Colorado Building & Construction Trades

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 13, 1978

239 N.L.R.B. 253 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
Colorado Building & Construction Trades Council and
Utilities Services Engineering, Inc. Case 27-CC-
622
November 13, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 28, 1977, Administrative Law Judge James
T. Barker issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed a brief
in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Deci-
sion and the Charging Party filed a brief in answer to
Respondent's exceptions. In addition, briefs amici cu-
riae were filed on behalf of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations,
the Building and Construction Trades Department,
AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America.
Pursuant to a notice of hearing issued by the
Board on February 8, 1978, oral argument in this and
related proceedings was held before the Board in
Washington, D.C., on February 23, 1978. In addition
to arguments presented by the parties involved in the
several proceedings, permission to argue orally as
amici curiae was granted to the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, the Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, and the Laborers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
filed by the parties, as well as the briefs filed by the
amici curiae and the oral arguments made to the
Board, and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) by picketing
to obtain an agreement which violated Section 8(e).
We agree with this finding for the reasons set forth
below.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Utilities Ser-
vices Engineering, Inc. (hereinafter Utilities), is en-
gaged in municipal utility and industrial construction
Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, and Local Union
No. 1497 United Brotherhood of Carpenters d Joiners of America (Donald
Schriwer, Inc. and Sullivan-Kelley A Associates), 239 NLRB 264 (1978);
Carpenters Local No. 944. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, AFL-CIO, and Carpenters Local No. 235, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, A FL-CIO (Woelke a Romero Framing,
Inc.), 239 NLRB 241 (1978); and International Union of Operating Engineers.
Local No. 701, A FL-CIO; Oregon-Columbia Chapter, The Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc. (Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc.), 239 NLRB 274 (1978).
and in maintenance operations. A major portion of
its business involves the construction of water and
sewage treatment plants and pump stations. At rele-
vant times. Utilities employed approximately 24 em-
ployees at some 12 active projects located throughout
the State of Colorado. One of these projects was a
contract with Johns-Manville Corporation to per-
form electrical maintenance work at the Johns-Man-
ville Corporation Research and Development Cen-
ter. Utilities normally does not use the service of
subcontractors. However, it has engaged in subcon-
tracting from time to time. In April 1976,2 several
subcontractors were used at the Meeker, Colorado,
project located approximately 400 miles from Den-
ver, Colorado. No subcontracting was done at the
Johns-Manville project. The employees of Utilities
are not represented by any labor organization and
Utilities has never had a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Respondent.
In early April, Utilities received a letter dated
April 5 and signed by Respondent's business agent.
The letter stated, inter alia, that Respondent was en-
gaged in a program to eliminate substandard wages
in the area, that it was requesting general contractors
to sign an agreement governing the subcontracting of
construction jobsite work, and that it intended to in-
form the public of those contractors who did not sign
the subcontracting agreement by means of picketing
and other modes of communication. The proposed
agreement contained the following provisions:
I. This contract shall govern, and be limited
to, labor performed at the site of construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of building, struc-
ture, or other work of the Contractor by sub-
contractors, and shall be limited to work which
is not customarily performed by employees of
the Contractor. This Agreement shall not apply
to work on any project for the performance of
which the Contractor has entered into a sub-
contract on or before the date of execution of
this Agreement. Nor shall this Agreement apply
to any work performed by any employee or em-
ployees in a certified or recognized collective
bargaining unit, or by any employee or employ-
ees who have a representative for collective bar-
gaining.
2. As used in this Agreement, the term "sub-
contractor" shall include any arrangement un-
der which the Contractor permits any other per-
son, firm or corporation, other than the
Contractor's own employees, to perform work
for which the Contractor has primary responsi-
bility.
:Al' dales are in 1976 unless otherwise indicated
253
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. It shall be the obligation of the Contractor
to include in every sub-contract for work gov-
erned by this Agreement a provision requiring
the payment of prevailing rates of wages for
such work. In the event any sub-contractor shall
fail to pay its employees the prevailing rates of
wages for work within the scope of this Agree-
ment, the Contractor shall make whole the em-
ployees of sub-contractors for all losses and
damages which they sustain by reason of the
sub-contractor's default.
4. The Contractor further agrees that it will
not permit a sub-contractor, or the employee of
any sub-contractor, to perform any work within
the scope of this Agreement, unless the sub-con-
tractor has entered into a written agreement
with the Contractor agreeing to pay its employ-
ees the prevailing wage rates for all work gov-
erned by this Agreement.
* * * * *
7. It is the purpose and intention of the par-
ties that this Agreement shall apply to all enter-
prises of the Contractor, regardless of the nature
of the entity through which the Contractor en-
gages in business. It is therefore agreed that this
Agreement shall inure to the benefit of, and be
binding upon, any person, firm, or corporation
controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the
Contractor, or by a principal stockholder or
owner of the Contractor.
8. It is understood and agreed by the parties
that the Council is not the collective bargaining
representative of any employee, and therefore,
nothing herein shall be construed to recognize the
Council as the collective bargaining representa-
tive of any employee or employees, or to super-
sede any collective bargaining contract pres-
ently, or hereafter, in effect, or to derogate in
any way from the authority of any collective
bargaining representative of employees of the
Contractor or the sub-contractor. Nor shall any
provision in this Agreement be construed to es-
tablish rates of compensation, conditions of
work, or terms of employment for any employ-
ees of the Contractor, or of a sub-contractor.
9. As used herein the term "prevailing rate of
wage" means that rate of wages paid in the area
in which the work is to be performed to the ma-
jority of workers employed in that classification
in construction in the area similar to the pro-
posed undertaking. In the event that there is not
a majority of workers paid at the same wage
rate, then the wage rate paid to the greater num-
ber of workers shall be deemed to be the prevail-
ing wage rate.
Utilities did not respond to the letter and no further
communication occurred between Utilities and Re-
spondent.
On April 22, the Union picketed the Johns-Man-
ville Research and Development Center site. A pick-
et sign was displayed containing the following state.
ment:
UTILITIES SERVICES ENGINEERING,
INC. has no sub-contracting agreement with
Colorado Building & Construction Trades
Council.
We have no dispute with any other person or
company on this project.
During the normal working hours on April 23, the
picketing ceased and no picketing has occurred since
that date. Neither the business office of Utilities nor
any of the other jobsites at which Utilities was per-
forming services were picketed by Respondent. At
the Johns-Manville World Headquarters location sit-
uated some 2-1/4 miles from the Research and De-
velopment Center, employees of Blackinton & Deck-
er ceased work during the time of the picketing at the
Research and Development Center. The Blackinton
& Decker job superintendent told the Company's
president that the employees were quitting because
the picketing at the Research and Development Cen-
ter was "flowing over" to the World Headquarters
si te.
The General Counsel contends that the agreement
sought by Respondent violates Section 8(e) because
it is addressed to the secondary objective of influenc-
ing the employment practices of firms which seek to
do business with Utilities, to the benefit of union
members generally.
Respondent contends that the proposed agreement
merely requires that the primary contractor engage
only those subcontractors paying the prevailing wage
rate. Respondent further contends that the mainte-
nance of area standards has long been recognized as
a legitimate union objective. Thus, it argues, the ten-
dered contract is not proscribed by Section 8(e) of
the Act.
Section 8(e) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer and a union to enter into an
agreement, express or implied, whereby the employer
agrees to cease doing business with any other per-
son.3 A literal construction of this section suggests
3Sec. 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor pracitce for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement. express or implied.
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
254
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
the illegality of any agreement which results in pre-
venting the employer from establishing a business re-
lationship with another person. That section, how-
ever, has been construed to reach only secondary
pressures whereby labor seeks to further its aims by
involving an employer in disputes not its own:
Section 8(e) was part of a legislative program
designed to plug technical loopholes in §
8(b)(4)'s general prohibition of secondary activi-
ties. In § 8(e) Congress broadly proscribed using
contractual agreements to achieve the economic
coercion prohibited by § 8(b)(4).4
Thus, union activity directed toward primary objec-
tives may be lawful even though it results in an em-
ployer's ceasing to do business with another person.
And contract clauses whose basic aims are to limit
subcontracting so as to preserve for unit employees
work which has customarily been performed by
them, or in some instances to recapture work regard-
ed as fairly claimable, have been found lawful.5 Simi-
larly, clauses which require an employer to limit sub-
contracting of such work to subcontractors who
maintain the same standard of employment-so
called union standard clauses-have been found law-
ful. Respondent contends that its proposed clause
falls within the latter category. We find no merit in
this contention.
The principal rationale for the lawful character of
union standard clauses is that the union has a pri-
mary interest in insuring that negotiated standards of
employees in a contractual unit will not be under-
mined by subcontractors maintaining substandard
conditions of employment which enable them to per-
form the unit work at cheaper labor costs.6 A union
may, therefore, remove an employer's economic in-
centive to subcontract by requiring that the employer
subcontract only to another employer who agrees to
meet prevailing standards for wages, hours, and the
from handling, using. selling. transporting or otherwise dealing in any
of the products of any other employer. or to cease doing business with
any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into hereto-
fore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforceable and void: Provided. That nothing is this subsection (e)
shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an em-
ployer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or sub-
contracting of work to be done at the site of the construction. altera-
tion, painting. or repair of a building, structure or other work . .
Connell Construction Co.. Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitiers Local Union
No. 100. United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbhing &
Pipefitting Industrs of the United Stares and Canada, AFL CIO. 421 L. S
616. 628 (1975).
Heavy. HlHghXav. Building and Construction Teamsteri (ommtinttee for
Northern California. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. e al ( California
Dump Truck Owners Associatrion). 227 NLRB 269. 272 (1976l. and cases
cited therein.
6 General Teamsters Local 386. International Brotherhood of Teamsterrs,
Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Construction Muatertali
Trucking, Inc.). 198 NLRB 1038 (1972), and International Union. United
Mine Workers of America (Dixie Mining Compaun, 188 NLRB 753 (1971)
like. If, however, the union is requiring the clause in
order to further union aims generally by controlling
the employment practices of firms seeking business
with the employer, the action is secondary and un-
lawful.7 The central question in these cases is there-
fore: Does the disputed clause have the primary ob-
ject of aiding employees in a contractual unit or the
secondary object of aiding and assisting union mem-
bers generally? Here, the clause has a secondary ob-
ject. First, there is no contractual unit. Respondent
does not represent any of Utilities' employees. Nor
does Respondent seek an agreement of the type per-
mitted by Section 8(f) which would cover employees
Utilities might hire in the future. Second. even if
there were such a unit, Respondent's clause would
not protect the interests of employees in the unit.
Instead, the clause is limited to "work which is not
customarily performed by employees of the Contrac-
tor." Thus, Respondent does not seek to maintain
standard wages for employees in a contractual unit
by insuring that unit work is not subcontracted to
firms which pay substandard wages. In these circum-
stances, Respondent's clause has the secondary effect
of aiding its own members generally by attempting to
place nonunion subcontractors in a position where
they must meet union standards in order to do busi-
ness.8 We, therefore, find that the clause is proscribed
by the general provisions of Section 8(e).
Respondent contends that even if the proposed
clause is within the general proscription of Section
8(e), it is protected by the first proviso (hereafter the
construction industry proviso or the proviso) to Sec-
tion 8(e). The General Counsel contends that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Connell, supra, requires a
finding that the proposed agreement is not protected
by the proviso because there is no collective-bargain-
ing relationship between Utilities and Respondent,
and the agreement is not limited to times and places
when Utilities has employees whom the Union seeks
to or does represent. In response to this contention,
Respondent argues that the portion of the Supreme
Court decision in Connell concerning the proviso is
not controlling, as it deals with a clause clearly pro-
hibited by Section 8(e). which admittedly was sought
Respondent relies heavils on its argument that presailing wages are a
legitimate objective favored by Federal law. Of course. the issue Is not
whether the objective is legitimate In a broad sense-unionization is such an
objective but whether it is legitimate to seek to achieve that objective by
the means used herein
9 In this connection, we note that California Dump TrucA Owners Associa-
tin, ¥iipra, involved considerations different than those in the present case
There. the union had a bargaining relationship with the contractor and
could lawfully seek a union standards subcontracting clause to protect the
interest of employees in a cintraclual unit. The question was whether the
clause was actually addressed to the protection of negotiated standards or
whether it served a secondary purpose Here, the Union does not have a
bargaining relationship with the contractor and the clause does not purport
to protect the interests of employees In a contractual unit. Thus. the clause
is unquestionabl, for the purpose of achieving union objectives elsewhere
255
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as a means of organizing subcontractors. It asserts
that the decision is, therefore, inapposite because Re-
spondent is not engaged in an organizational cam-
paign, but in an attempt to eliminate unfair competi-
tion based upon the payment of substandard wages.
We find no merit in Respondent's argument.
In Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.,9 a companion
case for oral argument, we concluded that the Con-
nell decision construed the construction industry pro-
viso to Section 8(e) to permit subcontracting clauses
such as that in the instant case in the context of a
collective-bargaining relationship. We further noted
that the Connell court suggested that such clauses
might be protected by the proviso even without a
collective-bargaining relationship if they were direct-
ed toward the problems raised by the close relation-
ship between contractors and subcontractors at the
construction site and/or to the reduction of friction
that may be caused when union and nonunion em-
ployees are required to work together at the same
jobsite.
Here, Respondent seeks the subcontracting clause
outside the context of a collective-bargaining rela-
tionship and thereby loses the protection of the pro-
viso, unless, possibly, the clause is addressed to prob-
lems posed by the common situs relationships on a
particular jobsite or to the reduction of friction be-
tween union and nonunion employees at a jobsite.
Respondent's clause, however, despite its different
phrasing, is no more related to these concerns than
was the Connell clause. The instant clause does not
restrict the subcontracting of other types of work at
the jobsite, nor does it apply only to jobsites where
the Union's members are working. Thus, the clause
allows for the possibility of union and nonunion em-
ployees working side by side at a jobsite.
Furthermore, as in Connell, Respondent does not
seek the clause in order "to organize a nonunion sub-
contractor on the building project it picketed," since
no subcontracting was done at the Johns-Manville
project which Respondent picketed. °0 Indeed, Utili-
ties does not normally use the services of subcontrac-
tors. Respondent's clause, therefore, is not aimed at
avoiding problems raised by common situs relation-
ships." As in Connell, the effect of the instant clause
is to place too great an organizational weapon in the
hands of the Union by allowing it to compel any
general contractor to agree to bring economic pres-
sure on any nonunion subcontractor provided the
agreement covers work to be performed at any con-
struction jobsite. In accord with the Court's holding
in Connell, we find that this clause is not saved by the
proviso.
Accordingly, we find, in agreement with the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, that the proposed agreement
violates Section 8(e) and Respondent's picketing to
obtain the agreement violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A)
of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
order that the Respondent, Colorado Building &
Construction Trades Council, Denver, Colorado, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
9( rpenters Lo al Vio 944, UInited Brroherhood of (arpenters and Joiners
iif mn4erea. A4 Fl ('10, and (orprenters lacal No. 235. United Brotherhood of
Carpenlerv and Joiners oj A merica, AIFL ('10 (Woelke <& Romero Framing.
Incli 239 NLRB 241.
( onnell ( ,onsrucion Co. In(. s. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local L nion
o. 10(), 421 U.S, at 631.
In light of this finding, we need not and do not pass on the question of
what tspe of clause would address these concerns and whether it would be
authorized bh the proviso if it were sought oatside the context of a collec-
tive-hargaining relationship
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES T BARKER. Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard before me at Denver, Colorado, on April 26,
1977, pursuant to a complaint and notice of hearing issued
on March 10, 1977, by the Regional Director of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board for Region 27, and an
amendment to the complaint issued by the Regional Direc-
tor on March 22, 1977. The complaint and the amendment
thereto are based upon an original charge filed on April 27,
1976.' by Utilities Services Engineering, Inc., hereinafter
called Utilities, and an amended charge filed by Utilities
on April 30. The complaint and amendment thereto allege
violations of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, hereinafter called the Act. The
parties were accorded full opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, introduce relevant evidence, and
to present oral argument. Counsel for the General Counsel
availed herself of the opportunity to make an opening
statement and the parties timely filed briefs with me.
Upon the entire record in this case, the briefs of the
parties, and my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1 THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
At all times material herein, Utilities, a corporation duly
organized under the laws of the State of Colorado, has
I Unless otherwise specified, all dates herein refer to the calendar year
1976.
256
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
maintained its principal office and place of business at
Denver, Colorado, and has been engaged at its Denver,
Colorado. establishment in business as a municipal utility
and industrial general contractor and as a maintenance
contractor. In the course and conduct of its business opera-
tions, Utilities annually purchases and receives goods and
materials valued in excess of $50,000. directly from points
and places outside the State of Colorado.
Upon the foregoing, I find that at all times material
herein, Utilities Services Engineering, Inc., has been an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORG(ANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent concedes, and I find, that at all times mate-
rial herein, Colorado Building & Construction Trades
Council has been a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRAC TICES
A. The Issues
The principal issue in this proceeding is whether the
picketing and handbilling undertaken by Respondent on
April 22 and 23. 1976, at a construction site on which Utili-
ties was performing certain work for Johns-Manville Cor-
poration, was with the object of forcing Utilities to enter
into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act in
violation of Section 8(b)(4Xii)(A) of the Act. In essential
terms, the resolution of this issue rests on a determination
of whether Respondent was endeavoring to engage in pro-
scribed "top-down" organizing of nonunion subcontrac-
tors within the meaning of the Supreme Court's Connell
decision.2
B. Pertinent Facts
Background facts
As found, Utilities is an enterprise engaged in municipal
utility and industrial construction and in maintenance op-
erations. A principal facet of its operation involves the con-
struction of water and sewage treantlent plants and pump
stations. Services of subcontractors are sometimes but not
usually utilized. Since 1969 Frank McHugh has been presi-
dent and principal stockholder of Utilities. At pertinent
times his wife, Jane McHugh, was employed in a full-time
capacity by Utilities. In spring 1976. Utilities obtained a
contract from Johns-Manville Corporation to perform
electrical maintenance and allied work at the Johns-Man-
ville Corporation Research and Development C'enter as a
support operation to the Johns-Manville scientists and en-
gineers employed at the facility. The work was not "con-
struction-type work as such" but involved the use of me-
chanics, maintenance electricians, and laborers. The
contract was obtained by competitive bid and was in effect
( onnell (on1sirucion ('e, In, v. Plumserv & Sl nlam lltre 1 o, l I -tn
Vo 1(()0, 421 tS 616 (1975).
from April 1, 1976, and at all relevant times thereafter. The
contract did not cover operations at the Johns-Manville
World Headquarters location situated some 2-1/4 miles by
road from the Research and Development Center. The two
locations are not visible one from the other.
At relevant times, Utilities employed approximately 24
rank-and-file employees manning approximately 12 active
projects scattered throughout the State of Colorado. The
employees of Utilities are not represented by any labor
organization and Utilities has never had a collective-bar-
gaining agreement with Respondent.
C. The Alleged Unlaxsful Conduct
In early April, Utilities received a letter dated April 5
signed by John J. Donlon, business manger of Respondent.
Enclosed was a document designated as an agreement gov-
erning subcontracting of construction site work. Utilities
had not previously been contacted by Donlon or any other
representative of the Respondent. The letter which was ad-
dressed to Utilities Services Engineering, Inc.. contained
the following:
We are presently engaged in a program to eliminate
substandard wages in the construction industry in this
area. To assist in accomplishing this, we are requesting
builders, general contractors, and project managers to
sub-contract jobsite work only to contractors who
agree to pay prevailing rates of wages to their employ-
ees. A proposed draft of such agreement is enclosed
for your consideration. You will note that it applies
only to future work for which no sub-contract has
been executed, and does not cover any work per-
formed by employees who have a collective bargaining
representative.
We intend to acquaint the public, by means of pick-
eting and other forms of communication, with the
names of builders, general contractors and project
managers who do not enter into our sub-contracting
agreement for prevailing wages. In the event that your
company is the subject of such picketing, it will be
conducted at your general offices and other places in
which you may be engaged in business. The picketing
will be directed to the public, and not to your contrac-
tors, suppliers or employees. Its sole purpose will be to
publicize the fact that you are not a party to our pre-
vailing wage sub-contracting agreement. We wish to
emphasize that we are not requesting or seeking, and
do not desire, you to cease or refrain from doing busi-
ness with any person, firm or corporation. Nor do we
claim to represent, or seek to organize, any of your
employees or employees of any sub-contractor, or to
bargain for them.
If you have any comment or question concerning
this matter, please communicate the same by letter.
which will be referred to our Executive Board for ap-
propriate consideration and action. Neither the under-
signed, nor any other person, has authority to discuss
this matter in behalf of the Council.
In pertinent part the agreement enclosed contained the
following provisions:
257
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. This contract shall govern, and be limited to, la-
bor performed at the site of construction, alteration,
painting, or repair of building, structure, or other work
of the Contractor by sub-contractors, and shall be lim-
ited to work which is not customarily performed by
employees of the Contractor. This Agreement shall
not apply to work on any project for the performance
of which the Contractor has entered into a sub-con-
tract on or before the date of execution of this Agree-
ment. Nor shall this Agreement apply to any work
performed by any employee or employees in a certi-
fied or recognized collective bargaining unit, or by any
employee or employees who have a representative for
collective bargaining.
2. As used in this Agreement, the term "sub-con-
tractor" shall include any arrangement under which
the Contractor permits any other person, firm or cor-
poration, other than the Contractor's own employees,
to perform work for which the Contractor has primary
responsibility.
3. It shall be the obligation of the Contractor to
include in every sub-contract for work governed by
this Agreement a provision requiring the payment of
prevailing rates of wages for such work. In the event
any sub-contractor shall fail to pay its employees the
prevailing rates of wages for work within the scope of
this Agreement, the Contractor shall make whole the
employees of sub-contracts for all losses and damages
which they sustain by reason of the sub-contractor's
default.
4. The Contractor further agrees that it will not per-
mit a sub-contractor, or the employee of any sub-con-
tractor, to perform any work within the scope of this
Agreement, unless the sub-contractor has entered into
a written agreement with the Contractor agreeing to
pay its employees the prevailing wage rates for all
work governed by this Agreement.
. * . * *
7. It is the purpose and intention of the parties that
this Agreement shall apply to all enterprises of the
Contractor, regardless of the nature of the entity
through which the Contractor engages in business. It
is therefore agreed that this Agreement shall inure to
the benefit of, and be binding upon, any person, firm,
or corporation controlled, either directly or indirectly,
by the Contractor, or by a principal stockholder or
owner of the Contractor.
8. It is understood and agreed by the parties that
the Council is not the collective bargaining representa-
tive of any employee, and therefore, nothing herein
shall be construed to recognize the Council as the col-
lective bargaining representative of any employee or
employees, or to supersede any collective bargaining
contract presently, or hereafter, in effect, or to dero-
gate in any way from the authority of any collective
bargaining representative of employees of the Con-
tractor or the sub-contractor. Nor shall any provision
in this Agreement be construed to establish rates of
compensation, conditions of work, or terms of em-
ployment for any employees of the Contractor, or of a
sub-contractor.
9. As used herein the term "prevailing rate of wage"
means that rate of wages paid in the area in which the
work is to be performed to the majonty of workers
employed in that classification in construction in the
area similar to the proposed undertaking. In the event
that there is not a majority of workers paid at the same
wage rate, then the wage rate paid to the greater num-
ber of workers shall be deemed to be the prevailing
wage rate.
The letter and proposed agreement came to the attention
of Frank McHugh, but neither he nor any other represen-
tative of Utilities responded to the letter. No further direct
communication by mail, telephone, or otherwise was re-
ceived by Utilities from Respondent. At no relevant time
had Utilities sub-contracted work on the Johns-Manville
project.
On April 22, McHugh received a telephone call from his
foreman at the Research and Development Center advising
him that picketing was transpiring at the center. Addition-
ally. McHugh received a call from a Johns-Manville repre-
sentative inquiring whether or not Utilities' employees had
reported to work at the center. As a consequence of these
telephone communications, Jane McHugh went to the Re-
search and Development site and observed Utilities' em-
ployees working. She also observed a picket stationed prox-
imate to the only entrance to the center. On display was a
picket sign containing the following legend:
UTILITIES SERVICES ENGINEERING, INC. has
no sub-contracting agreement with Colorado Building
& Construction Trades Council.
We have no dispute with any other person or compa-
ny on this project.
In possession of the picket were some yellow flyers con-
taining the following:
MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC
We are picketing UTILITIES SERVICES ENGI-
NEERING, INC. because of its refusal to sign a sub-
contracting agreement providing for payment of PRE-
VAILING WAGES. If you believe in the cause of fair
wages for American workers, please telephone or write
to UTILITIES SERVICES ENGINEERING, INC.,
and request them to sign our sub-contracting agree-
ment for prevailing wages.
Our picket is not directed against any other em-
ployer, and we have no dispute with any other em-
ployer on this project.
Thank you!
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION
TRADES COUNCIL
The person giving you this leaflet is not authorized
to discuss this or any other matter in behalf of the
Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council.
From the Research and Development Center Jane Mc-
Hugh drove to the World Headquarters site and observed
that, contrary to previous visits to the site. there was little
or no visible activity taking place. Jane McHugh drove into
258
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
the World Headquarters area at approximately I a.m. and
did not observe any picketing. She returned to the office of
Utilities and imparted to Frank McHugh what she had
observed and the information she had received.
On April 22, McHugh contacted John Martin, labor re-
lations representative of the Associated General Contrac-
tors Association of which Utilities was a member; placed a
telephone call to Dan Porter of Blackinton & Decker, a
firm whom McHugh knew to be performing work at the
World Headquarters; and also spoke by telephone with a
labor relations attorney.
The following day, April 23, Frank McHugh was in-
formed that picketing was again transpiring at the entrance
to the Research and Development Center. Employees of
Utilities reported to work on April 23 at the center and
performed their duties. During the normal working hours
on April 23 the picketing ceased, and no picketing has
transpired since April 23. At no time, including April 22 or
April 23, was the business office of Utilities picketed, nor
was picketing conducted at any of the other jobsites at
which Utilities was then performing services, either in met-
ropolitan Denver or elsewhere. At the time in question,
Utilities was employing subcontractors on a project in
Meeker, Colorado, some 400 miles from Denver.
In the meantime, on Thursday, April 22, Daniel Porter,
president of Blackinton & Decker, Inc., a general contract-
ing firm, a subcontractor of Turner Construction. the con-
struction manager for the construction of the Johns-Man-
ville World Headquarters, received a telephone call from
his job superintendent, Marshall Blanchard. Blanchard in-
formed Porter that Blackinton & Decker employees were
ceasing work. It was Blanchard's representation to Porter
that the employees were quitting because picketing was
being conducted at the Research and Development site
and was "flowing over" to the headquarters site. Blanchard
imparted to Porter the information that the Blackinton &
Decker employees had commenced work at their usual
starting time but had thereafter ceased working. As a con-
sequence of this information, Porter consulted with a labor
relations representative of the Association of General Con-
tractors and contacted Turner Construction. Later in the
day, he spoke with representatives of the Carpenters and
Laborers, which represented Blackinton & Decker employ-
ees? In the early afternoon, the project manager dis-
patched the following telegram to Blackinton & Decker:
THIS IS A CONFIRMATION COPY OF A PREVIOUSLY PHONE-DELIV-
ERED TELEGRAM RE JOHNS-MANVILLE WORLD HEADQUARTERS
AS OF 4-22-76 YOU AND YOUR SUBCONTRACTORS ARE NOT PRO-
VIDING SUFFICIENT MANPOWER AND ARE IN VIOLATION OF ARTI-
CLE 3 OF YOUR SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT. PLEASE CORRECT
THIS SITUATION IMMEDIATELY TO AVOID WORKING OVERTIME
AT YOUR OWN COST AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 3. PLEASE HAVE
MANAGEMENT ATTEND JOB SITE MEETING TODAY 4-22-76 AT 4
OCLOCK PM.
Blackinton & Decker compensated its employees on the
3 Daniel Porter credibly testified that Blackinton & Decker emplosed la-
borers, carpenters, ironworkers, cement finishers, and operating engineers.
all of whom were represented by labor organizalions
World Headquarters project for I hour of work on April
22. They received no compensation for Apnl 23.4
Conclusions
The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(h)(4)(ii)(A)
of the Act, arising from Respondent's April 22 and 23 pick-
eting and handbilling of Utilities at the Johns-Manville Re-
search & Development Center where Utilities had a con-
tract to perform maintenance electrical work. The
complaint avers that the object of the picketing was to
force Utilities to enter into an agreement prohibited by
Section 8(e) of the Act. It is the General Counsel's conten-
tion that the proposed agreement is on its face secondary
and unlawful in that it is addressed to the employment
practices of firms which seek to do business with Utilitics
and was calculated to accomplish "top-down" organizing
of nonunion subcontracting only, to the benefit of union
members generally and not for the legitimate purpose of
maintaining area wage or job standards. It is the General
Counsel's further contention that the proposed agreement
must be deemed outside the contemplation of the first pro-
viso to Section 8(e) under the rationale of the decision of
the U. S. Supreme Court in Connell Construction Co., Inc..
supra. and that, even assuming the subcontracting clause of
the proposed agreement falls within the exemption fash-
ioned by the first proviso to Section 8(e), the picketing and
handbilling was revealed by the record evidence not to
have been for legitimate "area standard" purposes but was
directed toward the impermissible organizing of nonunion
subcontractors by means of the proposed agreement with
Utilities.
On the other hand, Respondent contends that the pro-
posed agreement contains no provision prohibited by Sec-
tion 8(e) and seeks in no manner to infringe upon the free-
dom of any contractor to do business with any
subcontractor but, rather, legitimately obligates a signatory
contractor to require his subcontractors to pay prevailing
rates of wages. It is Respondent's contention that, in the
circumstances of this case, the General Counsel's reliance
upon Connell is misplaced in that the contract language
which was the subject of Court scrutiny in Connell clearly
contravened Section 8(e), and the union therein defended
on the ground that the agreement was saved by the first
proviso of Section 8(e). Respondent contends that, in the
instant matter, the proposed agreement is not subject to the
proscription of Section 8(e) because it has as its purpose
and effect only the elimination of unfair competition in the
construction industry based upon payment of substandard
wages. Therefore, avers Respondent, the question of the
applicability of the first proviso to Section 8(e) does not
arise.
Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor
4 The General Counsel introduced this evidence in support of the thesis
that Ihe picketing at the Research and Development Center was conducted
with the intent and foreseeable effect of causing a work stoppage at the
World Headquarters. thereby bringing pressure to bear against Johns-Man-
ville resulting in Sec 8(hbX4)(ii)(A) threats, coercion. and restraint. The esi-
dence was received over Respondent's objections based on relevance. mate-
nality. and lack of due process notice.
259
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
organization and any employer to enter into any con-
tract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or re-
frain from handling, using, selling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement
shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Pro-
vided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to
an agreement between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at
the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or re-
pair of a building, structure or other work....
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents:
[T]o threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-em-
ployed person to join any labor or employer organiza-
tion or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited
by section 8(e).
It is now well established that in enacting Section 8(e),
Congress meant to reach only secondary pressures. How-
ever, equally clear is the proposition that agreements and
boycotts tactically calculated to "satisfy union objectives
elsewhere" become secondary and are proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(e). National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, et
al. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Section 8(e) of the Act
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer and a
union to enter into an agreement, express or implied,
whereby the employer agrees to cease dealing in the prod-
ucts of any other employer or to cease doing business with
any other person. A literal construction of this section sug-
gests the illegality of any agreement which results in pre-
venting the employer from establishing a business relation-
ship with another employer or which causes him to break
off a relationship already established. The section, how-
ever, has not been construed to outlaw all agreements
which produce such results. Heavy, Highway, Building and
Construction Teamsters Committee for Northern California,
et al. (California Dump Truck Owners Association), 227
NLRB 269, 272 (1976). In assessing whether a proposed
agreement covering the subcontracting of work has as its
sole objective the protection of the legitimate economic in-
terests of the signatories, rather than "union objectives
elsewhere," it is permissible and essential that the various
provisions comprising the proposed agreement be analyzed
in pari materia and be given logical and empirical applica-
tion. California Dump Truck Owners Association, supra;
Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers Local 100, supra,;
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, et al. v.
N.L.R.B., supra. As observed in the last cited case at 645,
"[T]he touchstone is whether the Agreement [under scruti-
ny in a given case] or its maintenance is addressed to the
labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his
own employees."
In its decision in California Dump Truck Owners Associa-
tion, supra, the Board defined parameters pertinent to the
instant inquiry. Thus, in discussing in the abstract the
range and type of contract clauses involved in applying
Section 8(e) of the Act to factual situations arising in litiga-
tion before it, the Board observed at 272:
Contract clauses which purport to limit subcon-
tracting to employers who are signatories to union
contracts, so-called signatory clauses, and contract
clauses which purport to acquire for bargaining unit
employees work which has traditionally been per-
formed by employees of other employers, so-called
work acquisition clauses, have been held to violate the
Act. Such clauses are viewed as not being designed to
protect the wages and job opportunities of unit em-
ployees covered by the contract, but as directed at
furthering general union objectives and undertaking to
regulate the labor policies of other employers. Absent
a direct relationship to protection of the work of unit
employees, such clauses are considered as having an
unlawful secondary effect and are proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(b)(4) and (e).
On the other hand, however, contract clauses whose
basic aims are to limit subcontracting so as to preserve
for unit employees work which has customarily been
performed by them, or in some instances to recapture
work regarded as fairly claimable, so-called unit pro-
tection clauses, and contract clauses designed to limit
subcontracting of unit work to employers who main-
tain the same standards of employment, thus minimiz-
ing the economic incentive to subcontract, so-called
union standard clauses, have been held to be lawful.
The underlying rationale for the lawful character of
unit protection and union standard clauses is that the
union has a primary interest in preserving unit work
for unit employees and to insure that negotiated stan-
dards will not be undermined.
In the instant case, the Charging Party correctly con-
tends that in its decision in Connell, the Supreme Court
recognized the general validity of unit protection and
union standards clauses in the construction industry, and
in a cogent analogue to the Board's discussion of the un-
lawful nature of union signatory clauses and acquisition
clauses, the Supreme Court in Connell stated at 631:
If we agreed with Local 100 that the construction
industry proviso authorizes subcontracting agreements
with "stranger" contractors, not limited to any particular
jobsite, our ruling would give construction unions an
almost unlimited organizational weapon. The unions
would be free to enlist any general constractor to bring
economic pressure on nonunion subcontractors, as long
as the agreement recited that it only covered work to be
performed on some jobsite somewhere. The proviso's
jobsite restriction then would serve only to prohibit
agreements relating to subcontractors that deliver their
work complete to the jobsite.
It is highly improbable that Contress intended such
a result. One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to
260
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
limit "top-down" organizing campaigns, in which
unions used economic weapons to force recognition
from an employer regardless of the wishes of his em-
ployees.
These careful limits [defined by Section 8(f)] on the
economic pressure unions may use in aid of their orga-
nizational campaigns would be undermined seriously
if the proviso to Section 8(e) were construed to allow
unions to seek subcontracting agreements at large,
from any general contractor vulnerable to picketing.
Absent a clear indication that Congress intended to
leave such a glaring loophole in its restrictions on
"top-down" organizing, we are unwilling to read the
construction industry proviso as broadly as Local 100
suggests. Instead, we think its authorization extends
only to agreements in the context of collective bar-
gaining relationships and. in light of congressional ref-
erences to the Denver Building Trades problem, possi-
bly to common-situs relationships on particular
jobsites as well.
It seems thus apparent from an amalgam of the cited
precedents that, as argued explicitly in the Charging
Party's brief and articulated inferentially by the General
Counsel, in order for Respondent's tendered subcontractor
agreement to have threshold validity, it would be essential
that (I) the provisions of the proposed agreement be either
of the union standards or work protection variety; (2) the
agreement must be designed to protect legitimate interests
of particular unit employees rather than the furtherance of
general union objectives elsewhere, or the regulation of la-
bor policies of employees other than Utilities; (3) the ten-
dered subcontractor agreement must be limited to a partic-
ular jobsite; and (4) the subcontractor agreement must
arise in the context of a collective-bargaining relationship.
The General Counsel and Charging Party are clearly cor-
rect in urging the relevancy of these criteria to a resolution
of the instant matter, for, in my view of the record, there is
insufficient support for Respondent's contention that the
sole obligation Respondent was seeking by virtue of its
subcontracting agreement to impose upon Utilities was the
prevailing rates of wages. Rather, it is apparent from care-
ful scrutiny of the proposed agreement that its terms would
not apply to employees of Utilities or to any work custom-
arily performed by them in Utilities' employ. Moreover,
the agreement is specifically limited in its application to
nonunion subcontractors and the unrepresented employees
of those subcontractors. 1This strongly rebuts the notion
that the clauses were intended or fashioned to serve a pri-
mary purpose, and the concomitant conclusion is warrant-
ed that their purpose was secondary. Moreover, analysis of
the terms of the proposed subcontracting agreement re-
veals that Respondent was willing to countenance a duality
in wages and fringe benefits as between unrepresented em-
ployees of subcontractors whom Utilities might utilize and
employees of employers represented by a labor organiza-
tion. By establishing a "prevailing wage rates" standard for
subcontractors of signatory employers while exempting
from the coverage of the proposed agreement all employ-
ees "who have a representative for collective-bargaining,"
Respondent was contributing to a situation wherein the
wages of employees of Utilities' subcontractors could be
adversely eroded. This is so because, under operation of
the terms of the proposed agreement, a competitor subcon-
tractor of Utilities' subcontractor who had a collective-bar-
gaining agreement covering his employees would be ex-
empt from the standards prescribed by paragraph I of the
proposed agreement even if his collective-bargaining agree-
ment provided for the payment of wage rates lower than
those which Utilities' subcontractor paid its employees.
Thus, the concept of equivalency in wages and working
conditions which the Board has approved as a legitimate
labor relations objective 5 is not here present as a saving
consideration amplifying the Respondent's objective in
seeking to force Utilities to accept the proposed subcon-
tracting agreement. The General Counsel correctly con-
tends, in substance, that rather than fostering equivalency,
the proposed agreement countenances potential disparity
to the foreseeable detriment of the wage and fringe benefits
standards available to the employees of potential subcon-
tractors of Utilities. Cf. Heavv, Highway, Building and Con-
struction Teamsters Committeefor Northern California, et al.
(California Dump Truck Owners Association), 227 NLRB
269, 273 (1976); see Local Union No. 98, of the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association, et al. (Cincinnati Sheet
Metal & Roofing Company A /K/A Ajax Company), 174
NLRB 104. 111-112 (1969). The practical effect would be
to leave to subcontractors seeking a potential business rela-
tionship with Utilities the options of either executing a col-
lective-bargaining agreement with a union or of refraining
from entering into or severing any existing business rela-
tionship with Utilities, i.e., a cease doing business effect, an
effect which, on this record, may not properly be classified
as merely incidental to the accomplishment of an object
relating principally to terms and conditions of employment
of employees in an established and existing bargaining
unit. Cf. Newspaper & Periodical Drivers & Helpers Union
Local 921, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (San Francisco
Newspaper Printing Co.. Inc.), 204 NLRB 440, 441 (1973).
Stripped of its trappings, and giving cognizance to the ef-
fort of Respondent to force by picketing and handbilling
Utilities at the construction site to enforce its demand that
Utilities adopt its terms, the subcontracting agreement
must be viewed as possessing an object of "top-down" or-
ganizing and not merely the preservation of unit work or
the maintenance of union standards. Cf. General Teamsters
Lrocal 386, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauf-
feurs. 4 Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Construction
Materials Trucking, Inc.), 198 NLRB 1038 (1972). 6 The
General Counsel is correct in his contention that Respon-
dent's choice of the work situs as the locus of the picketing
to the exclusion of the main office of Utilities is a factor
See Relta, ( l,A , /wI lrnatonaIl 4 a stillot LI, ta I 'hin S,' SY9.4 ftl
(/0 ,, ! at,, St fart. In,, d h a (,rant food., 166 NtlRB 818 (1967)
1 lh.l .i UinI i hisl, a legitin.lte interesl in preenting Ihe underrnining or
Ihe . rk ipprltlrlnilles and sl.ndards of enlpIloees In a i' ratl rualll halrglin
ritn ludii h\ , uhconlriaclors ,h,. do not meet pre.a;liIng ,.age scales and
empiltee heilefils t,l ln b dht Mei, tirilr here recognlied his ilsuec i nol
hefore the Irier f flit[
261
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which may properly be weighed in determining the exis-
tence of a secondary object. See Local 294, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and
Helpers of America, et al. (K-C Refrigeration Transport
Company, Inc.), 124 NLRB 1245, 1252-53 (1959). 1 have
considered this evidence in reaching the conclusion, based
materially on other cogent evidentiary and analytical fac-
tors, that Respondent's object was secondary and pro-
scribed.
The effect, albeit indirect, of Respondent's conduct, was
an attempt to dictate and prescribe the wages and working
conditions of the employees of employers stranger to the
immediate labor dispute. See Orange Belt District Council
of Painters # 48, AFL-CIO, et al. (Calhoun Drywall Com-
pany), 153 NLRB 1196 (1965), enfd. 365 F.2d 540 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). The effort at "top-down organizing of non-
union contractors" constitutes conduct proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(e), which finds no protection in the proviso to Sec-
tion 8(e). No collective-bargaining relationship existed be-
tween Respondent and Utilities; the agreement, by its
terms, is not applicable to employees of Utilities which the
Union would represent, thus precluding Respondent from
claiming relevant representation status in a unit of Utili-
ties' employees; and the agreement would apply only to
work not traditionally or customarily performed by Utili-
ties employees. See Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumb-
ers Local 100, supra.
In the circumstances, I find, in agreement with the Gen-
eral Counsel, that the proposed agreement violates Section
8(e) and Respondent's picketing to obtain the agreement
was in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the Act. Ets-
Hokin Corporation, 154 NLRB 839, 842-843 (1965).7
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of Util-
ities Services Engineering, Inc., described in section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States
and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstruct-
ing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Utilities Services Engineering, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. Colorado Building & Construction Trades Council is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. The agreement governing subcontracting of construc-
tion site work is one into which the Respondent and Utili-
ties may not lawfully enter, under the provisions of Section
8(e) of the Act.
4. By picketing and handbilling Utilities at the premises
of the Johns-Manville Research and Development Center
where Utilities was honoring a contract to perform mainte-
nance electrical work, Respondent threatened, coerced,
and restrained Utilities and did thereby engage in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 8
The Respondent, Colorado Building & Construction
Trades Council, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from picketing or handbilling Utili-
ties Services Engineering, Inc., for the purpose of requiring
Utilities to enter into the proposed agreement governing
subcontracting of construction site work transmitted to Re-
spondent by covering letter dated April 15, 1976.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
In reaching this conclusion. it is unnecessary to rely on record evidence
relating to the effect of the picketing on the progress of construction work at
the World Headquarters site. and no weight is given that evidence.
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclu ion. and Order. and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
9In the event that this Order is enforced by ajudgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National l.abor Relations Board.
262
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
Region 27. after being duly signed by an authorized repre-
sentative of Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consec-
utive days thereafter, in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(b) Sign and deliver to the Regional Director for Region
27 sufficient copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director, for posting at the premises of Utilities,
if willing.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in writ-
ing, within 20 days of the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Utilities
Services Engineering, Inc., by picketing and handbill-
ing Utilities at the Johns-Manville Research and De-
velopment Center, where an object thereof is to force
or require Utilities to enter into an agreement which is
prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act, as amended.
COLORADO BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES
COUNCIL
263