Columbia Pictures Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 1949

84 N.L.R.B. 647 (N.L.R.B. 1949)

-In the Matter Of COLUMBIA PICTURES CORPORATION, EMPLOYER and
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND
MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA, AFL, PETITIONER -
in the Matter of PARAMOUNT PICTURES, INC., EMPLOYER and INTER-
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING
PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA,
AFL, PETITIONER
Cases Nos. 21-RC-617- and 21-RCD18, respectively. Decided
June 28, 1949
DECISION
AND
ORDER
- Upon separate petitions duly filed, -a hearing in these consolidated
•cases 1 was held in Los Angeles, California, on March 1, 15, 17, and
21, 1949, before Eugene M. Purver,• hearing officer. The hearing offi-
cer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial' error and
are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
- 1. The Employers are engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The Petitioner, and Screen Set Designers, Illustrators and Deco-
rators, Ldcal 1421, affiliated with Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators
and Paperhangers of America, AFL, herein called the Intervenor, are
labor organizations claiming to represent employees of the Employers.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the-Employers within the meaning of Section 9
(c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following rea-
sons : I • . ,14 .1
The Petitioner asks the Board. to find separate bargaining units,ap-
propriate for each Employer, consisting of all set designers, illustra-
tors, and sketch artists, and.their assistants and apprentices,2 exclud-
i Cases Nos . 21-RC-617 and 21-RC-618 were consolidated by order , of the Regional
Director on February 9, 1949.
3 This group of employees shall hereafter be referred to as set designers.
84 N. L. R..'B', `No.' 73. .
647
648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
jug all other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Intervenor does not seriously contest the specific composition of
this unit,3 but maintains that the only appropriate unit for set design-
ers is a single multiple-employer unit for the 10 major film producers,
including the Employers. The latter take a neutral position with re-
gard to the scope of the unit.
t Set designers are employees who design sets for motion picture pro-
duction. Illustrators and sketch artists 4 sketch and draw the scenes to,
be photographed. These employees are in the Employers' art depart-
ment,under the supervision of the art director. Until 1947 set design-
ers were hired, as other craftsmen in the motion picture industry still
are hired, out of a common pool composed of members of the particular
craft. Under such a hiring system, interchange of employment among
the major producers was prevalent. Set designers are now hired sep-
arately on the general labor market, and virtually no interchange
cccurs. Set designers are now much more likely to remain in the em-
ploy of one producer, and their employment is more regular than that
of other craftsmen. C
For many years the major film producers in this country, including
the Employers, have been members of the Association of Motion Pic-
ture Producers, Inc., which has handled practically all the labor rela-
tions. matters of its members. Representatives of the Association and
its members have met regularly with various unions, including the
Petitioner and the Intervenor, representing employees in the motion
picture industry. Contracts resulting from such collective bargaining
meetings have been executed, up to the present time, by the unions
concerned and each of the Association members. The Board has pre-
viously recognized the multiple-employer collective bargaining.pattern
in the motion picture industry 5 ,
' Set, designers were first bargained ,for collectively in 1939. Until
1944; these employees' were covered by contracts between the Inter-
venor, or its predecessor, and the major film producers, including the
Employers. After the last contract expired on January 1, 1944, the
Intervenor and the producers unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate
another contract: These ^ meetings took place, with decreasing fre-
quency, until August 1947. In July 1946, two wage increases for set
designers resulted from these [negotiations, one of which was the 25
The Intervenor , contrary to the contention of the Petitioner and the Employers, would
also ' include set decorators and model builders in the unit with the set designers . In view
of our finding that the units sought by the Petitioner are inappropriate , we need not
determine 'this question . 'r : , - . , . '
I These titles are used interchangeably.
5 See, for example, Matter., of Columbia , Pictures Corporation, et al., 80- N. L. R. B.
1381 ; Matter of Association of Motion Picture Producers, Inc., et al ., -79,N. L . R B. 466;
Matter, of Columbia Pictures, Corporation , at al., 61 N . L. R. B: 1030 ,'64 N. L . R. B. 480.
COLUMBIA: PICTURES CORPORATION 649
percent blanket industry-wide increase that followed the so-called
Treaty of Beverly Hills. There has been no bargaining, of, any kind
for set designers since August 1947.
Multiple-employer bargaining has become the established pattern in
the motion picture industry. The only history of collective bargaining
for set designers has also been on a multiple-employer basis In our
opinion, the pattern of organization for a special classification of
employees, as, for example, the set designers in this case, should fol-
low the pattern of bargaining established generally 6 for other em-
ployees of the particular employer involved.7 We believe, therefore,
that the uninterrupted and current pattern of multiple-employer
bargaining for the other employees of the Employers is controlling
with respect to the type of unit appropriate for set designers. Ac=
cordingly, we find that the proposed units are too limited in scope to be
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, and we shall dismiss
the petitions.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitions filed herein be, and they
hereby are, dismissed.
CHAIRMAN HERZOG took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
MEMBER HOUSTON, dissenting :
I cannot agree that in the circumstances of this case a multiple-
employer unit of set designers is the only appropriate unit and that
we are therefore warranted in dismissing these petitions seeking
separate single-employer units. Recognizing the central importance of
past bargaining history in determining the appropriateness of mul-
tiple-employer units, I have viewed such bargaining history liberally
and found a history of common bargaining sufficient to support a
multiple-employer unit, even though that bargaining did not extend
to participation by all the employers concerned in all phases of con-
0 Our dissenting colleague does not deny that multiple -employer bargaining is today
the established pattern in the motion picture industry . While it is true , as the dissenting
opinion points out, that the Board, a decade ago, found separate employer units appropriate
for screen writers and clerical employees , this fact does not warrant a conclusion that there
is a multiplicity of varied 'bargaining patterns in the motion picture industry. The
separate units for these two groups of employees were found appropriate before the Asso-
ciation assumed its present active role in handling the labor relations matters of its
members, there is no reason to assume that the current bargaining pattern for these
employees has not conformed to the multiple -employer pattern which generally followed the
assumption by the Association of a dominant position in the field of labor relations
'Matter of Joseph E . Seagram d Sons , Inc, 83 N . L. R. B. 167 . Member Gray,
though dissenting in the 1Seagram ,,case, considers himself bound by the majority holding
therein. , _
650 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR ' RELATIONS BOARD
tract negotiations." But that is far from finding that a history of
joint bargaining by a group of employers for only some of their em-
ployees; can- determine the appropriateness of a multiple-employer
unit for employees who have been` excluded from such- bargaining.
But that is precisely the effect of the majority's decision.
At one time these set designers were bargained for on a multiple-
employer basis; but there has been no bargaining, or attempt to bargain
for these employees for almost 2 years-a lapse of time which I think
must remove whatever controlling effect the earlier joint bargaining
may have had.9 Since 1947, the set designers have been hired sep-
arately by the individual employers, and the formerly prevalent in-
terchange of these employees among the various employers has ceased.
The Petitioner seeks to represent these employees in separate units of
single employers; the two Employers here involved do not object.
I am convinced that whether or not a multiple-employer unit of set
designers was appropriate in 1947, the situation has radically changed
and there now exists a real doubt as to whether a multiple-employer
unit can "assure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining." 10
For my colleagues, however, the critical element is not the past
bargaining history as it has affected set designers, but the bargaining
history with respect to other employees. The majority rely on Matter
of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 167, a decision
holding a single-plant unit of unrepresented employees too limited in
scope because, among other things, the past collective bargaining of
the employer's other employees had been conducted successfuly on a
multiple-plant basis. Although I disagree with the result reached in
that case, I am now bound by the Seagram decision; but I cannot agree
to its unwarranted extension and application 1 , n the present case.
When, as in this case, we are dealing with competing individual em-
ployers, and there is no element of common ownership and control, the
relevant considerations in determining the appropriateness of a
multiple-employer unit are distinguishable from those which are per-
tinent in determining the appropriateness of a single-employer
multiple-plant unit. In multiple-plant cases there are considera-
tions-such as close integration of the several plants and interchange
of employees-which may militate in favor of a single multiple-plant
unit wholly apart from the bargaining history, and the Board in deny-
ing a single plant unit in favor of a multiple-plant unit rarely-if
8 See the dissenting opinion In Matter of Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern
Massachusetts , et al, 81 N. L. R. B. 224. '
See Matter of Markey Machinery Co., Inc., 54 N. L. R. B. 251 , 255; Matter of James
Hanley Co ., 79 N. L . R. B. 929.
10 See Section 9 (b) of the Act.
COLUMBIA PICTURES CORPORATION 651
ever-relies on the bargaining history alone?1 In the instant case,
however, my colleagues in finding the single-employer units inappro-
priate.rely solely on bargaining history. To do that I would insist
that such bargaining history at least involve the employees in question.
Moreover, even if I were to concede that the approach of the Sea-
gram case is applicable to multiple-employer situations, that case,
by its own terms, is not applicable here. In our dissent in the Seagram
case, Member Gray and I urged the relevancy of Matter of The Wich-
ita Eagle, et al., 69 N. L. R. B. 1270,12 in which the Board rejected the
proposition the majority now adopts, i. e., that a history of multiple-
employer bargaining involving competing companies for some cate-
gories of employees should determine the extent of the unit for other
employees. The majority in the Seagram decision found the Wichita
case distinguishable on the ground that in the Wichita case no con-
trolling over-all pattern of collective bargaining had been established
among the other employee classifications. But if a multiplicity of
varied bargaining patterns renders the Seagram rule inapplicable,
then I doubt that it is applicable here. By agreement among all the
parties, the Producers have bargained jointly for scenic artists,
machinists, and automotive mechanics, and intend so to bargain for
set decorators.13 However, it is clear that in 1938 and 1940 they bar-
gained individually for writers and clerical employees '14 and I find
nothing in the record in this case which demonstrates that individual
company bargaining for such employees is not still the practice. In
these circumstances, neither the reason nor the rule of the Seagram
case is applicable.
11 Thus the Board in the Seagram decision also based its decision on (1) the close integra-
tion of plant operations and the centralized control of labor policies , and (2 ) the similarity
of the tasks of the requested employees and the frequency of inter-plant transfers. Ob-
viously none of these additional considerations has any applicability to the present case.
13 See also Matter of Bull-Insular Line, Inc., 56 N L. R. B. 189, 194 ; Matter of Union
Collieries Coal Co , 41 N L R B 961, 967-68, Matter of Danner Press, Inc, 80 N. L It. B.
844
13 Matter of Warner Bros . Pictures, Inc., et al, 27 N. L. R B. 48, 52; Matter of Columbia
Pictures Corp., et al ,` 80 N. L. R. B. 1381 ; Matter of Columbia Pictures Corp., et at., 81
N. L. It. B. 1313.
14 Matter of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, et at. , 7 N. L. R . B 662, 696; Matter of
Columbia Pictures Corp, et at., 27 N L R B 708, 715-6; 28 N. L R B 57.