to
10 Williams' presence at the special chapel meeting was not essential to
the Respondent's ability to investigate Richter's complaint to determine
whether a formal union grievance on his behalf was justified . Other means
induce or compel the employer through its supervisor-
member to be more amenable to the union's interpreta-
tion of how the contract should be administered ... .
Contrary to Respondent's contention, the Executive
Board's questioning of [the supervisor] cannot cavalier-
ly be overlooked as a mere "general inquiry concerning
complaints." The "underlying dispute was between the
Respondent and the Company . . . and not between
the Respondent and one of its members ..... If
Respondent desired to question [the supervisor's]
activities in this regard, it had only to meet with him in
his managerial capacity under the available contractual
procedures for settling grievances. . . . The Employer
here was entitled to have its representative free of
union coercion with respect to the overtime decisions
he made for it ... .
The reasoning that led the Board to its conclusion in the
Osten case appears equally applicable to the case at hand.
The fact that in Osten the summons was to a union's
executive board, whereas here it was to a union member-
ship body, provides no substantial basis for distinction.
The inhibitory impact upon a supervisor-member's per-
formance of his supervisory responsibilities with undivided
loyalty to management's point of view is, I think, the same
in the one situation as in the other. My opinion in this
respect is fortified by evidence in this record reflecting that
when in the past management representatives had ap-
peared at chapel meetings to explain or defend manage-
ment's position, they had at times been confronted by a
hostile audience and subjected to harassing questioning;
indeed, Williams' testimony discloses that she decided not
to attend the Richter meeting precisely because she feared
such harassment. Surely, under such conditions, the
enforcement against supervisors of a union rule requiring
them to justify to fellow members action taken by them in
their supervisory capacity operates to inhibit and restrain
them from carrying out their management role with the
complete faithfulness to management's interests an em-
ployer has the right to expect . It is , of course, no answer to
say that where, as here, the fine is only $10 and is paid by
the Employer, the restraining impact on a supervisor is de
minimus. The amount of the fine does not affect the
principle involved. And, if the principle were upheld that
such a rule is lawfully enforceable, there would be nothing
to deter the Respondent in the future from exacting
compliance with the rule by a more drastic penalty. Nor
does it aid the Respondent to say that the special chapel
meeting to which Williams was summoned was an
"investigatory" one, concerned not with whether Williams
should be disciplined for what she had done, but with
whether there was sufficient merit in Richter's complaint to
warrant the chapel membership's support of his grievance.
Even if this is assumed to be so, the restraining and
coercive impact upon supervisors flowing from the en-
forcement against them of the chapel rule here involved
would be the same. 10
Emphasizing that the prohibition of Section 8(b)(1)(B) is
were available for that purpose , and indeed were provided. Thus the
collective-bargaining contract requires the general foreman , within 24 hours
after a discharge, to give a discharged employee a statement in writing
COLUMBIA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 101 849
directed by its terms to restraint and coercion of an
employer, not of an employer representative, the Respon-
dent contends that even if the disciplinary action taken
against Williams had a restraining impact on her, the Post
is not in a position to claim that it, as her employer, was
also restrained and coerced by that action. The Respon-
dent states three supporting reasons for its contention.
Two of them may be quickly disposed of. One is based
on the Respondent's claim that the Post "had given its
contractual consent to the union requirement that supervi-
sor-members attend investigatory chapel meetings on
discharge cases." The short answer to that assertion is that
it is contrary to fact. This has been demonstrated by
findings earlier made. The Respondent's second asserted
reason is that the Post, according to the Respondent, had
over a long period of time acquiesced in and accepted the
union practice in discharge grievances of requiring the
involved management representative to be present at the
special chapel "appeal" meeting to state management's
version, thereby, in effect, making it part of Company
policy that supervisor-members comply with the require-
ments of the chapel rule that was applied to and enforced
against Williams. Here, again, the Respondent's position
lacks evidentiary support. The record fails to establish that
the Respondent had maintained a uniform practice or
policy of requiring its supervisors to attend such meetings.
The evidence shows, rather, that the general foreman, the
management representative usually involved in discharge
situations , had at times appeared at such meetings to give
management's version, and at times had not, the decision
on whether or not to appear having depended in large
measure on the anticipated mood of the chapel member-
ship. As for supervisors of lower rank, the record shows
only that, as in Williams' case, supervisors were told that
the decision whether or not to attend was their's to make,
but if they chose not to attend and were fined, the
Company would pay the fine.
The third-actually the Respondent's principal support-
ing reason-rests upon the ground that higher manage-
ment, as the record does show, interposed no objection to
Williams' complying with the Respondent's request to
attend the Richter meeting. Having thus disavowed any
opposition to her attendance at the meeting, argues the
Respondent, the Post cannot now say that her presence at
the meeting would have been contrary to its interests, and
that it was restrained and coerced by the invocation and
enforcement against her of the union rule in question. In
the setting stated by the -Respondent, a finding that the
Post was restrained and coerced does, to be sure, present
some conceptual difficulty. However, that difficulty is
"spelling out the reasons for the discharge " Further, as appears from
findings made above, the general foreman, in conformity with the
customary practice, met with chapel representatives and Richter before
largely dissipated when one considers the legislative
objectives of 8(b)(1)(B), the fact that the Post had in effect
delegated to Williams the management decision whether or
not to attend, and the precise nature of the restraint and
coercion involved, all as found above. In any event,
acceptance of the Respondent's contention in this respect
appears to be foreclosed by the Board's decision in Illinois
Bell Telephone Co., 192 NLRB 85, where a like contention
was urged and rejected by the Board. In that case, the
Board found that a union unlawfully restrained and
coerced an employee in violation of 8(b)(l)(B) by fining
supervisor-members who had reported for work and
performed strikers' duties during a rank-and-file strike,
even though the employer had expressly left the decision
whether or not to work up to each individual supervisor,
with specific assurances to them that no reprisals would be
visited on those who chose not to work. I read the Board's
holding in Illinois Bell as square authority opposed to the
Respondent's contention.
Accordingly, on all the evidence and for the reasons that
have been stated, I conclude and find, as alleged in the
complaint, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B)
of the Act by fining Williams and threatening her with
further disciplinary action because she failed to appear and
give testimony at the special chapel meeting in compliance
with the Respondent's internal union rules.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By fining Arlene Williams $10 and threatening her with
other disciplinary action because she refused Respondent's
request to appear and give testimony at a Washington Post
special chapel meeting held on July 19, 1971, the
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(b)(1)(B) and
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act,
it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and
desist therefrom, and from like or related conduct, and that
it take certain affirmative action which I find necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act, including the rescission
of its action fining Arlene Williams, the expunging of all
records thereof in its files, the repayment to Williams of the
fine levied against her, with interest thereon at 6 percent
per annum, and the posting of appropriate notices.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
finalizing the discharge, and informed them of Williams' complaint against
Ritcher. Williams was also present at that meeting and gave her account of
what had occured She was available for questioning by the chapel
representatives at that time.