Colonade Hotel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 3, 1978

235 N.L.R.B. 1362 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Colonnade Hotel and Local 26, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders International Union,
AFL-CIO. Cases I-CA- 11002 and 1-RC- 13919
May 3, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
On September 21, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Robert M. Schwarzbart issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, to
modify the remedy to recommend backpay for the
suspension according to F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in
Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977),1
and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Colonnade Hotel, Boston, Massachusetts, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(d) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this recommended
Order."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
I See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
235 NLRB No. 192
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that we will
close our hotel if they select Local 26, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to represent them.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate any em-
ployee concerning his or her union activities or
sympathies.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily issue oral or
written warnings to our employees to discourage
their activities or support on behalf of the above-
named Union or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT seek to induce ineligible employ-
ees or former employees to participate in union
representation elections affecting our employees
by offering them money to vote.
WE WILL NOT grant our employees wage in-
creases for the purpose of influencing their choice
of a labor organization as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
WE WILL NOT suspend our employees to dis-
courage their membership in or activities on
behalf of the above-named Union or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other way interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make whole Charles P. Hannon for
any loss in pay, plus interest, he suffered when
suspended for I month from August 19, 1975.
WE WILL remove from Charles P. Hannon's
personnel file, and from any of our other relevant
records, any reference to, and rescind, the written
warning and notice of suspension previously
issued to him on August 15 and 19, 1975,
respectively, and make provision that these no-
tices shall not be used as grounds for further
disciplinary action against this employee.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request, bargain
with Local 26, Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the appropriate unit. The appropriate unit is:
All housekeeping department employees
and all laundry department employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at its Huntington
Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts, location,
but excluding all office clerical employees,
1362
COLONNADE HOTEL
guards, and supervisors, as defined in the
Act, and all other employees of the Respon-
dent.
COLONNADE HOTEL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT M. SCHWARZBART, Administrative Law Judge:
These consolidated cases were heard in Boston, Massachu-
setts, on June 7 and 8, July 21, 22, and 23, and December
13, 14, and 15, 1976.
The original and amended charges in Case I -CA-11002
were filed on August 25, 1975, and January 8, 1976,
respectively, by Local 26, Hotel and Restaurant Employees
and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union. The consolidated complaint, as issued on
February 3, 1976, and as amended on April 5, 1976, alleges
that the Colonnade Hotel, herein the Respondent, violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, herein called the Act.
On June 30, 1975, the Union filed a petition for a
representation election in Case 1-RC-13919. Pursuant to a
Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election exe-
cuted by the parties and approved by the Regional
Director for Region I on July 30, 1975, an election by
secret ballot was conducted on August 21, 1975, among the
employees of the Respondent in an agreed-upon appropri-
ate bargaining unit.' The tally of ballots served on the
parties immediately following the election showed that, of
approximately 46 eligible voters, 35 cast ballots, of which
11 were cast for the Union, 22 were cast against the Union,
and 2 ballots were challenged. The challenged ballots were
not sufficient in number to affect the results of the election.
On August 25, 1975, the Union filed timely objections to
conduct affecting the results of the election. In the
objections, the Union alleged, inter alia, that, in the critical
period prior to the election,2 the Employer promised and
granted benefits and wage increases to members of the
unit, threatened and interrogated unit employees, and laid
off, disciplined, and/or discharged several employees be-
cause said employees were engaged in protected concerted
activity on behalf of the Union. 3
Issues
i. Whether the Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) of
the Act by coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union activities and sympathies; by threatening plant
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit, as set forth in the stipula-
tion, is:
All housekeeping department employees and all laundry department
employees employed by the Respondent at its Huntington Avenue,
Boston, Massachusetts, location, but excluding office clerical employ-
ees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act, and all other
employees of the Respondent.
2 In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. 138 NLRB 453 (1962), the
Board defined the critical period before an election as the interval from the
date of the filing of the petition to the time of the election. Conduct
occurring during the period found to have interfered with the employees'
freedom of choice at the polls may be grounds for setting aside the election.
closure if the employees selected the Union to represent
them; by inducing an ineligible former employee to vote in
the scheduled representation election by offer of monetary
payment, by issuing a written disciplinary warning to an
employee because of his union activities; and by granting
wage increases to discourage support for the Union.
2. Whether the Respondent violated Section 8(aX3)
and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily suspending Charles
P. Hannon, its employee, for a period of 30 days because of
his protected concerted activities on behalf of the Union.
3. Whether the election in Case I-RC-13919 should be
set aside.
4. Whether, at the time the Union requested the
Respondent to recognize it and bargain, it enjoyed valid
majority support among the employees in the unit.
5. Whether the Respondent should be ordered to
recognize and bargain with the Union.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. Briefs, filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent, have been carefully consid-
ered.
Upon the entire record of the case4 and my observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is en-
gaged in the operation of a hotel in Boston, Massachusetts,
where its principal office and place of business are situated.
The Respondent annually, in the course and conduct of its
business, causes and continually has caused large quanti-
ties of liquor and food stuffs to be purchased and
transported in interstate commerce and from and through
various States other than the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts. The Respondent annually receives goods valued in
excess of $50,000 at its Boston location directly from points
located outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and,
also, annually receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 at
its Boston location from businesses within the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, which businesses themselves are
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The
Respondent has an annual gross volume of business in
excess of $500,000.
Upon the foregoing conceded facts, I find that the
Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3 Certain objections originally filed by the Union, Objections 4 - 8, were
withdrawn by the Union on January 7. 1976, with the approval of the
Regional Director. In his report on objections, dated January 8, 1976, the
Regional Director ordered that a hearing be held on the Union's remaining
objections and consolidated the unfair labor practice and the representation
cases for purposes of hearing, ruling, and decision by an Administrative
Law Judge.
4 At the hearing, G.C. Exhs. 29 and 30, two letters, dated November 1,
1975, and March 27, 1976, respectively, issued to Patrick Tubwon, a witness
in this proceeding, were not received into evidence. Upon reconsideration, I
hereby reverse my earlier ruling and now include these exhibits as part of
the record.
1363
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The answer admits and I find that the Union and Local
34, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union, AFL-CIO, are both labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Since 1971, the Respondent has operated a hotel in
Boston, Massachusetts, where, in addition to boarding
guests, it maintains facilities for the conduct of banquets
and other functions. At all times material herein, Amos
Juster and El-Sayed Saleh have been the general manager
and resident manager, respectively. During the times
considered herein, Cassiano DeFreitas was the Respon-
dent's banquet manager and Ingeborg Morris the executive
housekeeper.
Since January 15, 1972, the Respondent has recognized
and bargained with the Local Joint Executive Board of
Boston, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
International Union, AFL-CIO, and its affiliate Local 34,
a sister local to the charging Union herein, Local 26. When
the hearing began, the Respondent, the Local Joint
Executive Board, and Local 34 were parties to their second
collective-bargaining agreement, effective December 1,
1973, to November 30, 1976.
Under this contract, Local 34, in effect, was recognized
as the bargaining representative for a unit consisting of:
All bartenders, waiters, waitresses, service captains, bar
boys, bus boys, all kitchen personnel, hostesses, ban-
quet porters, bell captains, bell men and doormen,
employed by the Respondent at its Boston, Massachu-
setts, hotel, but excluding all front office employees,
telephone operators, cashiers, checkers, confidential
employees, maintenance employees, check room em-
ployees, supervisors and guards, as defined in the Act.
Individuals employed in the Respondent's housekeeping
and laundry departments were not covered by the contract
between the Respondent and Local 34 and, to date, have
not been represented for purposes of collective bargaining
by a union.5
s It was stipulated at the hearing that Local 26, the Union herein, is a
successor union to Cooks and Pastry Cooks Association, Local 186, and
Hotel Service and Waitresses Union, Local 277, merged sister locals
affiliated with the Local Joint Executive Board of Boston, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO. The
Local Joint Executive Board of Boston, its two prior affiliates, Locals 277
and 186, and Local 34, all had been parties to successive collective-
bargaining agreements with the Respondent. The above-named labor
organizations also had been signatories to a collective-bargaining agreement
on an associationwide basis with 12 Boston hotels that are members of and
negotiate through the Greater Boston Hotel and Motor Inn Association.
The most recent associationwide contract at the time of the hearing was
effective from April 1, 1974, through November 30, 1976. Under the terms
of that contract, Local 34 was recognized as the bargaining representative
for the waiters, captains, and bartenders employed at the 12 hotels, while
Local 186 and 277, the predecessors of Local 26, were the bargaining agents
for the other employees, which included their housekeeping staff, such as
maids and housemen, and laundry employees, including linen room
On June 27 and 28, 1975,6 through the organizational
activities of Eileen Flynn, an assistant business agent for
Local 26, and of Charles P. Hannon, a banquet waiter
employed by the Respondent and a member of Local 34, a
number of employees in the Respondent's housekeeping
and laundry departments signed union authorization cards.
Thereafter, on June 30, Joseph Sullivan, president of the
Union, accompanied by Flynn, went to the Respondent's
premises and requested Amos Juster, the Respondent's
general manager, to recognize and bargain with Local 26
for the Respondent's housekeeping and laundry employees
on the ground that the Union then had enough signed
authorization cards to constitute a majority. Juster de-
clined to grant recognition.7
Later on June 30, the Union filed a petition in Case 1-
RC-13919 for an election in the housekeeping-laundry
unit. The complaint and the objections to the election
alleged, in substance, that, between the date of the filing of
the petition and the election of August 21, the Respondent
engaged in unlawful conduct to destroy the Union's
majority status. The Respondent denies the commission of
any unfair labor practices and contends that the Union has
never enjoyed the support of a true majority of the
employees in the housekeeping-laundry unit.
B. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Conduct
1. The alleged solicitation of an ineligible
employee to vote in the representation election;
facts and conclusions
Douglas Reddington, a college student, was employed by
the Respondent in its housekeeping department as a
yardman.8
Reddington testified that on Friday, August 15, he
voluntarily resigned his employment with the Respondent
after previously giving 10 days' notice of his intent to leave
to the Respondent's housekeeper, Ingeborg Morris. At that
time, Reddington had worked for the Respondent for
about 2 months.
Reddington testified that on Monday, August 18, Tues-
day, August 19, and Wednesday, August 20, the 3 days
immediately preceding the August 21 election, he received
telephone calls at his home from the Respondent's resident
manager, El-Sayed Saleh. Reddington related that, during
the first call on August 18, Saleh had asked him if he could
come in and vote, announcing that there would be a staff
employees. The Respondent, however, is not a member of the Greater
Boston Hotel and Motor Inn Association and, in its separate successive
contracts, in fact, has bargained only with respect to its bartenders, waiters,
waitresses, and other employees in the unit described above, but not for its
housekeeping and laundry employees.
6 All dates hereinafter are within 1975, unless stated to be otherwise.
7 It was stipulated at the hearing that on June 30, the date on which the
Union asked for recognition and bargaining, there were 52 persons
employed in the housekeeping and laundry unit. The validity of certain of
the cards on which the Union bases its majority is contested by the
Respondent in this proceeding. Accordingly, the circumstances under which
authorization cards were obtained and the details of the June 30 meeting
between Juster, Sullivan, and Flynn will be considered in greater detail
below.
8 Yardmen are responsible for sweeping the streets at the Respondent's
premises, caring for the plants around the hotel, and cleaning the garage;
they are expected to perform other duties specified by the executive
housekeeper.
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COLONNADE HOTEL
party on that day. Reddington replied that he would be
unavailable because he had football practice that Thursday
and did not know what time he would be through.
According to Reddington, Saleh said that that was okay
and the conversation ended.
On August 19, Reddington again answered the phone
and heard Saleh ask for him. When Reddington identified
himself, Saleh gave his name and again asked if Redding-
ton could come in. Reddington declined again, telling
Saleh that he had told him before that he had football
practice. Saleh told Reddington that it was very important
for him to come in. Reddington again stated that he did
not think he could. Saleh again repeated that it was really
important for Reddington to come in. Reddington replied
that, if he could get through with practice in time, he would
try to make it to the hotel.
On August 20, during the third telephone call from Saleh,
the resident manager repeated his request that Reddington
come in. Reddington again replied that he had football
practice on that day and was not quite certain that it would
end in time. Saleh then offered Reddington a day's pay to
come in and vote. Reddington responded that he still did
not know whether he could, but would find out; if he had
time to come in, he would. Saleh replied, "Well, if you can
make time, come in."
Reddington related that football practice ended earlier
during the afternoon of August 21 than he had expected.
Accordingly, he went to the Respondent's hotel. When he
arrived there, a party was in progress that was attended by
most of the Respondent's housekeeping employees. Red-
dington saw Saleh at the party and shook hands with him.
Saleh announced that the voting was downstairs. Redding-
ton went to the lower level, voted, and returned to the
party9 for approximately another half hour and left the
premises. Although he did not work that day, he was paid
his usual daily rate of approximately $18.
In January 1976, Reddington, having received corre-
spondence from the National Labor Relations Board's
Regional Office, telephoned Saleh to ask what was in
progress. Saleh, in that conversation, told Reddington not
to say anything about his having been paid by the
Respondent for August 21. Reddington, however, told
Saleh that he already had informed the Board that he had
been paid for that day. Saleh replied, "Okay. Then it is all
right."
Saleh, in turn, testified that, although Reddington had
been offered a day's pay to come to work on August 21,
this offer had only been made in the context of an offer of
work.10 Although Saleh had telephoned Reddington with
the suggestion that he come in to vote, he had done so only
because Reddington's name was on the voting eligibility
list and, not having had prior experience in Board-conduct-
ed representation cases, Saleh had a good-faith belief that
Reddington was entitled to vote.
Saleh related that on August 15, the day that Reddington
left the Respondent's employ, he came to Saleh's office to
say goodby, to thank him, and to announce that he was
9 Neither the complaint nor the objections to the election alleged that the
staff party, conducted from about 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. on August 21, the date
of the election, constituted an unlawful. benefit. Saleh testified, without
contradiction, that similar parties had been held in the third week of August
during each of the preceding 2 years and that all of the Respondent's
returning to school. During that conversation, Reddington
told Saleh that he would be glad to have part-time work
with the Respondent during 2 days or even I day a week.
Saleh promised to give him this if the opportunity arose.
Saleh testified that he made but one telephone call to
Reddington before the election, on or about Monday,
August 18. On that occasion, he told Reddington that the
Respondent's employees were having a union representa-
tion election on August 21, and that he (Saleh) expected
that a large number of the employees might not show up
for the election because there had been much talk for and
against the Union. As a result, it was Saleh's belief that a
number of employees were not going to come in to work
that day. Saleh told Reddington that the Respondent
would need help in case they run short of staff. If
Reddington would like to come in to work on that day, the
hotel would appreciate it. Reddington, of course, would be
paid for his work. According to Saleh, Reddington replied,
"Fine. I have basketball practice, but will be there before
noon." Reddington promised to work for that day.
Reddington, however, instead of reporting for work at
noon as promised, did not come in until around 2 or 2:30
p.m. Saleh saw Reddington when he walked into the staff
party; he apologized to Saleh for being late. Saleh told
Reddington to talk to the head houseman, Louis Ware.
Ware, in turn, told Reddington that he already had found
someone to clean the garage and that Reddington was so
late that he was not needed anymore that day. Reddington
came back to see Saleh accompanied by Ware. Reddington
told Saleh that he was late because he had had training. He
had spent money to come in that day as requested by Saleh
and would have to spend money to go home. Reddington
was completely unhappy about the situation. Accordingly,
Saleh told Ware to pay Reddington for the day. This was
done.
Saleh was not certain as to whether Reddington had
voted on August 21 but, as noted, believed that he was
entitled to vote as Reddington's name was on the eligibility
list.
In concluding that Reddington, who by the time of the
election was no longer employed by the Respondent or, if
Saleh's version is accepted, was at most a casual on call
employee and ineligible to vote in either circumstance, had
been unlawfully induced by a promise of money to come in
to vote, Reddington's testimony is credited over that of
Saleh's. In the first instance, Reddington testified as a
comparatively disinterested witness who, by the time of the
hearing, had no connection with either the Respondent or
the Union. In addition, Saleh's testimony described events
that were contrary to the Respondent's established policy.
At all times material herein, the Respondent has followed a
practice of initiating personnel action forms to mark each
material change in an employee's status. Accordingly,
personnel action forms are completed when employees
receive pay increases, demotions, transfers, layoffs, and
suspensions. Personnel action forms also reflect discharges
and rehires. Saleh conceded that it was also the Respon-
employees, approximately 270 to 280 in number, had been invited to attend.
Accordingly, I do not find that the party constituted an unlawful benefit or
that it affected the outcome of the election.
'O The offer of compensation in exchange for services on August 21, as
testified to by Saleh, is denied by Reddington.
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dent's policy to complete personnel action forms on behalf
of employees who worked for the Respondent on part-time
and oncall bases. At first, Saleh testified that no such forms
had been prepared for Reddington on August 21, because
he did not work at all on that day. However, inconsistent
with this statement, Saleh later agreed that personnel
action forms customarily are completed before employees
start work rather than afterwards and that no such form
had been completed for Reddington on August 21. This
tends to indicate that Reddington was not expected to
work that day. Saleh also testified that he did not usually
pay employees for a full day's work when no services were
performed because of the employee's marked lateness in
reporting. Noting the absence of a prepared personnel
action form, the inconsistency of Saleh's testimony with
respect thereto, and the deviation from the Respondent's
pay policies, I find that Saleh's explanation that Redding-
ton had been paid for August 21, because he was a student
who had volunteered to come in for the day to help in case
of need, to be unconvincing."
Accordingly, it is concluded that the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(l) of the Act when, through Saleh, it
induced Reddington, as an ineligible employee, to vote in
the representation election by offering him money in
exchange for his participation.
2. The alleged unlawful wage increases; facts and
conclusions
The amounts of the pay increases granted by the
Respondent in 1975 and their effective dates, both before
and after the filing of the representation petition, were
stipulated at the hearing. Accordingly, the parties agreed
that in the period between April 14 and June 30, the latter
being the date of the filing of the representation petition, 11
housekeeping and laundry employees received increases in
their hourly pay rates. It further was stipulated that, during
the period from July 18 to August 10, 40 of the 49
employees shown on the voting eligibility lists 1 2 also
received hourly wage rate increases. Of these 40 employees
so benefited 32 were employed in job classification as
chambermaids or laundry employees.
The parties stipulated that the hourly pay rates under the
then current collective-bargaining agreement between the
Greater Boston Hotel and Motor Inn Association and the
Local Joint Executive Board of Boston were $2.50 an hour
for chambermaids and laundry employees and $2.55 for
housemen. In accordance with stipulations made and the
exhibits submitted at the hearing, it is found that the wage
increases given to the Respondent's chambermaids, house-
men, and laundry employees, in the period from July 18 to
August 10, brought their hourly rates up to those establish-
ed under the Greater Boston Hotel and Motor Inn
Association contract, except for three employees who
received higher rates and who will be discussed below.
The General Counsel contends that the wage increases
given to the 40 employees after June 30, the date of the
" In this connection, it is noted that Saleh testified that he had
authorized the day's pay for Reddington on August 21 under the circum-
stances he described herein although Reddington, at the time, allegedly was
openly aggrieved only about the carfare he had spent to come to the hotel
that day.
Union's demand for recognition and its filing of the
representation petition, constituted an unlawful effort by
the Respondent to discourage employees from supporting
the Union and to influence the results of the pending
election. The Respondent asserts that the wage increases
given after June 30 were administered pursuant to a
decision that had been made earlier in the year to bring
these employees' pay scales up to those in the Boston Hotel
Association contract, and were merely an extension of the
increases given to the I 1 employees between April 14 and
June 30, which increments had resulted from the same
decision.
Ingeborg Morris, the Respondent's executive house-
keeper during the period in question,13 corroborated by
General Manager Juster and Resident Manager Saleh,
related that the subject of a wage increase for the
housekeeping staff was first mentioned in late March
during a luncheon meeting with Juster, during which Juster
first invited Morris to become the Respondent's executive
housekeeper. In the course of their talk, Juster discussed
the problems of the housekeeping department, expressed
his ideas, and described to Morris the pay rates for the
Respondent's housekeeping employees. Morris, who had
worked for years in hotels that were bound by the Boston
Hotel Association's collective-bargaining agreement, told
Juster that the staff at the Colonnade at that time was
paying less than the unionized hotels in Boston. Although
Morris expressed her realization that the workload at the
Respondent's hotel was less than that at any union hotel, in
that the Respondent's maids were required to make tip
only 14 rooms a day as compared to 16 at the unionized
hotels, she stated her view that, for the Respondent to be
able to get employees capable of doing the desired quality
of work, Juster would have to bring the wages up to the
level of any other hotel in Boston. Juster expressed his
interest in so doing.
In late March, Morris had a second interview with Juster
in the latter's office in the presence of Saleh. At that
meeting, Juster again asked if Morris would be interested
in leaving her then-current position and joining the
Respondent's hotel. Morris indicated her willingness.
Again, they discussed improvements that Morris felt she
would like to see implemented at the Respondent's hotel if
she should accept the executive housekeeping position.
Such improvements included upgrading the staff cafeteria,
getting the employees uniforms and name tags, improve-
ment in the locker rooms, and free meals for certain
employees. She then reiterated that the pay scales should
be raised to the union rates in any hotel in Boston. Juster
and Saleh agreed to Morris' requests but explained that
they could not be effectuated immediately, but would be
done as business improved during the summer months.
After this meeting, Morris gave notice to her employer
and reported for work with the Respondent on April 11.
On April 14, 3 days after she started work, Morris met
with Juster and Saleh in Juster's office. Also present were
Laverne Wiggins and Anna Jones, two supervisors in the
12 The payroll eligibility date on the voting list was for the week ending
July 26.
13 Morris served as the Respondent's executive housekeeper from April
I I to the end of November 1975. At the time she testified in this proceeding,
she was no longer associated with the Respondent.
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COLONNADE HOTEL
housekeeping department. At that meeting, Juster agreed
to provide housekeeping employees with uniforms and
name tags and to improve the cafeteria and the meals. It
was also agreed that Morris could give immediate wage
increases at her own discretion to a few of the people in her
department. As to the remaining employees, Morris was
told that she gradually could upgrade their wages after
obtaining authorization from Saleh.' 4
The minutes of the April 14 meeting, however, appear to
contradict the Respondent's evidence that any such broad-
based plan for general pay increases to bring all housekeep-
ing employees up to union scale in the summer was
discussed at that time. Rather, it was noted therein that
Morris merely had "suggested giving graduated increases
to persons in her department who consistently do their job
well. Mr. Juster and Mr. Saleh agreed this would be done
when business picked up in the summer." In fact, only
certain merit increases were afforded before the filing of
the petition.
Accordingly, Morris claimed to have been authorized to
give immediate wage increases at her meeting with Juster
and Saleh on about April 14. Although she testified that the
first wage increases were given to two laundry employees,
Mary DeBarros and Emma Allison, Joint Exhibit 4,
received by stipulation, revealed that no increases were
actually afforded until May 22, at which time eight maids
received 10-cent-per-hour across-the-board increases,
bringing their hourly rates up to $2.40 - an amount that
was still 10 cents less than that paid under the Boston
Hotel Association contract. DeBarros and Allison and a
third employee, Dianne Bonner, in fact, did not receive
their 10-cent increases until June 20, about I month after
the first increments were given. While Bonner's raise only
brought her up to $2.40, the same rate as was paid to those
who had received the earlier increases, DeBarros and
Allison were raised to $2.55 and $2.65, respectively, sums
in excess of the contract rate. Morris explained her decision
to pay DeBarros and Allison more than what was provided
under the Boston Hotel Association contract by pointing
out that they were experienced laundry employees who
worked in the linen room, described as a hot, dusty area.
She explained that by virtue of their experience and skill
they were acquainted with the use of all types of laundry
equipment, could operate independently, and, therefore,
were very important to her operation.i 5
Morris testified that she had met with the housekeeping
supervisors at the end of April or the beginning of May, at
which time she explained to them that, eventually, all
housekeeping employees would be given increases to bring
their rates to the same level as the other hotels in Boston,
although they still would not be required to make up more
than 14 rooms a day. This lesser workload would be
continued in the interest of obtaining work of a higher
quality. She also instructed her supervisors to communicate
their discussions concerning the pending wage increases
14 Morris testified that the other improvements that she earlier had
suggested to the Respondent's management also were implemented. Ac-
cordingly, within 4 or 5 weeks after Morris began to work for the
Respondent, all housekeeping employees had uniforms and name tags.
Cafeteria improvements were put in effect within approximately 4 weeks
and the policy concerning free meals for supervisors was also promptly
and the purposes therefor to all employees in the house-
keeping department.
Resident Manager Saleh testified that after he had
attended the April 14 meeting with Juster and Morris, at
which time it was decided to gradually increase the pay for
all housekeeping employees, the wages of the 11 house-
keeping and laundry room employees were immediately
raised to the levels described above. Saleh also testified that
following that meeting he had informed the Respondent's
controller, Sharif, of the decision that had been made so
that he could make provision for the graduated increases in
his budget. Sharif was asked to notify Saleh when the cash
flow improved sufficiently to enable the granting of further
raises. Juster, Saleh, and Morris agreed that the decision in
April was that the raises finally would be implemented and
the pay would be completely brought up to union scale
during the summer months of 1975, when it was antici-
pated that the Respondent's business would have increased
sufficiently to enable the additional expenditure.
On about April 17, in anticipation of a visit to the hotel
by President Ford, Juster called a meeting of the depart-
ment heads and the general hotel staff. Juster told those
assembled how proud he was of them and of the fact that
the President had chosen the Colonnade as the place to
stay. He told the staff to keep up the good work.
At that meeting, Juster also told the staff that, pursuant
to Morris' recommendation, the Respondent's pay scales
would be raised to the same standards as those of the other
Boston hotels, even though the Respondent was going to
continue its practice of requiring that a lesser number of
rooms be made up each day than the quota specified in the
Boston Hotel Association contract.
Saleh testified that in mid-July he met with Morris and
controller Sharif. At that meeting, the controller told him
and Morris that the cash flow was sufficient to enable the
Respondent to proceed. Saleh then told Morris that the
controller had given them the green light, that the cash flow
was improving, and that they could go forward with the
planned pay raises for the housekeeping department.
Morris also was told that the raises she was being
authorized to give should bring the maids and laundry
employees up to the contract rate of $2.50 per hour and
$2.55 for the housemen. However, Morris was instructed to
put the raises into effect gradually through the next 1 or 2
months to avoid the burden on the Respondent that abrupt
implementation would cause. Saleh denied that he was
involved in determining the order in which specific em-
ployees would receive their wages.
The wage increases thereafter were implemented as set
forth in the above-described stipulations, except that one
housekeeping employee, Rosalee Jackson, effective August
8, received a 30-cent hourly increase, which moved her pay
rate up to $2.75. As the raises granted the other employees
after June 30 ranged only between 10 to 20 cents, the
increase afforded Jackson, which put her a full 25 cents per
hour above the allegedly targeted union scale, appeared to
realized. The thorough cleaning of the locker areas that had been
recommended by and promised to Morris was also complied with.
i' At the time the raises to above scale were given to Allison and
DeBarros. there was one other laundry employee who did not receive an
increase as he worked only on a part-time weekend bases and was
considered to be less qualified than Allison and DeBarros.
1367
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be extraordinary. However, this increment was not ac-
counted for at the hearing nor was an explanation provided
on Jackson's personnel action form, which recorded this
raise.
On August 19, at or about 3 p.m., the recently granted
pay raises were called to the workers' attention at a
meeting of the housekeeping and laundry employees
presided over by Juster in one of the function rooms above
Respondent's hotel. This meeting, which lasted for approx-
imately 40 to 45 minutes, was also attended by Saleh and
Morris.
Consulting prepared notes, Juster told the assembled
staff that all were aware that in 2 days they were going to
have an election. He did not see why they should vote
"yes" at the forthcoming election as he considered the
standards of the hotel's housekeeping department, as far as
wages and working conditions, to be better if not equal to
the housekeeping departments in hotels in the area that
were unionized. From the time he had come to the hotel,
Juster told the assemblage, one of his foremost tasks had
been to improve the employees' working conditions be-
cause, in the hotel industry, good service could be given
only by happy employees.
Juster reminded the staff that, when he had come to the
Respondent's hotel, each maid had been expected to make
up 17 rooms per day. Juster immediately had reduced that
number to 15 and, after a time, had lowered this quota
again to 14 because he wanted to have a clean hotel. He
had tried to make the Colonnade into the best hotel in the
city. Juster pointed out that the union contract with the
other hotels in Boston required that 16 rooms be made up
by each maid. Juster related that in his prior positions in
Europe, in the Middle East, and in America, he had
worked with unions and was not afraid of them. However,
he had a job to do which he was going to perform and he
always did his job, with or without unions.
Juster also told the staff about the various programs that
had been instituted - the increases in salaries that had
been given before the Union had even approached the
hotel and the white glove contest.' 6
The August 19 meeting ended after Juster replied to
certain questions put to him by Wally Labat, a houseman,
concerning the status of Charles P. Hannon, the alleged
discriminatee. The aspect will be considered below.
The General Counsel contends that the wage increases
given in July and August 1975 were unprecedented and, in
view of their timing and the number of unit employees
affected, the burden had shifted to the Respondent to show
that the granting of the increases had been governed by
factors other than the pendency of the election and the
desire to influence its outcome. Noting that these raises
had not been given pursuant to a preexisting policy, the
General Counsel contends that the Respondent had not
met its burden and that the explanation afforded by the
it The white glove contest was a program instituted on August 1,
pursuant to Morris' recommendation as described in the June - July, 1975,
edition of the Respondent's newsletter, "Around the Columns." Manage-
ment would inspect every room with white gloves every 3 months to
determine which were the cleanest rooms. Following those inspections there
would be quarterly cash prizes for the first and second place winners. After I
year, the winners would be eligible to win a I-week paid vacation at a hotel
Respondent's witnesses for the increases should not be
credited.
The Respondent, in turn, argues that the raises had been
contemplated from a time in March, months before the
start of the Union's organizational campaign and the filing
of the representation petition, when Morris was first
interviewed for the position of executive housekeeper.
Their implementation had been decided on at the meeting
of April 13, announced to employees during the staff
meeting on April 17, and actually given to 11 of the unit
employees on May 22 and June 20, respectively. Accord-
ingly, the raises that had been given to the remaining 40
employees during July and August were mere extensions of
a previously planned, publicly announced, and partially
implemented wage plan which antedated the Union's
campaign.
In Idaho Candy Company,l7 Administrative Law Judge
Robbins, in her Board-approved Decision, properly stated
the rule:
Where, as here, wage increases are granted ... after
the filing of a representation petition, there is a
presumption of impropriety which can be rebutted only
by an affirmative showing that the granting of the
benefits was governed by factors other than the
impending election. Northwest Engineering Company,
148 NLRB 1136, 1145 (1964); Glosser Bros., Inc., 120
NLRB 965 (1958); International Shoe Company, 128
NLRB 682 (1959).
While it may be inferred that a restructuring of the
Respondent's wage scale for its housekeeping and laundry
staff had been planned prior to the advent of the Union
and although I am prepared to credit the uncontradicted
testimony of Juster, Morris, and Saleh that this decision
had been reached at or around the time Morris joined the
Respondent, and had been announced to the staff by Juster
on about April 17, I1 find that the promise of wage increases
made by Juster to the staff on that occasion was neither
specific as to when they would be implemented nor definite
as to their ultimate occurrence.
The pay increases, as referred to by Juster at the April
staff meeting, and even as internally discussed by members
of the Respondent's management, were not definite as to
timing and implementation but, in effect, were made
contingent upon business improving to some unascertained
degree in the coming summer.'8 Inherent in this contingen-
cy was the prospect that, if business did not improve to
whatever extent contemplated, the raises would not be
forthcoming. In fact, Saleh, in his testimony, strongly
stressed that future increments would be dependent on an
anticipated increase in the Respondent's "cash flow"
which, in his testimony, he distinguished from being a mere
improvement in business. This point had been made to
Morris, and the raises, in fact, were given to the 40
in Miami, Florida. All housekeeping department employees were automati-
cally contestants.
17 218 NLRB 352, 355 (1975).
18 See Tower Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Tower Records, 182 NLRB 382. 386
(1970), where the Board emphasized the requirement that promises of future
raises should be specific.
1368
COLONNADE HOTEL
employees only after the Respondent's controller, in
Morris' presence, had announced that the cash flow was
then sufficient. Morris, on the other hand, denied having
heard any reference to "cash flow" as a prerequisite to the
increments she had sought for her staff. Morris recalled
only that these raises would be implemented at some time
in the summer when management decided that business
had improved sufficiently. 19
Although the Respondent argues that its prepetition
intent to raise its employees to the rates paid under the
Boston Hotel Association contract was manifested by the
fact that Morris was authorized on April 14 to immediately
distribute raises to certain housekeeping and laundry
employees, it is hard to see from what was actually done
before the filing of the petition what would have enabled
these workers to discern the Respondent's claimed ultimate
intent. First, the Respondent's position as to the scope of
the raises planned at that meeting was disputed by the
minutes of that session, which referred only to granting
graduated increases to housekeeping employees who con-
sistently do their jobs well. Then, no raises were given to
anyone until May 22, over I month after that meeting
when eight maids each received 10-cent hourly increments
to bring them up to a level that was still 10 cents below
union scale. Moreover, Morris testified, these raises were
given on the basis of individual merit. Nothing further
happened thereafter until June 20, after almost another
month had passed, when three more employees received
raises. One of these three also was brought up to a level just
10 cents short of the contract scale, while the other two,
DeBarros and Allison, were raised above that level. Morris
testified, as noted, that she had placed them, DeBarros and
Allison, above scale because their specific skills, experi-
ence, and functional independence made them important
to her and their negative working conditions made her
afraid of losing them. Therefore they were the first to
receive raises. Yet, inconsistently, the record shows that of
the I I employees who received raises before the representa-
tion petition was filed, DeBarros and Allison were among
the last to be benefited, and were not given their wage
improvements until more than 2 months after Morris had
received her original authorization.
In finding that there had been no previously established
specific plan or timetable for the granting of the raises to
the 40 housekeeping and laundry employees in the period
which began about 18 days after the filing of the petition
and which ended only approximately II days before the
election, it is noted that Morris had been afforded the
authority to decide on which dates the raises would be
given and which employees would be the first to receive
them and to thus earn more money sooner. She had
discretion to deviate from the targeted Boston Hotel
Association contract rate and did so, not only with respect
to DeBarros and Allison but also, later, in the case of
Rosalee Jackson who, as noted, received the extraordinary
30-cent increase which brought her hourly rate up to 25
19 Morris testified that her housekeeping supervisors, during the early
spring, had been instructed to tell employees of the pending raises as they
made their inspection rounds. Although there is no direct testimony from
any supervisor that this, in fact, had been done, it is certain that they had
not been authorized to tell the employees anything meaningful as to their
timing and implementation.
cents above union scale. As the Respondent, in accordance
with its stated purpose, had staggered and otherwise
deferred the raises to ease their financial impact, it would
have been but a short further delay to have waited until
after the election. Then, without regard to who was
successful in the balloting, the anticipated union pay scale
could have been put into effect.
Therefore, noting the timing, the number of affected
employees, the unprecedented and contingent nature of the
increases, the absence of a specific timetable for their
implementation prior to the filing of the petition, and the
deviations from the union pay scale allegedly targeted, and
even the question of fact raised by the minutes of the April
14 meeting as to just when it was decided to raise everyone
to union scale, it is concluded that, while wage restructur-
ing may have been discussed prior to the advent of the
Union, the granting of the raises to the 40 employees
during July and August was so administered as to induce
the Respondent's employees to reject the Union.20
Accordingly, it is found that these wage increases
violated Section 8(aX1) of the Act and interfered with the
free conduct of the representation election.
The Extension of the Insurance Program
Although not alleged specifically in the complaint, and
only generally in the first objection to the election in Case
I-RC-13919, where it was charged that "Prior to the
election the employer promised benefits . . . to members
of the unit and granted same with the intention of coercing
the employees in their right to decide how to vote in the
election," the parties litigated at the hearing the issue as to
whether the Respondent had extended coverage under its
noncontributory insurance program to certain unit em-
ployees for the first time in the period immediately
preceding the election.
The record reveals that, at a staff meeting of housekeep-
ing and laundry employees conducted during the first half
of August, Mark Burnett, the Respondent's personnel
manager, distributed insurance enrollment cards to certain
employees and informed them that they were covered by
the Respondent's group policy with the Respondent's
insurance carrier retroactively from the dates of their
employment.
It appears from the undisputed testimony of the Respon-
dent's witnesses, particularly that of Saleh, Morris, and
Juster, that the hotel had provided hospitalization and life
insurance coverage for its employees under a series of
group plans in effect since the Respondent had begun
operations in 1971. The extent of these benefits, which
varied among different categories of employees, depended
on the individual employee's job classification. From the
beginning, all housekeeping employees, as a group, enjoyed
the same noncontributory medical and life insurance, for
which they became eligible after their first 3 months of
employment. New employees were supposed to have
20 N.LR.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405 (1964); Bechtel
Corporation, 200 NLRB 975 (1972); Idaho Candy Company, suprat East Bay
Newspapers, Inc., d/bla Contra Costa Times, 228 NLRB 692, 699 (1977);
Lang Feed Company, Incorporated 227 NLRB 1588, 1590 (1977); Tower
Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Tower Record supra.
1369
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
completed their insurance enrollment card with other
documents at the time they began their employment with
the Respondent. However, through error, approximately 10
percent of the housekeeping staff, in fact, had not com-
pleted enrollment cards by the end of June 1975.
This error had come to the Respondent's attention in
either May or June when a maid, expecting hospitalization,
inquired about her insurance protection and it was learned
that she did not have coverage. Saleh then instructed the
personnel manager to check all records, including those
related to housekeeping, to determine whether the relevant
insurance forms had been filled out and filed with the
insurance company. The matter was investigated and
rectified by early August. The Respondent's evidence that
this implementation of its insurance enrollment program,
which already was benefiting 90 percent of the employees
in the relevant unit, was amendatory, and did not consti-
tute a new benefit in the critical period before the election,
was not effectively countered in the record. Therefore,
there is no basis for a finding that the steps taken by the
Respondent to administer more properly its existing insur-
ance program constituted the granting of a new unlawful
economic benefit that interfered with the employees'
freedom of choice at the election.
3. The alleged interrogation of Allan L. Clarke;
facts and conclusions
One of the matters to be discussed below in connection
with the suspension of Charles P. Hannon, the alleged
8(a)(3) discriminatee, was a warning letter, dated August
15, sent to Hannon by Saleh for "the illegal practices" he
had "been carrying on in this hotel relative to union
organization." The letter noted that Hannon had been
coercing the Respondent's employees regarding union
matters without approval or permission of the Respon-
dent's management. Saleh testified that this letter had been
issued pursuant to complaints received from two employ-
ees - a lobby porter, Allan L. Clarke, and Lillie Greaves, a
maid. Both employees, according to Saleh, complained that
Hannon had been disturbing them in their work with his
prounion talk.
Saleh testified that Clarke and he were having their usual
general conversation one morning during the second week
of August, while Clarke,21 in accordance with his regular
assignment, was cleaning Saleh's office. When Clarke told
Saleh that Hannon had spoken to him a couple of times
about the Union while he was working around the hotel
and that he would like to be left alone, Saleh promised that
he would take care of it. Saleh denied that he had called
Clarke into his office to ask him about Hannon's activities
and also denied that he had been the one to raise the
question. Saleh related that he reported the complaint from
Clarke, and a similar one from Graves, to Juster and that
this, ultimately, had resulted in the warning letter being
sent to Hannon on August 15.
21 Clarke, called by the General Counsel as a rebuttal witness, had been
employed by the Respondent as a lobby porter since August 1973. At the
time of the hearing he was still in the Respondent's employ.
22 Although Clarke did not know Hannon by name, Hannon wears
spectacles and was recognized by Clarke in the courtroom as the man who
had spoken to him about the Union.
Clarke, contrary to Saleh, testified that, while he was
working in Saleh's office, Saleh had been the first to
mention the matter of the Union. Clarke related that, after
the morning greetings were exchanged, Saleh told him that
he understood that a gentleman over there was trying to
worry him about unions. Clarke replied that a gentleman
with eyeglasses 2 2 had passed by and had told Clarke to
expect a lady from the Union to come down to the
cafeteria at midday to sign a card and do whatever else was
necessary to join the Union.
Clarke himself had signed a union authorization card on
June 27, the date when Hannon and Union Representative
Eileen Flynn had obtained most of the signed authoriza-
tion cards in the employees cafeteria. Noting that Clarke
was not an articulate witness and that he had difficulty in
recalling dates, the Respondent argues that Saleh's account
of this conversation should be credited over that of
Clarke's and that it, therefore, should be found that, as
Clarke had initiated the conversation concerning the
Union on the day in question, Saleh had not interrogated
him.
For reasons that were specified above in connection with
Saleh's unlawful inducement of Douglas Reddington to
vote, and as will be further indicated below in connection
with Hannon's suspension, Saleh generally has not been
found to be a credible witness in this proceeding. Although
Saleh was a more coherent witness than Clarke, Clarke
clearly did remember that it was Saleh who had begun the
discussion concerning unions by questioning him. Noting
that Clarke, at the time of the hearing, was still employed
by the Respondent, and that he, at all times, had sought to
answer the questions put to him forthrightly to his best
recollection, Clarke's version of the conversation between
himself and Saleh hereby is credited.
Accordingly, it is found that Saleh, during the second
week of August, interrogated Clarke as to the Union's
organizing campaign in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.23
C. The Alleged Unlawful Events Affecting Charles
P. Hannon and the Union's Request for Recognition
1. Hannon's union activities
The general Counsel contends that Hannon had received
an unlawful warning letter, dated August 15, because of his
union activities, had been coercively interrogated as to
those activities, had been informed that the Respondent's
proprietor would close the hotel if the employees chose the
Union as its bargaining representative, and had been
suspended but 2 days before the election on the ground
that he was the Union's principal campaign organizer. The
Respondent denies that it violated the Act with respect to
Hannon and argues that such actions which it took were
justified.
23 The Respondent, in its brief, incorrectly referred to the Clarke incident
as the only evidence of interrogation involved herein. However, the
complaint alleges, and the General Counsel contends, that Hannon, too,
had been coercively interrogated concerning his union activities. Hannon's
interrogation and other alleged violations of Sec. 8(aXl), allegedly directed
against him, will be considered below.
1370
COLONNADE HOTEL
Hannon, a member of Local 34 for approximately 30
years, had been employed by the Respondent as a banquet
waiter since beginning its operation in 1971, except for a
brief initial period when he was a regular waiter.24
In mid-1975, Hannon was one of the five regular banquet
waiters reporting to the then banquet manager, Cassiano
DeFreitas, who, on a preferential basis, were called to work
at various functions conducted in the Respondent's hotel.
If additional waiters beyond the regular five were required,
DeFreitas would call on Local 34 to provide the extra help.
Banquet waiters, whose work schedules were arranged by
DeFreitas, were expected to report for work at least 35 to
45 minutes in advance of a function, gather up the linen,
china, flatware, and all else that might be required to set
the tables, prepare the tables, serve the function, and
thereafter clear the tables. Whether the event was luncheon
or a dinner, banquet waiters were required to stay for 3
hours, after which they were paid for each additional hour.
Hannon's capabilities as an effective waiter are not in
dispute.
Hannon testified that, after having informed a number of
housekeeping employees of the benefits of unionization as
he saw it, in response to their complaints about their
subscale pay, he visited the Local 26 office early in the
morning of June 27, where he spoke to Eileen Flynn,25 an
assistant business agent of the Union, about signing up the
Respondent's housekeeping staff. Hannon and Flynn
agreed to meet at the Respondent's employees cafeteria at
noon that day.
As the validity of a number of authorization cards on
which the Union bases its majority have been challenged
by the Respondent, and as the General Counsel concedes
that one such card originally relied on is not genuine, it is
relevant to consider in some detail, in connection with
Hannon's union activities, the methods used in soliciting
employee signatures.
At the appointed time on June 27, while approximately
35 employees were taking their lunches there, Flynn and
Hannon arrived at the cafeteria. Hannon 26 stood and
introduced Flynn to the employees as the business agent
from the Union. Flynn told the assembled employees that
she was the business agent for Local 26 and that that
Union represented the employees at most of the major
hotels in Boston. An employee asked why the Respon-
dent's housekeeping department had not been unionized
when other employees in the hotel were. Flynn explained
that, at the time when the Respondent's other employees
were organized, the Respondent did not have housekeeping
employees as such work was being performed by an outside
contractor.2
During the 28 minutes that the meeting lasted, employees
raised questions about the Union's health and welfare
programs and, in turn, informed Flynn that they had no
24 Hannon had played an active role in previous years within his union.
which, as noted, represents the Respondent's waiters, waitresses, bartenders,
and kitchen employees. He had served as an officer on Local 34's executive
board and had run for the office of president in about 1973. At the time of
the events material herein, Hannon was a rank-and-file member of his
Union.
25 Although Flynn was principally an official of Local 26, which had no
independent bargaining rights at the Respondent's premises, through the
Local Joint Executive Board of Boston she also helped to administer Local
34's contract with the Respondent for the unit that it there represented. In
paid holidays. Flynn told the employees that, under the
union contract, they would have paid holidays and other
benefits. She related that, if the employees became repre-
sented, they would earn union scale and have pension and
hospitalization plans and double pay on holidays, and that
there would be no initiation fee. Flynn told the group that
the cards that she was about to distribute would authorize
the Union to represent them for purposes of collective
bargaining. The Union, on the basis of the cards signed,
would request the Respondent's management to negotiate.
If the Respondent refused, the Union would petition the
National Labor Relations Board for a secret election.
Thereafter, while Flynn kept her seat at a table, circulat-
ing a number of authorization cards from there by having
them passed from employee to employee, Hannon walked
around the cafeteria distributing other cards received from
Flynn. Hannon testified that, while he was giving out these
cards, he repeatedly told the employees, either in small
groups or individually, that the purpose of these cards was
to authorize the Union to bargain for them, that the Union
would present the cards to management and, if manage-
ment did not sit down and negotiate a contract with the
Union, the Union would file a petition with the National
Labor Relations Board for a secret election. Hannon also
told various employees that, soon as a contract was signed,
the employees would be earning $2.50 an hour. However,
with the increases that were expected on November I of
that year, they thereafter would earn another 15 cents an
hour, which would give them a 35-cent hourly increase.
This would amount to $13 a week or $56 per month.
Hannon also explained to the employees that they would
receive seven paid holidays and pension and hospitaliza-
tion plans.
Hannon related that, while the cards were being issued,
signed, and returned, there were two or three maids in the
cafeteria who spoke Portuguese and, apparently, did not
understand what was being said. Accordingly, Hannon
requested that a kitchen employee, also present, who spoke
both English and Portuguese, explain to them what was
being told to the other employees with regard to the
purpose of the cards, the procedures that would be
followed when the cards were signed, and the benefits of
being covered by the Union's contract. This employee, to
Hannon's best knowledge, did so.
Hannon denied that he personally knew any of the
employees who signed the authorization cards in the
cafeteria on June 27. Flynn testified much to the same
effect, except that, during the June 27 meeting, she did
become acquainted with two of the Respondent's maids
who were sitting next to her at the table - a heavier
that capacity, Flynn, in the past, had had access to the Respondent's
premises.
26 Although Hannon had been scheduled to work by the Respondent on
June 27, he was not yet on duty at the time of the events described herein.
27 Flynn's explanation that the Respondent's housekeeping employees
had initially been brought under the original union contract because such
work had been contracted is disputed by the Respondent's general manager,
Juster, who testified that, to his best knowledge, the Respondent's house-
keeping work had always been performed by its own employees.
1371
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
woman and one slenderer. Flynn later learned that the
heavier woman was Lillie Hutchinson Akre 28 and that the
other lady was Lillie Greaves. Both women had taken
initiatives in questioning Flynn as to what the Union did
for employees in other hotels. In response to their respec-
tive requests, Flynn passed out several copies each of the
contract and booklets outlining the Union's health insur-
ance and pension programs. Hannon and Flynn testified
that, at the June 27 meeting, 28 completed and signed cards
were collected. 29 Hannon gave the cards returned to him to
Flynn, who left the cafeteria by 12:30 p.m. 30 with all 28
signed cards in her possession. No authorization cards were
signed before June 27.
Hannon testified that on the next day, June 28, he
obtained three or four additional signed authorization
cards, again in the employees cafeteria, from members of
the Respondent's housekeeping staff. Hannon related that,
on that date, he joined Yeworkweha (Yorke) Makonnen, 31
a maid, at her table in the staff cafeteria and informed her
that, on the day before, a union organizer had been to the
hotel and had gathered approximately 28 signed authoriza-
tion cards from other housekeeping employees. Hannon
told Makonnen that he wanted her to sign an authorization
card, which he then gave her, repeating again to her that
the Union would present the cards to management in order
to try to bargain and get a contract for the employees. If
management did not agree to bargain, the Union would
petition the National Labor Relations Board for a secret
election. He also told Makonnen of the effect of the pay
increases expected on November 1, and hospitalization
plans and seven paid holidays a year available to union
employees.
While Hannon was still at Makonnen's table, they were
joined by two or three other maids. Hannon again repeated
to these new arrivals what he had told Makonnen and the
employees when he had solicited on the preceding day as to
the purpose of the cards, the procedure that would be
followed to obtain bargaining or a secret election, the
benefits available under the union contract, and the fact
that no initiation fee would be required.
Hannon testified that on June 28, while they were all in
the cafeteria, Makonnen and the other maids who joined
them each completed and signed the cards he had offered
them.32
On June 30, Hannon turned over the four authorization
cards, dated June 28, to Flynn.33 Earlier on June 30,
however, before receiving the additional authorization
cards from Hannon, the Union already had made its
unsuccessful request to the Respondent for recognition as
2s As Akre had not yet married on June 27, her card was signed "Lillie
Hutchinson."
29 Flynn testified that all writing on the June 27 cards was put there by
employees, except that on the blank next to the word "Local," consistent
with the Union's policy, she had filled in the number "26" before going to
that meeting. This, Flynn contends, was the only notation made on the
cards by her or any other union official.
30 Flynn specifically had timed the meeting as having taken place
between noon and 12:28 p.m. as she had wanted it to end before 12:30.
31 Makonnen was the only unit employee whom Hannon recalled as
having signed a card in his presence.
32 Although Makonnen's authorization card was dated "28/75" and
those of Lillie Hutchinson Akre and Sana Gardescu bore June 26 dates, it
does not appear that these cards were correctly dated.
the bargaining representative of the Respondent's house-
keeping and laundry employees.
2. The Union's request for recognition
Hannon's circumstances were subsequently affected by
the next event, the Union's request for recognition and
bargaining, when, the Respondent contends, it first learned
of the organizational campaign.
Flynn testified that on the morning of Monday, June 30,
she accompanied the Union's president, Joseph Sullivan, to
the Respondent's premises, where they spoke to the
Respondent's general manager, Juster. Sullivan told Juster
that he had enough cards from the housekeeping depart-
ment to constitute a majority, and asked Juster to recog-
nize the Union as its bargaining representative or to make
the housekeeping unit part of the existing bargaining unit
already represented by Local 34.34 Juster replied that he
would not give Sullivan recognition. He might have, had
Sullivan waited for another year to make this request but,
as Sullivan had not waited, Juster would not recognize him.
Juster's account of this interview is even more detailed.
As Juster recalled the incident, Sullivan entered his office
alone, unaccompanied by Flynn, and told Juster that the
Union had organized his housekeeping department. Juster
asked, "Why, Joe? We had an understanding when we
signed our last contract that, for the period of the contract,
no other action would be taken by the Union." Sullivan
replied, "Well, Amos, you know your entire housekeeping
department is almost in revolution. They are pressing us.
What do you want me to do?" Sullivan then told Juster
that, if he did not agree to bargain with the Union, he was
going to file a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board. Juster told Sullivan to do whatever he had to do
and that Juster would do the same.
Sullivan then brought Flynn into the room for the first
time and announced that he had signed authorization
cards. Juster asked how the signatures had been obtained
and where. Flynn answered that they had been signed in
the staff cafeteria. Juster asked Flynn how she happened to
come to the hotel, reminding her that, according to their
contract, she, as a union representative, was supposed to
inform management whenever she was in the building.
Flynn, according to Juster, replied that she had parked her
car in his garage, and asked if that was enough.35 On this
note, Sullivan and Flynn left the Respondent's premises
and, on that day, filed the petition initiating Case 1-RC-
13919.36 The Respondent traced its first knowledge of the
Union's organizational campaign to the request for recog-
nition on June 30.
33 All authorization cards signed in connection with the Union orga-
nizing campaign herein were executed on June 27 and 28.
34 Sullivan was also an officer of Local 34.
3s Flynn also testified that, before going to the staff cafeteria on June 27,
she also had left her card with Juster's secretary.
36 Flynn, contrary to Juster, contends that she was present in his office
throughout the entire June 30 meeting between Juster and Sullivan. As there
was no fundamental disagreement between the parties as to what occurred
during that interview, it is not necessary to determine whether, in fact, Flynn
was present during the entire meeting, and such a determination is not
prerequisite to reaching a resolution of the more basic credibility matters in
this proceeding.
1372
COLONNADE HOTEL
3. The alleged interrogation and warning of
Hannon
Hannon testified that on Friday, August 8, various
members of the housekeeping department reported to him
that management that day had conducted a meeting of all
housekeeping employees, during which certain benefits
were mentioned.3 7 Also on that date, Banquet Manager
DeFreitas told Hannon to report to Juster in his office on
Monday, August 11, at 11 a.m. Hannon asked DeFreitas if
there was something wrong with his work. DeFreitas
replied that Hannon would find out when he went to see
Juster.
Although not scheduled to work on August II, Hannon
reported as directed by DeFreitas. When he entered
Juster's office, Resident Manager Saleh also was present.
Hannon testified that Juster told him, "We are not going to
fool around; I'm not going to fool around. We know what
you have been doing and you know what you have been
doing. Now, we are not going to fire you, but these illegal
activities of yours have got to stop." Juster repeated, "Now,
we are not going to fire you," three different times to
Hannon during the conversation. Juster told Hannon that
he was a very conscientious waiter, Juster's kind of waiter,
and asked Hannon if he was working as an organizer for
the Union. Hannon replied, "How can I be working as an
organizer for the Union when I have been working for you
all of the time?" 3 8 Thereafter, Hannon received the
following letter, dated August 15, from Saleh:
This is to warn you that the Colonnade Hotel does
not appreciate, nor will it stand for, the illegal practices
you have been carrying on in this hotel relative to union
organization. You have been coercing the Colonnade
employees regarding union matters without the approv-
al or permission of the management of this hotel.
If this is continued, be advised that strict remedial
action will be taken by the management of the
Colonnade.
Although the above letter referred to Hannon's "illegal
practices," conducted without the Respondent's "approv-
al," the parties stipulated at the hearing that at no time
material herein did the Respondent have a no-solicitation
rule.
Saleh and Juster testified that this interview, which they
recall as having occurred on August 15, and the warning
letter from Saleh that followed were in response to
complaints received by Saleh from lobby porter Allan
Clarke, and from Lillie Greaves, a maid, that Hannon had
been interrupting them in their work at the hotel by his
prounion talk.39 Saleh, as noted, had reported these
incidents to Juster, observing to the general manager that
37 Saleh testified that, on August 8, he, in fact, had conducted a staff
meeting attended by approximately 35 housekeeping employees, executive
housekeeper Morris, Personnel Manager Burnett, and Housekeeping Super-
visors Jones and Wiggins. The meeting had been called to discuss operations
within that department but, when a maid had asked why they had tojoin the
Union, he took the occasion to outline reasons why the employees should
not support the Union at the forthcoming August 21 election, outlining
certain existing benefits and policies. The complaint does not allege that
anything unlawful was stated at the meeting.
38 Since June 27 and 28. when the authorization cards were signed,
Hannon was engaged in matters not related to his duty.
Accordingly, Juster sent for and interviewed Hannon in his
office in Saleh's presence.
Juster testified that he told Hannon at that time that he
did not appreciate what Hannon was doing, that he did not
consider Hannon to be a labor organizer. He reminded
Hannon that he was in the hotel on the Respondent's
payroll and that he would very much appreciate it if
Hannon would stop what he was doing immediately. Juster
told Hannon that he had nothing against his professional
ability and thought he was a good waiter, but this would
have to stop immediately. Juster announced that he was
going to call the Union because he was very displeased,
having the feeling that certain activities were going on
behind his back. Juster stated that he had treated all of his
employees fairly and had a good relationship. Juster
testified that he had been absolutely disturbed.
Juster told Hannon that he was being warned that day
because he had been in places in the hotel where he was
not supposed to be, such as in the staff cafeteria, in the
elevators, and following hotel employees in the lobby. This
matter was being discussed because employees had com-
plained to Saleh that they wanted to be left alone. Juster
declared that he was going to call Hannon's union and, if
this happened again, he would fire Hannon. Juster testified
that, before leaving, Hannon had told him that he was
sorry and was not going to do it again.
After Hannon's departure, Juster told Saleh to write a
warning letter to Hannon with a copy to the Union. As
stated, Juster also telephoned Hannon's union to complain
about his conduct. The above-quoted letter, dated August
15, was written by Saleh in accordance with the foregoing
instruction from Juster.
4. The Respondent's alleged threat of hotel
closure and Hannon's suspension
After his warning of August 15, Hannon continued, as
before, to speak to the housekeeping employees about the
benefits of unionization when, by chance, he met them in
various places within the hotel.
On August 19, Hannon was to work at a soup and
sandwich luncheon for 20 people, scheduled to start at
12:30 p.m. According to Banquet Manager DeFreitas,
Hannon arrived for work that day at II a.m. and, working
alone, proceeded to set up the dining room for the event.
Hannon testified that he had gathered the linen, flatware,
china, and other items to be placed on the tables and had
finished his setup work not later than 11:50 a.m. At noon,
while on a rest stop, he met one of the housemen who
asked him to go to the employees' cafeteria to speak to the
maids, as they had some questions about the Union.
Hannon had continued to speak to the various housekeeping employees
about the benefits of unionization as he encountered them at different
places around the hotel. He resumed this practice after the above interview
with Juster and Saleh.
39 Clarke had denied Saleh's contention that Clarke had complained to
him and, as found above, Saleh's interrogation of Clarke, at that time, has
been found herein to be in violation of Sec. 8(aX)) of the Act. Greaves,
before the conclusion of the hearing, left the Respondent's employ to move
to another State and did not testify.
1373
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Accordingly, Hannon went to the employees cafeteria
where, again, a number of housekeeping employees were
having their lunch. As he entered, Hannon asked for their
attention, stating that those who wanted to listen should do
so and that those who did not should just keep on eating.
He then explained that the National Labor Relations
Board was going to hold an election on August 21, which
would be 2 days from then. The election would be
conducted by secret ballot, which meant that they should
not worry or be afraid that management would know how
they voted. Hannon told the employees not to be afraid
that they would lose their jobs if they voted for the Union.
Hannon again repeated the benefits that the housekeeping
staff could expect after November I - a 35-cent increase
in pay, double pay on holidays, and hospitalization and
pension plans.
As Hannon spoke, Mark Burnett 40 entered the Respon-
dent's cafeteria and heard Hannon speaking to the Re-
spondent's employees. Burnett then questioned Hannon
about the Union's sick leave plan. However, before
Hannon could answer, Saleh entered the staff cafeteria and
asked Hannon to come to his office. This, according to
Hannon, occurred at or about 12:05 p.m.
Hannon returned with Saleh to the latter's office. Saleh
then went next door to Juster's office to get him. Hannon
heard Saleh tell Juster as they approached that he had
caught "him" at it again. "He" was down in the employees'
cafeteria, talking to the people.
As Juster and Saleh reached the door of Saleh's office,
Juster said, "Suspend him. Get him out of here. I don't
want to see him in here again. He is nothing but a
troublemanker in his own union, anyway. Call Mr. Bevila-
qua. Call Mr. DeMatteo." 4 1 Juster then walked away.
Hannon testified that, before leaving, he asked Saleh if
that was it. Saleh told him that it was. Hannon protested
that the Respondent could not do this, this was America,
the land of freedom. People could not be fired for talking.
Saleh replied, "Well, what can I do? Mr. Druker4 2 will
close the hotel." Hannon responded that that was his
problem, not Hannon's, and continued to insist on his
rights of freedom of speech.
Hannon testified that, after leaving Saleh's office, he
returned to the employees cafeteria where he told those
present that he had been fired, but that they should not
worry as he would be back. Hannon told the employees to
make certain that they voted on August 21, that manage-
ment would not know how they voted as the election would
be secret. He cautioned them not to be afraid. Hannon
then left the hotel and a replacement was called in to serve
the luncheon in his stead.
Hannon thereafter received a letter, dated August 19,
from the Respondent, signed by Saleh. The text of this
letter is as follows:
0 Although the Respondent declined to stipulate a supervisory status for
Burnett, representing him to be a payroll clerk, he later was identified by the
Respondent's witnesses Morris and Saleh as the Respondent's personnel
manager, the individual who was charged with correcting the error under
which certain employees had been denied insurance coverage. He had sat at
management's table during various staff meetings, particularly that of
August 8. Although Burnett's status as a supervisor within the meaning of
the Act was not alleged or litigated at the hearing, it is clear from the record
that, at all times material herein, Burnett was strongly identified with the
Respondent's management.
On August 19, 1975, at 12:30 p.m. you were seen in
the Colonnade Employees Cafeteria talking to numer-
ous members of the staff. At this time, you were to be
working on a banquet, and you left your post complete-
ly unattended.
This letter will serve as a final warning to you, and
notification that you are under suspension for a period
of I month.
Hannon returned to work at the end of his month-long
suspension and was employed by the Respondent at the
time of the hearing.43
Saleh, in turn, testified that, on August 19, he learned
from a telephone call made to his office around noontime
that day that Hannon was in the employees cafeteria. He
was informed that there was a commotion in the employ-
ees' cafeteria and Hannon was there talking to employees.
Saleh went there to investigate after first reporting the call
to Juster. Juster testified that, while Saleh was en route to
the cafeteria, he called Banquet Manager DeFreitas from
whom he learned that Hannon was supposed to be on duty
at the time serving a function on the fifth floor. DeFreitas
also told him that the banquet was to start in another 20
minutes but that the preparations had not been completed
as there were no ashtrays, bread, butter plates, or matches
on the tables and that, in DeFreitas' opinion, Hannon
absolutely had no right to be away from the dining room.
When Saleh entered the employees cafeteria, he saw
Hannon standing in the middle of the floor making a
speech to approximately 30 to 40 employees who were then
present. Saleh brought Hannon back to his own office,
where they were joined by Juster.
Saleh testified that Juster told Hannon, "We warned you
before about this and you left your position unattended. So
you leave now. You are under suspension and you are
going to hear from us." Saleh denied that Juster had said
that Hannon was fired.
Juster, on the other hand, was more blunt and direct
about what his intent had been with regard to Hannon at
the time. Juster testified that he had said, "I want him out
of here. Get him out of here." Juster related that at that
point he wanted Hannon fired. After Hannon's departure,
Juster telephoned Joseph Bevilaqua, secretary of Local 34,
Hannon's union, in Saleh's presence. Juster told Belvilaqua
that, after everything they had been through and after he
had warned Hannon, the Respondent again had had a
disruption in the operation of the banquet department.
Juster declared that he wanted Hannon fired, but was told
by Bevilaqua that he could not fire Hannon but could only
suspend him for a maximum period of I month.
41 Bevilaqua and DeMatteo were officials of Local 34.
42 The parties stipulated that Bertram Druker is the owner of the
Respondent's hotel.
43 It is Hannon's testimony that, on August 19, he had been told that he
was being discharged, and that it was not until he received the letter that day
that he became aware that he was merely being suspended. This is
confirmed by Juster, who related that he had intended to fire Hannon and
would have done so had not his Union intervened.
1374
COLONNADE HOTEL
Hanging up the phone, Juster told Saleh to write Hannon
a letter notifying him of his 1-month suspension.44
The Respondent contends that the reason for Hannon's
suspension was that he had left his position unattended on
August 19. Juster testified that DeFreitas had complained
many times, even before the issuance of the August 15
warning letter to Hannon, that Hannon, although a good
waiter, had a habit of leaving his post to attend to union
matters. Juster conceded, however, that these earlier
complaints had not played a direct role in the decision to
warn Hannon on August 15.
To meet the Respondent's contention that Hannon had
been disciplined for leaving his post, and to support
Hannon's testimony that he had a right to be in the
cafeteria on August 19, between the time that he completed
his setup and the start of the luncheon, as he then was on
his own time, the General Counsel introduced evidence
tending to show that banquet waiters were not paid on a
straight hourly basis. Rather, they were compensated,
depending on the size of a given event, according to an
established schedule under which they received specific
sums for each separate task that they performed in
connection with each function at which they were sched-
uled to work. Accordingly, for the luncheon scheduled for
August 19 Hannon was to have been paid a flat base pay
rate for the job itself. In addition, he would have received
separate amounts for the setup and for each guest in excess
of 15, plus an allowance for cleanup and a gratuity based
on a percentage of the total bill for the luncheon.
Therefore, after the setup he was free until the luncheon
began.
Cassiano DeFreitas 45 testified that, on August 19, Saleh
called him at his office and stated that Hannon was making
a speech in the cafeteria that was contrary to the policy of
the house. Saleh instructed DeFreitas to get someone else
to serve the party because Hannon would be let go for
some time or else laid off. DeFreitas related that, after
finding a replacement for Hannon, he found Hannon in
the lobby and told him that he understood that Hannon
had been making a speech in the cafeteria. He told Hannon
that he was sorry but he would have to go. DeFreitas told
Hannon that, in his view, Hannon was being suspended
because, instead of watching his party as he was supposed
to be doing at the time, he was in the employees cafeteria
making a speech.
DeFreitas related that he did not go to inspect the
banquet room where Hannon had been scheduled to work
that day until he already had spoken to Hannon of his
suspension. It was not until then that DeFreitas noticed
that a few butter plates and ash trays had not been placed
on the otherwise fully set tables. However, DeFreitas
44 Later on August 19, around 3 p.m., Juster, accompanied by Saleh and
Morris, conducted a meeting of the Respondent's housekeeping and laundry
employees in one of the function rooms. Dunng this meeting, Juster
expressed reasons why, in his view, the employees should not support the
Union in the forthcoming election. The details of what Juster told the
employees in this regard are set forth above in connection with the
discussion concerning the disputed wage increases. At the conclusion of
Juster's talk, he asked if there were any questions from the employees. Only
Wally Labat, a houseman, responded, asking why Hannon had been fired.
Juster told Labat that he had the wrong information, Hannon had not been
fired but suspended with his union's approval. Labat was told that Juster
would be very glad to have him or any other employee go to his office to see
termed these defects in the setup as not being serious
infractions about which he would have made an issue. He
explained that Hannon had been the only waiter assigned
to set up the luncheon as the scheduled event was quite
small and the compensation available to set up a function
of that size would have not been adequate if divided among
two waiters.
DeFreitas explained that when waiters are called to work
at a function on the Respondent's premises they are
expected to report for work approximately 35 minutes
ahead of time. Whether the affair is a lunch or dinner,
waiters are required to stay for 3 hours, after which they
are paid for each extra hour. The housemen put up the
tables, but the banquet waiters are supposed to obtain the
linen and all that is required to set the tables for the various
events. DeFreitas stated that it would take someone of
Hannon's experience not more than a half hour to perform
the setup for the August 19 luncheon. DeFreitas recalled
that the August 19 luncheon had been scheduled to begin
at 12:30 p.m. and that Hannon arrived at 11 a.m., in
accordance with his customary punctuality. DeFreitas was
certain that Hannon, at that time, knew the rule that each
banquet waiter, after completing this setup, was to stay
nearby to watch the party, count the people as they came
in, and, when enough had assembled, inform the kitchen so
that service could begin. This rule did not preclude a waiter
from leaving the dining area between the completion of the
setup and the start of the meal for personal needs, but his
primary duty was to come in, complete the setup, and to
remain near the function to watch and to keep count. Later
in his testimony, DeFreitas liberalized his description of
this policy by observing that, if Hannon had finished his
setup for the 12:30 event at 11:30 a.m., it would have been
all right for him to go downstairs to the employees cafeteria
for a cup of coffee. If he had finished at noon, he might still
go for the coffee but he would have had to make it very fast
in order to return in time to watch the party.
As had Juster and Saleh, DeFreitas described Hannon as
a very good waiter, who was neat and always on time. He
recognized that Hannon was just "200 percent union," but
that he had nothing against Hannon. DeFreitas frequently
had found it necessary to send banquet waiters back to
their stations while they were supposed to be on duty.
Hannon was one of these individuals. DeFreitas testified
that this was a situation which occurred time and time
again.
The Respondent contends that, although it did not have
a no-solicitation rule at the time of Hannon's warning and
suspension, this did not free Hannon or any other employ-
ee to leave his work area to disturb other employees who
were on duty. Also, although the hotel has followed a
the letter of suspension that had been sent to Hannon. Labat. according to
Juster, then said that the employees had the impression that whoever was
going to vote for the Union was going to be fired. Juster replied that this was
nonsense, and he had two points to make. First, the ballot was going to be
secret and no one was going to know who voted for whom and, second.
although Juster sensed that Labat might vote for the Union, he assured
Labat that he was not going to be fired. Labat then asked what would
happened if he was. Juster replied that, if he was terminated, he should come
straight to Juster who promised that he would then reinstate him.
45 DeFreitas, who served as the Respondent's banquet manager from
March 1972 until mid-November 1975, at the time of the hearing, was no
longer connected with the Respondent.
1375
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
policy of granting three warnings to employees prior to
suspension or discharge, it was not considered necessary in
Hannon's case to ascertain what prior warnings he may
have received before taking action on August 19, as the
collective-bargaining agreement with Local 34 permits
discipline without previous warnings in cases where the
misdeed is of sufficient magnitude. Accordingly, three
warning notices are not automatically applicable and the
Respondent's ability to take disciplinary action in the
absence of prior warnings is dependent on the seriousness
of the offense.
Neither Juster nor Saleh knew of any waiter who had
been terminated before August 19 because he had left his
work station, the penalty originally intended for Hannon.
In fact, Juster recalled that one waiter, before his discharge
in 1976, had received more than three different warnings
for having left his work station and on two or three other
occasions had also received reprimands for tardiness.46
Another waiter, after previously having received an unre-
called number of prior warnings for having been away
from his post, was finally terminated in July 1975, for theft.
5. Discussion and conclusions as to the events
relating to Hannon
From the record herein it would appear that Hannon, in
fact, was interrogated and warned by the Respondent on or
about August 15 and was suspended for I month, effective
August 19, because of his union activities.
Although I find from DeFreitas' credited testimony that
Hannon improperly was away from his work station at
noontime on August 19, when he spoke to the housekeep-
ing employees in the cafeteria, it is concluded that this
infraction, standing alone, would not have resulted in the
harsh discipline originally intended and the less stringent
penalty that ultimately was administered.
Hannon initially was warned in writing on or about
August 15 expressly because of the "illegal practices" he
had "been carrying on in this hotel relative to union
organization." This warning was given although the Re-
spondent did not have a rule against solicitation. It
apparently was the expectation of obtaining information
about Hannon's union activities which prompted Saleh,
shortly before the warning was issued, to interrogate Allan
Clarke, as found above. Hannon's testimony that, when he
solicited employees to sign union cards on June 27 and 28,
he had done so on his own time, was not disputed.
It also appears that, in suspending Hannon, the Respon-
dent subjected him to disparate treatment. Neither Juster
nor Saleh knew of any waiter who had been so disciplined
before for having been away from his work station,
although DeFreitas testified that he frequently had been
required to send waiters back to where they belonged.
Contrary to the testimony of Juster and Saleh that
DeFreitas often had complained in the past about such
4s Juster explained that the Respondent did not automatically discharge
anyone because he had received a certain number of warning letters.
Warning letters were merely given to create a file.
47 Similarly, Hannon's treatment, as will be seen below, does not
compare favorably to that afforded Patrick Tubwon, employed by the
Respondent in a different category. Having been pressured into resigning
his position with the Respondent as a houseman in August 1975, Tubwon
straying, DeFreitas related that he did not regard such
infractions as being of great moment. Waiters terminated
in the past had received at least three written warnings
pursuant to the Respondent's earlier published policy and,
before more severe action was taken, it was customary to
give an even greater number of warnings than that.
Hannon, on the other hand, was regarded by management
as an excellent waiter with a fine record for punctuality. He
had been warned but once. Hannon cannot realistically be
grouped with the previous dischargees referred to herein,
who, after receiving multiple warnings, were finally termi-
nated for accumulated offenses establishing general unreli-
ability and ultimately theft.47 Nor is there merit to the
Respondent's argument that Hannon's failure to fully
complete his setup before straying from his work area on
August 19 was a factor in his discipline. DeFreitas, as
noted, testified that he did not inspect the dining room and
note the missing bread plates and ashtrays until after
Hannon had been informed of his penalty.
The basis for the Respondent's antiunion motivation, in
the context of the fact that much of its staff was already
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union's sister local, may be clarified by Juster's testimony
as to his response when, on June 30, the Union requested
recognition for the housekeeping unit. Juster related that
he had been angered by the Union's breach of its
agreement that, during the term of the current contract for
the waiters, waitresses and bartenders unit, the Union
would take no action to organize the Respondent's remain-
ing employees. Juster was of the view that his new hotel
would require at least that much additional time to be able
to afford greater unionization of its staff.
Thereafter, the Respondent took the actions designed to
defeat the Union found unlawful herein, including the
granting of wage increases to 40 of the 52 housekeeping
unit employees in the critical period before the election,
inducing former employee Reddington to come in to vote
by offering him a day's pay for no work and Saleh's
interrogation of Clarke. It was against this background that
the Respondent's conduct directed against Hannon as the
principal union activist took place, culminating in Han-
non's conspicuous suspension, effective just 2 days before
the election.48
It, therefore, is found that the Respondent further
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogat-
ing Hannon on or about August 15 as to whether he was
the organizer for the Union by warning him, in writing,
that he would be discharged if such union activities
continued, and by threatening on August 19 that the
Respondent's owner would close the hotel if the Union was
designated as bargaining representative.
For the foregoing reasons, also noting the timing and the
disparate nature of Hannon's 1-month suspension, in the
context of his excellent work record, the dubious circum-
stances on which his initial warning was based, the
was rehired as a security man in the garage about I month later. Although
Tubwon thereafter received two written "final" warnings from the Respon-
dent for sleeping on the job, at the time he testified at the hearing he was still
in the Respondent's employ.
*8 As testified to by DeFreitas, Hannon's strong union sentiments
apparently were well known.
1376
COLONNADE HOTEL
Respondent's conceded knowledge of Hannon's union
activities obtained, in part, through the interrogation of
Clarke, the Respondent's avowed hostility to the Union's
organizational campaign and its other unlawful conduct
summarized above, much of which was directed specifical-
ly at Hannon, it is found that the Respondent, in
suspending Hannon on August 19, violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
D. The Applicability of a Bargaining Order49
1. The Union's majority status; position of the
parties
The General Counsel and the Union contend that the
Respondent's unfair labor practices were so pervasive and
opprobrious as to have effectively destroyed the Union's
majority support within the housekeeping unit, which, on
June 30, consisted of 52 employees. In this connection,
although the Union claimed that it originally had received
a total of 32 signed authorization cards - 28 on June 27
and 4 on June 28 - the Union initially relied on only 29 of
these cards, including the 4 dated June 28. The Respon-
dent, correctly noting that the Union would have to have
27 authorization cards for a majority in its unit, challenged
the validity of certain of the cards. Specifically, the
Respondent has litigated the genuineness of authorization
cards allegedly signed by employees Cadroo Jenkins and
Patrick Tubwon on the ground that those employees did
not actually sign the cards bearing their names or authorize
anyone else to sign for them. The Respondent also
challenged the cards signed by Lillie Hutchinson Akre,
Lillie Greaves, Fatu Bona, and Maria Canto, all of which
were dated June 27, and those of Yeworkweha Makonnen,
Cilla O'Garro, Hewen Deneke, and Genet Assefa, dated
June 28.
The authorization cards distributed on June 27 and 28
are so-called single purpose cards, which on their face
authorize the Union to represent the signatory employ-
ees.50 The Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Co., Inc.,51 considered the evidence pertinent to the validity
of the disputed single purpose cards, as follows:
In resolving the conflict among the circuits in favor
of approving the Board's Cumberland rule, we think it
sufficient to point out that employees should be bound
by the clear language of what they sign unless that
language is deliberately and clearly canceled by a union
adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to
disregard and forget the language above his signature.
There is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a
card that says the signer authorizes the union to
represent him and then telling him that the card will
probably be used first to get an election.... We
cannot agree with the employers here that employees as
a rule are too unsophisticated to be bound by what they
49 The appropriate unit herein, which is described above in fn. I, is not in
dispute.
50 A copy of the disputed authorization card of Patrick Tubwon, printed
identically to the other authorization cards herein, is included in Appendix
A to this Decision lomitted from publication ].
5t 395 U.S. 575, 60608 (1969).
52 At the hearing, Jenkins identified Flynn and Hannon.
sign unless expressly told that their act of signing
represents something else ...
We agree, however, with the Board's own warnings
in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB No. 57, 68 LRRM
1338, 1341 and n. 7 (1968), that in hearing testimony
concerning a card challenge, trial examiners should not
neglect their obligation to ensure employees free choice
by a too easy mechanical application of the Cumberland
rule. We also accept the observation that employees are
more likely than not, many months after a card drive and
in response to questions by company counsel, to give
testimony damaging to the union, particularly where
company officials have previously threatened reprisals for
union activity in violation of [Section] 8(a)(1). We
therefore reject any rule that requires a probe of an
employee's subjective motivations as involving an
endless and unreliable inquiry. [Emphasis supplied.]
2. Authorization cards challenged on the basis of
genuineness
a. Cadroo Jenkins
At the hearing the General Counsel withdrew the
authorization card, dated June 27, allegedly signed by
Cadroo Jenkins. Jenkins' asserted card was one of the 29
authorization cards on which the Union based its majority,
at the hearing. It was withdrawn when the General Counsel
and the Union subsequently conceded, after Jenkins and
two expert witnesses had testified, that the card attributed
to Jenkins was not genuine.
Although Jenkins could not recall the date, he testified
that he had been in the employees cafeteria at lunchtime
when Hannon and Flynn were passing out authorization
cards52 and had heard them both speak to the employees.
Jenkins remembered that Hannon had given him a blank
authorization card and had told him what the card was
about. Jenkins related that he had returned the card to
Hannon without either having spoken to Hannon or
written anything on it. Shortly thereafter, Jenkins left the
cafeteria.
In accordance with the agreement of the parties, the
authorization card originally attributed to Cadroo Jenkins
will not be counted towards the Union's alleged majority
status.
b. Patrick Tubwon
The Respondent, in support of its position that the
authorization card attributed to Patrick Tubwon 53 did not
actually bear his signature, called Tubwon as a witness.
The card in question was signed in its center on the line
reserved for the employee's name. However, on the bottom
signature line there appeared some writing that the General
Counsel contends was an aborted attempt by Tubwon to
sign his name. This was apparently scratched out and
53 Tubwon, originally hired by the Respondent as a houseman in May
1975, left the Respondent's employ on August 15 of that year, under
circumstances that will be discussed below. He returned to work for the
Respondent on September 10, 1975, as a security employee in the garage
and was employed there at the time of the hearing. A native of Nigeria,
Tubwon also was a full-time college student.
1377
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
misspelled, yet the formation of certain letters appeared to
have been made in a manner consistent with Tubwon's
handwriting. Tubwon's disputed card and his W-4 form,
bearing his genuine signatures, are reproduced and at-
tached to this Decision as Appendix A [omitted from
publication ].
Tubwon denied having known that the Union had been
trying to organize the Respondent's housekeeping employ-
ees in the period from June to August, that he had been in
the cafeteria when Hannon and Flynn had distributed
authorization cards, 54 and that any part of the card that
bore his name was in his writing.
Tubwon, however, testified that, although unable to
recall dates, on an occasion in the employees cafeteria he
had signed a blank white sheet of paper which had been
given to him by Hannon. At that time, according to
Tubwon, he remembered that Hannon had told him that
the paper was from the Respondent's banquet office.
Tubwon related that he signed the paper because everyone
else did. There had been nothing on the paper to indicate
its purpose. At that time, Hannon had made no mention of
a union. Tubwon previously had seen Hannon at various
places around the hotel and knew that Hannon worked in
the banquet department. 5 Hannon, for his part, had no
independent recollection of having asked Tubwon to sign a
card, but inferred that, if the Union was in possession of a
signed authorization card, dated June 27, then it must have
been completed as a result of the efforts of Flynn and
himself on that date.
Although Tubwon testified in his direct examination that
he never had been terminated by the Respondent, the
evidence indicated that, in the very least, the Respondent
was on the point of discharging him when, on about
August 15, he resigned his employment.
Morris, the Respondent' executive housekeeper at the
time in question, testified that Tubwon had a practice of
coming in late for work in the morning and, when
reproved, had given his studies as an excuse for his lateness
and his inability to carry out certain of his duties. In early
August, Morris had advised him to try to find another job
that would better suit his schedule. Tubwon agreed and,
about 2 days later, had informed her of his resignation.
Morris agreed with his decision.
54 Contrary to Tubwon, Cadroo Jenkins testified that, on the day he
received and returned the blank authorization card to Hannon, he had seen
Tubwon in the cafetena. However, Jenkins did not see Tubwon sign an
authorization card.
55 Although Tubwon stated that the sheet of paper given to him by
Hannon on that occasion apparently had been signed by various employees,
he could not recall any specific names. Tubwon did not see Hannon give the
sheet of paper to any other employee.
56 On September 10, when Tubwon was hired into the security depart-
ment, his hourly rate became 20 cents above the contract scale for his
former position of houseman.
57 The Respondent argues that the testimony of its handwriting expert,
Tytell, is entitled to greater weight than that of McCarthy, the expert called
by the General Counsel, as Tytell, in accordance with preferred procedure,
had based her judgment on comparison against a greater number of
exemplars or standards than had McCarthy, and that Tytell had had access
to original signatures. McCarthy's opinion, on the other hand, was based
principally upon a photocopy of Tubwon's W-4 form. Although she saw
and examined an original signature by Tubwon before testifying at the
hearing, McCarthy by that time already had rendered her written opinion.
Thereafter, a personnel action form was initiated by
Morris' assistant, Spirlett, dated August 15, which showed
that Tubwon was being involuntarily terminated.
Thereafter, on September 10, Tubwon was rehired by the
Respondent's security department and assigned to the
garage. Tubwon testified that, upon his return to school in
September, he had requested a job in the garage so that he
would be able to do some studying while working.
Accordingly, he was rehired by Saleh. Although Tubwon
thereafter received two written warnings for sleeping on the
job in November and in late March, both of which were
termed final warnings, no further action was taken against
him and, at the time of the hearing, he was still employed
by the Respondent. 56
The General Counsel and the Respondent each called
expert witnesses to testify in support of their respective
positions as to the genuineness of the signatures attributed
to Tubwon on the disputed card. Each expert witness,
Elizabeth McCarthy Badlian for the General Counsel and
Pearl L. Tytell for the Respondent, prior to their testimony,
was afforded varying opportunities by her respective
principals to examine and compare the writing on the
authorization card with Tubwon's concededly authentic
signature as it appeared on other documents, such as his
tax withholding certificate (W-4 form). Such unquestioned
signatures used as bases for comparison are called standard
or exemplars.57
While both experts, as noted, agreed that the signature
on Cadroo Jenkins' card was not genuine, McCarthy
testified that it was her opinion that Tubwon had signed
the card attributed to him in full in the middle of the
document on the blank next to "Name," and that he also
was responsible for the misspelled, partially crossed-out
semblance of his name which appears on the signature line
at the bottom of the card. Tytell, on the other hand, was of
the view that Tubwon had not signed the card. When
questioned further, however, she stated that, although she
was quite convinced that Tubwon had not written on the
signature line, she felt it was "probable" - defined by her
as more than a 50-percent certainty - that Tubwon, in
fact, had signed his full signature in the center of the card
on the line calling for his name.
On my review of the record, having observed the
witnesses, the disputed signatures, and the relevant exemp-
McCarthy testified that her subsequent and more cursory comparison with
an original signed document afforded no ground for revising her original
opinion based on the comparison with the photocopy. While it was
conceded by both experts that it is most desirable to examine and to
compare disputed signatures with the maximum number of exemplars prior
to offering opinions as to genuineness, McCarthy, whose general profession-
al qualifications and more than 40 years' experience as an examiner of
questioned documents are known to and not disputed by the Respondent's
counsel, testified that she had no difficulty in reaching her conclusion on the
basis of the comparison with the photocopied signature. The record contains
greatly magnified reproductions of the genuine and questioned signatures
prepared by McCarthy in connection with her analysis. Although Tytell,
with access to the additional standards in the Respondent's files, apparently
was able to utilize better overall procedures, she did not appear to be more
certain in her conclusion as to whether Tubwon had signed his card in the
"Name" blank in the center of the card than was McCarthy. In any event,
for reasons which will be discussed herein, it is not actually necessary to
choose between the judgment of these experts in reaching a conclusion as to
whether Tubwon had actually signed his name on the card.
1378
COLONNADE HOTEL
lars, including that incorporated in Appendix A to this
Decision [omitted from publication], 58 it is concluded that
Tubwon did sign the authorization card in both places as
represented by the General Counsel and McCarthy. This
finding is facilitated by the fact that I find it next to
impossible to credit Tubwon. He was an uncooperative and
evasive witness who followed a pattern of repeating
questions put to him rather than answering them in the first
instance. Although Tubwon testified that he did not know
of the Union's organizational campaign and did not see
Flynn and Hannon in the cafeteria distributing authoriza-
tion cards, this story was directly refuted by the Respon-
dent's witness, Cadroo Jenkins. Although Jenkins did not
sign his own card, he recalled having seen Tubwon in the
cafeteria while Hannon and Flynn were distributing the
cards and speaking to the employees.
Tubwon's statement that he never had been discharged
by the Respondent, too, is at best of questionable accuracy
since he resigned under pressure.
It also is noted that there is no essential conflict between
the two handwriting experts that Tubwon did sign his
name in full in one place on the card, the "Name" blank.
McCarthy testified positively that Tubwon had signed the
card in the space and Tytell testified that he "probably"
did so. These conclusions both run contrary to Tubwon's
testimony that he did not write at all on the card. The
Respondent's expert, Tytell, based some of her reservations
as to the validity of Tubwon's card on the legalistic ground
that it did not appear that he had made his inscription on
the signature line, noting that in documents such as deeds,
contracts, and wills, properly made and placed signatures
are of great importance. McCarthy, on the other hand, was
of the view that Tubwon also had formed the letters
appearing on the signature line and opined that Tubwon,
as some people occasionally do, may have become mixed
up or confused at the time. She concluded that the
handwriting on both the "Name" and the signature lines
was that of Tubwon. From my own observation, noting,
too, the "blow-ups" of the signatures prepared by McCar-
thy, in the context of the record and credibility resolutions
made herein, I am in agreement with McCarthy's analy-
sis.59
Having found from the credited evidence that Tubwon
had signed his name on the line of a single-purpose card
calling for his name and, also, had attempted to sign on the
signature line, I cannot agree with the Respondent's
argument that Tubwon's card should not be counted as his
full signature did not appear in its proper place. In
circumstances where it can be inferred that the employee
has written on his authorization card with an appropriate
intent, the Board has taken such cards into account
although they were not actually signed.60
5s See Cato Show Printing Co., Inc., 219 NLRB 739, 755 (1975).
a9 It also is concluded that Tubwon's account of having signed a blank
sheet of paper at Hannon's request is not worthy of credence.
6o See C A. Froedge Delivery and Trucking Service, Inc., 172 NLRB 46,
53-54 (1968); Irving Taitel, Ruth Taitel andJerome Taitel. d/b/a I. Tailel and
Son. 119 NLRB 910, 912, fn. 3 (1957).
6t Pnor to the end of the hearing, Greaves left the Respondent's employ
to move to another State. Accordingly, she did not testify.
"2 Flynn, as noted, also had testified that Hutchinson and Greaves had
c. Lillie Hutchinson Akre and Lillie Greaves
The General Counsel contends that Akre (or Hutchin-
son) and Greaves, both employed as maids, signed valid
authorization cards in the employees cafeteria on June 27.
The Respondent argues that these cards should not be
counted as they had been obtained by misrepresentation.
Hutchinson was called as witness by the Respondent. 61
Contrary to Union Representative Flynn, who testified
that Akre and Lillie Greaves had sat next to her in the
employees cafeteria on June 27, Akre testified that she did
not know Flynn and did not remember seeing her in the
cafeteria when she received the card from Hannon on June
27. Hannon already was in the cafeteria when she arrived
there on the day in question, and she just had sat down by
Lillie Greaves when Hannon approached. He handed Akre
and Greaves authorization cards, telling them to sign them
as they were for the purpose of getting insurance at the
hotel. Akre testified that she had completed her card
without reading it on the basis of Hannon's representation
that it was for insurance. Greaves also signed her card at
the same time. In addition to denying that she had seen
Flynn in the cafeteria at that time, Hutchinson denied that
she had seen other cards being circulated, that she had
taken a role in distributing the cards herself, or that she had
requested copies of the collective-bargaining agreement or
any literature describing the health, welfare benefits or
pension plans that were available to union employees. She
also denied having seen such literature. 62
Hutchinson testified that she first learned that the cards
that she and Greaves had signed had something to do with
the Union when, by chance, she encountered Hannon as
she was coming to work at or about 7:30 a.m., a week after
having signed the card. At that time, Hannon was standing
outside the hotel distributing handbills to passersby.
Although Hannon offered her one, she did not take it. As
she passed by, Hannon stated that the card that she had
filled out was for the Union. As Hutchinson walked away
she told Hannon that she did not want to have any part of
it.
Contrary to Akre's testimony, the weight of the evidence
provided by witnesses for both the General Counsel and
the Respondent clearly establishes that both Akre and
Greaves were present in the employees cafeteria on June
27, while Hannon and Flynn were engaged there in
conspicuous organizational activities. I find Akre's testimo-
ny that she could then have been in the small cafeteria 63
and not have observed Flynn, who was in the center of
things or, as Akre testified, that she had signed an unread
taken an active role in questioning her, had requested and received from her
copies of the Union's collective-bargaining agreement and literature de-
scribing the Union's health, welfare, and pension plan. Although Flynn
previously had had no meaningful contact with the members of the
Respondent's housekeeping staff, she testified that she learned the identities
of Hutchinson and Greaves that day because thay had participated so
actively in that meeting that she made a point of looking at the card they
had signed to learn their names.
63 It was stipulated that the employees cafetena measured 18 by 22 feet.
1379
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
document placed before her by Hannon, who was a total
stranger to her, to be most unconvincing.64 It also seems
most unlikely that Hutchinson actually believed that, if a
policy was then being pursued of signing up employees for
an insurance program, such a task would have been
delegated to Hannon. Significantly, too, as will be dis-
cussed below, Akre and Fatu Bona, whose testimony was
somewhat similar, contradicted each other as to how they
first learned that the cards they signed were for the Union.
The Respondent's argument in its brief, that the General
Counsel should have called additional witnesses with
respect to the events of June 27 to establish the validity of
various other authorization cards signed on that date which
were not specifically challenged by the Respondent, miss-
tates the burden of proof. In Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Incorporated,65 the Board noted that where employees sign
unambiguous, single-purpose cards, the burden of proof
necessary to establish that any such cards were obtained
through misrepresentation as to their purpose falls upon
the party asserting that fact, here the Respondent.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the authorization
cards signed by Lillie Hutchinson Akre and Lillie Greaves
are valid and should be counted toward the establishment
of the Union's majority status.
d. Fatu Bona
Fatu Bona, another maid, also recognized her signature
on an authorization card, dated June 27.66
Bona's testimony was similar to that of Hutchinson. She
related that she had received an authorization card from
Hannon just as she entered the employees cafeteria around
12:10 p.m. 67 According to Bona, Hannon handed her the
card while walking to a table and she was more interested
in getting to her food than in what Hannon was saying.
Accordingly, the only thing that she heard was that the
card was for insurance. She admitted that Hannon might
have been saying additional things to her at the time, but
the purpose for the card that she had heard related to
insurance.
Although Bona testified that she could read and under-
stand English when she came to the United States and was
not prevented from reading her card by language difficul-
ties, all she looked at were the blank lines which called for
her name, address, city, and other information. These Bona
filled in and returned the card to Hannon.
Bona testified that Flynn, Hutchinson, and Greaves all
were in the cafeteria when she received and signed her
card, but did not recall whether Hutchinson and Greaves
were seated near Flynn.
Bona related that she did not learn that the card was for
the Union until some days later when she, while accompa-
nied by Hutchinson, Greaves, and another employee,68
encountered Hannon and Flynn while going home from
work. Hannon and Flynn 69 were giving out literature at
64 Hutchinson testified that all she knew of Hannon at the time that she
had signed the authorization card was that he was employed as a banquet
waiter.
65 197 NLRB 519, 525 (1972).
E6 Bona, a native of Somalia, has been in the United States since March
1974. At the time of the hearing, she was in her senior year in a Boston high
school.
the time near the hotel. It was then that Hannon told Bona
that the card was for union insurance. Bona told him, "You
didn't say that to me before I filled out the card." Hannon
replied, "I said that." Bona told him, "But I didn't hear you
say that. You didn't say that to me, maybe you said that to
someone else but not to me." She testified that the other
employees who were with her also expressed their outrage
that Hannon had lied to them by not telling them that the
card was for the Union.
The testimony of Fatu Bona that she, too, had signed her
card in the belief that it was her insurance, only to learn for
the first time, days later, that the card she had signed was
for the Union, is not credited. In reaching this conclusion,
certain of the reasons applicable in discrediting Hutchin-
son are likewise applicable to Bona. As unlikely as it would
be that the Respondent would have delegated the task of
signing up employees for a company-sponsored insurance
program to a banquet waiter, it is similarly unlikely that
these employees, who barely knew Hannon, would sign
whatever he put in front of them without reading it in the
belief that he had such authority.
As was true in the case of Hutchinson, the conclusion is
abetted by the fact that the testimony of Hutchinson and
Bona as to how they ultimately learned the real purpose of
the cards they had signed was for the Union is contradicto-
ry. Contrary to Hutchinson, Bona testified that she had
seen Hutchinson and Greaves in the small employees
cafeteria at the same time that Flynn was there. Also,
although Bona testified that she, Hutchinson, and Greaves
were supposed to have discovered only some days later,
together, when they met Hannon in front of the hotel, that
the cards that they had signed were for the Union, the
timing and details of that encounter, as described by
Hutchinson and Bona, are quite dissimilar. Hutchinson
testified that the encounter took place early in the morning
while she was coming to work and she did not refer to the
presence of any other employee or union representative at
the time. Bona, on the other hand, testified that she met
both Hannon and Flynn as she was leaving work, together
with Hutchinson, Greaves, and one other employee.
Hutchinson stated that, on having been told by Hannon
that the card she had signed earlier was for the Union, she
had kept on walking, merely saying in response that she did
not want any part of it. This sentiment was expressed over
her shoulder as she went by Hannon. Bona, however,
testified that she and her companions, including Hutchin-
son, had heatedly remonstrated with Hannon at some
length for his alleged deception. This testimony of Hutch-
inson and Bona was mutually too contradictory to be
credited. Accordingly, I also find that Bona's card is valid
and should be counted.
's Bona testified that she knew at the time that Hannon worked for the
hotel. He was standing in the doorway at the time he handed her the card.
s6 The other employee referred to by Bona was no longer employed by
the Respondent at the time of the hearing and did not testify.
69 Flynn, on rebuttal, credibly denied that she was at the hotel at the
time.
1380
COLONNADE HOTEL
e. Yeworkweha Makonnen, Cilla O'Garro, Hewan
Deneke, and Genet Assefa
The General Counsel contends that the authorization
cards, dated June 28, signed by Makonnen, Assefa,
Deneke, and O'Garro, should also be counted in establish-
ing the Union's majority status.
Hannon testified that he had solicited these four cards in
the employees cafeteria on the day after Flynn's visit to the
hotel, when he had joined Makonnen at her table. He had
offered her a card only after fully and accurately explain-
ing to her the true purposes for which the authorization
card was to be used. Of all the cards that had been signed
during the Union's organizing campaign, Makonnen's card
was the only one that Hannon could specifically identify as
having been signed in his presence. Hannon testified that,
while he was at the table with Makonnen, they were joined
by the three other maids whose names he still did net know
at the time of the hearing but who presumably were the
individuals who had signed the other three cards - Assefa,
Deneke, and O'Garro. After Hannon had made like
explanations to them, they too signed the cards. He
thereafter gave these four cards, dated June 28, to Flynn.70
The Respondent contends that these four employees
signed their authorization cards under circumstances dif-
ferent from those described by Hannon and that they did
so pursuant to a misrepresentation as to the purpose of the
cards. Of the four employees involved, only Makonnen
continued in the Respondent's employ during the course of
this proceeding and testified as a witness for the Respon-
dent.
Makonnen averred that she received the authorization
card, which she admits signing, from Hannon while she
was on an elevator in the Respondent's premises. With her
at the time were two of the employees, Genet Assefa and
Hewan Deneke. They had boarded the elevator in the
basement at or about 4 or 4:30 p.m. and were on their way
to work on the I Ith floor. Hannon entered the elevator on
the first floor and got off on the fifth floor. There were no
intermediate stops. It is Makonnen's testimony that, during
the time that Hannon was on the elevator between the first
floor and fifth floors, he distributed authorization cards to
herself, Assefa, and Deneke, and told them that, if they
signed the cards, they would make more money, have
insurance, not need to worry about initiation fees, and that
they should sign the cards because everyone on the day
shift had done so. Accordingly, in that short elevator run,
the three employees completed, signed, and returned the
cards to Hannon. Makonnen related that although Han-
non mentioned the Union she did not know what it meant
and knew nothing about labor unions at the time.l
When Makonnen testified at the hearing, she was on
maternity leave. She had asked to returned to the Respon-
dent's active employ, but has not yet been called as
70 Although these cards were not given to Flynn until late in the day of
June 30, after the Respondent already had declined the Union's request for
recognition as bargaining representative of its housekeeping and laundry
employees, the four cards, dated June 28, if otherwise valid could properly
be counted on the question of the Union's majority status. The Union's
request for recognition was a continuing one; it is clear from the record that
Hannon had been authorized by the Union to solicit signed cards from unit
employees and the cards, in fact, had been signed prior to June 30. In any
business was slow. However, Makonnen related that she
expected to return to work for the Respondent sometime
within the 2 months following the date of her testimony.
Even were Makonnen's version of the events surround-
ing the signing of her card to be credited, apparently no
misrepresentation was involved. Hannon, according to
Makonnen, had told her that the card was for a union and,
as she recalled, was to enable the employees to get more
money and insurance benefits. They also were told that
there would be no initiation fee. Her explanation that she
did not understand what these cards involved is dubious.
There was little ground for general confusion as to what the
purpose of the cards was or even what a union was for, as
Makonnen testified, her two companions were students at
a local community college.
Noting the unlikelihood of Makonnen's testimony, in-
cluding the practical difficulties involved in accomplishing
everything she described in the short elevator ride, Makon-
nen's interest at the time of the hearing in returning to the
Respondent's employ and, also, the Supreme Court's
observation in Gissel [395 U.S. 575, supra at 6081, that
"employees are more likely than not, many months after a
card drive and in response to questions by company
counsel, to give testimony damaging to the union, particu-
larly where company officials have previously threatened
reprisals for union activity in violation of [Section]
8(a)(l)," I find that the Respondent has failed to meet its
burden of establishing that, when Makonnen and the other
signers of the June 28 cards executed them, that they did so
pursuant to misrepresentation or for an unclear purpose.
Accordingly, I find that Makonnen's card and those of
Deneke, Assefa, and O'Garro are valid.
f. Maria Canto
Canto 72 concededly signed an authorization card for the
Union, dated June 27. The Respondent, however, contends
that Canto had signed the card in the mistaken belief that it
was only for insurance and did not actually know that it
was for a union. The General Counsel asserts that Canto's
testimony as to how she happened to sign the card is not
worthy of credence. However, even if her story were to be
accepted, the General Counsel argues that she did not act
on any misrepresentation from the Union or its agents and
that, therefore, Canto's card should be counted in estab-
lishing the Union's majority status.
Canto at first testified that the card had been given to her
in the basement office where, each day, she picks up the
keys used in her work. Canto explained that she followed
the daily routine of entering the hotel, changing into her
event, in appropriate circumstances, a request for recognition is not a
necessary prerequisite to the issuance of the bargaining order.
71 Makonnen, a native of Ethiopia. had been in this country for
approximately I-1/2 years when she signed her card.
72 As Canto is not fluent in English, she testified at the hearing in
Portuguese, using an interpreter. She has been in the United States since
November 1973, and, at the time of the hearing. was employed by the
Respondent as a maid, a position she had held for approximately 2 years.
1381
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work clothes, picking up her keys, and beginning work at 8
a.m.73 Canto did not recall who gave her the keys on the
day she, at first, testified that she received the card.
Canto later changed her testimony to relate that she
received the card, not in the morning when she picked up
her keys, as she originally described, but only at or around
4:15 p.m., at the conclusion of her day's work, when she
returned her keys. She still did not remember to whom she
gave the keys on that day or whether the individual who
gave her the card was the same person who had given her
the keys. Canto recalled seeing other employees also
receiving cards at the time and place that the card was
given to her, but she did not discuss these cards with
anyone, although there were others there at the time who
spoke Portuguese.
Canto testified that she took the card home with her on
the evening it was received, where she showed it to a cousin
who lived nearby. Her cousin, who was not associated with
the Respondent or the Union, knew some English in
addition to his Portuguese, but did not translate the card to
Canto. He merely told her that it was for insurance, but did
not tell Canto that the card was for a union. The cousin
completed the blanks on the card in pencil and Canto
signed it. When Canto went to work the next morning, she
gave the card to the same person who handed her the keys
that morning.
Canto related that she did not discover that the card she
had signed was for a union until an unspecified later date
when, while eating her lunch in the cafeteria, she saw
Union Representative Flynn in the cafeteria. Canto did not
understand what Flynn was talking about because of her
language difficulty, 74 but she learned that Flynn was there
as a union representative after she asked other Portuguese-
speaking employees in the cafeteria what was going on and
had been told that the meeting was for "voting." 75 Canto
testified that no papers or authorization cards were
distributed in the cafeteria while she was there. Canto,
furthermore, could not recall whether she signed her card
before or after she voted in the union election.
Canto did not appear to be a forthright witness. Not only
did her narrative run contrary to the weight of evidence -
even employees who testified against the Union's interest
herein, as did Bona and Jenkins, agreed that Hannon and
Flynn had passed out authorization cards in the cafeteria
on June 27 - but, virtually every detail of Canto's
narrative was blurred by uncertainty. At first, Canto
testified that she had received the blank authorization card
when she came to work. She later recalled that the card had
been given to her on an unremembered date while she was
turning in her keys just before leaving work, and that she
had given it back the next day while picking up her keys.
7J Former executive housekeeper Morris testified that the keys were
distributed to the maids each day at that time by the housekeeping
supervisors. Anna Jones or Laverne Wiggins, or the head houseman, Louis
Ware.
74 Canto could not recall seeing Hannon at the meeting although she
remembered having seen him around the hotel on a daily basis.
75 Canto testified that she could speak a small amount of English and
sometimes spoke to Lillie Hutchinson Akre. Canto denied, however, that
Hutchinson had ever spoken to her about the Union or about the events of
the union meeting in the cafeteria.
17 Included among these unchallenged cards were those signed by Maria
Lopes, Jose Soares, Rosa Alvemaz, and Sana Gardescu. Although the
She thereafter could not remember who gave her the card,
the party to whom she returned it, whether she remitted the
card to the person who originally had given it, or whether
she had signed the card before or after the election. Canto's
alleged understanding when she signed the card that it
merely was for some unspecified form of insurance, even
by her own testimony, was based on what she had been
told by her cousin and was not based on any misrepresen-
tation traceable to the Union.
Canto, at most, related that she received an authorization
card which she was able to have translated by someone of
her choice, and which she considered to the extent desired,
in the privacy of her home.
Noting that Canto did not even claim to have been
misled by the Union into signing her card, there would
appear to be no basis, in any event, to discount the card on
the basis of misrepresentation by the soliciting Union.
However, Canto's testimony was both most unlikely and
generally indeterminate. It therefore is not credited. Based
on the record as a whole, noting the date of the card, that
Hannon specifically had requested aid for Portuguese-
speaking employees, and, as the nonsignature blanks
thereon apparently had been filled in by someone other
than Canto, it is concluded that Canto had signed her card
with assistance on June 27, and that her card is valid.
3. Conclusions as to the Union's majority status
Having found no merit to the Respondent's challenges to
the validity of authorization cards signed by Patrick
Tubwon, Maria Canto, Fatu Bona, Lillie Hutchinson Akre,
Lillie Greaves, Yeworkweha Makonnen, Cilia O'Garro,
Hewan Deneke, and Genet Assefa, it is concluded that
these cards are valid and should be counted in establishing
the Union's majority status. In addition to the foregoing,
the parties have introduced into the record the signed and
dated authorization cards of 19 other employees, the
validity of which was not contested.'7
Although the card of Cadroo Jenkins has been found to
be invalid herein, as of the date of the Union's demand for
recognition on June 30, 1975, there were 52 employees in
the bargaining unit; at least 28 of those employees had
freely authorized the Union to represent them by signing
unequivocal authorization cards. Accordingly, I find that,
on the day of the Union's demand for recognition and
bargaining, which coincided with the date that the repre-
sentation petition in Case 1-RC-13919 was filed, the
Union represented the majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit.77
Respondent, early in the hearing, had taken the position that it would
litigate the validity of these cards as well, on the ground that Soares'
signature was not genuine and that the signatures on the remaining cards
had been obtained by material misrepresentation at the time of solicitation,
no evidence was adduced by the Respondent to support its position.
77 Although employees were told while being asked to sign union cards
that they would not have to pay union initiation fees, the record reveals that
no assurances were made to prospective card signers that such fees would be
waived only for those who signed union cards. See N.LR.B. v. Savair
Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973); C &d W Super Markets, Inc., 231
NLRB 403, 416, fn. 37 (1977).
1382
COLONNADE HOTEL
4. The Refusal to Bargain
In Boston Pet Supply, Inc.,78 Administrative Law Judge
Taplitz, in his Board-approved Decision, correctly noted as
follows:
In N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., [395 U.S. 575, 613,
614 (1969] the [United States] Supreme Court held that
a bargaining order would be appropriate in two
situations. The first is in "exceptional" cases marked by
"outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices of
"such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies,
with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot
be had." The second is "in less extraordinary cases
marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless
still have the tendency to undermine majority strength
and impede the election processes." The Court also
held (at 600): "an employer can insist on a secret ballot
election, unless, in the words of the Board, he engages
in 'contemporaneous unfair labor practices likely to
destroy the union's majority and seriously impede the
election.' " In Ship Shape Maintenance Co., Inc., 189
NLRB 395 (1971), the Board expressed the test to be
applied in terms of whether the lingering effects of the
unfair labor practices rendered uncertain the probabili-
ty that traditional remedies could insure a fair election,
and whether the union's majority card designations
obtained before the unfair labor practices provided a
more reliable test of the employees' desires and better
protected employee rights than would an election. As
stated in Joseph J. Lachniet, d/b/a Honda of Haslett,
201 NLRB 855 (1973), enfd. 490 F.2d 1382 (C.A. 6,
1974), where a coercive atmosphere is created by the
employer which conventional Board remedies may not
adequately dissipate so that a fair election can be held
with reasonable certainty, a bargaining order is war-
ranted. See also Petrolane Alaska Gas Service, Inc., 205
NLRB 68 (1973).
On June 30, 1975, when recognition was requested, the
Union represented a majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. The Respondent refused to
honor the Union's bargaining request and, on that date, the
Union filed a petition for an election. Between the date of
the filing of the petition and the election on August 21,
1975, the Respondent engaged in a number of flagrant
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act to under-
mine the Union. The Respondent's general manager,
Juster, and his resident manager, Saleh, both participated
in that conduct. Banquet waiter Charles Hannon, the
Union's principal and most conspicuous activist in its
organizational campaign among the Respondent's house-
keeping employees, was coercively interrogated as to his
union activities and was warned that the Respondent's
owner would close the hotel if the housekeeping employees
selected the Union as their bargaining representative.
78 227 NLRB 1891.
79 195 NLRB 1109 (1972), enforcement denied 472 F.2d 170 (C.A. 2,
1972).
so Also see Milgo Industrial, Inc., 203 NLRB 1196 (1973), enfd. 497 F.2d
919 (C.A. 2, 1974); Automated Business Systems, a Division of Liuon Business
Hannon also received verbal written warnings because of
his union activities, although the Respondent at that time
did not have a no-solicitation rule. When, as found above,
Hannon persisted in his union pursuits, he was suspended
for a period of I month, effective 2 days before the
scheduled election, and, in fact, spared from discharge at
that time only by the intervention of his Union. The
Respondent also interrogated lobby porter Allan Clarke as
to Hannon's union activities and, in the critical period
before the election, granted unlawful pay increases to
virtually every member of the unit. Finally, in the last days
before the balloting, the Respondent, through Saleh, after
repeated efforts, successfully induced an ineligible voter,
Douglas Reddington, by an outright offer of money, to
come to the Respondent's premises to participate in the
election.
As detailed above, the Respondent here engaged in
serious violations of Section 8(aX)() and (3) of the Act,
which were calculated to defeat the Union's organizational
effort and to undermine its status among the employees. In
my view, these unfair labor practices were so severe and
pervasive that the application of traditional remedies
afford no guarantee that a new election will provide a more
accurate index of employee sentiment than the authoriza-
tion cards executed by a majority of employees. In the past,
the Board has issued bargaining orders on the basis of the
unlawful conduct in which the Respondent has engaged.
Accordingly, in General Stencils, Inc.,79 the Board found a
threat to close the employer's business, made to only I of
32 employees, to be of sufficient consequence to warrant a
bargaining order. The Board noted that in the "reality of
industrial life," so serious a threat, though made but to a
single employee, would affect all employees in the selection
of a union as it "all but inevitably" would be discussed
among them.80 In Tower Enterprises Inc., d/b/a Tower
Records,8' the Board saw fit to issue a bargaining order
where the only unfair labor practice was a wage increase
that was found to have been issued at a time calculated to
interfere with the employees' free choice of a bargaining
representative.
The Respondent further argued that a bargaining order
would not be appropriate in the present case on the ground
that there had been demonstrable turnover in its house-
keeping and laundry unit since the time that recognition
was requested. Accordingly, of the 55 unit employees who
were employed by the Respondent at the start of the
hearing, only 19 were named on the voting eligibility list
used at the election. Although the Respondent has cited a
number of decisions of various courts of appeals in support
of its position in the matter, I, of course, am bound by the
judgment of the Board which, in Tower Records,82 noted
the following:
Respondent also resists entry of a bargaining order
by claiming that at all times it had a good-faith doubt
as to the Union's majority, and that a demonstrable
turnover shows that any majority which the Union may
Systems, Inc., a Subsidiary of Litton Industries, Inc., 205 NLRB 532. 536
(1973), remanded 497 F.2d 262 (C.A. 6, 1974).
81 182 NLRB 382, 387 (1970).
R2 Id at 387.
1383
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have been able to claim ... was subsequently dissipat-
ed by turnover. Respondent's contention in this regard
misconceives the rationale of Gissel. While prior to
Gissel, the Board frequently spoke of the presence or
absence of good-faith doubts as to majority by an
employer, after Gissel the primary reliance is placed
upon evaluation of the unfair labor practices commit-
ted. As found above, the Union represented a majority
of Respondent's employees at the time of its demand
.... Had Respondent refrained from unlawful con-
duct following the demand, subsequent turnover might
have become an appropriate consideration. However,
. . . Respondent embarked upon an unlawful course of
conduct which we have found above was designed and
calculated to undermine the union's majority and
interfere with the employee's right of free choice.
Respondent thus by its own unlawful conduct forfeited
the right to challenge the Union's majority at a
subsequent date, and subsequent turnover became
irrelevant in resolving the majority issue. Respondent
by . . . undermining the employees' interest in the
Union can no longer question any seeming loss of
majority since it may well have resulted from its own
unlawful conduct.
Accordingly, I conclude and find that, by refusing the
Union's bargaining request and thereafter engaging in the
aforesaid unfair labor practices, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, and that a bargaining
order is necessary and appropriate to protect the majority
sentiment expressed through authorization cards and to
otherwise remedy the violations committed.? 3
E. Case 1-RC-13919
The Objections to the Election
The Union's objections to the election closely parallel
certain of the unfair labor practice issues alleged by the
consolidated complaint.8 4 Pursuant to findings hereto
made, I shall sustain Objections 1, 2, and 3 in view of my
finding that, during the critical preelection period, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by granting
unlawful wage increases to unit employees, by coercively
interrogating them with regard to their union activities and
sympathies, and, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act, discriminatorily suspending Charles P. Hannon
for his union activities. These unfair labor practices
precluded the exercise of a free and uncoerced choice in
the election.
83 N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), Trading Port, Inc.,
219 NLRB 298 (1975). In these circumstances, I find that the violation of
Sec. 8(a)(5) occurred on June 30. 1975, the date the Respondent refused to
recognize and bargain with the majority representative of its employees. C
W Super Markets, Inc., 231 NLRB 403, supra at fn. 2.
s4 The relevant objections are as follows:
(I) Prior to the election the employer promised benefits and wage
increases to members of the unit and granted same with the intention of
coercing the employees in their right to decide how to vote in the
election.
(2) Prior to the election the employer threatened and interrogated
unit employees with the intention of coercing said employees in their
right to decide how to vote in the election.
The Regional Director, as noted, earlier had approved a
request by the Union that its remaining Objections 4 - 8 be
withdrawn.
In view of the bargaining order recommended herein, it
is recommended that the election in Case 1-RC-13919 be
set aside and that the said representation proceeding be
dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section 1, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
v. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.85
Having found that the Respondent, by administering a
warning notice to and by suspending Charles P. Hannon,
committed unfair labor practices, it is recommended that
Respondent be required to expunge the warning notice
from Hannon's file and that it make him whole for any loss
of wages he may have suffered by the suspension, with 7-
percent interest thereon as prescribed by the Board in
Florida Steel Corporation.86
It further is recommended that the Respondent be
ordered to recognize and, upon request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the employees in the above-described unit.
In view of the provision for a bargaining order, it is
recommended that the election held on August 21, 1975, in
Case 1-RC-13919 be set aside and the petition in the
matter be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Unions herein, Locals 26 and 34, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
(3) Prior to the election the employer discriminated against, laid off,
disciplined and/or discharged several employees because said employ-
ees were engaged in protected concerted activity on behalf of Local 26
or otherwise supported the petitioner in the scheduled election.
8s As the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent were
senous and go to the very heart of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and in any other manner from interfering with the
rights of employees guaranteed by Sec. 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle
Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (1941).
6 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
1384
COLONNADE HOTEL
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by:
(a) Threatening its employees with closure of its hotel if
the employees selected the Union to represent them.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities and sympathies.
(c) Inducing an ineligible employee to vote in a represen-
tation election by offer of monetary benefit.
(d) Issuing warnings to an employee because of his union
activities and sympathies.
(e) Granting wage increases to its employees for the
purpose of influencing their selection of a labor organiza-
tion as their bargaining representative.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
by suspending Charles P. Hannon because of his union
activities and sympathies.
5. The following unit is appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act:
All housekeeping department employees and all
laundry department employees employed by the Re-
spondent at its Huntington Avenue, Boston, Massachu-
setts, location, but excluding all office clerical employ-
ees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act, and
all other employees of the Respondent.
6. On or about June 30, 1975, and at all times material
thereafter, the Union herein, Local 26, represented a
majority of the employees in the above-described appropri-
ate unit, and has been the exclusive representative of all
said employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 8(a) of the Act.
7. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its
employees in the above-described unit since on or about
June 30, 1975, the Respondent has engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. The Respondent's unlawful conduct interfered with
the representation election held on August 21, 1975.
10. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as
specifically found herein.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER87
The Respondent, Colonnade Hotel, Boston, Massachu-
setts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening its employees with closure of its hotel if
they select Local 26, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
8' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, to represent
them.
(b) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities and sympathies.
(c) Issuing warnings to employees because of their union
activities or sympathies.
(d) Inducing ineligible employees to vote in union
representation elections by offers of monetary benefit.
(e) Granting wage increases to its employees for the
purpose of influencing their selection of a labor organiza-
tion as their bargaining representative.
(f) Suspending any employee to discourage his or her
membership in or activities on behalf of the above-named
Union, or any other labor organization.
(g) Refusing to recognize and, upon request, to bargain
with the above-named Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees in the following
unit:
All housekeeping department employees and all
laundry department employees employed by the Re-
spondent at its Huntington Avenue, Boston, Massachu-
setts, location, but excluding all office clerical employ-
ees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act, and
all other employees of the Respondent.
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make Charles P. Hannon whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered by reason of his I-month suspension,
effective on August 19, 1975, in the manner set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Expunge from its files the warning and suspension
notices to Hannon, dated August 15 and 19, 1975,
respectively.
(c) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Local 26,
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative of its employees in the bargaining
unit set forth above, with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(d) Post at its Boston, Massachusetts, hotel copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix B." 8 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region I, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
as In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
1385
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has
taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the election held on
August 21, 1975, in Case I-RC-13919 be, and it hereby is,
set aside and the petition in that matter is dismissed.
1386